LSM: Module stacking for all
Subsystems (18)
Casey Schaufler
maintainercover LSM: Module stacking for all
This patchset provides the changes required for the any security module to stack safely with any other.
A new process attribute identifies which security module information should be reported by SO_PEERSEC and the /proc/.../attr/current interface. This is provided by /proc/.../attr/display. Writing the name of the security module desired to this interface will set which LSM hooks will be called for this information. The first security module providing the hooks will be used by default.
The use of integer based security tokens (secids) is generally (but not completely) replaced by a structure lsm_export. The lsm_export structure can contain information for each of the security modules that export information outside the LSM layer.
The LSM interfaces that provide "secctx" text strings have been changed to use a structure "lsm_context" instead of a pointer/length pair. In some cases the interfaces used a "char *" pointer and in others a "void *". This was necessary to ensure that the correct release mechanism for the text is used. It also makes many of the interfaces cleaner.
Security modules that use Netlabel must agree on the labels to be used on outgoing packets. If the modules do not agree on the label option to be used the operation will fail.
Netfilter secmarks are restricted to a single security module. The first module using the facility will "own" the secmarks.
git://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.1-v2-full
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 25 +- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 6 +- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 31 +- fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +- fs/nfs/inode.c | 13 +- fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 +- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 17 +- fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +- fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 8 +- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 +- fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 +- fs/proc/base.c | 1 + include/linux/cred.h | 3 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 119 +++--- include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 +- include/linux/security.h | 159 ++++++-- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/netlabel.h | 18 +- include/net/scm.h | 14 +- kernel/audit.c | 43 +-- kernel/audit.h | 9 +- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 77 ++-- kernel/cred.c | 15 +- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 +- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 14 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 29 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 16 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 35 +- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 8 +- net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 9 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 125 ++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 101 +++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +- security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 +- security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +- security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 9 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 64 ++-- security/apparmor/secid.c | 42 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +- security/security.c | 653 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- security/selinux/hooks.c | 310 +++++++-------- security/selinux/include/audit.h | 5 +- security/selinux/include/netlabel.h | 7 + security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 43 ++- security/selinux/netlabel.c | 69 ++-- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +- security/smack/smack.h | 34 ++ security/smack/smack_access.c | 14 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 388 ++++++++++--------- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 48 ++- security/smack/smackfs.c | 23 +- 60 files changed, 1855 insertions(+), 961 deletions(-)
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 1/90 LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/security.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++---- security/selinux/hooks.c | 58 ++++++++++++------------------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 6 ++++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +- security/smack/smack.h | 6 ++++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 35 +++++-------------- 7 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +1 -0
@@ -2055,6 +2055,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {int lbs_cred;int lbs_file;int lbs_inode; +int lbs_superblock;int lbs_ipc;int lbs_msg_msg;int lbs_task;
security/security.c +39 -7
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security/selinux/hooks.c +22 -36
188 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/include/objsec.h +6 -0
@@ -188,4 +188,10 @@ static inline struct ipc_security_struct *selinux_ipc( return ipc->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc; } +static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock ( +const struct super_block *superblock) +{ +return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; +} +#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
security/selinux/ss/services.c +2 -1
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@#include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include "flask.h"
@@ -2751,7 +2752,7 @@ int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)struct sidtab *sidtab;int rc =0 ;struct ocontext *c; -struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; +struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =selinux_superblock (sb);const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;read_lock (&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
security/smack/smack.h +6 -0
@@ -375,6 +375,12 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc; } +static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock ( +const struct super_block *superblock) +{ +return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; +} +/* * Is the directory transmuting? */
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +9 -26
@@ -540,12 +540,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)*/ static int smack_sb_alloc_security (struct super_block *sb) { -struct superblock_smack *sbsp; - - sbsp =kzalloc (sizeof (struct superblock_smack ),GFP_KERNEL ); - -if (sbsp ==NULL ) -return -ENOMEM ; +struct superblock_smack *sbsp =smack_superblock (sb); sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor; sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
@@ -554,22 +549,10 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)/* * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc. */ - sb->s_security = sbsp;return 0 ; } -/** -* smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob -* @sb: the superblock getting the blob -* -*/ -static void smack_sb_free_security (struct super_block *sb) -{ -kfree (sb->s_security); - sb->s_security =NULL ; -} -struct smack_mnt_opts {const char *fsdefault, *fsfloor, *fshat, *fsroot, *fstransmute; };
@@ -781,7 +764,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, {struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;struct inode *inode =d_backing_inode (root); -struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security; +struct superblock_smack *sp =smack_superblock (sb);struct inode_smack *isp;struct smack_known *skp;struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
@@ -880,7 +863,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,*/ static int smack_sb_statfs (struct dentry *dentry) { -struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security; +struct superblock_smack *sbp =smack_superblock (dentry->d_sb);int rc;struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -917,7 +900,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)if (isp->smk_task ==NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)return 0 ; - sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security; + sbsp =smack_superblock (inode->i_sb);if ((sbsp->smk_flags &SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED ) && isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)return 0 ;
@@ -1168,7 +1151,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,*/ static int smack_inode_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask) { -struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security; +struct superblock_smack *sbsp =smack_superblock (inode->i_sb);struct smk_audit_info ad;int no_block = mask &MAY_NOT_BLOCK ;int rc;
@@ -1410,7 +1393,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)*/ if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACK ) ==0 ) {struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb; -struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security; +struct superblock_smack *sbsp =smack_superblock (sbp); isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC ) ==0 )
@@ -1680,7 +1663,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file, isp =smack_inode (file_inode (file));if (isp->smk_mmap ==NULL )return 0 ; - sbsp =file_inode (file)->i_sb->s_security; + sbsp =smack_superblock (file_inode (file)->i_sb);if (sbsp->smk_flags &SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED && isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)return -EACCES ;
@@ -3288,7 +3271,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) goto unlockandout; sbp = inode->i_sb; - sbsp = sbp->s_security; + sbsp =smack_superblock (sbp);/* * We're going to use the superblock default label * if there's no label on the file.
@@ -4575,6 +4558,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack), .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *), .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *), + .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack), }; static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -4586,7 +4570,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (fs_context_parse_param, smack_fs_context_parse_param),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_free_mnt_opts, smack_free_mnt_opts),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_eat_lsm_opts, smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 2/90 LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
In reply to Casey SchauflerMove management of the sock->sk_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++----------- security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 78 +++++++++++++++---------------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++ security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++----- security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 64 ++++++++++++------------- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 ++-- 10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +1 -0
@@ -2055,6 +2055,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {int lbs_cred;int lbs_file;int lbs_inode; +int lbs_sock;int lbs_superblock;int lbs_ipc;int lbs_msg_msg;
security/apparmor/include/net.h +5 -1
@@ -55,7 +55,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {struct aa_label *peer; }; -#define SK_CTX (X ) ((X)->sk_security) +static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock (const struct sock *sk) +{ +return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} +#define SOCK_ctx (X ) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET (NAME ,OP ,SK ,F ,T ,P ) \ struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
security/apparmor/lsm.c +10 -28
@@ -757,33 +757,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginforeturn error; } -/** -* apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field -*/ -static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t flags) -{ -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; - - ctx =kzalloc (sizeof (*ctx), flags); -if (!ctx) -return -ENOMEM ; - -SK_CTX (sk) = ctx; - -return 0 ; -} -/** * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field */ static void apparmor_sk_free_security (struct sock *sk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk); -SK_CTX (sk) =NULL ;aa_put_label (ctx->label);aa_put_label (ctx->peer); -kfree (ctx); }/**
@@ -792,8 +774,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)static void apparmor_sk_clone_security (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); -struct aa_sk_ctx *new =SK_CTX (newsk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *new =aa_sock (newsk); new->label =aa_get_label (ctx->label); new->peer =aa_get_label (ctx->peer);
@@ -844,7 +826,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, label =aa_get_current_label ();if (sock->sk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sock->sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sock->sk);aa_put_label (ctx->label); ctx->label =aa_get_label (label);
@@ -1029,7 +1011,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)*/ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!skb->secmark)return 0 ;
@@ -1042,7 +1024,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label (struct sock *sk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (ctx->peer)return ctx->peer;
@@ -1126,7 +1108,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,*/ static void apparmor_sock_graft (struct sock *sk,struct socket *parent) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!ctx->label) ctx->label =aa_get_current_label ();
@@ -1136,7 +1118,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)static int apparmor_inet_conn_request (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb,struct request_sock *req) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!skb->secmark)return 0 ;
@@ -1153,6 +1135,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *), .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx), .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), + .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx), }; static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1189,7 +1172,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),LSM_HOOK_INIT (setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
@@ -1581,7 +1563,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,if (sk ==NULL )return NF_ACCEPT ; - ctx =SK_CTX (sk); + ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!apparmor_secmark_check (ctx->label,OP_SENDMSG ,AA_MAY_SEND , skb->secmark, sk))return NF_ACCEPT ;
security/security.c +35 -1
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@#include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/msg.h> #include <net/flow.h> +#include <net/sock.h> #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -172,6 +173,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); +lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); }
@@ -306,6 +308,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)init_debug ("inode blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_inode);init_debug ("ipc blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);init_debug ("msg_msg blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); +init_debug ("sock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_sock);init_debug ("superblock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);init_debug ("task blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_task);
@@ -605,6 +608,28 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)panic ("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n" , __func__); } +/** +* lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob +* @sock: the sock that needs a blob +* @priority: allocation mode +* +* Allocate the sock blob for all the modules +* +* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. +*/ +int lsm_sock_alloc (struct sock *sock,gfp_t priority) +{ +if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock ==0 ) { + sock->sk_security =NULL ; +return 0 ; + } + + sock->sk_security =kzalloc (blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority); +if (sock->sk_security ==NULL ) +return -ENOMEM ; +return 0 ; +} +/** * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
@@ -2048,12 +2073,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);int security_sk_alloc (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority) { -return call_int_hook (sk_alloc_security,0 , sk, family, priority); +int rc =lsm_sock_alloc (sk, priority); + +if (unlikely (rc)) +return rc; + rc =call_int_hook (sk_alloc_security,0 , sk, family, priority); +if (unlikely (rc)) +security_sk_free (sk); +return rc; }void security_sk_free (struct sock *sk) {call_void_hook (sk_free_security, sk); +kfree (sk->sk_security); + sk->sk_security =NULL ; }void security_sk_clone (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk)
security/selinux/hooks.c +37 -41
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security/selinux/include/objsec.h +5 -0
@@ -194,4 +194,9 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock( return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; } +static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock (const struct sock *sock) +{ +return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} +#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
security/selinux/netlabel.c +12 -11
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@#include <linux/gfp.h> #include <linux/ip.h> #include <linux/ipv6.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include <net/ip.h>
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr (struct sock *sk) {int rc; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;if (sksec->nlbl_secattr !=NULL )
@@ -114,7 +115,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr( const struct sock *sk, u32 sid) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;if (secattr ==NULL )
@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */ sk =skb_to_full_sk (skb);if (sk !=NULL ) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (sksec->nlbl_state !=NLBL_REQSKB )return 0 ;
@@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, {int rc;struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (ep->base.sk);struct sockaddr *addr;struct sockaddr_in addr4;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IPV6 )
@@ -370,7 +371,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)*/ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone (struct sock *sk,u16 family) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (family ==PF_INET ) sksec->nlbl_state =NLBL_LABELED ;
@@ -388,8 +389,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)*/ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone (struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; -struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk); +struct sk_security_struct *newsksec =selinux_sock (newsk); newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state; }
@@ -407,7 +408,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create (struct sock *sk,u16 family) {int rc; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;if (family !=PF_INET && family !=PF_INET6 )
@@ -522,7 +523,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, {int rc =0 ;struct sock *sk = sock->sk; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
@@ -560,7 +561,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr) {int rc; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
@@ -599,7 +600,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked (struct sock *sk,struct sockaddr *addr) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (sksec->nlbl_state !=NLBL_REQSKB && sksec->nlbl_state !=NLBL_CONNLABELED )
security/smack/smack.h +5 -0
@@ -375,6 +375,11 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc; } +static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock (const struct sock *sock) +{ +return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} +static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock (const struct super_block *superblock) {
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +30 -34
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security/smack/smack_netfilter.c +4 -4
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,struct socket_smack *ssp;struct smack_known *skp; -if (sk && sk->sk_security) { - ssp = sk->sk_security; +if (sk &&smack_sock (sk)) { + ssp =smack_sock (sk); skp = ssp->smk_out; skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid; }
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,struct socket_smack *ssp;struct smack_known *skp; -if (sk && sk->sk_security) { - ssp = sk->sk_security; +if (sk &&smack_sock (sk)) { + ssp =smack_sock (sk); skp = ssp->smk_out; skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid; }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 3/90 LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob
In reply to Casey SchauflerFrom: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Move management of the key->security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/security.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 23 +++++------------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 7 ++++++ security/smack/smack.h | 7 ++++++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 33 ++++++++++++------------- 6 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +1 -0
@@ -2058,6 +2058,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {int lbs_sock;int lbs_superblock;int lbs_ipc; +int lbs_key;int lbs_msg_msg;int lbs_task; };
security/security.c +39 -1
@@ -172,6 +172,9 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) blob_sizes.lbs_inode =sizeof (struct rcu_head );lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_key, &blob_sizes.lbs_key); +#endif lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
@@ -307,6 +310,9 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)init_debug ("file blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_file);init_debug ("inode blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_inode);init_debug ("ipc blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +init_debug ("key blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_key); +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ init_debug ("msg_msg blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);init_debug ("sock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_sock);init_debug ("superblock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
@@ -573,6 +579,29 @@ static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)return 0 ; } +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +/** +* lsm_key_alloc - allocate a composite key blob +* @key: the key that needs a blob +* +* Allocate the key blob for all the modules +* +* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. +*/ +int lsm_key_alloc (struct key *key) +{ +if (blob_sizes.lbs_key ==0 ) { + key->security =NULL ; +return 0 ; + } + + key->security =kzalloc (blob_sizes.lbs_key,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (key->security ==NULL ) +return -ENOMEM ; +return 0 ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ +/** * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob
@@ -2339,12 +2368,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);int security_key_alloc (struct key *key,const struct cred *cred,unsigned long flags) { -return call_int_hook (key_alloc,0 , key, cred, flags); +int rc =lsm_key_alloc (key); + +if (unlikely (rc)) +return rc; + rc =call_int_hook (key_alloc,0 , key, cred, flags); +if (unlikely (rc)) +security_key_free (key); +return rc; }void security_key_free (struct key *key) {call_void_hook (key_free, key); +kfree (key->security); + key->security =NULL ; } int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
security/selinux/hooks.c +6 -17
@@ -6353,11 +6353,7 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags) {const struct task_security_struct *tsec; -struct key_security_struct *ksec; - - ksec =kzalloc (sizeof (struct key_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!ksec) -return -ENOMEM ; +struct key_security_struct *ksec =selinux_key (k); tsec =selinux_cred (cred);if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
@@ -6365,18 +6361,9 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,else ksec->sid = tsec->sid; - k->security = ksec;return 0 ; } -static void selinux_key_free (struct key *k) -{ -struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security; - - k->security =NULL ; -kfree (ksec); -} -static int selinux_key_permission (key_ref_t key_ref,const struct cred *cred,unsigned perm)
@@ -6394,7 +6381,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, sid =cred_sid (cred); key =key_ref_to_ptr (key_ref); - ksec = key->security; + ksec =selinux_key (key);return avc_has_perm (&selinux_state, sid, ksec->sid,SECCLASS_KEY , perm,NULL );
@@ -6402,7 +6389,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,static int selinux_key_getsecurity (struct key *key,char **_buffer) { -struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; +struct key_security_struct *ksec =selinux_key (key);char *context =NULL ;unsigned len;int rc;
@@ -6627,6 +6614,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct), .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), .lbs_ipc =sizeof (struct ipc_security_struct ), +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + .lbs_key = sizeof(struct key_security_struct), +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ .lbs_msg_msg =sizeof (struct msg_security_struct ), .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct), .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
@@ -6842,7 +6832,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS LSM_HOOK_INIT (key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (key_free, selinux_key_free),LSM_HOOK_INIT (key_permission, selinux_key_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity), #endif
security/selinux/include/objsec.h +7 -0
@@ -194,6 +194,13 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; } +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +static inline struct key_security_struct *selinux_key (const struct key *key) +{ +return key->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_key; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ +static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock (const struct sock *sock) {return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
security/smack/smack.h +7 -0
@@ -386,6 +386,13 @@ static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; } +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +static inline struct smack_known **smack_key (const struct key *key) +{ +return key->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_key; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ +/* * Is the directory transmuting? */
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +15 -18
@@ -4179,23 +4179,13 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,static int smack_key_alloc (struct key *key,const struct cred *cred,unsigned long flags) { +struct smack_known **blob =smack_key (key);struct smack_known *skp =smk_of_task (smack_cred (cred)); - key->security = skp; + *blob = skp;return 0 ; } -/** -* smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob -* @key: the object -* -* Clear the blob pointer -*/ -static void smack_key_free (struct key *key) -{ - key->security =NULL ; -} -/** * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key * @key_ref: gets to the object
@@ -4208,6 +4198,8 @@ static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)static int smack_key_permission (key_ref_t key_ref,const struct cred *cred,unsigned perm) { +struct smack_known **blob; +struct smack_known *skp;struct key *keyp;struct smk_audit_info ad;struct smack_known *tkp =smk_of_task (smack_cred (cred));
@@ -4227,7 +4219,9 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,* If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that * it may do so. */ -if (keyp->security ==NULL ) + blob =smack_key (keyp); + skp = *blob; +if (skp ==NULL )return 0 ;/* * This should not occur
@@ -4247,8 +4241,8 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, request |=MAY_READ ;if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE |KEY_NEED_LINK |KEY_NEED_SETATTR )) request |=MAY_WRITE ; - rc =smk_access (tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad); - rc =smk_bu_note ("key access" , tkp, keyp->security, request, rc); + rc =smk_access (tkp, skp, request, &ad); + rc =smk_bu_note ("key access" , tkp, skp, request, rc);return rc; }
@@ -4263,11 +4257,12 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,*/ static int smack_key_getsecurity (struct key *key,char **_buffer) { -struct smack_known *skp = key->security; +struct smack_known **blob =smack_key (key); +struct smack_known *skp = *blob;size_t length;char *copy; -if (key->security ==NULL ) { +if (skp ==NULL ) { *_buffer =NULL ;return 0 ; }
@@ -4550,6 +4545,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *), .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack), .lbs_ipc =sizeof (struct smack_known *), +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + .lbs_key = sizeof(struct smack_known *), +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ .lbs_msg_msg =sizeof (struct smack_known *), .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack), .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
@@ -4671,7 +4669,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {/* key management security hooks */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS LSM_HOOK_INIT (key_alloc, smack_key_alloc), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (key_free, smack_key_free),LSM_HOOK_INIT (key_permission, smack_key_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity), #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 4/90 LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure.
In reply to Casey SchauflerWhen more than one security module is exporting data to audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a structure to be used instead.
--- include/linux/security.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
include/linux/security.h +12 -0
@@ -76,6 +76,18 @@ enum lsm_event { LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, }; +/* Data exported by the security modules */ +struct lsm_export { +u32 selinux; +u32 smack; +u32 apparmor; +u32 flags; +}; +#define LSM_EXPORT_NONE 0x00 +#define LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX 0x01 +#define LSM_EXPORT_SMACK 0x02 +#define LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR 0x04 +/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable (const struct cred *cred,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,unsigned int opts);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 5/90 LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert the inode_getsecid hooks to use the lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when security_inode_getsecid() is updated.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++-- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++++ security/security.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++----- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +2 -2
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@* @inode_getsecid: * Get the secid associated with the node. * @inode contains a pointer to the inode. -* @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved. +* @data contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved. * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. * @inode_copy_up: * A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of
@@ -1574,7 +1574,7 @@ union security_list_options { int flags);int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode,char *buffer,size_t buffer_size); -void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode,u32 *secid); +void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode,struct lsm_export *data);int (*inode_copy_up)(struct dentry *src,struct cred **new);int (*inode_copy_up_xattr)(const char *name);
include/linux/security.h +5 -0
@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ struct lsm_export {#define LSM_EXPORT_SMACK 0x02#define LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR 0x04 +static inline void lsm_export_init (struct lsm_export *l) +{ +memset (l,0 ,sizeof (*l)); +} +/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable (const struct cred *cred,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,unsigned int opts);
security/security.c +34 -1
@@ -712,6 +712,36 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)RC ; \ }) +/** +* lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export +* @data: the containing data structure +* @secid: where to put the one that matters. +* +* Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done. +*/ +static inline void lsm_export_secid (struct lsm_export *data,u32 *secid) +{ +switch (data->flags) { +case LSM_EXPORT_NONE : + *secid =0 ; +break ; +case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX : + *secid = data->selinux; +break ; +case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK : + *secid = data->smack; +break ; +case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR : + *secid = data->apparmor; +break ; +default : +pr_warn ("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n" , __func__, + data->flags); + *secid =0 ; +break ; + } +} +/* Security operations */ int security_binder_set_context_mgr (struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -1389,7 +1419,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid) { -call_void_hook (inode_getsecid, inode, secid); +struct lsm_export data = { .flags =LSM_EXPORT_NONE }; + +call_void_hook (inode_getsecid, inode, &data); +lsm_export_secid (&data, secid); }int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new)
security/selinux/hooks.c +16 -5
@@ -213,6 +213,15 @@ static void cred_init_security(void) tsec->osid = tsec->sid =SECINITSID_KERNEL ; } +/* +* Set the SELinux secid in an lsm_export structure +*/ +static inline void selinux_export_secid (struct lsm_export *l,u32 secid) +{ + l->selinux = secid; + l->flags |=LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX ; +} +/* * get the security ID of a set of credentials */
@@ -3316,15 +3325,16 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_treturn len; } -static void selinux_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid) +static void selinux_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_export *l) {struct inode_security_struct *isec =inode_security_novalidate (inode); - *secid = isec->sid; + +selinux_export_secid (l, isec->sid); }static int selinux_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new) { -u32 sid; +struct lsm_export l;struct task_security_struct *tsec;struct cred *new_creds = *new;
@@ -3336,8 +3346,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) tsec =selinux_cred (new_creds);/* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */ -selinux_inode_getsecid (d_inode (src), &sid); - tsec->create_sid = sid; +lsm_export_init (&l); +selinux_inode_getsecid (d_inode (src), &l); + tsec->create_sid = l.selinux; *new = new_creds;return 0 ; }
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +11 -2
@@ -466,6 +466,15 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,return rc; } +/* +* Set the Smack secid in an lsm_export structure +*/ +static inline void smack_export_secid (struct lsm_export *l,u32 secid) +{ + l->smack = secid; + l->flags |=LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ; +} +/* * LSM hooks. * We he, that is fun!
@@ -1481,11 +1490,11 @@ static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,* @inode: inode to extract the info from * @secid: where result will be saved */ -static void smack_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid) +static void smack_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_export *l) {struct smack_known *skp =smk_of_inode (inode); - *secid = skp->smk_secid; +smack_export_secid (l, skp->smk_secid); }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 6/90 LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert the cred_getsecid hooks to use the lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when security_cred_getsecid() is updated.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +++-- security/security.c | 6 ++++-- security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++-- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +3 -2
@@ -572,7 +572,8 @@* Transfer data from original creds to new creds * @cred_getsecid: * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c -* @c contains the credentials, secid will be placed into @secid. +* @c contains the credentials +* @l contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved. * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. * @kernel_act_as: * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
@@ -1604,7 +1605,7 @@ union security_list_options {int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new,const struct cred *old,gfp_t gfp);void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new,const struct cred *old); -void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c,u32 *secid); +void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c,struct lsm_export *l);int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new,u32 secid);int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new,struct inode *inode);int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
security/security.c +4 -2
@@ -1638,8 +1638,10 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,u32 *secid) { - *secid =0 ; -call_void_hook (cred_getsecid, c, secid); +struct lsm_export data = { .flags =LSM_EXPORT_NONE }; + +call_void_hook (cred_getsecid, c, &data); +lsm_export_secid (&data, secid); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_cred_getsecid);
security/selinux/hooks.c +2 -2
@@ -3764,9 +3764,9 @@ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) *tsec = *old_tsec; } -static void selinux_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,u32 *secid) +static void selinux_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,struct lsm_export *l) { - *secid =cred_sid (c); +selinux_export_secid (l,cred_sid (c)); }/*
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +2 -2
@@ -1980,13 +1980,13 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)* * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label. */ -static void smack_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *cred,u32 *secid) +static void smack_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *cred,struct lsm_export *l) {struct smack_known *skp;rcu_read_lock (); skp =smk_of_task (smack_cred (cred)); - *secid = skp->smk_secid; +smack_export_secid (l, skp->smk_secid);rcu_read_unlock (); }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 7/90 LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert the cred_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks to use the lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when security_ipc_getsecid() and security_task_getsecid() are updated.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 8 ++++---- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 12 ++++++++++-- security/security.c | 12 ++++++++---- security/selinux/hooks.c | 10 ++++++---- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 ++++---- 5 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +4 -4
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_getsecid: * Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p. -* @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid. +* @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @l. * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. * * @task_setnice:
@@ -1096,7 +1096,7 @@* @ipc_getsecid: * Get the secid associated with the ipc object. * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure. -* @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved. +* @l contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved. * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. * * Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
@@ -1618,7 +1618,7 @@ union security_list_options {int (*task_setpgid)(struct task_struct *p,pid_t pgid);int (*task_getpgid)(struct task_struct *p);int (*task_getsid)(struct task_struct *p); -void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid); +void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *p,struct lsm_export *l);int (*task_setnice)(struct task_struct *p,int nice);int (*task_setioprio)(struct task_struct *p,int ioprio);int (*task_getioprio)(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1636,7 +1636,7 @@ union security_list_options {void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode);int (*ipc_permission)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,short flag); -void (*ipc_getsecid)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,u32 *secid); +void (*ipc_getsecid)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,struct lsm_export *l);int (*msg_msg_alloc_security)(struct msg_msg *msg);void (*msg_msg_free_security)(struct msg_msg *msg);
security/apparmor/lsm.c +10 -2
@@ -49,6 +49,14 @@ int apparmor_initialized; DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers); +/* +* Set the AppArmor secid in an lsm_export structure +*/ +static inline void apparmor_export_secid (struct lsm_export *l,u32 secid) +{ + l->apparmor = secid; + l->flags |=LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR ; +}/* * LSM hook functions
@@ -710,10 +718,10 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)return ; } -static void apparmor_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid) +static void apparmor_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,struct lsm_export *l) {struct aa_label *label =aa_get_task_label (p); - *secid = label->secid; +apparmor_export_secid (l, label->secid);aa_put_label (label); }
security/security.c +8 -4
@@ -1722,8 +1722,10 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid) { - *secid =0 ; -call_void_hook (task_getsecid, p, secid); +struct lsm_export data = { .flags =LSM_EXPORT_NONE }; + +call_void_hook (task_getsecid, p, &data); +lsm_export_secid (&data, secid); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_task_getsecid);
@@ -1805,8 +1807,10 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,u32 *secid) { - *secid =0 ; -call_void_hook (ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); +struct lsm_export data = { .flags =LSM_EXPORT_NONE }; + +call_void_hook (ipc_getsecid, ipcp, &data); +lsm_export_secid (&data, secid); }int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg *msg)
security/selinux/hooks.c +6 -4
@@ -3911,9 +3911,9 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL); } -static void selinux_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid) +static void selinux_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,struct lsm_export *l) { - *secid =task_sid (p); +selinux_export_secid (l,task_sid (p)); }static int selinux_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p,int nice)
@@ -6094,10 +6094,12 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)return ipc_has_perm (ipcp, av); } -static void selinux_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,u32 *secid) +static void selinux_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, +struct lsm_export *l) {struct ipc_security_struct *isec =selinux_ipc (ipcp); - *secid = isec->sid; + +selinux_export_secid (l, isec->sid); }static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +4 -4
@@ -2087,11 +2087,11 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)* * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label. */ -static void smack_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid) +static void smack_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,struct lsm_export *l) {struct smack_known *skp =smk_of_task_struct (p); - *secid = skp->smk_secid; +smack_export_secid (l, skp->smk_secid); }/**
@@ -3231,12 +3231,12 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)* @ipp: the object permissions * @secid: where result will be saved */ -static void smack_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp,u32 *secid) +static void smack_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp,struct lsm_export *l) {struct smack_known **blob =smack_ipc (ipp);struct smack_known *iskp = *blob; - *secid = iskp->smk_secid; +smack_export_secid (l, iskp->smk_secid); }/**
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 8/90 LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert the kernel_ask_as hooks to use the lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when security_kernel_ask_as() is updated.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++-- security/security.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 12 +++++++++++- 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +2 -2
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@* @kernel_act_as: * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context). * @new points to the credentials to be modified. -* @secid specifies the security ID to be set +* @l specifies the security data to be set * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid. * Return 0 if successful. * @kernel_create_files_as:
@@ -1606,7 +1606,7 @@ union security_list_options { gfp_t gfp);void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new,const struct cred *old);void (*cred_getsecid)(const struct cred *c,struct lsm_export *l); -int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new,u32 secid); +int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new,struct lsm_export *l);int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new,struct inode *inode);int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);int (*kernel_load_data)(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
security/security.c +14 -1
@@ -742,6 +742,15 @@ static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid) } } +static inline void lsm_export_to_all (struct lsm_export *data,u32 secid) +{ + data->selinux = secid; + data->smack = secid; + data->apparmor = secid; + data->flags =LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX |LSM_EXPORT_SMACK | +LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR ; +} +/* Security operations */ int security_binder_set_context_mgr (struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -1647,7 +1656,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,u32 secid) { -return call_int_hook (kernel_act_as,0 , new, secid); +struct lsm_export data = { .flags =LSM_EXPORT_NONE }; + +lsm_export_to_all (&data, secid); + +return call_int_hook (kernel_act_as,0 , new, &data); }int security_kernel_create_files_as (struct cred *new,struct inode *inode)
security/selinux/hooks.c +14 -3
@@ -222,6 +222,14 @@ static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid) l->flags |=LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX ; } +static inline void selinux_import_secid (struct lsm_export *l,u32 *secid) +{ +if (l->flags |LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX ) + *secid = l->selinux; +else + *secid =SECSID_NULL ; +} +/* * get the security ID of a set of credentials */
@@ -3773,19 +3781,22 @@ static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_export *l)* set the security data for a kernel service * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled */ -static int selinux_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,u32 secid) +static int selinux_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,struct lsm_export *l) {struct task_security_struct *tsec =selinux_cred (new); +u32 nsid;u32 sid =current_sid ();int ret; +selinux_import_secid (l, &nsid); + ret =avc_has_perm (&selinux_state, - sid, secid, + sid, nsid,SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE ,KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE ,NULL );if (ret ==0 ) { - tsec->sid = secid; + tsec->sid = nsid; tsec->create_sid =0 ; tsec->keycreate_sid =0 ; tsec->sockcreate_sid =0 ;
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +11 -1
@@ -475,6 +475,14 @@ static inline void smack_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid) l->flags |=LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ; } +static inline void smack_import_secid (struct lsm_export *l,u32 *secid) +{ +if (l->flags |LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ) + *secid = l->smack; +else + *secid =0 ; +} +/* * LSM hooks. * We he, that is fun!
@@ -1997,10 +2005,12 @@ static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_export *l)* * Set the security data for a kernel service. */ -static int smack_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,u32 secid) +static int smack_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,struct lsm_export *l) { +u32 secid;struct task_smack *new_tsp =smack_cred (new); +smack_import_secid (l, &secid); new_tsp->smk_task =smack_from_secid (secid);return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 9/90 LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert the getpeersec_dgram hooks to use the lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when security_getpeersec_dgram() is updated.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 ++++--- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 3 ++- security/security.c | 13 ++++++++++--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 ++++-- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 +++-- 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +4 -3
@@ -881,9 +881,9 @@* the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. It can then retrieve the * security state returned by this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY * ancillary message type. +* @sock is the socket * @skb is the skbuff for the packet being queried -* @secdata is a pointer to a buffer in which to copy the security data -* @seclen is the maximum length for @secdata +* @l is a pointer to a buffer in which to copy the security data * Return 0 on success, error on failure. * @sk_alloc_security: * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field,
@@ -1710,7 +1710,8 @@ union security_list_options {char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len);int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(struct socket *sock, -struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid); +struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsm_export *l);int (*sk_alloc_security)(struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority);void (*sk_free_security)(struct sock *sk);void (*sk_clone_security)(const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk);
security/apparmor/lsm.c +2 -1
@@ -1096,7 +1096,8 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent */ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock, -struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid) +struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsm_export *l) {/* TODO: requires secid support */
security/security.c +10 -3
@@ -2145,10 +2145,17 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, optval, optlen, len); } -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid) +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb, +u32 *secid) { -return call_int_hook (socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT , sock, - skb, secid); +int rc; +struct lsm_export data = { .flags =LSM_EXPORT_NONE }; + + rc =call_int_hook (socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT , sock, skb, + &data); + +lsm_export_secid (&data, secid); +return rc; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
security/selinux/hooks.c +4 -2
@@ -4949,7 +4949,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,return err; } -static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid) +static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock, +struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsm_export *l) {u32 peer_secid =SECSID_NULL ;u16 family;
@@ -4971,7 +4973,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid (skb, family, &peer_secid); out: - *secid = peer_secid; +selinux_export_secid (l, peer_secid);if (peer_secid ==SECSID_NULL )return -EINVAL ;return 0 ;
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +3 -2
@@ -3973,7 +3973,8 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent */ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock, -struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid) +struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsm_export *l) {struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
@@ -4024,7 +4025,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,#endif break ; } - *secid = s; +smack_export_secid (l, s);if (s ==0 )return -EINVAL ;return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 10/90 LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert the audit_rule_match hooks to use the lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is quite a bit of scaffolding involved that will be removed when security_audit_rule_match() is updated.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +++-- security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 ++-- security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/secid.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- security/security.c | 7 ++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 17 ----------------- security/selinux/include/audit.h | 5 +++-- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 6 +++++- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 +++++-- 11 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +3 -2
@@ -1357,7 +1357,7 @@* @audit_rule_match: * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved * by @audit_rule_known. -* @secid contains the security id in question. +* @l points to the security data in question. * @field contains the field which relates to current LSM. * @op contains the operator that will be used for matching. * @rule points to the audit rule that will be checked against.
@@ -1786,7 +1786,8 @@ union security_list_options {int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **lsmrule);int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule); -int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op,void *lsmrule); +int (*audit_rule_match)(struct lsm_export *l,u32 field,u32 op, +void *lsmrule);void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule);#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
security/apparmor/audit.c +2 -2
@@ -225,13 +225,13 @@ int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)return 0 ; } -int aa_audit_rule_match (u32 sid,u32 field,u32 op,void *vrule) +int aa_audit_rule_match (struct lsm_export *l,u32 field,u32 op,void *vrule) {struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule;struct aa_label *label;int found =0 ; - label =aa_secid_to_label (sid); + label =aa_secid_to_label (l);if (!label)return -ENOENT ;
security/apparmor/include/audit.h +1 -1
@@ -192,6 +192,6 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error)void aa_audit_rule_free (void *vrule);int aa_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **vrule);int aa_audit_rule_known (struct audit_krule *rule); -int aa_audit_rule_match (u32 sid,u32 field,u32 op,void *vrule); +int aa_audit_rule_match (struct lsm_export *l,u32 field,u32 op,void *vrule);#endif /* __AA_AUDIT_H */
security/apparmor/include/secid.h +1 -1
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ struct aa_label;/* secid value that matches any other secid */ #define AA_SECID_WILDCARD 1 -struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label (u32 secid); +struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label (struct lsm_export *l);int apparmor_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen);int apparmor_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid);void apparmor_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen);
security/apparmor/secid.c +15 -2
@@ -61,9 +61,12 @@ void aa_secid_update(u32 secid, struct aa_label *label)* * see label for inverse aa_label_to_secid */ -struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label (u32 secid) +struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label (struct lsm_export *l) {struct aa_label *label; +u32 secid; + + secid = (l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR ) ? l->apparmor :0 ;rcu_read_lock (); label =idr_find (&aa_secids, secid);
@@ -72,12 +75,22 @@ struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid)return label; } +static inline void aa_import_secid (struct lsm_export *l,u32 secid) +{ + l->flags =LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR ; + l->apparmor = secid; +} +int apparmor_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) {/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */ -struct aa_label *label =aa_secid_to_label (secid); +struct lsm_export data; +struct aa_label *label;int len; +aa_import_secid (&data, secid); + label =aa_secid_to_label (&data); +AA_BUG (!seclen);if (!label)
security/security.c +6 -1
@@ -2477,7 +2477,12 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)int security_audit_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op,void *lsmrule) { -return call_int_hook (audit_rule_match,0 , secid, field, op, lsmrule); +int rc; +struct lsm_export data = { .flags =LSM_EXPORT_NONE }; + + rc =call_int_hook (audit_rule_match,0 , &data, field, op, lsmrule); +lsm_export_secid (&data, &secid); +return rc; }#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
security/selinux/hooks.c +0 -17
@@ -213,23 +213,6 @@ static void cred_init_security(void) tsec->osid = tsec->sid =SECINITSID_KERNEL ; } -/* -* Set the SELinux secid in an lsm_export structure -*/ -static inline void selinux_export_secid (struct lsm_export *l,u32 secid) -{ - l->selinux = secid; - l->flags |=LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX ; -} - -static inline void selinux_import_secid (struct lsm_export *l,u32 *secid) -{ -if (l->flags |LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX ) - *secid = l->selinux; -else - *secid =SECSID_NULL ; -} -/* * get the security ID of a set of credentials */
security/selinux/include/audit.h +3 -2
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);/** * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule. -* @sid: the context ID to check +* @l: points to the context ID to check * @field: the field this rule refers to * @op: the operater the rule uses * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);* Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and * -errno on failure. */ -int selinux_audit_rule_match (u32 sid,u32 field,u32 op,void *rule); +int selinux_audit_rule_match (struct lsm_export *l,u32 field,u32 op, +void *rule);/** * selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.
security/selinux/include/objsec.h +17 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,23 @@ static inline u32 current_sid(void)return tsec->sid; } +/* +* Set the SELinux secid in an lsm_export structure +*/ +static inline void selinux_export_secid (struct lsm_export *l,u32 secid) +{ + l->selinux = secid; + l->flags |=LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX ; +} + +static inline void selinux_import_secid (struct lsm_export *l,u32 *secid) +{ +if (l->flags |LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX ) + *secid = l->selinux; +else + *secid =SECSID_NULL ; +} +enum label_initialized {LABEL_INVALID ,/* invalid or not initialized */ LABEL_INITIALIZED ,/* initialized */
security/selinux/ss/services.c +5 -1
@@ -3395,13 +3395,15 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)return 0 ; } -int selinux_audit_rule_match (u32 sid,u32 field,u32 op,void *vrule) +int selinux_audit_rule_match (struct lsm_export *l,u32 field,u32 op, +void *vrule) {struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;struct context *ctxt;struct mls_level *level;struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;int match =0 ; +u32 sid;if (unlikely (!rule)) {WARN_ONCE (1 ,"selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n" );
@@ -3415,6 +3417,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule) goto out; } +selinux_import_secid (l, &sid); + ctxt =sidtab_search (state->ss->sidtab, sid);if (unlikely (!ctxt)) { WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +5 -2
@@ -4369,7 +4369,7 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)/** * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ? -* @secid: security id for identifying the object to test +* @l: security id for identifying the object to test * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space * @op: required testing operator * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
@@ -4377,10 +4377,12 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)* The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of * whether to audit or not to audit a given object. */ -static int smack_audit_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op,void *vrule) +static int smack_audit_rule_match (struct lsm_export *l,u32 field,u32 op, +void *vrule) {struct smack_known *skp;char *rule = vrule; +u32 secid;if (unlikely (!rule)) {WARN_ONCE (1 ,"Smack: missing rule\n" );
@@ -4390,6 +4392,7 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)if (field !=AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field !=AUDIT_OBJ_USER )return 0 ; +smack_import_secid (l, &secid); skp =smack_from_secid (secid);/*
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 11/90 LSM: Fix logical operation in lsm_export checks
In reply to Casey SchauflerFix the logic in Smack and SELinux when checking to see if the secid is included.
--- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 2 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/selinux/include/objsec.h +1 -1
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static inline void selinux_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)static inline void selinux_import_secid (struct lsm_export *l,u32 *secid) { -if (l->flags |LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX ) +if (l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX ) *secid = l->selinux;else *secid =SECSID_NULL ;
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1 -1
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ static inline void smack_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid)static inline void smack_import_secid (struct lsm_export *l,u32 *secid) { -if (l->flags |LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ) +if (l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ) *secid = l->smack;else *secid =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 12/90 LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert the secid_to_secctx hooks to use the lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when security_secid_to_secctx() is updated.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +++-- security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/secid.c | 6 ++---- security/security.c | 5 ++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +++++- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 9 +++++++-- 6 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +3 -2
@@ -1322,7 +1322,7 @@* This does mean that the length could change between calls to check the * length and the next call which actually allocates and returns the * secdata. -* @secid contains the security ID. +* @l points to the security information. * @secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security * context. * @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data
@@ -1672,7 +1672,8 @@ union security_list_options {int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p,char *name,char **value);int (*setprocattr)(const char *name,void *value,size_t size);int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name); -int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); +int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata, +u32 *seclen);int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid);void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata,u32 seclen);
security/apparmor/include/secid.h +1 -1
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ struct aa_label;#define AA_SECID_WILDCARD 1struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label (struct lsm_export *l); -int apparmor_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); +int apparmor_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata,u32 *seclen);int apparmor_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid);void apparmor_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen);
security/apparmor/secid.c +2 -4
@@ -81,15 +81,13 @@ static inline void aa_import_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid) l->apparmor = secid; } -int apparmor_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +int apparmor_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) {/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */ -struct lsm_export data;struct aa_label *label;int len; -aa_import_secid (&data, secid); - label =aa_secid_to_label (&data); + label =aa_secid_to_label (l);AA_BUG (!seclen);
security/security.c +4 -1
@@ -2002,7 +2002,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) { -return call_int_hook (secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , secid, secdata, +struct lsm_export data; + +lsm_export_to_all (&data, secid); +return call_int_hook (secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , &data, secdata, seclen); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secid_to_secctx);
security/selinux/hooks.c +5 -1
@@ -6301,8 +6301,12 @@ static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)return (strcmp (name,XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX ) ==0 ); } -static int selinux_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +static int selinux_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata, +u32 *seclen) { +u32 secid; + +selinux_import_secid (l, &secid);return security_sid_to_context (&selinux_state, secid, secdata, seclen); }
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +7 -2
@@ -4433,9 +4433,14 @@ static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)* * Exists for networking code. */ -static int smack_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +static int smack_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata, +u32 *seclen) { -struct smack_known *skp =smack_from_secid (secid); +struct smack_known *skp; +u32 secid; + +smack_import_secid (l, &secid); + skp =smack_from_secid (secid);if (secdata) *secdata = skp->smk_known;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 13/90 LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert the secctx_to_secid hooks to use the lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when security_secctx_to_secid() is updated.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 ++++--- security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 3 ++- security/apparmor/secid.c | 9 +++++---- security/security.c | 8 ++++++-- security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 +++++++++--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++++--- 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +4 -3
@@ -1327,8 +1327,8 @@* context. * @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data * @secctx_to_secid: -* Convert security context to secid. -* @secid contains the pointer to the generated security ID. +* Convert security context to exported lsm data. +* @l contains the pointer to the generated security data. * @secdata contains the security context. * * @release_secctx:
@@ -1674,7 +1674,8 @@ union security_list_options {int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); -int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid); +int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +struct lsm_export *l);void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata,u32 seclen);void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);
security/apparmor/include/secid.h +2 -1
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ struct aa_label;struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label (struct lsm_export *l);int apparmor_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); -int apparmor_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid); +int apparmor_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +struct lsm_export *l);void apparmor_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen);
security/apparmor/secid.c +5 -4
@@ -75,9 +75,9 @@ struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l)return label; } -static inline void aa_import_secid (struct lsm_export *l,u32 secid) +static inline void aa_export_secid (struct lsm_export *l,u32 secid) { - l->flags =LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR ; + l->flags |=LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR ; l->apparmor = secid; }
@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)return 0 ; } -int apparmor_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid) +int apparmor_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +struct lsm_export *l) {struct aa_label *label;
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) seclen, GFP_KERNEL, false, false);if (IS_ERR (label))return PTR_ERR (label); - *secid = label->secid; +aa_export_secid (l, label->secid);return 0 ; }
security/security.c +6 -2
@@ -2012,8 +2012,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid) { - *secid =0 ; -return call_int_hook (secctx_to_secid,0 , secdata, seclen, secid); +struct lsm_export data = { .flags =LSM_EXPORT_NONE }; +int rc; + + rc =call_int_hook (secctx_to_secid,0 , secdata, seclen, &data); +lsm_export_secid (&data, secid); +return rc; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secctx_to_secid);
security/selinux/hooks.c +9 -3
@@ -6311,10 +6311,16 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, secdata, seclen); } -static int selinux_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid) +static int selinux_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +struct lsm_export *l) { -return security_context_to_sid (&selinux_state, secdata, seclen, - secid,GFP_KERNEL ); +u32 secid; +int rc; + + rc =security_context_to_sid (&selinux_state, secdata, seclen, + &secid,GFP_KERNEL ); +selinux_export_secid (l, secid); +return rc; }static void selinux_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +4 -3
@@ -4456,14 +4456,15 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,* * Exists for audit and networking code. */ -static int smack_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid) +static int smack_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +struct lsm_export *l) {struct smack_known *skp =smk_find_entry (secdata);if (skp) - *secid = skp->smk_secid; +smack_export_secid (l, skp->smk_secid);else - *secid =0 ; +smack_export_secid (l,0 );return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 14/90 LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert security_audit_rule_match to use the lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- include/linux/security.h | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-- kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 ++- kernel/auditsc.c | 13 +++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++-- security/security.c | 48 ++--------------------------- 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +43 -3
@@ -93,6 +93,45 @@ static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l)memset (l,0 ,sizeof (*l)); } +/** +* lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export +* @data: the containing data structure +* @secid: where to put the one that matters. +* +* Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done. +*/ +static inline void lsm_export_secid (struct lsm_export *data,u32 *secid) +{ +switch (data->flags) { +case LSM_EXPORT_NONE : + *secid =0 ; +break ; +case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX : + *secid = data->selinux; +break ; +case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK : + *secid = data->smack; +break ; +case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR : + *secid = data->apparmor; +break ; +default : +pr_warn ("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n" , __func__, + data->flags); + *secid =0 ; +break ; + } +} + +static inline void lsm_export_to_all (struct lsm_export *data,u32 secid) +{ + data->selinux = secid; + data->smack = secid; + data->apparmor = secid; + data->flags =LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX |LSM_EXPORT_SMACK | +LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR ; +} +/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable (const struct cred *cred,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,unsigned int opts);
@@ -1712,7 +1751,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY int security_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **lsmrule);int security_audit_rule_known (struct audit_krule *krule); -int security_audit_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op,void *lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_match (struct lsm_export *l,u32 field,u32 op, +void *lsmrule);void security_audit_rule_free (void *lsmrule);#else
@@ -1728,8 +1768,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)return 0 ; } -static inline int security_audit_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op, -void *lsmrule) +static inline int security_audit_rule_match (struct lsm_export *l,u32 field, +u32 op,void *lsmrule) {return 0 ; }
kernel/auditfilter.c +3 -1
@@ -1324,6 +1324,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];pid_t pid;u32 sid; +struct lsm_export le;switch (f->type) {case AUDIT_PID :
@@ -1354,7 +1355,8 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR :if (f->lsm_rule) {security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); - result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, +lsm_export_to_all (&le, sid); + result =security_audit_rule_match (&le, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); }break ;
kernel/auditsc.c +9 -4
@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,const struct cred *cred;int i, need_sid =1 ;u32 sid; +struct lsm_export le;unsigned int sessionid; cred =rcu_dereference_check (tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
@@ -630,7 +631,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,security_task_getsecid (tsk, &sid); need_sid =0 ; } - result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, f->type, +lsm_export_to_all (&le, sid); + result =security_audit_rule_match (&le, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); }
@@ -645,15 +647,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,if (f->lsm_rule) {/* Find files that match */ if (name) { +lsm_export_to_all (&le, name->osid); result =security_audit_rule_match ( - name->osid, + &le, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); }else if (ctx) {list_for_each_entry (n, &ctx->names_list, list) { +lsm_export_to_all (&le, n->osid);if (security_audit_rule_match ( - n->osid, + &le, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule)) {
@@ -665,7 +669,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,/* Find ipc objects that match */ if (!ctx || ctx->type !=AUDIT_IPC )break ; -if (security_audit_rule_match (ctx->ipc.osid, +lsm_export_to_all (&le, ctx->ipc.osid); +if (security_audit_rule_match (&le, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule)) ++result;
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +5 -2
@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) {int rc =0 ;u32 osid; +struct lsm_export le;int retried =0 ;if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
@@ -337,7 +338,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_OBJ_ROLE :case LSM_OBJ_TYPE :security_inode_getsecid (inode, &osid); - rc =security_filter_rule_match (osid, +lsm_export_to_all (&le, osid); + rc =security_filter_rule_match (&le, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule);
@@ -345,7 +347,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_SUBJ_USER :case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE :case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE : - rc =security_filter_rule_match (secid, +lsm_export_to_all (&le, secid); + rc =security_filter_rule_match (&le, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule);
security/security.c +3 -45
62 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 15/90 LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as
In reply to Casey SchauflerFrom: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Convert security_kernel_act_as to use the lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- kernel/cred.c | 10 ++++++---- security/security.c | 8 ++------ 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
include/linux/cred.h +2 -1
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@struct cred ;struct inode ; +struct lsm_export ;/* * COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);extern void revert_creds (const struct cred *);extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred (struct task_struct *);extern int change_create_files_as (struct cred *,struct inode *); -extern int set_security_override (struct cred *,u32 ); +extern int set_security_override (struct cred *,struct lsm_export *);extern int set_security_override_from_ctx (struct cred *,const char *);extern int set_create_files_as (struct cred *,struct inode *);extern int cred_fscmp (const struct cred *,const struct cred *);
include/linux/security.h +3 -2
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);int security_prepare_creds (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old,gfp_t gfp);void security_transfer_creds (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old);void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,u32 *secid); -int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,u32 secid); +int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,struct lsm_export *l);int security_kernel_create_files_as (struct cred *new,struct inode *inode);int security_kernel_module_request (char *kmod_name);int security_kernel_load_data (enum kernel_load_data_id id);
@@ -961,7 +961,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, { } -static inline int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *cred,u32 secid) +static inline int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *cred, +struct lsm_export *l) {return 0 ; }
kernel/cred.c +6 -4
@@ -701,14 +701,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);/** * set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials * @new: The credentials to alter -* @secid: The LSM security ID to set +* @l: The LSM security information to set * * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used. */ -int set_security_override (struct cred *new,u32 secid) +int set_security_override (struct cred *new,struct lsm_export *l) { -return security_kernel_act_as (new, secid); +return security_kernel_act_as (new, l); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (set_security_override);
@@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);*/ int set_security_override_from_ctx (struct cred *new,const char *secctx) { +struct lsm_export le;u32 secid;int ret;
@@ -731,7 +732,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)if (ret <0 )return ret; -return set_security_override (new, secid); +lsm_export_to_all (&le, secid); +return set_security_override (new, &le); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (set_security_override_from_ctx);
security/security.c +2 -6
@@ -1615,13 +1615,9 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_cred_getsecid); -int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,u32 secid) +int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,struct lsm_export *l) { -struct lsm_export data = { .flags =LSM_EXPORT_NONE }; - -lsm_export_to_all (&data, secid); - -return call_int_hook (kernel_act_as,0 , new, &data); +return call_int_hook (kernel_act_as,0 , new, l); }int security_kernel_create_files_as (struct cred *new,struct inode *inode)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 16/90 LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert security_socket_getpeersec_dgram to use the lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
In particular, the le entry in scm_cookie includes the secid data. The secid will go away.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++-- include/net/scm.h | 4 +++- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 +++- security/security.c | 13 ++++--------- 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +5 -2
@@ -1270,7 +1270,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);int security_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_socket_getpeersec_stream (struct socket *sock,char __user *optval,int __user *optlen,unsigned len); -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid); +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsm_export *l);int security_sk_alloc (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority);void security_sk_free (struct sock *sk);void security_sk_clone (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1408,7 +1409,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __return -ENOPROTOOPT ; } -static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid) +static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock, +struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsm_export *l) {return -ENOPROTOOPT ; }
include/net/scm.h +3 -1
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {struct scm_creds creds;/* Skb credentials */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK u32 secid;/* Passed security ID */ +struct lsm_export le;/* Passed LSM data */ #endif };
@@ -46,7 +47,8 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK static __inline__void unix_get_peersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct scm_cookie *scm) { -security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (sock,NULL , &scm->secid); +security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (sock,NULL , &scm->le); +lsm_export_secid (&scm->le, &scm->secid); }#else static __inline__void unix_get_peersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct scm_cookie *scm)
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +3 -1
@@ -130,14 +130,16 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,static void ip_cmsg_recv_security (struct msghdr *msg,struct sk_buff *skb) { +struct lsm_export le;char *secdata;u32 seclen, secid;int err; - err =security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (NULL , skb, &secid); + err =security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (NULL , skb, &le);if (err)return ; +lsm_export_secid (&le, &secid); err =security_secid_to_secctx (secid, &secdata, &seclen);if (err)return ;
security/security.c +4 -9
@@ -2110,16 +2110,11 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, }int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb, -u32 *secid) +struct lsm_export *l) { -int rc; -struct lsm_export data = { .flags =LSM_EXPORT_NONE }; - - rc =call_int_hook (socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT , sock, skb, - &data); - -lsm_export_secid (&data, secid); -return rc; +lsm_export_init (l); +return call_int_hook (socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT , sock, skb, + l); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 17/90 LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert security_secctx_to_secid to use the lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- kernel/cred.c | 4 +--- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 4 +++- net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 5 +++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 8 ++++++-- security/security.c | 11 ++++------- 6 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +3 -2
@@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name);int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); -int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid); +int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +struct lsm_export *l);void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen);void security_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode);
@@ -1220,7 +1221,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclestatic inline int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, -u32 *secid) +struct lsm_export *l) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
kernel/cred.c +1 -3
@@ -725,14 +725,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);int set_security_override_from_ctx (struct cred *new,const char *secctx) {struct lsm_export le; -u32 secid;int ret; - ret =security_secctx_to_secid (secctx,strlen (secctx), &secid); + ret =security_secctx_to_secid (secctx,strlen (secctx), &le);if (ret <0 )return ret; -lsm_export_to_all (&le, secid);return set_security_override (new, &le); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (set_security_override_from_ctx);
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c +3 -1
@@ -576,13 +576,15 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {static int nft_secmark_compute_secid (struct nft_secmark *priv) { +struct lsm_export le;u32 tmp_secid =0 ;int err; - err =security_secctx_to_secid (priv->ctx,strlen (priv->ctx), &tmp_secid); + err =security_secctx_to_secid (priv->ctx,strlen (priv->ctx), &le);if (err)return err; +lsm_export_secid (&le, &tmp_secid);if (!tmp_secid)return -ENOENT ;
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c +3 -2
@@ -49,13 +49,13 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)static int checkentry_lsm (struct xt_secmark_target_info *info) { +struct lsm_export le;int err; info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX -1 ] ='\0' ; info->secid =0 ; - err =security_secctx_to_secid (info->secctx,strlen (info->secctx), - &info->secid); + err =security_secctx_to_secid (info->secctx,strlen (info->secctx), &le);if (err) {if (err == -EINVAL ) pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)return err; } +lsm_export_secid (&le, &info->secid);if (!info->secid) {pr_info_ratelimited ("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n" , info->secctx);
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +6 -2
@@ -896,6 +896,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,void *mask;u32 addr_len;u32 secid; +struct lsm_export le;struct netlbl_audit audit_info;/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -919,10 +920,11 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb, ret_val =security_secctx_to_secid (nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]),nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]), - &secid); + &le);if (ret_val !=0 )return ret_val; +lsm_export_secid (&le, &secid);return netlbl_unlhsh_add (&init_net, dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid, &audit_info);
@@ -947,6 +949,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,void *mask;u32 addr_len;u32 secid; +struct lsm_export le;struct netlbl_audit audit_info;/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -968,10 +971,11 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb, ret_val =security_secctx_to_secid (nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]),nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]), - &secid); + &le);if (ret_val !=0 )return ret_val; +lsm_export_secid (&le, &secid);return netlbl_unlhsh_add (&init_net,NULL , addr, mask, addr_len, secid, &audit_info);
security/security.c +4 -7
@@ -1967,14 +1967,11 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secid_to_secctx); -int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid) +int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +struct lsm_export *l) { -struct lsm_export data = { .flags =LSM_EXPORT_NONE }; -int rc; - - rc =call_int_hook (secctx_to_secid,0 , secdata, seclen, &data); -lsm_export_secid (&data, secid); -return rc; +lsm_export_init (l); +return call_int_hook (secctx_to_secid,0 , secdata, seclen, l); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secctx_to_secid);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 18/90 LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert security_secid_to_secctx to use the lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 4 +++- include/linux/security.h | 9 +++++++-- include/net/scm.h | 4 +--- kernel/audit.c | 9 +++++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 13 +++++++++---- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 5 ++--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 8 ++++++-- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 +++- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 8 ++++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 6 +++--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 9 ++++++--- security/security.c | 8 ++------ 13 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +3 -1
@@ -3120,9 +3120,11 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {u32 secid; +struct lsm_export le;security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &secid); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz); +lsm_export_to_all (&le, secid); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &secctx, &secctx_sz);if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ; return_error_param = ret;
include/linux/security.h +7 -2
@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@ static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR : *secid = data->apparmor;break ; +case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX |LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR : +/* For scaffolding only */ + *secid = data->selinux; +break ;default :pr_warn ("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n" , __func__, data->flags);
@@ -436,7 +440,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, size_t size);int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name); -int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata,u32 *seclen);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsm_export *l);void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen);
@@ -1214,7 +1218,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)return 0 ; } -static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l, +char **secdata,u32 *seclen) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
include/net/scm.h +1 -3
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ struct scm_cookie {struct scm_fp_list *fp;/* Passed files */ struct scm_creds creds;/* Skb credentials */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK -u32 secid;/* Passed security ID */ struct lsm_export le;/* Passed LSM data */ #endif };
@@ -48,7 +47,6 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);static __inline__void unix_get_peersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct scm_cookie *scm) {security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (sock,NULL , &scm->le); -lsm_export_secid (&scm->le, &scm->secid); }#else static __inline__void unix_get_peersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct scm_cookie *scm)
@@ -99,7 +97,7 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scint err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->le, &secdata, &seclen);if (!err) {put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata);
kernel/audit.c +7 -2
@@ -1430,7 +1430,10 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO : len =0 ;if (audit_sig_sid) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len); +struct lsm_export le; + +lsm_export_to_all (&le, audit_sig_sid); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &ctx, &len);if (err)return err; }
@@ -2073,12 +2076,14 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)unsigned len;int error;u32 sid; +struct lsm_export le;security_task_getsecid (current, &sid);if (!sid)return 0 ; - error =security_secid_to_secctx (sid, &ctx, &len); +lsm_export_to_all (&le, sid); + error =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &ctx, &len);if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL ) goto error_path;
kernel/auditsc.c +9 -4
@@ -946,6 +946,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len;int rc =0 ; +struct lsm_export le; ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_OBJ_PID );if (!ab)
@@ -955,7 +956,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);if (sid) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (sid, &ctx, &len)) { +lsm_export_to_all (&le, sid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else {
@@ -1197,7 +1199,9 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)if (osid) {char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len; -if (security_secid_to_secctx (osid, &ctx, &len)) { +struct lsm_export le; +lsm_export_to_all (&le, osid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , osid); *call_panic =1 ; }else {
@@ -1348,9 +1352,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,if (n->osid !=0 ) {char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len; +struct lsm_export le; -if (security_secid_to_secctx ( - n->osid, &ctx, &len)) { +lsm_export_to_all (&le, n->osid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , n->osid);if (call_panic) *call_panic =2 ;
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +2 -3
@@ -132,15 +132,14 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb) {struct lsm_export le;char *secdata; -u32 seclen, secid; +u32 seclen;int err; err =security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (NULL , skb, &le);if (err)return ; -lsm_export_secid (&le, &secid); - err =security_secid_to_secctx (secid, &secdata, &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &secdata, &seclen);if (err)return ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +6 -2
@@ -330,8 +330,10 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)struct nlattr *nest_secctx;int len, ret;char *secctx; +struct lsm_export le; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (ct->secmark, &secctx, &len); +lsm_export_to_all (&le, ct->secmark); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &secctx, &len);if (ret)return 0 ;
@@ -615,8 +617,10 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct) {#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK int len, ret; +struct lsm_export le; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (ct->secmark,NULL , &len); +lsm_export_to_all (&le, ct->secmark); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le,NULL , &len);if (ret)return 0 ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +3 -1
@@ -175,8 +175,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)int ret;u32 len;char *secctx; +struct lsm_export le; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (ct->secmark, &secctx, &len); +lsm_export_to_all (&le, ct->secmark); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &secctx, &len);if (ret)return ;
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +6 -2
@@ -309,13 +309,17 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata) {u32 seclen =0 ;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK ) +struct lsm_export le; +if (!skb || !sk_fullsock (skb->sk))return 0 ;read_lock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); -if (skb->secmark) -security_secid_to_secctx (skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen); +if (skb->secmark) { +lsm_export_to_all (&le, skb->secmark); +security_secid_to_secctx (&le, secdata, &seclen); + }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);#endif
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +14 -4
@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf =NULL ;char *secctx =NULL ;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsm_export le;if (addr_len !=sizeof (struct in_addr ) && addr_len !=sizeof (struct in6_addr ))
@@ -451,7 +452,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net, unlhsh_add_return:rcu_read_unlock ();if (audit_buf !=NULL ) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (secid, +lsm_export_to_all (&le, secid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx);
@@ -488,6 +490,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,struct net_device *dev;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsm_export le;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock); list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -507,8 +510,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net, addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev); +if (entry !=NULL ) +lsm_export_to_all (&le, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (entry->secid, +security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx);security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -550,6 +555,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,struct net_device *dev;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsm_export le;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock); list_entry =netlbl_af6list_remove (addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -568,8 +574,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net, addr, mask);if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev); +if (entry !=NULL ) +lsm_export_to_all (&le, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (entry->secid, +security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx);security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1092,6 +1100,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,u32 secid;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsm_export le; data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid, cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1146,7 +1155,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd, secid = addr6->secid; } - ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (secid, &secctx, &secctx_len); +lsm_export_to_all (&le, secid); + ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &secctx, &secctx_len);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +3 -3
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsm_export le;if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )return NULL ;
@@ -112,10 +113,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid), audit_info->sessionid); +lsm_export_to_all (&le, audit_info->secid);if (audit_info->secid !=0 && -security_secid_to_secctx (audit_info->secid, - &secctx, - &secctx_len) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , secctx);security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); }
net/unix/af_unix.c +6 -3
@@ -143,17 +143,20 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK static void unix_get_secdata (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb) { -UNIXCB (skb).secid = scm->secid; +lsm_export_secid (&scm->le, &(UNIXCB (skb).secid)); }static inline void unix_set_secdata (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb) { - scm->secid =UNIXCB (skb).secid; +lsm_export_to_all (&scm->le,UNIXCB (skb).secid); }static inline bool unix_secdata_eq (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb) { -return (scm->secid ==UNIXCB (skb).secid); +u32 best_secid; + +lsm_export_secid (&scm->le, &best_secid); +return (best_secid ==UNIXCB (skb).secid); }#else static inline void unix_get_secdata (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb)
security/security.c +2 -6
@@ -1957,13 +1957,9 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_ismaclabel); -int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) { -struct lsm_export data; - -lsm_export_to_all (&data, secid); -return call_int_hook (secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , &data, secdata, - seclen); +return call_int_hook (secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , l, secdata, seclen); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secid_to_secctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 19/90 LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert security_ipc_getsecid to use the lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 4 +++- security/security.c | 8 +++----- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);void security_task_to_inode (struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode);int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,short flag); -void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,u32 *secid); +void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,struct lsm_export *l);int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg *msg);void security_msg_msg_free (struct msg_msg *msg);int security_msg_queue_alloc (struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -1096,9 +1096,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,return 0 ; } -static inline void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,u32 *secid) +static inline void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, +struct lsm_export *l) { - *secid =0 ; +lsm_export_init (l); }static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg *msg)
kernel/auditsc.c +3 -1
@@ -2266,11 +2266,13 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)void __audit_ipc_obj (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) {struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); +struct lsm_export le; context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; context->ipc.has_perm =0 ; -security_ipc_getsecid (ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); +security_ipc_getsecid (ipcp, &le); +lsm_export_secid (&le, &context->ipc.osid); context->type =AUDIT_IPC ; }
security/security.c +3 -5
@@ -1775,12 +1775,10 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)return call_int_hook (ipc_permission,0 , ipcp, flag); } -void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,u32 *secid) +void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,struct lsm_export *l) { -struct lsm_export data = { .flags =LSM_EXPORT_NONE }; - -call_void_hook (ipc_getsecid, ipcp, &data); -lsm_export_secid (&data, secid); +lsm_export_init (l); +call_void_hook (ipc_getsecid, ipcp, l); }int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg *msg)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 20/90 LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert security_task_getsecid to use the lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 4 +--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/audit.c | 4 ++-- kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +--- kernel/auditsc.c | 18 +++++++++++------- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 4 +++- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 5 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- security/security.c | 8 +++----- 10 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +1 -3
@@ -3119,11 +3119,9 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->priority =task_nice (current);if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) { -u32 secid;struct lsm_export le; -security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &secid); -lsm_export_to_all (&le, secid); +security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &le); ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &secctx, &secctx_sz);if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ;
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,int security_task_setpgid (struct task_struct *p,pid_t pgid);int security_task_getpgid (struct task_struct *p);int security_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p); -void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid); +void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,struct lsm_export *l);int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p,int nice);int security_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p,int ioprio);int security_task_getioprio (struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1023,9 +1023,10 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)return 0 ; } -static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid) +static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p, +struct lsm_export *l) { - *secid =0 ; +lsm_export_init (l); }static inline int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p,int nice)
kernel/audit.c +2 -2
@@ -2078,11 +2078,11 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)u32 sid;struct lsm_export le; -security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &le); +lsm_export_secid (&le, &sid);if (!sid)return 0 ; -lsm_export_to_all (&le, sid); error =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &ctx, &len);if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL )
kernel/auditfilter.c +1 -3
@@ -1323,7 +1323,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)for (i =0 ; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];pid_t pid; -u32 sid;struct lsm_export le;switch (f->type) {
@@ -1354,8 +1353,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN :case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR :if (f->lsm_rule) { -security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); -lsm_export_to_all (&le, sid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &le); result =security_audit_rule_match (&le, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); }
kernel/auditsc.c +11 -7
@@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, {const struct cred *cred;int i, need_sid =1 ; -u32 sid;struct lsm_export le;unsigned int sessionid;
@@ -628,10 +627,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,logged upon error */ if (f->lsm_rule) {if (need_sid) { -security_task_getsecid (tsk, &sid); +security_task_getsecid (tsk, &le); need_sid =0 ; } -lsm_export_to_all (&le, sid); result =security_audit_rule_match (&le, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
@@ -2362,12 +2360,14 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)void __audit_ptrace (struct task_struct *t) {struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); +struct lsm_export le; context->target_pid =task_tgid_nr (t); context->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); context->target_uid =task_uid (t); context->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &context->target_sid); +security_task_getsecid (t, &le); +lsm_export_secid (&le, &context->target_sid);memcpy (context->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); }
@@ -2384,6 +2384,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;struct audit_context *ctx =audit_context ();kuid_t uid =current_uid (), auid, t_uid =task_uid (t); +struct lsm_export le; if (auditd_test_task(t) && (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2394,7 +2395,8 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; -security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_sig_sid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &le); +lsm_export_secid (&le, &audit_sig_sid); }if (!audit_signals ||audit_dummy_context ())
@@ -2407,7 +2409,8 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &ctx->target_sid); +security_task_getsecid (t, &le); +lsm_export_secid (&le, &ctx->target_sid);memcpy (ctx->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN );return 0 ; }
@@ -2428,7 +2431,8 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_loginuid (t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); +security_task_getsecid (t, &le); +lsm_export_secid (&le, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);memcpy (axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); axp->pid_count++;
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +3 -1
@@ -1554,11 +1554,13 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)int ret_val;struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;struct netlbl_audit audit_info; +struct lsm_export le;/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */ -security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_info.secid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &le); +lsm_export_secid (&le, &audit_info.secid); audit_info.loginuid =GLOBAL_ROOT_UID ; audit_info.sessionid =0 ;
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h +4 -1
@@ -48,7 +48,10 @@static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo (struct sk_buff *skb,struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { -security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_info->secid); +struct lsm_export le; + +security_task_getsecid (current, &le); +lsm_export_secid (&le, &audit_info->secid); audit_info->loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current); audit_info->sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (current); }
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +3 -1
@@ -51,11 +51,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)int ima_must_appraise (struct inode *inode,int mask,enum ima_hooks func) {u32 secid; +struct lsm_export le;if (!ima_appraise)return 0 ; -security_task_getsecid (current, &secid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &le); +lsm_export_secid (&le, &secid);return ima_match_policy (inode,current_cred (), secid, func, mask,IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ,NULL ); }
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +12 -4
@@ -336,9 +336,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,int ima_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long prot) {u32 secid; +struct lsm_export le;if (file && (prot &PROT_EXEC )) { -security_task_getsecid (current, &secid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &le); +lsm_export_secid (&le, &secid);return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), secid,NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,MMAP_CHECK ); }
@@ -363,8 +365,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) {int ret;u32 secid; +struct lsm_export le; -security_task_getsecid (current, &secid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &le); +lsm_export_secid (&le, &secid); ret =process_measurement (bprm->file,current_cred (), secid,NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,BPRM_CHECK );if (ret)
@@ -388,8 +392,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)int ima_file_check (struct file *file,int mask) {u32 secid; +struct lsm_export le; -security_task_getsecid (current, &secid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &le); +lsm_export_secid (&le, &secid);return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), secid,NULL ,0 , mask & (MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE |MAY_EXEC |MAY_APPEND ),FILE_CHECK );
@@ -500,6 +506,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, {enum ima_hooks func;u32 secid; +struct lsm_export le;if (!file && read_id ==READING_FIRMWARE ) { if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
@@ -521,7 +528,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, } func = read_idmap[read_id] ?:FILE_CHECK ; -security_task_getsecid (current, &secid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &le); +lsm_export_secid (&le, &secid);return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), secid, buf, size,MAY_READ , func); }
security/security.c +3 -5
@@ -1690,12 +1690,10 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)return call_int_hook (task_getsid,0 , p); } -void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid) +void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,struct lsm_export *l) { -struct lsm_export data = { .flags =LSM_EXPORT_NONE }; - -call_void_hook (task_getsecid, p, &data); -lsm_export_secid (&data, secid); +lsm_export_init (l); +call_void_hook (task_getsecid, p, l); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_task_getsecid);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 21/90 LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert security_inode_getsecid to use the lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 5 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 +--- security/security.c | 8 +++----- 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);int security_inode_getsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,void **buffer,bool alloc);int security_inode_setsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size,int flags);int security_inode_listsecurity (struct inode *inode,char *buffer,size_t buffer_size); -void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid); +void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_export *l);int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new);int security_inode_copy_up_xattr (const char *name);int security_file_permission (struct file *file,int mask);
@@ -852,9 +852,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,return 0 ; } -static inline void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid) +static inline void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode, +struct lsm_export *l) { - *secid =0 ; +lsm_export_init (l); }static inline int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new)
kernel/auditsc.c +4 -1
@@ -1908,13 +1908,16 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,void audit_copy_inode (struct audit_names *name,const struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,unsigned int flags) { +struct lsm_export le; + name->ino = inode->i_ino; name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; name->mode = inode->i_mode; name->uid = inode->i_uid; name->gid = inode->i_gid; name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; -security_inode_getsecid (inode, &name->osid); +security_inode_getsecid (inode, &le); +lsm_export_secid (&le, &name->osid);if (flags &AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL ) { name->fcap_ver =-1 ;return ;
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1 -3
@@ -326,7 +326,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,return false;for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) {int rc =0 ; -u32 osid;struct lsm_export le;int retried =0 ;
@@ -337,8 +336,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_OBJ_USER :case LSM_OBJ_ROLE :case LSM_OBJ_TYPE : -security_inode_getsecid (inode, &osid); -lsm_export_to_all (&le, osid); +security_inode_getsecid (inode, &le); rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
security/security.c +3 -5
@@ -1387,12 +1387,10 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_listsecurity); -void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid) +void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_export *l) { -struct lsm_export data = { .flags =LSM_EXPORT_NONE }; - -call_void_hook (inode_getsecid, inode, &data); -lsm_export_secid (&data, secid); +lsm_export_init (l); +call_void_hook (inode_getsecid, inode, l); }int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 22/90 LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert security_cred_getsecid to use the lsm_export structure instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- include/linux/security.h | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 3 ++- security/security.c | 8 +++----- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +1 -1
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);void security_cred_free (struct cred *cred);int security_prepare_creds (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old,gfp_t gfp);void security_transfer_creds (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old); -void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,u32 *secid); +void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,struct lsm_export *l);int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,struct lsm_export *l);int security_kernel_create_files_as (struct cred *new,struct inode *inode);int security_kernel_module_request (char *kmod_name);
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +2 -1
@@ -374,7 +374,8 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)if (ret)return ret; -security_cred_getsecid (bprm->cred, &secid); +security_cred_getsecid (bprm->cred, &le); +lsm_export_secid (&le, &secid);return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid,NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,CREDS_CHECK ); }
security/security.c +3 -5
@@ -1604,12 +1604,10 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)call_void_hook (cred_transfer, new, old); } -void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,u32 *secid) +void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,struct lsm_export *l) { -struct lsm_export data = { .flags =LSM_EXPORT_NONE }; - -call_void_hook (cred_getsecid, c, &data); -lsm_export_secid (&data, secid); +lsm_export_init (l); +call_void_hook (cred_getsecid, c, l); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_cred_getsecid);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 23/90 Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm
In reply to Casey SchauflerRemove lsm_export scaffolding around audit_sig_sid by changing the u32 secid into an lsm_export structure named audit_sig_lsm.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++ kernel/audit.c | 18 ++++++++---------- kernel/audit.h | 2 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 3 +-- 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +7 -0
@@ -93,6 +93,13 @@ static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l)memset (l,0 ,sizeof (*l)); } +static inline bool lsm_export_any (struct lsm_export *l) +{ +return (((l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX ) && l->selinux) || + ((l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ) && l->smack) || + ((l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR ) && l->apparmor)); +} +/** * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export * @data: the containing data structure
kernel/audit.c +8 -10
@@ -135,9 +135,9 @@ static u32 audit_backlog_limit = 64;static u32 audit_backlog_wait_time =AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME ;/* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */ -kuid_t audit_sig_uid =INVALID_UID ; -pid_t audit_sig_pid =-1 ; -u32 audit_sig_sid =0 ; +kuid_t audit_sig_uid =INVALID_UID ; +pid_t audit_sig_pid =-1 ; +struct lsm_export audit_sig_lsm;/* Records can be lost in several ways: 0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1429,23 +1429,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) }case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO : len =0 ; -if (audit_sig_sid) { -struct lsm_export le; - -lsm_export_to_all (&le, audit_sig_sid); - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &ctx, &len); +if (lsm_export_any (&audit_sig_lsm)) { + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx, + &len);if (err)return err; } sig_data =kmalloc (sizeof (*sig_data) + len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!sig_data) { -if (audit_sig_sid) +if (lsm_export_any (&audit_sig_lsm))security_release_secctx (ctx, len);return -ENOMEM ; } sig_data->uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid); sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid; -if (audit_sig_sid) { +if (lsm_export_any (&audit_sig_lsm)) {memcpy (sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);security_release_secctx (ctx, len); }
kernel/audit.h +1 -1
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid; -extern u32 audit_sig_sid; +extern struct lsm_export audit_sig_lsm;extern int audit_filter (int msgtype,unsigned int listtype);
kernel/auditsc.c +1 -2
@@ -2398,8 +2398,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; -security_task_getsecid (current, &le); -lsm_export_secid (&le, &audit_sig_sid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_sig_lsm); }if (!audit_signals ||audit_dummy_context ())
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 24/90 Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert target_sid to be an lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. Clean out the associated
scaffolding. Change the name to target_lsm to be
descriptive.
--- kernel/audit.h | 3 ++- kernel/auditsc.c | 30 ++++++++++++------------------ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
kernel/audit.h +2 -1
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@#include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h> #include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context {kuid_t target_auid;kuid_t target_uid;unsigned int target_sessionid; -u32 target_sid; +struct lsm_export target_lsm;char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN ];struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
kernel/auditsc.c +12 -18
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ];kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ];unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ]; -u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ]; +struct lsm_export target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ];char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ][TASK_COMM_LEN ];int pid_count; };
@@ -937,14 +937,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) }static int audit_log_pid_context (struct audit_context *context,pid_t pid, -kuid_t auid,kuid_t uid,unsigned int sessionid, -u32 sid,char *comm) +kuid_t auid,kuid_t uid, +unsigned int sessionid, +struct lsm_export *l,char *comm) {struct audit_buffer *ab;char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len;int rc =0 ; -struct lsm_export le; ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_OBJ_PID );if (!ab)
@@ -953,9 +953,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,audit_log_format (ab,"opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d" , pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid),from_kuid (&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid); -if (sid) { -lsm_export_to_all (&le, sid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &ctx, &len)) { +if (lsm_export_any (l)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (l, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else {
@@ -1525,7 +1524,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) axs->target_auid[i], axs->target_uid[i], axs->target_sessionid[i], - axs->target_sid[i], + &axs->target_lsm[i], axs->target_comm[i])) call_panic = 1; }
@@ -1534,7 +1533,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)audit_log_pid_context (context, context->target_pid, context->target_auid, context->target_uid, context->target_sessionid, - context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) + &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm)) call_panic = 1;if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -1711,7 +1710,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) context->aux =NULL ; context->aux_pids =NULL ; context->target_pid =0 ; - context->target_sid =0 ; +lsm_export_init (&context->target_lsm); context->sockaddr_len =0 ; context->type =0 ; context->fds[0 ] =-1 ;
@@ -2363,14 +2362,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)void __audit_ptrace (struct task_struct *t) {struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); -struct lsm_export le; context->target_pid =task_tgid_nr (t); context->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); context->target_uid =task_uid (t); context->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &le); -lsm_export_secid (&le, &context->target_sid); +security_task_getsecid (t, &context->target_lsm);memcpy (context->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); }
@@ -2387,7 +2384,6 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;struct audit_context *ctx =audit_context ();kuid_t uid =current_uid (), auid, t_uid =task_uid (t); -struct lsm_export le; if (auditd_test_task(t) && (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2411,8 +2407,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &le); -lsm_export_secid (&le, &ctx->target_sid); +security_task_getsecid (t, &ctx->target_lsm);memcpy (ctx->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN );return 0 ; }
@@ -2433,8 +2428,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_loginuid (t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &le); -lsm_export_secid (&le, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); +security_task_getsecid (t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]);memcpy (axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); axp->pid_count++;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 25/90 Audit: Convert osid to an lsm_export structure
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert osid to be an lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. Clean out the associated
scaffolding. Change the name to olsm to be
descriptive.
--- kernel/audit.c | 4 +--- kernel/audit.h | 4 ++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 36 ++++++++++++------------------------ 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
kernel/audit.c +1 -3
@@ -2073,12 +2073,10 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)char *ctx =NULL ;unsigned len;int error; -u32 sid;struct lsm_export le;security_task_getsecid (current, &le); -lsm_export_secid (&le, &sid); -if (!sid) +if (!lsm_export_any (&le))return 0 ; error =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &ctx, &len);
kernel/audit.h +2 -2
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct audit_names {kuid_t uid;kgid_t gid;dev_t rdev; -u32 osid; +struct lsm_export olsm;struct audit_cap_data fcap;unsigned int fcap_ver;unsigned char type;/* record type */
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ struct audit_context {kuid_t uid;kgid_t gid;umode_t mode; -u32 osid; +struct lsm_export olsm;int has_perm;uid_t perm_uid;gid_t perm_gid;
kernel/auditsc.c +12 -24
@@ -645,17 +645,15 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,if (f->lsm_rule) {/* Find files that match */ if (name) { -lsm_export_to_all (&le, name->osid); result =security_audit_rule_match ( - &le, + &name->olsm, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); }else if (ctx) {list_for_each_entry (n, &ctx->names_list, list) { -lsm_export_to_all (&le, n->osid);if (security_audit_rule_match ( - &le, + &n->olsm, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule)) {
@@ -667,8 +665,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,/* Find ipc objects that match */ if (!ctx || ctx->type !=AUDIT_IPC )break ; -lsm_export_to_all (&le, ctx->ipc.osid); -if (security_audit_rule_match (&le, +if (security_audit_rule_match (&ctx->ipc.olsm, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule)) ++result;
@@ -1187,19 +1184,17 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) context->socketcall.args[i]);break ; }case AUDIT_IPC : { -u32 osid = context->ipc.osid; +struct lsm_export *l = &context->ipc.olsm;audit_log_format (ab,"ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho" ,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),from_kgid (&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid), context->ipc.mode); -if (osid) { +if (lsm_export_any (l)) {char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len; -struct lsm_export le; -lsm_export_to_all (&le, osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &ctx, &len)) { -audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , osid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (l, &ctx, &len)) { +audit_log_format (ab," osid=(unknown)" ); *call_panic =1 ; }else {audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx);
@@ -1346,14 +1341,12 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,from_kgid (&init_user_ns, n->gid),MAJOR (n->rdev), MINOR(n->rdev)); -if (n->osid !=0 ) { +if (lsm_export_any (&n->olsm)) {char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len; -struct lsm_export le; -lsm_export_to_all (&le, n->osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &ctx, &len)) { -audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , n->osid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&n->olsm, &ctx, &len)) { +audit_log_format (ab," osid=(unknown)" );if (call_panic) *call_panic =2 ; }else {
@@ -1907,16 +1900,13 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,void audit_copy_inode (struct audit_names *name,const struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,unsigned int flags) { -struct lsm_export le; - name->ino = inode->i_ino; name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; name->mode = inode->i_mode; name->uid = inode->i_uid; name->gid = inode->i_gid; name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; -security_inode_getsecid (inode, &le); -lsm_export_secid (&le, &name->osid); +security_inode_getsecid (inode, &name->olsm);if (flags &AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL ) { name->fcap_ver =-1 ;return ;
@@ -2266,13 +2256,11 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)void __audit_ipc_obj (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) {struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); -struct lsm_export le; context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; context->ipc.has_perm =0 ; -security_ipc_getsecid (ipcp, &le); -lsm_export_secid (&le, &context->ipc.osid); +security_ipc_getsecid (ipcp, &context->ipc.olsm); context->type =AUDIT_IPC ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 26/90 IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding
In reply to Casey SchauflerClean out the scaffolding used in the lsm_export transition. This requires changing some of the IMA internal interfaces from u32 to struct lsm_export pointers.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 10 ++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 +--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 25 ++++++++----------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 +++++++------- 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +6 -4
@@ -192,8 +192,9 @@ enum ima_hooks { };/* LIM API function definitions */ -int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -int mask,enum ima_hooks func,int *pcr); +int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsm_export *l,int mask,enum ima_hooks func, +int *pcr);int ima_must_measure (struct inode *inode,int mask,enum ima_hooks func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -213,8 +214,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);const char *ima_d_path (const struct path *path,char **pathbuf,char *filename);/* IMA policy related functions */ -int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -enum ima_hooks func,int mask,int flags,int *pcr); +int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsm_export *l,enum ima_hooks func,int mask, +int flags,int *pcr);void ima_init_policy (void );void ima_update_policy (void );void ima_update_policy_flag (void );
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +5 -4
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy. * @inode: pointer to inode to measure * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate -* @secid: secid of the task being validated +* @l: LAM data of the task being validated * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC, * MAY_APPEND) * @func: caller identifier
@@ -175,14 +175,15 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask. * */ -int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -int mask,enum ima_hooks func,int *pcr) +int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsm_export *l,int mask,enum ima_hooks func, +int *pcr) {int flags =IMA_MEASURE |IMA_AUDIT |IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ; flags &= ima_policy_flag; -return ima_match_policy (inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr); +return ima_match_policy (inode, cred, l, func, mask, flags, pcr); }/*
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +1 -3
@@ -50,15 +50,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)*/ int ima_must_appraise (struct inode *inode,int mask,enum ima_hooks func) { -u32 secid;struct lsm_export le;if (!ima_appraise)return 0 ;security_task_getsecid (current, &le); -lsm_export_secid (&le, &secid); -return ima_match_policy (inode,current_cred (), secid, func, mask, +return ima_match_policy (inode,current_cred (), &le, func, mask,IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ,NULL ); }
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +8 -17
@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) }static int process_measurement (struct file *file,const struct cred *cred, -u32 secid,char *buf,loff_t size,int mask, -enum ima_hooks func) +struct lsm_export *l,char *buf,loff_t size, +int mask,enum ima_hooks func) {struct inode *inode =file_inode (file);struct integrity_iint_cache *iint =NULL ;
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. * Included is the appraise submask. */ - action =ima_get_action (inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr); + action =ima_get_action (inode, cred, l, mask, func, &pcr); violation_check = ((func ==FILE_CHECK || func ==MMAP_CHECK ) && (ima_policy_flag &IMA_MEASURE ));if (!action && !violation_check)
@@ -335,13 +335,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,*/ int ima_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long prot) { -u32 secid;struct lsm_export le;if (file && (prot &PROT_EXEC )) {security_task_getsecid (current, &le); -lsm_export_secid (&le, &secid); -return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), secid,NULL , +return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), &le,NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,MMAP_CHECK ); }
@@ -364,19 +362,16 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)int ima_bprm_check (struct linux_binprm *bprm) {int ret; -u32 secid;struct lsm_export le;security_task_getsecid (current, &le); -lsm_export_secid (&le, &secid); - ret =process_measurement (bprm->file,current_cred (), secid,NULL ,0 , + ret =process_measurement (bprm->file,current_cred (), &le,NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,BPRM_CHECK );if (ret)return ret;security_cred_getsecid (bprm->cred, &le); -lsm_export_secid (&le, &secid); -return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid,NULL ,0 , +return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, &le,NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,CREDS_CHECK ); }
@@ -392,12 +387,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)*/ int ima_file_check (struct file *file,int mask) { -u32 secid;struct lsm_export le;security_task_getsecid (current, &le); -lsm_export_secid (&le, &secid); -return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), secid,NULL ,0 , +return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), &le,NULL ,0 , mask & (MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE |MAY_EXEC |MAY_APPEND ),FILE_CHECK ); }
@@ -506,7 +499,6 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) {enum ima_hooks func; -u32 secid;struct lsm_export le;if (!file && read_id ==READING_FIRMWARE ) {
@@ -530,8 +522,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, func = read_idmap[read_id] ?:FILE_CHECK ;security_task_getsecid (current, &le); -lsm_export_secid (&le, &secid); -return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), secid, buf, size, +return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), &le, buf, size,MAY_READ , func); }
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +7 -7
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)* Returns true on rule match, false on failure. */ static bool ima_match_rules (struct ima_rule_entry *rule,struct inode *inode, -const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, +const struct cred *cred,struct lsm_export *l,enum ima_hooks func,int mask) {int i;
@@ -345,8 +345,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_SUBJ_USER :case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE :case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE : -lsm_export_to_all (&le, secid); - rc =security_filter_rule_match (&le, + rc =security_filter_rule_match (l, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule);
@@ -394,7 +393,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is * being made -* @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated +* @l: LSM data of the task to be validated * @func: IMA hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
@@ -406,8 +405,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)* list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. */ -int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -enum ima_hooks func,int mask,int flags,int *pcr) +int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsm_export *l,enum ima_hooks func,int mask, +int flags,int *pcr) {struct ima_rule_entry *entry;int action =0 , actmask = flags | (flags <<1 );
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,if (!(entry->action & actmask))continue ; -if (!ima_match_rules (entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask)) +if (!ima_match_rules (entry, inode, cred, l, func, mask))continue ; action |= entry->flags &IMA_ACTION_FLAGS ;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 27/90 NET: Change the UNIXCB from a secid to an lsm_export
In reply to Casey SchauflerStore a lsm_export structure in the UDS control information instead of a single secid.
--- include/linux/security.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- net/unix/af_unix.c | 9 +++------ 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +16 -0
@@ -100,6 +100,22 @@ static inline bool lsm_export_any(struct lsm_export *l) ((l->flags & LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR) && l->apparmor)); } +static inline bool lsm_export_equal (struct lsm_export *l,struct lsm_export *m) +{ +if (l->flags != m->flags || l->flags ==LSM_EXPORT_NONE ) +return false; +if (l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX && + (l->selinux != m->selinux || l->selinux ==0 )) +return false; +if (l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_SMACK && + (l->smack != m->smack || l->smack ==0 )) +return false; +if (l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR && + (l->apparmor != m->apparmor || l->apparmor ==0 )) +return false; +return true; +} +/** * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export * @data: the containing data structure
include/net/af_unix.h +1 -1
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {kgid_t gid;struct scm_fp_list *fp;/* Passed files */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK -u32 secid;/* Security ID */ +struct lsm_export le;/* LSM data */ #endif u32 consumed; } __randomize_layout;
net/unix/af_unix.c +3 -6
@@ -143,20 +143,17 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK static void unix_get_secdata (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb) { -lsm_export_secid (&scm->le, &(UNIXCB (skb).secid)); +UNIXCB (skb).le = scm->le; }static inline void unix_set_secdata (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb) { -lsm_export_to_all (&scm->le,UNIXCB (skb).secid); + scm->le =UNIXCB (skb).le; }static inline bool unix_secdata_eq (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb) { -u32 best_secid; - -lsm_export_secid (&scm->le, &best_secid); -return (best_secid ==UNIXCB (skb).secid); +return lsm_export_equal (&scm->le, &(UNIXCB (skb).le)); }#else static inline void unix_get_secdata (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 28/90 NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks
In reply to Casey SchauflerReplace the lsm_export scaffolding in xt_SECMARK.c This raises an issue, in that Smack users have been using SECMARK_MODE_SEL, which is suppoed to be exclusively for SELinux. This is worked around in the code, but not fully addressed.
--- net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c +7 -1
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info) info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX -1 ] ='\0' ; info->secid =0 ; +lsm_export_init (&le); err =security_secctx_to_secid (info->secctx,strlen (info->secctx), &le);if (err) {if (err == -EINVAL )
@@ -63,7 +64,12 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)return err; } -lsm_export_secid (&le, &info->secid); +/* Smack is cheating, using SECMARK_MODE_SEL */ +if (le.selinux) + info->secid = le.selinux; +else + info->secid = le.smack; +if (!info->secid) {pr_info_ratelimited ("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n" , info->secctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 29/90 NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks
In reply to Casey SchauflerReplace the lsm_export scaffolding in nft_meta.
--- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c +7 -1
@@ -580,11 +580,17 @@ static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)u32 tmp_secid =0 ;int err; +lsm_export_init (&le); err =security_secctx_to_secid (priv->ctx,strlen (priv->ctx), &le);if (err)return err; -lsm_export_secid (&le, &tmp_secid); +/* Use the "best" secid */ +if (le.selinux) + tmp_secid = le.selinux; +else + tmp_secid = le.smack; +if (!tmp_secid)return -ENOENT ;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 30/90 NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export
In reply to Casey SchauflerRemove scaffolding functions from the netfilter code. Replace with direct access to lsm_export fields so as to be explicit about how the secmarks are being handled.
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 12 ++++++++++-- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 7 ++++++- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 6 +++++- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +10 -2
@@ -332,7 +332,11 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)char *secctx;struct lsm_export le; -lsm_export_to_all (&le, ct->secmark); +lsm_export_init (&le); + le.flags =LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX |LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ; + le.selinux = ct->secmark; + le.smack = ct->secmark; + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &secctx, &len);if (ret)return 0 ;
@@ -619,7 +623,11 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)int len, ret;struct lsm_export le; -lsm_export_to_all (&le, ct->secmark); +lsm_export_init (&le); + le.flags =LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX |LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ; + le.selinux = ct->secmark; + le.smack = ct->secmark; + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le,NULL , &len);if (ret)return 0 ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +6 -1
@@ -177,7 +177,12 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)char *secctx;struct lsm_export le; -lsm_export_to_all (&le, ct->secmark); +/* Whichever LSM may be using the secmark */ +lsm_export_init (&le); + le.flags =LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX |LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ; + le.selinux = ct->secmark; + le.smack = ct->secmark; + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &secctx, &len);if (ret)return ;
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +5 -1
@@ -317,7 +317,11 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)read_lock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);if (skb->secmark) { -lsm_export_to_all (&le, skb->secmark); +/* Whichever LSM may be using the secmark */ +lsm_export_init (&le); + le.flags =LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX |LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ; + le.selinux = skb->secmark; + le.smack = skb->secmark;security_secid_to_secctx (&le, secdata, &seclen); }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 31/90 Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert to lsm_export structures instead of u32 secids. Clean out the associated scaffolding. This requires changes to several internal interfaces, but no change in behavior.
Change the LOC tag type to pass an lsm_export instead of a single u32. As this tag is only used locally there is no change to externally exposed interfaces.
--- include/net/netlabel.h | 10 ++--- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 ++++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 5 +-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 65 ++++++++++++------------------- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 7 ++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 5 +-- security/selinux/netlabel.c | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 9 +++-- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 ++- security/smack/smackfs.c | 12 ++++-- 11 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
include/net/netlabel.h +5 -5
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ struct calipso_doi;/* NetLabel audit information */ struct netlbl_audit { -u32 secid; +struct lsm_export le;kuid_t loginuid;unsigned int sessionid; };
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {* @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label * @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap * @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level -* @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token +* @attr.le: LSM specific data * * Description: * This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;u32 lvl; } mls; -u32 secid; +struct lsm_export le; } attr; };
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u16 family, - u32 secid, + struct lsm_export *l, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info); int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net, const char *dev_name,
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u16 family, - u32 secid, + struct lsm_export *l, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { return -ENOSYS;
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c +8 -5
@@ -122,13 +122,16 @@ int cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid = 1;* * 0 8 16 24 32 * +----------+----------+----------+----------+ -* | 10000000 | 00000110 | 32-bit secid value | +* | 10000000 | 00000110 | SELinux secid | * +----------+----------+----------+----------+ -* | in (host byte order)| +* | Smack secid | AppArmor secid | +* +----------+----------+----------+----------+ +* | LSM export flags | * +----------+----------+ * +* All secid and flag fields are in host byte order. */ -#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN 6 +#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN (2 + sizeof(struct lsm_export))/* * Helper Functions
@@ -1481,7 +1484,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def, buffer[0 ] =CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL ; buffer[1 ] =CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN ; - *(u32 *)&buffer[2 ] = secattr->attr.secid; +memcpy (&buffer[2 ], &secattr->attr.le,sizeof (secattr->attr.le));return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN ; }
@@ -1501,7 +1504,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,const unsigned char *tag, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { - secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2]; + memcpy(&secattr->attr.le, &tag[2], sizeof(secattr->attr.le)); secattr->flags |=NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ;return 0 ;
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c +2 -3
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u16 family, - u32 secid, + struct lsm_export *l, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { u32 addr_len;
@@ -243,8 +243,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net, }return netlbl_unlhsh_add (net, - dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, - secid, audit_info); + dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, l, audit_info); }/**
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +25 -40
239 lines not on this page · raw message
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h +1 -1
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u32 addr_len, - u32 secid, + struct lsm_export *l, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info); int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net, const char *dev_name,
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +3 -4
@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; -struct lsm_export le;if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )return NULL ;
@@ -113,9 +112,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid), audit_info->sessionid); -lsm_export_to_all (&le, audit_info->secid); -if (audit_info->secid !=0 && -security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) { +if (lsm_export_any (&audit_info->le) && +security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_info->le, &secctx, + &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , secctx);security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); }
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h +1 -4
@@ -48,10 +48,7 @@static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo (struct sk_buff *skb,struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { -struct lsm_export le; - -security_task_getsecid (current, &le); -lsm_export_secid (&le, &audit_info->secid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_info->le); audit_info->loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current); audit_info->sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (current); }
security/selinux/netlabel.c +1 -1
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(return NULL ;if ((secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ) && - (secattr->attr.secid == sid)) + (secattr->attr.le.selinux == sid))return secattr;return NULL ;
security/selinux/ss/services.c +6 -3
@@ -3596,8 +3596,9 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,if (secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE ) *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data; -else if (secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ) - *sid = secattr->attr.secid; +else if (secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID && + (secattr->attr.le.flags &LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX )) + *sid = secattr->attr.le.selinux;else if (secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL ) { rc = -EIDRM ; ctx =sidtab_search (sidtab,SECINITSID_NETMSG );
@@ -3670,7 +3671,9 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,if (secattr->domain ==NULL ) goto out; - secattr->attr.secid = sid; +lsm_export_init (&secattr->attr.le); + secattr->attr.le.flags =LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX ; + secattr->attr.le.selinux = sid; secattr->flags |=NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY |NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ;mls_export_netlbl_lvl (policydb, ctx, secattr); rc =mls_export_netlbl_cat (policydb, ctx, secattr);
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +3 -2
@@ -3756,11 +3756,12 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,return &smack_known_web;return &smack_known_star; } -if ((sap->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ) !=0 ) +if ((sap->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ) !=0 && + (sap->attr.le.flags &LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ))/* * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid. */ -return smack_from_secid (sap->attr.secid); +return smack_from_secid (sap->attr.le.smack);/* * Without guidance regarding the smack value * for the packet fall back on the network
security/smack/smackfs.c +9 -3
@@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap) nap->loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current); nap->sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (current); - nap->secid = skp->smk_secid; + nap->le.flags =LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ; + nap->le.smack = skp->smk_secid; }/*
@@ -1150,6 +1151,7 @@ static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr (struct file *file,const char __user *buf,size_t count,loff_t *ppos) { +struct lsm_export le;struct smk_net4addr *snp;struct sockaddr_in newname;char *smack;
@@ -1281,10 +1283,14 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,* this host so that incoming packets get labeled. * but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option */ -if (rc ==0 && skp !=NULL ) +if (rc ==0 && skp !=NULL ) { +lsm_export_init (&le); + le.flags =LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ; + le.smack = snp->smk_label->smk_secid; rc =netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add (&init_net,NULL , &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask,PF_INET , - snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info); + &le, &audit_info); + }if (rc ==0 ) rc = count;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 32/90 LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions
In reply to Casey SchauflerThe scaffolding functions lsm_export_secid and lsm_export_to_all are no longer required. Remove them.
--- include/linux/security.h | 43 ---------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 43 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +0 -43
@@ -116,49 +116,6 @@ static inline bool lsm_export_equal(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_export *m)return true; } -/** -* lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export -* @data: the containing data structure -* @secid: where to put the one that matters. -* -* Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done. -*/ -static inline void lsm_export_secid (struct lsm_export *data,u32 *secid) -{ -switch (data->flags) { -case LSM_EXPORT_NONE : - *secid =0 ; -break ; -case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX : - *secid = data->selinux; -break ; -case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK : - *secid = data->smack; -break ; -case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR : - *secid = data->apparmor; -break ; -case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX |LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR : -/* For scaffolding only */ - *secid = data->selinux; -break ; -default : -pr_warn ("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n" , __func__, - data->flags); - *secid =0 ; -break ; - } -} - -static inline void lsm_export_to_all (struct lsm_export *data,u32 secid) -{ - data->selinux = secid; - data->smack = secid; - data->apparmor = secid; - data->flags =LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX |LSM_EXPORT_SMACK | -LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR ; -} -/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable (const struct cred *cred,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,unsigned int opts);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 33/90 IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export
In reply to Casey SchauflerFix the prototype on a function stub
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2 -2
@@ -309,8 +309,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,return -EINVAL ; } -static inline int security_filter_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op, -void *lsmrule) +static inline int security_filter_rule_match (struct lsm_export *l,u32 field, +u32 op,void *lsmrule) {return -EINVAL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 34/90 Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook
In reply to Casey SchauflerThe secid_to_secctx() hook has to be balanced with a release_secctx hook for stacking. This hook does nothing.
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +5 -3
@@ -4470,10 +4470,11 @@ static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, }/* -* There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook -* that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector. -* Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost. +* There smack_release_secctx hook does nothing */ +static void smack_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen) +{ +}static int smack_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen) {
@@ -4713,6 +4714,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),LSM_HOOK_INIT (secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),LSM_HOOK_INIT (secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid), +LSM_HOOK_INIT (release_secctx, smack_release_secctx),LSM_HOOK_INIT (inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),LSM_HOOK_INIT (inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 35/90 AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub
In reply to Casey SchauflerRemove the getpeersec_dgram hook stub. It's unnecessary and disrupts stacking.
--- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 12 ++---------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
security/apparmor/lsm.c +2 -10
@@ -1094,15 +1094,9 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,* @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet * * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent +* +* The TODO stub interfered with stacking and was removed - Casey */ -static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock, -struct sk_buff *skb, -struct lsm_export *l) - -{ -/* TODO: requires secid support */ -return -ENOPROTOOPT ; -}/** * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
@@ -1202,8 +1196,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {#endif LSM_HOOK_INIT (socket_getpeersec_stream, apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (socket_getpeersec_dgram, - apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft), #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 36/90 LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks
In reply to Casey SchauflerLSM hooks dealing with security context strings should only be called for one security module. Add call macros that invoke a single module hook and us in for those cases.
--- security/security.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/security.c +28 -4
@@ -698,6 +698,16 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)P ->hook.FUNC (__VA_ARGS__); \ } while (0) +#define call_one_void_hook (FUNC , ...) \ + do { \ + struct security_hook_list *P; \ + \ + hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \ + P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ + break; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define call_int_hook (FUNC ,IRC , ...) ({ \ int RC = IRC; \ do { \
@@ -712,6 +722,19 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)RC ; \ }) +#define call_one_int_hook (FUNC ,IRC , ...) ({ \ + int RC = IRC; \ + do { \ + struct security_hook_list *P; \ + \ + hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \ + RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ + break; \ + } \ + } while (0); \ + RC; \ +}) +/* Security operations */ int security_binder_set_context_mgr (struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -1951,7 +1974,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) { -return call_int_hook (secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , l, secdata, seclen); +return call_one_int_hook (secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , l, secdata, + seclen); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secid_to_secctx);
@@ -1959,13 +1983,13 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, struct lsm_export *l) {lsm_export_init (l); -return call_int_hook (secctx_to_secid,0 , secdata, seclen, l); +return call_one_int_hook (secctx_to_secid,0 , secdata, seclen, l); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secctx_to_secid);void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen) { -call_void_hook (release_secctx, secdata, seclen); +call_one_void_hook (release_secctx, secdata, seclen); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_release_secctx);
@@ -2090,7 +2114,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);int security_socket_getpeersec_stream (struct socket *sock,char __user *optval,int __user *optlen,unsigned len) { -return call_int_hook (socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT , sock, +return call_one_int_hook (socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT , sock, optval, optlen, len); }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 37/90 LSM: Create a data structure for a security context
In reply to Casey SchauflerA "security context" is the text representation of the information used by LSMs. This provides a structure so that the use can be made consistant.
--- include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
include/linux/security.h +11 -0
@@ -116,6 +116,17 @@ static inline bool lsm_export_equal(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_export *m)return true; } +/* Text representation of LSM specific security information - a "context" */ +struct lsm_context { +char *context; +u32 len; +}; + +static inline void lsm_context_init (struct lsm_context *cp) +{ +memset (cp,0 ,sizeof (*cp)); +} +/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable (const struct cred *cred,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,unsigned int opts);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 38/90 LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert SELinux, Smack and AppArmor to use the lsm_context structure instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++---- security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/secid.c | 11 +++++------ security/security.c | 12 ++++++++++-- security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 ++--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 +++----- 6 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +2 -4
@@ -1323,9 +1323,8 @@* length and the next call which actually allocates and returns the * secdata. * @l points to the security information. -* @secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security +* @cp contains the pointer that stores the converted security * context. -* @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data * @secctx_to_secid: * Convert security context to exported lsm data. * @l contains the pointer to the generated security data.
@@ -1672,8 +1671,7 @@ union security_list_options {int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p,char *name,char **value);int (*setprocattr)(const char *name,void *value,size_t size);int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name); -int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata, -u32 *seclen); +int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l,struct lsm_context *cp);int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsm_export *l);void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata,u32 seclen);
security/apparmor/include/secid.h +1 -1
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ struct aa_label;#define AA_SECID_WILDCARD 1struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label (struct lsm_export *l); -int apparmor_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); +int apparmor_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,struct lsm_context *cp);int apparmor_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsm_export *l);void apparmor_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen);
security/apparmor/secid.c +5 -6
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static inline void aa_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid) l->apparmor = secid; } -int apparmor_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +int apparmor_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,struct lsm_context *cp) {/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */ struct aa_label *label;
@@ -89,13 +89,12 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) label =aa_secid_to_label (l); -AA_BUG (!seclen); -if (!label)return -EINVAL ; -if (secdata) - len =aa_label_asxprint (secdata, root_ns, label, +/* scaffolding check - Casey */ +if (cp) + len =aa_label_asxprint (&cp->context, root_ns, label,FLAG_SHOW_MODE |FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED |FLAG_ABS_ROOT ,GFP_ATOMIC );
@@ -106,7 +105,7 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)if (len <0 )return -ENOMEM ; - *seclen = len; + cp->len = len;return 0 ; }
security/security.c +10 -2
@@ -1974,8 +1974,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) { -return call_one_int_hook (secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , l, secdata, - seclen); +struct lsm_context lc = { .context =NULL , .len =0 , }; +int rc; + + rc =call_one_int_hook (secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , l, &lc); +if (secdata) + *secdata = lc.context; +else +security_release_secctx (lc.context, lc.len); + *seclen = lc.len; +return rc; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secid_to_secctx);
security/selinux/hooks.c +2 -3
@@ -6301,14 +6301,13 @@ static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)return (strcmp (name,XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX ) ==0 ); } -static int selinux_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata, -u32 *seclen) +static int selinux_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,struct lsm_context *cp) {u32 secid;selinux_import_secid (l, &secid);return security_sid_to_context (&selinux_state, secid, - secdata, seclen); + &cp->context, &cp->len); } static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +3 -5
@@ -4434,8 +4434,7 @@ static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)* * Exists for networking code. */ -static int smack_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata, -u32 *seclen) +static int smack_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,struct lsm_context *cp) {struct smack_known *skp;u32 secid;
@@ -4443,9 +4442,8 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata,smack_import_secid (l, &secid); skp =smack_from_secid (secid); -if (secdata) - *secdata = skp->smk_known; - *seclen =strlen (skp->smk_known); + cp->context = skp->smk_known; + cp->len =strlen (skp->smk_known);return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 39/90 LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert SELinux, Smack and AppArmor to use the lsm_context structure instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++-- security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/secid.c | 7 +++---- security/security.c | 6 +++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++-- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++-- 6 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +2 -2
@@ -1327,8 +1327,8 @@* context. * @secctx_to_secid: * Convert security context to exported lsm data. +* @cp contains the security context. * @l contains the pointer to the generated security data. -* @secdata contains the security context. * * @release_secctx: * Release the security context.
@@ -1672,7 +1672,7 @@ union security_list_options {int (*setprocattr)(const char *name,void *value,size_t size);int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l,struct lsm_context *cp); -int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +int (*secctx_to_secid)(const struct lsm_context *cp,struct lsm_export *l);void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata,u32 seclen);
security/apparmor/include/secid.h +1 -1
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ struct aa_label;struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label (struct lsm_export *l);int apparmor_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,struct lsm_context *cp); -int apparmor_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +int apparmor_secctx_to_secid (const struct lsm_context *cp,struct lsm_export *l);void apparmor_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen);
security/apparmor/secid.c +3 -4
@@ -110,13 +110,12 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)return 0 ; } -int apparmor_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, -struct lsm_export *l) +int apparmor_secctx_to_secid (const struct lsm_context *cp,struct lsm_export *l) {struct aa_label *label; - label =aa_label_strn_parse (&root_ns->unconfined->label, secdata, - seclen,GFP_KERNEL , false, false); + label =aa_label_strn_parse (&root_ns->unconfined->label, cp->context, + cp->len,GFP_KERNEL , false, false);if (IS_ERR (label))return PTR_ERR (label);aa_export_secid (l, label->secid);
security/security.c +5 -1
@@ -1990,8 +1990,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsm_export *l) { +struct lsm_context lc; + + lc.context = secdata; + lc.len = seclen;lsm_export_init (l); -return call_one_int_hook (secctx_to_secid,0 , secdata, seclen, l); +return call_one_int_hook (secctx_to_secid,0 , &lc, l); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secctx_to_secid);
security/selinux/hooks.c +2 -2
@@ -6310,13 +6310,13 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp) &cp->context, &cp->len); } -static int selinux_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +static int selinux_secctx_to_secid (const struct lsm_context *cp,struct lsm_export *l) {u32 secid;int rc; - rc =security_context_to_sid (&selinux_state, secdata, seclen, + rc =security_context_to_sid (&selinux_state, cp->context, cp->len, &secid,GFP_KERNEL );selinux_export_secid (l, secid);return rc;
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +2 -2
@@ -4455,10 +4455,10 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)* * Exists for audit and networking code. */ -static int smack_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +static int smack_secctx_to_secid (const struct lsm_context *cp,struct lsm_export *l) { -struct smack_known *skp =smk_find_entry (secdata); +struct smack_known *skp =smk_find_entry (cp->context);if (skp)smack_export_secid (l, skp->smk_secid);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 40/90 LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert SELinux and Smack to use the lsm_context structure instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 +++---- security/security.c | 9 ++++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +++--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 +++--- 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +3 -4
@@ -1401,12 +1401,11 @@* @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx. * * @inode_getsecctx: -* On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security +* On success, returns 0 and fills out @cp with the security * context for the given @inode. * * @inode we wish to get the security context of. -* @ctx is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context. -* @ctxlen points to the place to put the length of @ctx. +* @cp is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context. * * Security hooks for using the eBPF maps and programs functionalities through * eBPF syscalls.
@@ -1679,7 +1678,7 @@ union security_list_options {void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen); -int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen); +int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp);#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK int (*unix_stream_connect)(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
security/security.c +8 -1
@@ -2025,7 +2025,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen) { -return call_int_hook (inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , inode, ctx, ctxlen); +struct lsm_context lc = { .context =NULL , .len =0 , }; +int rc; + + rc =call_int_hook (inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , inode, &lc); + + *ctx = (void *)lc.context; + *ctxlen = lc.len; +return rc; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_getsecctx);
security/selinux/hooks.c +3 -3
@@ -6355,14 +6355,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)return __vfs_setxattr_noperm (dentry,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , ctx, ctxlen,0 ); } -static int selinux_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen) +static int selinux_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp) {int len =0 ; len =selinux_inode_getsecurity (inode,XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX , - ctx, true); + (void **)&cp->context, true);if (len <0 )return len; - *ctxlen = len; + cp->len = len;return 0 ; }#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +3 -3
@@ -4484,12 +4484,12 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)return __vfs_setxattr_noperm (dentry,XATTR_NAME_SMACK , ctx, ctxlen,0 ); } -static int smack_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen) +static int smack_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp) {struct smack_known *skp =smk_of_inode (inode); - *ctx = skp->smk_known; - *ctxlen =strlen (skp->smk_known); + cp->context = skp->smk_known; + cp->len =strlen (skp->smk_known);return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 41/90 LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_notifysecctx hooks
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert SELinux and Smack to use the lsm_context structure instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 ++--- security/security.c | 6 +++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 +++-- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 +++-- 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +2 -3
@@ -1382,8 +1382,7 @@* Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked. * * @inode we wish to set the security context of. -* @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode. -* @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx. +* @cp contains the string which we wish to set in the inode. * * @inode_setsecctx: * Change the security context of an inode. Updates the
@@ -1676,7 +1675,7 @@ union security_list_options {void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata,u32 seclen);void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode); -int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen); +int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp);int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp);
security/security.c +5 -1
@@ -2013,7 +2013,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx);int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen) { -return call_int_hook (inode_notifysecctx,0 , inode, ctx, ctxlen); +struct lsm_context lc; + + lc.context = ctx; + lc.len = ctxlen; +return call_int_hook (inode_notifysecctx,0 , inode, &lc); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_notifysecctx);
security/selinux/hooks.c +3 -2
@@ -6339,10 +6339,11 @@ static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)/* * called with inode->i_mutex locked */ -static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen) +static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode, +struct lsm_context *cp) {int rc =selinux_inode_setsecurity (inode,XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX , - ctx, ctxlen,0 ); + cp->context, cp->len,0 );/* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */ return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ?0 : rc; }
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +3 -2
@@ -4474,9 +4474,10 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) { } -static int smack_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen) +static int smack_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp) { -return smack_inode_setsecurity (inode,XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX , ctx, ctxlen,0 ); +return smack_inode_setsecurity (inode,XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX , cp->context, + cp->len,0 ); }static int smack_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 42/90 LSM: Use lsm_context in dentry_init_security hooks
In reply to Casey SchauflerFrom: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Convert SELinux to use the lsm_context structure
instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 +++---- security/security.c | 10 ++++++++-- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++---- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +3 -4
@@ -166,8 +166,7 @@* @dentry dentry to use in calculating the context. * @mode mode used to determine resource type. * @name name of the last path component used to create file -* @ctx pointer to place the pointer to the resulting context in. -* @ctxlen point to place the length of the resulting context. +* @cp pointer to place the pointer to the resulting context in. * @dentry_create_files_as: * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available * and set that context in passed in creds so that new files are
@@ -1500,8 +1499,8 @@ union security_list_options {int (*sb_add_mnt_opt)(const char *option,const char *val,int len,void **mnt_opts);int (*dentry_init_security)(struct dentry *dentry,int mode, -const struct qstr *name,void **ctx, -u32 *ctxlen); +const struct qstr *name, +struct lsm_context *cp); int (*dentry_create_files_as)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, struct qstr *name, const struct cred *old,
security/security.c +8 -2
@@ -1017,8 +1017,14 @@ int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, const struct qstr *name, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { - return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode, -name ,ctx ,ctxlen ); + struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, .len = 0, }; +int rc; + + rc =call_int_hook (dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP , dentry, mode, + name, &lc); + *ctx = (void *)lc.context; + *ctxlen = lc.len; +return rc; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_dentry_init_security);
security/selinux/hooks.c +4 -4
@@ -2813,8 +2813,8 @@ static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) }static int selinux_dentry_init_security (struct dentry *dentry,int mode, -const struct qstr *name,void **ctx, -u32 *ctxlen) +const struct qstr *name, +struct lsm_context *cp) {u32 newsid;int rc;
@@ -2826,8 +2826,8 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,if (rc)return rc; -return security_sid_to_context (&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx, - ctxlen); +return security_sid_to_context (&selinux_state, newsid, &cp->context, + &cp->len); } static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 43/90 LSM: Use lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security
In reply to Casey SchauflerFrom: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Convert security_dentry_init_security to use the lsm_context structure instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 5 ++++- include/linux/security.h | 7 +++---- security/security.c | 14 ++++---------- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +4 -1
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ static inline struct nfs4_label * nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *sattr, struct nfs4_label *label) { + struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */int err;if (label ==NULL )
@@ -122,7 +123,9 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,return NULL ; err =security_dentry_init_security (dentry, sattr->ia_mode, - &dentry->d_name, (void **)&label->label, &label->len); + &dentry->d_name, &lc); + label->label = lc.context; + label->len = lc.len;if (err ==0 )return label;
include/linux/security.h +3 -4
@@ -302,8 +302,8 @@ int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,int security_add_mnt_opt (const char *option,const char *val,int len,void **mnt_opts);int security_dentry_init_security (struct dentry *dentry,int mode, -const struct qstr *name,void **ctx, -u32 *ctxlen); +const struct qstr *name, +struct lsm_context *cp); int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, struct qstr *name, const struct cred *old,
@@ -674,8 +674,7 @@ static inline void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)static inline int security_dentry_init_security (struct dentry *dentry,int mode,const struct qstr *name, -void **ctx, -u32 *ctxlen) +struct lsm_context *cp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
security/security.c +4 -10
@@ -1014,17 +1014,11 @@ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) }int security_dentry_init_security (struct dentry *dentry,int mode, -const struct qstr *name,void **ctx, -u32 *ctxlen) +const struct qstr *name, +struct lsm_context *cp) { -struct lsm_context lc = { .context =NULL , .len =0 , }; -int rc; - - rc =call_int_hook (dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP , dentry, mode, - name, &lc); - *ctx = (void *)lc.context; - *ctxlen = lc.len; -return rc; +return call_int_hook (dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP , dentry, mode, + name, cp); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_dentry_init_security);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 44/90 LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_notifysecctx
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert security_inode_notifysecctx to use the lsm_context structure instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 6 ++++-- fs/nfs/inode.c | 6 ++++-- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- security/security.c | 8 ++------ 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
fs/kernfs/inode.c +4 -2
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ static inline void set_inode_attr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *iattr)static void kernfs_refresh_inode (struct kernfs_node *kn,struct inode *inode) {struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs = kn->iattr; +struct lsm_context lc;/* Scaffolding -Casey */ inode->i_mode = kn->mode;if (attrs) {
@@ -192,8 +193,9 @@ static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)* persistent copy in kernfs_node. */ set_inode_attr (inode, &attrs->ia_iattr); -security_inode_notifysecctx (inode, attrs->ia_secdata, - attrs->ia_secdata_len); + lc.context = attrs->ia_secdata; + lc.len = attrs->ia_secdata_len; +security_inode_notifysecctx (inode, &lc); }if (kernfs_type (kn) ==KERNFS_DIR )
fs/nfs/inode.c +4 -2
@@ -340,14 +340,16 @@ static void nfs_clear_label_invalid(struct inode *inode)void nfs_setsecurity (struct inode *inode,struct nfs_fattr *fattr,struct nfs4_label *label) { +struct lsm_context lc;/* Scaffolding -Casey */ int error;if (label ==NULL )return ;if ((fattr->valid &NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4_SECURITY_LABEL ) && inode->i_security) { - error =security_inode_notifysecctx (inode, label->label, - label->len); + lc.context = label->label; + lc.len = label->len; + error =security_inode_notifysecctx (inode, &lc);if (error) printk(KERN_ERR "%s() %s %d " "security_inode_notifysecctx() %d\n",
include/linux/security.h +3 -2
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen);void security_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode); -int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen); +int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp);int security_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen);#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
@@ -1232,7 +1232,8 @@ static inline void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) { } -static inline int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen) +static inline int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode, +struct lsm_context *cp); {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
security/security.c +2 -6
@@ -2011,13 +2011,9 @@ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_invalidate_secctx); -int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen) +int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp) { -struct lsm_context lc; - - lc.context = ctx; - lc.len = ctxlen; -return call_int_hook (inode_notifysecctx,0 , inode, &lc); +return call_int_hook (inode_notifysecctx,0 , inode, cp); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_notifysecctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 45/90 LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx
In reply to Casey SchauflerFrom: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Convert security_inode_getsecctx to use the lsm_context structure instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 11 +++++------ fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 ++++++-------- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- security/security.c | 11 ++--------- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
fs/kernfs/inode.c +5 -6
@@ -351,8 +351,7 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, {struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs; -void *secdata; -u32 secdata_len =0 ; +struct lsm_context lc = { .context =NULL , .len =0 , };int error; attrs =kernfs_iattrs (kn);
@@ -362,16 +361,16 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, error =security_inode_setsecurity (inode, suffix, value, size, flags);if (error)return error; - error =security_inode_getsecctx (inode, &secdata, &secdata_len); + error =security_inode_getsecctx (inode, &lc);if (error)return error;mutex_lock (&kernfs_mutex); - error =kernfs_node_setsecdata (attrs, &secdata, &secdata_len); + error =kernfs_node_setsecdata (attrs, (void **)&lc.context, &lc.len);mutex_unlock (&kernfs_mutex); -if (secdata) -security_release_secctx (secdata, secdata_len); +if (lc.context) +security_release_secctx (lc.context, lc.len);return error; }
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +6 -8
@@ -2420,8 +2420,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,__be32 status;int err;struct nfs4_acl *acl =NULL ; -void *context =NULL ; -int contextlen; +struct lsm_context lc = { .context =NULL , .len =0 , };bool contextsupport = false;struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;u32 minorversion = resp->cstate.minorversion;
@@ -2477,8 +2476,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,if ((bmval2 &FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL ) || bmval0 &FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS ) {if (exp->ex_flags &NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL ) - err =security_inode_getsecctx (d_inode (dentry), - &context, &contextlen); + err =security_inode_getsecctx (d_inode (dentry), &lc);else err = -EOPNOTSUPP ; contextsupport = (err ==0 );
@@ -2907,8 +2905,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp, }if (bmval2 &FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL ) { - status =nfsd4_encode_security_label (xdr, rqstp, context, - contextlen); + status =nfsd4_encode_security_label (xdr, rqstp, lc.context, + lc.len);if (status) goto out; }
@@ -2919,8 +2917,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp, out:#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL -if (context) -security_release_secctx (context, contextlen); +if (lc.context) +security_release_secctx (lc.context, lc.len);#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */ kfree (acl);if (tempfh) {
include/linux/security.h +3 -2
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);void security_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode);int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp);int security_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen); -int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen); +int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp);#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ static inline int call_lsm_notifier (enum lsm_event event,void *data)
@@ -1241,7 +1241,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } -static inline int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen) +static inline int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode, +struct lsm_context *cp); {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
security/security.c +2 -9
@@ -2023,16 +2023,9 @@ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_setsecctx); -int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen) +int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp) { -struct lsm_context lc = { .context =NULL , .len =0 , }; -int rc; - - rc =call_int_hook (inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , inode, &lc); - - *ctx = (void *)lc.context; - *ctxlen = lc.len; -return rc; +return call_int_hook (inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , inode, cp); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_getsecctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 46/90 LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secctx_to_secid
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert security_secctx_to_secid to use the lsm_context structure instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- include/linux/security.h | 6 ++---- kernel/cred.c | 5 ++++- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 5 ++++- net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 5 ++++- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 16 ++++++++-------- security/security.c | 8 ++------ 6 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +2 -4
@@ -432,8 +432,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name);int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); -int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, -struct lsm_export *l); +int security_secctx_to_secid (struct lsm_context *cp,struct lsm_export *l);void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen);void security_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode);
@@ -1217,8 +1216,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l,return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } -static inline int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata, -u32 seclen, +static inline int security_secctx_to_secid (struct lsm_context *cp,struct lsm_export *l) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
kernel/cred.c +4 -1
@@ -724,10 +724,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);*/ int set_security_override_from_ctx (struct cred *new,const char *secctx) { +struct lsm_context lc;struct lsm_export le;int ret; - ret =security_secctx_to_secid (secctx,strlen (secctx), &le); + lc.context = secctx; + lc.len =strlen (secctx); + ret =security_secctx_to_secid (&lc, &le);if (ret <0 )return ret;
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c +4 -1
@@ -577,11 +577,14 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {static int nft_secmark_compute_secid (struct nft_secmark *priv) {struct lsm_export le; +struct lsm_context lc;u32 tmp_secid =0 ;int err;lsm_export_init (&le); - err =security_secctx_to_secid (priv->ctx,strlen (priv->ctx), &le); + lc.context = priv->ctx; + lc.len =strlen (priv->ctx); + err =security_secctx_to_secid (&lc, &le);if (err)return err;
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c +4 -1
@@ -50,13 +50,16 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)static int checkentry_lsm (struct xt_secmark_target_info *info) {struct lsm_export le; +struct lsm_context lc;int err; info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX -1 ] ='\0' ; info->secid =0 ;lsm_export_init (&le); - err =security_secctx_to_secid (info->secctx,strlen (info->secctx), &le); + lc.context = info->secctx; + lc.len =strlen (info->secctx); + err =security_secctx_to_secid (&lc, &le);if (err) {if (err == -EINVAL ) pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +8 -8
@@ -894,6 +894,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,void *mask;u32 addr_len;struct lsm_export le; +struct lsm_context lc;struct netlbl_audit audit_info;/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -914,10 +915,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,if (ret_val !=0 )return ret_val; dev_name =nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IFACE ]); - ret_val =security_secctx_to_secid ( -nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]), -nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]), - &le); + lc.context =nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]); + lc.len =nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]); + ret_val =security_secctx_to_secid (&lc, &le);if (ret_val !=0 )return ret_val;
@@ -945,6 +945,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,void *mask;u32 addr_len;struct lsm_export le; +struct lsm_context lc;struct netlbl_audit audit_info;/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -963,10 +964,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb, ret_val =netlbl_unlabel_addrinfo_get (info, &addr, &mask, &addr_len);if (ret_val !=0 )return ret_val; - ret_val =security_secctx_to_secid ( -nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]), -nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]), - &le); + lc.context =nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]); + lc.len =nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]); + ret_val =security_secctx_to_secid (&lc, &le);if (ret_val !=0 )return ret_val;
security/security.c +2 -6
@@ -1987,15 +1987,11 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secid_to_secctx); -int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, -struct lsm_export *l) +int security_secctx_to_secid (struct lsm_context *cp,struct lsm_export *l) { -struct lsm_context lc; - lc.context = secdata; - lc.len = seclen;lsm_export_init (l); -return call_one_int_hook (secctx_to_secid,0 , &lc, l); +return call_one_int_hook (secctx_to_secid,0 , cp, l); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secctx_to_secid);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 47/90 LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert SELinux, Smack and AppAror to use the lsm_context structure instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +-- security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/secid.c | 4 ++-- security/security.c | 7 +++++-- security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++-- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++-- 6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +1 -2
@@ -1332,7 +1332,6 @@* @release_secctx: * Release the security context. * @secdata contains the security context. -* @seclen contains the length of the security context. * * Security hooks for Audit *
@@ -1671,7 +1670,7 @@ union security_list_options {int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l,struct lsm_context *cp);int (*secctx_to_secid)(const struct lsm_context *cp,struct lsm_export *l); -void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata,u32 seclen); +void (*release_secctx)(struct lsm_context *cp);void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp);
security/apparmor/include/secid.h +1 -1
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(struct lsm_export *l);int apparmor_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,struct lsm_context *cp);int apparmor_secctx_to_secid (const struct lsm_context *cp,struct lsm_export *l); -void apparmor_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen); +void apparmor_release_secctx (struct lsm_context *cp);int aa_alloc_secid (struct aa_label *label,gfp_t gfp);
security/apparmor/secid.c +2 -2
@@ -123,9 +123,9 @@ int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l)return 0 ; } -void apparmor_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen) +void apparmor_release_secctx (struct lsm_context *cp) { -kfree (secdata); +kfree (cp->context); }/**
security/security.c +5 -2
@@ -1989,7 +1989,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);int security_secctx_to_secid (struct lsm_context *cp,struct lsm_export *l) { -lsm_export_init (l);return call_one_int_hook (secctx_to_secid,0 , cp, l); }
@@ -1997,7 +1996,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen) { -call_one_void_hook (release_secctx, secdata, seclen); +struct lsm_context lc; + + lc.context = secdata; + lc.len = seclen; +call_one_void_hook (release_secctx, &lc); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_release_secctx);
security/selinux/hooks.c +2 -2
@@ -6322,9 +6322,9 @@ static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,return rc; } -static void selinux_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen) +static void selinux_release_secctx (struct lsm_context *cp) { -kfree (secdata); +kfree (cp->context); }static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +2 -2
@@ -4468,9 +4468,9 @@ static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp, }/* -* There smack_release_secctx hook does nothing +* The smack_release_secctx hook does nothing */ -static void smack_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen) +static void smack_release_secctx (struct lsm_context *cp) { }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 48/90 LSM: Use lsm_context in security_release_secctx
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert security_release_secctx to use the lsm_context structure instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 21 +++++++-------- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 9 ++++--- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 2 +- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 9 +++++-- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 2 +- include/linux/security.h | 4 +-- include/net/scm.h | 10 +++---- kernel/audit.c | 27 +++++++++---------- kernel/auditsc.c | 27 +++++++++---------- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 9 +++---- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 10 +++---- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 9 +++---- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 28 ++++++++++--------- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 36 ++++++++++++------------- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 11 ++++---- security/security.c | 10 +++---- 16 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +10 -11
@@ -2874,8 +2874,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off =0 ;struct binder_context *context = proc->context;int t_debug_id =atomic_inc_return (&binder_last_id); -char *secctx =NULL ; -u32 secctx_sz =0 ; +struct lsm_context lc = { .len =0 , .context =NULL , }; e =binder_transaction_log_add (&binder_transaction_log); e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
@@ -3122,14 +3121,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,struct lsm_export le;security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &le); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &secctx, &secctx_sz); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ; return_error_param = ret; return_error_line = __LINE__; goto err_get_secctx_failed; } - extra_buffers_size +=ALIGN (secctx_sz,sizeof (u64)); + extra_buffers_size +=ALIGN (lc.len,sizeof (u64)); }trace_binder_transaction (reply, t, target_node);
@@ -3148,18 +3147,18 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->buffer =NULL ; goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed; } -if (secctx) { +if (lc.context) {size_t buf_offset =ALIGN (tr->data_size,sizeof (void *)) +ALIGN (tr->offsets_size,sizeof (void *)) +ALIGN (extra_buffers_size,sizeof (void *)) - -ALIGN (secctx_sz,sizeof (u64)); +ALIGN (lc.len,sizeof (u64)); t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t )t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer (&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer, buf_offset, - secctx, secctx_sz); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_sz); - secctx =NULL ; + lc.context, lc.len); +security_release_secctx (&lc); + lc.context =NULL ; } t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id; t->buffer->transaction = t;
@@ -3479,8 +3478,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->buffer->transaction =NULL ;binder_alloc_free_buf (&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer); err_binder_alloc_buf_failed: -if (secctx) -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_sz); +if (lc.context) +security_release_secctx (&lc); err_get_secctx_failed:kfree (tcomplete);binder_stats_deleted (BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE );
fs/kernfs/dir.c +6 -3
@@ -532,9 +532,12 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)kfree_const (kn->name);if (kn->iattr) { -if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) -security_release_secctx (kn->iattr->ia_secdata, - kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len); +if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) { +struct lsm_context lc;/* Scaffolding -Casey */ + lc.context = kn->iattr->ia_secdata; + lc.len = kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len; +security_release_secctx (&lc); + }simple_xattrs_free (&kn->iattr->xattrs);kmem_cache_free (kernfs_iattrs_cache, kn->iattr); }
fs/kernfs/inode.c +1 -1
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,mutex_unlock (&kernfs_mutex);if (lc.context) -security_release_secctx (lc.context, lc.len); +security_release_secctx (&lc);return error; }
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +7 -2
@@ -134,8 +134,13 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,static inline void nfs4_label_release_security (struct nfs4_label *label) { -if (label) -security_release_secctx (label->label, label->len); +struct lsm_context lc;/* Scaffolding -Casey */ + +if (label) { + lc.context = label->label; + lc.len = label->len; +security_release_secctx (&lc); + } }static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask (struct nfs_server *server,struct nfs4_label *label) {
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +1 -1
@@ -2918,7 +2918,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp, out:#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL if (lc.context) -security_release_secctx (lc.context, lc.len); +security_release_secctx (&lc);#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */ kfree (acl);if (tempfh) {
include/linux/security.h +2 -2
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name);int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata,u32 *seclen);int security_secctx_to_secid (struct lsm_context *cp,struct lsm_export *l); -void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen); +void security_release_secctx (struct lsm_context *cp);void security_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode);int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp);
@@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(struct lsm_context *cp,return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } -static inline void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen) +static inline void security_release_secctx (struct lsm_context *cp); { }
include/net/scm.h +5 -5
@@ -92,16 +92,16 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK static inline void scm_passec (struct socket *sock,struct msghdr *msg,struct scm_cookie *scm) { -char *secdata; -u32 seclen; +struct lsm_context lc;int err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->le, &secdata, &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->le, &lc.context, &lc.len);if (!err) { -put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata); -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , + lc.len, lc.context); +security_release_secctx (&lc); } } }
kernel/audit.c +12 -15
@@ -1191,8 +1191,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)struct audit_buffer *ab;u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;struct audit_sig_info *sig_data; -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len; +struct lsm_context lc = { .context =NULL , .len =0 , }; err =audit_netlink_ok (skb, msg_type);if (err)
@@ -1428,27 +1427,26 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)break ; }case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO : - len =0 ;if (lsm_export_any (&audit_sig_lsm)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx, - &len); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, + &lc.context, &lc.len);if (err)return err; } - sig_data =kmalloc (sizeof (*sig_data) + len,GFP_KERNEL ); + sig_data =kmalloc (sizeof (*sig_data) + lc.len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!sig_data) {if (lsm_export_any (&audit_sig_lsm)) -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +security_release_secctx (&lc);return -ENOMEM ; } sig_data->uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid); sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;if (lsm_export_any (&audit_sig_lsm)) { -memcpy (sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +memcpy (sig_data->ctx, lc.context, lc.len); +security_release_secctx (&lc); }audit_send_reply (skb, seq,AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO ,0 ,0 , - sig_data,sizeof (*sig_data) + len); + sig_data,sizeof (*sig_data) + lc.len);kfree (sig_data);break ;case AUDIT_TTY_GET : {
@@ -2070,24 +2068,23 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab) { -char *ctx =NULL ; -unsigned len;int error;struct lsm_export le; +struct lsm_context lc = { .context =NULL , };security_task_getsecid (current, &le);if (!lsm_export_any (&le))return 0 ; - error =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &ctx, &len); + error =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL ) goto error_path;return 0 ; } -audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , lc.context); +security_release_secctx (&lc);return 0 ; error_path:
kernel/auditsc.c +12 -15
@@ -938,9 +938,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,unsigned int sessionid, struct lsm_export *l, char *comm) { + struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, };struct audit_buffer *ab; -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len;int rc =0 ; ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_OBJ_PID );
@@ -951,12 +950,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);if (lsm_export_any (l)) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (l, &ctx, &len)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (l, &lc.context, &lc.len)) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , lc.context); +security_release_secctx (&lc); } }audit_log_format (ab," ocomm=" );
@@ -1191,14 +1190,13 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)from_kgid (&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid), context->ipc.mode);if (lsm_export_any (l)) { -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len; -if (security_secid_to_secctx (l, &ctx, &len)) { +struct lsm_context lc = { .context =NULL , }; +if (security_secid_to_secctx (l, &lc.context, &lc.len)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=(unknown)" ); *call_panic =1 ; }else { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , lc.context); +security_release_secctx (&lc); } }if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
@@ -1342,16 +1340,15 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,MAJOR (n->rdev), MINOR(n->rdev));if (lsm_export_any (&n->olsm)) { -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len; +struct lsm_context lc; -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&n->olsm, &ctx, &len)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&n->olsm, &lc.context, &lc.len)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=(unknown)" );if (call_panic) *call_panic =2 ; }else { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , lc.context); +security_release_secctx (&lc); } }
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +4 -5
@@ -131,20 +131,19 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,static void ip_cmsg_recv_security (struct msghdr *msg,struct sk_buff *skb) {struct lsm_export le; -char *secdata; -u32 seclen; +struct lsm_context lc;int err; err =security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (NULL , skb, &le);if (err)return ; - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &secdata, &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);if (err)return ; -put_cmsg (msg,SOL_IP ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata); -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +put_cmsg (msg,SOL_IP ,SCM_SECURITY , lc.len, lc.context); +security_release_secctx (&lc); }static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr (struct msghdr *msg,struct sk_buff *skb)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +5 -5
@@ -328,16 +328,16 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx (struct sk_buff *skb,const struct nf_conn *ct) {struct nlattr *nest_secctx; -int len, ret; -char *secctx; +int ret;struct lsm_export le; +struct lsm_context lc;lsm_export_init (&le); le.flags =LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX |LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ; le.selinux = ct->secmark; le.smack = ct->secmark; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &secctx, &len); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);if (ret)return 0 ;
@@ -346,13 +346,13 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)if (!nest_secctx) goto nla_put_failure; -if (nla_put_string (skb,CTA_SECCTX_NAME , secctx)) +if (nla_put_string (skb,CTA_SECCTX_NAME , lc.context)) goto nla_put_failure;nla_nest_end (skb, nest_secctx); ret =0 ; nla_put_failure: -security_release_secctx (secctx, len); +security_release_secctx (&lc); return ret; }#else
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +4 -5
@@ -173,9 +173,8 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)static void ct_show_secctx (struct seq_file *s,const struct nf_conn *ct) {int ret; -u32 len; -char *secctx;struct lsm_export le; +struct lsm_context lc;/* Whichever LSM may be using the secmark */ lsm_export_init (&le);
@@ -183,13 +182,13 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct) le.selinux = ct->secmark; le.smack = ct->secmark; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &secctx, &len); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc.context, &lc.len);if (ret)return ; -seq_printf (s,"secctx=%s " , secctx); +seq_printf (s,"secctx=%s " , lc.context); - security_release_secctx(secctx, len); + security_release_secctx(&lc); }#else static inline void ct_show_secctx (struct seq_file *s,const struct nf_conn *ct)
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +15 -13
@@ -307,9 +307,9 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (struct sk_buff *skb,char **secdata) { -u32 seclen =0 ;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK )struct lsm_export le; +struct lsm_context lc = { .context =NULL , .len =0 , };if (!skb || !sk_fullsock (skb->sk))return 0 ;
@@ -322,12 +322,15 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata) le.flags =LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX |LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ; le.selinux = skb->secmark; le.smack = skb->secmark; - security_secid_to_secctx(&le, secdata, &seclen); +security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc.context, &lc.len); + *secdata = lc.context; }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); +return lc.len; +#else +return 0 ;#endif -return seclen; }static u32 nfqnl_get_bridge_size (struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
@@ -403,8 +406,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var (ctinfo );struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;bool csum_verify; -char *secdata =NULL ; -u32 seclen =0 ; +struct lsm_context lc = { .context =NULL , }; size =nlmsg_total_size (sizeof (struct nfgenmsg )) +nla_total_size (sizeof (struct nfqnl_msg_packet_hdr ))
@@ -470,9 +472,9 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, }if ((queue->flags &NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX ) && entskb->sk) { - seclen =nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (entskb, &secdata); -if (seclen) - size +=nla_total_size (seclen); + lc.len =nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (entskb, &lc.context); +if (lc.len) + size +=nla_total_size (lc.len); } skb =alloc_skb (size,GFP_ATOMIC );
@@ -605,7 +607,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(skb, entskb->sk) < 0) goto nla_put_failure; -if (seclen &&nla_put (skb,NFQA_SECCTX , seclen, secdata)) +if (lc.len &&nla_put (skb,NFQA_SECCTX , lc.len, lc.context)) goto nla_put_failure;if (ct && nfnl_ct->build (skb, ct, ctinfo,NFQA_CT ,NFQA_CT_INFO ) <0 )
@@ -633,8 +635,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, } nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len; -if (seclen) -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +if (lc.context) +security_release_secctx (&lc);return skb; nla_put_failure:
@@ -642,8 +644,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,kfree_skb (skb);net_err_ratelimited ("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n" ); nlmsg_failure: -if (seclen) -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +if (lc.context) +security_release_secctx (&lc);return NULL ; }
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +17 -19
@@ -387,8 +387,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,struct net_device *dev;struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf =NULL ; -char *secctx =NULL ; -u32 secctx_len;if (addr_len !=sizeof (struct in_addr ) && addr_len !=sizeof (struct in6_addr ))
@@ -451,9 +449,10 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net, unlhsh_add_return:rcu_read_unlock ();if (audit_buf !=NULL ) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (l, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +struct lsm_context lc; +if (security_secid_to_secctx (l, &lc.context, &lc.len) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , lc.context); +security_release_secctx (&lc); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , ret_val ==0 ?1 :0 );audit_log_end (audit_buf);
@@ -484,8 +483,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock); list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -499,6 +496,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net, audit_buf =netlbl_audit_start_common (AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL , audit_info);if (audit_buf !=NULL ) { +struct lsm_context lc; dev =dev_get_by_index (net, iface->ifindex); netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1, (dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
@@ -507,9 +505,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,dev_put (dev);if (entry !=NULL &&security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->le, - &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); + &lc.context, &lc.len) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , lc.context); +security_release_secctx (&lc); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , entry !=NULL ?1 :0 );audit_log_end (audit_buf);
@@ -560,6 +558,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net, audit_buf =netlbl_audit_start_common (AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL , audit_info);if (audit_buf !=NULL ) { +struct lsm_context lc; dev =dev_get_by_index (net, iface->ifindex); netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1, (dev != NULL ? dev->name : NULL),
@@ -568,9 +567,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,dev_put (dev);if (entry !=NULL &&security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->le, - &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); + &lc.context, &lc.len) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , lc.context); +security_release_secctx (&lc); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , entry !=NULL ?1 :0 );audit_log_end (audit_buf);
@@ -1082,9 +1081,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;struct net_device *dev;void *data; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsm_export *lep; +struct lsm_context lc; data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid, cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1139,14 +1137,14 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd, lep = (struct lsm_export *)&addr6->le; } - ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (lep, &secctx, &secctx_len); + ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (lep, &lc.context, &lc.len);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; ret_val =nla_put (cb_arg->skb,NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX , - secctx_len, - secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); + lc.len, + lc.context); +security_release_secctx (&lc);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure;
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +5 -6
@@ -98,8 +98,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) {struct audit_buffer *audit_buf; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len; +struct lsm_context lc;if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )return NULL ;
@@ -113,10 +112,10 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type, audit_info->sessionid);if (lsm_export_any (&audit_info->le) && -security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_info->le, &secctx, - &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_info->le, &lc.context, + &lc.len) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , lc.context); +security_release_secctx (&lc); }return audit_buf;
security/security.c +3 -7
@@ -1981,7 +1981,7 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)if (secdata) *secdata = lc.context;else -security_release_secctx (lc.context, lc.len); +security_release_secctx (&lc); *seclen = lc.len;return rc; }
@@ -1994,13 +1994,9 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secctx_to_secid); -void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen) +void security_release_secctx (struct lsm_context *cp) { -struct lsm_context lc; - - lc.context = secdata; - lc.len = seclen; -call_one_void_hook (release_secctx, &lc); +call_one_void_hook (release_secctx, cp); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_release_secctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 49/90 LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secid_to_secctx
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert security_secid_to_secctx to use the lsm_context structure instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Add a flag for lsm_export to indicate that the caller of security_secid_to_secctx() is only interested in the length of the context.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +- include/linux/security.h | 13 +++++++------ include/net/scm.h | 2 +- kernel/audit.c | 5 ++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 10 +++++----- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 11 ++++++----- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 12 ++++-------- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 3 +-- security/apparmor/secid.c | 3 +-- security/security.c | 13 ++----------- security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 +++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +- 15 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +1 -1
@@ -3121,7 +3121,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,struct lsm_export le;security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &le); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc.context, &lc.len); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc);if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ; return_error_param = ret;
include/linux/security.h +7 -6
@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ struct lsm_export {u32 apparmor;u32 flags; }; -#define LSM_EXPORT_NONE 0x00 -#define LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX 0x01 -#define LSM_EXPORT_SMACK 0x02 -#define LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR 0x04 +#define LSM_EXPORT_NONE 0x00000000 +#define LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX 0x00000001 +#define LSM_EXPORT_SMACK 0x00000002 +#define LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR 0x00000004 +#define LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH 0x80000000/* Only the length required */ static inline void lsm_export_init (struct lsm_export *l) {
@@ -431,7 +432,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, size_t size);int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name); -int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,struct lsm_context *cp);int security_secctx_to_secid (struct lsm_context *cp,struct lsm_export *l);void security_release_secctx (struct lsm_context *cp);
@@ -1211,7 +1212,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l, -char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +struct lsm_seccontext *cp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
include/net/scm.h +1 -1
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scint err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->le, &lc.context, &lc.len); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->le, &lc);if (!err) { put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
kernel/audit.c +2 -3
@@ -1428,8 +1428,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) }case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO :if (lsm_export_any (&audit_sig_lsm)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, - &lc.context, &lc.len); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, &lc);if (err)return err; }
@@ -2076,7 +2075,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)if (!lsm_export_any (&le))return 0 ; - error =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc.context, &lc.len); + error =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc);if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL ) goto error_path;
kernel/auditsc.c +5 -5
@@ -938,7 +938,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,unsigned int sessionid, struct lsm_export *l, char *comm) { - struct lsm_context lc = { .context = NULL, }; + struct lsm_context lc;struct audit_buffer *ab;int rc =0 ;
@@ -950,7 +950,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);if (lsm_export_any (l)) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (l, &lc.context, &lc.len)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (l, &lc)) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else {
@@ -1190,8 +1190,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)from_kgid (&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid), context->ipc.mode);if (lsm_export_any (l)) { -struct lsm_context lc = { .context =NULL , }; -if (security_secid_to_secctx (l, &lc.context, &lc.len)) { +struct lsm_context lc; +if (security_secid_to_secctx (l, &lc)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=(unknown)" ); *call_panic =1 ; }else {
@@ -1342,7 +1342,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,if (lsm_export_any (&n->olsm)) {struct lsm_context lc; -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&n->olsm, &lc.context, &lc.len)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&n->olsm, &lc)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=(unknown)" );if (call_panic) *call_panic =2 ;
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +1 -1
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)if (err)return ; - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc.context, &lc.len); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc);if (err)return ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +6 -5
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct) le.selinux = ct->secmark; le.smack = ct->secmark; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc.context, &lc.len); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc);if (ret)return 0 ;
@@ -620,20 +620,21 @@ static inline size_t ctnetlink_acct_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size (const struct nf_conn *ct) {#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK -int len, ret; +int ret;struct lsm_export le; +struct lsm_context lc;lsm_export_init (&le); - le.flags =LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX |LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ; + le.flags =LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX |LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH ; le.selinux = ct->secmark; le.smack = ct->secmark; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le,NULL , &len); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc);if (ret)return 0 ;return nla_total_size (0 )/* CTA_SECCTX */ - +nla_total_size (sizeof (char ) * len);/* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */ + +nla_total_size (sizeof (char ) * lc.len);/* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */ #else return 0 ;#endif
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +1 -1
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct) le.selinux = ct->secmark; le.smack = ct->secmark; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc.context, &lc.len); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc);if (ret)return ;
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +1 -1
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata) le.flags =LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX |LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ; le.selinux = skb->secmark; le.smack = skb->secmark; -security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc.context, &lc.len); +security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc); *secdata = lc.context; }
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +4 -8
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,rcu_read_unlock ();if (audit_buf !=NULL ) {struct lsm_context lc; -if (security_secid_to_secctx (l, &lc.context, &lc.len) ==0 ) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (l, &lc) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , lc.context);security_release_secctx (&lc); }
@@ -504,8 +504,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->le, - &lc.context, &lc.len) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->le, &lc) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , lc.context);security_release_secctx (&lc); }
@@ -544,8 +543,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock); list_entry =netlbl_af6list_remove (addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -566,8 +563,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->le, - &lc.context, &lc.len) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->le, &lc) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , lc.context);security_release_secctx (&lc); }
@@ -1137,7 +1133,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd, lep = (struct lsm_export *)&addr6->le; } - ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (lep, &lc.context, &lc.len); + ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (lep, &lc);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +1 -2
@@ -112,8 +112,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type, audit_info->sessionid);if (lsm_export_any (&audit_info->le) && -security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_info->le, &lc.context, - &lc.len) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_info->le, &lc) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , lc.context);security_release_secctx (&lc); }
security/apparmor/secid.c +1 -2
@@ -92,8 +92,7 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)if (!label)return -EINVAL ; -/* scaffolding check - Casey */ -if (cp) +if (!(l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH )) len = aa_label_asxprint(&cp->context, root_ns, label, FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED | FLAG_ABS_ROOT,
security/security.c +2 -11
@@ -1972,18 +1972,9 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_ismaclabel); -int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,struct lsm_context *cp) { -struct lsm_context lc = { .context =NULL , .len =0 , }; -int rc; - - rc =call_one_int_hook (secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , l, &lc); -if (secdata) - *secdata = lc.context; -else -security_release_secctx (&lc); - *seclen = lc.len; -return rc; +return call_one_int_hook (secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , l, cp); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secid_to_secctx);
security/selinux/hooks.c +3 -0
@@ -6306,6 +6306,9 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)u32 secid;selinux_import_secid (l, &secid); +if (l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH ) +return security_sid_to_context (&selinux_state, secid, +NULL , &cp->len);return security_sid_to_context (&selinux_state, secid, &cp->context, &cp->len); }
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1 -1
@@ -4442,7 +4442,7 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)smack_import_secid (l, &secid); skp =smack_from_secid (secid); - cp->context = skp->smk_known; + cp->context = (l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH ) ?NULL : skp->smk_known; cp->len =strlen (skp->smk_known);return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 50/90 fs: remove lsm_context scaffolding
In reply to Casey SchauflerThe conversion from secctx/seclen pairs to the lsm_context structure used scaffolding in kernfs and nfs. Replace the secctx/seclen pairs in the filesystem local datastructures with a lsm_context.
--- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 9 +++------ fs/kernfs/inode.c | 13 +++++-------- fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +-- fs/nfs/inode.c | 15 ++++++--------- fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 ++++---- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 27 +++++++++++---------------- fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +++++++++------- include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 ++++---- 8 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
fs/kernfs/dir.c +3 -6
@@ -532,12 +532,9 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)kfree_const (kn->name);if (kn->iattr) { -if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) { -struct lsm_context lc;/* Scaffolding -Casey */ - lc.context = kn->iattr->ia_secdata; - lc.len = kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len; -security_release_secctx (&lc); - } +if (kn->iattr->ia_context.context) +security_release_secctx ( + &kn->iattr->ia_context);simple_xattrs_free (&kn->iattr->xattrs);kmem_cache_free (kernfs_iattrs_cache, kn->iattr); }
fs/kernfs/inode.c +5 -8
@@ -141,11 +141,11 @@ static int kernfs_node_setsecdata(struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs, void **secdata,void *old_secdata;size_t old_secdata_len; - old_secdata = attrs->ia_secdata; - old_secdata_len = attrs->ia_secdata_len; + old_secdata = attrs->ia_context.context; + old_secdata_len = attrs->ia_context.len; - attrs->ia_secdata = *secdata; - attrs->ia_secdata_len = *secdata_len; + attrs->ia_context.context = *secdata; + attrs->ia_context.len = *secdata_len; *secdata = old_secdata; *secdata_len = old_secdata_len;
@@ -184,7 +184,6 @@ static inline void set_inode_attr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *iattr)static void kernfs_refresh_inode (struct kernfs_node *kn,struct inode *inode) {struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs = kn->iattr; -struct lsm_context lc;/* Scaffolding -Casey */ inode->i_mode = kn->mode;if (attrs) {
@@ -193,9 +192,7 @@ static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)* persistent copy in kernfs_node. */ set_inode_attr (inode, &attrs->ia_iattr); - lc.context = attrs->ia_secdata; - lc.len = attrs->ia_secdata_len; -security_inode_notifysecctx (inode, &lc); +security_inode_notifysecctx (inode, &attrs->ia_context); }if (kernfs_type (kn) ==KERNFS_DIR )
fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h +1 -2
@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@struct kernfs_iattrs {struct iattr ia_iattr; -void *ia_secdata; -u32 ia_secdata_len; +struct lsm_context ia_context;struct simple_xattrs xattrs; };
fs/nfs/inode.c +6 -9
@@ -340,22 +340,19 @@ static void nfs_clear_label_invalid(struct inode *inode)void nfs_setsecurity (struct inode *inode,struct nfs_fattr *fattr,struct nfs4_label *label) { -struct lsm_context lc;/* Scaffolding -Casey */ int error;if (label ==NULL )return ;if ((fattr->valid &NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4_SECURITY_LABEL ) && inode->i_security) { - lc.context = label->label; - lc.len = label->len; - error =security_inode_notifysecctx (inode, &lc); + error =security_inode_notifysecctx (inode, &label->context);if (error)printk (KERN_ERR "%s() %s %d " "security_inode_notifysecctx() %d\n" , __func__, - (char *)label->label, - label->len, error); + label->context.context, + label->context.len, error);nfs_clear_label_invalid (inode); } }
@@ -375,12 +372,12 @@ struct nfs4_label *nfs4_label_alloc(struct nfs_server *server, gfp_t flags)if (label ==NULL )return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); - label->label =kzalloc (NFS4_MAXLABELLEN , flags); -if (label->label ==NULL ) { + label->context.context =kzalloc (NFS4_MAXLABELLEN , flags); +if (label->context.context ==NULL ) {kfree (label);return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); } - label->len =NFS4_MAXLABELLEN ; + label->context.len =NFS4_MAXLABELLEN ;return label; }
fs/nfs/internal.h +4 -4
@@ -307,20 +307,20 @@ nfs4_label_copy(struct nfs4_label *dst, struct nfs4_label *src)if (!dst || !src)return NULL ; -if (src->len >NFS4_MAXLABELLEN ) +if (src->context.len >NFS4_MAXLABELLEN )return NULL ; dst->lfs = src->lfs; dst->pi = src->pi; - dst->len = src->len; -memcpy (dst->label, src->label, src->len); + dst->context.len = src->context.len; +memcpy (dst->context.context, src->context.context, src->context.len);return dst; }static inline void nfs4_label_free (struct nfs4_label *label) {if (label) { -kfree (label->label); +kfree (label->context.context);kfree (label); }return ;
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +11 -16
@@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ static inline struct nfs4_label * nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *sattr, struct nfs4_label *label) { - struct lsm_context lc; /* Scaffolding -Casey */ int err;if (label ==NULL )
@@ -123,9 +122,7 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,return NULL ; err =security_dentry_init_security (dentry, sattr->ia_mode, - &dentry->d_name, &lc); - label->label = lc.context; - label->len = lc.len; + &dentry->d_name, &label->context);if (err ==0 )return label;
@@ -134,13 +131,8 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,static inline void nfs4_label_release_security (struct nfs4_label *label) { -struct lsm_context lc;/* Scaffolding -Casey */ - -if (label) { - lc.context = label->label; - lc.len = label->len; -security_release_secctx (&lc); - } +if (label) +security_release_secctx (&label->context); }static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask (struct nfs_server *server,struct nfs4_label *label) {
@@ -3556,7 +3548,9 @@ nfs4_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct nfs_open_context *ctx, int open_flags, struct iattr *attr, int *opened) { struct nfs4_state *state; -struct nfs4_label l = {0 ,0 ,0 ,NULL }, *label =NULL ; +struct nfs4_label *label =NULL ; +struct nfs4_label l = {0 ,0 , + .context = { .context =NULL , .len =0 , }, }; label =nfs4_label_init_security (dir, ctx->dentry, attr, &l);
@@ -5595,7 +5589,8 @@ static int _nfs4_get_security_label(struct inode *inode, void *buf, {struct nfs_server *server =NFS_SERVER (inode);struct nfs_fattr fattr; -struct nfs4_label label = {0 ,0 , buflen, buf}; +struct nfs4_label label = {0 ,0 , + .context = { .context = buf, .len = buflen, }, };u32 bitmask[3 ] = {0 ,0 ,FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL };struct nfs4_getattr_arg arg = {
@@ -5621,7 +5616,7 @@ static int _nfs4_get_security_label(struct inode *inode, void *buf,return ret;if (!(fattr.valid &NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4_SECURITY_LABEL ))return -ENOENT ; -if (buflen < label.len) +if (buflen < label.context.len)return -ERANGE ;return 0 ; }
@@ -5713,8 +5708,8 @@ nfs4_set_security_label(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, size_t buflen) ilabel.pi =0 ; ilabel.lfs =0 ; - ilabel.label = (char *)buf; - ilabel.len = buflen; + ilabel.context.context = (char *)buf; + ilabel.context.len = buflen; olabel =nfs4_label_alloc (NFS_SERVER (inode),GFP_KERNEL );if (IS_ERR (olabel)) {
fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c +9 -7
@@ -1141,7 +1141,7 @@ static void encode_attrs(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct iattr *iap, }if (label && (attrmask[2 ] &FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL )) { - len +=4 +4 +4 + (XDR_QUADLEN (label->len) <<2 ); + len +=4 +4 +4 + (XDR_QUADLEN (label->context.len) <<2 ); bmval[2 ] |=FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL ; }
@@ -1175,8 +1175,9 @@ static void encode_attrs(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct iattr *iap,if (bmval[2 ] &FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL ) { *p++ =cpu_to_be32 (label->lfs); *p++ =cpu_to_be32 (label->pi); - *p++ =cpu_to_be32 (label->len); - p =xdr_encode_opaque_fixed (p, label->label, label->len); + *p++ =cpu_to_be32 (label->context.len); + p =xdr_encode_opaque_fixed (p, label->context.context, + label->context.len); }if (bmval[2 ] &FATTR4_WORD2_MODE_UMASK ) { *p++ =cpu_to_be32 (iap->ia_mode &S_IALLUGO );
@@ -4163,8 +4164,8 @@ static int decode_attr_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap,return -EIO ;if (len <NFS4_MAXLABELLEN ) {if (label) { -memcpy (label->label, p, len); - label->len = len; +memcpy (label->context.context, p, len); + label->context.len = len; label->pi = pi; label->lfs = lfs; status =NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4_SECURITY_LABEL ;
@@ -4174,9 +4175,10 @@ static int decode_attr_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap,printk (KERN_WARNING "%s: label too long (%u)!\n" , __func__, len); } -if (label && label->label) +if (label && label->context.context)dprintk ("%s: label=%s, len=%d, PI=%d, LFS=%d\n" , __func__, - (char *)label->label, label->len, label->pi, label->lfs); + (char *)label->context.context, label->context.len, + label->pi, label->lfs);return status; }
include/linux/nfs4.h +4 -4
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/uidgid.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <uapi/linux/nfs4.h> enum nfs4_acl_whotype {
@@ -43,10 +44,9 @@ struct nfs4_acl {#define NFS4_MAXLABELLEN 2048struct nfs4_label { -uint32_t lfs; -uint32_t pi; -u32 len; -char *label; +uint32_t lfs; +uint32_t pi; +struct lsm_context context; };typedef struct {char data[NFS4_VERIFIER_SIZE ]; }nfs4_verifier ;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 51/90 LSM: Add the release function to the lsm_context
In reply to Casey SchauflerIn order to ensure that the release function for a lsm_context matches the LSM that allocated it an element is added to the lsm_context structure to contain a pointer to it. This function is called in security_release_secctx instead of relying on a value in a hook list.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ------ include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/apparmor/lsm.c | 1 - security/apparmor/secid.c | 11 ++++++----- security/security.c | 5 ++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 14 ++++++++------ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 7 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +0 -6
@@ -1329,10 +1329,6 @@* @cp contains the security context. * @l contains the pointer to the generated security data. * -* @release_secctx: -* Release the security context. -* @secdata contains the security context. -* * Security hooks for Audit * * @audit_rule_init:
@@ -1670,7 +1666,6 @@ union security_list_options {int (*secid_to_secctx)(struct lsm_export *l,struct lsm_context *cp);int (*secctx_to_secid)(const struct lsm_context *cp,struct lsm_export *l); -void (*release_secctx)(struct lsm_context *cp);void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp);
@@ -1947,7 +1942,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads {struct hlist_head ismaclabel;struct hlist_head secid_to_secctx;struct hlist_head secctx_to_secid; -struct hlist_head release_secctx;struct hlist_head inode_invalidate_secctx;struct hlist_head inode_notifysecctx;struct hlist_head inode_setsecctx;
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ static inline bool lsm_export_equal(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_export *m)struct lsm_context {char *context;u32 len; +void (*release)(struct lsm_context *cp);/* frees .context */ };static inline void lsm_context_init (struct lsm_context *cp)
security/apparmor/lsm.c +0 -1
@@ -1225,7 +1225,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (secid_to_secctx, apparmor_secid_to_secctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, apparmor_secctx_to_secid), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, apparmor_release_secctx), };/*
security/apparmor/secid.c +6 -5
@@ -81,6 +81,11 @@ static inline void aa_export_secid(struct lsm_export *l, u32 secid) l->apparmor = secid; } +void apparmor_release_secctx (struct lsm_context *cp) +{ +kfree (cp->context); +} +int apparmor_secid_to_secctx (struct lsm_export *l,struct lsm_context *cp) {/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */
@@ -105,6 +110,7 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)return -ENOMEM ; cp->len = len; + cp->release = apparmor_release_secctx;return 0 ; }
@@ -122,11 +128,6 @@ int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp, struct lsm_export *l)return 0 ; } -void apparmor_release_secctx (struct lsm_context *cp) -{ -kfree (cp->context); -} -/** * aa_alloc_secid - allocate a new secid for a profile * @label: the label to allocate a secid for
security/security.c +4 -1
@@ -1987,7 +1987,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);void security_release_secctx (struct lsm_context *cp) { -call_one_void_hook (release_secctx, cp); +if (WARN_ON (cp->release ==NULL )) +return ; + cp->release (cp); +lsm_context_init (cp); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_release_secctx);
security/selinux/hooks.c +8 -6
@@ -2812,6 +2812,11 @@ static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)inode_free_security (inode); } +static void selinux_release_secctx (struct lsm_context *cp) +{ +kfree (cp->context); +} +static int selinux_dentry_init_security (struct dentry *dentry,int mode,const struct qstr *name,struct lsm_context *cp)
@@ -2826,6 +2831,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,if (rc)return rc; + cp->release = selinux_release_secctx;return security_sid_to_context (&selinux_state, newsid, &cp->context, &cp->len); }
@@ -6306,6 +6312,7 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)u32 secid;selinux_import_secid (l, &secid); + cp->release = selinux_release_secctx;if (l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH )return security_sid_to_context (&selinux_state, secid,NULL , &cp->len);
@@ -6325,11 +6332,6 @@ static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,return rc; } -static void selinux_release_secctx (struct lsm_context *cp) -{ -kfree (cp->context); -} -static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode) {struct inode_security_struct *isec =selinux_inode (inode);
@@ -6367,6 +6369,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp)if (len <0 )return len; cp->len = len; + cp->release = selinux_release_secctx;return 0 ; }#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
@@ -6781,7 +6784,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),LSM_HOOK_INIT (secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),LSM_HOOK_INIT (secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),LSM_HOOK_INIT (inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),LSM_HOOK_INIT (inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +8 -8
@@ -4425,6 +4425,12 @@ static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)return (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX ) ==0 ); } +/* +* The smack_release_secctx hook does nothing +*/ +static void smack_release_secctx (struct lsm_context *cp) +{ +}/** * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
@@ -4444,6 +4450,7 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp) cp->context = (l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH ) ?NULL : skp->smk_known; cp->len =strlen (skp->smk_known); + cp->release = smack_release_secctx;return 0 ; }
@@ -4467,13 +4474,6 @@ static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const struct lsm_context *cp,return 0 ; } -/* -* The smack_release_secctx hook does nothing -*/ -static void smack_release_secctx (struct lsm_context *cp) -{ -} -static int smack_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp) { return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, cp->context,
@@ -4491,6 +4491,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp) cp->context = skp->smk_known; cp->len =strlen (skp->smk_known); + cp->release = smack_release_secctx;return 0 ; }
@@ -4713,7 +4714,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),LSM_HOOK_INIT (secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),LSM_HOOK_INIT (secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (release_secctx, smack_release_secctx),LSM_HOOK_INIT (inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),LSM_HOOK_INIT (inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 52/90 LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_setsecctx hooks
In reply to Casey SchauflerConvert SELinux and Smack to use the lsm_context structure instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 ++--- security/security.c | 6 +++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 ++++-- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 +++-- 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +2 -3
@@ -1390,8 +1390,7 @@* Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked. * * @dentry contains the inode we wish to set the security context of. -* @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode. -* @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx. +* @cp contains the string which we wish to set in the inode. * * @inode_getsecctx: * On success, returns 0 and fills out @cp with the security
@@ -1669,7 +1668,7 @@ union security_list_options {void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp); -int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen); +int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry,struct lsm_context *cp);int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp);#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
security/security.c +5 -1
@@ -2008,7 +2008,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);int security_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen) { -return call_int_hook (inode_setsecctx,0 , dentry, ctx, ctxlen); +struct lsm_context lc; + + lc.context = ctx; + lc.len = ctxlen; +return call_int_hook (inode_setsecctx,0 , dentry, &lc); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_setsecctx);
security/selinux/hooks.c +4 -2
@@ -6356,9 +6356,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode,/* * called with inode->i_mutex locked */ -static int selinux_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen) +static int selinux_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry, +struct lsm_context *cp) { -return __vfs_setxattr_noperm (dentry,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , ctx, ctxlen,0 ); +return __vfs_setxattr_noperm (dentry,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , cp->context, + cp->len,0 ); }static int selinux_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +3 -2
@@ -4480,9 +4480,10 @@ static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp) cp->len, 0); } -static int smack_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen) +static int smack_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,struct lsm_context *cp) { -return __vfs_setxattr_noperm (dentry,XATTR_NAME_SMACK , ctx, ctxlen,0 ); +return __vfs_setxattr_noperm (dentry,XATTR_NAME_SMACK , cp->context, + cp->len,0 ); }static int smack_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 53/90 LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_setsecctx
In reply to Casey SchauflerFrom: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Convert security_inode_setsecctx to use the lsm_context structure instead of a context/secid pair. There is some scaffolding involved that will be removed when the related data is updated.
--- fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 8 ++++++-- fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 ++++++- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- security/security.c | 8 ++------ 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c +6 -2
@@ -54,12 +54,16 @@static inline void nfsd4_security_inode_setsecctx (struct svc_fh *resfh,struct xdr_netobj *label,u32 *bmval) { +struct lsm_context lc;struct inode *inode =d_inode (resfh->fh_dentry);int status;inode_lock (inode); - status =security_inode_setsecctx (resfh->fh_dentry, - label->data, label->len); + +lsm_context_init (&lc); + lc.context = label->data; + lc.len = label->len; + status =security_inode_setsecctx (resfh->fh_dentry, &lc);inode_unlock (inode);if (status)
fs/nfsd/vfs.c +6 -1
@@ -531,6 +531,7 @@ __be32 nfsd4_set_nfs4_label(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp,__be32 error;int host_error;struct dentry *dentry; +struct lsm_context lc; error =fh_verify (rqstp, fhp,0 /* S_IFREG */ ,NFSD_MAY_SATTR );if (error)
@@ -539,7 +540,11 @@ __be32 nfsd4_set_nfs4_label(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;inode_lock (d_inode (dentry)); - host_error =security_inode_setsecctx (dentry, label->data, label->len); + +lsm_context_init (&lc); + lc.context = label->data; + lc.len = label->len; + host_error =security_inode_setsecctx (dentry, &lc);inode_unlock (d_inode (dentry));return nfserrno (host_error); }
include/linux/security.h +3 -2
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(struct lsm_context *cp);void security_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode);int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp); -int security_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen); +int security_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,struct lsm_context *cp);int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp);#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
@@ -1237,7 +1237,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } -static inline int security_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen) +static inline int security_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry, +struct lsm_context *cp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
security/security.c +2 -6
@@ -2006,13 +2006,9 @@ int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_notifysecctx); -int security_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen) +int security_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,struct lsm_context *cp) { -struct lsm_context lc; - - lc.context = ctx; - lc.len = ctxlen; -return call_int_hook (inode_setsecctx,0 , dentry, &lc); +return call_int_hook (inode_setsecctx,0 , dentry, cp); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_setsecctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 54/90 kernfs: remove lsm_context scaffolding
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the parameters to kernfs_node_setsecdata from a data/length pair to a lsm_context struct as both the function it calls and the function that calls it want that.
--- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 19 +++++++------------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
fs/kernfs/inode.c +7 -12
@@ -135,20 +135,15 @@ int kernfs_iop_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)return error; } -static int kernfs_node_setsecdata (struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs,void **secdata, -u32 *secdata_len) +static int kernfs_node_setsecdata (struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs, +struct lsm_context *cp) { -void *old_secdata; -size_t old_secdata_len; +struct lsm_context old_context; - old_secdata = attrs->ia_context.context; - old_secdata_len = attrs->ia_context.len; + old_context = attrs->ia_context; + attrs->ia_context = *cp; + *cp = old_context; - attrs->ia_context.context = *secdata; - attrs->ia_context.len = *secdata_len; - - *secdata = old_secdata; - *secdata_len = old_secdata_len;return 0 ; }
@@ -363,7 +358,7 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,return error;mutex_lock (&kernfs_mutex); - error =kernfs_node_setsecdata (attrs, (void **)&lc.context, &lc.len); + error =kernfs_node_setsecdata (attrs, &lc);mutex_unlock (&kernfs_mutex);if (lc.context)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 55/90 LSM: Remove unused macro
In reply to Casey SchauflerThe call_one_void_hook macro is unused since the change to how releasing a secctx was made. Remove it.
--- security/security.c | 10 ---------- 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)
security/security.c +0 -10
@@ -698,16 +698,6 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)P ->hook.FUNC (__VA_ARGS__); \ } while (0) -#define call_one_void_hook (FUNC , ...) \ - do { \ - struct security_hook_list *P; \ - \ - hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \ - P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ - break; \ - } \ - } while (0) -#define call_int_hook (FUNC ,IRC , ...) ({ \ int RC = IRC; \ do { \
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 56/90 LSM: Special handling for secctx lsm hooks
In reply to Casey SchauflerCreate a special set of LSM hooks for the translation to human readable security data.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 10 ++++++++++ security/security.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +10 -0
@@ -2040,6 +2040,16 @@ struct security_hook_list {char *lsm; } __randomize_layout; +/* +* The set of hooks that may be selected for a specific module. +*/ +struct lsm_one_hooks { +char *lsm; +union security_list_options secid_to_secctx; +union security_list_options secctx_to_secid; +union security_list_options socket_getpeersec_stream; +}; +/* * Security blob size or offset data. */
security/security.c +24 -8
@@ -420,6 +420,9 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)return 0 ; } +/* Base list of once-only hooks */ +struct lsm_one_hooks lsm_base_one; +/** * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. * @hooks: the hooks to add
@@ -436,6 +439,25 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,for (i =0 ; i < count; i++) { hooks[i].lsm = lsm;hlist_add_tail_rcu (&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); + +/* +* Check for the special hooks that are restricted to +* a single module to create the base set. Use the hooks +* from that module for the set, which may not be complete. +*/ +if (lsm_base_one.lsm &&strcmp (lsm_base_one.lsm, hooks[i].lsm)) +continue ; +if (hooks[i].head == &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx) + lsm_base_one.secid_to_secctx = hooks[i].hook; +else if (hooks[i].head == &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid) + lsm_base_one.secctx_to_secid = hooks[i].hook; +else if (hooks[i].head == + &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream) + lsm_base_one.socket_getpeersec_stream = hooks[i].hook; +else +continue ; +if (lsm_base_one.lsm ==NULL ) + lsm_base_one.lsm =kstrdup (hooks[i].lsm,GFP_KERNEL ); }if (lsm_append (lsm, &lsm_names) <0 )panic ("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n" , __func__);
@@ -714,14 +736,8 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)#define call_one_int_hook (FUNC ,IRC , ...) ({ \ int RC = IRC; \ - do { \ - struct security_hook_list *P; \ - \ - hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \ - RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ - break; \ - } \ - } while (0); \ + if (lsm_base_one.FUNC.FUNC) \ + RC = lsm_base_one.FUNC.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \ RC; \ })
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 57/90 SELinux: Use blob offset in current_sid
In reply to Casey SchauflerReplace the use of current_security() with a call to current_cred() so that the blob offset can be correctly applied.
--- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/selinux/include/objsec.h +5 -2
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@#include "flask.h" #include "avc.h" +extern struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes; +struct task_security_struct {u32 osid;/* SID prior to last execve */ u32 sid;/* current SID */
@@ -45,7 +47,9 @@ struct task_security_struct {*/ static inline u32 current_sid (void ) { -const struct task_security_struct *tsec =current_security (); +const struct task_security_struct *tsec; + + tsec =current_cred ()->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;return tsec->sid; }
@@ -174,7 +178,6 @@ struct bpf_security_struct {u32 sid;/*SID of bpf obj creater*/ }; -extern struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes;static inline struct task_security_struct *selinux_cred (const struct cred *cred) {return cred->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_cred;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 58/90 LSM: Specify which LSM to display
In reply to Casey SchauflerCreate a new entry "display" in /proc/.../attr for controlling which LSM security information is displayed for a process. The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for human readable data may be written to "display" to set the value. The name of the LSM currently in use can be read from "display".
--- fs/proc/base.c | 1 + security/security.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/proc/base.c +1 -0
@@ -2618,6 +2618,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {ATTR (NULL ,"fscreate" ,0666 ),ATTR (NULL ,"keycreate" ,0666 ),ATTR (NULL ,"sockcreate" ,0666 ), +ATTR (NULL ,"display" ,0666 ), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACKDIR ("smack" ,0555 , proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
security/security.c +108 -2
161 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 59/90 AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
In reply to Casey SchauflerWith the inclusion of the "display" process attribute mechanism AppArmor no longer needs to be treated as an "exclusive" security module. Remove the flag that indicates it is exclusive.
--- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/apparmor/lsm.c +1 -1
@@ -1705,7 +1705,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)DEFINE_LSM (apparmor) = { .name ="apparmor" , - .flags =LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR |LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE , + .flags =LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR , .enabled = &apparmor_enabled, .blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes, .init = apparmor_init,
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 60/90 LSM: Add secmark_relabel_packet to the set of one call hooks
In reply to Casey SchauflerThe secmark_relabel_packet hooks are dependent on the results of secctx_to_secid hooks. Add secmark_relabel_packet to the set of one call hooks, as the secid use will always match the LSM providing the secid.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +1 -0
@@ -2048,6 +2048,7 @@ struct lsm_one_hooks {union security_list_options secid_to_secctx;union security_list_options secctx_to_secid;union security_list_options socket_getpeersec_stream; +union security_list_options secmark_relabel_packet; };/*
security/security.c +17 -1
@@ -456,6 +456,9 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,else if (hooks[i].head == &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream) lsm_base_one.socket_getpeersec_stream = hooks[i].hook; +else if (hooks[i].head == + &security_hook_heads.secmark_relabel_packet) + lsm_base_one.secmark_relabel_packet = hooks[i].hook;else continue ;if (lsm_base_one.lsm ==NULL )
@@ -2006,6 +2009,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,union security_list_options secid_to_secctx;union security_list_options secctx_to_secid;union security_list_options socket_getpeersec_stream; +union security_list_options secmark_relabel_packet;if (size ==0 || size >=100 )return -EINVAL ;
@@ -2041,6 +2045,17 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,break ; } } + secmark_relabel_packet.secmark_relabel_packet =NULL ; +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, + &security_hook_heads.secmark_relabel_packet, + list) { +if (size >=strlen (hp->lsm) && + !strncmp (value, hp->lsm, size)) { + secmark_relabel_packet = hp->hook; + found = true; +break ; + } + }if (!found)return -EINVAL ;
@@ -2059,6 +2074,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, loh->secid_to_secctx = secid_to_secctx; loh->secctx_to_secid = secctx_to_secid; loh->socket_getpeersec_stream = socket_getpeersec_stream; + loh->secmark_relabel_packet = secmark_relabel_packet;return size; }
@@ -2305,7 +2321,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);int security_secmark_relabel_packet (u32 secid) { -return call_int_hook (secmark_relabel_packet,0 , secid); +return call_one_int_hook (secmark_relabel_packet,0 , secid); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secmark_relabel_packet);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 61/90 LSM: Make getting the secmark right cleaner
In reply to Casey SchauflerGetting the u32 secmark from the result of security_secctx_to_secid() requires knowledge about which LSM interpreted the context. Add a function lsm_export_one_secid() that finds the active secid in a lsm_export structure. Use it in secmark processing.
--- include/linux/security.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 7 +------ net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 7 +------ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +16 -0
@@ -117,6 +117,22 @@ static inline bool lsm_export_equal(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_export *m)return true; } +/* +* After calling security_secctx_to_secid() one, and only one +* of the LSM fields will be set in the lsm_export. Return +* whichever one was set. Used to supply secmarks. +*/ +static inline u32 lsm_export_one_secid (struct lsm_export *l) +{ +if (l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX ) +return l->selinux; +if (l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ) +return l->smack; +if (l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR ) +return l->apparmor; +return 0 ; +} +/* Text representation of LSM specific security information - a "context" */ struct lsm_context {char *context;
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c +1 -6
@@ -588,12 +588,7 @@ static int nft_secmark_compute_secid(struct nft_secmark *priv)if (err)return err; -/* Use the "best" secid */ -if (le.selinux) - tmp_secid = le.selinux; -else - tmp_secid = le.smack; - + tmp_secid =lsm_export_one_secid (&le);if (!tmp_secid)return -ENOENT ;
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c +1 -6
@@ -67,12 +67,7 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)return err; } -/* Smack is cheating, using SECMARK_MODE_SEL */ -if (le.selinux) - info->secid = le.selinux; -else - info->secid = le.smack; - + info->secid =lsm_export_one_secid (&le);if (!info->secid) {pr_info_ratelimited ("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n" , info->secctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 62/90 netfilter: Fix memory leak introduced with lsm_context
In reply to Casey SchauflerFix a memory leak introduced by the scaffolding around the introduction of lsm_context structures.
--- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 18 ++++++------------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +6 -12
@@ -305,14 +305,13 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)return -1 ; } -static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (struct sk_buff *skb,char **secdata) +static void nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (struct sk_buff *skb,struct lsm_context *cp) {#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK )struct lsm_export le; -struct lsm_context lc = { .context =NULL , .len =0 , };if (!skb || !sk_fullsock (skb->sk)) -return 0 ; +return ;read_lock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
@@ -322,14 +321,10 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata) le.flags =LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX |LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ; le.selinux = skb->secmark; le.smack = skb->secmark; -security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc); - *secdata = lc.context; + security_secid_to_secctx(&le, cp); }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); -return lc.len; -#else -return 0 ;#endif }
@@ -406,7 +401,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var (ctinfo );struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;bool csum_verify; -struct lsm_context lc = { .context =NULL , }; +struct lsm_context lc; size =nlmsg_total_size (sizeof (struct nfgenmsg )) +nla_total_size (sizeof (struct nfqnl_msg_packet_hdr ))
@@ -472,7 +467,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, }if ((queue->flags &NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX ) && entskb->sk) { - lc.len =nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (entskb, &lc.context); +nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (entskb, &lc);if (lc.len) size +=nla_total_size (lc.len); }
@@ -635,8 +630,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, } nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len; -if (lc.context) -security_release_secctx (&lc); +security_release_secctx (&lc);return skb; nla_put_failure:
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 63/90 Smack: Consolidate secmark conversions
In reply to Casey SchauflerAdd a helper function smack_from_skb() that does all the checks required and maps a valid secmark to a smack_known structure. Replace the direct use of the secmark in surrounding code.
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +27 -12
@@ -3820,6 +3820,20 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip) }#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ +/** +* smack_from_skb - Smack data from the secmark in an skb +* @skb: packet +* +* Returns smack_known of the secmark or NULL if that won't work. +*/ +static struct smack_known *smack_from_skb (struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +if (skb ==NULL || skb->secmark ==0 ) +return NULL ; + +return smack_from_secid (skb->secmark); +} +/** * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check * @sk: socket
@@ -3854,10 +3868,9 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)* If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO. * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better. */ -if (skb && skb->secmark !=0 ) { - skp =smack_from_secid (skb->secmark); + skp =smack_from_skb (skb); +if (skp) goto access_check; - }#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ /* * Translate what netlabel gave us.
@@ -3900,9 +3913,8 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) proto != IPPROTO_TCP && proto != IPPROTO_DCCP)break ;#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING -if (skb && skb->secmark !=0 ) - skp =smack_from_secid (skb->secmark); -else + skp =smack_from_skb (skb); +if (skp ==NULL ) skp =smack_ipv6host_label (&sadd);if (skp ==NULL ) skp = smack_net_ambient;
@@ -4003,9 +4015,11 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,break ;case PF_INET :#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER - s = skb->secmark; -if (s !=0 ) + skp =smack_from_skb (skb); +if (skp) { + s = skp->smk_secid;break ; + }#endif /* * Translate what netlabel gave us.
@@ -4022,7 +4036,9 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,break ;case PF_INET6 :#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING - s = skb->secmark; + skp =smack_from_skb (skb); +if (skp) + s = skp->smk_secid;#endif break ; }
@@ -4100,10 +4116,9 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,* If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO. * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better. */ -if (skb && skb->secmark !=0 ) { - skp =smack_from_secid (skb->secmark); + skp =smack_from_skb (skb); +if (skp) goto access_check; - }#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ netlbl_secattr_init (&secattr);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 64/90 netfilter: Remove unnecessary NULL check in lsm_context
In reply to Casey SchauflerThere is a redundant NULL check when releasing a security context. Remove it.
--- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +1 -2
@@ -638,8 +638,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,kfree_skb (skb);net_err_ratelimited ("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n" ); nlmsg_failure: -if (lc.context) -security_release_secctx (&lc); +security_release_secctx (&lc);return NULL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 65/90 LSM: Add secmark refcounting to call_one list
In reply to Casey SchauflerAdd secmark_refcount_dec and secmark_refcount_inc to the LSM hooks for which only the designated module is called. This is in support of consistant secmark behavior.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 ++ security/security.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +2 -0
@@ -2049,6 +2049,8 @@ struct lsm_one_hooks {union security_list_options secctx_to_secid;union security_list_options socket_getpeersec_stream;union security_list_options secmark_relabel_packet; +union security_list_options secmark_refcount_inc; +union security_list_options secmark_refcount_dec; };/*
security/security.c +42 -2
85 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 66/90 LSM: refactor security_setprocattr
In reply to Casey SchauflerBreak the common code for setting the lsm_one hooks into a helper function.
--- security/security.c | 124 ++++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)
security/security.c +45 -79
@@ -2004,12 +2004,31 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,return -EINVAL ; } +/* +* The use of the secid_to_secctx memeber of the union is +* arbitrary. Any member would work. +*/ +static bool lsm_add_one (union security_list_options *hook, +struct hlist_head *head,char *lsm,size_t size, +bool was) +{ +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, head, list) { +if (size >=strlen (hp->lsm) && !strncmp (lsm, hp->lsm, size)) { + hook->secid_to_secctx = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx; +return true; + } + } + hook->secid_to_secctx =NULL ; +return was; +} +int security_setprocattr (const char *lsm,const char *name,void *value,size_t size) {struct security_hook_list *hp;struct lsm_one_hooks *loh = current->security; -bool found = false;char *s;/*
@@ -2020,80 +2039,31 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, *s ='\0' ;if (!strcmp (name,"display" )) { -union security_list_options secid_to_secctx; -union security_list_options secctx_to_secid; -union security_list_options socket_getpeersec_stream; -union security_list_options secmark_relabel_packet; -union security_list_options secmark_refcount_inc; -union security_list_options secmark_refcount_dec; +struct lsm_one_hooks o; +bool found = false;if (size ==0 || size >=100 )return -EINVAL ; - secid_to_secctx.secid_to_secctx =NULL ; -hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, - list) { -if (size >=strlen (hp->lsm) && - !strncmp (value, hp->lsm, size)) { - secid_to_secctx = hp->hook; - found = true; -break ; - } - } - secctx_to_secid.secctx_to_secid =NULL ; -hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, - list) { -if (size >=strlen (hp->lsm) && - !strncmp (value, hp->lsm, size)) { - secctx_to_secid = hp->hook; - found = true; -break ; - } - } - socket_getpeersec_stream.socket_getpeersec_stream =NULL ; -hlist_for_each_entry (hp, - &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream, - list) { -if (size >=strlen (hp->lsm) && - !strncmp (value, hp->lsm, size)) { - socket_getpeersec_stream = hp->hook; - found = true; -break ; - } - } - secmark_relabel_packet.secmark_relabel_packet =NULL ; -hlist_for_each_entry (hp, - &security_hook_heads.secmark_relabel_packet, - list) { -if (size >=strlen (hp->lsm) && - !strncmp (value, hp->lsm, size)) { - secmark_relabel_packet = hp->hook; - found = true; -break ; - } - } - secmark_refcount_inc.secmark_refcount_inc =NULL ; -hlist_for_each_entry (hp, - &security_hook_heads.secmark_refcount_inc, - list) { -if (size >=strlen (hp->lsm) && - !strncmp (value, hp->lsm, size)) { - secmark_refcount_inc = hp->hook; - found = true; -break ; - } - } - secmark_refcount_dec.secmark_refcount_dec =NULL ; -hlist_for_each_entry (hp, - &security_hook_heads.secmark_refcount_dec, - list) { -if (size >=strlen (hp->lsm) && - !strncmp (value, hp->lsm, size)) { - secmark_refcount_dec = hp->hook; - found = true; -break ; - } - } + found =lsm_add_one (&o.secid_to_secctx, + &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, + value, size, found); + found =lsm_add_one (&o.secctx_to_secid, + &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, + value, size, found); + found =lsm_add_one (&o.socket_getpeersec_stream, + &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream, + value, size, found); + found =lsm_add_one (&o.secmark_relabel_packet, + &security_hook_heads.secmark_relabel_packet, + value, size, found); + found =lsm_add_one (&o.secmark_refcount_inc, + &security_hook_heads.secmark_refcount_inc, + value, size, found); + found =lsm_add_one (&o.secmark_refcount_dec, + &security_hook_heads.secmark_refcount_dec, + value, size, found); +if (!found)return -EINVAL ;
@@ -2101,20 +2071,16 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,* The named lsm is active and supplies one or more * of the relevant hooks. Switch to it. */ - s =kmemdup (value, size +1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + s =kmemdup (value, size,GFP_KERNEL );if (s ==NULL )return -ENOMEM ; - s[size] ='\0' ; + s[size -1 ] ='\0' ;if (loh->lsm)kfree (loh->lsm); + + *loh = o; loh->lsm = s; - loh->secid_to_secctx = secid_to_secctx; - loh->secctx_to_secid = secctx_to_secid; - loh->socket_getpeersec_stream = socket_getpeersec_stream; - loh->secmark_relabel_packet = secmark_relabel_packet; - loh->secmark_refcount_inc = secmark_refcount_inc; - loh->secmark_refcount_dec = secmark_refcount_dec;return size; }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 67/90 Smack: Detect if secmarks can be safely used
In reply to Casey SchauflerUtilize the security_secmark_refcount_in() hooks to determine if Smack can safely assume that IP secmarks are not being used by another LSM. Only use secmarks if they can be determined to belong to Smack.
--- security/smack/smack.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 16 +++++----------- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack.h +15 -0
@@ -544,4 +544,19 @@ static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(struct smk_audit_info *a, }#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER +extern bool smack_use_secmark; +void smack_secmark_refcount_inc (void ); + +static inline bool smk_use_secmark (void ) +{ +return smack_use_secmark; +} +#else +static inline bool smk_use_secmark (void ) +{ +return false; +} +#endif +#endif /* _SECURITY_SMACK_H */
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +5 -11
@@ -3828,7 +3828,7 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)*/ static struct smack_known *smack_from_skb (struct sk_buff *skb) { -if (skb ==NULL || skb->secmark ==0 ) +if (skb ==NULL || skb->secmark ==0 || !smk_use_secmark ())return NULL ;return smack_from_secid (skb->secmark);
@@ -3862,7 +3862,6 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)switch (family) {case PF_INET : -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER /* * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label. * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
@@ -3871,7 +3870,6 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) skp =smack_from_skb (skb);if (skp) goto access_check; -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ /* * Translate what netlabel gave us. */
@@ -3885,9 +3883,8 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)netlbl_secattr_destroy (&secattr); -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER access_check: -#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT smk_ad_init_net (&ad, __func__,LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET , &net); ad.a.u.net->family = family;
@@ -4014,13 +4011,11 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;break ;case PF_INET : -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER skp =smack_from_skb (skb);if (skp) { s = skp->smk_secid;break ; } -#endif /* * Translate what netlabel gave us. */
@@ -4110,7 +4105,6 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, }#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER /* * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label. * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
@@ -4119,7 +4113,6 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, skp =smack_from_skb (skb);if (skp) goto access_check; -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ netlbl_secattr_init (&secattr); rc =netlbl_skbuff_getattr (skb, family, &secattr);
@@ -4129,9 +4122,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, skp = &smack_known_huh;netlbl_secattr_destroy (&secattr); -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER access_check: -#endif #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT smk_ad_init_net (&ad, __func__,LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET , &net);
@@ -4708,6 +4699,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security), +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER +LSM_HOOK_INIT (secmark_refcount_inc, smack_secmark_refcount_inc), #endifLSM_HOOK_INIT (sock_graft, smack_sock_graft), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c +23 -2
@@ -21,6 +21,15 @@#include <net/net_namespace.h> #include "smack.h" +bool smack_use_secmark; +static bool smack_checked_secmark; + +void smack_secmark_refcount_inc (void ) +{ + smack_use_secmark = true; +pr_info ("Smack: Using network secmarks.\n" ); +} +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IPV6 ) static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,
@@ -31,7 +40,13 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,struct socket_smack *ssp;struct smack_known *skp; -if (sk &&smack_sock (sk)) { +if (!smack_checked_secmark) { +security_secmark_refcount_inc (); +security_secmark_refcount_dec (); + smack_checked_secmark = true; + } + +if (smack_use_secmark && sk &&smack_sock (sk)) { ssp =smack_sock (sk); skp = ssp->smk_out; skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
@@ -49,7 +64,13 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,struct socket_smack *ssp;struct smack_known *skp; -if (sk &&smack_sock (sk)) { +if (!smack_checked_secmark) { +security_secmark_refcount_inc (); +security_secmark_refcount_dec (); + smack_checked_secmark = true; + } + +if (smack_use_secmark && sk &&smack_sock (sk)) { ssp =smack_sock (sk); skp = ssp->smk_out; skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 68/90 LSM: Support multiple LSMs using inode_init_security
In reply to Casey SchauflerRefactor security_inode_init_security() so that it can do the integrity processing for more than one LSM.
--- security/security.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
security/security.c +29 -19
@@ -1064,9 +1064,10 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,const struct qstr *qstr, const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data) { - struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1]; -struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr; -int ret; + struct security_hook_list *p; +struct xattr *repo; +int rc; +int i;if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (inode)))return 0 ;
@@ -1074,24 +1075,33 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,if (!initxattrs)return call_int_hook (inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP , inode, dir, qstr,NULL ,NULL ,NULL ); -memset (new_xattrs,0 ,sizeof (new_xattrs)); - lsm_xattr = new_xattrs; - ret =call_int_hook (inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP , inode, dir, qstr, - &lsm_xattr->name, - &lsm_xattr->value, - &lsm_xattr->value_len); -if (ret) - goto out; - evm_xattr = lsm_xattr +1 ; - ret =evm_inode_init_security (inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr); -if (ret) - goto out; - ret =initxattrs (inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); + repo =kzalloc ((LSM_COUNT *2 ) *sizeof (*repo),GFP_NOFS ); +if (repo ==NULL ) +return -ENOMEM ; + + i =0 ; + rc = -EOPNOTSUPP ; +hlist_for_each_entry (p, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security, + list) { + rc = p->hook.inode_init_security (inode, dir, qstr, + &repo[i].name, &repo[i].value, + &repo[i].value_len); +if (rc) + goto out; + + rc =evm_inode_init_security (inode, &repo[i], &repo[i +1 ]); +if (rc) + goto out; + + i +=2 ; + } + rc =initxattrs (inode, repo, fs_data); out: -for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value !=NULL ; xattr++) -kfree (xattr->value); -return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP ) ?0 : ret; +for (i-- ; i >=0 ; i--) +kfree (repo[i].value); +kfree (repo); +return (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ) ?0 : rc; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_init_security);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 69/90 LSM: Use full security context in security_inode_setsecctx
In reply to Casey SchauflerThe security hooks security_inode_setsecctx and security_inode_getsecctx need to maintain the context strings for any and all LSMs that provide contexts. This information is internal to the kernel and volitile. If only one LSM uses this information the raw form is used.
--- security/security.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 108 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/security.c +108 -2
@@ -425,6 +425,9 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)/* Base list of once-only hooks */ struct lsm_one_hooks lsm_base_one; +/* Count of inode_[gs]etsecctx hooks */ +static int lsm_inode_secctx_count; +/** * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. * @hooks: the hooks to add
@@ -442,6 +445,15 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, hooks[i].lsm = lsm;hlist_add_tail_rcu (&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); +/* +* Keep count of the internal security context using hooks. +* Assume that there is a 1:1 mapping from inode_getsecctx +* to inode_setsecctx in the security modules. +*/ +if (hooks[i].head == &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx) { + lsm_inode_secctx_count++; +continue ; + }/* * Check for the special hooks that are restricted to * a single module to create the base set. Use the hooks
@@ -2150,15 +2162,109 @@ int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_notifysecctx); +/* +* The inode_[gs]etsecctx functions need to proved a context +* for multiple security modules. If there is more than one +* LSM supplying hooks the format will be +* lsm1='value',lsm2='value'[,lsmN='value']... +*/ +static void lsm_release_secctx (struct lsm_context *cp) +{ +kfree (cp->context); +} +int security_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,struct lsm_context *cp) { -return call_int_hook (inode_setsecctx,0 , dentry, cp); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +struct lsm_context lc; +char *full; +char *ctx; +char *quote; +int rc =0 ; + +if (lsm_inode_secctx_count <=1 ) +return call_int_hook (inode_setsecctx,0 , dentry, cp); + + full =kstrndup (cp->context, cp->len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (full ==NULL ) +return -ENOMEM ; + + ctx = full; +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecctx, list) { +if (strncmp (ctx, hp->lsm,strlen (hp->lsm))) { +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"security_inode_setsecctx form1 error\n" ); + rc = -EINVAL ; +break ; + } + ctx +=strlen (hp->lsm); +if (ctx[0 ] !='=' || ctx[1 ] !='\'' ) { +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"security_inode_setsecctx form2 error\n" ); + rc = -EINVAL ; +break ; + } + ctx +=2 ; + quote =strnchr (ctx, cp->len,'\'' ); +if (quote ==NULL ) { +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"security_inode_setsecctx form3 error\n" ); + rc = -EINVAL ; +break ; + } + quote[0 ] ='\0' ; +if (quote[1 ] !=',' && quote[1 ] !='\0' ) { +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"security_inode_setsecctx form4 error\n" ); + rc = -EINVAL ; +break ; + } + lc.context = ctx; + lc.len =strlen (ctx); + + ctx = quote +2 ; + + rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecctx (dentry, &lc); +if (rc) +break ; + } + +kfree (full); +return rc; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_setsecctx);int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsm_context *cp) { -return call_int_hook (inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , inode, cp); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +struct lsm_context lc; +char *final =NULL ; +char *tp; +int rc; + +if (lsm_inode_secctx_count <=1 ) +return call_int_hook (inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , inode, cp); + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list) { + rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecctx (inode, &lc); +if (rc) { +kfree (final); +return rc; + } +if (final) { + tp =kasprintf (GFP_KERNEL ,"%s,%s='%s'" , final, + hp->lsm, lc.context); +kfree (final); + }else + tp =kasprintf (GFP_KERNEL ,"%s='%s'" , hp->lsm, + lc.context); +security_release_secctx (&lc); +if (tp ==NULL ) { +kfree (final); +return -ENOMEM ; + } + final = tp; + } + cp->context = final; + cp->len =strlen (final); + cp->release = lsm_release_secctx; +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_getsecctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Re: [PATCH 69/90] LSM: Use full security context in security_inode_setsecctx
security/security.c int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp) · line 2198
Quoted 6 lines · Casey Schaufler
security/security.c +6
-0+hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecctx, list) { +if (strncmp (ctx, hp->lsm,strlen (hp->lsm))) { +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"security_inode_setsecctx form1 error\n" ); + rc = -EINVAL ; +break ; + }
Will you avoid using WARN*() ?
Since syzbot tests using panic_on_warn == 1, this WARN_ONCE() will act as panic().
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH 69/90] LSM: Use full security context in security_inode_setsecctx
Quoted 9 lines · Tetsuo Handa
security/security.c int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp) · line 2198
Quoted 6 lines · Casey Schaufler
security/security.c +6
-0+hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecctx, list) { +if (strncmp (ctx, hp->lsm,strlen (hp->lsm))) { +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"security_inode_setsecctx form1 error\n" ); + rc = -EINVAL ; +break ; + }Will you avoid using WARN*() ?
Since syzbot tests usingpanic_on_warn== 1, thisWARN_ONCE()will act aspanic().
If syzbot hits any of the WARN_ONCE()s in security_inode_setsecctx() I want it to panic and generate a report. A badly formatted inode secctx would indicate that kernfs isn't getting the string from security_inode_getsecctx() or that it is getting corrupted somehow. In either case, it would be a bug that needs fixing. I used WARN instead of BUG for the kernfs people, who might break something by accident.
If there's a strong objection to WARN_ONCE() in general, I can pull it.
Re: [PATCH 69/90] LSM: Use full security context in security_inode_setsecctx
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 9 lines · Tetsuo Handa
Quoted 6 lines · Casey Schaufler
+
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecctx, list){ + if (strncmp(ctx, hp->lsm, strlen(hp->lsm))) {
+WARN_ONCE(1, "security_inode_setsecctx form1 error\n"); + rc =-EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }Will you avoid using WARN*() ?
Since syzbot tests usingpanic_on_warn== 1, thisWARN_ONCE()will act aspanic().
Quoted 6 lines
If syzbot hits any of the WARN_ONCE()s in
security_inode_setsecctx()I want it to panic and generate a report. A badly formatted inode secctx would indicate that kernfs isn't getting the string fromsecurity_inode_getsecctx()or that it is getting corrupted somehow. In either case, it would be a bug that needs fixing. I used WARN instead of BUG for the kernfs people, who might break something by accident.
Since the code continues with -EINVAL error, I assumed that this is not a bad situation. But if this can't be triggered by invalid input from userspace, BUG() is better.
Quoted 3 lines
If there's a strong objection to
WARN_ONCE()in general, I can pull it.
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 70/90 LSM: Correct handling of ENOSYS in inode_setxattr
In reply to Casey SchauflerThe usual "bail on fail" behavior of LSM hooks doesn't work for security_inode_setxattr(). Modules are allowed to return -ENOSYS if the attribute specifed isn't one they manage. Fix the code to accomodate this unusal case. This requires changes to the hooks in SELinux and Smack.
--- security/security.c | 28 ++++++++++++++-------------- security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 ++----- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 10 +++++----- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
security/security.c +14 -14
@@ -1341,24 +1341,24 @@ int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)int security_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size,int flags) { -int ret; +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc = -ENOSYS ;if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (d_backing_inode (dentry))))return 0 ; -/* -* SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, -* so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. -*/ - ret =call_int_hook (inode_setxattr,1 , dentry, name, value, size, - flags); -if (ret ==1 ) - ret =cap_inode_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size, flags); -if (ret) -return ret; - ret =ima_inode_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size); -if (ret) -return ret; +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setxattr, list) { + rc = hp->hook.inode_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size, flags); +if (rc != -ENOSYS ) +break ; + } +if (rc == -ENOSYS ) + rc =cap_inode_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size, flags); +if (rc) +return rc; + rc =ima_inode_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size); +if (rc) +return rc;return evm_inode_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size); }
security/selinux/hooks.c +2 -5
@@ -3097,13 +3097,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,int rc =0 ;if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX )) { - rc =cap_inode_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size, flags); -if (rc) -return rc; -/* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the ordinary setattr permission. */ -return dentry_has_perm (current_cred (), dentry,FILE__SETATTR ); + rc =dentry_has_perm (current_cred (), dentry,FILE__SETATTR ); +return rc ? rc : -ENOSYS ; } sbsec =selinux_superblock (inode->i_sb);
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +5 -5
@@ -1281,7 +1281,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0) rc = -EINVAL ; }else - rc =cap_inode_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size, flags); + rc = -ENOSYS ;if (check_priv && !smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) rc = -EPERM ;
@@ -1295,11 +1295,11 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, rc = -EINVAL ; } -smk_ad_init (&ad, __func__,LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY ); -smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry (&ad, dentry); -if (rc ==0 ) { - rc =smk_curacc (smk_of_inode (d_backing_inode (dentry)),MAY_WRITE , &ad); +smk_ad_init (&ad, __func__,LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY ); +smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry (&ad, dentry); + rc =smk_curacc (smk_of_inode (d_backing_inode (dentry)), +MAY_WRITE , &ad); rc =smk_bu_inode (d_backing_inode (dentry),MAY_WRITE , rc); }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 71/90 LSM: Infrastructure security blobs for mount options
In reply to Casey SchauflerManage LSM data for mount options in the infrastructure rather than in the individual modules.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +++++ security/security.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++------------- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ 4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +5 -0
@@ -2066,6 +2066,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {int lbs_key;int lbs_msg_msg;int lbs_task; +int lbs_mnt_opts; };/*
@@ -2139,4 +2140,8 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,extern int lsm_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +void *lsm_mnt_opts_alloc (void ); +#endif +#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
security/security.c +18 -0
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_key, &blob_sizes.lbs_key);#endif +lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_mnt_opts, &blob_sizes.lbs_mnt_opts);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
@@ -315,6 +316,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS init_debug ("key blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_key);#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ +init_debug ("mnt_opts blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_mnt_opts);init_debug ("msg_msg blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);init_debug ("sock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_sock);init_debug ("superblock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
@@ -726,6 +728,21 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)return 0 ; } +/** +* lsm_mnt_opts_alloc - allocate a composite mnt_opts blob +* +* Allocate the mount options blob +* +* Returns the blob, or NULL if memory can't be allocated. +*/ +void *lsm_mnt_opts_alloc (void ) +{ +if (blob_sizes.lbs_mnt_opts ==0 ) +return NULL ; + +return kzalloc (blob_sizes.lbs_mnt_opts,GFP_KERNEL ); +} +/* * Hook list operation macros. *
@@ -939,6 +956,7 @@ void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts)if (!*mnt_opts)return ;call_void_hook (sb_free_mnt_opts, *mnt_opts); +kfree (*mnt_opts); *mnt_opts =NULL ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_free_mnt_opts);
security/selinux/hooks.c +18 -13
@@ -383,14 +383,20 @@ struct selinux_mnt_opts {const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext; }; +static void *selinux_mnt_opts (void *mnt_opts) +{ +if (mnt_opts) +return mnt_opts + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_mnt_opts; +return NULL ; +} +static void selinux_free_mnt_opts (void *mnt_opts) { -struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; +struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts =selinux_mnt_opts (mnt_opts);kfree (opts->fscontext);kfree (opts->context);kfree (opts->rootcontext);kfree (opts->defcontext); -kfree (opts); }static inline int inode_doinit (struct inode *inode)
@@ -638,7 +644,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,const struct cred *cred =current_cred ();struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =selinux_superblock (sb);struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root; -struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; +struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts =selinux_mnt_opts (mnt_opts);struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;u32 fscontext_sid =0 , context_sid =0 , rootcontext_sid =0 ;u32 defcontext_sid =0 ;
@@ -653,7 +659,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,server is ready to handle calls. */ goto out; } - rc = -EINVAL ; +/* Don't set any SELinux options. Allow any other LSM +that's on the stack to do so. */ pr_warn ("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options " "before the security server is initialized\n" ); goto out;
@@ -980,16 +987,17 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,static int selinux_add_opt (int token,const char *s,void **mnt_opts) { -struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts; +struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts =selinux_mnt_opts (*mnt_opts);if (token == Opt_seclabel)/* eaten and completely ignored */ return 0 ;if (!opts) { - opts =kzalloc (sizeof (struct selinux_mnt_opts ),GFP_KERNEL ); + opts =lsm_mnt_opts_alloc ();if (!opts)return -ENOMEM ; *mnt_opts = opts; + opts =selinux_mnt_opts (opts); }if (!s)return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -1042,10 +1050,8 @@ static int selinux_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val, int len, rc =selinux_add_opt (token, val, mnt_opts);if (unlikely (rc)) {kfree (val); -if (*mnt_opts) { +if (*mnt_opts)selinux_free_mnt_opts (*mnt_opts); - *mnt_opts =NULL ; - } }return rc; }
@@ -2611,10 +2617,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts) rc =selinux_add_opt (token, arg, mnt_opts);if (unlikely (rc)) {kfree (arg); -if (*mnt_opts) { +if (*mnt_opts)selinux_free_mnt_opts (*mnt_opts); - *mnt_opts =NULL ; - }return rc; } }else {
@@ -2637,7 +2641,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)static int selinux_sb_remount (struct super_block *sb,void *mnt_opts) { -struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; +struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts =selinux_mnt_opts (mnt_opts);struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =selinux_superblock (sb);u32 sid;int rc;
@@ -6641,6 +6645,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS .lbs_key = sizeof(struct key_security_struct),#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ + .lbs_mnt_opts = sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct), .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +13 -6
@@ -574,26 +574,33 @@ struct smack_mnt_opts {const char *fsdefault, *fsfloor, *fshat, *fsroot, *fstransmute; }; +static void *smack_mnt_opts (void *opts) +{ +if (opts) +return opts + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_mnt_opts; +return NULL ; +} +static void smack_free_mnt_opts (void *mnt_opts) { -struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; +struct smack_mnt_opts *opts =smack_mnt_opts (mnt_opts);kfree (opts->fsdefault);kfree (opts->fsfloor);kfree (opts->fshat);kfree (opts->fsroot);kfree (opts->fstransmute); -kfree (opts); }static int smack_add_opt (int token,const char *s,void **mnt_opts) { -struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts; +struct smack_mnt_opts *opts =smack_mnt_opts (*mnt_opts);if (!opts) { - opts =kzalloc (sizeof (struct smack_mnt_opts ),GFP_KERNEL ); + opts =lsm_mnt_opts_alloc ();if (!opts)return -ENOMEM ; *mnt_opts = opts; + opts =smack_mnt_opts (opts); }if (!s)return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -741,7 +748,6 @@ static int smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)kfree (arg);if (*mnt_opts)smack_free_mnt_opts (*mnt_opts); - *mnt_opts =NULL ;return rc; } }else {
@@ -784,7 +790,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,struct superblock_smack *sp =smack_superblock (sb);struct inode_smack *isp;struct smack_known *skp; -struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; +struct smack_mnt_opts *opts =smack_mnt_opts (mnt_opts);bool transmute = false;if (sp->smk_flags &SMK_SB_INITIALIZED )
@@ -4586,6 +4592,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS .lbs_key = sizeof(struct smack_known *),#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ + .lbs_mnt_opts = sizeof(struct smack_mnt_opts), .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *), .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack), .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 72/90 LSM: Fix for security_init_inode_security
In reply to Casey SchauflerThe code assumes you can call evm_init_inode_security more than once for an inode, but that won't work because security.evm is a single value attribute. This does not make EVM work properly, but does allow the security modules to initialize their attributes.
--- security/security.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
security/security.c +25 -10
@@ -1102,11 +1102,24 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (inode)))return 0 ; -if (!initxattrs) -return call_int_hook (inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP , inode, - dir, qstr,NULL ,NULL ,NULL ); +if (!initxattrs) { + rc = -EOPNOTSUPP ; +hlist_for_each_entry (p, + &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security, + list) { + rc = p->hook.inode_init_security (inode, dir, qstr, +NULL ,NULL ,NULL ); +if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ) { + rc =0 ; +continue ; + } +if (rc) +break ; + } +return rc; + } - repo =kzalloc ((LSM_COUNT *2 ) *sizeof (*repo),GFP_NOFS ); + repo =kzalloc ((LSM_COUNT +1 ) *sizeof (*repo),GFP_NOFS );if (repo ==NULL )return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -1117,18 +1130,20 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, rc = p->hook.inode_init_security (inode, dir, qstr, &repo[i].name, &repo[i].value, &repo[i].value_len); +if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ) +continue ;if (rc) goto out; - rc =evm_inode_init_security (inode, &repo[i], &repo[i +1 ]); -if (rc) - goto out; - - i +=2 ; + i++; } + rc =evm_inode_init_security (inode, &repo[i], &repo[i +1 ]); +if (rc) + goto out; + rc =initxattrs (inode, repo, fs_data); out: -for (i-- ; i >=0 ; i--) +for (i++ ; i >=0 ; i--)kfree (repo[i].value);kfree (repo);return (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ) ?0 : rc;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 73/90 Smack: Advertise the secid to netlabel
In reply to Casey SchauflerAdd the secid to the attributes shared with netlabel.
--- security/smack/smack_access.c | 8 ++++++-- security/smack/smackfs.c | 8 ++++++-- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_access.c +6 -2
@@ -549,8 +549,12 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len) skp->smk_known = smack; skp->smk_secid = smack_next_secid++; skp->smk_netlabel.domain = skp->smk_known; - skp->smk_netlabel.flags = -NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN |NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL ; +lsm_export_init (&skp->smk_netlabel.attr.le); + skp->smk_netlabel.attr.le.flags =LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ; + skp->smk_netlabel.attr.le.smack = skp->smk_secid; + skp->smk_netlabel.flags =NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | +NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL | +NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ;/* * If direct labeling works use it. * Otherwise use mapped labeling.
security/smack/smackfs.c +6 -2
@@ -2953,8 +2953,12 @@ static struct vfsmount *smackfs_mount;static int __init smk_preset_netlabel (struct smack_known *skp) { skp->smk_netlabel.domain = skp->smk_known; - skp->smk_netlabel.flags = -NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN |NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL ; +lsm_export_init (&skp->smk_netlabel.attr.le); + skp->smk_netlabel.attr.le.flags =LSM_EXPORT_SMACK ; + skp->smk_netlabel.attr.le.smack = skp->smk_secid; + skp->smk_netlabel.flags =NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | +NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL | +NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ;return smk_netlbl_mls (smack_cipso_direct, skp->smk_known, &skp->smk_netlabel,strlen (skp->smk_known)); }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 74/90 LSM: Change error detection for UDP peer security
In reply to Casey Schauflersecurity_socket_getpeercred_dgram() supplies secids for use by security_secid_to_secctx(). Sometimes a secid will be invalid. Move the check for an invalid secid from the LSM specific socket_getpeercred_dgram hooks into the secid_to_secctx hooks. This allows for the case where one LSM (Smack) will provide a secid and another (SELinux) to have an error for the same call. Regardless of which LSM the caller wants to see the peer security attributes for the correct result will be provided.
As there is no longer any reason for security_secid_to_secctx() to return a value make all the secid_to_secctx functions void instead of int. Add checking for a invalid secid to the Smack and SELinux secid_to_secctx hooks.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +-- include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++------ net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 +--- security/security.c | 7 +++---- security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 +++++++------ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 17 ++++++++--------- 6 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +1 -2
@@ -883,7 +883,6 @@* @sock is the socket * @skb is the skbuff for the packet being queried * @l is a pointer to a buffer in which to copy the security data -* Return 0 on success, error on failure. * @sk_alloc_security: * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field, * which is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets.
@@ -1699,7 +1698,7 @@ union security_list_options {int (*socket_getpeersec_stream)(struct socket *sock,char __user *optval,int __user *optlen,unsigned len); -int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(struct socket *sock, +void (*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,struct lsm_export *l);int (*sk_alloc_security)(struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority);
include/linux/security.h +5 -6
@@ -1288,8 +1288,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);int security_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_socket_getpeersec_stream (struct socket *sock,char __user *optval,int __user *optlen,unsigned len); -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb, -struct lsm_export *l); +void security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsm_export *l);int security_sk_alloc (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority);void security_sk_free (struct sock *sk);void security_sk_clone (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1427,11 +1427,10 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __return -ENOPROTOOPT ; } -static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock, -struct sk_buff *skb, -struct lsm_export *l) +static inline void security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock, +struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsm_export *l) { -return -ENOPROTOOPT ; }static inline int security_sk_alloc (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority)
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +1 -3
@@ -134,9 +134,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)struct lsm_context lc;int err; - err =security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (NULL , skb, &le); -if (err) -return ; +security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (NULL , skb, &le); err =security_secid_to_secctx (&le, &lc);if (err)
security/security.c +3 -4
@@ -2402,12 +2402,11 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, optval, optlen, len); } -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb, -struct lsm_export *l) +void security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsm_export *l) {lsm_export_init (l); -return call_int_hook (socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT , sock, skb, - l); +call_void_hook (socket_getpeersec_dgram, sock, skb, l); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
security/selinux/hooks.c +7 -6
@@ -4939,9 +4939,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,return err; } -static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock, -struct sk_buff *skb, -struct lsm_export *l) +static void selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock, +struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsm_export *l) {u32 peer_secid =SECSID_NULL ;u16 family;
@@ -4964,9 +4964,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, out:selinux_export_secid (l, peer_secid); -if (peer_secid ==SECSID_NULL ) -return -EINVAL ; -return 0 ; +return ; }static int selinux_sk_alloc_security (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority)
@@ -6313,6 +6311,9 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)u32 secid;selinux_import_secid (l, &secid); +if (secid ==SECSID_NULL ) +return -EINVAL ; + cp->release = selinux_release_secctx;if (l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH ) return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +8 -9
@@ -3988,9 +3988,9 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,* * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent */ -static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock, -struct sk_buff *skb, -struct lsm_export *l) +static void smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock, +struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsm_export *l) {struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
@@ -3998,7 +3998,6 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,struct smack_known *skp;int family =PF_UNSPEC ;u32 s =0 ;/* 0 is the invalid secid */ -int rc;if (skb !=NULL ) {if (skb->protocol ==htons (ETH_P_IP ))
@@ -4028,8 +4027,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,if (sock !=NULL && sock->sk !=NULL ) ssp =smack_sock (sock->sk);netlbl_secattr_init (&secattr); - rc =netlbl_skbuff_getattr (skb, family, &secattr); -if (rc ==0 ) { +if (netlbl_skbuff_getattr (skb, family, &secattr) ==0 ) { skp =smack_from_secattr (&secattr, ssp); s = skp->smk_secid; }
@@ -4044,9 +4042,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,break ; }smack_export_secid (l, s); -if (s ==0 ) -return -EINVAL ; -return 0 ; +return ; }/**
@@ -4458,6 +4454,9 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, struct lsm_context *cp)u32 secid;smack_import_secid (l, &secid); +if (secid ==0 ) +return -EINVAL ; + skp =smack_from_secid (secid); cp->context = (l->flags &LSM_EXPORT_LENGTH ) ?NULL : skp->smk_known;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 75/90 Smack: Fix setting of the CIPSO MLS_CAT flags
In reply to Casey SchauflerDon't tell CIPSO that a netlabel created by Smack has categories set when it does not.
--- security/smack/smack_access.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/smack/smack_access.c +5 -1
@@ -494,8 +494,8 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int level, char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,int cat;int rc;int byte; +bool has = false; - sap->flags |=NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT ; sap->attr.mls.lvl = level; sap->attr.mls.cat =NULL ;
@@ -503,6 +503,7 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int level, char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,for (m =0x80 ; m !=0 ; m >>=1 , cat++) {if ((m & *cp) ==0 )continue ; + has = true; rc =netlbl_catmap_setbit (&sap->attr.mls.cat, cat,GFP_KERNEL );if (rc <0 ) {
@@ -511,6 +512,9 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int level, char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, } } +if (has) + sap->flags |=NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT ; +return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 76/90 Smack: Set netlabel flags properly on new label import
In reply to Casey SchauflerEnsure that all netlabel flags are correctly set on the netlabel attribute of a newly imported Smack label.
--- security/smack/smackfs.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
security/smack/smackfs.c +3 -0
@@ -931,6 +931,9 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,smack_catset_bit (cat, mapcatset); } + skp->smk_netlabel.flags =NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | +NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL | +NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ; rc =smk_netlbl_mls (maplevel, mapcatset, &ncats,SMK_CIPSOLEN );if (rc >=0 ) {netlbl_catmap_free (skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 77/90 Netlabel: Add a secattr comparison API function
In reply to Casey SchauflerAdd a new API function netlbl_secattr_equal() that determines if two secattr structures would result in the same on-wire representation.
--- include/net/netlabel.h | 8 ++++++ net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+)
include/net/netlabel.h +8 -0
@@ -472,6 +472,8 @@ int netlbl_catmap_setlong(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap,u32 offset, unsigned long bitmap, gfp_t flags); +bool netlbl_secattr_equal (const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr_a, +const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr_b);/* Bitmap functions */
@@ -623,6 +625,12 @@ static inline int netlbl_catmap_setlong(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap, {return 0 ; } +static inline bool netlbl_secattr_equal ( +const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr_a, +const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr_b) +{ +return true; +}static inline int netlbl_enabled (void ) {return 0 ;
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c +50 -0
56 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 78/90 Smack: Let netlabel do the work on the ambient domain
In reply to Casey SchauflerDon't delete the netlabel data from sockets on the ambient domain as netlabel will do it correctly without any help.
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 31 ++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +8 -23
@@ -2403,37 +2403,27 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)/** * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket * @sk: the socket -* @labeled: socket label scheme * * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a * secattr and attach it to the socket. * * Returns 0 on success or an error code */ -static int smack_netlabel (struct sock *sk,int labeled) +static int smack_netlabel (struct sock *sk) {struct smack_known *skp;struct socket_smack *ssp =smack_sock (sk);int rc =0 ;/* -* Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the +* The netlabel code will handle changing the * packet labeling based on the label. -* The case of a single label host is different, because -* a single label host should never get a labeled packet -* even though the label is usually associated with a packet -* label. */ local_bh_disable ();bh_lock_sock_nested (sk); -if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient || - labeled ==SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET ) -netlbl_sock_delattr (sk); -else { - skp = ssp->smk_out; - rc =netlbl_sock_setattr (sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel); - } + skp = ssp->smk_out; + rc =netlbl_sock_setattr (sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel);bh_unlock_sock (sk);local_bh_enable ();
@@ -2455,8 +2445,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)static int smack_netlabel_send (struct sock *sk,struct sockaddr_in *sap) {struct smack_known *skp; -int rc; -int sk_lbl; +int rc =0 ;struct smack_known *hkp;struct socket_smack *ssp =smack_sock (sk);struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -2472,19 +2461,15 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap) ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port; ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;#endif - sk_lbl =SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET ; skp = ssp->smk_out; rc =smk_access (skp, hkp,MAY_WRITE , &ad); rc =smk_bu_note ("IPv4 host check" , skp, hkp,MAY_WRITE , rc); - }else { - sk_lbl =SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET ; - rc =0 ; }rcu_read_unlock ();if (rc !=0 )return rc; -return smack_netlabel (sk, sk_lbl); +return smack_netlabel (sk); }#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IPV6 )
@@ -2722,7 +2707,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT ) ==0 ) { ssp->smk_out = skp;if (sock->sk->sk_family ==PF_INET ) { - rc =smack_netlabel (sock->sk,SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET ); + rc =smack_netlabel (sock->sk);if (rc !=0 ) printk(KERN_WARNING "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
@@ -2773,7 +2758,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,/* * Set the outbound netlbl. */ -return smack_netlabel (sock->sk,SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET ); +return smack_netlabel (sock->sk); }/**
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 79/90 Smack: Don't set the socket label on each send
In reply to Casey SchauflerThe socket does not need to be relabeled on each send. Remove the code that does that.
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1 -4
@@ -2466,10 +2466,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap) rc =smk_bu_note ("IPv4 host check" , skp, hkp,MAY_WRITE , rc); }rcu_read_unlock (); -if (rc !=0 ) -return rc; - -return smack_netlabel (sk); +return rc; }#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IPV6 )
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 80/90 Smack: Let netlabel do the work on connections
In reply to Casey SchauflerRather than removing the netlabel socket attribute on connections set the ambient domain. This is more in line with the way netlabel "should" be used.
--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1 -1
@@ -4143,7 +4143,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,if (hskp ==NULL ) rc =netlbl_req_setattr (req, &skp->smk_netlabel);else -netlbl_req_delattr (req); + rc =netlbl_req_setattr (req, &smack_net_ambient->smk_netlabel);return rc; }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH 81/90 Netlabel: Return the labeling type on socket
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange netlbl_sock_setattr() to return the labeling type of the domain. This allows the labeling types to be compared when two LSMs want to determine how a socket should be used.
--- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 25 ++++++++++++------------- security/selinux/netlabel.c | 11 ++++------- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c +12 -13
@@ -974,15 +974,14 @@ int netlbl_enabled(void)* Attach the correct label to the given socket using the security attributes * specified in @secattr. This function requires exclusive access to @sk, * which means it either needs to be in the process of being created or locked. -* Returns zero on success, -EDESTADDRREQ if the domain is configured to use -* network address selectors (can't blindly label the socket), and negative -* values on all other failures. +* Returns the labeling type of the domain, or negative values on failures. * */ int netlbl_sock_setattr (struct sock *sk,u16 family,const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { +int rc;int ret_val;struct netlbl_dom_map *dom_entry;
@@ -994,17 +993,17 @@ int netlbl_sock_setattr(struct sock *sk, }switch (family) {case AF_INET : + ret_val = dom_entry->def.type;switch (dom_entry->def.type) {case NETLBL_NLTYPE_ADDRSELECT : - ret_val = -EDESTADDRREQ ;break ;case NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4 : - ret_val =cipso_v4_sock_setattr (sk, - dom_entry->def.cipso, - secattr); + rc =cipso_v4_sock_setattr (sk, dom_entry->def.cipso, + secattr); +if (rc <0 ) + ret_val = rc;break ;case NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED : - ret_val =0 ;break ;default : ret_val = -ENOENT ;
@@ -1012,17 +1011,17 @@ int netlbl_sock_setattr(struct sock *sk,break ;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IPV6 )case AF_INET6 : + ret_val = dom_entry->def.type;switch (dom_entry->def.type) {case NETLBL_NLTYPE_ADDRSELECT : - ret_val = -EDESTADDRREQ ;break ;case NETLBL_NLTYPE_CALIPSO : - ret_val =calipso_sock_setattr (sk, - dom_entry->def.calipso, - secattr); + rc =calipso_sock_setattr (sk, dom_entry->def.calipso, + secattr); +if (rc <0 ) + ret_val = rc;break ;case NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED : - ret_val =0 ;break ;default : ret_val = -ENOENT ;
security/selinux/netlabel.c +4 -7
@@ -418,15 +418,12 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)if (secattr ==NULL )return -ENOMEM ; rc =netlbl_sock_setattr (sk, family, secattr); -switch (rc) { -case 0 : - sksec->nlbl_state =NLBL_LABELED ; -break ; -case -EDESTADDRREQ : +if (rc ==NETLBL_NLTYPE_ADDRSELECT ) sksec->nlbl_state =NLBL_REQSKB ; +else if (rc >=0 ) + sksec->nlbl_state =NLBL_LABELED ; +if (rc >0 ) rc =0 ; -break ; - }return rc; }
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +2 -0
@@ -2424,6 +2424,8 @@ static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk) skp = ssp->smk_out; rc =netlbl_sock_setattr (sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel); +if (rc >0 ) + rc =0 ;bh_unlock_sock (sk);local_bh_enable ();
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Quoted 25 lines · Casey Schaufler
This patchset provides the changes required for the any security module to stack safely with any other.
A new process attribute identifies which security module information should be reported by
SO_PEERSECand the/proc/.../attr/currentinterface. This is provided by/proc/.../attr/display. Writing the name of the security module desired to this interface will set which LSM hooks will be called for this information. The first security module providing the hooks will be used by default.The use of integer based security tokens (secids) is generally (but not completely) replaced by a structure
lsm_export. Thelsm_exportstructure can contain information for each of the security modules that export information outside the LSM layer.The LSM interfaces that provide "secctx" text strings have been changed to use a structure "
lsm_context" instead of a pointer/length pair. In some cases the interfaces used a "char *" pointer and in others a "void *". This was necessary to ensure that the correct release mechanism for the text is used. It also makes many of the interfaces cleaner.
Quoted 8 lines
Security modules that use Netlabel must agree on the labels to be used on outgoing packets. If the modules do not agree on the label option to be used the operation will fail.
Netfilter secmarks are restricted to a single security module. The first module using the facility will "own" the secmarks.
Is it expected that enabling all security modules with this change will yield permission denials on packet send/receive (e.g. sendmsg() fails with permission denied), even without any configuration of NetLabel or SECMARK? That's what I see.
Quoted 67 lines
git://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.1-v2-fullSigned-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- drivers/android/binder.c | 25 +- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 6 +- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 31 +- fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +- fs/nfs/inode.c | 13 +- fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 +- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 17 +- fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +- fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 8 +- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 +- fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 +- fs/proc/base.c | 1 + include/linux/cred.h | 3 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 119 +++--- include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 +- include/linux/security.h | 159 ++++++-- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/netlabel.h | 18 +- include/net/scm.h | 14 +- kernel/audit.c | 43 +-- kernel/audit.h | 9 +- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 77 ++-- kernel/cred.c | 15 +- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 +- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 14 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 29 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 16 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 35 +- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 8 +- net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 9 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 125 ++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 101 +++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +- security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 +- security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +- security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 9 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 64 ++-- security/apparmor/secid.c | 42 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +- security/security.c | 653 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- security/selinux/hooks.c | 310 +++++++-------- security/selinux/include/audit.h | 5 +- security/selinux/include/netlabel.h | 7 + security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 43 ++- security/selinux/netlabel.c | 69 ++-- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +- security/smack/smack.h | 34 ++ security/smack/smack_access.c | 14 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 388 ++++++++++--------- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 48 ++- security/smack/smackfs.c | 23 +- 60 files changed, 1855 insertions(+), 961 deletions(-)
Casey Schaufler
maintainerQuoted 31 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 30 lines · Casey Schaufler
This patchset provides the changes required for the any security module to stack safely with any other.
A new process attribute identifies which security module information should be reported by
SO_PEERSECand the/proc/.../attr/currentinterface. This is provided by/proc/.../attr/display. Writing the name of the security module desired to this interface will set which LSM hooks will be called for this information. The first security module providing the hooks will be used by default.The use of integer based security tokens (secids) is generally (but not completely) replaced by a structure
lsm_export. Thelsm_exportstructure can contain information for each of the security modules that export information outside the LSM layer.The LSM interfaces that provide "secctx" text strings have been changed to use a structure "
lsm_context" instead of a pointer/length pair. In some cases the interfaces used a "char *" pointer and in others a "void *". This was necessary to ensure that the correct release mechanism for the text is used. It also makes many of the interfaces cleaner.Security modules that use Netlabel must agree on the labels to be used on outgoing packets. If the modules do not agree on the label option to be used the operation will fail.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Netfilter secmarks are restricted to a single security module. The first module using the facility will "own" the secmarks.
Is it expected that enabling all security modules with this change will yield permission denials on packet send/receive (e.g.
sendmsg()fails with permission denied), even without any configuration of NetLabel or SECMARK? That's what I see.
Yes.
Smack is much more aggressive about using labeled networking than SELinux. Smack tells Netlabel to label networks, whereas SELinux expects them to be unlabeled. Smack has the concept of an "ambient" label, which is applied to unlabeled packets, and for which packets are sent unlabeled. SELinux only uses netlabel for the MLS component, whereas Smack uses it for the entire label. In short, it's amazing if there's a case where they do agree.
You can make the default configuration work better by specifying that the Smack "floor" label be treated more like the unconfined_t.
# echo _ 0 0 0 > /sys/fs/smackfs/cipso2 # echo NotFloor > /sys/fs/smackfs/ambient
Will result in a situation where the two MAC systems will agree much more often.
Quoted 70 lines
Quoted 69 lines
git://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.1-v2-fullSigned-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>---
drivers/android/binder.c | 25 +- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 6 +- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 31 +- fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +- fs/nfs/inode.c | 13 +- fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 +- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 17 +- fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +- fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 8 +- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 +- fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 +- fs/proc/base.c | 1 + include/linux/cred.h | 3 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 119 +++--- include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 +- include/linux/security.h | 159 ++++++-- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/netlabel.h | 18 +- include/net/scm.h | 14 +- kernel/audit.c | 43 +-- kernel/audit.h | 9 +- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 77 ++-- kernel/cred.c | 15 +- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 +- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 14 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 29 +-net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c| 16 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 35 +- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 8 +- net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 9 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 125 ++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 101 +++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +- security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 +- security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +- security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 9 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 64 ++-- security/apparmor/secid.c | 42 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +- security/security.c | 653
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 310 +++++++-------- security/selinux/include/audit.h | 5 +- security/selinux/include/netlabel.h | 7 + security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 43 ++- security/selinux/netlabel.c | 69 ++-- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +- security/smack/smack.h | 34 ++ security/smack/smack_access.c | 14 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 388 ++++++++++--------- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 48 ++- security/smack/smackfs.c | 23 +-60 files changed, 1855 insertions(+), 961 deletions(-)
Quoted 49 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 31 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 30 lines · Casey Schaufler
This patchset provides the changes required for the any security module to stack safely with any other.
A new process attribute identifies which security module information should be reported by
SO_PEERSECand the/proc/.../attr/currentinterface. This is provided by/proc/.../attr/display. Writing the name of the security module desired to this interface will set which LSM hooks will be called for this information. The first security module providing the hooks will be used by default.The use of integer based security tokens (secids) is generally (but not completely) replaced by a structure
lsm_export. Thelsm_exportstructure can contain information for each of the security modules that export information outside the LSM layer.The LSM interfaces that provide "secctx" text strings have been changed to use a structure "
lsm_context" instead of a pointer/length pair. In some cases the interfaces used a "char *" pointer and in others a "void *". This was necessary to ensure that the correct release mechanism for the text is used. It also makes many of the interfaces cleaner.Security modules that use Netlabel must agree on the labels to be used on outgoing packets. If the modules do not agree on the label option to be used the operation will fail.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Netfilter secmarks are restricted to a single security module. The first module using the facility will "own" the secmarks.
Is it expected that enabling all security modules with this change will yield permission denials on packet send/receive (e.g.
sendmsg()fails with permission denied), even without any configuration of NetLabel or SECMARK? That's what I see.Yes.
Smack is much more aggressive about using labeled networking than SELinux. Smack tells Netlabel to label networks, whereas SELinux expects them to be unlabeled. Smack has the concept of an "ambient" label, which is applied to unlabeled packets, and for which packets are sent unlabeled. SELinux only uses netlabel for the MLS component, whereas Smack uses it for the entire label. In short, it's amazing if there's a case where they do agree.
Quoted 8 lines
You can make the default configuration work better by specifying that the Smack "floor" label be treated more like the
unconfined_t.# echo _ 0 0 0 > /sys/fs/smackfs/cipso2 # echo NotFloor > /sys/fs/smackfs/ambientWill result in a situation where the two MAC systems will agree much more often.
Not sure that should be required given that SELinux doesn't enable labeled networking at all by default, so there is no real conflict until/unless someone configures labeled networking for SELinux. I'll defer to Paul on that question.
Given this restriction, to what extent have you tested Smack+SELinux together and what worked and didn't work? Everything except for networking-related tests?
Quoted 72 lines
Quoted 72 lines
Quoted 71 lines
git://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.1-v2-fullSigned-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>---
drivers/android/binder.c | 25 +- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 6 +- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 31 +- fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +- fs/nfs/inode.c | 13 +- fs/nfs/internal.h | 8 +- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 17 +- fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 16 +- fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 8 +- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 14 +- fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 7 +- fs/proc/base.c | 1 + include/linux/cred.h | 3 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 119 +++--- include/linux/nfs4.h | 8 +- include/linux/security.h | 159 ++++++-- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/netlabel.h | 18 +- include/net/scm.h | 14 +- kernel/audit.c | 43 +-- kernel/audit.h | 9 +- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 77 ++-- kernel/cred.c | 15 +- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 13 +- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 14 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 29 +-net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c| 16 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 35 +- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 8 +- net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 9 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 125 ++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 101 +++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 2 +- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +- security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 +- security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +- security/apparmor/include/secid.h | 9 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 64 ++-- security/apparmor/secid.c | 42 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +- security/security.c | 653
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 310 +++++++-------- security/selinux/include/audit.h | 5 +- security/selinux/include/netlabel.h | 7 + security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 43 ++- security/selinux/netlabel.c | 69 ++-- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +- security/smack/smack.h | 34 ++ security/smack/smack_access.c | 14 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 388 ++++++++++--------- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 48 ++- security/smack/smackfs.c | 23 +-60 files changed, 1855 insertions(+), 961 deletions(-)
Casey Schaufler
maintainerQuoted 53 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 52 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 31 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 30 lines · Casey Schaufler
This patchset provides the changes required for the any security module to stack safely with any other.
A new process attribute identifies which security module information should be reported by
SO_PEERSECand the/proc/.../attr/currentinterface. This is provided by/proc/.../attr/display. Writing the name of the security module desired to this interface will set which LSM hooks will be called for this information. The first security module providing the hooks will be used by default.The use of integer based security tokens (secids) is generally (but not completely) replaced by a structure
lsm_export. Thelsm_exportstructure can contain information for each of the security modules that export information outside the LSM layer.The LSM interfaces that provide "secctx" text strings have been changed to use a structure "
lsm_context" instead of a pointer/length pair. In some cases the interfaces used a "char *" pointer and in others a "void *". This was necessary to ensure that the correct release mechanism for the text is used. It also makes many of the interfaces cleaner.Security modules that use Netlabel must agree on the labels to be used on outgoing packets. If the modules do not agree on the label option to be used the operation will fail.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Netfilter secmarks are restricted to a single security module. The first module using the facility will "own" the secmarks.
Is it expected that enabling all security modules with this change will yield permission denials on packet send/receive (e.g.
sendmsg()fails with permission denied), even without any configuration of NetLabel or SECMARK? That's what I see.Yes.
Smack is much more aggressive about using labeled networking than SELinux. Smack tells Netlabel to label networks, whereas SELinux expects them to be unlabeled. Smack has the concept of an "ambient" label, which is applied to unlabeled packets, and for which packets are sent unlabeled. SELinux only uses netlabel for the MLS component, whereas Smack uses it for the entire label. In short, it's amazing if there's a case where they do agree.
You can make the default configuration work better by specifying that the Smack "floor" label be treated more like the
unconfined_t.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
# echo _ 0 0 0 > /sys/fs/smackfs/cipso2 # echo NotFloor > /sys/fs/smackfs/ambientWill result in a situation where the two MAC systems will agree much more often.
Not sure that should be required given that SELinux doesn't enable labeled networking at all by default,
SELinux doesn't. Smack does. Smack always enables labeled networking.
Quoted 1 line
so there is no real conflict until/unless someone configures labeled networking for SELinux.
Labeled networking is independent of the security modules. Netlabel provides mechanism and leaves policy up to whoever might look at the lsm_secattr. Once Smack sets the default labeling everyone get the labels.
Quoted 3 lines
I'll defer to Paul on that question.
Given this restriction, to what extent have you tested Smack+SELinux together and what worked and didn't work? Everything except for networking-related tests?
Exporting security information, either by netlabel, netfilter secmarks or security contexts has always been the challenge. User space has never had to deal with the possibility that there might be more than one security module to deal with. A system that assumes a particular security module, as do Fedora and Ubuntu, will have some opportunities for improvement in the full stacking world.
I have been using Fedora 29 as a primary testbed. The Fedora user space expects SELinux and so long as SELinux appears before Smack in the LSM list, it's happy except for the networking. If you put Smack ahead of SELinux the user space fails when it tries to get or set SELinux attributes. This is because the kernel uses the first module providing the interfaces like SO_PEERSEC, and the code only wants to see SELinux attributes.
I'm not 100% sure I can explain the behavior of overlayfs in the combined environment, but then I'm not sure I really understand how it's expected to work in any case.