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added ima hook for buffer, being enabled as a policy

RFC PATCH In review Prakhar Srivastava 6 participants 13 messages Apr 24, 2019 – Apr 26, 2019

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#0 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 1/5 added ima hook for buffer, being enabled as a policy

From: Prakhar Srivastava <[email protected]>

---
Currently for soft reboot(kexec_file_load) the kernel file and signature is measured by IMA. The cmdline args used to load the kernel is not measured.
The boot aggregate that gets calculated will have no change since the EFI loader has not been triggered.
Adding the kexec cmdline args measure and kernel version will add some attestable criteria.

This adds a new ima hook ima_buffer_check and a policy entry BUFFER_CHECK. This enables buffer has measurements into ima log

 Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy |  1 +
 include/linux/ima.h                  | 13 +++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h         |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c    | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  | 14 +++-
 5 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +1 -0
index bb0f9a135e21..676088c7ab26 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ Description:
 		base: 	func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
 				[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
 				[KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
+				[BUFFER_CHECK]
 			mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
 			       [[^]MAY_EXEC]
 			fsmagic:= hex value
include/linux/ima.h +12 -1
index 7f6952f8d6aa..733d0cb9dedc 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,12 @@
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 struct linux_binprm;
 
+enum __buffer_id {
+	KERNEL_VERSION,
+	KEXEC_CMDLINE,
+	MAX_BUFFER_ID = KEXEC_CMDLINE
+} buffer_id;
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA
 extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened);
@@ -23,7 +29,7 @@ extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 			      enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
-
+extern void ima_buffer_check(const void *buff, int size, enum buffer_id id);
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
 extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
 #endif
@@ -65,6 +71,11 @@ static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return;
 }
 
+static inline void ima_buffer_check(const void *buff, int size,
+			enum buffer_id id)
+{
+	return;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +1 -0
index b563fbd4d122..b71f2f6f7421 100644
@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ enum ima_hooks {
 	FIRMWARE_CHECK,
 	KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
 	KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
+	BUFFER_CHECK,
 	POLICY_CHECK,
 	MAX_CHECK
 };
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +95 -0

107 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +13 -1
index 3ab1067db624..cefe1a188f31 100644
@@ -231,6 +231,12 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	int i;
 
+	// Incase of BUFFER_CHECK, Inode is NULL
+	if (!inode) {
+		if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func))
+			return true;
+		return false;
+	}
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
 	    (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
 		return false;
@@ -665,6 +671,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK")
 				 == 0)
 				entry->func = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BUFFER_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = BUFFER_CHECK;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0)
 				entry->func = POLICY_CHECK;
 			else
@@ -944,7 +952,7 @@ enum {
 	func_file = 0, func_mmap, func_bprm,
 	func_module, func_firmware, func_post,
 	func_kexec_kernel, func_kexec_initramfs,
-	func_policy
+	func_buffer, func_policy
 };
 
 static char *func_tokens[] = {
@@ -956,6 +964,7 @@ static char *func_tokens[] = {
 	"POST_SETATTR",
 	"KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK",
 	"KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK",
+	"BUFFER_CHECK",
 	"POLICY_CHECK"
 };
 
@@ -1027,6 +1036,9 @@ static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_hooks func)
 	case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
 		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_kexec_initramfs));
 		break;
+	case BUFFER_CHECK:
+		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_buffer));
+		break;
 	case POLICY_CHECK:
 		seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_func), ft(func_policy));
 		break;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#1 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 2/5 use event name instead of enum to make the call generic

From: Prakhar Srivastava <[email protected]>

---

Currently for soft reboot(kexec_file_load) the kernel file and signature is measured by IMA. The cmdline args used to load the kernel is not measured.
The boot aggregate that gets calculated will have no change since the EFI loader has not been triggered.
Adding the kexec cmdline args measure and kernel version will add some attestable criteria.

remove enums to control type of buffers entries, instead pass the event name to be used.

 include/linux/ima.h               | 10 ++--------
 kernel/kexec_file.c               |  3 +++
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h      |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 30 ++++++++++--------------------
 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
include/linux/ima.h +2 -8
index 733d0cb9dedc..5e41507c57e5 100644
@@ -14,12 +14,6 @@
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 struct linux_binprm;
 
-enum __buffer_id {
-	KERNEL_VERSION,
-	KEXEC_CMDLINE,
-	MAX_BUFFER_ID = KEXEC_CMDLINE
-} buffer_id;
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA
 extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened);
@@ -29,7 +23,7 @@ extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 			      enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
-extern void ima_buffer_check(const void *buff, int size, enum buffer_id id);
+extern void ima_buffer_check(const void *buff, int size, char *eventname);
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
 extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
 #endif
@@ -72,7 +66,7 @@ static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
 }
 
 static inline void ima_buffer_check(const void *buff, int size,
-			enum buffer_id id)
+			char *eventname)
 {
 	return;
 }
kernel/kexec_file.c +3 -0
index b118735fea9d..2a5234eb4b28 100644
@@ -182,6 +182,9 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			goto out;
 		}
+
+		ima_buffer_check(image->cmdline_buf, cmdline_len - 1,
+				"kexec_cmdline");
 	}
 
 	/* Call arch image load handlers */
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +1 -1
index b71f2f6f7421..fcade3c103ed 100644
@@ -181,8 +181,8 @@ enum ima_hooks {
 	FIRMWARE_CHECK,
 	KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
 	KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
-	BUFFER_CHECK,
 	POLICY_CHECK,
+	BUFFER_CHECK,
 	MAX_CHECK
 };
 
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +10 -20
index 6408cadaadbb..da82c705a5ed 100644
@@ -160,8 +160,7 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
  * (Instead of using the file hash the buffer hash is used).
  * @buff - The buffer that needs to be added to the log
  * @size - size of buffer(in bytes)
- * @id - buffer id, this is differentiator for the various buffers
- * that can be measured.
+ * @id - eventname, event name to be used for buffer measurement.
  *
  * The buffer passed is added to the ima logs.
  * If the sig template is used, then the sig field contains the buffer.
@@ -170,7 +169,7 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
  * On error cases surface errors from ima calls.
  */
 static int process_buffer_measurement(const void *buff, int size,
-				enum buffer_id id)
+				char *eventname)
 {
 	int ret = -EINVAL;
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
@@ -185,23 +184,13 @@ static int process_buffer_measurement(const void *buff, int size,
 	int violation = 0;
 	int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
 
-	if (!buff || size ==  0)
+	if (!buff || size ==  0 || !eventname)
 		goto err_out;
 
 	if (ima_get_action(NULL, 0, BUFFER_CHECK, &pcr) != IMA_MEASURE)
 		goto err_out;
 
-	switch (buffer_id) {
-	case KERNEL_VERSION:
-		name = "Kernel-version";
-		break;
-	case KEXEC_CMDLINE:
-		name = "Kexec-cmdline";
-		break;
-	default:
-		goto err_out;
-	}
-
+	name = eventname;
 	memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
 	memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
 
@@ -452,15 +441,16 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
  * ima_buffer_check - based on policy, collect & store buffer measurement
  * @buf: pointer to buffer
  * @size: size of buffer
- * @buffer_id: caller identifier
+ * @eventname: caller identifier
  *
  * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised.  The buffer identifier
- * is used as the measurement list entry name (eg. boot_cmdline).
+ * is used as the measurement list entry name (eg. boot_cmdline,
+ * kernel_version).
  */
-void ima_buffer_check(const void *buf, int size, enum buffer_id id)
+void ima_buffer_check(const void *buf, int size, char *eventname)
 {
-	if (buf && size != 0)
-		process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, id);
+	if (buf && size != 0 && eventname)
+		process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, eventname);
 
 	return;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/5 RFC] use event name instead of enum to make the call generic

Quoted 5 lines · Prakhar Srivastava

From: Prakhar Srivastava <[email protected]>

---

Quoted 8 lines

Currently for soft reboot(kexec_file_load) the kernel file and signature is measured by IMA. The cmdline args used to load the kernel is not measured.
The boot aggregate that gets calculated will have no change since the EFI loader has not been triggered.
Adding the kexec cmdline args measure and kernel version will add some attestable criteria.

Any reason for including the whole commit message after "---"

Anything after "---" is not included in the patch description when patch is applied.

This comment applies to all the patches in this patchset.

Quoted 1 line

remove enums to control type of buffers entries, instead pass the event name to be used.

Is the last statement meant to be a Changelog from v1-> v2 ? Only the changelog has to be after "---"

Also, If posting more than one patch, it is preferrable to add a cover-letter.

Quoted 11 lines
  include/linux/ima.h               | 10 ++--------
  kernel/kexec_file.c               |  3 +++
  security/integrity/ima/ima.h      |  2 +-
  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 30 ++++++++++--------------------
  4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
include/linux/ima.h +0 -0
index 733d0cb9dedc..5e41507c57e5 100644

include/linux/ima.h line 22

Quoted 9 lines
include/linux/ima.h +0 -6
@@ -14,12 +14,6 @@
  #include <linux/kexec.h>
  struct linux_binprm;
 
-enum __buffer_id {
-	KERNEL_VERSION,
-	KEXEC_CMDLINE,
-	MAX_BUFFER_ID = KEXEC_CMDLINE
-} buffer_id;
-

Is the v2 version created on top of the v1 version that was posted ?

The v2 version has to be on top of the HEAD of the repository itself, and not on the v1 version. Only the final reviewed and tested version makes to the upstream.

Btw, which repository and its branch are you using ?

Thanks & Regards,
      - Nayna

Quoted 120 lines
include/linux/ima.h +2 -2
  #ifdef CONFIG_IMA
  extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
  extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened);
@@ -29,7 +23,7 @@ extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
  extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
  			      enum kernel_read_file_id id);
  extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
-extern void ima_buffer_check(const void *buff, int size, enum buffer_id id);
+extern void ima_buffer_check(const void *buff, int size, char *eventname);
  #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
  extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
  #endif
@@ -72,7 +66,7 @@ static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
  }
 
  static inline void ima_buffer_check(const void *buff, int size,
-			enum buffer_id id)
+			char *eventname)
  {
  	return;
  }
kernel/kexec_file.c +3 -0
index b118735fea9d..2a5234eb4b28 100644
@@ -182,6 +182,9 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
  			ret = -EINVAL;
  			goto out;
  		}
+
+		ima_buffer_check(image->cmdline_buf, cmdline_len - 1,
+				"kexec_cmdline");
  	}
 
  	/* Call arch image load handlers */
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +1 -1
index b71f2f6f7421..fcade3c103ed 100644
@@ -181,8 +181,8 @@ enum ima_hooks {
  	FIRMWARE_CHECK,
  	KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
  	KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
-	BUFFER_CHECK,
  	POLICY_CHECK,
+	BUFFER_CHECK,
  	MAX_CHECK
  };
 
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +10 -20
index 6408cadaadbb..da82c705a5ed 100644
@@ -160,8 +160,7 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
   * (Instead of using the file hash the buffer hash is used).
   * @buff - The buffer that needs to be added to the log
   * @size - size of buffer(in bytes)
- * @id - buffer id, this is differentiator for the various buffers
- * that can be measured.
+ * @id - eventname, event name to be used for buffer measurement.
   *
   * The buffer passed is added to the ima logs.
   * If the sig template is used, then the sig field contains the buffer.
@@ -170,7 +169,7 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
   * On error cases surface errors from ima calls.
   */
  static int process_buffer_measurement(const void *buff, int size,
-				enum buffer_id id)
+				char *eventname)
  {
  	int ret = -EINVAL;
  	struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
@@ -185,23 +184,13 @@ static int process_buffer_measurement(const void *buff, int size,
  	int violation = 0;
  	int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
 
-	if (!buff || size ==  0)
+	if (!buff || size ==  0 || !eventname)
  		goto err_out;
 
  	if (ima_get_action(NULL, 0, BUFFER_CHECK, &pcr) != IMA_MEASURE)
  		goto err_out;
 
-	switch (buffer_id) {
-	case KERNEL_VERSION:
-		name = "Kernel-version";
-		break;
-	case KEXEC_CMDLINE:
-		name = "Kexec-cmdline";
-		break;
-	default:
-		goto err_out;
-	}
-
+	name = eventname;
  	memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
  	memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
 
@@ -452,15 +441,16 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
   * ima_buffer_check - based on policy, collect & store buffer measurement
   * @buf: pointer to buffer
   * @size: size of buffer
- * @buffer_id: caller identifier
+ * @eventname: caller identifier
   *
   * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised.  The buffer identifier
- * is used as the measurement list entry name (eg. boot_cmdline).
+ * is used as the measurement list entry name (eg. boot_cmdline,
+ * kernel_version).
   */
-void ima_buffer_check(const void *buf, int size, enum buffer_id id)
+void ima_buffer_check(const void *buf, int size, char *eventname)
  {
-	if (buf && size != 0)
-		process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, id);
+	if (buf && size != 0 && eventname)
+		process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, eventname);
 
  	return;
  }
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/5 RFC] use event name instead of enum to make the call generic

Quoted 17 lines · Nayna
Quoted 5 lines · Prakhar Srivastava

From: Prakhar Srivastava <[email protected]>

---

Quoted 8 lines

Currently for soft reboot(kexec_file_load) the kernel file and signature is measured by IMA. The cmdline args used to load the kernel is not measured.
The boot aggregate that gets calculated will have no change since the EFI loader has not been triggered.
Adding the kexec cmdline args measure and kernel version will add some attestable criteria.

Quoted 5 lines

Any reason for including the whole commit message after "---"

Anything after "---" is not included in the patch description when patch is applied.

This comment applies to all the patches in this patchset.

I will fix the comments and send out the patchset with a cover letter. Thankyou for pointing this out.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

remove enums to control type of buffers entries, instead pass the event name to be used.

Is the last statement meant to be a Changelog from v1-> v2 ? Only the changelog has to be after "---"

Also, If posting more than one patch, it is preferrable to add a cover-letter.

I will add a cover letter alongside fixing the comments. Thankyou!

Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 16 lines

  include/linux/ima.h               | 10 ++-------- kernel/kexec_file.c               |  3 +++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h      |  2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 30 ++++++++++--------------------

  4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
include/linux/ima.h +0 -0
index 733d0cb9dedc..5e41507c57e5 100644
@@ -14,12 +14,6 @@
   #include <linux/kexec.h>
   struct linux_binprm;
 
Quoted 9 lines

include/linux/ima.h line 22

Quoted 6 lines
include/linux/ima.h +0 -6
-enum __buffer_id {
-    KERNEL_VERSION,
-    KEXEC_CMDLINE,
-    MAX_BUFFER_ID = KEXEC_CMDLINE
-} buffer_id;
-

Is the v2 version created on top of the v1 version that was posted ?

v2 is based off the HEAD of the repo.

Quoted 4 lines

The v2 version has to be on top of the HEAD of the repository itself, and not on the v1 version. Only the final reviewed and tested version makes to the upstream.

Btw, which repository and its branch are you using ?

I am basing my changes off IMA branch:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git

Quoted 133 lines

Thanks & Regards,
      - Nayna

Quoted 127 lines
include/linux/ima.h +1 -1
   #ifdef CONFIG_IMA
   extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
   extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened);
@@ -29,7 +23,7 @@ extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum 
 kernel_read_file_id id);
   extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
                     enum kernel_read_file_id id);
   extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
-extern void ima_buffer_check(const void *buff, int size, enum 
 buffer_id id);
+extern void ima_buffer_check(const void *buff, int size, char 
 *eventname);

  #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
  extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); #endif

include/linux/ima.h +1 -1
@@ -72,7 +66,7 @@ static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry 
 *dentry)
   }
 
   static inline void ima_buffer_check(const void *buff, int size,
-            enum buffer_id id)
+            char *eventname)
   {
       return;

  }

kernel/kexec_file.c +3 -0
index b118735fea9d..2a5234eb4b28 100644
@@ -182,6 +182,9 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, 
 int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
               ret = -EINVAL;
               goto out;
           }
+
+        ima_buffer_check(image->cmdline_buf, cmdline_len - 1,
+                "kexec_cmdline");
       }
 

      /* Call arch image load handlers */

security/integrity/ima/ima.h +1 -1
index b71f2f6f7421..fcade3c103ed 100644
@@ -181,8 +181,8 @@ enum ima_hooks {
       FIRMWARE_CHECK,
       KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
       KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
-    BUFFER_CHECK,
       POLICY_CHECK,
+    BUFFER_CHECK,

      MAX_CHECK
  };

security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +10 -20
index 6408cadaadbb..da82c705a5ed 100644
@@ -160,8 +160,7 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
    * (Instead of using the file hash the buffer hash is used).
    * @buff - The buffer that needs to be added to the log
    * @size - size of buffer(in bytes)
- * @id - buffer id, this is differentiator for the various buffers
- * that can be measured.
+ * @id - eventname, event name to be used for buffer measurement.
    *
    * The buffer passed is added to the ima logs.
    * If the sig template is used, then the sig field contains the buffer.
@@ -170,7 +169,7 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
    * On error cases surface errors from ima calls.
    */
   static int process_buffer_measurement(const void *buff, int size,
-                enum buffer_id id)
+                char *eventname)
   {
       int ret = -EINVAL;
       struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
@@ -185,23 +184,13 @@ static int process_buffer_measurement(const void 
 *buff, int size,
       int violation = 0;
       int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
 
-    if (!buff || size ==  0)
+    if (!buff || size ==  0 || !eventname)
           goto err_out;
 
       if (ima_get_action(NULL, 0, BUFFER_CHECK, &pcr) != IMA_MEASURE)
           goto err_out;
 
-    switch (buffer_id) {
-    case KERNEL_VERSION:
-        name = "Kernel-version";
-        break;
-    case KEXEC_CMDLINE:
-        name = "Kexec-cmdline";
-        break;
-    default:
-        goto err_out;
-    }
-
+    name = eventname;
       memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
       memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
@@ -452,15 +441,16 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum 
 kernel_read_file_id read_id)
    * ima_buffer_check - based on policy, collect & store buffer measurement
    * @buf: pointer to buffer
    * @size: size of buffer
- * @buffer_id: caller identifier
+ * @eventname: caller identifier
    *
    * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised.  The buffer identifier
- * is used as the measurement list entry name (eg. boot_cmdline).
+ * is used as the measurement list entry name (eg. boot_cmdline,
+ * kernel_version).
    */
-void ima_buffer_check(const void *buf, int size, enum buffer_id id)
+void ima_buffer_check(const void *buf, int size, char *eventname)
   {
-    if (buf && size != 0)
-        process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, id);
+    if (buf && size != 0 && eventname)
+        process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, eventname);
 
       return;

  }

#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/5 RFC] use event name instead of enum to make the call generic

Quoted 3 lines · prsriva

I will fix the comments and send out the patchset with a cover letter. Thankyou for pointing this out.

Please trim the emails you reply to rather than quoting everything.

But the real reason I'm reacting to this email is because it was marked as spam, because your SMTP setup is incorrect, and you don't go through the proper MS SMTP server. As a result, you don't get the proper DKIM signature for verification of the microsoft.com email address, and sane email clients will mark your emails as spam.

Please fix.

Linus

maintainer
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/5 RFC] use event name instead of enum to make the call generic

Quoted 7 lines · Linus Torvalds
Quoted 3 lines · prsriva

I will fix the comments and send out the patchset with a cover letter. Thankyou for pointing this out.

Please trim the emails you reply to rather than quoting everything.

Quoted 7 lines

But the real reason I'm reacting to this email is because it was marked as spam, because your SMTP setup is incorrect, and you don't go through the proper MS SMTP server. As a result, you don't get the proper DKIM signature for verification of the microsoft.com email address, and sane email clients will mark your emails as spam.

Please fix.

It's the correct SMTP server for linux.microsoft.com.

linux.microsoft.com. 3600 IN TXT "v=spf1 ip4:13.77.154.182 -all"
linux.microsoft.com. 3600 IN TXT "v=DMARC1;p=none;pct=100;rua=mailto:[email protected]"

We don't have DKIM set up yet.

Signature · 2 lines
James Morris
<[email protected]>
maintainer
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/5 RFC] use event name instead of enum to make the call generic

Quoted 17 lines · James Morris
Quoted 15 lines · Linus Torvalds
Quoted 3 lines · prsriva

I will fix the comments and send out the patchset with a cover letter. Thankyou for pointing this out.

Please trim the emails you reply to rather than quoting everything.

But the real reason I'm reacting to this email is because it was marked as spam, because your SMTP setup is incorrect, and you don't go through the proper MS SMTP server. As a result, you don't get the proper DKIM signature for verification of the microsoft.com email address, and sane email clients will mark your emails as spam.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line

Please fix.

It's the correct SMTP server for linux.microsoft.com.

linux.microsoft.com. 3600 IN TXT "v=spf1
ip4:13.77.154.182 -all"
linux.microsoft.com. 3600 IN TXT "v=DMARC
1;p=none;pct=100;rua=mailto:[email protected]"

That's not the correct location: DMARC records should be at the _dmarc. subdomain. without this you'll inherit the dmarc policy of _dmarc.microsoft.com

Quoted 1 line

We don't have DKIM set up yet.

If you advertise DMARC, you're expected to have DKIM working for spam purposes. On the other hand, if you don't advertise DMARC, google will probably still bin all your email as spam.

James

maintainer
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/5 RFC] use event name instead of enum to make the call generic

Quoted 4 lines · James Bottomley

That's not the correct location: DMARC records should be at the _dmarc. subdomain. without this you'll inherit the dmarc policy of _dmarc.microsoft.com

Thanks.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line

We don't have DKIM set up yet.

If you advertise DMARC, you're expected to have DKIM working for spam purposes. On the other hand, if you don't advertise DMARC, google will probably still bin all your email as spam.

Working on it.

Signature · 2 lines
James Morris
<[email protected]>
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/5 RFC] use event name instead of enum to make the call generic

In reply to James Morris
Quoted 4 lines · James Morris
Quoted 2 lines

Please fix.

It's the correct SMTP server for linux.microsoft.com.

In that case, it seems that your SMTP server is misconfigured, and shouldn't be used.

Quoted 4 lines
linux.microsoft.com.    3600    IN      TXT     "v=spf1 ip4:13.77.154.182 -all"
linux.microsoft.com.    3600    IN      TXT     "v=DMARC1;p=none;pct=100;rua=mailto:[email protected]"

We don't have DKIM set up yet.

I get

dmarc=fail (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=QUARANTINE) header.from=microsoft.com

because the microsoft.com DMARC rules will be triggered before the "linux.microsoft.com" rules are.

Linus

#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/5 RFC] use event name instead of enum to make the call generic

In reply to prsriva
Quoted 9 lines · prsriva
Quoted 8 lines · Nayna
Quoted 5 lines · Prakhar Srivastava

From: Prakhar Srivastava <[email protected]>

---

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

The v2 version has to be on top of the HEAD of the repository itself, and not on the v1 version. Only the final reviewed and tested version makes to the upstream.

Btw, which repository and its branch are you using ?

I am basing my changes off IMA branch:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git

Ok. Please use either next-integrity branch or James Morris next-general or next-testing.

Thanks & Regards,
      - Nayna

#10 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 3/5 since cmdline args can be same for multiple kexec, log entry hash will collide. Prepend the kernel file name to the cmdline args to distinguish between cmdline args passed to subsequent kexec calls

In reply to Prakhar Srivastava

From: Prakhar Srivastava <[email protected]>

---

Currently for soft reboot(kexec_file_load) the kernel file and signature is measured by IMA. The cmdline args used to load the kernel is not measured.
The boot aggregate that gets calculated will have no change since the EFI loader has not been triggered.
Adding the kexec cmdline args measure and kernel version will add some attestable criteria.

Cmdline args can be same for multiple kexec, log entry
hash will collide. Prepend the kernel file name to the cmdline args to distinguish between cmdline args passed to subsequent kexec calls

 kernel/kexec_core.c     | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/kexec_file.c     | 14 ++++++++--
 kernel/kexec_internal.h |  3 +++
 3 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/kexec_core.c +57 -0
index ae1a3ba24df5..97b77c780311 100644
@@ -1151,3 +1151,60 @@ void __weak arch_kexec_protect_crashkres(void)
 
 void __weak arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void)
 {}
+
+/**
+ * kexec_cmdline_prepend_img_name - prepare the buffer with cmdline
+ * that needs to be measured
+ * @outbuf - out buffer that contains the formated string
+ * @kernel_fd - the file identifier for the kerenel image
+ * @cmdline_ptr - ptr to the cmdline buffer
+ * @cmdline_len - len of the buffer.
+ *
+ * This generates a buffer in the format Kerenelfilename::cmdline
+ *
+ * On success return 0.
+ * On failure return -EINVAL.
+ */
+int kexec_cmdline_prepend_img_name(char **outbuf, int kernel_fd,
+				const char *cmdline_ptr,
+				unsigned long cmdline_len)
+{
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+	struct fd f = {};
+	int size = 0;
+	char *buf = NULL;
+	char delimiter[] = "::";
+
+	if (!outbuf || !cmdline_ptr)
+		goto out;
+
+	f = fdget(kernel_fd);
+	if (!f.file)
+		goto out;
+
+	size = (f.file->f_path.dentry->d_name.len + cmdline_len - 1+
+			ARRAY_SIZE(delimiter)) - 1;
+
+	buf = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buf)
+		goto out;
+
+	memcpy(buf, f.file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
+		f.file->f_path.dentry->d_name.len);
+	memcpy(buf + f.file->f_path.dentry->d_name.len,
+		delimiter, ARRAY_SIZE(delimiter) - 1);
+	memcpy(buf + f.file->f_path.dentry->d_name.len +
+		ARRAY_SIZE(delimiter) - 1,
+		cmdline_ptr, cmdline_len - 1);
+
+	*outbuf = buf;
+	ret = size;
+
+	pr_debug("kexec cmdline buff: %s\n", buf);
+
+out:
+	if (f.file)
+		fdput(f);
+
+	return ret;
+}
kernel/kexec_file.c +12 -2
index 2a5234eb4b28..a487491d55b9 100644
@@ -126,6 +126,8 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
 	int ret = 0;
 	void *ldata;
 	loff_t size;
+	char *buff_to_measure = NULL;
+	int buff_to_measure_size = 0;
 
 	ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, &image->kernel_buf,
 				       &size, INT_MAX, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
@@ -183,8 +185,13 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		ima_buffer_check(image->cmdline_buf, cmdline_len - 1,
-				"kexec_cmdline");
+		/* IMA measures the cmdline args passed to the next kernel*/
+		buff_to_measure_size = kexec_cmdline_prepend_img_name(&buff_to_measure,
+			kernel_fd, image->cmdline_buf, image->cmdline_buf_len);
+
+		ima_buffer_check(buff_to_measure, buff_to_measure_size,
+					"kexec_cmdline");
+
 	}
 
 	/* Call arch image load handlers */
@@ -200,6 +207,9 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
 	/* In case of error, free up all allocated memory in this function */
 	if (ret)
 		kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(image);
+
+	kfree(buff_to_measure);
+
 	return ret;
 }
 
kernel/kexec_internal.h +3 -0
index 799a8a452187..4d34a8ef4637 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ int kimage_load_segment(struct kimage *image, struct kexec_segment *segment);
 void kimage_terminate(struct kimage *image);
 int kimage_is_destination_range(struct kimage *image,
 				unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
+int kexec_cmdline_prepend_img_name(char **outbuf, int kernel_fd,
+				const char *cmdline_ptr,
+				unsigned long cmdline_len);
 
 extern struct mutex kexec_mutex;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#11 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 4/5 added a buffer_check LSM hook

In reply to Prakhar Srivastava

From: Prakhar Srivastava <[email protected]>

---
Currently for soft reboot(kexec_file_load) the kernel file and signature is measured by IMA. The cmdline args used to load the kernel is not measured.
The boot aggregate that gets calculated will have no change since the EFI loader has not been triggered.
Adding the kexec cmdline args measure and kernel version will add some attestable criteria.

This patch adds a LSM hook for buffer_check
Suggested by Mimi Zohar

 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +++
 include/linux/security.h  | 5 +++++
 security/security.c       | 7 +++++++
 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +3 -0
index 080f34e66017..854bf3cac716 100644
@@ -1568,6 +1568,8 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
 	int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
 
+	int (*buffer_check)(const void *buff, int size, const char *eventname);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 	int (*unix_stream_connect)(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
 					struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1813,6 +1815,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head inode_notifysecctx;
 	struct list_head inode_setsecctx;
 	struct list_head inode_getsecctx;
+	struct list_head buffer_check;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 	struct list_head unix_stream_connect;
 	struct list_head unix_may_send;
include/linux/security.h +5 -0
index af675b576645..cbba0e119234 100644
@@ -377,6 +377,8 @@ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+
+void security_buffer_measure(const void *buff, int size, char *eventname);
 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 struct security_mnt_opts {
 };
@@ -776,6 +778,9 @@ static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = 0;
 }
 
+static inline void security_buffer_measure(const void *buff, int size, char *eventname)
+{ }
+
 static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
 {
 	return 0;
security/security.c +7 -0
index 38316bb28b16..a0dfdb015412 100644
@@ -320,6 +320,13 @@ int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
 }
 
+void security_buffer_measure(const void *buff, int size, char *eventname)
+{
+	call_void_hook(buffer_check, buff, size, eventname);
+	return ima_buffer_check(buff, size, eventname);
+}
+
+
 void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm);
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#12 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 5/5 add the buffer to the event data in ima free entry data if store_template failed added check in templates for buffer

In reply to Prakhar Srivastava

From: Prakhar Srivastava <[email protected]>

---
Currently for soft reboot(kexec_file_load) the kernel file and signature is measured by IMA. The cmdline args used to load the kernel is not measured.
The boot aggregate that gets calculated will have no change since the EFI loader has not been triggered.
Adding the kexec cmdline args measure and kernel version will add some attestable criteria.

This patch adds the buffer to be measured as the event data. this also contains changes necessary for template

 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c         | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c |  3 +-
 security/integrity/integrity.h            |  1 +
 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +33 -3
index da82c705a5ed..204a7a1acb86 100644
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  *
  * File: ima_main.c
  *	implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
- *	and ima_file_check.
+ *	ima_file_check and ima_buffer_check.
  */
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
@@ -180,16 +180,37 @@ static int process_buffer_measurement(const void *buff, int size,
 		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
 		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	} hash;
+	struct buffer_xattr {
+		enum evm_ima_xattr_type type;
+		u16 buff_length;
+		unsigned char buff[0];
+	};
 	char *name = NULL;
 	int violation = 0;
 	int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
+	struct buffer_xattr *buffer_event_data = NULL;
+	int alloc_length = 0;
+	int action  = 0;
 
 	if (!buff || size ==  0 || !eventname)
 		goto err_out;
 
-	if (ima_get_action(NULL, 0, BUFFER_CHECK, &pcr) != IMA_MEASURE)
+	action = ima_get_action(NULL, 0, BUFFER_CHECK, &pcr);
+	if (!(action & IMA_AUDIT) && !(action & IMA_MEASURE))
 		goto err_out;
 
+	alloc_length = sizeof(struct buffer_xattr) + size;
+	buffer_event_data = kzalloc(alloc_length, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buffer_event_data)
+		goto err_out;
+
+	buffer_event_data->type = IMA_BUFFER_CHECK;
+	buffer_event_data->buff_length = size;
+	memcpy(buffer_event_data->buff, buff, size);
+
+	event_data.xattr_value = (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *)buffer_event_data;
+	event_data.xattr_len = alloc_length;
+
 	name = eventname;
 	memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
 	memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
@@ -208,16 +229,25 @@ static int process_buffer_measurement(const void *buff, int size,
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto err_out;
 
-	ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL,
+	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
+		ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL,
 					buff, pcr);
+
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
 		goto err_out;
 	}
 
+	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
+		ima_audit_measurement(iint, event_data.filename);
+
+	kfree(buffer_event_data);
 	return 0;
 
 err_out:
+
+	kfree(buffer_event_data);
+
 	pr_err("Error in adding buffer measure: %d\n", ret);
 	return ret;
 }
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +2 -1
index f9ba37b3928d..6050ef774355 100644
@@ -322,7 +322,8 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 	int xattr_len = event_data->xattr_len;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))
+	if ((!xattr_value) || !((xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) ||
+		 (xattr_value->type == IMA_BUFFER_CHECK)))
 		goto out;
 
 	rc = ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, xattr_len, fmt,
security/integrity/integrity.h +1 -0
index 24520b4ef3b0..a674ae5be231 100644
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
 	EVM_XATTR_HMAC,
 	EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG,
 	IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG,
+	IMA_BUFFER_CHECK,
 	IMA_XATTR_LAST
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1