imx8: support container
Subsystems (4)
cover imx8: support container
This patchset is to support i.MX8 container loading from SPL, i.MX8 AHAB secure boot not support FIT image, so we need to use container image.
Currently still use a fixed offset for the 2nd container(u-boot.cnt), future patches will drop this fixed offset and use dynamaic offset according to the size of 1st container for spl.
Only MMC is supported now, future patches will also support SPI/NOR/NAND following similar style as mmc part, if the mmc part is ok.
Build pass: https://travis-ci.org/MrVan/u-boot/builds/529180267
Peng Fan (6):
imx: mach-imx: clean up Makefile
spl: Add function to get u-boot raw sector
imx8: support parsing i.MX8 Container file
spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
imx: add container target
imx8qxp_mek: switch to use container image
Makefile | 8 ++ arch/arm/include/asm/arch-imx8/image.h | 56 +++++++++++ arch/arm/mach-imx/Makefile | 26 +++-- arch/arm/mach-imx/imx8/Kconfig | 13 +++ arch/arm/mach-imx/imx8/Makefile | 4 + arch/arm/mach-imx/imx8/parse-container.c | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ board/freescale/imx8qxp_mek/README | 4 +- board/freescale/imx8qxp_mek/uboot-container.cfg | 13 +++ common/spl/spl_mmc.c | 21 ++++- configs/imx8qxp_mek_defconfig | 5 +- include/spl.h | 12 +++ 11 files changed, 268 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm/include/asm/arch-imx8/image.h create mode 100644 arch/arm/mach-imx/imx8/parse-container.c create mode 100644 board/freescale/imx8qxp_mek/uboot-container.cfg
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
PATCH 1/6 imx: mach-imx: clean up Makefile
Only eval the variables when building related target, then we will not see unrelated warning that when building spl and u-boot.
--- arch/arm/mach-imx/Makefile | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm/mach-imx/Makefile +6 -6
@@ -104,18 +104,15 @@ IMX_CONFIG = $(CONFIG_IMX_CONFIG:"%"=%) $(Q)mkdir -p $(dir $@) $(call if_changed_dep,cpp_cfg) +DEPFILE_EXISTS := 0 ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARCH_IMX8), y) CNTR_DEPFILES := $(srctree)/tools/imx_cntr_image.sh IMAGE_TYPE := imx8image -SPL_DEPFILE_EXISTS := $(shell $(CPP) $(cpp_flags) -x c -o spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout $(srctree)/$(IMX_CONFIG); if [ -f spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout ]; then $(CNTR_DEPFILES) spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout; echo $$?; fi) -DEPFILE_EXISTS := $(shell $(CPP) $(cpp_flags) -x c -o u-boot-dtb.cfgout $(srctree)/$(IMX_CONFIG); if [ -f u-boot-dtb.cfgout ]; then $(CNTR_DEPFILES) u-boot-dtb.cfgout; echo $$?; fi) else ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARCH_IMX8M), y) IMAGE_TYPE := imx8mimage IMX8M_DEPFILES := $(srctree)/tools/imx8m_image.sh -DEPFILE_EXISTS := $(shell $(CPP) $(cpp_flags) -x c -o spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout $(srctree)/$(IMX_CONFIG);if [ -f spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout ]; then $(IMX8M_DEPFILES) spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout 0; echo $$?; fi) else IMAGE_TYPE := imximage -DEPFILE_EXISTS := 0 endif MKIMAGEFLAGS_u-boot.imx = -n $(filter-out $(PLUGIN).bin $< $(PHONY),$^) \
@@ -139,30 +136,33 @@ endif ifdef CONFIG_ARM64 ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARCH_IMX8M), y) -SPL: +SPL: spl/u-boot-spl.bin spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout FORCE MKIMAGEFLAGS_flash.bin = -n spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout \ -T $(IMAGE_TYPE) -e $(CONFIG_SPL_TEXT_BASE) flash.bin: MKIMAGEOUTPUT = flash.log spl/u-boot-spl-ddr.bin: spl/u-boot-spl.bin spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout FORCE + $(eval DEPFILE_EXISTS := $(shell $(CPP) $(cpp_flags) -x c -o spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout $(srctree)/$(IMX_CONFIG);if [ -f spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout ]; then $(IMX8M_DEPFILES) spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout 0; echo $$?; fi)) ifeq ($(DEPFILE_EXISTS),0) $(IMX8M_DEPFILES) spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout 1 endif flash.bin: spl/u-boot-spl-ddr.bin u-boot.itb FORCE + $(eval DEPFILE_EXISTS := $(shell $(CPP) $(cpp_flags) -x c -o spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout $(srctree)/$(IMX_CONFIG);if [ -f spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout ]; then $(IMX8M_DEPFILES) spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout 0; echo $$?; fi)) ifeq ($(DEPFILE_EXISTS),0) $(call if_changed,mkimage) endif endif ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARCH_IMX8), y) -SPL: +SPL: spl/u-boot-spl.bin spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout FORCE MKIMAGEFLAGS_flash.bin = -n spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout -T $(IMAGE_TYPE) -e 0x100000 flash.bin: MKIMAGEOUTPUT = flash.log flash.bin: spl/u-boot-spl.bin u-boot.itb FORCE + $(eval SPL_DEPFILE_EXISTS := $(shell $(CPP) $(cpp_flags) -x c -o spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout $(srctree)/$(IMX_CONFIG); if [ -f spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout ]; then $(CNTR_DEPFILES) spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout; echo $$?; fi)) ifeq ($(SPL_DEPFILE_EXISTS),0) $(call if_changed,mkimage) endif
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
PATCH 2/6 spl: Add function to get u-boot raw sector
In reply to Peng FanAdd a weak function spl_mmc_get_uboot_raw_sector to get u-boot raw sector. At default it returns CONFIG_SYS_MMCSD_RAW_MODE_U_BOOT_SECTOR. Users can overwrite it to return customized offset.
This is to support i.MX8 specific image type container image type.
--- common/spl/spl_mmc.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
common/spl/spl_mmc.c +9 -2
@@ -149,6 +149,13 @@ static int spl_mmc_find_device(struct mmc **mmcp, u32 boot_device)return 0 ; } +#ifdef CONFIG_SYS_MMCSD_RAW_MODE_U_BOOT_USE_SECTOR +unsigned long __weak spl_mmc_get_uboot_raw_sector (struct mmc *mmc) +{ +return CONFIG_SYS_MMCSD_RAW_MODE_U_BOOT_SECTOR ; +} +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SYS_MMCSD_RAW_MODE_U_BOOT_USE_PARTITION static int mmc_load_image_raw_partition (struct spl_image_info *spl_image,struct mmc *mmc,int partition)
@@ -181,7 +188,7 @@ static int mmc_load_image_raw_partition(struct spl_image_info *spl_image,#ifdef CONFIG_SYS_MMCSD_RAW_MODE_U_BOOT_USE_SECTOR return mmc_load_image_raw_sector (spl_image, mmc, - info.start +CONFIG_SYS_MMCSD_RAW_MODE_U_BOOT_SECTOR ); + info.start +spl_mmc_get_uboot_raw_sector (mmc));#else return mmc_load_image_raw_sector (spl_image, mmc, info.start);#endif
@@ -366,7 +373,7 @@ int spl_mmc_load_image(struct spl_image_info *spl_image,#endif #ifdef CONFIG_SYS_MMCSD_RAW_MODE_U_BOOT_USE_SECTOR err =mmc_load_image_raw_sector (spl_image, mmc, -CONFIG_SYS_MMCSD_RAW_MODE_U_BOOT_SECTOR ); +spl_mmc_get_uboot_raw_sector (mmc));if (!err)return err;#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
PATCH 3/6 imx8: support parsing i.MX8 Container file
In reply to Peng FanAdd parsing i.MX8 Container file support, this is to let SPL could load images in a container file to destination address.
--- arch/arm/include/asm/arch-imx8/image.h | 56 +++++++++++++++ arch/arm/mach-imx/imx8/Kconfig | 6 ++ arch/arm/mach-imx/imx8/Makefile | 4 ++ arch/arm/mach-imx/imx8/parse-container.c | 120 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 186 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/arm/include/asm/arch-imx8/image.h create mode 100644 arch/arm/mach-imx/imx8/parse-container.c
arch/arm/include/asm/arch-imx8/image.h new file +56 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */ +/* +* Copyright 2018-2019 NXP +*/ + +#ifndef __CONTAINER_HEADER_H_ +#define __CONTAINER_HEADER_H_ + +#include <linux/sizes.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +#define IV_MAX_LEN 32 +#define HASH_MAX_LEN 64 + +#define CONTAINER_HDR_ALIGNMENT 0x400 +#define CONTAINER_HDR_EMMC_OFFSET 0 +#define CONTAINER_HDR_MMCSD_OFFSET SZ_32K +#define CONTAINER_HDR_QSPI_OFFSET SZ_4K +#define CONTAINER_HDR_NAND_OFFSET SZ_128M + +struct container_hdr { +u8 version; +u8 length_lsb; +u8 length_msb; +u8 tag; +u32 flags; +u16 sw_version; +u8 fuse_version; +u8 num_images; +u16 sig_blk_offset; +u16 reserved; +} __packed; + +struct boot_img_t { +u32 offset; +u32 size; +u64 dst; +u64 entry; +u32 hab_flags; +u32 meta; +u8 hash[HASH_MAX_LEN ]; +u8 iv[IV_MAX_LEN ]; +} __packed; + +struct signature_block_hdr { +u8 version; +u8 length_lsb; +u8 length_msb; +u8 tag; +u16 srk_table_offset; +u16 cert_offset; +u16 blob_offset; +u16 signature_offset; +u32 reserved; +} __packed; +#endif
arch/arm/mach-imx/imx8/Kconfig +6 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ config IMX8QXP config SYS_SOC default "imx8" +config SPL_LOAD_IMX_CONTAINER + bool "Enable SPL loading U-Boot as a i.MX Container image" + depends on SPL + help + This is to let SPL could load i.MX8 Container image + choice prompt "i.MX8 board select" optional
arch/arm/mach-imx/imx8/Makefile +4 -0
@@ -5,3 +5,7 @@ # obj-y += cpu.o iomux.o + +ifdef CONFIG_SPL_BUILD +obj-$(CONFIG_SPL_LOAD_IMX_CONTAINER) += parse-container.o +endif
arch/arm/mach-imx/imx8/parse-container.c new file +120 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
In reply to Peng Fani.MX8 only support AHAB secure boot with Container format image, we could not use FIT to support secure boot, so introduce container support to let SPL could load container images.
--- common/spl/spl_mmc.c | 10 ++++++++++ include/spl.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
common/spl/spl_mmc.c +10 -0
@@ -79,6 +79,16 @@ int mmc_load_image_raw_sector(struct spl_image_info *spl_image, load.bl_len = mmc->read_bl_len; load.read = h_spl_load_read; ret =spl_load_simple_fit (spl_image, &load, sector, header); + }else if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_SPL_LOAD_IMX_CONTAINER )) { +struct spl_load_info load; + + load.dev = mmc; + load.priv =NULL ; + load.filename =NULL ; + load.bl_len = mmc->read_bl_len; + load.read = h_spl_load_read; + + ret =spl_load_imx_container (spl_image, &load, sector); }else { ret =mmc_load_legacy (spl_image, mmc, sector, header); }
include/spl.h +12 -0
@@ -125,6 +125,18 @@ int spl_load_simple_fit(struct spl_image_info *spl_image,#define SPL_COPY_PAYLOAD_ONLY 1#define SPL_FIT_FOUND 2 +/** +* spl_load_imx_container() - Loads a imx container image from a device. +* @spl_image: Image description to set up +* @info: Structure containing the information required to load data. +* @sector: Sector number where container image is located in the device +* +* Reads the container image @sector in the device. Loads u-boot image to +* specified load address. +*/ +int spl_load_imx_container (struct spl_image_info *spl_image, +struct spl_load_info *info,ulong sector); +/* SPL common functions */ void preloader_console_init (void );u32 spl_boot_device (void );
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Peng,
Quoted 3 lines · Peng Fan
i.MX8 only support AHAB secure boot with Container format image, we could not use FIT to support secure boot, so introduce container
Why not FIT?
Quoted 1 line
support to let SPL could load container images.
What is a container image? Can you please point to documentation?
Quoted 11 lines
Cc Simon Goldschmidt <[email protected]>Cc Tien Fong Chee <[email protected]>Cc York Sun <[email protected]>Cc Marek Vasut <[email protected]>Cc Alex Kiernan <[email protected]>Cc Simon Glass <[email protected]>Cc Philipp Tomsich <[email protected]>Cc Kever Yang <[email protected]>Cc Heiko Schocher <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Peng Fan <[email protected]>
Quoted 4 lines
--- common/spl/spl_mmc.c | 10 ++++++++++ include/spl.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
Regards,
Simon
PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Simon,
Quoted 10 lines
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Peng,
Quoted 3 lines · Peng Fan
i.MX8 only support AHAB secure boot with Container format image, we could not use FIT to support secure boot, so introduce container
Why not FIT?
Actually before we implement secure boot, we use FIT image, however i.MX8 only support i.MX container format image for secure boot,
The chip will verify the container image when secure boot. It could not recognize FIT image. So we have to drop FIT image.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
support to let SPL could load container images.
What is a container image? Can you please point to documentation?
Sadly, there is no public reference manual. There is a doc that has a bit of information. https://community.nxp.com/docs/DOC-343178
Thanks,
Peng.
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 12 lines
Cc Simon Goldschmidt <[email protected]>Cc Tien Fong Chee <[email protected]>Cc York Sun <[email protected]>Cc Marek Vasut <[email protected]>Cc Alex Kiernan <[email protected]>Cc Simon Glass <[email protected]>Cc Philipp Tomsich <[email protected]>Cc Kever Yang <[email protected]>Cc Heiko Schocher <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Peng Fan <[email protected]>Quoted 4 lines
--- common/spl/spl_mmc.c | 10 ++++++++++ include/spl.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)Regards,
Simon
PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 19 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Simon,
Quoted 10 lines
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Peng,
Quoted 3 lines · Peng Fan
i.MX8 only support AHAB secure boot with Container format image, we could not use FIT to support secure boot, so introduce container
Why not FIT?
Actually before we implement secure boot, we use FIT image, however i.MX8 only support i.MX container format image for secure boot,
The chip will verify the container image when secure boot. It could not recognize FIT image. So we have to drop FIT image.Quoted 1 line
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
support to let SPL could load container images.
What is a container image? Can you please point to documentation?
Sadly, there is no public reference manual. There is a doc that has a bit of information. https://community.nxp.com/docs/DOC-343178
Shouldn't it suffice for the SPL to be in this custom format , while the rest of the binaries can be in fitImage ?
Signature · 2 lines
Best regards, Marek Vasut
PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Marek,
Quoted 39 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 20 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Simon,
Quoted 11 lines
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Peng,
Quoted 3 lines · Peng Fan
i.MX8 only support AHAB secure boot with Container format image, we could not use FIT to support secure boot, so introduce container
Why not FIT?
Actually before we implement secure boot, we use FIT image, however i.MX8 only support i.MX container format image for secure boot, The chip will verify the container image when secure boot. It could not recognize FIT image. So we have to drop FIT image.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
support to let SPL could load container images.
What is a container image? Can you please point to documentation?
Sadly, there is no public reference manual. There is a doc that has a bit of information.
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcomm
Quoted 1 line
unity.nxp.com%2Fdocs%2FDOC-343178&data=02%7C01%7Cpeng.fan%4 0nxp.co
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m%7C8626e7a1d20c44b8715408d6dcc4d866%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd9
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5%7C0%7C0%7C636939135344595378&sdata=vmIaO78XmuL1tQJufqf7 HCGdWHTCJ
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bEpmGBio15j46U%3D&reserved=0
Shouldn't it suffice for the SPL to be in this custom format , while the rest of the binaries can be in fitImage ?
The issue is the SoC only support i.MX container format for secure boot(AHAB boot), if we not use secure boot, FIT image do work and could work well.
We investigated using FIT for i.MX8 secure boot, but it does not make sense we did a FIT wrapper for container. Container itself is also an image format, it contains image load/entry/size and etc information.
I add a kconfig entry in SPL code, it does not hurt others if the Kconfig entry not chosen.
I do not know how other SoC vendor did FIT hardware secure boot, please share you have any information.
Thanks,
Peng.
Quoted 4 lines
--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut
PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 51 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Marek,
Quoted 39 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 20 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Simon,
Quoted 11 lines
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Peng,
Quoted 3 lines · Peng Fan
i.MX8 only support AHAB secure boot with Container format image, we could not use FIT to support secure boot, so introduce container
Why not FIT?
Actually before we implement secure boot, we use FIT image, however i.MX8 only support i.MX container format image for secure boot, The chip will verify the container image when secure boot. It could not recognize FIT image. So we have to drop FIT image.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
support to let SPL could load container images.
What is a container image? Can you please point to documentation?
Sadly, there is no public reference manual. There is a doc that has a bit of information.
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcomm
Quoted 1 line
unity.nxp.com%2Fdocs%2FDOC-343178&data=02%7C01%7Cpeng.fan%4 0nxp.co
Quoted 1 line
m%7C8626e7a1d20c44b8715408d6dcc4d866%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd9
9c5c30163Quoted 1 line
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5%7C0%7C0%7C636939135344595378&sdata=vmIaO78XmuL1tQJufqf7 HCGdWHTCJ
Quoted 1 line
bEpmGBio15j46U%3D&reserved=0
Shouldn't it suffice for the SPL to be in this custom format , while the rest of the binaries can be in fitImage ?
The issue is the SoC only support i.MX container format for secure boot(AHAB boot), if we not use secure boot, FIT image do work and could work well.
Quoted 8 lines
We investigated using FIT for i.MX8 secure boot, but it does not make sense we did a FIT wrapper for container. Container itself is also an image format, it contains image load/entry/size and etc information.
I add a kconfig entry in SPL code, it does not hurt others if the
Kconfigentry not chosen.I do not know how other SoC vendor did FIT hardware secure boot, please share you have any information.
The SPL can be in the custom format, but then can load fitImage with the next stage(s), right ?
Signature · 2 lines
Best regards, Marek Vasut
PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Marek,
Quoted 66 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 35 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Marek,
Quoted 33 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 28 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Simon,
Quoted 5 lines
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Peng,
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines · Peng Fan
i.MX8 only support AHAB secure boot with Container format image, we could not use FIT to support secure boot, so introduce container
Why not FIT?
Actually before we implement secure boot, we use FIT image, however i.MX8 only support i.MX container format image for secure boot, The chip will verify the container image when secure boot. It could not recognize FIT image. So we have to drop FIT image.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
support to let SPL could load container images.
What is a container image? Can you please point to documentation?
Sadly, there is no public reference manual. There is a doc that has a bit of information.
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcom
Quoted 3 lines
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m
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unity.nxp.com%2Fdocs%2FDOC-343178&data=02%7C01%7Cpeng.fan%4
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0nxp.co
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m%7C8626e7a1d20c44b8715408d6dcc4d866%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd9
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9c5c30163Quoted 1 line
5%7C0%7C0%7C636939135344595378&sdata=vmIaO78XmuL1tQJufqf7
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
HCGdWHTCJ
Quoted 1 line
bEpmGBio15j46U%3D&reserved=0
Shouldn't it suffice for the SPL to be in this custom format , while the rest of the binaries can be in fitImage ?
The issue is the SoC only support i.MX container format for secure boot(AHAB boot), if we not use secure boot, FIT image do work and could
work well.
Quoted 5 lines
We investigated using FIT for i.MX8 secure boot, but it does not make sense we did a FIT wrapper for container. Container itself is also an image format, it contains image load/entry/size and etc information.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
I add a kconfig entry in SPL code, it does not hurt others if the
Kconfigentrynot chosen.
Quoted 3 lines
I do not know how other SoC vendor did FIT hardware secure boot, please share you have any information.
The SPL can be in the custom format, but then can load fitImage with the next stage(s), right ?
I am not able to follow you, could you share more details?
Thanks,
Peng.
Quoted 4 lines
--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut
PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 71 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Marek,
Quoted 69 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 35 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Marek,
Quoted 33 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 28 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Simon,
Quoted 5 lines
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Peng,
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines · Peng Fan
i.MX8 only support AHAB secure boot with Container format image, we could not use FIT to support secure boot, so introduce container
Why not FIT?
Actually before we implement secure boot, we use FIT image, however i.MX8 only support i.MX container format image for secure boot, The chip will verify the container image when secure boot. It could not recognize FIT image. So we have to drop FIT image.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
support to let SPL could load container images.
What is a container image? Can you please point to documentation?
Sadly, there is no public reference manual. There is a doc that has a bit of information.
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcom
Quoted 3 lines
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m
Quoted 1 line
unity.nxp.com%2Fdocs%2FDOC-343178&data=02%7C01%7Cpeng.fan%4
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0nxp.co
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m%7C8626e7a1d20c44b8715408d6dcc4d866%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd9
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9c5c30163Quoted 1 line
5%7C0%7C0%7C636939135344595378&sdata=vmIaO78XmuL1tQJufqf7
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
HCGdWHTCJ
Quoted 1 line
bEpmGBio15j46U%3D&reserved=0
Shouldn't it suffice for the SPL to be in this custom format , while the rest of the binaries can be in fitImage ?
The issue is the SoC only support i.MX container format for secure boot(AHAB boot), if we not use secure boot, FIT image do work and could
work well.
Quoted 6 lines
We investigated using FIT for i.MX8 secure boot, but it does not make sense we did a FIT wrapper for container. Container itself is also an image format, it contains image load/entry/size and etc information.
I add a kconfig entry in SPL code, it does not hurt others if the
Kconfigentrynot chosen.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I do not know how other SoC vendor did FIT hardware secure boot, please share you have any information.
The SPL can be in the custom format, but then can load fitImage with the next stage(s), right ?
I am not able to follow you, could you share more details?
Wrap the SPL into this custom format and then have the SPL load/authenticate fitImage with the rest (U-Boot, Linux, DTB etc). Would that work ?
Signature · 2 lines
Best regards, Marek Vasut
PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Marek,
Quoted 86 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 43 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Marek,
Quoted 41 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 36 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Marek,
Quoted 34 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 29 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Simon,
Quoted 5 lines
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Peng,
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines · Peng Fan
i.MX8 only support AHAB secure boot with Container format image, we could not use FIT to support secure boot, so introduce container
Why not FIT?
Actually before we implement secure boot, we use FIT image, however
i.MX8 only support i.MX container format image for secure boot, The chip will verify the container image when secure boot. It could not recognize FIT image. So we have to drop FIT image.Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
support to let SPL could load container images.
What is a container image? Can you please point to documentation?
Sadly, there is no public reference manual. There is a doc that has a bit of information.
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcom
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m
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unity.nxp.com%2Fdocs%2FDOC-343178&data=02%7C01%7Cpeng.fan%4
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0nxp.co
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m%7C8626e7a1d20c44b8715408d6dcc4d866%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd9
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5%7C0%7C0%7C636939135344595378&sdata=vmIaO78XmuL1tQJufqf7
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HCGdWHTCJ
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bEpmGBio15j46U%3D&reserved=0
Shouldn't it suffice for the SPL to be in this custom format , while the rest of the binaries can be in fitImage ?
Quoted 8 lines
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The issue is the SoC only support i.MX container format for secure boot(AHAB boot), if we not use secure boot, FIT image do work and could
work well.
Quoted 4 lines
We investigated using FIT for i.MX8 secure boot, but it does not make sense we did a FIT wrapper for container. Container itself is also an image format, it contains image load/entry/size and etc
information.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I add a kconfig entry in SPL code, it does not hurt others if the
Kconfigentrynot chosen.
Quoted 3 lines
I do not know how other SoC vendor did FIT hardware secure boot, please share you have any information.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The SPL can be in the custom format, but then can load fitImage with the next stage(s), right ?
I am not able to follow you, could you share more details?
Wrap the SPL into this custom format and then have the SPL load/authenticate fitImage with the rest (U-Boot, Linux, DTB etc). Would that work ?
It not work.
We already wrap SPL in i.MX container format, this patchset is to let SPL could load the 2nd container file which contains U-Boot/DTB/OP-TEE/ATF. If we let SPL load a fitimage which contains (U-Boot/DTB and etc), it could not pass secure boot authentication, because ROM not know fitimage, it only know i.MX container format.
For authentication, we always let ROM to authenticate including SPL authenticating U-Boot, so we need pass an image to ROM that ROM could recognize when SPL booting 2nd image.
Thanks,
Peng.
Quoted 4 lines
--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut
PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
On 5/21/19 4:55 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I do not know how other SoC vendor did FIT hardware secure boot, please share you have any information.
The SPL can be in the custom format, but then can load fitImage with the next stage(s), right ?
I am not able to follow you, could you share more details?
Wrap the SPL into this custom format and then have the SPL load/authenticate fitImage with the rest (U-Boot, Linux, DTB etc). Would that work ?
Quoted 6 lines
It not work.
We already wrap SPL in i.MX container format, this patchset is to let SPL could load the 2nd container file which contains U-Boot/DTB/OP-TEE/ATF. If we let SPL load a fitimage which contains (U-Boot/DTB and etc), it could not pass secure boot authentication, because ROM not know fitimage, it only know i.MX container format.
It's not bootrom that authenticates the next stage, it's U-Boot SPL. BootROM already authenticated and started the U-Boot SPL, so that's a trusted code. Now this trusted code can authenticate and start the next stage (U-Boot, ATF, OpTee OS, etc) ; the BootROM is already out of the picture at this point.
Quoted 3 lines
For authentication, we always let ROM to authenticate including SPL authenticating U-Boot, so we need pass an image to ROM that ROM could recognize when SPL booting 2nd image.
Shouldn't the CPU have some sort of facility, like a crypto engine, which authenticates whatever blob with the right signature against a key burned into the CPU ? If so, then you would just implement a crypto driver and pass the blob and signature to it. I suspect that's how it should work, how else would Linux be able to make use of these secure bits if it cannot call the bootrom anymore ?
Signature · 2 lines
Best regards, Marek Vasut
PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 25 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
On 5/21/19 4:55 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I do not know how other SoC vendor did FIT hardware secure boot, please share you have any information.
The SPL can be in the custom format, but then can load fitImage with the next stage(s), right ?
I am not able to follow you, could you share more details?
Wrap the SPL into this custom format and then have the SPL load/authenticate fitImage with the rest (U-Boot, Linux, DTB etc). Would that work ?
Quoted 6 lines
It not work.
We already wrap SPL in i.MX container format, this patchset is to let SPL could load the 2nd container file which contains U-Boot/DTB/OP-TEE/ATF. If we let SPL load a fitimage which contains (U-Boot/DTB and etc), it could not pass secure boot authentication, because ROM not know fitimage, it only know i.MX container format.
Quoted 5 lines
It's not bootrom that authenticates the next stage, it's U-Boot SPL. BootROM already authenticated and started the U-Boot SPL, so that's a trusted code. Now this trusted code can authenticate and start the next stage (U-Boot, ATF, OpTee OS, etc) ; the BootROM is already out of the picture at this point.
Sorry for not clear. On i.MX8, SCFW (a runtime firmware )exports API for others to use, sc_seco_authenticate is the API that used for authentication. I could not share more information about this API works inside SCFW and ROM.sc_err_t sc_seco_authenticate(sc_ipc_t ipc, sc_seco_auth_cmd_t cmd, sc_faddr_t addr)
SPL will call this API, one parameter is address which needs a container image there.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 4 lines
For authentication, we always let ROM to authenticate including SPL authenticating U-Boot, so we need pass an image to ROM that ROM could recognize when SPL booting 2nd image.
Shouldn't the CPU have some sort of facility, like a crypto engine, which authenticates whatever blob with the right signature against a key burned into the CPU ? If so, then you would just implement a crypto driver and pass the blob and signature to it. I suspect that's how it should work, how else would Linux be able to make use of these secure bits if it cannot call the bootrom anymore ?
sc_seco_authenticate on i.MX8 will always be available. It is exported by a runtime firmware running on a Cortex-M core inside i.MX8. The API will do authentication, its accepts container format image as input and no other format.
Thanks,
Peng.
Quoted 4 lines
--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut
PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Peng,
Quoted 32 lines
Quoted 26 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
On 5/21/19 4:55 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I do not know how other SoC vendor did FIT hardware secure boot, please share you have any information.
The SPL can be in the custom format, but then can load fitImage with the next stage(s), right ?
I am not able to follow you, could you share more details?
Wrap the SPL into this custom format and then have the SPL load/authenticate fitImage with the rest (U-Boot, Linux, DTB etc). Would that work ?
Quoted 7 lines
It not work.
We already wrap SPL in i.MX container format, this patchset is to let SPL could load the 2nd container file which contains U-Boot/DTB/OP-TEE/ATF. If we let SPL load a fitimage which contains (U-Boot/DTB and etc), it could not pass secure boot authentication, because ROM not know fitimage, it only know i.MX container format.Quoted 5 lines
It's not bootrom that authenticates the next stage, it's U-Boot SPL. BootROM already authenticated and started the U-Boot SPL, so that's a trusted code. Now this trusted code can authenticate and start the next stage (U-Boot, ATF, OpTee OS, etc) ; the BootROM is already out of the picture at this point.
Quoted 8 lines
Sorry for not clear. On i.MX8, SCFW (a runtime firmware )exports API for others to use,
sc_seco_authenticateis the API that used for authentication. I could not share more information about this API works inside SCFW and ROM.sc_err_tsc_seco_authenticate(sc_ipc_t ipc, sc_seco_auth_cmd_t cmd, sc_faddr_t addr)SPL will call this API, one parameter is address which needs a container image there.
Please consider following scenario (I think that this is in sync with Marek's point):
1. You wrap SPL into i.MX8 "container", so the SPL would be recognised an checked by secure code in ROM.
2. Then we do have SPL "trusted". It is up to SPL to:
2.1. Use its private key to check u-boot, dtb, etc embedded into FitImage (as written here: ./doc/uImage.FIT/verified-boot.txt).
2.2. Use crypto engine (it's API) with fused keys to speed-up the process of boot (by HW support to check the binary). Such approach is in i.MX6Q.
By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container" format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is "trused" we may use available facilities.
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
For authentication, we always let ROM to authenticate including SPL authenticating U-Boot, so we need pass an image to ROM that ROM could recognize when SPL booting 2nd image.
Quoted 6 lines
Shouldn't the CPU have some sort of facility, like a crypto engine, which authenticates whatever blob with the right signature against a key burned into the CPU ? If so, then you would just implement a crypto driver and pass the blob and signature to it. I suspect that's how it should work, how else would Linux be able to make use of these secure bits if it cannot call the bootrom anymore ?
sc_seco_authenticateon i.MX8 will always be available. It is exported by a runtime firmware running on a Cortex-M core inside i.MX8. The API will do authentication, its accepts container format image as input and no other format.Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 1 line
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut_______________________________________________
U-Boot mailing list
U-Boot at lists.denx.de
https://lists.denx.de/listinfo/u-boot
Best regards,
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email: lukma at denx.de -------------- next part --------------
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PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 40 lines · Lukasz Majewski
Hi Peng,
Quoted 38 lines
Quoted 26 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
On 5/21/19 4:55 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I do not know how other SoC vendor did FIT hardware secure boot, please share you have any information.
The SPL can be in the custom format, but then can load fitImage with the next stage(s), right ?
I am not able to follow you, could you share more details?
Wrap the SPL into this custom format and then have the SPL load/authenticate fitImage with the rest (U-Boot, Linux, DTB etc). Would that work ?
Quoted 7 lines
It not work.
We already wrap SPL in i.MX container format, this patchset is to let SPL could load the 2nd container file which contains U-Boot/DTB/OP-TEE/ATF. If we let SPL load a fitimage which contains (U-Boot/DTB and etc), it could not pass secure boot authentication, because ROM not know fitimage, it only know i.MX container format.Quoted 5 lines
It's not bootrom that authenticates the next stage, it's U-Boot SPL. BootROM already authenticated and started the U-Boot SPL, so that's a trusted code. Now this trusted code can authenticate and start the next stage (U-Boot, ATF, OpTee OS, etc) ; the BootROM is already out of the picture at this point.
Sorry for not clear. On i.MX8, SCFW (a runtime firmware )exports API for others to use,
sc_seco_authenticateis the API that used for authentication. I could not share more information about this API works inside SCFW and ROM.sc_err_tsc_seco_authenticate(sc_ipc_t ipc, sc_seco_auth_cmd_t cmd, sc_faddr_t addr)
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
SPL will call this API, one parameter is address which needs a container image there.
Please consider following scenario (I think that this is in sync with Marek's point):
It's not in sync, see 2.1 below.
Quoted 7 lines
1. You wrap SPL into i.MX8 "container", so the SPL would be recognised an checked by secure code in ROM.
2. Then we do have SPL "trusted". It is up to SPL to:
2.1. Use its private key to check u-boot, dtb, etc embedded into FitImage (as written here:
./doc/uImage.FIT/verified-boot.txt).
Then you have two private keys, one which is potentially exposed by being in the SPL. You want to use the crypto engine, which has a key in it and which cannot be easily extracted.
Quoted 8 lines
2.2. Use crypto engine (it's API) with fused keys to speed-up the process of boot (by HW support to check the binary). Such approach is in i.MX6Q.
By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container" format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is "trused" we may use available facilities.
My question is, how can Linux crypto API make use of the built-in private key in the iMX8 to authenticate payload ? There surely is a way.
Signature · 2 lines
Best regards, Marek Vasut
PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Marek,
Quoted 53 lines · Lukasz Majewski
Quoted 41 lines
Hi Peng,
Quoted 39 lines
Quoted 26 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
On 5/21/19 4:55 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I do not know how other SoC vendor did FIT hardware secure boot, please share you have any information.
The SPL can be in the custom format, but then can load fitImage with the next stage(s), right ?
I am not able to follow you, could you share more details?
Wrap the SPL into this custom format and then have the SPL load/authenticate fitImage with the rest (U-Boot, Linux, DTB etc). Would that work ?
Quoted 7 lines
It not work.
We already wrap SPL in i.MX container format, this patchset is to let SPL could load the 2nd container file which contains U-Boot/DTB/OP-TEE/ATF. If we let SPL load a fitimage which contains (U-Boot/DTB and etc), it could not pass secure boot authentication, because ROM not know fitimage, it only know i.MX container format.Quoted 5 lines
It's not bootrom that authenticates the next stage, it's U-Boot SPL. BootROM already authenticated and started the U-Boot SPL, so that's a trusted code. Now this trusted code can authenticate and start the next stage (U-Boot, ATF, OpTee OS, etc) ; the BootROM is already out of the picture at this point.
Sorry for not clear. On i.MX8, SCFW (a runtime firmware )exports API for others to use,
sc_seco_authenticateis the API that used for authentication. I could not share more information about this API works inside SCFW and ROM.sc_err_tsc_seco_authenticate(sc_ipc_t ipc, sc_seco_auth_cmd_t cmd, sc_faddr_t addr)Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
SPL will call this API, one parameter is address which needs a container image there.
Please consider following scenario (I think that this is in sync with Marek's point):
It's not in sync, see 2.1 below.
Quoted 3 lines
1. You wrap SPL into i.MX8 "container", so the SPL would be recognised an checked by secure code in ROM.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
2. Then we do have SPL "trusted". It is up to SPL to:
2.1. Use its private key to check u-boot, dtb, etc embedded into FitImage (as written here:
./doc/uImage.FIT/verified-boot.txt).Then you have two private keys,
There shall be s/private key/public key/g in the SPL (but then the SPL needs to be trusted).
And I fully agree that we shall use crypto engine whenever possible.
Quoted 9 lines
one which is potentially exposed by
being in the SPL. You want to use the crypto engine, which has a key in it and which cannot be easily extracted.Quoted 5 lines
2.2. Use crypto engine (it's API) with fused keys to speed-up the process of boot (by HW support to check the binary). Such approach is in i.MX6Q.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container" format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is "trused" we may use available facilities.
My question is, how can Linux crypto API make use of the built-in private key in the iMX8 to authenticate payload ? There surely is a way.
Best regards,
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email: lukma at denx.de -------------- next part --------------
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PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
In reply to Lukasz MajewskiHi Lukasz,
Quoted 60 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Lukasz Majewski [mailto:lukma at denx.de]
Sent: 2019年5月21日 16:33
To: Peng Fan <[email protected]>
Cc: Marek Vasut <[email protected]>; Marek Vasut <[email protected]>; Simon Glass <[email protected]>; u-boot at lists.denx.de; Tien Fong Chee <[email protected]>; York Sun <[email protected]>; dl-uboot-imx <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format fileHi Peng,
Quoted 32 lines
Quoted 26 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
On 5/21/19 4:55 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I do not know how other SoC vendor did FIT hardware secure boot, please share you have any information.
The SPL can be in the custom format, but then can load fitImage with the next stage(s), right ?
I am not able to follow you, could you share more details?
Wrap the SPL into this custom format and then have the SPL load/authenticate fitImage with the rest (U-Boot, Linux, DTB etc). Would that work ?
Quoted 7 lines
It not work.
We already wrap SPL in i.MX container format, this patchset is to let SPL could load the 2nd container file which contains U-Boot/DTB/OP-TEE/ATF. If we let SPL load a fitimage which contains (U-Boot/DTB and etc), it could not pass secure boot authentication, because ROM not know fitimage, it only know i.MX container format.Quoted 5 lines
It's not bootrom that authenticates the next stage, it's U-Boot SPL. BootROM already authenticated and started the U-Boot SPL, so that's a trusted code. Now this trusted code can authenticate and start the next stage (U-Boot, ATF, OpTee OS, etc) ; the BootROM is already out of the picture at this point.
Quoted 8 lines
Sorry for not clear. On i.MX8, SCFW (a runtime firmware )exports API for others to use,
sc_seco_authenticateis the API that used for authentication. I could not share more information about this API works inside SCFW and ROM.sc_err_tsc_seco_authenticate(sc_ipc_t ipc, sc_seco_auth_cmd_t cmd, sc_faddr_t addr)SPL will call this API, one parameter is address which needs a container image there.
Please consider following scenario (I think that this is in sync with Marek's point):
1. You wrap SPL into i.MX8 "container", so the SPL would be recognised an checked by secure code in ROM.
Quoted 7 lines
2. Then we do have SPL "trusted". It is up to SPL to:
2.1. Use its private key to check u-boot, dtb, etc embedded into FitImage (as written here:
./doc/uImage.FIT/verified-boot.txt).2.2. Use crypto engine (it's API) with fused keys to speed-up the process of boot (by HW support to check the binary). Such approach is in i.MX6Q.
I suppose you talking HAB.
Quoted 5 lines
By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container" format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is "trused" we may use available facilities.
The issue to me is that sc_seco_authenticate could not take a FIT image as input.
If I switch to FIT, I need to use FIT to wrap a container image, it does not make sense to me.
Thanks,
Peng.
Quoted 44 lines
Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
For authentication, we always let ROM to authenticate including SPL authenticating U-Boot, so we need pass an image to ROM that ROM could recognize when SPL booting 2nd image.
Quoted 6 lines
Shouldn't the CPU have some sort of facility, like a crypto engine, which authenticates whatever blob with the right signature against a key burned into the CPU ? If so, then you would just implement a crypto driver and pass the blob and signature to it. I suspect that's how it should work, how else would Linux be able to make use of these secure bits if it cannot call the bootrom anymore ?
sc_seco_authenticateon i.MX8 will always be available. It is exported by a runtime firmware running on a Cortex-M core inside i.MX8. The API will do authentication, its accepts container format image as input and no other format.Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 1 line
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut_______________________________________________
U-Boot mailing list
U-Boot at lists.denx.de
https://lists.denx.de/listinfo/u-bootBest regards,
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email:
lukma at denx.de
PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Peng,
Quoted 66 lines
Hi Lukasz,
Quoted 64 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Lukasz Majewski [mailto:lukma at denx.de]
Sent: 2019年5月21日 16:33
To: Peng Fan <[email protected]>
Cc: Marek Vasut <[email protected]>; Marek Vasut <[email protected]>; Simon Glass <[email protected]>; u-boot at lists.denx.de; Tien Fong Chee <[email protected]>; York Sun <[email protected]>; dl-uboot-imx <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format fileHi Peng,
Quoted 40 lines
Quoted 26 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
On 5/21/19 4:55 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I do not know how other SoC vendor did FIT hardware secure boot, please share you have any information.
The SPL can be in the custom format, but then can load fitImage with the next stage(s), right ?
I am not able to follow you, could you share more details?
Wrap the SPL into this custom format and then have the SPL load/authenticate fitImage with the rest (U-Boot, Linux, DTB etc). Would that work ?
Quoted 7 lines
It not work.
We already wrap SPL in i.MX container format, this patchset is to let SPL could load the 2nd container file which contains U-Boot/DTB/OP-TEE/ATF. If we let SPL load a fitimage which contains (U-Boot/DTB and etc), it could not pass secure boot authentication, because ROM not know fitimage, it only know i.MX container format.Quoted 6 lines
It's not bootrom that authenticates the next stage, it's U-Boot SPL. BootROM already authenticated and started the U-Boot SPL, so that's a trusted code. Now this trusted code can authenticate and start the next stage (U-Boot, ATF, OpTee OS, etc) ; the BootROM is already out of the picture at this point.
Sorry for not clear. On i.MX8, SCFW (a runtime firmware )exports API for others to use,
sc_seco_authenticateis the API that used for authentication. I could not share more information about this API works inside SCFW and ROM.sc_err_tsc_seco_authenticate(sc_ipc_t ipc, sc_seco_auth_cmd_t cmd, sc_faddr_t addr)Quoted 2 lines
SPL will call this API, one parameter is address which needs a container image there.
Please consider following scenario (I think that this is in sync with Marek's point):
1. You wrap SPL into i.MX8 "container", so the SPL would be recognised an checked by secure code in ROM.
2. Then we do have SPL "trusted". It is up to SPL to:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
2.1. Use its private key to check u-boot, dtb, etc embedded into FitImage (as written here:
./doc/uImage.FIT/verified-boot.txt).2.2. Use crypto engine (it's API) with fused keys to speed-up the process of boot (by HW support to check the binary). Such approach is in i.MX6Q.
I suppose you talking HAB.
Yes. As described here:
https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/application-note/AN4581.pdf
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 7 lines
By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container" format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is "trused" we may use available facilities.
The issue to me is that
sc_seco_authenticatecould not take a FIT image as input.
Is the sc_seco_authenticate an API accessible from SPL, U-Boot proper or Linux crypro engine driver?
Or is it just the function executed by ROM on the very beginning to load SPL?
Quoted 3 lines
If I switch to FIT, I need to use FIT to wrap a container image, it does not make sense to me.
Please correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't the container image only needed to wrap SPL?
In which other cases the container image is needed in U-Boot proper or Linux kernel?
Quoted 48 lines
Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 45 lines
Quoted 24 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
For authentication, we always let ROM to authenticate including SPL authenticating U-Boot, so we need pass an image to ROM that ROM could recognize when SPL booting 2nd image.
Quoted 7 lines
Shouldn't the CPU have some sort of facility, like a crypto engine, which authenticates whatever blob with the right signature against a key burned into the CPU ? If so, then you would just implement a crypto driver and pass the blob and signature to it. I suspect that's how it should work, how else would Linux be able to make use of these secure bits if it cannot call the bootrom anymore ?
sc_seco_authenticateon i.MX8 will always be available. It is exported by a runtime firmware running on a Cortex-M core inside i.MX8. The API will do authentication, its accepts container format image as input and no other format.Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 1 line
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut_______________________________________________
U-Boot mailing list
U-Boot at lists.denx.de
https://lists.denx.de/listinfo/u-bootBest regards,
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang
Denk HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email:
lukma at denx.de
Best regards,
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email: lukma at denx.de -------------- next part --------------
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PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 71 lines
Quoted 50 lines
Quoted 50 lines
Quoted 39 lines
Quoted 26 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
On 5/21/19 4:55 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I do not know how other SoC vendor did FIT hardware secure boot, please share you have any information.
The SPL can be in the custom format, but then can load fitImage with the next stage(s), right ?
I am not able to follow you, could you share more details?
Wrap the SPL into this custom format and then have the SPL load/authenticate fitImage with the rest (U-Boot, Linux, DTB etc). Would that work ?
Quoted 7 lines
It not work.
We already wrap SPL in i.MX container format, this patchset is to let SPL could load the 2nd container file which contains U-Boot/DTB/OP-TEE/ATF. If we let SPL load a fitimage which contains (U-Boot/DTB and etc), it could not pass secure boot authentication, because ROM not know fitimage, it only know i.MX container format.Quoted 5 lines
It's not bootrom that authenticates the next stage, it's U-Boot SPL. BootROM already authenticated and started the U-Boot SPL, so that's a trusted code. Now this trusted code can authenticate and start the next stage (U-Boot, ATF, OpTee OS,
etc) ; the BootROM is already out of the picture at this point.Sorry for not clear. On i.MX8, SCFW (a runtime firmware )exports API for others to use,
sc_seco_authenticateis the API that used for authentication. I could not share more information about this API works inside SCFW and ROM.sc_err_tsc_seco_authenticate(sc_ipc_t ipc, sc_seco_auth_cmd_t cmd, sc_faddr_t addr)Quoted 2 lines
SPL will call this API, one parameter is address which needs a container image there.
Please consider following scenario (I think that this is in sync with Marek's point):
1. You wrap SPL into i.MX8 "container", so the SPL would be recognised an checked by secure code in ROM.
2. Then we do have SPL "trusted". It is up to SPL to:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
2.1. Use its private key to check u-boot, dtb, etc embedded into FitImage (as written here:
./doc/uImage.FIT/verified-boot.txt).2.2. Use crypto engine (it's API) with fused keys to speed-up the process of boot (by HW support to check the binary). Such approach is in i.MX6Q.
I suppose you talking HAB.
Yes. As described here:
https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/application-note/AN4581.pdf
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container" format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is "trused" we may use available facilities.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The issue to me is that
sc_seco_authenticatecould not take a FIT image as input.Is the
sc_seco_authenticatean API accessible from SPL, U-Boot proper or Linux crypro engine driver?
Yes, it is an API accessible in SPL/U-Boot stage. I do not know about Linux crypto driver.
Quoted 9 lines
Or is it just the function executed by ROM on the very beginning to load SPL?
Quoted 3 lines
If I switch to FIT, I need to use FIT to wrap a container image, it does not make sense to me.
Please correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't the container image only needed to wrap SPL?
Container image will wrap SPL to make ROM could load SPL, Kick SPL and authenticate SPL.
When SPL booting U-Boot, SPL could use FIT to load and boot uboot. But when SPL need to authenticate U-Boot with AHAB on i.MX8, a container format header/image needs to be passed to sc_seco_authenticate API, the API internal implementation is it will parse the container header/image.
So in vendor tree, uboot/atf/optee are wrapped into a container format image.
Quoted 3 lines
In which other cases the container image is needed in U-Boot proper or Linux kernel?
When uboot authenticate kernel, we also wrap kernel image into a container format file using CST. I do not know how Linux kernel itself authenticate others.
Thanks,
Peng.
Quoted 63 lines
Quoted 49 lines
Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 45 lines
Quoted 24 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
For authentication, we always let ROM to authenticate including SPL authenticating U-Boot, so we need pass an image to ROM that ROM could recognize when SPL booting 2nd image.
Quoted 7 lines
Shouldn't the CPU have some sort of facility, like a crypto engine, which authenticates whatever blob with the right signature against a key burned into the CPU ? If so, then you would just implement a crypto driver and pass the blob and signature to it. I suspect that's how it should work, how else would Linux be able to make use of these secure bits if it cannot call the bootrom anymore ?
sc_seco_authenticateon i.MX8 will always be available. It is exported by a runtime firmware running on a Cortex-M core inside i.MX8. The API will do authentication, its accepts container format image as input and no other format.Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 1 line
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut_______________________________________________
U-Boot mailing list
U-Boot at lists.denx.de
https://lists.denx.de/listinfo/u-bootBest regards,
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang
Denk HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email:
lukma at denx.deBest regards,
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email:
lukma at denx.de
PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Peng,
Quoted 73 lines
Quoted 73 lines
Quoted 52 lines
Quoted 52 lines
Quoted 41 lines
Quoted 27 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
On 5/21/19 4:55 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I do not know how other SoC vendor did FIT hardware secure boot, please share you have any information.
The SPL can be in the custom format, but then can load fitImage with the next stage(s), right ?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I am not able to follow you, could you share more
details?Wrap the SPL into this custom format and then have the SPL load/authenticate fitImage with the rest (U-Boot, Linux, DTB etc). Would that work ?
Quoted 7 lines
It not work.
We already wrap SPL in i.MX container format, this patchset is to let SPL could load the 2nd container file which contains U-Boot/DTB/OP-TEE/ATF. If we let SPL load a fitimage which contains (U-Boot/DTB and etc), it could not pass secure boot authentication, because ROM not know fitimage, it only know i.MX container format.Quoted 6 lines
It's not bootrom that authenticates the next stage, it's U-Boot SPL. BootROM already authenticated and started the U-Boot SPL, so that's a trusted code. Now this trusted code can authenticate and start the next stage (U-Boot, ATF, OpTee OS, etc) ; the BootROM is already out of the picture at this point.
Sorry for not clear. On i.MX8, SCFW (a runtime firmware )exports API for others to use,
sc_seco_authenticateis the API that used for authentication. I could not share more information about this API works inside SCFW and ROM.sc_err_tsc_seco_authenticate(sc_ipc_t ipc, sc_seco_auth_cmd_t cmd, sc_faddr_t addr)Quoted 2 lines
SPL will call this API, one parameter is address which needs a container image there.
Please consider following scenario (I think that this is in sync with Marek's point):
1. You wrap SPL into i.MX8 "container", so the SPL would be recognised an checked by secure code in ROM.
2. Then we do have SPL "trusted". It is up to SPL to:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
2.1. Use its private key to check u-boot, dtb, etc embedded into FitImage (as written here:
./doc/uImage.FIT/verified-boot.txt).2.2. Use crypto engine (it's API) with fused keys to speed-up the process of boot (by HW support to check the binary). Such approach is in i.MX6Q.
I suppose you talking HAB.
Yes. As described here:
https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/application-note/AN4581.pdf
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container" format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is "trused" we may use available facilities.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The issue to me is that
sc_seco_authenticatecould not take a FIT image as input.Is the
sc_seco_authenticatean API accessible from SPL, U-Boot proper or Linux crypro engine driver?Yes, it is an API accessible in SPL/U-Boot stage. I do not know about Linux crypto driver.
Maybe it would be worth to check how Linux handle this? Maybe it would shed some more light on it?
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Or is it just the function executed by ROM on the very beginning to load SPL?
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
If I switch to FIT, I need to use FIT to wrap a container image, it does not make sense to me.
Please correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't the container image only needed to wrap SPL?
Container image will wrap SPL to make ROM could load SPL, Kick SPL and authenticate SPL.
Ok. So it is needed in the ROM "part" of security.
Quoted 6 lines
When SPL booting U-Boot, SPL could use FIT to load and boot uboot. But when SPL need to authenticate U-Boot with AHAB on i.MX8, a container format header/image needs to be passed to
sc_seco_authenticateAPI, the API internal implementation is it will parse the container header/image.
Ok. So every time we want to use the sc_seco_authenticate API the provided image for checking needs to be wrapped into the "container" iMX8 specific format.
Quoted 3 lines
So in vendor tree, uboot/atf/optee are wrapped into a container format image.
Ok.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
In which other cases the container image is needed in U-Boot proper or Linux kernel?
Quoted 71 lines
When uboot authenticate kernel, we also wrap kernel image into a container format file using CST. I do not know how Linux kernel itself authenticate others.
Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 64 lines
Quoted 50 lines
Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 46 lines
Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
For authentication, we always let ROM to authenticate including SPL authenticating U-Boot, so we need pass an image to ROM that ROM could recognize when SPL booting 2nd image.
Quoted 7 lines
Shouldn't the CPU have some sort of facility, like a crypto engine, which authenticates whatever blob with the right signature against a key burned into the CPU ? If so, then you would just implement a crypto driver and pass the blob and signature to it. I suspect that's how it should work, how else would Linux be able to make use of these secure bits if it cannot call the bootrom anymore ?
sc_seco_authenticateon i.MX8 will always be available. It is exported by a runtime firmware running on a Cortex-M core inside i.MX8. The API will do authentication, its accepts container format image as input and no other format.Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 1 line
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut_______________________________________________
U-Boot mailing list
U-Boot at lists.denx.de
https://lists.denx.de/listinfo/u-bootBest regards,
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang
Denk HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax:
(+49)-8142-66989-80 Email: lukma at denx.deBest regards,
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang
Denk HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email:
lukma at denx.de
Best regards,
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email: lukma at denx.de -------------- next part --------------
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PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 77 lines
Quoted 77 lines
Quoted 77 lines
Quoted 53 lines
Quoted 53 lines
Quoted 42 lines
Quoted 28 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
On 5/21/19 4:55 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I do not know how other SoC vendor did FIT hardware secure boot, please share you have any information.
The SPL can be in the custom format, but then can load fitImage with the next stage(s), right ?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I am not able to follow you, could you share more
details?Wrap the SPL into this custom format and then have the SPL load/authenticate fitImage with the rest (U-Boot, Linux, DTB etc). Would that work ?
Quoted 7 lines
It not work.
We already wrap SPL in i.MX container format, this patchset is to let SPL could load the 2nd container file which contains U-Boot/DTB/OP-TEE/ATF. If we let SPL load a fitimage which contains (U-Boot/DTB and etc), it could not pass secure boot authentication, because ROM not know fitimage, it only know i.MX container format.Quoted 6 lines
It's not bootrom that authenticates the next stage, it's U-Boot SPL. BootROM already authenticated and started the U-Boot SPL, so that's a trusted code. Now this trusted code can authenticate and start the next stage (U-Boot, ATF, OpTee OS, etc) ; the BootROM is already out of the picture at this point.
Sorry for not clear. On i.MX8, SCFW (a runtime firmware )exports API for others to use,
sc_seco_authenticateis the API that used for authentication. I could not share more information about this API works inside SCFW and ROM.sc_err_tsc_seco_authenticate(sc_ipc_t ipc, sc_seco_auth_cmd_t cmd, sc_faddr_t addr)Quoted 2 lines
SPL will call this API, one parameter is address which needs a container image there.
Please consider following scenario (I think that this is in sync with Marek's point):
1. You wrap SPL into i.MX8 "container", so the SPL would be recognised an checked by secure code in ROM.
2. Then we do have SPL "trusted". It is up to SPL to:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
2.1. Use its private key to check u-boot, dtb, etc embedded into FitImage (as written here:
./doc/uImage.FIT/verified-boot.txt).2.2. Use crypto engine (it's API) with fused keys to speed-up the process of boot (by HW support to check the binary). Such approach is in i.MX6Q.
I suppose you talking HAB.
Yes. As described here:
https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/application-note/AN4581.pdf
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 7 lines
By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container" format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is "trused" we may use available facilities.
The issue to me is that
sc_seco_authenticatecould not take a FIT image as input.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Is the
sc_seco_authenticatean API accessible from SPL, U-Boot proper or Linux crypro engine driver?Yes, it is an API accessible in SPL/U-Boot stage. I do not know about Linux crypto driver.
Maybe it would be worth to check how Linux handle this? Maybe it would shed some more light on it?
I am not familiar with that, so might be stupid question below. Does it really matter? i.MX6 HAB secure boot also requires CSF padding into image, we could not pass other format image to ROM when using HAB, right?
Quoted 24 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Or is it just the function executed by ROM on the very beginning to load SPL?
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
If I switch to FIT, I need to use FIT to wrap a container image, it does not make sense to me.
Please correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't the container image only needed to wrap SPL?
Container image will wrap SPL to make ROM could load SPL, Kick SPL and authenticate SPL.
Ok. So it is needed in the ROM "part" of security.
Quoted 6 lines
When SPL booting U-Boot, SPL could use FIT to load and boot uboot. But when SPL need to authenticate U-Boot with AHAB on i.MX8, a container format header/image needs to be passed to
sc_seco_authenticateAPI, the API internal implementation is it will parse the container header/image.
Quoted 3 lines
Ok. So every time we want to use the
sc_seco_authenticateAPI the provided image for checking needs to be wrapped into the "container" iMX8 specific format.
Yes. Otherwise sc_seco_authenticate will return failure. I could not think out better solution, another approach is let uboot generating a container header, and use FIT to wrap the header and other payload images, but I think directly generating a container image is simpler, because we already have SPL been wrapped into container format.
Thanks,
Peng.
Quoted 98 lines
Quoted 4 lines
So in vendor tree, uboot/atf/optee are wrapped into a container format image.
Ok.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
In which other cases the container image is needed in U-Boot proper or Linux kernel?
Quoted 54 lines
When uboot authenticate kernel, we also wrap kernel image into a container format file using CST. I do not know how Linux kernel itself authenticate others.
Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 47 lines
Quoted 47 lines
Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 43 lines
Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
For authentication, we always let ROM to authenticate including SPL authenticating U-Boot, so we need pass an image to ROM that ROM could recognize when SPL booting 2nd image.
Quoted 7 lines
Shouldn't the CPU have some sort of facility, like a crypto engine, which authenticates whatever blob with the right signature against a key burned into the CPU ? If so, then you would just implement a crypto driver and pass the blob and signature to it. I suspect that's how it should work, how else would Linux be able to make use of these secure bits if it cannot call the bootrom anymore ?
sc_seco_authenticateon i.MX8 will always be available. It is exported by a runtime firmware running on a Cortex-M core inside i.MX8. The API will do authentication, its accepts container format image as input and no other format.Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 1 line
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut_______________________________________________
U-Boot mailing list
U-Boot at lists.denx.de
https://lists.denx.de/listinfo/u-bootBest regards,
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director:
Wolfgang
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Denk HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax:
(+49)-8142-66989-80 Email: lukma at denx.deBest regards,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang
Denk HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email:
lukma at denx.deBest regards,
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email:
lukma at denx.de
PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Peng,
Quoted 83 lines
Quoted 83 lines
Quoted 83 lines
Quoted 82 lines
Quoted 59 lines
Quoted 59 lines
Quoted 44 lines
Quoted 30 lines
Subject: Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
On 5/21/19 4:55 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I do not know how other SoC vendor did FIT
hardware secure boot, please share you have any
information.The SPL can be in the custom format, but then can
load fitImage with the next stage(s), right ?Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I am not able to follow you, could you share more
details?Wrap the SPL into this custom format and then have the SPL load/authenticate fitImage with the rest (U-Boot, Linux, DTB etc). Would that work ?
Quoted 8 lines
It not work.
We already wrap SPL in i.MX container format, this patchset is to let SPL could load the 2nd container file which contains U-Boot/DTB/OP-TEE/ATF. If we let SPL load a fitimage which contains (U-Boot/DTB and etc), it could not pass secure boot authentication, because ROM not know fitimage, it only know i.MX container format.Quoted 6 lines
It's not bootrom that authenticates the next stage, it's U-Boot SPL. BootROM already authenticated and started the U-Boot SPL, so that's a trusted code. Now this trusted code can authenticate and start the next stage (U-Boot, ATF, OpTee OS, etc) ; the BootROM is already out of the picture at this point.
Sorry for not clear. On i.MX8, SCFW (a runtime firmware )exports API for others to use,
sc_seco_authenticateis the API that used for authentication. I could not share more information about this API works inside SCFW and ROM.sc_err_tsc_seco_authenticate(sc_ipc_t ipc, sc_seco_auth_cmd_t cmd, sc_faddr_t addr)Quoted 2 lines
SPL will call this API, one parameter is address which needs a container image there.
Please consider following scenario (I think that this is in sync with Marek's point):
1. You wrap SPL into i.MX8 "container", so the SPL would be recognised an checked by secure code in ROM.
2. Then we do have SPL "trusted". It is up to SPL to:
2.1. Use its private key to check u-boot, dtb, etc embedded into FitImage (as written
here:./doc/uImage.FIT/verified-boot.txt).Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
2.2. Use crypto engine (it's API) with fused keys to speed-up the process of boot (by HW support to check the binary). Such approach is in i.MX6Q.
I suppose you talking HAB.
Yes. As described here:
https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/application-note/AN4581.pdf
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 7 lines
By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container" format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is "trused" we may use available facilities.
The issue to me is that
sc_seco_authenticatecould not take a FIT image as input.Is the
sc_seco_authenticatean API accessible from SPL, U-Boot proper or Linux crypro engine driver?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Yes, it is an API accessible in SPL/U-Boot stage. I do not know about Linux crypto driver.
Maybe it would be worth to check how Linux handle this? Maybe it would shed some more light on it?
I am not familiar with that, so might be stupid question below. Does it really matter?
I would check it just out of curiosity.
Quoted 4 lines
i.MX6 HAB secure boot also requires CSF padding
into image, we could not pass other format image to ROM when using HAB, right?
Yes.
Quoted 28 lines
Quoted 24 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Or is it just the function executed by ROM on the very beginning to load SPL?
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
If I switch to FIT, I need to use FIT to wrap a container image, it does not make sense to me.
Please correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't the container image only needed to wrap SPL?
Container image will wrap SPL to make ROM could load SPL, Kick SPL and authenticate SPL.
Ok. So it is needed in the ROM "part" of security.
Quoted 6 lines
When SPL booting U-Boot, SPL could use FIT to load and boot uboot. But when SPL need to authenticate U-Boot with AHAB on i.MX8, a container format header/image needs to be passed to
sc_seco_authenticateAPI, the API internal implementation is it will parse the container header/image.Quoted 3 lines
Ok. So every time we want to use the
sc_seco_authenticateAPI the provided image for checking needs to be wrapped into the "container" iMX8 specific format.
Quoted 6 lines
Yes. Otherwise
sc_seco_authenticatewill return failure. I could not think out better solution, another approach is let uboot generating a container header, and use FIT to wrap the header and other payload images, but I think directly generating a container image is simpler, because we already have SPL been wrapped into container format.
I just wanted to understand the issue and help to get the simplest possible solution.
Quoted 103 lines
Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 100 lines
Quoted 4 lines
So in vendor tree, uboot/atf/optee are wrapped into a container format image.
Ok.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
In which other cases the container image is needed in U-Boot proper or Linux kernel?
Quoted 56 lines
When uboot authenticate kernel, we also wrap kernel image into a container format file using CST. I do not know how Linux kernel itself authenticate others.
Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 49 lines
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Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 45 lines
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For authentication, we always let ROM to authenticate including SPL authenticating U-Boot, so we need pass an image to ROM that ROM could recognize when SPL booting 2nd image.
Quoted 8 lines
Shouldn't the CPU have some sort of facility, like a crypto engine, which authenticates whatever blob with the right signature against a key burned into the CPU ? If so, then you would just implement a crypto driver and pass the blob and signature to it. I suspect that's how it should work, how else would Linux be able to make use of these secure bits if it cannot call the bootrom anymore ?
sc_seco_authenticateon i.MX8 will always be available. It is exported by a runtime firmware running on a Cortex-M core inside i.MX8. The API will do authentication, its accepts container format image as input and no other format.Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 1 line
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--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut_______________________________________________
U-Boot mailing list
U-Boot at lists.denx.de
https://lists.denx.de/listinfo/u-bootBest regards,
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director:
Wolfgang
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Denk HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax:
(+49)-8142-66989-80 Email: lukma at denx.deBest regards,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang
Denk HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax:
(+49)-8142-66989-80 Email: lukma at denx.deBest regards,
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang
Denk HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email:
lukma at denx.de
Best regards,
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email: lukma at denx.de -------------- next part --------------
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PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
On 5/22/19 9:34 AM, Lukasz Majewski wrote:
[...]
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By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container" format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is "trused" we may use available facilities.
The issue to me is that
sc_seco_authenticatecould not take a FIT image as input.Is the
sc_seco_authenticatean API accessible from SPL, U-Boot proper or Linux crypro engine driver?Yes, it is an API accessible in SPL/U-Boot stage. I do not know about Linux crypto driver.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Maybe it would be worth to check how Linux handle this? Maybe it would shed some more light on it?
I am not familiar with that, so might be stupid question below. Does it really matter?
I would check it just out of curiosity.
Yes, it matters, because there should be such API. How would Linux authenticate e.g. userspace binaries if there wasn't one, surely not by wrapping every single object into the custom vendor-specific container ? And if there is one, you can use it to authenticate raw binaries from U-Boot SPL too, e.g. fitImage blobs with an associated signature.
[...]
Signature · 2 lines
Best regards, Marek Vasut
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Marek,
Quoted 24 lines · Marek Vasut
Caution: EXT Email
On 5/22/19 9:34 AM, Lukasz Majewski wrote:
[...]Quoted 20 lines
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By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container" format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is "trused" we may use available facilities.
The issue to me is that
sc_seco_authenticatecould not take a FIT image as input.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Is the
sc_seco_authenticatean API accessible from SPL, U-Boot proper or Linux crypro engine driver?Yes, it is an API accessible in SPL/U-Boot stage. I do not know about Linux crypto driver.
Maybe it would be worth to check how Linux handle this? Maybe it would shed some more light on it?
I am not familiar with that, so might be stupid question below. Does it really matter?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
I would check it just out of curiosity.
Yes, it matters, because there should be such API. How would Linux authenticate e.g. userspace binaries if there wasn't one, surely not by wrapping every single object into the custom vendor-specific container ? And if there is one, you can use it to authenticate raw binaries from U-Boot SPL too, e.g. fitImage blobs with an associated signature.
iMX8 AHAB uses RSA key pair for authentication, the on-chip thing we called SRK is a array of public key hash which is dedicated for AHAB. It is not a real key. The real public key is in container. AHAB will check the public key with the on-chip SRK before using it to authenticate the image. Seco which contains the crypto engine on imx8 does not allow to use the SRK by user. No such API exported. And the fuse of SRK is locked, can't be read directly.
Actually on imx6/imx7/imx8m, the SPL and u-boot are already using ROM HAB to implement the trust chain, like SPL authenticates u-boot, u-boot authenticatse kernel. We just follow this same way on imx8, the difference is imx8 needs container format for signed image. We prefer directly loading container image than fit image. If we pack fit image into container, obviously this will cause one more copy.
As a boot loader, isn't it better to have more image format supported? We don't force to use container, just set it as default. Users still can choose fit or raw image.
Quoted 6 lines
[...]
--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Marek, Lukasz,
Quoted 48 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Marek,
Quoted 24 lines · Marek Vasut
Caution: EXT Email
On 5/22/19 9:34 AM, Lukasz Majewski wrote:
[...]Quoted 20 lines
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By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container" format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is "trused" we may use available facilities.
The issue to me is that
sc_seco_authenticatecould not take a FIT image as input.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Is the
sc_seco_authenticatean API accessible from SPL, U-Boot proper or Linux crypro engine driver?Yes, it is an API accessible in SPL/U-Boot stage. I do not know about Linux crypto driver.
Maybe it would be worth to check how Linux handle this? Maybe it would shed some more light on it?
I am not familiar with that, so might be stupid question below. Does it really matter?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
I would check it just out of curiosity.
Yes, it matters, because there should be such API. How would Linux authenticate e.g. userspace binaries if there wasn't one, surely not by wrapping every single object into the custom vendor-specific container ? And if there is one, you can use it to authenticate raw binaries from U-Boot SPL too, e.g. fitImage blobs with an associated signature.
iMX8 AHAB uses RSA key pair for authentication, the on-chip thing we called SRK is a array of public key hash which is dedicated for AHAB. It is not a real key. The real public key is in container.
AHAB will check the public key with the on-chip SRK before using it to authenticate the image.
Seco which contains the crypto engine on imx8 does not allow to use the SRK by user. No such API exported.
And the fuse of SRK is locked, can't be read directly.
Quoted 9 lines
Actually on imx6/imx7/imx8m, the SPL and u-boot are already using ROM HAB to implement the trust chain, like SPL authenticates u-boot, u-boot authenticatse kernel. We just follow this same way on imx8, the difference is imx8 needs container format for signed image. We prefer directly loading container image than fit image.
If we pack fit image into container, obviously this will cause one more copy. As a boot loader, isn't it better to have more image format supported? We don't force to use container, just set it as default. Users still can choose fit or raw image.
Do you have more comment?
Thanks,
Peng.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 8 lines
[...]
--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 57 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Marek, Lukasz,
Quoted 55 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Marek,
Quoted 24 lines · Marek Vasut
Caution: EXT Email
On 5/22/19 9:34 AM, Lukasz Majewski wrote:
[...]Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
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Quoted 4 lines
By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container" format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is "trused" we may use available facilities.
The issue to me is that
sc_seco_authenticatecould not take a FIT image as input.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Is the
sc_seco_authenticatean API accessible from SPL, U-Boot proper or Linux crypro engine driver?Yes, it is an API accessible in SPL/U-Boot stage. I do not know about Linux crypto driver.
Maybe it would be worth to check how Linux handle this? Maybe it would shed some more light on it?
I am not familiar with that, so might be stupid question below. Does it really matter?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
I would check it just out of curiosity.
Yes, it matters, because there should be such API. How would Linux authenticate e.g. userspace binaries if there wasn't one, surely not by wrapping every single object into the custom vendor-specific container ? And if there is one, you can use it to authenticate raw binaries from U-Boot SPL too, e.g. fitImage blobs with an associated signature.
iMX8 AHAB uses RSA key pair for authentication, the on-chip thing we called SRK is a array of public key hash which is dedicated for AHAB. It is not a real key. The real public key is in container.
AHAB will check the public key with the on-chip SRK before using it to authenticate the image.
Seco which contains the crypto engine on imx8 does not allow to use the SRK by user. No such API exported.
And the fuse of SRK is locked, can't be read directly.Actually on imx6/imx7/imx8m, the SPL and u-boot are already using ROM HAB to implement the trust chain, like SPL authenticates u-boot, u-boot authenticatse kernel. We just follow this same way on imx8, the difference is imx8 needs container format for signed image. We prefer directly loading container image than fit image.
If we pack fit image into container, obviously this will cause one more copy. As a boot loader, isn't it better to have more image format supported?
If the functionality of the new image format is a subset of already present image format, then no, that's called a duplication.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
We
don't force to use container, just set it as default. Users still can choose fit or raw image.
They can. however they cannot authenticate the fitImage because the firmware doesn't provide the necessary API for that ?
Quoted 2 lines
Do you have more comment?
How could Linux use this iMX8 chain of trust stuff to authenticate e.g. userspace binaries ? It's the same thing as authenticating blob in a fitImage.
Signature · 2 lines
Best regards, Marek Vasut
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 72 lines · Marek Vasut
Caution: EXT Email
Quoted 57 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Marek, Lukasz,
Quoted 55 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Marek,
Quoted 24 lines · Marek Vasut
Caution: EXT Email
On 5/22/19 9:34 AM, Lukasz Majewski wrote:
[...]Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
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Quoted 4 lines
By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container" format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is "trused" we may use available facilities.
The issue to me is that
sc_seco_authenticatecould not take a FIT image as input.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Is the
sc_seco_authenticatean API accessible from SPL, U-Boot proper or Linux crypro engine driver?Yes, it is an API accessible in SPL/U-Boot stage. I do not know about Linux crypto driver.
Maybe it would be worth to check how Linux handle this? Maybe it would shed some more light on it?
I am not familiar with that, so might be stupid question below. Does it really matter?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
I would check it just out of curiosity.
Yes, it matters, because there should be such API. How would Linux authenticate e.g. userspace binaries if there wasn't one, surely not by wrapping every single object into the custom vendor-specific container ? And if there is one, you can use it to authenticate raw binaries from U-Boot SPL too, e.g. fitImage blobs with an associated signature.
iMX8 AHAB uses RSA key pair for authentication, the on-chip thing we called SRK is a array of public key hash which is dedicated for AHAB. It is not a real key. The real public key is in container.
AHAB will check the public key with the on-chip SRK before using it to authenticate the image.
Seco which contains the crypto engine on imx8 does not allow to use the SRK by user. No such API exported.
And the fuse of SRK is locked, can't be read directly.Actually on imx6/imx7/imx8m, the SPL and u-boot are already using ROM HAB to implement the trust chain, like SPL authenticates u-boot, u-boot authenticatse kernel. We just follow this same way on imx8, the difference is imx8 needs container format for signed image. We prefer directly loading container image than fit image.
If we pack fit image into container, obviously this will cause one more copy. As a boot loader, isn't it better to have more image format supported?If the functionality of the new image format is a subset of already present image format, then no, that's called a duplication.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
We
don't force to use container, just set it as default. Users still can choose fit or raw image.They can. however they cannot authenticate the fitImage because the firmware doesn't provide the necessary API for that ?
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Do you have more comment?
How could Linux use this iMX8 chain of trust stuff to authenticate e.g. userspace binaries ? It's the same thing as authenticating blob in a fitImage.
Userspace binaries don't use the same key pair. They are signed by software vendors' key. The private key for chip secure boot is only hold by device manufacturer.
For example, android needs to authenticate a signed APK. Its public key (Key A) is in system FS. iMX trust chain only reaches to kernel + ramdisk. Then the chain hands over to android. In ramdisk, android puts another public Key (Key B) used by dm-verify for system FS. So once system FS is verified ok, then the public key A becomes trusted. Finally we can use public key A for APK authentication.
Best regards,
Ye Li
Quoted 4 lines
--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 80 lines · Ye Li
Quoted 72 lines · Marek Vasut
Caution: EXT Email
Quoted 57 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Marek, Lukasz,
Quoted 55 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Marek,
Quoted 24 lines · Marek Vasut
Caution: EXT Email
On 5/22/19 9:34 AM, Lukasz Majewski wrote:
[...]Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 8 lines
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By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container" format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is "trused" we may use available facilities.
The issue to me is that
sc_seco_authenticatecould not take a FIT image as input.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Is the
sc_seco_authenticatean API accessible from SPL, U-Boot proper or Linux crypro engine driver?Yes, it is an API accessible in SPL/U-Boot stage. I do not know about Linux crypto driver.
Maybe it would be worth to check how Linux handle this? Maybe it would shed some more light on it?
I am not familiar with that, so might be stupid question below. Does it really matter?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
I would check it just out of curiosity.
Yes, it matters, because there should be such API. How would Linux authenticate e.g. userspace binaries if there wasn't one, surely not by wrapping every single object into the custom vendor-specific container ? And if there is one, you can use it to authenticate raw binaries from U-Boot SPL too, e.g. fitImage blobs with an associated signature.
iMX8 AHAB uses RSA key pair for authentication, the on-chip thing we called SRK is a array of public key hash which is dedicated for AHAB. It is not a real key. The real public key is in container.
AHAB will check the public key with the on-chip SRK before using it to authenticate the image.
Seco which contains the crypto engine on imx8 does not allow to use the SRK by user. No such API exported.
And the fuse of SRK is locked, can't be read directly.Actually on imx6/imx7/imx8m, the SPL and u-boot are already using ROM HAB to implement the trust chain, like SPL authenticates u-boot, u-boot authenticatse kernel. We just follow this same way on imx8, the difference is imx8 needs container format for signed image. We prefer directly loading container image than fit image.
If we pack fit image into container, obviously this will cause one more copy. As a boot loader, isn't it better to have more image format supported?If the functionality of the new image format is a subset of already present image format, then no, that's called a duplication.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
We
don't force to use container, just set it as default. Users still can choose fit or raw image.They can. however they cannot authenticate the fitImage because the firmware doesn't provide the necessary API for that ?
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Do you have more comment?
How could Linux use this iMX8 chain of trust stuff to authenticate e.g. userspace binaries ? It's the same thing as authenticating blob in a fitImage.
Quoted 7 lines
Userspace binaries don't use the same key pair. They are signed by software vendors' key. The private key for chip secure boot is only hold by device manufacturer.
For example, android needs to authenticate a signed APK. Its public key (Key A) is in system FS. iMX trust chain only reaches to kernel + ramdisk. Then the chain hands over to android. In ramdisk, android puts another public Key (Key B) used by dm-verify for system FS. So once system FS is verified ok, then the public key A becomes trusted. Finally we can use public key A for APK authentication.
So can we put a public key into the SPL and use it to verify a fitImage ?
Signature · 2 lines
Best regards, Marek Vasut
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 92 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 11 lines · Ye Li
Quoted 10 lines · Marek Vasut
Caution: EXT Email
Quoted 7 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Marek, Lukasz,
Quoted 5 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Marek,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines · Marek Vasut
Quoted 7 lines
Caution: EXT Email
On 5/22/19 9:34 AM, Lukasz Majewski wrote:
[...]Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
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Quoted 3 lines
By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container"
format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example
Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is"trused"
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
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Quoted 10 lines
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we may use available facilities.
The issue to me is that
sc_seco_authenticatecould not take a FIT image as input.Is the
sc_seco_authenticatean API accessible from SPL, U-Boot proper or Linux crypro engine driver?Yes, it is an API accessible in SPL/U-Boot stage. I do not know about Linux crypto driver.
Maybe it would be worth to check how Linux handle this? Maybe it would shed some more light on it?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I am not familiar with that, so might be stupid question below. Does it really matter?
I would check it just out of curiosity.
Yes, it matters, because there should be such API. How would Linux authenticate e.g. userspace binaries if there wasn't one, surely not by wrapping every single object into the custom vendor-specific
container ?
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 3 lines
And if there is one, you can use it to authenticate raw binaries from U-Boot SPL too, e.g. fitImage blobs with an associated signature.
iMX8 AHAB uses RSA key pair for authentication, the on-chip thing we called SRK is a array of public key hash which is dedicated for AHAB. It is not a real key. The real public key is in container. AHAB will check the public key with the on-chip SRK before using it to authenticate the image.
Seco which contains the crypto engine on imx8 does not allow to use the SRK by user. No such API exported.
And the fuse of SRK is locked, can't be read directly.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Actually on imx6/imx7/imx8m, the SPL and u-boot are already using ROM HAB to implement the trust chain, like SPL authenticates u-boot, u-boot authenticatse kernel. We just follow this same way on imx8, the difference is
imx8 needs container format for signed image. We prefer directly loading container image than fit image.
If we pack fit image into container, obviously this will cause one morecopy.
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
As a boot loader, isn't it better to have more image format supported?
If the functionality of the new image format is a subset of already present image format, then no, that's called a duplication.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
We
don't force to use container, just set it as default. Users still can choose fit or raw image.They can. however they cannot authenticate the fitImage because the firmware doesn't provide the necessary API for that ?
Quoted 2 lines
Do you have more comment?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
How could Linux use this iMX8 chain of trust stuff to authenticate e.g. userspace binaries ? It's the same thing as authenticating blob in a fitImage.
Userspace binaries don't use the same key pair. They are signed by software vendors' key. The private key for chip secure boot is only hold by
device manufacturer.
Quoted 1 line
For example, android needs to authenticate a signed APK. Its public key (Key
Quoted 8 lines
A) is in system FS.
Quoted 1 line
iMX trust chain only reaches to kernel + ramdisk. Then the chain hands over
to android.
Quoted 3 lines
In ramdisk, android puts another public Key (Key B) used by dm-verify for system FS. So once system FS is verified ok, then the public key A becomes trusted. Finally we can use public key A for APK authentication.
So can we put a public key into the SPL and use it to verify a fitImage ?
Technically doable. But compared with the current approach that reuse ROM public API, Using crypto driver in SPL will be complicated and code size larger without calling ROM API.
I do not understand the problem the SPL loading NXP i.MX8 container format. SPL should only support raw and fit format? vendor format is not allowed and not accepted?
Stefano, Simon, Tom
Any comments?
Thanks,
Peng.
Quoted 4 lines
--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 101 lines · Peng Fan
Quoted 92 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 11 lines · Ye Li
Quoted 10 lines · Marek Vasut
Caution: EXT Email
Quoted 7 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Marek, Lukasz,
Quoted 5 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Marek,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines · Marek Vasut
Quoted 7 lines
Caution: EXT Email
On 5/22/19 9:34 AM, Lukasz Majewski wrote:
[...]Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container"
format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example
Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is"trused"
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
we may use available facilities.
The issue to me is that sc_seco_authenticate could not take
a FIT image as input.Is the
sc_seco_authenticatean API accessible from SPL, U-Boot proper or Linux crypro engine driver?Yes, it is an API accessible in SPL/U-Boot stage. I do not know about Linux crypto driver.
Maybe it would be worth to check how Linux handle this? Maybe it would shed some more light on it?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I am not familiar with that, so might be stupid question below. Does it really matter?
I would check it just out of curiosity.
Yes, it matters, because there should be such API. How would Linux authenticate e.g. userspace binaries if there wasn't one, surely not by wrapping every single object into the custom vendor-specific
container ?
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 3 lines
And if there is one, you can use it to authenticate raw binaries from U-Boot SPL too, e.g. fitImage blobs with an associated signature.
iMX8 AHAB uses RSA key pair for authentication, the on-chip thing we called SRK is a array of public key hash which is dedicated for AHAB. It is not a real key. The real public key is in container. AHAB will check the public key with the on-chip SRK before using it to authenticate the image.
Seco which contains the crypto engine on imx8 does not allow to use the SRK by user. No such API exported.
And the fuse of SRK is locked, can't be read directly.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Actually on imx6/imx7/imx8m, the SPL and u-boot are already using ROM HAB to implement the trust chain, like SPL authenticates u-boot, u-boot authenticatse kernel. We just follow this same way on imx8, the difference is
imx8 needs container format for signed image. We prefer directly loading container image than fit image.
If we pack fit image into container, obviously this will cause one morecopy.
Quoted 15 lines
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As a boot loader, isn't it better to have more image format supported?
If the functionality of the new image format is a subset of already present image format, then no, that's called a duplication.
Quoted 3 lines
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We
don't force to use container, just set it as default. Users still can choose fit or raw image.They can. however they cannot authenticate the fitImage because the firmware doesn't provide the necessary API for that ?
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Do you have more comment?
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How could Linux use this iMX8 chain of trust stuff to authenticate e.g. userspace binaries ? It's the same thing as authenticating blob in a fitImage.
Userspace binaries don't use the same key pair. They are signed by software vendors' key. The private key for chip secure boot is only hold by
device manufacturer.
Quoted 1 line
For example, android needs to authenticate a signed APK. Its public key (Key
Quoted 8 lines
A) is in system FS.
Quoted 1 line
iMX trust chain only reaches to kernel + ramdisk. Then the chain hands over
to android.
Quoted 3 lines
In ramdisk, android puts another public Key (Key B) used by dm-verify for system FS. So once system FS is verified ok, then the public key A becomes trusted. Finally we can use public key A for APK authentication.
So can we put a public key into the SPL and use it to verify a fitImage ?
Quoted 7 lines
Technically doable. But compared with the current approach that reuse ROM public API, Using crypto driver in SPL will be complicated and code size larger without calling ROM API.
I do not understand the problem the SPL loading NXP i.MX8 container format. SPL should only support raw and fit format? vendor format is not allowed and not accepted?
The problem I have is with the duplication of functionality -- the iMX8 custom format does exactly the same as fitImage, except differently and with smaller user base, thus with less users and reviewers and thus with less potential bugfixes, which I think in crypto code is important.
Signature · 2 lines
Best regards, Marek Vasut
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 117 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 43 lines · Peng Fan
Quoted 43 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 11 lines · Ye Li
Quoted 10 lines · Marek Vasut
Caution: EXT Email
Quoted 7 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Marek, Lukasz,
Quoted 5 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Marek,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines · Marek Vasut
Quoted 7 lines
Caution: EXT Email
On 5/22/19 9:34 AM, Lukasz Majewski wrote:
[...]Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container"
format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example
Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is"trused"
Quoted 19 lines
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Quoted 19 lines
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we may use available facilities.
The issue to me is that sc_seco_authenticate could not
take a FIT image as input.Is the sc_seco_authenticate an API accessible from SPL,
U-Boot proper or Linux crypro engine driver?Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Yes, it is an API accessible in SPL/U-Boot stage. I do not know about Linux crypto driver.
Maybe it would be worth to check how Linux handle this? Maybe it would shed some more light on it?
I am not familiar with that, so might be stupid question below. Does it really matter?
I would check it just out of curiosity.
Quoted 7 lines
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Yes, it matters, because there should be such API. How would Linux authenticate e.g. userspace binaries if there wasn't one, surely not by wrapping every single object into the custom vendor-specific
container ?
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And if there is one, you can use it to authenticate raw binaries from U-Boot SPL too, e.g. fitImage blobs with an associated
signature.
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iMX8 AHAB uses RSA key pair for authentication, the on-chip thing we called SRK is a array of public key hash which is dedicated for AHAB. It is not a real key. The real public key is in container. AHAB will check the public key with the on-chip SRK before using it to authenticate the image.
Seco which contains the crypto engine on imx8 does not allow to use the SRK by user. No such API exported.
And the fuse of SRK is locked, can't be read directly.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Actually on imx6/imx7/imx8m, the SPL and u-boot are already using ROM HAB to implement the trust chain, like SPL authenticates u-boot, u-boot authenticatse kernel. We just follow this same way on imx8, the difference is
imx8 needs container format for signed image. We prefer directly loading container image than fit image.
If we pack fit image into container, obviously this will cause one morecopy.
Quoted 15 lines
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Quoted 1 line
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As a boot loader, isn't it better to have more image format supported?
If the functionality of the new image format is a subset of already present image format, then no, that's called a duplication.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
We
don't force to use container, just set it as default. Users still can choose fit or raw image.They can. however they cannot authenticate the fitImage because the firmware doesn't provide the necessary API for that ?
Quoted 2 lines
Do you have more comment?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
How could Linux use this iMX8 chain of trust stuff to authenticate e.g. userspace binaries ? It's the same thing as authenticating blob in a fitImage.
Userspace binaries don't use the same key pair. They are signed by software vendors' key. The private key for chip secure boot is only hold by
device manufacturer.
Quoted 2 lines
For example, android needs to authenticate a signed APK. Its public key (Key
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
A) is in system FS.
Quoted 2 lines
iMX trust chain only reaches to kernel + ramdisk. Then the chain hands over
to android.
Quoted 3 lines
In ramdisk, android puts another public Key (Key B) used by dm-verify for system FS. So once system FS is verified ok, then the public key A becomes trusted. Finally we can use public key A for APK
authentication.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
So can we put a public key into the SPL and use it to verify a fitImage ?
Technically doable. But compared with the current approach that reuse ROM public API, Using crypto driver in SPL will be complicated and code size larger without calling ROM API.
I do not understand the problem the SPL loading NXP i.MX8 container
Quoted 8 lines
format.
Quoted 2 lines
SPL should only support raw and fit format? vendor format is not allowed and not accepted?
The problem I have is with the duplication of functionality -- the iMX8 custom format does exactly the same as fitImage, except differently and with smaller user base, thus with less users and reviewers and thus with less potential bugfixes, which I think in crypto code is important.
The change to spl mmc common code is as below:
common/spl/spl_mmc.c +10 -0
@@ -79,6 +79,16 @@ int mmc_load_image_raw_sector(struct spl_image_info *spl_image, load.bl_len = mmc->read_bl_len; load.read = h_spl_load_read; ret =spl_load_simple_fit (spl_image, &load, sector, header); + }else if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_SPL_LOAD_IMX_CONTAINER )) { +struct spl_load_info load; + + load.dev = mmc; + load.priv =NULL ; + load.filename =NULL ; + load.bl_len = mmc->read_bl_len; + load.read = h_spl_load_read; + + ret =spl_load_imx_container (spl_image, &load, sector); }else {
If IMX_CONTAINER is not preferred, I'll change it to CONFIG_SPL_LOAD_VENDOR_FORMAT. In this way, only i.MX users need to take care container format, non i.MX users no need to care about that.
It is not duplication of FIT. Container support the similar function of FIT image, but it is not only that.
Thanks,
Peng.
Quoted 4 lines
--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 147 lines · Peng Fan
Quoted 117 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 43 lines · Peng Fan
Quoted 43 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 11 lines · Ye Li
Quoted 10 lines · Marek Vasut
Caution: EXT Email
Quoted 7 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Marek, Lukasz,
Quoted 5 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Marek,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines · Marek Vasut
Quoted 7 lines
Caution: EXT Email
On 5/22/19 9:34 AM, Lukasz Majewski wrote:
[...]Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
By using above approach we do have the NXP's "container"
format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for example
Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1). When SPL is"trused"
Quoted 19 lines
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Quoted 19 lines
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we may use available facilities.
The issue to me is that sc_seco_authenticate could not
take a FIT image as input.Is the sc_seco_authenticate an API accessible from SPL,
U-Boot proper or Linux crypro engine driver?Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Yes, it is an API accessible in SPL/U-Boot stage. I do not
know about Linux crypto driver.Maybe it would be worth to check how Linux handle this? Maybe it would shed some more light on it?
I am not familiar with that, so might be stupid question below. Does it really matter?
I would check it just out of curiosity.
Quoted 7 lines
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Yes, it matters, because there should be such API. How would Linux authenticate e.g. userspace binaries if there wasn't one, surely not by wrapping every single object into the custom vendor-specific
container ?
Quoted 2 lines
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And if there is one, you can use it to authenticate raw binaries from U-Boot SPL too, e.g. fitImage blobs with an associated
signature.
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iMX8 AHAB uses RSA key pair for authentication, the on-chip thing we called SRK is a array of public key hash which is dedicated for AHAB. It is not a real key. The real public key is in container. AHAB will check the public key with the on-chip SRK before using it to authenticate the image.
Seco which contains the crypto engine on imx8 does not allow to use the SRK by user. No such API exported.
And the fuse of SRK is locked, can't be read directly.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Actually on imx6/imx7/imx8m, the SPL and u-boot are already using ROM HAB to implement the trust chain, like SPL authenticates u-boot, u-boot authenticatse kernel. We just follow this same way on imx8, the difference is
imx8 needs container format for signed image. We prefer directly loading container image than fit image.
If we pack fit image into container, obviously this will cause one morecopy.
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
As a boot loader, isn't it better to have more image format supported?
If the functionality of the new image format is a subset of already present image format, then no, that's called a duplication.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
We
don't force to use container, just set it as default. Users still can choose fit or raw image.They can. however they cannot authenticate the fitImage because the firmware doesn't provide the necessary API for that ?
Quoted 2 lines
Do you have more comment?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
How could Linux use this iMX8 chain of trust stuff to authenticate e.g. userspace binaries ? It's the same thing as authenticating blob in a fitImage.
Userspace binaries don't use the same key pair. They are signed by software vendors' key. The private key for chip secure boot is only hold by
device manufacturer.
Quoted 2 lines
For example, android needs to authenticate a signed APK. Its public key (Key
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
A) is in system FS.
Quoted 2 lines
iMX trust chain only reaches to kernel + ramdisk. Then the chain hands over
to android.
Quoted 3 lines
In ramdisk, android puts another public Key (Key B) used by dm-verify for system FS. So once system FS is verified ok, then the public key A becomes trusted. Finally we can use public key A for APK
authentication.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
So can we put a public key into the SPL and use it to verify a fitImage ?
Technically doable. But compared with the current approach that reuse ROM public API, Using crypto driver in SPL will be complicated and code size larger without calling ROM API.
I do not understand the problem the SPL loading NXP i.MX8 container
Quoted 8 lines
format.
Quoted 2 lines
SPL should only support raw and fit format? vendor format is not allowed and not accepted?
The problem I have is with the duplication of functionality -- the iMX8 custom format does exactly the same as fitImage, except differently and with smaller user base, thus with less users and reviewers and thus with less potential bugfixes, which I think in crypto code is important.
The change to spl mmc common code is as below:
common/spl/spl_mmc.c +10
-0@@ -79,6 +79,16 @@ int mmc_load_image_raw_sector(struct spl_image_info *spl_image, load.bl_len = mmc->read_bl_len; load.read = h_spl_load_read; ret =spl_load_simple_fit (spl_image, &load, sector, header); + }else if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_SPL_LOAD_IMX_CONTAINER )) { +struct spl_load_info load; + + load.dev = mmc; + load.priv =NULL ; + load.filename =NULL ; + load.bl_len = mmc->read_bl_len; + load.read = h_spl_load_read; + + ret =spl_load_imx_container (spl_image, &load, sector); }else {
Quoted 1 line
If
IMX_CONTAINERis not preferred
I never implied that.
Quoted 3 lines
, I'll change it to
CONFIG_SPL_LOAD_VENDOR_FORMAT.
In this way, only i.MX users need to take care container format, non i.MX users no need to care about that.
That would make it even worse, since if we follow this course of development, I suspect iMX9 will have another different container format and the list will grow on.
Quoted 2 lines
It is not duplication of FIT. Container support the similar function of FIT image, but it is not only that.
So what is it ?
I don't think I get it. Why would I, as an iMX8 user, want to pick custom new vendor-specific format over years-proven generic fitImage? What is the selling point here ?
Signature · 2 lines
Best regards, Marek Vasut
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 166 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 17 lines · Peng Fan
Quoted 17 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 13 lines · Peng Fan
Quoted 13 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 9 lines · Ye Li
Quoted 8 lines · Marek Vasut
Caution: EXT Email
Quoted 5 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Marek, Lukasz,
Quoted 3 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 8 lines
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Hi Marek,
Quoted 5 lines · Marek Vasut
Caution: EXT Email
On 5/22/19 9:34 AM, Lukasz Majewski wrote:
[...]Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
By using above approach we do have the NXP's
"container"
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format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for
example Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1).When
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Quoted 1 line
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SPL is
"trused"
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we may use available facilities.
The issue to me is that sc_seco_authenticate could not
take a FIT image as input.Is the sc_seco_authenticate an API accessible from SPL,
U-Boot proper or Linux crypro engine driver?Yes, it is an API accessible in SPL/U-Boot stage. I do not
know about Linux crypto driver.Maybe it would be worth to check how Linux handle this?
Maybe it would shed some more light on it?I am not familiar with that, so might be stupid question below. Does it really matter?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
I would check it just out of curiosity.
Yes, it matters, because there should be such API. How would Linux authenticate e.g. userspace binaries if there wasn't one, surely not by wrapping every single object into the custom vendor-specific
container ?
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
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And if there is one, you can use it to authenticate raw binaries from U-Boot SPL too, e.g. fitImage blobs with an associated
Quoted 6 lines
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signature.
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iMX8 AHAB uses RSA key pair for authentication, the on-chip thing we called SRK is a array of public key hash which is dedicated for AHAB. It is not a real key. The real public key is in
container.
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AHAB will check the public key with the on-chip SRK before using it to authenticate the image.
Seco which contains the crypto engine on imx8 does not allow to use the SRK by user. No such API exported.
And the fuse of SRK is locked, can't be read directly.Actually on imx6/imx7/imx8m, the SPL and u-boot are already using ROM HAB to implement the trust chain, like SPL authenticates u-boot, u-boot authenticatse kernel. We just follow this same way on imx8, the difference is
imx8 needs container format for signed image. We prefer directly loading container image than fit image.
If we pack fit image into container, obviously this will cause one moreQuoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
copy.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
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Quoted 1 line
As a boot loader, isn't it better to have more image format
supported?
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Quoted 14 lines
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If the functionality of the new image format is a subset of already present image format, then no, that's called a duplication.
Quoted 3 lines
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We
don't force to use container, just set it as default. Users still can choose fit or raw image.They can. however they cannot authenticate the fitImage because the firmware doesn't provide the necessary API for that ?
Quoted 2 lines
Do you have more comment?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
How could Linux use this iMX8 chain of trust stuff to authenticate e.g. userspace binaries ? It's the same thing as authenticating blob in a fitImage.
Userspace binaries don't use the same key pair. They are signed by software vendors' key. The private key for chip secure boot is only hold by
device manufacturer.
Quoted 2 lines
For example, android needs to authenticate a signed APK. Its public key (Key
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
A) is in system FS.
Quoted 2 lines
iMX trust chain only reaches to kernel + ramdisk. Then the chain hands over
to android.
Quoted 4 lines
In ramdisk, android puts another public Key (Key B) used by dm-verify for system FS. So once system FS is verified ok, then the public key A becomes trusted. Finally we can use public key A for APK
authentication.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
So can we put a public key into the SPL and use it to verify a fitImage ?
Technically doable. But compared with the current approach that reuse ROM public API, Using crypto driver in SPL will be complicated and code size larger without calling ROM API.
I do not understand the problem the SPL loading NXP i.MX8 container
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
format.
Quoted 2 lines
SPL should only support raw and fit format? vendor format is not allowed and not accepted?
The problem I have is with the duplication of functionality -- the iMX8 custom format does exactly the same as fitImage, except differently and with smaller user base, thus with less users and reviewers and thus with less potential bugfixes, which I think in crypto
code is important.
common/spl/spl_mmc.c int mmc_load_image_raw_sector(struct
Quoted 7 lines
The change to spl mmc common code is as below:
common/spl/spl_mmc.c index renamed from common/spl/spl_mmc.c +0
-0
bf53a1dadf..6320af055b100644common/spl/spl_mmc.c +0
-0@@ -79,6 +79,16 @@ int mmc_load_image_raw_sector(struct
spl_image_info*spl_image,Quoted 17 lines
common/spl/spl_mmc.c +11
-0load.bl_len = mmc->read_bl_len; load.read = h_spl_load_read; ret =spl_load_simple_fit (spl_image, &load, sector, header); + }else if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_SPL_LOAD_IMX_CONTAINER )) { +struct spl_load_info load; + + load.dev = mmc; + load.priv =NULL ; + load.filename =NULL ; + load.bl_len = mmc->read_bl_len; + load.read = h_spl_load_read; + + ret =spl_load_imx_container (spl_image, &load, + sector); }else {Quoted 1 line
If
IMX_CONTAINERis not preferredI never implied that.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
, I'll change it to
CONFIG_SPL_LOAD_VENDOR_FORMAT.
In this way, only i.MX users need to take care container format, non i.MX users no need to care about that.That would make it even worse, since if we follow this course of development, I suspect iMX9 will have another different container format and the list will grow on.
Let me summary the previous SoC that NXP is actively maintaining i.MX6/7/7ULP/8M use IVT
i.MX8/8X use container
I could not disclose information about future i.MX SoC.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
It is not duplication of FIT. Container support the similar function of FIT image, but it is not only that.
So what is it ?
https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/reference-manual/IMX8DQXPRM.pdf
Chapter 5 has information about container set and container.
Quoted 3 lines
I don't think I get it. Why would I, as an iMX8 user, want to pick custom new vendor-specific format over years-proven generic fitImage?
We not against FIT, we already use FIT on i.MX8M, to let spl to authenticate FIT image using ROM HAB, not using crypto driver.
Quoted 1 line
What is the selling point here ?
We would not introduce cypto driver in SPL stage, that means HAB FIT and AHAB container needs to be dropped when SPL loading other images. ROM already provides API for bootloader to authenticate images, introducing complex crypto driver in SPL could enlarge code size and make things complicated.
Thanks,
Peng.
Quoted 4 lines
--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 174 lines · Peng Fan
Quoted 166 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 17 lines · Peng Fan
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Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 13 lines · Peng Fan
Quoted 13 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 9 lines · Ye Li
Quoted 8 lines · Marek Vasut
Caution: EXT Email
Quoted 5 lines · Peng Fan
Hi Marek, Lukasz,
Quoted 3 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 8 lines
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Hi Marek,
Quoted 5 lines · Marek Vasut
Caution: EXT Email
On 5/22/19 9:34 AM, Lukasz Majewski wrote:
[...]Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
By using above approach we do have the NXP's
"container"
Quoted 2 lines
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Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
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Quoted 2 lines
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format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for
example Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1).When
Quoted 29 lines
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Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
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SPL is
"trused"
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we may use available facilities.
The issue to me is that sc_seco_authenticate could not
take a FIT image as input.Is the sc_seco_authenticate an API accessible from SPL,
U-Boot proper or Linux crypro engine driver?Yes, it is an API accessible in SPL/U-Boot stage. I do not
know about Linux crypto driver.Maybe it would be worth to check how Linux handle this?
Maybe it would shed some more light on it?I am not familiar with that, so might be stupid question below.
Does it really matter?Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
I would check it just out of curiosity.
Yes, it matters, because there should be such API. How would Linux authenticate e.g. userspace binaries if there wasn't one, surely not by wrapping every single object into the custom vendor-specific
container ?
Quoted 3 lines
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Quoted 3 lines
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And if there is one, you can use it to authenticate raw binaries from U-Boot SPL too, e.g. fitImage blobs with an associated
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signature.
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iMX8 AHAB uses RSA key pair for authentication, the on-chip thing we called SRK is a array of public key hash which is dedicated for AHAB. It is not a real key. The real public key is in
container.
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AHAB will check the public key with the on-chip SRK before using it to authenticate the image.
Seco which contains the crypto engine on imx8 does not allow to use the SRK by user. No such API exported.
And the fuse of SRK is locked, can't be read directly.Actually on imx6/imx7/imx8m, the SPL and u-boot are already using ROM HAB to implement the trust chain, like SPL authenticates u-boot, u-boot authenticatse kernel. We just follow this same way on imx8, the difference is
imx8 needs container format for signed image. We prefer directly loading container image than fit image.
If we pack fit image into container, obviously this will cause one moreQuoted 2 lines
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copy.
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As a boot loader, isn't it better to have more image format
supported?
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If the functionality of the new image format is a subset of already present image format, then no, that's called a duplication.
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We
don't force to use container, just set it as default. Users still can choose fit or raw image.They can. however they cannot authenticate the fitImage because the firmware doesn't provide the necessary API for that ?
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Do you have more comment?
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How could Linux use this iMX8 chain of trust stuff to authenticate e.g. userspace binaries ? It's the same thing as authenticating blob in a fitImage.
Userspace binaries don't use the same key pair. They are signed by software vendors' key. The private key for chip secure boot is only hold by
device manufacturer.
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For example, android needs to authenticate a signed APK. Its public key (Key
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A) is in system FS.
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iMX trust chain only reaches to kernel + ramdisk. Then the chain hands over
to android.
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In ramdisk, android puts another public Key (Key B) used by dm-verify for system FS. So once system FS is verified ok, then the public key A becomes trusted. Finally we can use public key A for APK
authentication.
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So can we put a public key into the SPL and use it to verify a fitImage ?
Technically doable. But compared with the current approach that reuse ROM public API, Using crypto driver in SPL will be complicated and code size larger without calling ROM API.
I do not understand the problem the SPL loading NXP i.MX8 container
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format.
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SPL should only support raw and fit format? vendor format is not allowed and not accepted?
The problem I have is with the duplication of functionality -- the iMX8 custom format does exactly the same as fitImage, except differently and with smaller user base, thus with less users and reviewers and thus with less potential bugfixes, which I think in crypto
code is important.
common/spl/spl_mmc.c int mmc_load_image_raw_sector(struct
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The change to spl mmc common code is as below:
common/spl/spl_mmc.c index renamed from common/spl/spl_mmc.c +0
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spl_image_info*spl_image,Quoted 17 lines
common/spl/spl_mmc.c +11
-0load.bl_len = mmc->read_bl_len; load.read = h_spl_load_read; ret =spl_load_simple_fit (spl_image, &load, sector, header); + }else if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_SPL_LOAD_IMX_CONTAINER )) { +struct spl_load_info load; + + load.dev = mmc; + load.priv =NULL ; + load.filename =NULL ; + load.bl_len = mmc->read_bl_len; + load.read = h_spl_load_read; + + ret =spl_load_imx_container (spl_image, &load, + sector); }else {Quoted 1 line
If
IMX_CONTAINERis not preferredI never implied that.
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, I'll change it to
CONFIG_SPL_LOAD_VENDOR_FORMAT.
In this way, only i.MX users need to take care container format, non i.MX users no need to care about that.That would make it even worse, since if we follow this course of development, I suspect iMX9 will have another different container format and the list will grow on.
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Let me summary the previous SoC that NXP is actively maintaining i.MX6/7/7ULP/8M use IVT
i.MX8/8X use containerI could not disclose information about future i.MX SoC.
My assumption is that the future iMX SoC will use yet another different container format.
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It is not duplication of FIT. Container support the similar function of FIT image, but it is not only that.
So what is it ?
https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/reference-manual/IMX8DQXPRM.pdf
Chapter 5 has information about container set and container.
Thanks, any specific part of those 80 pages ?
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I don't think I get it. Why would I, as an iMX8 user, want to pick custom new vendor-specific format over years-proven generic fitImage?
We not against FIT, we already use FIT on i.MX8M, to let spl to authenticate FIT image using ROM HAB, not using crypto driver.
Great
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What is the selling point here ?
We would not introduce cypto driver in SPL stage, that means HAB FIT and AHAB container needs to be dropped when SPL loading other images. ROM already provides API for bootloader to authenticate images, introducing complex crypto driver in SPL could enlarge code size and make things complicated.
Ah I see, so it's all making the whole crypto simpler by offloading the hard parts into the firmware, which just magically handles everything , without having much extra code in the SPL ?
Signature · 2 lines
Best regards, Marek Vasut
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
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Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 43 lines · Peng Fan
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Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 17 lines · Peng Fan
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Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 13 lines · Peng Fan
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Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 9 lines · Ye Li
Quoted 8 lines · Marek Vasut
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Hi Marek, Lukasz,
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Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
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Hi Marek,
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On 5/22/19 9:34 AM, Lukasz Majewski wrote:
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By using above approach we do have the NXP's
"container"
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format only seen in the SPL (which is OK, as for
example Samsung does similar thing with FBL/BL1).When
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SPL is
"trused"
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we may use available facilities.
The issue to me is that sc_seco_authenticate could not
take a FIT image as input.Is the sc_seco_authenticate an API accessible from SPL,
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Yes, it is an API accessible in SPL/U-Boot stage. I do
not know about Linux crypto driver.Maybe it would be worth to check how Linux handle this?
Maybe it would shed some more light on it?I am not familiar with that, so might be stupid question
below.
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Does it really matter?
I would check it just out of curiosity.
Yes, it matters, because there should be such API. How would Linux authenticate e.g. userspace binaries if there wasn't one, surely not by wrapping every single object into the custom vendor-specific
container ?
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And if there is one, you can use it to authenticate raw binaries from U-Boot SPL too, e.g. fitImage blobs with an associated
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signature.
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iMX8 AHAB uses RSA key pair for authentication, the on-chip thing we called SRK is a array of public key hash which is dedicated for AHAB. It is not a real key. The real public key is in
container.
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AHAB will check the public key with the on-chip SRK before using it to authenticate the image.
Seco which contains the crypto engine on imx8 does not allow to use the SRK by user. No such API exported.
And the fuse of SRK is locked, can't be read directly.Actually on imx6/imx7/imx8m, the SPL and u-boot are already using ROM HAB to implement the trust chain, like SPL authenticates u-boot, u-boot authenticatse kernel. We just follow this same way on imx8, the difference is imx8 needs container format for signed image. We prefer directly loading container image than fit image. If we pack fit image into container, obviously this will cause one more
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copy.
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As a boot loader, isn't it better to have more image format
supported?
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If the functionality of the new image format is a subset of already present image format, then no, that's called a duplication.
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We
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They can. however they cannot authenticate the fitImage because the firmware doesn't provide the necessary API for that ?
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Do you have more comment?
How could Linux use this iMX8 chain of trust stuff to authenticate
e.g.
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userspace binaries ? It's the same thing as authenticating blob in a fitImage.
Userspace binaries don't use the same key pair. They are signed by software vendors' key. The private key for chip secure boot is only hold by
device manufacturer.
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For example, android needs to authenticate a signed APK. Its public key (Key
A) is in system FS.
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iMX trust chain only reaches to kernel + ramdisk. Then the chain hands over
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to android.
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In ramdisk, android puts another public Key (Key B) used by dm-verify for system FS. So once system FS is verified ok, then the public key A becomes trusted. Finally we can use public key A for APK
authentication.
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So can we put a public key into the SPL and use it to verify a
fitImage ?
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Technically doable. But compared with the current approach that reuse ROM public API, Using crypto driver in SPL will be complicated and code size larger without calling ROM API.
I do not understand the problem the SPL loading NXP i.MX8 container
format.
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SPL should only support raw and fit format? vendor format is not allowed and not accepted?
The problem I have is with the duplication of functionality -- the iMX8 custom format does exactly the same as fitImage, except differently and with smaller user base, thus with less users and reviewers and thus with less potential bugfixes, which I think in crypto
code is important.
common/spl/spl_mmc.c int mmc_load_image_raw_sector(struct
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The change to spl mmc common code is as below:
common/spl/spl_mmc.c index renamed from common/spl/spl_mmc.c +0
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spl_image_info*spl_image,Quoted 17 lines
common/spl/spl_mmc.c +11
-0load.bl_len = mmc->read_bl_len; load.read = h_spl_load_read; ret =spl_load_simple_fit (spl_image, &load, sector, header); + }else if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_SPL_LOAD_IMX_CONTAINER )) { +struct spl_load_info load; + + load.dev = mmc; + load.priv =NULL ; + load.filename =NULL ; + load.bl_len = mmc->read_bl_len; + load.read = h_spl_load_read; + + ret =spl_load_imx_container (spl_image, &load, + sector); }else {Quoted 1 line
If
IMX_CONTAINERis not preferredI never implied that.
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, I'll change it to
CONFIG_SPL_LOAD_VENDOR_FORMAT.
In this way, only i.MX users need to take care container format, non i.MX users no need to care about that.Quoted 8 lines
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That would make it even worse, since if we follow this course of development, I suspect iMX9 will have another different container format and the list will grow on.
Let me summary the previous SoC that NXP is actively maintaining i.MX6/7/7ULP/8M use IVT i.MX8/8X use container
I could not disclose information about future i.MX SoC.
My assumption is that the future iMX SoC will use yet another different container format.
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It is not duplication of FIT. Container support the similar function of FIT image, but it is not only that.
So what is it ?
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.
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nxp.com%2Fdocs%2Fen%2Freference-manual%2FIMX8DQXPRM.pdf&da ta=02%7C
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Chapter 5 has information about container set and container.
Thanks, any specific part of those 80 pages ?
Figure 5-24. Container Format has a picture about a single container. i.MX8 container also support container sets, support encrypt blob, certificates, SRK management. Support signature to the whole container, no need single image inside container.
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I don't think I get it. Why would I, as an iMX8 user, want to pick custom new vendor-specific format over years-proven generic fitImage?
We not against FIT, we already use FIT on i.MX8M, to let spl to authenticate FIT image using ROM HAB, not using crypto driver.
Great
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What is the selling point here ?
We would not introduce cypto driver in SPL stage, that means HAB FIT and AHAB container needs to be dropped when SPL loading other images. ROM already provides API for bootloader to authenticate images, introducing complex crypto driver in SPL could enlarge code size and make things complicated.
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Ah I see, so it's all making the whole crypto simpler by offloading the hard parts into the firmware, which just magically handles everything , without having much extra code in the SPL ?
Yes. Use what ROM provides will make things easier for U-Boot.
Thanks,
Peng.
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--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
On 6/5/19 5:03 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]
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It is not duplication of FIT. Container support the similar function of FIT image, but it is not only that.
So what is it ?
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.
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Chapter 5 has information about container set and container.
Thanks, any specific part of those 80 pages ?
Figure 5-24. Container Format has a picture about a single container. i.MX8 container also support container sets, support encrypt blob, certificates, SRK management. Support signature to the whole container, no need single image inside container.
Isn't that all supported in fitImage too ?
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I don't think I get it. Why would I, as an iMX8 user, want to pick custom new vendor-specific format over years-proven generic fitImage?
We not against FIT, we already use FIT on i.MX8M, to let spl to authenticate FIT image using ROM HAB, not using crypto driver.
Great
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What is the selling point here ?
We would not introduce cypto driver in SPL stage, that means HAB FIT and AHAB container needs to be dropped when SPL loading other images. ROM already provides API for bootloader to authenticate images, introducing complex crypto driver in SPL could enlarge code size and make things complicated.
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Ah I see, so it's all making the whole crypto simpler by offloading the hard parts into the firmware, which just magically handles everything , without having much extra code in the SPL ?
Yes. Use what ROM provides will make things easier for U-Boot.
Is it possible to perform a security audit on the ROM as easily as on U-Boot ? I mean, U-Boot is free software, the source is available, so security researchers can easily scrutinize it. Is the ROM ?
Signature · 2 lines
Best regards, Marek Vasut
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 23 lines · Marek Vasut
On 6/5/19 5:03 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
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It is not duplication of FIT. Container support the similar function of FIT image, but it is not only that.
So what is it ?
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.
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Chapter 5 has information about container set and container.
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Thanks, any specific part of those 80 pages ?
Figure 5-24. Container Format has a picture about a single container. i.MX8 container also support container sets, support encrypt blob, certificates, SRK management. Support signature to the whole container, no need single image inside container.
Isn't that all supported in fitImage too ?
This is neither the first nor last time functionality has been essentially duplicated, sadly, for reasons.
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I don't think I get it. Why would I, as an iMX8 user, want to pick custom new vendor-specific format over years-proven generic fitImage?
We not against FIT, we already use FIT on i.MX8M, to let spl to authenticate FIT image using ROM HAB, not using crypto driver.
Great
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What is the selling point here ?
We would not introduce cypto driver in SPL stage, that means HAB FIT and AHAB container needs to be dropped when SPL loading other images. ROM already provides API for bootloader to authenticate images, introducing complex crypto driver in SPL could enlarge code size and make things complicated.
Ah I see, so it's all making the whole crypto simpler by offloading the hard parts into the firmware, which just magically handles everything , without having much extra code in the SPL ?
Quoted 5 lines
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Yes. Use what ROM provides will make things easier for U-Boot.
Is it possible to perform a security audit on the ROM as easily as on U-Boot ? I mean, U-Boot is free software, the source is available, so security researchers can easily scrutinize it. Is the ROM ?
So, here's my two cents (and it may or may not seem contradictory with my opinions in the secure boot thread going on currently on the Linaro Boot Architecture list). Yes, it would and IMHO is better when we use free and open software to solve our problems (and an aside to the RISC-V folks as this is yet another area they can make the world a better place in). But I am a believe in dealing with the world as it stands at times too. The question isn't "can we get NXP to re-spin i.MX8 to use the FIT image format?" as that's obviously going to be "No.". The question is, "can we support this format in a clean manner?" and the answer is obviously "Yes.". So please lets keep that in mind with reviewing the code as at the end of the day it is more beneficial for this to be supported in mainline U-Boot than only supported in the vendor tree. Thanks!
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[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 62 lines · Tom Rini
Quoted 23 lines · Marek Vasut
On 6/5/19 5:03 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
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It is not duplication of FIT. Container support the similar function of FIT image, but it is not only that.
So what is it ?
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.
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Chapter 5 has information about container set and container.
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Thanks, any specific part of those 80 pages ?
Figure 5-24. Container Format has a picture about a single container. i.MX8 container also support container sets, support encrypt blob, certificates, SRK management. Support signature to the whole container, no need single image inside container.
Isn't that all supported in fitImage too ?
This is neither the first nor last time functionality has been essentially duplicated, sadly, for reasons.
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I don't think I get it. Why would I, as an iMX8 user, want to pick custom new vendor-specific format over years-proven generic fitImage?
We not against FIT, we already use FIT on i.MX8M, to let spl to authenticate FIT image using ROM HAB, not using crypto driver.
Great
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What is the selling point here ?
We would not introduce cypto driver in SPL stage, that means HAB FIT and AHAB container needs to be dropped when SPL loading other images. ROM already provides API for bootloader to authenticate images, introducing complex crypto driver in SPL could enlarge code size and make things complicated.
Ah I see, so it's all making the whole crypto simpler by offloading the hard parts into the firmware, which just magically handles everything , without having much extra code in the SPL ?
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Yes. Use what ROM provides will make things easier for U-Boot.
Is it possible to perform a security audit on the ROM as easily as on U-Boot ? I mean, U-Boot is free software, the source is available, so security researchers can easily scrutinize it. Is the ROM ?
Quoted 12 lines
So, here's my two cents (and it may or may not seem contradictory with my opinions in the secure boot thread going on currently on the Linaro Boot Architecture list). Yes, it would and IMHO is better when we use free and open software to solve our problems (and an aside to the RISC-V folks as this is yet another area they can make the world a better place in). But I am a believe in dealing with the world as it stands at times too. The question isn't "can we get NXP to re-spin i.MX8 to use the FIT image format?" as that's obviously going to be "No.". The question is, "can we support this format in a clean manner?" and the answer is obviously "Yes.". So please lets keep that in mind with reviewing the code as at the end of the day it is more beneficial for this to be supported in mainline U-Boot than only supported in the vendor tree.
I agree with this. I would still like to have an open alternative available though.
Signature · 2 lines
Best regards, Marek Vasut
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
In reply to Tom RiniQuoted 39 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 9 lines · Marek Vasut
On 6/5/19 5:03 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]Quoted 7 lines
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It is not duplication of FIT. Container support the similar function of FIT image, but it is not only that.
So what is it ?
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.
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nxp.com%2Fdocs%2Fen%2Freference-manual%2FIMX8DQXPRM.pdf&da
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Chapter 5 has information about container set and container.
Thanks, any specific part of those 80 pages ?
Figure 5-24. Container Format has a picture about a single container. i.MX8 container also support container sets, support encrypt blob, certificates, SRK management. Support signature to the whole container, no need single image inside container.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Isn't that all supported in fitImage too ?
This is neither the first nor last time functionality has been essentially duplicated, sadly, for reasons.
I'll share the fit things to our ROM stakeholders, but they take decision on new SoC design.
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I don't think I get it. Why would I, as an iMX8 user, want to pick custom new vendor-specific format over years-proven generic
fitImage?
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 3 lines
We not against FIT, we already use FIT on i.MX8M, to let spl to authenticate FIT image using ROM HAB, not using crypto driver.
Great
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
What is the selling point here ?
We would not introduce cypto driver in SPL stage, that means HAB FIT and AHAB container needs to be dropped when SPL loading other
images.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
ROM already provides API for bootloader to authenticate images, introducing complex crypto driver in SPL could enlarge code size and make things complicated.
Ah I see, so it's all making the whole crypto simpler by offloading the hard parts into the firmware, which just magically handles everything , without having much extra code in the SPL ?
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
Yes. Use what ROM provides will make things easier for U-Boot.
Is it possible to perform a security audit on the ROM as easily as on U-Boot ? I mean, U-Boot is free software, the source is available, so security researchers can easily scrutinize it. Is the ROM ?
Quoted 12 lines
So, here's my two cents (and it may or may not seem contradictory with my opinions in the secure boot thread going on currently on the Linaro Boot Architecture list). Yes, it would and IMHO is better when we use free and open software to solve our problems (and an aside to the RISC-V folks as this is yet another area they can make the world a better place in). But I am a believe in dealing with the world as it stands at times too. The question isn't "can we get NXP to re-spin i.MX8 to use the FIT image format?" as that's obviously going to be "No.". The question is, "can we support this format in a clean manner?" and the answer is obviously "Yes.". So please lets keep that in mind with reviewing the code as at the end of the day it is more beneficial for this to be supported in mainline U-Boot than only supported in the vendor tree.
Thanks. So I think you agree the current approach. Could I get any A-b or R-b tags from the list?
Thanks,
Peng.
Quoted 4 lines
Thanks!
--
Tom
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 96 lines · On Thu, 6 Jun 2019 02:33:14 +0000 Peng Fan <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 39 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 9 lines · Marek Vasut
On 6/5/19 5:03 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
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It is not duplication of FIT. Container support the similar function of FIT image, but it is not only that.
So what is it ?
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.
Quoted 2 lines
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nxp.com%2Fdocs%2Fen%2Freference-manual%2FIMX8DQXPRM.pdf&da
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Chapter 5 has information about container set and container.
Thanks, any specific part of those 80 pages ?
Figure 5-24. Container Format has a picture about a single container. i.MX8 container also support container sets, support encrypt blob, certificates, SRK management. Support signature to the whole container, no need single image inside container.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Isn't that all supported in fitImage too ?
This is neither the first nor last time functionality has been essentially duplicated, sadly, for reasons.
I'll share the fit things to our ROM stakeholders, but they take decision on new SoC design.
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I don't think I get it. Why would I, as an iMX8 user, want to pick custom new vendor-specific format over years-proven generic
fitImage?
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
We not against FIT, we already use FIT on i.MX8M, to let spl to authenticate FIT image using ROM HAB, not using crypto driver.
Quoted 7 lines
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Quoted 7 lines
Great
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
What is the selling point here ?
We would not introduce cypto driver in SPL stage, that means HAB FIT and AHAB container needs to be dropped when SPL loading other
images.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
ROM already provides API for bootloader to authenticate images, introducing complex crypto driver in SPL could enlarge code size and make things complicated.
Ah I see, so it's all making the whole crypto simpler by offloading the hard parts into the firmware, which just magically handles everything , without having much extra code in the SPL ?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Yes. Use what ROM provides will make things easier for U-Boot.
Is it possible to perform a security audit on the ROM as easily as on U-Boot ? I mean, U-Boot is free software, the source is available, so security researchers can easily scrutinize it. Is the ROM ?
Quoted 14 lines
So, here's my two cents (and it may or may not seem contradictory with my opinions in the secure boot thread going on currently on the Linaro Boot Architecture list). Yes, it would and IMHO is better when we use free and open software to solve our problems (and an aside to the RISC-V folks as this is yet another area they can make the world a better place in). But I am a believe in dealing with the world as it stands at times too. The question isn't "can we get NXP to re-spin i.MX8 to use the FIT image format?" as that's obviously going to be "No.". The question is, "can we support this format in a clean manner?" and the answer is obviously "Yes.". So please lets keep that in mind with reviewing the code as at the end of the day it is more beneficial for this to be supported in mainline U-Boot than only supported in the vendor tree.
Quoted 2 lines
Thanks. So I think you agree the current approach. Could I get any A-b or R-b tags from the list?
Just to add my 2 cents...
Please if possible provide a good (and as much verbose as possible) entry to ./doc/README.imx_image (or something) regarding the i.MX8 format.
Thanks in advance,
Quoted 8 lines
Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 4 lines
Thanks!
--
Tom
Best regards,
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email: lukma at denx.de -------------- next part --------------
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[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 106 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 6 lines · On Thu, 6 Jun 2019 02:33:14 +0000 Peng Fan <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 6 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 2 lines · Marek Vasut
On 6/5/19 5:03 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
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It is not duplication of FIT. Container support the similar function of FIT image, but it is not only that.
So what is it ?
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.
Quoted 3 lines
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Chapter 5 has information about container set and container.
Thanks, any specific part of those 80 pages ?
Figure 5-24. Container Format has a picture about a single container. i.MX8 container also support container sets, support encrypt blob, certificates, SRK management. Support signature to the whole container, no need single image inside container.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Isn't that all supported in fitImage too ?
This is neither the first nor last time functionality has been essentially duplicated, sadly, for reasons.
I'll share the fit things to our ROM stakeholders, but they take decision on new SoC design.
Quoted 47 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I don't think I get it. Why would I, as an iMX8 user, want to pick custom new vendor-specific format over years-proven generic
fitImage?
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
We not against FIT, we already use FIT on i.MX8M, to let spl to authenticate FIT image using ROM HAB, not using crypto driver.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Great
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
What is the selling point here ?
We would not introduce cypto driver in SPL stage, that means HAB FIT and AHAB container needs to be dropped when SPL loading other
images.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
ROM already provides API for bootloader to authenticate images, introducing complex crypto driver in SPL could enlarge code size and make things complicated.
Ah I see, so it's all making the whole crypto simpler by offloading the hard parts into the firmware, which just magically handles everything , without having much extra code in the SPL ?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Yes. Use what ROM provides will make things easier for U-Boot.
Is it possible to perform a security audit on the ROM as easily as on U-Boot ? I mean, U-Boot is free software, the source is available, so security researchers can easily scrutinize it. Is the ROM ?
So, here's my two cents (and it may or may not seem contradictory with my opinions in the secure boot thread going on currently on the Linaro Boot Architecture list). Yes, it would and IMHO is better when we use free and open software to solve our problems (and an aside to the RISC-V folks as this is yet another area they can make the world a better place in). But I am a believe in dealing with the world as it stands at times too. The question isn't "can we get NXP to re-spin i.MX8 to use the FIT image format?" as that's obviously going to be "No.". The question is, "can we support this format in a clean manner?" and the answer is obviously "Yes.". So please lets keep that in mind with reviewing the code as at the end of the day it is more beneficial for this to be supported in mainline U-Boot than only supported in the vendor tree.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Thanks. So I think you agree the current approach. Could I get any A-b or R-b tags from the list?
Just to add my 2 cents...
Please if possible provide a good (and as much verbose as possible) entry to ./doc/README.imx_image (or something) regarding the i.MX8 format.
ok. I'll post out a separate patch for that.
Regards,
Peng.
Quoted 25 lines
Thanks in advance,
Quoted 8 lines
Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 4 lines
Thanks!
--
TomBest regards,
Lukasz Majewski
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-59 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email:
lukma at denx.de
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
In reply to Peng FanQuoted 89 lines · Peng Fan
Quoted 39 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 9 lines · Marek Vasut
On 6/5/19 5:03 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
It is not duplication of FIT. Container support the similar function of FIT image, but it is not only that.
So what is it ?
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
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nxp.com%2Fdocs%2Fen%2Freference-manual%2FIMX8DQXPRM.pdf&da
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ta=02%7C
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01%7Cpeng.fan%40nxp.com%7C72216052f4234a93ad1f08d6e95ed782%7C6
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E3v%2FkHuJ%2BhR7mBgc4NWXxbMUupfubXXu%2BueIWo%3D&reserv
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ed=0
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Chapter 5 has information about container set and container.
Thanks, any specific part of those 80 pages ?
Figure 5-24. Container Format has a picture about a single container. i.MX8 container also support container sets, support encrypt blob, certificates, SRK management. Support signature to the whole container, no need single image inside container.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Isn't that all supported in fitImage too ?
This is neither the first nor last time functionality has been essentially duplicated, sadly, for reasons.
I'll share the fit things to our ROM stakeholders, but they take decision on new SoC design.
Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I don't think I get it. Why would I, as an iMX8 user, want to pick custom new vendor-specific format over years-proven generic
fitImage?
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 3 lines
We not against FIT, we already use FIT on i.MX8M, to let spl to authenticate FIT image using ROM HAB, not using crypto driver.
Great
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
What is the selling point here ?
We would not introduce cypto driver in SPL stage, that means HAB FIT and AHAB container needs to be dropped when SPL loading other
images.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
ROM already provides API for bootloader to authenticate images, introducing complex crypto driver in SPL could enlarge code size and make things complicated.
Ah I see, so it's all making the whole crypto simpler by offloading the hard parts into the firmware, which just magically handles everything , without having much extra code in the SPL ?
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
Yes. Use what ROM provides will make things easier for U-Boot.
Is it possible to perform a security audit on the ROM as easily as on U-Boot ? I mean, U-Boot is free software, the source is available, so security researchers can easily scrutinize it. Is the ROM ?
Quoted 12 lines
So, here's my two cents (and it may or may not seem contradictory with my opinions in the secure boot thread going on currently on the Linaro Boot Architecture list). Yes, it would and IMHO is better when we use free and open software to solve our problems (and an aside to the RISC-V folks as this is yet another area they can make the world a better place in). But I am a believe in dealing with the world as it stands at times too. The question isn't "can we get NXP to re-spin i.MX8 to use the FIT image format?" as that's obviously going to be "No.". The question is, "can we support this format in a clean manner?" and the answer is obviously "Yes.". So please lets keep that in mind with reviewing the code as at the end of the day it is more beneficial for this to be supported in mainline U-Boot than only supported in the vendor tree.
Quoted 2 lines
Thanks. So I think you agree the current approach. Could I get any A-b or R-b tags from the list?
I would still like an answer to my question about the security auditing above.
Signature · 2 lines
Best regards, Marek Vasut
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 98 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 6 lines · Peng Fan
Quoted 6 lines
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Quoted 2 lines · Marek Vasut
On 6/5/19 5:03 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
It is not duplication of FIT. Container support the similar function of FIT image, but it is not only that.
So what is it ?
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
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nxp.com%2Fdocs%2Fen%2Freference-manual%2FIMX8DQXPRM.pdf&da
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Chapter 5 has information about container set and container.
Thanks, any specific part of those 80 pages ?
Figure 5-24. Container Format has a picture about a single container. i.MX8 container also support container sets, support encrypt blob, certificates, SRK management. Support signature to the whole container, no need single image inside container.
Quoted 49 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Isn't that all supported in fitImage too ?
This is neither the first nor last time functionality has been essentially duplicated, sadly, for reasons.
I'll share the fit things to our ROM stakeholders, but they take decision on new SoC design.
Quoted 41 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I don't think I get it. Why would I, as an iMX8 user, want to pick custom new vendor-specific format over years-proven generic
fitImage?
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 3 lines
We not against FIT, we already use FIT on i.MX8M, to let spl to authenticate FIT image using ROM HAB, not using crypto driver.
Great
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
What is the selling point here ?
We would not introduce cypto driver in SPL stage, that means HAB FIT and AHAB container needs to be dropped when SPL loading other
images.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
ROM already provides API for bootloader to authenticate images, introducing complex crypto driver in SPL could enlarge code size and make things complicated.
Ah I see, so it's all making the whole crypto simpler by offloading the hard parts into the firmware, which just magically handles everything , without having much extra code in the SPL ?
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
Yes. Use what ROM provides will make things easier for U-Boot.
Is it possible to perform a security audit on the ROM as easily as on U-Boot ? I mean, U-Boot is free software, the source is available, so security researchers can easily scrutinize it. Is the ROM ?
So, here's my two cents (and it may or may not seem contradictory with my opinions in the secure boot thread going on currently on the Linaro Boot Architecture list). Yes, it would and IMHO is better when we use free and open software to solve our problems (and an aside to the RISC-V folks as this is yet another area they can make the world a better place in). But I am a believe in dealing with the world as it stands at times too. The question isn't "can we get NXP to re-spin i.MX8 to use the FIT image format?" as that's obviously going to be "No.". The question is, "can we support this format in a clean manner?" and the answer is obviously "Yes.". So please lets keep that in mind with reviewing the code as at the end of the day it is more beneficial for this to be supported in mainline U-Boot than only
Quoted 6 lines
supported in the vendor tree.
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks. So I think you agree the current approach. Could I get any A-b or R-b tags from the list?
I would still like an answer to my question about the security auditing above.
Sorry. Missed your thread. I not work on ROM stuff, but I think answer is no to public.
Thanks,
Peng.
Quoted 4 lines
--
Best regards,
Marek Vasut
[U-Boot] [EXT] Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
On 6/6/19 9:54 AM, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]
Quoted 31 lines
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Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
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We would not introduce cypto driver in SPL stage, that means HAB FIT and AHAB container needs to be dropped when SPL loading other
images.
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
ROM already provides API for bootloader to authenticate images, introducing complex crypto driver in SPL could enlarge code size and make things complicated.
Ah I see, so it's all making the whole crypto simpler by offloading the hard parts into the firmware, which just magically handles everything , without having much extra code in the SPL ?
Yes. Use what ROM provides will make things easier for U-Boot.
Is it possible to perform a security audit on the ROM as easily as on U-Boot ? I mean, U-Boot is free software, the source is available, so security researchers can easily scrutinize it. Is the ROM ?
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 4 lines
So, here's my two cents (and it may or may not seem contradictory with my opinions in the secure boot thread going on currently on the Linaro Boot Architecture list). Yes, it would and IMHO is better when we use free and open software to solve our problems (and an
Quoted 8 lines
aside to the RISC-V folks as this is yet another area they can make the world a better place in). But I am a believe in dealing with the world as it stands at times too. The question isn't "can we get NXP to re-spin i.MX8 to use the FIT image format?" as that's obviously going to be "No.". The question is, "can we support this format in a clean manner?" and the answer is obviously "Yes.". So please lets keep that in mind with reviewing the code as at the end of the day it is more beneficial for this to be supported in mainline U-Boot than only
supported in the vendor tree.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Thanks. So I think you agree the current approach. Could I get any A-b or R-b tags from the list?
I would still like an answer to my question about the security auditing above.
Sorry. Missed your thread. I not work on ROM stuff, but I think answer is no to public.
I see.
Signature · 2 lines
Best regards, Marek Vasut
PATCH 4/6 spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
In reply to Peng FanSimon,
Quoted 22 lines
Subject: RE: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Simon,
Quoted 11 lines
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] spl: mmc: support loading i.MX container format file
Hi Peng,
Quoted 3 lines · Peng Fan
i.MX8 only support AHAB secure boot with Container format image, we could not use FIT to support secure boot, so introduce container
Why not FIT?
Actually before we implement secure boot, we use FIT image, however i.MX8 only support i.MX container format image for secure boot, The chip will verify the container image when secure boot. It could not recognize FIT image. So we have to drop FIT image.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
support to let SPL could load container images.
What is a container image? Can you please point to documentation?
Sadly, there is no public reference manual. There is a doc that has a bit of information. https://community.nxp.com/docs/DOC-343178
https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/reference-manual/IMX8DQXPRM.pdf
Chapter 5.9.4 High Level Container Format
Thanks,
Peng.
Quoted 23 lines
Thanks,
Peng.Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 12 lines
Cc Simon Goldschmidt <[email protected]>Cc Tien Fong Chee <[email protected]>Cc York Sun <[email protected]>Cc Marek Vasut <[email protected]>Cc Alex Kiernan <[email protected]>Cc Simon Glass <[email protected]>Cc Philipp Tomsich <[email protected]>Cc Kever Yang <[email protected]>Cc Heiko Schocher <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Peng Fan <[email protected]>Quoted 4 lines
--- common/spl/spl_mmc.c | 10 ++++++++++ include/spl.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)Regards,
Simon
PATCH 5/6 imx: add container target
In reply to Peng FanTo support SPL loading container file, add a new Makefile target, and introduce a new Kconfig file to source the cfg file which will be parsed by mkimage.
--- Makefile | 8 ++++++++ arch/arm/mach-imx/Makefile | 14 ++++++++++++++ arch/arm/mach-imx/imx8/Kconfig | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
Makefile +8 -0
@@ -1300,9 +1300,17 @@ SPL: spl/u-boot-spl.bin FORCE $(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=arch/arm/mach-imx $@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARCH_IMX8M)$(CONFIG_ARCH_IMX8), y) +ifeq ($(CONFIG_SPL_LOAD_IMX_CONTAINER), y) +u-boot.cnt: u-boot.bin FORCE + $(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=arch/arm/mach-imx $@ + +flash.bin: spl/u-boot-spl.bin u-boot.cnt FORCE + $(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=arch/arm/mach-imx $@ +else flash.bin: spl/u-boot-spl.bin u-boot.itb FORCE $(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=arch/arm/mach-imx $@ endif +endif u-boot-with-spl.imx u-boot-with-nand-spl.imx: SPL u-boot.bin FORCE $(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=arch/arm/mach-imx $@
arch/arm/mach-imx/Makefile +14 -0
@@ -104,6 +104,11 @@ IMX_CONFIG = $(CONFIG_IMX_CONFIG:"%"=%) $(Q)mkdir -p $(dir $@) $(call if_changed_dep,cpp_cfg) +IMX_CONTAINER_CFG = $(CONFIG_IMX_CONTAINER_CFG:"%"=%) +container.cfg: $(IMX_CONTAINER_CFG) FORCE + $(Q)mkdir -p $(dir $@) + $(call if_changed_dep,cpp_cfg) + DEPFILE_EXISTS := 0 ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARCH_IMX8), y) CNTR_DEPFILES := $(srctree)/tools/imx_cntr_image.sh
@@ -161,7 +166,16 @@ SPL: spl/u-boot-spl.bin spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout FORCE MKIMAGEFLAGS_flash.bin = -n spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout -T $(IMAGE_TYPE) -e 0x100000 flash.bin: MKIMAGEOUTPUT = flash.log +MKIMAGEFLAGS_u-boot.cnt = -n container.cfg -T $(IMAGE_TYPE) -e 0x100000 +u-boot.cnt: MKIMAGEOUTPUT = u-boot.cnt.log + +ifeq ($(CONFIG_SPL_LOAD_IMX_CONTAINER), y) +u-boot.cnt: u-boot.bin container.cfg FORCE + $(call if_changed,mkimage) +flash.bin: spl/u-boot-spl.bin u-boot.cnt FORCE +else flash.bin: spl/u-boot-spl.bin u-boot.itb FORCE +endif $(eval SPL_DEPFILE_EXISTS := $(shell $(CPP) $(cpp_flags) -x c -o spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout $(srctree)/$(IMX_CONFIG); if [ -f spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout ]; then $(CNTR_DEPFILES) spl/u-boot-spl.cfgout; echo $$?; fi)) ifeq ($(SPL_DEPFILE_EXISTS),0) $(call if_changed,mkimage)
arch/arm/mach-imx/imx8/Kconfig +7 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,13 @@ config SPL_LOAD_IMX_CONTAINER help This is to let SPL could load i.MX8 Container image +config IMX_CONTAINER_CFG + string "i.MX Container config file" + depends on SPL + help + This is to specific the cfg file for generating container + image which will be loaded by SPL. + choice prompt "i.MX8 board select" optional
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
PATCH 6/6 imx8qxp_mek: switch to use container image
In reply to Peng FanBecause FIT could not be used for AHAB secure boot on i.MX8, so switch to use container image that could let SPL verify ATF and U-Boot with AHAB.
Note: The AHAB related code has not been added.
--- board/freescale/imx8qxp_mek/README | 4 +--- board/freescale/imx8qxp_mek/uboot-container.cfg | 13 +++++++++++++ configs/imx8qxp_mek_defconfig | 5 ++--- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 board/freescale/imx8qxp_mek/uboot-container.cfg
board/freescale/imx8qxp_mek/README +1 -3
@@ -39,11 +39,9 @@ $ cp imx-sc-firmware-0.7/mx8qx-mek-scfw-tcm.bin . Build U-Boot ============ -$ export ATF_LOAD_ADDR=0x80000000 -$ export BL33_LOAD_ADDR=0x80020000 $ make imx8qxp_mek_defconfig $ make flash.bin -$ dd if=u-boot.itb of=flash.bin bs=512 seek=528 +$ dd if=u-boot.cnt of=flash.bin bs=512 seek=528 Flash the binary into the SD card =================================
board/freescale/imx8qxp_mek/uboot-container.cfg new file +13 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */ +/* + * Copyright 2019 NXP + */ + +#define __ASSEMBLY__ + +/* This file is to create a container image could be loaded by SPL */ +BOOT_FROM SD 0x400 +SOC_TYPE IMX8QX +CONTAINER +IMAGE A35 bl31.bin 0x80000000 +IMAGE A35 u-boot.bin CONFIG_SYS_TEXT_BASE
configs/imx8qxp_mek_defconfig +2 -3
@@ -5,15 +5,14 @@ CONFIG_SPL_GPIO_SUPPORT=y CONFIG_SPL_LIBCOMMON_SUPPORT=y CONFIG_SPL_LIBGENERIC_SUPPORT=y CONFIG_SYS_MALLOC_F_LEN=0x4000 +CONFIG_SPL_LOAD_IMX_CONTAINER=y +CONFIG_IMX_CONTAINER_CFG="board/freescale/imx8qxp_mek/uboot-container.cfg" CONFIG_TARGET_IMX8QXP_MEK=y CONFIG_SPL_MMC_SUPPORT=y CONFIG_SPL_SERIAL_SUPPORT=y CONFIG_SPL_DRIVERS_MISC_SUPPORT=y CONFIG_NR_DRAM_BANKS=3 CONFIG_SPL=y -CONFIG_FIT=y -CONFIG_SPL_LOAD_FIT=y -CONFIG_SPL_FIT_GENERATOR="arch/arm/mach-imx/mkimage_fit_atf.sh" CONFIG_SYS_EXTRA_OPTIONS="IMX_CONFIG=board/freescale/imx8qxp_mek/imximage.cfg" CONFIG_BOOTDELAY=3 CONFIG_LOG=y
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4