Kexec cmdline bufffer measure
Subsystems (5)
v5 cover Kexec cmdline bufffer measure
From: Prakhar Srivastava <[email protected]>
For secure boot attestation, it is necessary to measure the kernel command line and the kernel version. For cold boot, the boot loader can be enhanced to measure these parameters.
(https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/48897.html)
However, for attestation across soft reboot boundary, these values also need to be measured during kexec.
Currently for Kexec(kexec_file_load)/soft reboot scenario the cmdline args that are used to boot the next kernel is not measured. For normal case of boot/hardreboot the cmdline args are measured into the TPM.
The hash of boot command line is calculated and added to the current running kernel's measurement list. On a soft reboot like kexec, the PCRs are not reset to zero. Refer to commit 94c3aac567a9 ("ima: on soft reboot, restore the measurement list") patch description.
To achive the above the patch series does the following
-adds a new ima hook: ima_kexec_cmdline which measures the cmdline args
into the ima log, behind a new ima policy entry KEXEC_CMDLINE.
-since the cmldine args cannot be appraised, a new template field(buf) is
added. The template field contains the buffer passed(cmldine args), which can be used to appraise/attest at a later stage.
-call the ima_kexec_cmdline(...) hook from kexec_file_load call.
The ima logs need to carried over to the next kernel, which will be followed up by other patchsets for x86_64 and arm64.
Changelog:
v5:
-add a new ima hook and policy to measure the cmdline
args(ima_kexec_cmdline)
-add a new template field buf to contain the buffer measured.
[suggested by Mimi Zohar]
-call ima_kexec_cmdline from kexec_file_load path
v4:
- per feedback from LSM community, removed the LSM hook and renamed the IMA policy to KEXEC_CMDLINE
v3: (rebase changes to next-general)
- Add policy checks for buffer[suggested by Mimi Zohar]
- use the IMA_XATTR to add buffer
- Add kexec_cmdline used for kexec file load
- Add an LSM hook to allow usage by other LSM.[suggestd by Mimi Zohar]
v2:
- Add policy checks for buffer[suggested by Mimi Zohar]
- Add an LSM hook to allow usage by other LSM.[suggestd by Mimi Zohar]
- use the IMA_XATTR to add buffer instead of sig template
v1:
-Add kconfigs to control the ima_buffer_check -measure the cmdline args suffixed with the kernel file name -add the buffer to the template sig field.
Prakhar Srivastava (3):
add a new ima hook and policy to measure the cmdline add a new template field buf to contain the buffer call ima_kexec_cmdline from kexec_file_load path
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 1 + include/linux/ima.h | 2 + kernel/kexec_file.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 9 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 21 +++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 4 + security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 + 11 files changed, 151 insertions(+)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v5 1/3 add a new ima hook and policy to measure the cmdline
From: Prakhar Srivastava <[email protected]>
For this reason, this patch adds support for measuring these parameters during kexec. To achive this, a new ima policy and hook id, defined KEXEC_CMDLINE and ima_kexec_cmdline respectively, are added.
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 1 + include/linux/ima.h | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 9 +++ 6 files changed, 98 insertions(+)
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +1 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ Description: base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK] [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] + [KEXEC_CMDLINE] mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] [[^]MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value
include/linux/ima.h +2 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);extern int ima_post_read_file (struct file *file,void *buf,loff_t size,enum kernel_read_file_id id);extern void ima_post_path_mknod (struct dentry *dentry); +extern void ima_kexec_cmdline (const void *buf,int size);#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer (struct kimage *image);
@@ -92,6 +93,7 @@ static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) return; } +static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline (const void *buf,int size) {}#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +1 -0
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) \ hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK) \ hook(POLICY_CHECK) \ + hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE) \ hook(MAX_CHECK) #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM) ENUM,
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +1 -0
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK +* | KEXEC_CMDLINE * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value *
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +84 -0
90 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +9 -0
@@ -291,6 +291,13 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, {int i; +/* only incase of KEXEC_CMDLINE, inode is NULL */ +if (func ==KEXEC_CMDLINE ) { +if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && + (rule->func == func) && (!inode)) +return true; +return false; + }if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func != func && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false;
@@ -869,6 +876,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->func =KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK ; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = POLICY_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_CMDLINE") == 0) + entry->func = KEXEC_CMDLINE; else result = -EINVAL ;if (!result)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v5 2/3 add a new template field buf to contain the buffer
In reply to Prakhar SrivastavaFrom: Prakhar Srivastava <[email protected]>
The buffer(cmdline args) added to the ima log cannot be attested without having the actual buffer. Thus to make the measured buffer available to stroe/read a new ima temaplate (buf) is added. The cmdline args used for soft reboot can then be read and attested later.
The patch adds a new template field buf to store/read the buffer used while measuring kexec_cmdline args in the
[PATCH 1/2 v5]: "add a new ima hook and policy to measure the cmdline".
--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 4 ++++ security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 51 insertions(+)
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +23 -0
@@ -605,10 +605,32 @@ static int process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,int pcr =CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX ;int action =0 ; +struct buffer_xattr { +enum evm_ima_xattr_type type; +u16 buf_length; +unsigned char buf[0 ]; + }; +struct buffer_xattr *buffer_event_data =NULL ; +int alloc_length =0 ; + action =ima_get_action (NULL , cred, secid,0 ,KEXEC_CMDLINE , &pcr);if (!(action &IMA_AUDIT ) && !(action &IMA_MEASURE )) goto out; + alloc_length =sizeof (struct buffer_xattr ) + size; + buffer_event_data =kzalloc (alloc_length,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!buffer_event_data) { + ret = -ENOMEM ; + goto out; + } + + buffer_event_data->type =IMA_XATTR_BUFFER ; + buffer_event_data->buf_length = size; +memcpy (buffer_event_data->buf, buf, size); + + event_data.xattr_value = (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *)buffer_event_data; + event_data.xattr_len = alloc_length; +memset (iint,0 ,sizeof (*iint));memset (&hash,0 ,sizeof (hash));
@@ -638,6 +660,7 @@ static int process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, } out: +kfree (buffer_event_data);return ret; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +2 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = { .field_show = ima_show_template_string}, {.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_sig}, + {.field_id = "buf", .field_init = ima_eventbuf_init, + .field_show = ima_show_template_buf}, };#define MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN 15
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +21 -0
@@ -162,6 +162,11 @@ void ima_show_template_sig(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,ima_show_template_field_data (m, show,DATA_FMT_HEX , field_data); } +void ima_show_template_buf (struct seq_file *m,enum ima_show_type show, +struct ima_field_data *field_data) +{ +ima_show_template_field_data (m, show,DATA_FMT_HEX , field_data); +}/** * ima_parse_buf() - Parses lengths and data from an input buffer * @bufstartp: Buffer start address.
@@ -389,3 +394,19 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,return ima_write_template_field_data (xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len,DATA_FMT_HEX , field_data); } + +/* +* ima_eventbuf_init - include the buffer(kexec-cmldine) as part of the +* template data. +*/ +int ima_eventbuf_init (struct ima_event_data *event_data, +struct ima_field_data *field_data) +{ +struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value; + +if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type !=IMA_XATTR_BUFFER )) +return 0 ; + +return ima_write_template_field_data (xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len, +DATA_FMT_HEX , field_data); +}
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h +4 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show, struct ima_field_data *field_data);void ima_show_template_sig (struct seq_file *m,enum ima_show_type show,struct ima_field_data *field_data); +void ima_show_template_buf (struct seq_file *m,enum ima_show_type show, +struct ima_field_data *field_data);int ima_parse_buf (void *bufstartp,void *bufendp,void **bufcurp,int maxfields,struct ima_field_data *fields,int *curfields,unsigned long *len_mask,int enforce_mask,char *bufname);
@@ -42,4 +44,6 @@ int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data);int ima_eventsig_init (struct ima_event_data *event_data,struct ima_field_data *field_data); +int ima_eventbuf_init (struct ima_event_data *event_data, +struct ima_field_data *field_data);#endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */
security/integrity/integrity.h +1 -0
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type {EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG ,IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG ,EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG , +IMA_XATTR_BUFFER , IMA_XATTR_LAST };
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v5 3/3 call ima_kexec_cmdline from kexec_file_load path
In reply to Prakhar SrivastavaFrom: Prakhar Srivastava <[email protected]>
--- kernel/kexec_file.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
kernel/kexec_file.c +2 -0
@@ -241,6 +241,8 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, ret = -EINVAL ; goto out; } + +ima_kexec_cmdline (image->cmdline_buf, image->cmdline_buf_len -1 ); }/* Call arch image load handlers */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1