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xfrm: policy: Fix out-of-bound array accesses in __xfrm_policy_unlink

PATCH In review Sasha Levin 2 participants 17 messages May 16, 2019 – May 19, 2019

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Sasha Levin

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/16 xfrm: policy: Fix out-of-bound array accesses in __xfrm_policy_unlink

From: YueHaibing <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b805d78d300bcf2c83d6df7da0c818b0fee41427 ]

UBSAN report this:

UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1289:24
index 6 is out of range for type 'unsigned int [6]'
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.4.162-514.55.6.9.x86_64+ #13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
 0000000000000000 1466cf39b41b23c9 ffff8801f6b07a58 ffffffff81cb35f4
 0000000041b58ab3 ffffffff83230f9c ffffffff81cb34e0 ffff8801f6b07a80
 ffff8801f6b07a20 1466cf39b41b23c9 ffffffff851706e0 ffff8801f6b07ae8
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>  [<ffffffff81cb35f4>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline]
 <IRQ>  [<ffffffff81cb35f4>] dump_stack+0x114/0x1a0 lib/dump_stack.c:51
 [<ffffffff81d94225>] ubsan_epilogue+0x12/0x8f lib/ubsan.c:164
 [<ffffffff81d954db>] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x16e/0x1b2 lib/ubsan.c:382
 [<ffffffff82a25acd>] __xfrm_policy_unlink+0x3dd/0x5b0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1289
 [<ffffffff82a2e572>] xfrm_policy_delete+0x52/0xb0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1309
 [<ffffffff82a3319b>] xfrm_policy_timer+0x30b/0x590 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:243
 [<ffffffff813d3927>] call_timer_fn+0x237/0x990 kernel/time/timer.c:1144
 [<ffffffff813d8e7e>] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1218 [inline]
 [<ffffffff813d8e7e>] run_timer_softirq+0x6ce/0xb80 kernel/time/timer.c:1401
 [<ffffffff8120d6f9>] __do_softirq+0x299/0xe10 kernel/softirq.c:273
 [<ffffffff8120e676>] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:350 [inline]
 [<ffffffff8120e676>] irq_exit+0x216/0x2c0 kernel/softirq.c:391
 [<ffffffff82c5edab>] exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:652 [inline]
 [<ffffffff82c5edab>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8b/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:926
 [<ffffffff82c5c985>] apic_timer_interrupt+0xa5/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:735
 <EOI>  [<ffffffff81188096>] ? native_safe_halt+0x6/0x10 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:52
 [<ffffffff810834d7>] arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:111 [inline]
 [<ffffffff810834d7>] default_idle+0x27/0x430 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:446
 [<ffffffff81085f05>] arch_cpu_idle+0x15/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:437
 [<ffffffff8132abc3>] default_idle_call+0x53/0x90 kernel/sched/idle.c:92
 [<ffffffff8132b32d>] cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:156 [inline]
 [<ffffffff8132b32d>] cpu_idle_loop kernel/sched/idle.c:251 [inline]
 [<ffffffff8132b32d>] cpu_startup_entry+0x60d/0x9a0 kernel/sched/idle.c:299
 [<ffffffff8113e119>] start_secondary+0x3c9/0x560 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:245

The issue is triggered as this:

xfrm_add_policy

    -->verify_newpolicy_info  //check the index provided by user with XFRM_POLICY_MAX
			      //In my case, the index is 0x6E6BB6, so it pass the check.
    -->xfrm_policy_construct  //copy the user's policy and set xfrm_policy_timer
    -->xfrm_policy_insert
	--> __xfrm_policy_link //use the orgin dir, in my case is 2
	--> xfrm_gen_index   //generate policy index, there is 0x6E6BB6

then xfrm_policy_timer be fired

xfrm_policy_timer
--> xfrm_policy_id2dir //get dir from (policy index & 7), in my case is 6 --> xfrm_policy_delete

      --> __xfrm_policy_unlink //access policy_count[dir], trigger out of range access

Add xfrm_policy_id2dir check in verify_newpolicy_info, make sure the computed dir is valid, to fix the issue.

Fixes e682adf021be ("xfrm: Try to honor policy index if it's supplied by user")
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +1 -1
index 9ff9255d2191b..919b8406028cc 100644
@@ -1381,7 +1381,7 @@ static int verify_newpolicy_info(struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *p)
 	ret = verify_policy_dir(p->dir);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
-	if (p->index && ((p->index & XFRM_POLICY_MAX) != p->dir))
+	if (p->index && (xfrm_policy_id2dir(p->index) != p->dir))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	return 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/16 xfrm6_tunnel: Fix potential panic when unloading xfrm6_tunnel module

From: Su Yanjun <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6ee02a54ef990a71bf542b6f0a4e3321de9d9c66 ]

When unloading xfrm6_tunnel module, xfrm6_tunnel_fini directly frees the xfrm6_tunnel_spi_kmem. Maybe someone has gotten the xfrm6_tunnel_spi, so need to wait it.

Fixes 91cc3bb0b04ff("xfrm6_tunnel: RCU conversion")
---
 net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c +4 -0
index c28e3eaad7c26..b51368ebd1e67 100644
@@ -391,6 +391,10 @@ static void __exit xfrm6_tunnel_fini(void)
 	xfrm6_tunnel_deregister(&xfrm6_tunnel_handler, AF_INET6);
 	xfrm_unregister_type(&xfrm6_tunnel_type, AF_INET6);
 	unregister_pernet_subsys(&xfrm6_tunnel_net_ops);
+	/* Someone maybe has gotten the xfrm6_tunnel_spi.
+	 * So need to wait it.
+	 */
+	rcu_barrier();
 	kmem_cache_destroy(xfrm6_tunnel_spi_kmem);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/16 vti4: ipip tunnel deregistration fixes.

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jeremy Sowden <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5483844c3fc18474de29f5d6733003526e0a9f78 ]

If tunnel registration failed during module initialization, the module would fail to deregister the IPPROTO_COMP protocol and would attempt to deregister the tunnel.

The tunnel was not deregistered during module-exit.

Fixes dd9ee3444014e ("vti4: Fix a ipip packet processing bug in 'IPCOMP' virtual tunnel")
---
 net/ipv4/ip_vti.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/ip_vti.c +3 -2
index 306603a7f3514..c07065b7e3b0e 100644
@@ -663,9 +663,9 @@ static int __init vti_init(void)
 	return err;
 
 rtnl_link_failed:
-	xfrm4_protocol_deregister(&vti_ipcomp4_protocol, IPPROTO_COMP);
-xfrm_tunnel_failed:
 	xfrm4_tunnel_deregister(&ipip_handler, AF_INET);
+xfrm_tunnel_failed:
+	xfrm4_protocol_deregister(&vti_ipcomp4_protocol, IPPROTO_COMP);
 xfrm_proto_comp_failed:
 	xfrm4_protocol_deregister(&vti_ah4_protocol, IPPROTO_AH);
 xfrm_proto_ah_failed:
@@ -680,6 +680,7 @@ static int __init vti_init(void)
 static void __exit vti_fini(void)
 {
 	rtnl_link_unregister(&vti_link_ops);
+	xfrm4_tunnel_deregister(&ipip_handler, AF_INET);
 	xfrm4_protocol_deregister(&vti_ipcomp4_protocol, IPPROTO_COMP);
 	xfrm4_protocol_deregister(&vti_ah4_protocol, IPPROTO_AH);
 	xfrm4_protocol_deregister(&vti_esp4_protocol, IPPROTO_ESP);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 4/16 esp4: add length check for UDP encapsulation

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8dfb4eba4100e7cdd161a8baef2d8d61b7a7e62e ]

esp_output_udp_encap can produce a length that doesn't fit in the 16 bits of a UDP header's length field. In that case, we'll send a fragmented packet whose length is larger than IP_MAX_MTU (resulting in "Oversized IP packet" warnings on receive) and with a bogus UDP length.

To prevent this, add a length check to esp_output_udp_encap and return
-EMSGSIZE on failure.

This seems to be older than git history.

---
 net/ipv4/esp4.c | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/esp4.c +15 -5
index d30285c5d52dd..c8e32f167ebbf 100644
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ static void esp_output_fill_trailer(u8 *tail, int tfclen, int plen, __u8 proto)
 	tail[plen - 1] = proto;
 }
 
-static void esp_output_udp_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info *esp)
+static int esp_output_udp_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info *esp)
 {
 	int encap_type;
 	struct udphdr *uh;
@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ static void esp_output_udp_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, stru
 	__be16 sport, dport;
 	struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
 	struct ip_esp_hdr *esph = esp->esph;
+	unsigned int len;
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
 	sport = encap->encap_sport;
@@ -220,11 +221,14 @@ static void esp_output_udp_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, stru
 	encap_type = encap->encap_type;
 	spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);
 
+	len = skb->len + esp->tailen - skb_transport_offset(skb);
+	if (len + sizeof(struct iphdr) >= IP_MAX_MTU)
+		return -EMSGSIZE;
+
 	uh = (struct udphdr *)esph;
 	uh->source = sport;
 	uh->dest = dport;
-	uh->len = htons(skb->len + esp->tailen
-		  - skb_transport_offset(skb));
+	uh->len = htons(len);
 	uh->check = 0;
 
 	switch (encap_type) {
@@ -241,6 +245,8 @@ static void esp_output_udp_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, stru
 
 	*skb_mac_header(skb) = IPPROTO_UDP;
 	esp->esph = esph;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 int esp_output_head(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info *esp)
@@ -254,8 +260,12 @@ int esp_output_head(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info *
 	int tailen = esp->tailen;
 
 	/* this is non-NULL only with UDP Encapsulation */
-	if (x->encap)
-		esp_output_udp_encap(x, skb, esp);
+	if (x->encap) {
+		int err = esp_output_udp_encap(x, skb, esp);
+
+		if (err < 0)
+			return err;
+	}
 
 	if (!skb_cloned(skb)) {
 		if (tailen <= skb_tailroom(skb)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 5/16 xfrm4: Fix uninitialized memory read in _decode_session4

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8742dc86d0c7a9628117a989c11f04a9b6b898f3 ]

We currently don't reload pointers pointing into skb header after doing pskb_may_pull() in _decode_session4(). So in case pskb_may_pull() changed the pointers, we read from random memory. Fix this by putting all the needed infos on the stack, so that we don't need to access the header pointers after doing pskb_may_pull().

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
---
 net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c | 24 +++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c +13 -11
index 4b586e7d56370..5952dca98e6b7 100644
@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ static void
 _decode_session4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl, int reverse)
 {
 	const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
-	u8 *xprth = skb_network_header(skb) + iph->ihl * 4;
+	int ihl = iph->ihl;
+	u8 *xprth = skb_network_header(skb) + ihl * 4;
 	struct flowi4 *fl4 = &fl->u.ip4;
 	int oif = 0;
 
@@ -122,6 +123,11 @@ _decode_session4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl, int reverse)
 	fl4->flowi4_mark = skb->mark;
 	fl4->flowi4_oif = reverse ? skb->skb_iif : oif;
 
+	fl4->flowi4_proto = iph->protocol;
+	fl4->daddr = reverse ? iph->saddr : iph->daddr;
+	fl4->saddr = reverse ? iph->daddr : iph->saddr;
+	fl4->flowi4_tos = iph->tos;
+
 	if (!ip_is_fragment(iph)) {
 		switch (iph->protocol) {
 		case IPPROTO_UDP:
@@ -133,7 +139,7 @@ _decode_session4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl, int reverse)
 			    pskb_may_pull(skb, xprth + 4 - skb->data)) {
 				__be16 *ports;
 
-				xprth = skb_network_header(skb) + iph->ihl * 4;
+				xprth = skb_network_header(skb) + ihl * 4;
 				ports = (__be16 *)xprth;
 
 				fl4->fl4_sport = ports[!!reverse];
@@ -146,7 +152,7 @@ _decode_session4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl, int reverse)
 			    pskb_may_pull(skb, xprth + 2 - skb->data)) {
 				u8 *icmp;
 
-				xprth = skb_network_header(skb) + iph->ihl * 4;
+				xprth = skb_network_header(skb) + ihl * 4;
 				icmp = xprth;
 
 				fl4->fl4_icmp_type = icmp[0];
@@ -159,7 +165,7 @@ _decode_session4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl, int reverse)
 			    pskb_may_pull(skb, xprth + 4 - skb->data)) {
 				__be32 *ehdr;
 
-				xprth = skb_network_header(skb) + iph->ihl * 4;
+				xprth = skb_network_header(skb) + ihl * 4;
 				ehdr = (__be32 *)xprth;
 
 				fl4->fl4_ipsec_spi = ehdr[0];
@@ -171,7 +177,7 @@ _decode_session4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl, int reverse)
 			    pskb_may_pull(skb, xprth + 8 - skb->data)) {
 				__be32 *ah_hdr;
 
-				xprth = skb_network_header(skb) + iph->ihl * 4;
+				xprth = skb_network_header(skb) + ihl * 4;
 				ah_hdr = (__be32 *)xprth;
 
 				fl4->fl4_ipsec_spi = ah_hdr[1];
@@ -183,7 +189,7 @@ _decode_session4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl, int reverse)
 			    pskb_may_pull(skb, xprth + 4 - skb->data)) {
 				__be16 *ipcomp_hdr;
 
-				xprth = skb_network_header(skb) + iph->ihl * 4;
+				xprth = skb_network_header(skb) + ihl * 4;
 				ipcomp_hdr = (__be16 *)xprth;
 
 				fl4->fl4_ipsec_spi = htonl(ntohs(ipcomp_hdr[1]));
@@ -196,7 +202,7 @@ _decode_session4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl, int reverse)
 				__be16 *greflags;
 				__be32 *gre_hdr;
 
-				xprth = skb_network_header(skb) + iph->ihl * 4;
+				xprth = skb_network_header(skb) + ihl * 4;
 				greflags = (__be16 *)xprth;
 				gre_hdr = (__be32 *)xprth;
 
@@ -213,10 +219,6 @@ _decode_session4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl, int reverse)
 			break;
 		}
 	}
-	fl4->flowi4_proto = iph->protocol;
-	fl4->daddr = reverse ? iph->saddr : iph->daddr;
-	fl4->saddr = reverse ? iph->daddr : iph->saddr;
-	fl4->flowi4_tos = iph->tos;
 }
 
 static void xfrm4_update_pmtu(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk,
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 6/16 power: supply: cpcap-battery: Fix division by zero

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dbe7208c6c4aec083571f2ec742870a0d0edbea3 ]

If called fast enough so samples do not increment, we can get division by zero in kernel:

__div0
cpcap_battery_cc_raw_div
cpcap_battery_get_property
power_supply_get_property.part.1
power_supply_get_property
power_supply_show_property
power_supply_uevent

Fixes 874b2adbed12 ("power: supply: cpcap-battery: Add a battery driver")
---
 drivers/power/supply/cpcap-battery.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/power/supply/cpcap-battery.c +3 -0
index ee71a2b37b12c..fe7fcf3a2ad03 100644
@@ -221,6 +221,9 @@ static int cpcap_battery_cc_raw_div(struct cpcap_battery_ddata *ddata,
 	int avg_current;
 	u32 cc_lsb;
 
+	if (!divider)
+		return 0;
+
 	sample &= 0xffffff;		/* 24-bits, unsigned */
 	offset &= 0x7ff;		/* 10-bits, signed */
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 06/16] power: supply: cpcap-battery: Fix division by zero

Quoted 15 lines · Sasha Levin

From: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dbe7208c6c4aec083571f2ec742870a0d0edbea3 ]

If called fast enough so samples do not increment, we can get division by zero in kernel:

__div0
cpcap_battery_cc_raw_div
cpcap_battery_get_property
power_supply_get_property.part.1
power_supply_get_property
power_supply_show_property
power_supply_uevent

Quoted 5 lines
Fixes 874b2adbed12 ("power: supply: cpcap-battery: Add a battery driver")

Yup, this one makes sense for stable

Thanks,
Pavel

Signature · 2 lines
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/16 securityfs: fix use-after-free on symlink traversal

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Al Viro <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 46c874419652bbefdfed17420fd6e88d8a31d9ec ]

symlink body shouldn't be freed without an RCU delay. Switch securityfs to ->destroy_inode() and use of call_rcu(); free both the inode and symlink body in the callback.

---
 security/inode.c | 13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/inode.c +9 -4
index 8dd9ca8848e43..829f15672e01f 100644
@@ -26,17 +26,22 @@
 static struct vfsmount *mount;
 static int mount_count;
 
-static void securityfs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
+static void securityfs_i_callback(struct rcu_head *head)
 {
-	truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
-	clear_inode(inode);
+	struct inode *inode = container_of(head, struct inode, i_rcu);
 	if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
 		kfree(inode->i_link);
+	free_inode_nonrcu(inode);
+}
+
+static void securityfs_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	call_rcu(&inode->i_rcu, securityfs_i_callback);
 }
 
 static const struct super_operations securityfs_super_operations = {
 	.statfs		= simple_statfs,
-	.evict_inode	= securityfs_evict_inode,
+	.destroy_inode	= securityfs_destroy_inode,
 };
 
 static int fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/16 apparmorfs: fix use-after-free on symlink traversal

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Al Viro <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f51dcd0f621caac5380ce90fbbeafc32ce4517ae ]

symlink body shouldn't be freed without an RCU delay. Switch apparmorfs to ->destroy_inode() and use of call_rcu(); free both the inode and symlink body in the callback.

---
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +9 -4
index 0e03377bb83ea..dd746bd69a9b2 100644
@@ -126,17 +126,22 @@ static int aafs_show_path(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *dentry)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void aafs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
+static void aafs_i_callback(struct rcu_head *head)
 {
-	truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
-	clear_inode(inode);
+	struct inode *inode = container_of(head, struct inode, i_rcu);
 	if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
 		kfree(inode->i_link);
+	free_inode_nonrcu(inode);
+}
+
+static void aafs_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	call_rcu(&inode->i_rcu, aafs_i_callback);
 }
 
 static const struct super_operations aafs_super_ops = {
 	.statfs = simple_statfs,
-	.evict_inode = aafs_evict_inode,
+	.destroy_inode = aafs_destroy_inode,
 	.show_path = aafs_show_path,
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/16 mac80211: Fix kernel panic due to use of txq after free

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bhagavathi Perumal S <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f1267cf3c01b12e0f843fb6a7450a7f0b2efab8a ]

The txq of vif is added to active_txqs list for ATF TXQ scheduling in the function ieee80211_queue_skb(), but it was not properly removed before freeing the txq object. It was causing use after free of the txq objects from the active_txqs list, result was kernel panic due to invalid memory access.

Fix kernel invalid memory access by properly removing txq object from active_txqs list before free the object.

---
 net/mac80211/iface.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/mac80211/iface.c +3 -0
index 222c063244f56..6ce13e976b7a2 100644
@@ -1924,6 +1924,9 @@ void ieee80211_if_remove(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
 	list_del_rcu(&sdata->list);
 	mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->iflist_mtx);
 
+	if (sdata->vif.txq)
+		ieee80211_txq_purge(sdata->local, to_txq_info(sdata->vif.txq));
+
 	synchronize_rcu();
 
 	if (sdata->dev) {
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/16 KVM: arm/arm64: Ensure vcpu target is unset on reset failure

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Andrew Jones <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 811328fc3222f7b55846de0cd0404339e2e1e6d7 ]

A failed KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT should not set the vcpu target, as the vcpu target is used by kvm_vcpu_initialized() to determine if other vcpu ioctls may proceed. We need to set the target before calling kvm_reset_vcpu(), but if that call fails, we should then unset it and clear the feature bitmap while we're at it.

[maz: Simplified patch, completed commit message]
---
 virt/kvm/arm/arm.c | 11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
virt/kvm/arm/arm.c +8 -3
index 32aa88c19b8d5..4154f98b337c5 100644
@@ -856,7 +856,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_irq_line(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irq_level *irq_level,
 static int kvm_vcpu_set_target(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 			       const struct kvm_vcpu_init *init)
 {
-	unsigned int i;
+	unsigned int i, ret;
 	int phys_target = kvm_target_cpu();
 
 	if (init->target != phys_target)
@@ -891,9 +891,14 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_set_target(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	vcpu->arch.target = phys_target;
 
 	/* Now we know what it is, we can reset it. */
-	return kvm_reset_vcpu(vcpu);
-}
+	ret = kvm_reset_vcpu(vcpu);
+	if (ret) {
+		vcpu->arch.target = -1;
+		bitmap_zero(vcpu->arch.features, KVM_VCPU_MAX_FEATURES);
+	}
 
+	return ret;
+}
 
 static int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 					 struct kvm_vcpu_init *init)
Signature · 6 lines
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author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/16 power: supply: sysfs: prevent endless uevent loop with CONFIG_POWER_SUPPLY_DEBUG

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Andrey Smirnov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 349ced9984ff540ce74ca8a0b2e9b03dc434b9dd ]

Fix a similar endless event loop as was done in commit 8dcf32175b4e ("i2c: prevent endless uevent loop with CONFIG_I2C_DEBUG_CORE"):

The culprit is the dev_dbg printk in the i2c uevent handler. If this is activated (for instance by CONFIG_I2C_DEBUG_CORE) it results in an endless loop with systemd-journald.

This happens if user-space scans the system log and reads the uevent file to get information about a newly created device, which seems fair use to me. Unfortunately reading the "uevent" file uses the same function that runs for creating the uevent for a new device, generating the next syslog entry

Both CONFIG_I2C_DEBUG_CORE and CONFIG_POWER_SUPPLY_DEBUG were reported in https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=76886 but only former seems to have been fixed. Drop debug prints as it was done in I2C subsystem to resolve the issue.

---
 drivers/power/supply/power_supply_sysfs.c | 6 ------
 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
drivers/power/supply/power_supply_sysfs.c +0 -6
index 5204f115970fe..eb5dc74820539 100644
@@ -325,15 +325,11 @@ int power_supply_uevent(struct device *dev, struct kobj_uevent_env *env)
 	char *prop_buf;
 	char *attrname;
 
-	dev_dbg(dev, "uevent\n");
-
 	if (!psy || !psy->desc) {
 		dev_dbg(dev, "No power supply yet\n");
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	dev_dbg(dev, "POWER_SUPPLY_NAME=%s\n", psy->desc->name);
-
 	ret = add_uevent_var(env, "POWER_SUPPLY_NAME=%s", psy->desc->name);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
@@ -369,8 +365,6 @@ int power_supply_uevent(struct device *dev, struct kobj_uevent_env *env)
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		dev_dbg(dev, "prop %s=%s\n", attrname, prop_buf);
-
 		ret = add_uevent_var(env, "POWER_SUPPLY_%s=%s", attrname, prop_buf);
 		kfree(attrname);
 		if (ret)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 12/16 iwlwifi: mvm: check for length correctness in iwl_mvm_create_skb()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Luca Coelho <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit de1887c064b9996ac03120d90d0a909a3f678f98 ]

We don't check for the validity of the lengths in the packet received from the firmware. If the MPDU length received in the rx descriptor is too short to contain the header length and the crypt length together, we may end up trying to copy a negative number of bytes (headlen - hdrlen < 0) which will underflow and cause us to try to copy a huge amount of data. This causes oopses such as this one:

BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff896be2970000
PGD 5e201067 P4D 5e201067 PUD 5e205067 PMD 16110d063 PTE 8000000162970161
Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 2 PID: 1824 Comm: irq/134-iwlwifi Not tainted 4.19.33-04308-geea41cf4930f #1
Hardware name: [...]
RIP: 0010:memcpy_erms+0x6/0x10
Code: 90 90 90 90 eb 1e 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 d1 48 c1 e9 03 83 e2 07 f3 48 a5 89 d1 f3 a4 c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 d1 <f3> a4 c3
 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 83 fa 20 72 7e 40 38 fe
RSP: 0018:ffffa4630196fc60 EFLAGS: 00010287
RAX: ffff896be2924618 RBX: ffff896bc8ecc600 RCX: 00000000fffb4610
RDX: 00000000fffffff8 RSI: ffff896a835e2a38 RDI: ffff896be2970000
RBP: ffffa4630196fd30 R08: ffff896bc8ecc600 R09: ffff896a83597000
R10: ffff896bd6998400 R11: 000000000200407f R12: ffff896a83597050
R13: 00000000fffffff8 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: ffff896a83597038
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff896be8280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff896be2970000 CR3: 000000005dc12002 CR4: 00000000003606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 iwl_mvm_rx_mpdu_mq+0xb51/0x121b [iwlmvm]
 iwl_pcie_rx_handle+0x58c/0xa89 [iwlwifi]
 iwl_pcie_irq_rx_msix_handler+0xd9/0x12a [iwlwifi]
 irq_thread_fn+0x24/0x49
 irq_thread+0xb0/0x122
 kthread+0x138/0x140
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40

Fix that by checking the lengths for correctness and trigger a warning to show that we have received wrong data.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/rxmq.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/rxmq.c +24 -4
index 8ba8c70571fb7..7fb8bbaf21420 100644
@@ -141,9 +141,9 @@ static inline int iwl_mvm_check_pn(struct iwl_mvm *mvm, struct sk_buff *skb,
 }
 
 /* iwl_mvm_create_skb Adds the rxb to a new skb */
-static void iwl_mvm_create_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr,
-			       u16 len, u8 crypt_len,
-			       struct iwl_rx_cmd_buffer *rxb)
+static int iwl_mvm_create_skb(struct iwl_mvm *mvm, struct sk_buff *skb,
+			      struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr, u16 len, u8 crypt_len,
+			      struct iwl_rx_cmd_buffer *rxb)
 {
 	struct iwl_rx_packet *pkt = rxb_addr(rxb);
 	struct iwl_rx_mpdu_desc *desc = (void *)pkt->data;
@@ -184,6 +184,20 @@ static void iwl_mvm_create_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr,
 	 * present before copying packet data.
 	 */
 	hdrlen += crypt_len;
+
+	if (WARN_ONCE(headlen < hdrlen,
+		      "invalid packet lengths (hdrlen=%d, len=%d, crypt_len=%d)\n",
+		      hdrlen, len, crypt_len)) {
+		/*
+		 * We warn and trace because we want to be able to see
+		 * it in trace-cmd as well.
+		 */
+		IWL_DEBUG_RX(mvm,
+			     "invalid packet lengths (hdrlen=%d, len=%d, crypt_len=%d)\n",
+			     hdrlen, len, crypt_len);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	skb_put_data(skb, hdr, hdrlen);
 	skb_put_data(skb, (u8 *)hdr + hdrlen + pad_len, headlen - hdrlen);
 
@@ -196,6 +210,8 @@ static void iwl_mvm_create_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr,
 		skb_add_rx_frag(skb, 0, rxb_steal_page(rxb), offset,
 				fraglen, rxb->truesize);
 	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* iwl_mvm_pass_packet_to_mac80211 - passes the packet for mac80211 */
@@ -1033,7 +1049,11 @@ void iwl_mvm_rx_mpdu_mq(struct iwl_mvm *mvm, struct napi_struct *napi,
 			rx_status->boottime_ns = ktime_get_boot_ns();
 	}
 
-	iwl_mvm_create_skb(skb, hdr, len, crypt_len, rxb);
+	if (iwl_mvm_create_skb(mvm, skb, hdr, len, crypt_len, rxb)) {
+		kfree_skb(skb);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	if (!iwl_mvm_reorder(mvm, napi, queue, sta, skb, desc))
 		iwl_mvm_pass_packet_to_mac80211(mvm, napi, skb, queue, sta);
 out:
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 13/16 sched/cpufreq: Fix kobject memleak

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: "Tobin C. Harding" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9a4f26cc98d81b67ecc23b890c28e2df324e29f3 ]

Currently the error return path from kobject_init_and_add() is not followed by a call to kobject_put() - which means we are leaking the kobject.

Fix it by adding a call to kobject_put() in the error path of kobject_init_and_add().

Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>
Cc Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc Viresh Kumar <[email protected]>
---
 kernel/sched/cpufreq_schedutil.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
kernel/sched/cpufreq_schedutil.c +1 -0
index b314c9eaa71d3..f8c45d30ec6d0 100644
@@ -600,6 +600,7 @@ static int sugov_init(struct cpufreq_policy *policy)
 	return 0;
 
 fail:
+	kobject_put(&tunables->attr_set.kobj);
 	policy->governor_data = NULL;
 	sugov_tunables_free(tunables);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 14/16 x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Disable all instrumentation for early SME setup

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Gary Hook <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b51ce3744f115850166f3d6c292b9c8cb849ad4f ]

Enablement of AMD's Secure Memory Encryption feature is determined very early after start_kernel() is entered. Part of this procedure involves scanning the command line for the parameter 'mem_encrypt'.

To determine intended state, the function sme_enable() uses library functions cmdline_find_option() and strncmp(). Their use occurs early enough such that it cannot be assumed that any instrumentation subsystem is initialized.

For example, making calls to a KASAN-instrumented function before KASAN is set up will result in the use of uninitialized memory and a boot failure.

When AMD's SME support is enabled, conditionally disable instrumentation of these dependent functions in lib/string.c and arch/x86/lib/cmdline.c.

[ bp: Get rid of intermediary nostackp var and cleanup whitespace. ]

Fixes aca20d546214 ("x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption")
Cc Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Cc Boris Brezillon <[email protected]>
Cc Coly Li <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>
Cc Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
Cc Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc x86-ml <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 12 ++++++++++++
 lib/Makefile          | 11 +++++++++++
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
arch/x86/lib/Makefile +12 -0
index d435c89875c14..60b410ff31e8a 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,18 @@
 # Produces uninteresting flaky coverage.
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_delay.o	:= n
 
+# Early boot use of cmdline; don't instrument it
+ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT_cmdline.o := n
+KASAN_SANITIZE_cmdline.o  := n
+
+ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_cmdline.o = -pg
+endif
+
+CFLAGS_cmdline.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
+endif
+
 inat_tables_script = $(srctree)/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk
 inat_tables_maps = $(srctree)/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt
 quiet_cmd_inat_tables = GEN     $@
lib/Makefile +11 -0
index b1ac450329033..4ea31c2d982df 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,17 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_list_debug.o := n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_debugobjects.o := n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT_dynamic_debug.o := n
 
+# Early boot use of cmdline, don't instrument it
+ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+KASAN_SANITIZE_string.o := n
+
+ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_string.o = -pg
+endif
+
+CFLAGS_string.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
+endif
+
 lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
 	 rbtree.o radix-tree.o dump_stack.o timerqueue.o\
 	 idr.o int_sqrt.o extable.o \
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 15/16 ufs: fix braino in ufs_get_inode_gid() for solaris UFS flavour

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Al Viro <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4e9036042fedaffcd868d7f7aa948756c48c637d ]

To choose whether to pick the GID from the old (16bit) or new (32bit) field, we should check if the old gid field is set to 0xffff. Mainline checks the old *UID* field instead - cut'n'paste from the corresponding code in ufs_get_inode_uid().

Fixes 252e211e90ce
---
 fs/ufs/util.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ufs/util.h +1 -1
index 1907be6d58085..f3092d513551a 100644
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ ufs_get_inode_gid(struct super_block *sb, struct ufs_inode *inode)
 	case UFS_UID_44BSD:
 		return fs32_to_cpu(sb, inode->ui_u3.ui_44.ui_gid);
 	case UFS_UID_EFT:
-		if (inode->ui_u1.oldids.ui_suid == 0xFFFF)
+		if (inode->ui_u1.oldids.ui_sgid == 0xFFFF)
 			return fs32_to_cpu(sb, inode->ui_u3.ui_sun.ui_gid);
 		/* Fall through */
 	default:
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 16/16 perf bench numa: Add define for RUSAGE_THREAD if not present

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bf561d3c13423fc54daa19b5d49dc15fafdb7acc ]

While cross building perf to the ARC architecture on a fedora 30 host, we were failing with:

CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/numa.o
bench/numa.c: In function ?worker_thread?:
bench/numa.c:1261:12: error: ?RUSAGE_THREAD? undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean ?SIGEV_THREAD??

    getrusage(RUSAGE_THREAD, &rusage);
              ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
              SIGEV_THREAD

bench/numa.c:1261:12: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in

[perfbuilder at 60d5802468f6 perf]$ /arc_gnu_2019.03-rc1_prebuilt_uclibc_le_archs_linux_install/bin/arc-linux-gcc --version | head -1 arc-linux-gcc (ARCv2 ISA Linux uClibc toolchain 2019.03-rc1) 8.3.1 20190225
[perfbuilder at 60d5802468f6 perf]$

Trying to reproduce a report by Vineet, I noticed that, with just cross-built zlib and numactl libraries, I ended up with the above failure.

So, since RUSAGE_THREAD is available as a define, check for that and numactl libraries, I ended up with the above failure.

So, since RUSAGE_THREAD is available as a define in the system headers, check if it is defined in the 'perf bench numa' sources and define it if not.

Now it builds and I have to figure out if the problem reported by Vineet only takes place if we have libelf or some other library available.

Cc Arnd Bergmann <arnd at arndb.de>
Cc Jiri Olsa <jolsa at kernel.org>
Cc linux-snps-arc at lists.infradead.org
Cc Namhyung Kim <namhyung at kernel.org>
Cc Vineet Gupta <Vineet.Gupta1 at synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by Sasha Levin <sashal at kernel.org>
---
 tools/perf/bench/numa.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
tools/perf/bench/numa.c +4 -0
index 0afcc7eccc619..997875c770b10 100644
@@ -38,6 +38,10 @@
 #include <numa.h>
 #include <numaif.h>
 
+#ifndef RUSAGE_THREAD
+# define RUSAGE_THREAD 1
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Regular printout to the terminal, supressed if -q is specified:
  */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1