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fscrypt: key management improvements

PATCH Superseded Eric Biggers 2 participants 20 messages May 20, 2019 – May 21, 2019

Subsystems (10)

v6 of 8 Superseded Latest is v8 →

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Eric Biggers

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#0 lore raw

v6 cover fscrypt: key management improvements

Hello,

[Note: I'd like to apply this for v5.3. Additional review is greatly
appreciated, especially of the API before it's set in stone. Thanks!]

This patchset makes major improvements to how keys are added, removed, and derived in fscrypt, aka ext4/f2fs/ubifs encryption. It does this by adding new ioctls that add and remove encryption keys directly to/from the filesystem, and by adding a new encryption policy version ("v2") where the user-provided keys are only used as input to HKDF-SHA512 and are identified by their cryptographic hash.

All new APIs and all cryptosystem changes are documented in Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst. Userspace can use the new key management ioctls with existing encrypted directories, but migrating to v2 encryption policies is needed for the full benefits.

These changes solve four interrelated problems:

(1) Providing fscrypt keys via process-subscribed keyrings is abusing encryption as an OS-level access control mechanism, causing many bugs where processes don't get access to the keys they need -- e.g., when a 'sudo' command or a system service needs to access encrypted files. It's also inconsistent with the filesystem/VFS "view" of encrypted files which is global, so sometimes things randomly happen to work anyway due to caching. Regardless, currently almost all fscrypt users actually do need global keys, so they're having to use workarounds that heavily abuse the session or user keyrings, e.g. Android and Chromium OS both use a systemwide "session keyring" and the 'fscrypt' tool links all user keyrings into root's user keyring.

(2) Currently there's no way to securely and efficiently remove a fscrypt key such that not only is the original key wiped, but also all files and directories protected by that key are "locked" and their per-file keys wiped. Many users want this and are using 'echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches' as a workaround, but this is root-only, and also is overkill so can be a performance disaster.

(3) The key derivation function (KDF) that fscrypt uses to derive per-file keys is nonstandard, inflexible, and has some weaknesses such as being reversible and not evenly distributing the entropy from the user-provided keys.

(4) fscrypt doesn't check that the correct key was supplied. This can be a security vulnerability, since it allows malicious local users to associate the wrong key with files to which they have read-only access, causing other users' processes to read/write the wrong data.

Ultimately, the solutions to these problems all tie into each other. By adding a filesystem-level encryption keyring with ioctls to add/remove keys to/from it, the keys are made usable filesystem-wide (solves problem #1). It also becomes easy to track the inodes that were "unlocked" with each key, so they can be evicted when the key is removed (solves problem #2). Moreover, the filesystem-level keyring is a natural place to store an HMAC transform keyed by each key, thus making it easy and efficient to switch the KDF to HKDF (solves problem #3).

Finally, to check that the correct key was supplied, I use HKDF to derive a cryptographically secure key_identifier for each key (solves problem #4). This in combination with key quotas and other careful precautions also makes it safe to allow non-root users to add and remove keys to/from the filesystem-level keyring. Thus, all problems are solved without having to restrict the fscrypt API to root only.

The patchset is organized as follows:

- Patches 1-8 add new ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS. Adding a key logically "unlocks" all files on the filesystem that are protected by that key; removing a key "locks" them again.

- Patches 9-12 add support for v2 encryption policies.

- Patches 13-15 wire up the new ioctls to ext4, f2fs, and ubifs.

- Patch 16 updates the fscrypt documentation for all the changes.

Changes v5 => v6:
- Change HKDF to use the specification-defined default salt rather than a custom fixed salt, and prepend the string "fscrypt" to 'info' instead. This is arguably needed to match how RFC 5869 and SP 800-56C are worded. Both ways are secure in this context, so prefer the "boring" way that clearly matches the standards.
- Rebase onto v5.2-rc1.
- A few small cleanups.

Changes v4 => v5:
- Simplify shrink_dcache_inode(), as suggested by Al Viro; also move it into fs/crypto/.
- Fix a build error on some architectures by calling copy_from_user() rather than get_user() with a __u64 pointer.

Changes v3 => v4:
- Introduce fscrypt_sb_free() to avoid an extra #ifdef.
- Fix UBIFS's ->drop_inode().
- Add 'version' to union fscrypt_policy and union fscrypt_context.

Changes v2 => v3:
- Use ->drop_inode() to trigger the inode eviction during/after FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, as suggested by Dave Chinner.
- A few small cleanups.

v1 of this patchset was sent in October 2017 with title "fscrypt:
filesystem-level keyring and v2 policy support". This revived version follows the same basic design but incorporates numerous improvements, such as splitting keyinfo.c into multiple files for much better understandability, and introducing "per-mode" encryption keys to implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY encryption policy flag.

This patchset applies to v5.2-rc1. You can also get it from git at:

Repository: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux.git
Branch: fscrypt-key-mgmt-improvements-v6

I've written xfstests for the new APIs. They test the APIs themselves as well as verify the correctness of the ciphertext stored on-disk for v2 encryption policies. The tests can be found at:

Repository: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/xfstests-dev.git
Branch: fscrypt-key-mgmt-improvements

The xfstests depend on new xfs_io commands which can be found at:

Repository: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/xfsprogs-dev.git
Branch: fscrypt-key-mgmt-improvements

I've also made proof-of-concept changes to the 'fscrypt' userspace program (https://github.com/google/fscrypt) to make it support v2 encryption policies. You can find these changes in git at:

Repository: https://github.com/ebiggers/fscrypt.git
Branch: fscrypt-key-mgmt-improvements

To make the 'fscrypt' userspace program experimentally use v2 encryption policies on new encrypted directories, add the following to /etc/fscrypt.conf within the "options" section:

	"policy_version": "2"

Finally, it's also planned for Android and Chromium OS to switch to the new ioctls and eventually to v2 encryption policies. Work-in-progress, proof-of-concept changes by Satya Tangirala for AOSP can be found at
https://android-review.googlesource.com/q/topic:fscrypt-key-mgmt-improvements

Eric Biggers (16):
fs, fscrypt: move uapi definitions to new header <linux/fscrypt.h>
fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_ prefix for uapi constants
fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_* definitions, not FS_*
fscrypt: add ->ci_inode to fscrypt_info
fscrypt: refactor v1 policy key setup into keysetup_legacy.c
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl
fscrypt: add FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS ioctl
fscrypt: add an HKDF-SHA512 implementation
fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support
fscrypt: allow unprivileged users to add/remove keys for v2 policies
fscrypt: require that key be added when setting a v2 encryption policy
ext4: wire up new fscrypt ioctls
f2fs: wire up new fscrypt ioctls
ubifs: wire up new fscrypt ioctls
fscrypt: document the new ioctls and policy version

 Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst | 670 ++++++++++++++----
 MAINTAINERS                           |   1 +
 fs/crypto/Kconfig                     |   2 +
 fs/crypto/Makefile                    |  10 +-
 fs/crypto/crypto.c                    |  14 +-
 fs/crypto/fname.c                     |   5 +-
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h           | 366 +++++++++-
 fs/crypto/hkdf.c                      | 178 +++++
 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c                   | 612 ----------------
 fs/crypto/keyring.c                   | 963 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/crypto/keysetup.c                  | 560 +++++++++++++++
 fs/crypto/keysetup_legacy.c           | 340 +++++++++
 fs/crypto/policy.c                    | 392 ++++++++---
 fs/ext4/ioctl.c                       |  24 +
 fs/ext4/super.c                       |   3 +
 fs/f2fs/file.c                        |  46 ++
 fs/f2fs/super.c                       |   2 +
 fs/super.c                            |   2 +
 fs/ubifs/ioctl.c                      |  16 +
 fs/ubifs/super.c                      |  11 +
 include/linux/fs.h                    |   1 +
 include/linux/fscrypt.h               |  48 +-
 include/uapi/linux/fs.h               |  54 +-
 include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h          | 163 +++++
 24 files changed, 3541 insertions(+), 942 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 fs/crypto/hkdf.c
 delete mode 100644 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
 create mode 100644 fs/crypto/keyring.c
 create mode 100644 fs/crypto/keysetup.c
 create mode 100644 fs/crypto/keysetup_legacy.c
 create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v6 1/16 fs, fscrypt: move uapi definitions to new header <linux/fscrypt.h>

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

More fscrypt definitions are being added, and we shouldn't use a disproportionate amount of space in <linux/fs.h> for fscrypt stuff. So move the fscrypt definitions to a new header <linux/fscrypt.h>.

For source compatibility with existing userspace programs, <linux/fs.h> still includes the new header.

---
 MAINTAINERS                  |  1 +
 include/linux/fscrypt.h      |  1 +
 include/uapi/linux/fs.h      | 54 ++-------------------------------
 include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
index 5cfbea4ce5750..b55acde12f65f 100644
@@ -6475,6 +6475,7 @@ T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt.git
 S:	Supported
 F:	fs/crypto/
 F:	include/linux/fscrypt*.h
+F:	include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h
 F:	Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
 
 FSI-ATTACHED I2C DRIVER
include/linux/fscrypt.h +1 -0
index f7680ef1abd2d..a2b2ceaf33a85 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/fscrypt.h>
 
 #define FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE		16
 
include/uapi/linux/fs.h +3 -51

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include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h new file +58 -0

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Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH v6 2/16 fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_ prefix for uapi constants

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Prefix all filesystem encryption UAPI constants except the ioctl numbers with "FSCRYPT_" rather than with "FS_". This namespaces the constants more appropriately and makes it clear that they are related specifically to the filesystem encryption feature, and to the 'fscrypt_*' structures. With some of the old names like "FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID", it was not immediately clear that the constant had anything to do with encryption.

This is also useful because we'll be adding more encryption-related constants, e.g. for the policy version, and we'd otherwise have to choose whether to use unclear names like FS_POLICY_V1 or inconsistent names like FS_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_V1.

For source compatibility with existing userspace programs, keep the old names defined as aliases to the new names.

Finally, as long as new names are being defined anyway, I skipped defining new names for the fscrypt mode numbers that aren't actually
used: INVALID (0), AES_256_GCM (2), AES_256_CBC (3), SPECK128_256_XTS (7), and SPECK128_256_CTS (8).

---
 Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst | 36 +++++++--------
 include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h          | 66 +++++++++++++++++----------
 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst +18 -18
index 08c23b60e0164..4f9df6ba669e5 100644
@@ -223,9 +223,10 @@ a little endian number, except that:
   is encrypted with AES-256 where the AES-256 key is the SHA-256 hash
   of the file's data encryption key.
 
-- In the "direct key" configuration (FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY set in
-  the fscrypt_policy), the file's nonce is also appended to the IV.
-  Currently this is only allowed with the Adiantum encryption mode.
+- In the "direct key" configuration (FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY
+  set in the fscrypt_policy), the file's nonce is also appended to the
+  IV.  Currently this is only allowed with the Adiantum encryption
+  mode.
 
 Filenames encryption
 --------------------
@@ -272,14 +273,14 @@ empty directory or verifies that a directory or regular file already
 has the specified encryption policy.  It takes in a pointer to a
 :c:type:`struct fscrypt_policy`, defined as follows::
 
-    #define FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE  8
+    #define FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE  8
 
     struct fscrypt_policy {
             __u8 version;
             __u8 contents_encryption_mode;
             __u8 filenames_encryption_mode;
             __u8 flags;
-            __u8 master_key_descriptor[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
+            __u8 master_key_descriptor[FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
     };
 
 This structure must be initialized as follows:
@@ -288,18 +289,17 @@ This structure must be initialized as follows:
 
 - ``contents_encryption_mode`` and ``filenames_encryption_mode`` must
   be set to constants from ``<linux/fs.h>`` which identify the
-  encryption modes to use.  If unsure, use
-  FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS (1) for ``contents_encryption_mode``
-  and FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS (4) for
-  ``filenames_encryption_mode``.
+  encryption modes to use.  If unsure, use FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS
+  (1) for ``contents_encryption_mode`` and FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_CTS
+  (4) for ``filenames_encryption_mode``.
 
 - ``flags`` must contain a value from ``<linux/fs.h>`` which
   identifies the amount of NUL-padding to use when encrypting
-  filenames.  If unsure, use FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32 (0x3).
-  In addition, if the chosen encryption modes are both
-  FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_ADIANTUM, this can contain
-  FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY to specify that the master key should be
-  used directly, without key derivation.
+  filenames.  If unsure, use FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32 (0x3).  In
+  addition, if the chosen encryption modes are both
+  FSCRYPT_MODE_ADIANTUM, this can contain
+  FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY to specify that the master key should
+  be used directly, without key derivation.
 
 - ``master_key_descriptor`` specifies how to find the master key in
   the keyring; see `Adding keys`_.  It is up to userspace to choose a
@@ -399,11 +399,11 @@ followed by the 16-character lower case hex representation of the
 ``master_key_descriptor`` that was set in the encryption policy.  The
 key payload must conform to the following structure::
 
-    #define FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE 64
+    #define FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE 64
 
     struct fscrypt_key {
             u32 mode;
-            u8 raw[FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+            u8 raw[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
             u32 size;
     };
 
@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ much confusion if an encryption policy were to be added to or removed
 from anything other than an empty directory.)  The struct is defined
 as follows::
 
-    #define FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE  8
+    #define FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE  8
     #define FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE 16
 
     struct fscrypt_context {
@@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ as follows::
             u8 contents_encryption_mode;
             u8 filenames_encryption_mode;
             u8 flags;
-            u8 master_key_descriptor[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
+            u8 master_key_descriptor[FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
             u8 nonce[FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE];
     };
 
include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h +43 -23

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Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH v6 3/16 fscrypt: use FSCRYPT_* definitions, not FS_*

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Update fs/crypto/ to use the new names for the UAPI constants rather than the old names, then make the old definitions conditional on !__KERNEL__.

---
 fs/crypto/crypto.c           |  2 +-
 fs/crypto/fname.c            |  2 +-
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h  | 16 +++++------
 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c          | 53 ++++++++++++++++++------------------
 fs/crypto/policy.c           | 14 +++++-----
 include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h |  2 ++
 6 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
fs/crypto/crypto.c +1 -1
index 68e2ca4c4af63..b10f375ecee81 100644
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num,
 	memset(iv, 0, ci->ci_mode->ivsize);
 	iv->lblk_num = cpu_to_le64(lblk_num);
 
-	if (ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)
+	if (ci->ci_flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)
 		memcpy(iv->nonce, ci->ci_nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
 
 	if (ci->ci_essiv_tfm != NULL)
fs/crypto/fname.c +1 -1
index eccea3d8f9234..65f1bda87c3c9 100644
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const struct inode *inode, u32 orig_len,
 				  u32 max_len, u32 *encrypted_len_ret)
 {
 	int padding = 4 << (inode->i_crypt_info->ci_flags &
-			    FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_MASK);
+			    FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_MASK);
 	u32 encrypted_len;
 
 	if (orig_len > max_len)
fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +8 -8
index 7da2761595933..52e09ef40bfa6 100644
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ struct fscrypt_context {
 	u8 contents_encryption_mode;
 	u8 filenames_encryption_mode;
 	u8 flags;
-	u8 master_key_descriptor[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
+	u8 master_key_descriptor[FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
 	u8 nonce[FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE];
 } __packed;
 
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ struct fscrypt_info {
 	u8 ci_data_mode;
 	u8 ci_filename_mode;
 	u8 ci_flags;
-	u8 ci_master_key_descriptor[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
+	u8 ci_master_key_descriptor[FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
 	u8 ci_nonce[FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE];
 };
 
@@ -99,16 +99,16 @@ typedef enum {
 static inline bool fscrypt_valid_enc_modes(u32 contents_mode,
 					   u32 filenames_mode)
 {
-	if (contents_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC &&
-	    filenames_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CTS)
+	if (contents_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_128_CBC &&
+	    filenames_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_128_CTS)
 		return true;
 
-	if (contents_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS &&
-	    filenames_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS)
+	if (contents_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS &&
+	    filenames_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_CTS)
 		return true;
 
-	if (contents_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_ADIANTUM &&
-	    filenames_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_ADIANTUM)
+	if (contents_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_ADIANTUM &&
+	    filenames_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_ADIANTUM)
 		return true;
 
 	return false;
fs/crypto/keyinfo.c +27 -26

180 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/crypto/policy.c +7 -7
index d536889ac31bf..18f1bf300ec44 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static bool is_encryption_context_consistent_with_policy(
 				const struct fscrypt_policy *policy)
 {
 	return memcmp(ctx->master_key_descriptor, policy->master_key_descriptor,
-		      FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) = 0 &&
+		      FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) = 0 &&
 		(ctx->flags = policy->flags) &&
 		(ctx->contents_encryption_mode =
 		 policy->contents_encryption_mode) &&
@@ -37,13 +37,13 @@ static int create_encryption_context_from_policy(struct inode *inode,
 
 	ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
 	memcpy(ctx.master_key_descriptor, policy->master_key_descriptor,
-					FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
+					FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
 
 	if (!fscrypt_valid_enc_modes(policy->contents_encryption_mode,
 				     policy->filenames_encryption_mode))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (policy->flags & ~FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID)
+	if (policy->flags & ~FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	ctx.contents_encryption_mode = policy->contents_encryption_mode;
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(struct file *filp, void __user *arg)
 	policy.filenames_encryption_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
 	policy.flags = ctx.flags;
 	memcpy(policy.master_key_descriptor, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
-				FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
+				FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
 
 	if (copy_to_user(arg, &policy, sizeof(policy)))
 		return -EFAULT;
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child)
 	if (parent_ci && child_ci) {
 		return memcmp(parent_ci->ci_master_key_descriptor,
 			      child_ci->ci_master_key_descriptor,
-			      FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) = 0 &&
+			      FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) = 0 &&
 			(parent_ci->ci_data_mode = child_ci->ci_data_mode) &&
 			(parent_ci->ci_filename_mode =
 			 child_ci->ci_filename_mode) &&
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child)
 
 	return memcmp(parent_ctx.master_key_descriptor,
 		      child_ctx.master_key_descriptor,
-		      FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) = 0 &&
+		      FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) = 0 &&
 		(parent_ctx.contents_encryption_mode =
 		 child_ctx.contents_encryption_mode) &&
 		(parent_ctx.filenames_encryption_mode =
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child,
 	ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = ci->ci_filename_mode;
 	ctx.flags = ci->ci_flags;
 	memcpy(ctx.master_key_descriptor, ci->ci_master_key_descriptor,
-	       FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
+	       FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
 	get_random_bytes(ctx.nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx) != FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE);
 	res = parent->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(child, &ctx,
include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h +2 -0
index f9b99cc028bc6..3bbc5dfbde211 100644
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct fscrypt_key {
 /**********************************************************************/
 
 /* old names; don't add anything new here! */
+#ifndef __KERNEL__
 #define FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE		FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE
 #define FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_4		FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_4
 #define FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_8		FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_8
@@ -74,5 +75,6 @@ struct fscrypt_key {
 #define FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX		FSCRYPT_KEY_DESC_PREFIX
 #define FS_KEY_DESC_PREFIX_SIZE		FSCRYPT_KEY_DESC_PREFIX_SIZE
 #define FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE			FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE
+#endif /* !__KERNEL__ */
 
 #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_FSCRYPT_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH v6 4/16 fscrypt: add ->ci_inode to fscrypt_info

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Add an inode back-pointer to 'struct fscrypt_info', such that inode->i_crypt_info->ci_inode = inode.

This will be useful for:

1. Evicting the inodes when a fscrypt key is removed, since we'll track the inodes using a given key by linking their fscrypt_infos together, rather than the inodes directly. This avoids bloating 'struct inode' with a new list_head.

2. Simplifying the per-file key setup, since the inode pointer won't have to be passed around everywhere just in case something goes wrong and it's needed for fscrypt_warn().

---
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 3 +++
 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c         | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +3 -0
index 52e09ef40bfa6..ac24edfc297f1 100644
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ struct fscrypt_info {
 	 */
 	struct fscrypt_mode *ci_mode;
 
+	/* Back-pointer to the inode */
+	struct inode *ci_inode;
+
 	/*
 	 * If non-NULL, then this inode uses a master key directly rather than a
 	 * derived key, and ci_ctfm will equal ci_master_key->mk_ctfm.
fs/crypto/keyinfo.c +2 -0
index 479389a4e0559..49764d335c370 100644
@@ -541,6 +541,8 @@ int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
 	if (!crypt_info)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	crypt_info->ci_inode = inode;
+
 	crypt_info->ci_flags = ctx.flags;
 	crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
 	crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH v6 5/16 fscrypt: refactor v1 policy key setup into keysetup_legacy.c

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

In preparation for introducing v2 encryption policies which will find and derive encryption keys differently from the current v1 encryption policies, refactor the v1 policy-specific key setup code from keyinfo.c into keysetup_legacy.c. Then rename keyinfo.c to keysetup.c.

Note: the code moved into keysetup_legacy.c includes the table of master keys referenced by v1 DIRECT_KEY policies. I've chosen to keep this table as-is rather than trying to replace it with using the filesystem-level keyring, since the latter would add more complexity than it would save especially given the requirement to continue to support the keys actually being provided in a process-subscribed keyring. However, to distinguish the structures in this table from the structures that will go in the filesystem-level keyring, I renamed them from 'struct fscrypt_master_key' to 'struct fscrypt_direct_key'.

---
 fs/crypto/Makefile          |   8 +-
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h |  37 ++-
 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c         | 615 ------------------------------------
 fs/crypto/keysetup.c        | 329 +++++++++++++++++++
 fs/crypto/keysetup_legacy.c | 338 ++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/fscrypt.h     |   4 +-
 6 files changed, 705 insertions(+), 626 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
 create mode 100644 fs/crypto/keysetup.c
 create mode 100644 fs/crypto/keysetup_legacy.c
fs/crypto/Makefile +7 -1
index cb496989a6b69..75c0c29fcc627 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION)	+= fscrypto.o
 
-fscrypto-y := crypto.o fname.o hooks.o keyinfo.o policy.o
+fscrypto-y := crypto.o \
+	      fname.o \
+	      hooks.o \
+	      keysetup.o \
+	      keysetup_legacy.o \
+	      policy.o
+
 fscrypto-$(CONFIG_BLOCK) += bio.o
fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +29 -8
index ac24edfc297f1..c5a8181fc26c1 100644
@@ -4,9 +4,8 @@
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
  *
- * This contains encryption key functions.
- *
- * Written by Michael Halcrow, Ildar Muslukhov, and Uday Savagaonkar, 2015.
+ * Originally written by Michael Halcrow, Ildar Muslukhov, and Uday Savagaonkar.
+ * Heavily modified since then.
  */
 
 #ifndef _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H
@@ -77,11 +76,10 @@ struct fscrypt_info {
 	struct inode *ci_inode;
 
 	/*
-	 * If non-NULL, then this inode uses a master key directly rather than a
-	 * derived key, and ci_ctfm will equal ci_master_key->mk_ctfm.
-	 * Otherwise, this inode uses a derived key.
+	 * If non-NULL, then encryption is done using the master key directly
+	 * and ci_ctfm will equal ci_direct_key->dk_ctfm.
 	 */
-	struct fscrypt_master_key *ci_master_key;
+	struct fscrypt_direct_key *ci_direct_key;
 
 	/* fields from the fscrypt_context */
 	u8 ci_data_mode;
@@ -161,7 +159,7 @@ extern bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const struct inode *inode,
 					 u32 orig_len, u32 max_len,
 					 u32 *encrypted_len_ret);
 
-/* keyinfo.c */
+/* keysetup.c */
 
 struct fscrypt_mode {
 	const char *friendly_name;
@@ -172,6 +170,29 @@ struct fscrypt_mode {
 	bool needs_essiv;
 };
 
+static inline bool
+fscrypt_mode_supports_direct_key(const struct fscrypt_mode *mode)
+{
+	return mode->ivsize >= offsetofend(union fscrypt_iv, nonce);
+}
+
+extern struct crypto_skcipher *
+fscrypt_allocate_skcipher(struct fscrypt_mode *mode, const u8 *raw_key,
+			  const struct inode *inode);
+
+extern int fscrypt_set_derived_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
+				   const u8 *derived_key);
+
 extern void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void);
 
+/* keysetup_legacy.c */
+
+extern void fscrypt_put_direct_key(struct fscrypt_direct_key *dk);
+
+extern int fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
+				     const u8 *raw_master_key);
+
+extern int fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key_via_subscribed_keyrings(
+					struct fscrypt_info *ci);
+
 #endif /* _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H */
fs/crypto/keyinfo.c deleted +0 -614

614 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/crypto/keysetup.c new file +329 -0

329 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/crypto/keysetup_legacy.c new file +338 -0

338 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/fscrypt.h +2 -2
index a2b2ceaf33a85..f9d63986c4310 100644
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ extern int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(struct file *, void __user *);
 extern int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *, struct inode *);
 extern int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *, struct inode *,
 					void *, bool);
-/* keyinfo.c */
+/* keysetup.c */
 extern int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *);
 extern void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *);
 extern void fscrypt_free_inode(struct inode *);
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static inline int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent,
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
-/* keyinfo.c */
+/* keysetup.c */
 static inline int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH v6 6/16 fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys, making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked".

Why we need this
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext) status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not. fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring.

Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear "unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on whether the files are currently present in the inode cache.

Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc. Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest.

Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents session keyrings from being used for any other purpose.

On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring [2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker containers (see [6], [7]).

By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control.

Why not use the add_key() syscall
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches:

- Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted; also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried.

- Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it to userspace.

- Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks, users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is only really removed after all users who added it have removed it.

Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier.

However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in /proc/keys for debugging purposes.

References:

    [1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt
    [2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb
    [3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939
    [4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116
    [5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715
    [6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128
    [7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem
---
 fs/crypto/Makefile           |   1 +
 fs/crypto/crypto.c           |  11 +-
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h  |  44 +++++-
 fs/crypto/keyring.c          | 294 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/crypto/keysetup.c         |  34 +++-
 fs/super.c                   |   2 +
 include/linux/fs.h           |   1 +
 include/linux/fscrypt.h      |  14 ++
 include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h |  40 +++--
 9 files changed, 428 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 fs/crypto/keyring.c
fs/crypto/Makefile +1 -0
index 75c0c29fcc627..accdd622c9083 100644
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION)	+= fscrypto.o
 fscrypto-y := crypto.o \
 	      fname.o \
 	      hooks.o \
+	      keyring.o \
 	      keysetup.o \
 	      keysetup_legacy.o \
 	      policy.o
fs/crypto/crypto.c +10 -1
index b10f375ecee81..3fe287952ac95 100644
@@ -447,6 +447,8 @@ void fscrypt_msg(struct super_block *sb, const char *level,
  */
 static int __init fscrypt_init(void)
 {
+	int err = -ENOMEM;
+
 	/*
 	 * Use an unbound workqueue to allow bios to be decrypted in parallel
 	 * even when they happen to complete on the same CPU.  This sacrifices
@@ -469,14 +471,20 @@ static int __init fscrypt_init(void)
 	if (!fscrypt_info_cachep)
 		goto fail_free_ctx;
 
+	err = fscrypt_init_keyring();
+	if (err)
+		goto fail_free_info;
+
 	return 0;
 
+fail_free_info:
+	kmem_cache_destroy(fscrypt_info_cachep);
 fail_free_ctx:
 	kmem_cache_destroy(fscrypt_ctx_cachep);
 fail_free_queue:
 	destroy_workqueue(fscrypt_read_workqueue);
 fail:
-	return -ENOMEM;
+	return err;
 }
 module_init(fscrypt_init)
 
@@ -493,6 +501,7 @@ static void __exit fscrypt_exit(void)
 	kmem_cache_destroy(fscrypt_info_cachep);
 
 	fscrypt_essiv_cleanup();
+	fscrypt_exit_keyring();
 }
 module_exit(fscrypt_exit);
 
fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +43 -1

58 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/crypto/keyring.c new file +294 -0

294 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/crypto/keysetup.c +33 -1
index d9748999f3a68..13425513fa5c1 100644
@@ -212,7 +212,39 @@ int fscrypt_set_derived_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *derived_key)
  */
 static int setup_file_encryption_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
 {
-	return fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key_via_subscribed_keyrings(ci);
+	struct key *key;
+	struct fscrypt_master_key *mk = NULL;
+	struct fscrypt_key_specifier mk_spec;
+	int err;
+
+	mk_spec.type = FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR;
+	memcpy(mk_spec.u.descriptor, ci->ci_master_key_descriptor,
+	       FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
+
+	key = fscrypt_find_master_key(ci->ci_inode->i_sb, &mk_spec);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		if (key != ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY))
+			return PTR_ERR(key);
+
+		return fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key_via_subscribed_keyrings(ci);
+	}
+
+	mk = key->payload.data[0];
+
+	if (mk->mk_secret.size < ci->ci_mode->keysize) {
+		fscrypt_warn(NULL,
+			     "key with description '%s' is too short (got %u bytes, need %u+ bytes)",
+			     key->description, mk->mk_secret.size,
+			     ci->ci_mode->keysize);
+		err = -ENOKEY;
+		goto out_release_key;
+	}
+
+	err = fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key(ci, mk->mk_secret.raw);
+
+out_release_key:
+	key_put(key);
+	return err;
 }
 
 static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
fs/super.c +2 -0
index 2739f57515f81..20f6318611c4f 100644
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
 #include <linux/rculist_bl.h>
 #include <linux/cleancache.h>
+#include <linux/fscrypt.h>
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
 #include <linux/lockdep.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
@@ -290,6 +291,7 @@ static void __put_super(struct super_block *s)
 		WARN_ON(s->s_inode_lru.node);
 		WARN_ON(!list_empty(&s->s_mounts));
 		security_sb_free(s);
+		fscrypt_sb_free(s);
 		put_user_ns(s->s_user_ns);
 		kfree(s->s_subtype);
 		call_rcu(&s->rcu, destroy_super_rcu);
include/linux/fs.h +1 -0
index f7fdfe93e25d3..db4e0dcc942c8 100644
@@ -1429,6 +1429,7 @@ struct super_block {
 	const struct xattr_handler **s_xattr;
 #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION
 	const struct fscrypt_operations	*s_cop;
+	struct key		*s_master_keys; /* master crypto keys in use */
 #endif
 	struct hlist_bl_head	s_roots;	/* alternate root dentries for NFS */
 	struct list_head	s_mounts;	/* list of mounts; _not_ for fs use */
include/linux/fscrypt.h +14 -0
index f9d63986c4310..d58b6e52b1649 100644
@@ -126,6 +126,10 @@ extern int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(struct file *, void __user *);
 extern int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *, struct inode *);
 extern int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *, struct inode *,
 					void *, bool);
+/* keyring.c */
+extern void fscrypt_sb_free(struct super_block *sb);
+extern int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *arg);
+
 /* keysetup.c */
 extern int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *);
 extern void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *);
@@ -337,6 +341,16 @@ static inline int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent,
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
+/* keyring.c */
+static inline void fscrypt_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *arg)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 /* keysetup.c */
 static inline int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
 {
include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h +30 -10
index 3bbc5dfbde211..7bed24632bda7 100644
@@ -34,22 +34,42 @@ struct fscrypt_policy {
 	__u8 master_key_descriptor[FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
 };
 
-#define FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY	_IOR('f', 19, struct fscrypt_policy)
-#define FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_PWSALT	_IOW('f', 20, __u8[16])
-#define FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY	_IOW('f', 21, struct fscrypt_policy)
-
-/* Parameters for passing an encryption key into the kernel keyring */
+/*
+ * Process-subscribed "logon" key description prefix and payload format.
+ * Deprecated; prefer FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY instead.
+ */
 #define FSCRYPT_KEY_DESC_PREFIX		"fscrypt:"
-#define FSCRYPT_KEY_DESC_PREFIX_SIZE		8
-
-/* Structure that userspace passes to the kernel keyring */
-#define FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE			64
-
+#define FSCRYPT_KEY_DESC_PREFIX_SIZE	8
+#define FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE		64
 struct fscrypt_key {
 	__u32 mode;
 	__u8 raw[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
 	__u32 size;
 };
+
+struct fscrypt_key_specifier {
+#define FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR	1
+	__u32 type;
+	__u32 __reserved;
+	union {
+		__u8 __reserved[32]; /* reserve some extra space */
+		__u8 descriptor[FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
+	} u;
+};
+
+/* Struct passed to FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY */
+struct fscrypt_add_key_arg {
+	struct fscrypt_key_specifier key_spec;
+	__u32 raw_size;
+	__u32 __reserved[9];
+	__u8 raw[];
+};
+
+#define FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY	  _IOR('f', 19, struct fscrypt_policy)
+#define FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_PWSALT	  _IOW('f', 20, __u8[16])
+#define FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY	  _IOW('f', 21, struct fscrypt_policy)
+#define FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY	 _IOWR('f', 23, struct fscrypt_add_key_arg)
+
 /**********************************************************************/
 
 /* old names; don't add anything new here! */
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH v6 7/16 fscrypt: add FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl removes an encryption key that was added by FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It wipes the secret key itself, then "locks" the encrypted files and directories that had been unlocked using that key -- implemented by evicting the relevant dentries and inodes from the VFS caches.

The problem this solves is that many fscrypt users want the ability to remove encryption keys, causing the corresponding encrypted directories to appear "locked" (presented in ciphertext form) again. Moreover, users want removing an encryption key to *really* remove it, in the sense that the removed keys cannot be recovered even if kernel memory is compromised, e.g. by the exploit of a kernel security vulnerability or by a physical attack. This is desirable after a user logs out of the system, for example. In many cases users even already assume this to be the case and are surprised to hear when it's not.

It is not sufficient to simply unlink the master key from the keyring (or to revoke or invalidate it), since the actual encryption transform objects are still pinned in memory by their inodes. Therefore, to really remove a key we must also evict the relevant inodes.

Currently one workaround is to run 'sync && echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches'. But, that evicts all unused inodes in the system rather than just the inodes associated with the key being removed, causing severe performance problems. Moreover, it requires root privileges, so regular users can't "lock" their encrypted files.

Another workaround, used in Chromium OS kernels, is to add a new VFS-level ioctl FS_IOC_DROP_CACHE which is a more restricted version of drop_caches that operates on a single super_block. It does:

        shrink_dcache_sb(sb);
        invalidate_inodes(sb, false);

But it's still a hack. Yet, the major users of filesystem encryption want this feature badly enough that they are actually using these hacks.

To properly solve the problem, start maintaining a list of the inodes which have been "unlocked" using each master key. Originally this wasn't possible because the kernel didn't keep track of in-use master keys at all. But, with the ->s_master_keys keyring it is now possible.

Then, add an ioctl FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It finds the specified master key in ->s_master_keys, then wipes the secret key itself, which prevents any additional inodes from being unlocked with the key. Then, it syncs the filesystem and evicts the inodes in the key's list. The normal inode eviction code will free and wipe the per-file keys (in ->i_crypt_info). Note that freeing ->i_crypt_info without evicting the inodes was also considered, but would have been racy.

Some inodes may still be in use when a master key is removed, and we can't simply revoke random file descriptors, mmap's, etc. Thus, the ioctl simply skips in-use inodes, and returns -EBUSY to indicate that some inodes weren't evicted. The master key *secret* is still removed, but the fscrypt_master_key struct remains to keep track of the remaining inodes. Userspace can then retry the ioctl to evict the remaining inodes. Alternatively, if userspace adds the key again, the refreshed secret will be associated with the existing list of inodes so they remain correctly tracked for future key removals.

The ioctl doesn't wipe pagecache pages. Thus, we tolerate that after a kernel compromise some portions of plaintext file contents may still be recoverable from memory. This can be solved be enabling page poisoning system-wide, which security conscious users may choose to do. But it's very difficult to solve otherwise, e.g. note that plaintext file contents may have been read in other places than pagecache pages.

Like FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is initially restricted to privileged users only. This is sufficient for some use cases, but not all. A later patch will relax this restriction, but it will require introducing key hashes, among other changes.

---
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h  |  53 +++++++-
 fs/crypto/keyring.c          | 247 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 fs/crypto/keysetup.c         | 103 ++++++++++++++-
 include/linux/fscrypt.h      |  13 ++
 include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h |   7 +
 5 files changed, 418 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +52 -1
index b4c4312085554..cc1862c9baa1d 100644
@@ -78,6 +78,19 @@ struct fscrypt_info {
 	/* Back-pointer to the inode */
 	struct inode *ci_inode;
 
+	/*
+	 * The master key with which this inode was unlocked (decrypted).  This
+	 * will be NULL if the master key was found in a process-subscribed
+	 * keyring rather than in the filesystem-level keyring.
+	 */
+	struct key *ci_master_key;
+
+	/*
+	 * Link in list of inodes that were unlocked with the master key.
+	 * Only used when ->ci_master_key is set.
+	 */
+	struct list_head ci_master_key_link;
+
 	/*
 	 * If non-NULL, then encryption is done using the master key directly
 	 * and ci_ctfm will equal ci_direct_key->dk_ctfm.
@@ -186,14 +199,52 @@ struct fscrypt_master_key_secret {
  */
 struct fscrypt_master_key {
 
-	/* The secret key material */
+	/*
+	 * The secret key material.  After FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY is
+	 * executed, this is wiped and no new inodes can be unlocked with this
+	 * key; however, there may still be inodes in ->mk_decrypted_inodes
+	 * which could not be evicted.  As long as some inodes still remain,
+	 * FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY can be retried, or
+	 * FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY can add the secret again.
+	 *
+	 * Locking: protected by key->sem.
+	 */
 	struct fscrypt_master_key_secret	mk_secret;
 
 	/* Arbitrary key descriptor which was assigned by userspace */
 	struct fscrypt_key_specifier		mk_spec;
 
+	/*
+	 * Length of ->mk_decrypted_inodes, plus one if mk_secret is present.
+	 * Once this goes to 0, the master key is removed from ->s_master_keys.
+	 * The 'struct fscrypt_master_key' will continue to live as long as the
+	 * 'struct key' whose payload it is, but we won't let this reference
+	 * count rise again.
+	 */
+	refcount_t		mk_refcount;
+
+	/*
+	 * List of inodes that were unlocked using this key.  This allows the
+	 * inodes to be evicted efficiently if the key is removed.
+	 */
+	struct list_head	mk_decrypted_inodes;
+	spinlock_t		mk_decrypted_inodes_lock;
+
 } __randomize_layout;
 
+static inline bool
+is_master_key_secret_present(const struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The READ_ONCE() is only necessary for fscrypt_drop_inode() and
+	 * fscrypt_key_describe().  These run in atomic context, so they can't
+	 * take key->sem and thus 'secret' can change concurrently which would
+	 * be a data race.  But they only need to know whether the secret *was*
+	 * present at the time of check, so READ_ONCE() suffices.
+	 */
+	return READ_ONCE(secret->size) != 0;
+}
+
 extern struct key *
 fscrypt_find_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
 			const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec);
fs/crypto/keyring.c +245 -1

289 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/crypto/keysetup.c +99 -3

155 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/fscrypt.h +13 -0
index d58b6e52b1649..dcbc9636cb8b1 100644
@@ -129,11 +129,13 @@ extern int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *, struct inode *,
 /* keyring.c */
 extern void fscrypt_sb_free(struct super_block *sb);
 extern int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *arg);
+extern int fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg);
 
 /* keysetup.c */
 extern int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *);
 extern void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *);
 extern void fscrypt_free_inode(struct inode *);
+extern int fscrypt_drop_inode(struct inode *inode);
 
 /* fname.c */
 extern int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *, const struct qstr *,
@@ -351,6 +353,12 @@ static inline int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *arg)
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
+static inline int fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key(struct file *filp,
+					   const void __user *arg)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 /* keysetup.c */
 static inline int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
 {
@@ -366,6 +374,11 @@ static inline void fscrypt_free_inode(struct inode *inode)
 {
 }
 
+static inline int fscrypt_drop_inode(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
  /* fname.c */
 static inline int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir,
 					 const struct qstr *iname,
include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h +7 -0
index 7bed24632bda7..3302a407131e6 100644
@@ -65,10 +65,17 @@ struct fscrypt_add_key_arg {
 	__u8 raw[];
 };
 
+/* Struct passed to FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY */
+struct fscrypt_remove_key_arg {
+	struct fscrypt_key_specifier key_spec;
+	__u32 __reserved[6];
+};
+
 #define FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY	  _IOR('f', 19, struct fscrypt_policy)
 #define FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_PWSALT	  _IOW('f', 20, __u8[16])
 #define FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY	  _IOW('f', 21, struct fscrypt_policy)
 #define FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY	 _IOWR('f', 23, struct fscrypt_add_key_arg)
+#define FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY	  _IOW('f', 24, struct fscrypt_remove_key_arg)
 
 /**********************************************************************/
 
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH v6 8/16 fscrypt: add FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS ioctl

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS. Given a key specified by 'struct fscrypt_key_specifier' (the same way a key is specified for the other fscrypt key management ioctls), it returns status information in a 'struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg'.

The main motivation for this is that applications need to be able to check whether an encrypted directory is "unlocked" or not, so that they can add the key if it is not, and avoid adding the key (which may involve prompting the user for a passphrase) if it already is.

It's possible to use some workarounds such as checking whether opening a regular file fails with ENOKEY, or checking whether the filenames "look like gibberish" or not. However, no workaround is usable in all cases.

Like the other key management ioctls, the keyrings syscalls may seem at first to be a good fit for this. Unfortunately, they are not. Even if we exposed the keyring ID of the ->s_master_keys keyring and gave everyone Search permission on it (note: currently the keyrings permission system would also allow everyone to "invalidate" the keyring too), the fscrypt keys have an additional state that doesn't map cleanly to the keyrings API: the secret can be removed, but we can be still tracking the files that were using the key, and the removal can be re-attempted or the secret added again.

After later patches, some applications will also need a way to determine whether a key was added by the current user vs. by some other user. Reserved fields are included in fscrypt_get_key_status_arg for this and other future extensions.

---
 fs/crypto/keyring.c          | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/fscrypt.h      |  7 +++++
 include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h | 15 +++++++++
 3 files changed, 82 insertions(+)
fs/crypto/keyring.c +60 -0
index 701da63f01073..97e1360e4610c 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
  *
  * - FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY: add a key
  * - FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY: remove a key
+ * - FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS: get key status
  */
 
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
@@ -528,6 +529,65 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key);
 
+/*
+ * Retrieve the status of an fscrypt master encryption key.
+ *
+ * We set ->status to indicate whether the key is absent, present, or
+ * incompletely removed.  "Incompletely removed" means that the master key
+ * secret has been removed, but some files which had been unlocked with it are
+ * still in use.  This field allows applications to easily determine the state
+ * of an encrypted directory without using a hack such as trying to open a
+ * regular file in it (which can confuse the "incompletely removed" state with
+ * absent or present).
+ */
+int fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status(struct file *filp, void __user *uarg)
+{
+	struct super_block *sb = file_inode(filp)->i_sb;
+	struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg arg;
+	struct key *key;
+	struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
+	int err;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (!valid_key_spec(&arg.key_spec))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (memchr_inv(arg.__reserved, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memset(arg.__out_reserved, 0, sizeof(arg.__out_reserved));
+
+	key = fscrypt_find_master_key(sb, &arg.key_spec);
+	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+		if (key != ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY))
+			return PTR_ERR(key);
+		arg.status = FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_ABSENT;
+		err = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	mk = key->payload.data[0];
+	down_read(&key->sem);
+
+	if (!is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret)) {
+		arg.status = FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_INCOMPLETELY_REMOVED;
+		err = 0;
+		goto out_release_key;
+	}
+
+	arg.status = FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_PRESENT;
+	err = 0;
+out_release_key:
+	up_read(&key->sem);
+	key_put(key);
+out:
+	if (!err && copy_to_user(uarg, &arg, sizeof(arg)))
+		err = -EFAULT;
+	return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status);
+
 int __init fscrypt_init_keyring(void)
 {
 	return register_key_type(&key_type_fscrypt);
include/linux/fscrypt.h +7 -0
index dcbc9636cb8b1..4441a74b967b4 100644
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ extern int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *, struct inode *,
 extern void fscrypt_sb_free(struct super_block *sb);
 extern int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *arg);
 extern int fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg);
+extern int fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status(struct file *filp, void __user *arg);
 
 /* keysetup.c */
 extern int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *);
@@ -359,6 +360,12 @@ static inline int fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key(struct file *filp,
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
+static inline int fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status(struct file *filp,
+					       void __user *arg)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 /* keysetup.c */
 static inline int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
 {
include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h +15 -0
index 3302a407131e6..042e70a4ff7ee 100644
@@ -71,11 +71,26 @@ struct fscrypt_remove_key_arg {
 	__u32 __reserved[6];
 };
 
+/* Struct passed to FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS */
+struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg {
+	/* input */
+	struct fscrypt_key_specifier key_spec;
+	__u32 __reserved[6];
+
+	/* output */
+#define FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_ABSENT		1
+#define FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_PRESENT		2
+#define FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_INCOMPLETELY_REMOVED	3
+	__u32 status;
+	__u32 __out_reserved[15];
+};
+
 #define FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY	  _IOR('f', 19, struct fscrypt_policy)
 #define FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_PWSALT	  _IOW('f', 20, __u8[16])
 #define FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY	  _IOW('f', 21, struct fscrypt_policy)
 #define FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY	 _IOWR('f', 23, struct fscrypt_add_key_arg)
 #define FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY	  _IOW('f', 24, struct fscrypt_remove_key_arg)
+#define FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS _IOWR('f', 25, struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg)
 
 /**********************************************************************/
 
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH v6 9/16 fscrypt: add an HKDF-SHA512 implementation

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Add an implementation of HKDF (RFC 5869) to fscrypt, for the purpose of deriving additional key material from the fscrypt master keys for v2 encryption policies. HKDF is a key derivation function built on top of HMAC. We choose SHA-512 for the underlying unkeyed hash, and use an "hmac(sha512)" transform allocated from the crypto API.

We'll be using this to replace the AES-ECB based KDF currently used to derive the per-file encryption keys. While the AES-ECB based KDF is believed to meet the original security requirements, it is nonstandard and has problems that don't exist in modern KDFs such as HKDF:

1. It's reversible. Given a derived key and nonce, an attacker can easily compute the master key. This is okay if the master key and derived keys are equally hard to compromise, but now we'd like to be more robust against threats such as a derived key being compromised through a timing attack, or a derived key for an in-use file being compromised after the master key has already been removed.

2. It doesn't evenly distribute the entropy from the master key; each 16 input bytes only affects the corresponding 16 output bytes.

3. It isn't easily extensible to deriving other values or keys, such as a public hash for securely identifying the key, or per-mode keys. Per-mode keys will be immediately useful for Adiantum encryption, for which fscrypt currently uses the master key directly, introducing unnecessary usage constraints. Per-mode keys will also be useful for hardware inline encryption, which is currently being worked on.

HKDF solves all the above problems.

---
 fs/crypto/Kconfig           |   2 +
 fs/crypto/Makefile          |   1 +
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h |  15 +++
 fs/crypto/hkdf.c            | 178 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 196 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 fs/crypto/hkdf.c
fs/crypto/Kconfig +2 -0
index f0de238000c02..c160598a9fe2c 100644
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ config FS_ENCRYPTION
 	select CRYPTO_XTS
 	select CRYPTO_CTS
 	select CRYPTO_SHA256
+	select CRYPTO_SHA512
+	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select KEYS
 	help
 	  Enable encryption of files and directories.  This
fs/crypto/Makefile +1 -0
index accdd622c9083..4977b43479289 100644
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION)	+= fscrypto.o
 
 fscrypto-y := crypto.o \
 	      fname.o \
+	      hkdf.o \
 	      hooks.o \
 	      keyring.o \
 	      keysetup.o \
fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +15 -0
index cc1862c9baa1d..e2a65189eb578 100644
@@ -175,6 +175,21 @@ extern bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const struct inode *inode,
 					 u32 orig_len, u32 max_len,
 					 u32 *encrypted_len_ret);
 
+/* hkdf.c */
+
+struct fscrypt_hkdf {
+	struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
+};
+
+extern int fscrypt_init_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, const u8 *master_key,
+			     unsigned int master_key_size);
+
+extern int fscrypt_hkdf_expand(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, u8 context,
+			       const u8 *info, unsigned int infolen,
+			       u8 *okm, unsigned int okmlen);
+
+extern void fscrypt_destroy_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf);
+
 /* keyring.c */
 
 /*
fs/crypto/hkdf.c new file +178 -0

178 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH v6 10/16 fscrypt: v2 encryption policy support

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Add a new fscrypt policy version, "v2". It has the following changes from the original policy version, which we call "v1" (*):

- Master keys (the user-provided encryption keys) are only ever used as input to HKDF-SHA512. This is more flexible and less error-prone, and it avoids the quirks and limitations of the AES-128-ECB based KDF. Three classes of cryptographically isolated subkeys are defined:

- Per-file keys, like used in v1 policies except for the new KDF.

- Per-mode keys. These implement the semantics of the DIRECT_KEY flag, which for v1 policies made the master key be used directly. These are also planned to be used for inline encryption when support for it is added.

- Key identifiers (see below).

- Each master key is identified by a 16-byte master_key_identifier, which is derived from the key itself using HKDF-SHA512. This prevents users from associating the wrong key with an encrypted file or directory. This was easily possible with v1 policies, which identified the key by an arbitrary 8-byte master_key_descriptor.

- The key must be provided in the filesystem-level keyring, not in a process-subscribed keyring.

The following UAPI additions are made:

- The existing ioctl FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can now be passed a fscrypt_policy_v2 to set a v2 encryption policy. It's disambiguated from fscrypt_policy/fscrypt_policy_v1 by the version code prefix.

- A new ioctl FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX is added. It allows getting the v1 or v2 encryption policy of an encrypted file or directory. The existing FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl could not be used because it did not have a way for userspace to indicate which policy structure is expected. The new ioctl includes a size field, so it is extensible to future fscrypt policy versions.

- The ioctls FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS now support managing keys for v2 encryption policies. Such keys are kept logically separate from keys for v1 encryption policies, and are identified by 'identifier' rather than by 'descriptor'. The 'identifier' need not be provided when adding a key, since the kernel will calculate it anyway.

This patch temporarily keeps adding/removing v2 policy keys behind the same permission check done for adding/removing v1 policy keys:
capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, the next patch will carefully take advantage of the cryptographically secure master_key_identifier to allow non-root users to add/remove v2 policy keys, thus providing a full replacement for v1 policies.

(*) Actually, in the API fscrypt_policy::version is 0 while on-disk
fscrypt_context::format is 1. But I believe it makes the most sense to advance both to '2' to have them be in sync, and to consider the numbering to start at 1 except for the API quirk.

---
 fs/crypto/crypto.c           |   3 +-
 fs/crypto/fname.c            |   3 +-
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h  | 182 ++++++++++++++---
 fs/crypto/keyring.c          |  37 +++-
 fs/crypto/keysetup.c         | 174 ++++++++++++----
 fs/crypto/keysetup_legacy.c  |  18 +-
 fs/crypto/policy.c           | 386 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 include/linux/fscrypt.h      |   9 +-
 include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h |  42 +++-
 9 files changed, 671 insertions(+), 183 deletions(-)
fs/crypto/crypto.c +1 -2
index 3fe287952ac95..45da5b46c1f88 100644
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
 #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/dcache.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
-#include <crypto/aes.h>
 #include <crypto/skcipher.h>
 #include "fscrypt_private.h"
 
@@ -133,7 +132,7 @@ void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num,
 	memset(iv, 0, ci->ci_mode->ivsize);
 	iv->lblk_num = cpu_to_le64(lblk_num);
 
-	if (ci->ci_flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)
+	if (fscrypt_is_direct_key_policy(&ci->ci_policy))
 		memcpy(iv->nonce, ci->ci_nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
 
 	if (ci->ci_essiv_tfm != NULL)
fs/crypto/fname.c +2 -1
index 65f1bda87c3c9..e024d459c9bc5 100644
@@ -186,7 +186,8 @@ static int digest_decode(const char *src, int len, char *dst)
 bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const struct inode *inode, u32 orig_len,
 				  u32 max_len, u32 *encrypted_len_ret)
 {
-	int padding = 4 << (inode->i_crypt_info->ci_flags &
+	const struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
+	int padding = 4 << (fscrypt_policy_flags(&ci->ci_policy) &
 			    FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_MASK);
 	u32 encrypted_len;
 
fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +157 -25

237 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/crypto/keyring.c +36 -1
index 97e1360e4610c..fb1d247898f93 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
  * - FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS: get key status
  */
 
+#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@
 
 static void wipe_master_key_secret(struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret)
 {
+	fscrypt_destroy_hkdf(&secret->hkdf);
 	memzero_explicit(secret, sizeof(*secret));
 }
 
@@ -33,7 +35,13 @@ static void move_master_key_secret(struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *dst,
 
 static void free_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
 {
+	size_t i;
+
 	wipe_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mk->mk_mode_keys); i++)
+		crypto_free_skcipher(mk->mk_mode_keys[i]);
+
 	kzfree(mk);
 }
 
@@ -42,6 +50,8 @@ static inline int master_key_spec_len(const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *spec)
 	switch (spec->type) {
 	case FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR:
 		return FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE;
+	case FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER:
+		return FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -115,7 +125,7 @@ static struct key *search_fscrypt_keyring(struct key *keyring,
 #define FSCRYPT_FS_KEYRING_DESCRIPTION_SIZE	\
 	(CONST_STRLEN("fscrypt-") + FIELD_SIZEOF(struct super_block, s_id))
 
-#define FSCRYPT_MK_DESCRIPTION_SIZE	(2 * FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE + 1)
+#define FSCRYPT_MK_DESCRIPTION_SIZE	(2 * FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE + 1)
 
 static void format_fs_keyring_description(
 			char description[FSCRYPT_FS_KEYRING_DESCRIPTION_SIZE],
@@ -319,6 +329,31 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg)
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		goto out_wipe_secret;
 
+	if (arg.key_spec.type != FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR) {
+		err = fscrypt_init_hkdf(&secret.hkdf, secret.raw, secret.size);
+		if (err)
+			goto out_wipe_secret;
+
+		/*
+		 * Now that the HKDF context is initialized, the raw key is no
+		 * longer needed.
+		 */
+		memzero_explicit(secret.raw, secret.size);
+
+		/* Calculate the key identifier and return it to userspace. */
+		err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&secret.hkdf,
+					  HKDF_CONTEXT_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
+					  NULL, 0, arg.key_spec.u.identifier,
+					  FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE);
+		if (err)
+			goto out_wipe_secret;
+		err = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(uarg->key_spec.u.identifier,
+				 arg.key_spec.u.identifier,
+				 FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE))
+			goto out_wipe_secret;
+	}
+
 	err = add_master_key(sb, &secret, &arg.key_spec);
 out_wipe_secret:
 	wipe_master_key_secret(&secret);
fs/crypto/keysetup.c +137 -37

241 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/crypto/keysetup_legacy.c +9 -8
index 407daa0b64d82..1ec420b189f0f 100644
@@ -189,12 +189,13 @@ find_or_insert_direct_key(struct fscrypt_direct_key *to_insert,
 	 */
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(hash_key) > FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
-	memcpy(&hash_key, ci->ci_master_key_descriptor, sizeof(hash_key));
+	memcpy(&hash_key, ci->ci_policy.v1.master_key_descriptor,
+	       sizeof(hash_key));
 
 	spin_lock(&fscrypt_direct_keys_lock);
 	hash_for_each_possible(fscrypt_direct_keys, dk, dk_node, hash_key) {
-		if (memcmp(ci->ci_master_key_descriptor, dk->dk_descriptor,
-			   FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) != 0)
+		if (memcmp(ci->ci_policy.v1.master_key_descriptor,
+			   dk->dk_descriptor, FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) != 0)
 			continue;
 		if (ci->ci_mode != dk->dk_mode)
 			continue;
@@ -237,7 +238,7 @@ fscrypt_get_direct_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key)
 		dk->dk_ctfm = NULL;
 		goto err_free_dk;
 	}
-	memcpy(dk->dk_descriptor, ci->ci_master_key_descriptor,
+	memcpy(dk->dk_descriptor, ci->ci_policy.v1.master_key_descriptor,
 	       FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
 	memcpy(dk->dk_raw, raw_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize);
 
@@ -262,7 +263,8 @@ static int setup_v1_file_key_direct(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (ci->ci_data_mode != ci->ci_filename_mode) {
+	if (ci->ci_policy.v1.contents_encryption_mode !+	    ci->ci_policy.v1.filenames_encryption_mode) {
 		fscrypt_warn(ci->ci_inode->i_sb,
 			     "direct key flag not allowed with different contents and filenames modes");
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -308,7 +310,7 @@ static int setup_v1_file_key_derived(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 
 int fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_master_key)
 {
-	if (ci->ci_flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)
+	if (ci->ci_policy.v1.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)
 		return setup_v1_file_key_direct(ci, raw_master_key);
 	else
 		return setup_v1_file_key_derived(ci, raw_master_key);
@@ -321,11 +323,11 @@ int fscrypt_setup_v1_file_key_via_subscribed_keyrings(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
 	int err;
 
 	key = find_and_lock_process_key(FSCRYPT_KEY_DESC_PREFIX,
-					ci->ci_master_key_descriptor,
+					ci->ci_policy.v1.master_key_descriptor,
 					ci->ci_mode->keysize, &payload);
 	if (key = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) && ci->ci_inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix) {
 		key = find_and_lock_process_key(ci->ci_inode->i_sb->s_cop->key_prefix,
-						ci->ci_master_key_descriptor,
+						ci->ci_policy.v1.master_key_descriptor,
 						ci->ci_mode->keysize, &payload);
 	}
 	if (IS_ERR(key))
fs/crypto/policy.c +272 -105

475 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/fscrypt.h +8 -1
index 4441a74b967b4..1ee0945614d80 100644
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ struct fscrypt_name {
 #define fname_len(p)		((p)->disk_name.len)
 
 /* Maximum value for the third parameter of fscrypt_operations.set_context(). */
-#define FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE	28
+#define FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE	40
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION
 /*
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ extern void fscrypt_restore_control_page(struct page *);
 /* policy.c */
 extern int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *, const void __user *);
 extern int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(struct file *, void __user *);
+extern int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy_ex(struct file *, void __user *);
 extern int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *, struct inode *);
 extern int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *, struct inode *,
 					void *, bool);
@@ -331,6 +332,12 @@ static inline int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(struct file *filp, void __user *arg)
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
+static inline int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy_ex(struct file *filp,
+					      void __user *arg)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static inline int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent,
 						struct inode *child)
 {
include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h +39 -3

86 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH v6 11/16 fscrypt: allow unprivileged users to add/remove keys for v2 policies

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Allow the FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY and FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctls to be used by non-root users to add and remove encryption keys from the filesystem-level crypto keyrings, subject to limitations.

Motivation: while privileged fscrypt key management is sufficient for some users (e.g. Android and Chromium OS, where a privileged process manages all keys), the old API by design also allows non-root users to set up and use encrypted directories, and we don't want to regress on that. Especially, we don't want to force users to continue using the old API, running into the visibility mismatch between files and keyrings and being unable to "lock" encrypted directories.

Intuitively, the ioctls have to be privileged since they manipulate filesystem-level state. However, it's actually safe to make them unprivileged if we very carefully enforce some specific limitations.

First, each key must be identified by a cryptographic hash so that a user can't add the wrong key for another user's files. For v2 encryption policies, we use the key_identifier for this. v1 policies don't have this, so managing keys for them remains privileged.

Second, each key a user adds is charged to their quota for the keyrings service. Thus, a user can't exhaust memory by adding a huge number of keys. By default each non-root user is allowed up to 200 keys; this can be changed using the existing sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys'.

Third, if multiple users add the same key, we keep track of those users of the key (of which there remains a single copy), and won't really remove the key, i.e. "lock" the encrypted files, until all those users have removed it. This prevents denial of service attacks that would be possible under simpler schemes, such allowing the first user who added a key to remove it -- since that could be a malicious user who has compromised the key. Of course, encryption keys should be kept secret, but the idea is that using encryption should never be *less* secure than not using encryption, even if your key was compromised.

We tolerate that a user will be unable to really remove a key, i.e. unable to "lock" their encrypted files, if another user has added the same key. But in a sense, this is actually a good thing because it will avoid providing a false notion of security where a key appears to have been removed when actually it's still in memory, available to any attacker who compromises the operating system kernel.

---
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h  |  31 +++-
 fs/crypto/keyring.c          | 310 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 fs/crypto/keysetup.c         |  18 +-
 include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h |   9 +-
 4 files changed, 340 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +27 -4
index 9591f5fd72b33..5f679ba32cece 100644
@@ -338,9 +338,16 @@ struct fscrypt_master_key {
 	 * FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY can be retried, or
 	 * FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY can add the secret again.
 	 *
-	 * Locking: protected by key->sem.
+	 * Locking: protected by key->sem (outer) and mk_secret_sem (inner).
+	 * The reason for two locks is that key->sem also protects modifying
+	 * mk_users, which ranks it above the semaphore for the keyring key
+	 * type, which is in turn above page faults (via keyring_read).  But
+	 * sometimes filesystems call fscrypt_get_encryption_info() from within
+	 * a transaction, which ranks it below page faults.  So we need a
+	 * separate lock which protects mk_secret but not also mk_users.
 	 */
 	struct fscrypt_master_key_secret	mk_secret;
+	struct rw_semaphore			mk_secret_sem;
 
 	/*
 	 * For v1 policy keys: an arbitrary key descriptor which was assigned by
@@ -350,6 +357,22 @@ struct fscrypt_master_key {
 	 */
 	struct fscrypt_key_specifier		mk_spec;
 
+	/*
+	 * Keyring which contains a key of type 'key_type_fscrypt_user' for each
+	 * user who has added this key.  Normally each key will be added by just
+	 * one user, but it's possible that multiple users share a key, and in
+	 * that case we need to keep track of those users so that one user can't
+	 * remove the key before the others want it removed too.
+	 *
+	 * This is NULL for v1 policy keys; those can only be added by root.
+	 *
+	 * Locking: in addition to this keyrings own semaphore, this is
+	 * protected by the master key's key->sem, so we can do atomic
+	 * search+insert.  It can also be searched without taking any locks, but
+	 * in that case the returned key may have already been removed.
+	 */
+	struct key		*mk_users;
+
 	/*
 	 * Length of ->mk_decrypted_inodes, plus one if mk_secret is present.
 	 * Once this goes to 0, the master key is removed from ->s_master_keys.
@@ -377,9 +400,9 @@ is_master_key_secret_present(const struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret)
 	/*
 	 * The READ_ONCE() is only necessary for fscrypt_drop_inode() and
 	 * fscrypt_key_describe().  These run in atomic context, so they can't
-	 * take key->sem and thus 'secret' can change concurrently which would
-	 * be a data race.  But they only need to know whether the secret *was*
-	 * present at the time of check, so READ_ONCE() suffices.
+	 * take ->mk_secret_sem and thus 'secret' can change concurrently which
+	 * would be a data race.  But they only need to know whether the secret
+	 * *was* present at the time of check, so READ_ONCE() suffices.
 	 */
 	return READ_ONCE(secret->size) != 0;
 }
fs/crypto/keyring.c +295 -14

429 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/crypto/keysetup.c +10 -8
index e88524b730ac0..29ad2416955ee 100644
@@ -282,10 +282,10 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
  *
  * If the master key is found in the filesystem-level keyring, then the
  * corresponding 'struct key' is returned in *master_key_ret with
- * ->sem read-locked.  This is needed to ensure that only one task links the
- * fscrypt_info into ->mk_decrypted_inodes (as multiple tasks may race to create
- * an fscrypt_info for the same inode), and to synchronize the master key being
- * removed with a new inode starting to use it.
+ * ->mk_secret_sem read-locked.  This is needed to ensure that only one task
+ * links the fscrypt_info into ->mk_decrypted_inodes (as multiple tasks may race
+ * to create an fscrypt_info for the same inode), and to synchronize the master
+ * key being removed with a new inode starting to use it.
  */
 static int setup_file_encryption_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 				     struct key **master_key_ret)
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static int setup_file_encryption_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 	}
 
 	mk = key->payload.data[0];
-	down_read(&key->sem);
+	down_read(&mk->mk_secret_sem);
 
 	/* Has the secret been removed (via FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY)? */
 	if (!is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret)) {
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ static int setup_file_encryption_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 	return 0;
 
 out_release_key:
-	up_read(&key->sem);
+	up_read(&mk->mk_secret_sem);
 	key_put(key);
 	return err;
 }
@@ -483,7 +483,9 @@ int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
 	res = 0;
 out:
 	if (master_key) {
-		up_read(&master_key->sem);
+		struct fscrypt_master_key *mk = master_key->payload.data[0];
+
+		up_read(&mk->mk_secret_sem);
 		key_put(master_key);
 	}
 	if (res = -ENOKEY)
@@ -546,7 +548,7 @@ int fscrypt_drop_inode(struct inode *inode)
 	mk = ci->ci_master_key->payload.data[0];
 
 	/*
-	 * Note: since we aren't holding key->sem, the result here can
+	 * Note: since we aren't holding ->mk_secret_sem, the result here can
 	 * immediately become outdated.  But there's no correctness problem with
 	 * unnecessarily evicting.  Nor is there a correctness problem with not
 	 * evicting while iput() is racing with the key being removed, since
include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h +7 -2
index 26879e669dfa0..fd1c3e2b0b7c1 100644
@@ -103,7 +103,9 @@ struct fscrypt_add_key_arg {
 /* Struct passed to FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY */
 struct fscrypt_remove_key_arg {
 	struct fscrypt_key_specifier key_spec;
-	__u32 __reserved[6];
+#define FSCRYPT_REMOVE_KEY_FLAG_ALL_USERS	0x00000001
+	__u32 flags;
+	__u32 __reserved[5];
 };
 
 /* Struct passed to FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS */
@@ -117,7 +119,10 @@ struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg {
 #define FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_PRESENT		2
 #define FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_INCOMPLETELY_REMOVED	3
 	__u32 status;
-	__u32 __out_reserved[15];
+#define FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_FLAG_ADDED_BY_SELF   0x00000001
+	__u32 status_flags;
+	__u32 user_count;
+	__u32 __out_reserved[13];
 };
 
 #define FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY	  _IOR('f', 19, struct fscrypt_policy)
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH v6 12/16 fscrypt: require that key be added when setting a v2 encryption policy

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

By looking up the master keys in a filesystem-level keyring rather than in the calling processes' key hierarchy, it becomes possible for a user to set an encryption policy which refers to some key they don't actually know, then encrypt their files using that key. Cryptographically this isn't much of a problem, but the semantics of this would be a bit weird. Thus, enforce that a v2 encryption policy can only be set if the user has previously added the key, or has capable(CAP_FOWNER).

We tolerate that this problem will continue to exist for v1 encryption policies, however; there is no way around that.

---
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h |  3 +++
 fs/crypto/keyring.c         | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/crypto/policy.c          |  6 +++++
 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+)
fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +3 -0
index 5f679ba32cece..a398383ae9e34 100644
@@ -411,6 +411,9 @@ extern struct key *
 fscrypt_find_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
 			const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec);
 
+extern int fscrypt_verify_key_added(struct super_block *sb,
+				    const u8 identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE]);
+
 extern int __init fscrypt_init_keyring(void);
 extern void fscrypt_exit_keyring(void);
 
fs/crypto/keyring.c +47 -0

53 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/crypto/policy.c +6 -0
index 3643156a511a7..8fb9f5ac5f8c0 100644
@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ static int set_encryption_policy(struct inode *inode,
 {
 	union fscrypt_context ctx;
 	int ctxsize;
+	int err;
 
 	if (!fscrypt_supported_policy(policy))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -229,6 +230,11 @@ static int set_encryption_policy(struct inode *inode,
 		 */
 		pr_warn_once("%s (pid %d) is setting deprecated v1 encryption policy; recommend upgrading to v2.\n",
 			     current->comm, current->pid);
+	} else {
+		err = fscrypt_verify_key_added(inode->i_sb,
+					       policy->v2.master_key_identifier);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 	}
 
 	ctxsize = fscrypt_new_context_from_policy(&ctx, policy);
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH v6 13/16 ext4: wire up new fscrypt ioctls

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Wire up the new ioctls for adding and removing fscrypt keys to/from the filesystem, and the new ioctl for retrieving v2 encryption policies.

FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY also required making ext4_drop_inode() call fscrypt_drop_inode().

For more details see Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst and the fscrypt patches that added the implementation of these ioctls.

---
 fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/ext4/super.c |  3 +++
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/ioctl.c +24 -0
index e486e49b31ed7..b51b6384045b8 100644
@@ -1092,6 +1092,26 @@ long ext4_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	case EXT4_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY:
 		return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(filp, (void __user *)arg);
 
+	case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX:
+		if (!ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb))
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy_ex(filp, (void __user *)arg);
+
+	case FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
+		if (!ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb))
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		return fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(filp, (void __user *)arg);
+
+	case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
+		if (!ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb))
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		return fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key(filp, (const void __user *)arg);
+
+	case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS:
+		if (!ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb))
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		return fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status(filp, (void __user *)arg);
+
 	case EXT4_IOC_FSGETXATTR:
 	{
 		struct fsxattr fa;
@@ -1210,6 +1230,10 @@ long ext4_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	case EXT4_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY:
 	case EXT4_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_PWSALT:
 	case EXT4_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY:
+	case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX:
+	case FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
+	case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
+	case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS:
 	case EXT4_IOC_SHUTDOWN:
 	case FS_IOC_GETFSMAP:
 		break;
fs/ext4/super.c +3 -0
index 4079605d437ae..757819139b8f7 100644
@@ -1107,6 +1107,9 @@ static int ext4_drop_inode(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	int drop = generic_drop_inode(inode);
 
+	if (!drop)
+		drop = fscrypt_drop_inode(inode);
+
 	trace_ext4_drop_inode(inode, drop);
 	return drop;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH v6 14/16 f2fs: wire up new fscrypt ioctls

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Wire up the new ioctls for adding and removing fscrypt keys to/from the filesystem, and the new ioctl for retrieving v2 encryption policies.

FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY also required making f2fs_drop_inode() call fscrypt_drop_inode().

For more details see Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst and the fscrypt patches that added the implementation of these ioctls.

---
 fs/f2fs/file.c  | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/f2fs/super.c |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+)
fs/f2fs/file.c +46 -0
index 45b45f37d347e..d88b77a41117c 100644
@@ -2107,6 +2107,40 @@ static int f2fs_ioc_get_encryption_pwsalt(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)
 	return err;
 }
 
+static int f2fs_ioc_get_encryption_policy_ex(struct file *filp,
+					     unsigned long arg)
+{
+	if (!f2fs_sb_has_encrypt(F2FS_I_SB(file_inode(filp))))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy_ex(filp, (void __user *)arg);
+}
+
+static int f2fs_ioc_add_encryption_key(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)
+{
+	if (!f2fs_sb_has_encrypt(F2FS_I_SB(file_inode(filp))))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	return fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(filp, (void __user *)arg);
+}
+
+static int f2fs_ioc_remove_encryption_key(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)
+{
+	if (!f2fs_sb_has_encrypt(F2FS_I_SB(file_inode(filp))))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	return fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key(filp, (const void __user *)arg);
+}
+
+static int f2fs_ioc_get_encryption_key_status(struct file *filp,
+					      unsigned long arg)
+{
+	if (!f2fs_sb_has_encrypt(F2FS_I_SB(file_inode(filp))))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	return fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status(filp, (void __user *)arg);
+}
+
 static int f2fs_ioc_gc(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
@@ -3012,6 +3046,14 @@ long f2fs_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 		return f2fs_ioc_get_encryption_policy(filp, arg);
 	case F2FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_PWSALT:
 		return f2fs_ioc_get_encryption_pwsalt(filp, arg);
+	case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX:
+		return f2fs_ioc_get_encryption_policy_ex(filp, arg);
+	case FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
+		return f2fs_ioc_add_encryption_key(filp, arg);
+	case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
+		return f2fs_ioc_remove_encryption_key(filp, arg);
+	case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS:
+		return f2fs_ioc_get_encryption_key_status(filp, arg);
 	case F2FS_IOC_GARBAGE_COLLECT:
 		return f2fs_ioc_gc(filp, arg);
 	case F2FS_IOC_GARBAGE_COLLECT_RANGE:
@@ -3137,6 +3179,10 @@ long f2fs_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	case F2FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY:
 	case F2FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_PWSALT:
 	case F2FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY:
+	case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX:
+	case FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
+	case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
+	case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS:
 	case F2FS_IOC_GARBAGE_COLLECT:
 	case F2FS_IOC_GARBAGE_COLLECT_RANGE:
 	case F2FS_IOC_WRITE_CHECKPOINT:
fs/f2fs/super.c +2 -0
index 6b959bbb336a3..e3bf604e0d58f 100644
@@ -934,6 +934,8 @@ static int f2fs_drop_inode(struct inode *inode)
 		return 0;
 	}
 	ret = generic_drop_inode(inode);
+	if (!ret)
+		ret = fscrypt_drop_inode(inode);
 	trace_f2fs_drop_inode(inode, ret);
 	return ret;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH v6 15/16 ubifs: wire up new fscrypt ioctls

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Wire up the new ioctls for adding and removing fscrypt keys to/from the filesystem, and the new ioctl for retrieving v2 encryption policies.

FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY also required making UBIFS use fscrypt_drop_inode().

For more details see Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst and the fscrypt patches that added the implementation of these ioctls.

---
 fs/ubifs/ioctl.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 fs/ubifs/super.c | 11 +++++++++++
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
fs/ubifs/ioctl.c +16 -0
index 6b05b3ec500e1..b2a67618bef91 100644
@@ -204,6 +204,18 @@ long ubifs_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY:
 		return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(file, (void __user *)arg);
 
+	case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX:
+		return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy_ex(file, (void __user *)arg);
+
+	case FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
+		return fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(file, (void __user *)arg);
+
+	case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
+		return fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key(file, (const void __user *)arg);
+
+	case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS:
+		return fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status(file, (void __user *)arg);
+
 	default:
 		return -ENOTTY;
 	}
@@ -221,6 +233,10 @@ long ubifs_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 		break;
 	case FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY:
 	case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY:
+	case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX:
+	case FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
+	case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
+	case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS:
 		break;
 	default:
 		return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
fs/ubifs/super.c +11 -0
index 04b8ecfd34701..ae026a7bb1a62 100644
@@ -330,6 +330,16 @@ static int ubifs_write_inode(struct inode *inode, struct writeback_control *wbc)
 	return err;
 }
 
+static int ubifs_drop_inode(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	int drop = generic_drop_inode(inode);
+
+	if (!drop)
+		drop = fscrypt_drop_inode(inode);
+
+	return drop;
+}
+
 static void ubifs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	int err;
@@ -1980,6 +1990,7 @@ const struct super_operations ubifs_super_operations = {
 	.free_inode    = ubifs_free_inode,
 	.put_super     = ubifs_put_super,
 	.write_inode   = ubifs_write_inode,
+	.drop_inode    = ubifs_drop_inode,
 	.evict_inode   = ubifs_evict_inode,
 	.statfs        = ubifs_statfs,
 	.dirty_inode   = ubifs_dirty_inode,
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH v6 16/16 fscrypt: document the new ioctls and policy version

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Update the fscrypt documentation file to catch up to all the latest changes, including the new ioctls to manage master encryption keys in the filesystem-level keyring and the support for v2 encryption policies.

---
 Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst | 648 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 532 insertions(+), 116 deletions(-)
Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst +81 -23
index 4f9df6ba669e5..d72591e3a911b 100644
@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ Online attacks
 fscrypt (and storage encryption in general) can only provide limited
 protection, if any at all, against online attacks.  In detail:
 
+Side-channel attacks
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
 fscrypt is only resistant to side-channel attacks, such as timing or
 electromagnetic attacks, to the extent that the underlying Linux
 Cryptographic API algorithms are.  If a vulnerable algorithm is used,
@@ -80,29 +83,84 @@ attacker to mount a side channel attack against the online system.
 Side channel attacks may also be mounted against applications
 consuming decrypted data.
 
-After an encryption key has been provided, fscrypt is not designed to
-hide the plaintext file contents or filenames from other users on the
-same system, regardless of the visibility of the keyring key.
-Instead, existing access control mechanisms such as file mode bits,
-POSIX ACLs, LSMs, or mount namespaces should be used for this purpose.
-Also note that as long as the encryption keys are *anywhere* in
-memory, an online attacker can necessarily compromise them by mounting
-a physical attack or by exploiting any kernel security vulnerability
-which provides an arbitrary memory read primitive.
-
-While it is ostensibly possible to "evict" keys from the system,
-recently accessed encrypted files will remain accessible at least
-until the filesystem is unmounted or the VFS caches are dropped, e.g.
-using ``echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches``.  Even after that, if the
-RAM is compromised before being powered off, it will likely still be
-possible to recover portions of the plaintext file contents, if not
-some of the encryption keys as well.  (Since Linux v4.12, all
-in-kernel keys related to fscrypt are sanitized before being freed.
-However, userspace would need to do its part as well.)
-
-Currently, fscrypt does not prevent a user from maliciously providing
-an incorrect key for another user's existing encrypted files.  A
-protection against this is planned.
+Unauthorized file access
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+After an encryption key has been added, fscrypt does not hide the
+plaintext file contents or filenames from other users on the same
+system.  Instead, existing access control mechanisms such as file mode
+bits, POSIX ACLs, LSMs, or namespaces should be used for this purpose.
+
+(For the reasoning behind this, understand that while the key is
+added, the confidentiality of the data, from the perspective of the
+system itself, is *not* protected by the mathematical properties of
+encryption but rather only by the correctness of the kernel.
+Therefore, any encryption-specific access control checks would merely
+be enforced by kernel *code* and therefore would be largely redundant
+with the wide variety of access control mechanisms already available.)
+
+Kernel memory compromise
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+An attacker who compromises the system enough to read from arbitrary
+memory, e.g. by mounting a physical attack or by exploiting a kernel
+security vulnerability, can compromise all encryption keys that are
+currently in use.
+
+However, fscrypt allows encryption keys to be removed from the kernel,
+which may protect them from later compromise.
+
+In more detail, the FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl will wipe a
+master encryption key from kernel memory.  Moreover, it will try to
+evict all cached inodes which had been "unlocked" using the key,
+thereby wiping their per-file keys and making them once again appear
+"locked", i.e. in ciphertext or encrypted form.
+
+However, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY has some limitations:
+
+- Per-file keys for in-use files will *not* be removed or wiped.
+  Therefore, for maximum effect, userspace should close the relevant
+  encrypted files and directories before removing a master key, as
+  well as kill any processes whose working directory is in an affected
+  encrypted directory.
+
+- The kernel cannot magically wipe copies of the master key(s) that
+  userspace might have as well.  Therefore, userspace must wipe all
+  copies of the master key(s) it makes as well.  Naturally, the same
+  also applies to all higher levels in the key hierarchy.  Userspace
+  should also follow other security precautions such as mlock()ing
+  memory containing keys to prevent it from being swapped out.
+
+- In general, decrypted contents and filenames in the kernel VFS
+  caches are freed but not wiped.  Therefore, portions thereof may be
+  recoverable from freed memory, even after the corresponding key(s)
+  were wiped.  To partially solve this, you can set
+  CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y in your kernel config and add page_poison=1
+  to your kernel command line.  However, this has a performance cost.
+
+- Secret keys might still exist in CPU registers, in crypto
+  accelerator hardware (if used by the crypto API to implement any of
+  the algorithms), or in other places not explicitly considered here.
+
+Limitations of v1 policies
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+v1 encryption policies have some weaknesses with respect to online
+attacks:
+
+- There is no verification that the provided master key is correct.
+  Consequently, malicious users can associate the wrong key with
+  encrypted files, even files to which they have only read-only
+  access.
+
+- A compromise of a per-file key also compromises the master key from
+  which it was derived.
+
+- Non-root users cannot securely remove encryption keys.
+
+All the above problems are fixed with v2 encryption policies.  For
+this reason among others, it is recommended to use v2 encryption
+policies on all new encrypted directories.
 
 Key hierarchy
 ======@@ -123,11 +181,46 @@ appropriate master key.  There can be any number of master keys, each

of which protects any number of directory trees on any number of filesystems.

-Userspace should generate master keys either using a cryptographically -secure random number generator, or by using a KDF (Key Derivation -Function). Note that whenever a KDF is used to "stretch" a -lower-entropy secret such as a passphrase, it is critical that a KDF -designed for this purpose be used, such as scrypt, PBKDF2, or Argon2. +Master keys should be pseudorandom, i.e. indistinguishable from random +bytestrings of the same length. This implies that users **must not** +directly use a password as a master key, zero-pad a shorter key, or +repeat a shorter key. Instead, users should generate master keys +either using a cryptographically secure random number generator, or by +using a KDF (Key Derivation Function). Note that whenever a KDF is +used to "stretch" a lower-entropy secret such as a passphrase, it is +critical that a KDF designed for this purpose be used, such as scrypt, +PBKDF2, or Argon2.
+
+Key derivation function
+-----------------------
+
+With one exception, fscrypt never uses the master key(s) for +encryption directly. Instead, they are only used as input to a KDF +(Key Derivation Function) to derive the actual keys.
+
+The KDF used for a particular master key differs depending on whether +the key is used for v1 encryption policies or for v2 encryption +policies. Users **must not** use the same key for both v1 and v2 +encryption policies.
+
+For v1 encryption policies, the KDF only supports deriving per-file +encryption keys. It works by encrypting the master key with +AES-128-ECB, using the file's 16-byte nonce as the AES key. The +resulting ciphertext is used as the derived key. If the ciphertext is +longer than needed, then it is truncated to the needed length. +
+For v2 encryption policies, the KDF is HKDF-SHA512. The master key is +passed as the "input keying material", no salt is used, and a distinct +"application-specific information string" is used for each distinct +key to be derived. For example, when a per-file encryption key is +derived, the application-specific information string is the file's +nonce prefixed with "fscrypt\0" and a context byte. Different context +bytes are used for other types of derived keys.
+
+HKDF-SHA512 is preferred to the original AES-128-ECB based KDF because +HKDF is more flexible, is nonreversible, and evenly distributes +entropy from the master key. HKDF is also standardized and widely +used by other software, whereas the AES-128-ECB based KDF is ad-hoc.

Per-file keys
-------------
@@ -138,29 +231,9 @@ files doesn't map to the same ciphertext, or vice versa. In most
cases, fscrypt does this by deriving per-file keys. When a new encrypted inode (regular file, directory, or symlink) is created, fscrypt randomly generates a 16-byte nonce and stores it in the
-inode's encryption xattr. Then, it uses a KDF (Key Derivation -Function) to derive the file's key from the master key and nonce.
-
-The Adiantum encryption mode (see Encryption modes and usage_) is -special, since it accepts longer IVs and is suitable for both contents -and filenames encryption. For it, a "direct key" option is offered -where the file's nonce is included in the IVs and the master key is -used for encryption directly. This improves performance; however, -users must not use the same master key for any other encryption mode.
-
-Below, the KDF and design considerations are described in more detail. -
-The current KDF works by encrypting the master key with AES-128-ECB, -using the file's nonce as the AES key. The output is used as the -derived key. If the output is longer than needed, then it is -truncated to the needed length.
-
-Note: this KDF meets the primary security requirement, which is to -produce unique derived keys that preserve the entropy of the master -key, assuming that the master key is already a good pseudorandom key. -However, it is nonstandard and has some problems such as being -reversible, so it is generally considered to be a mistake! It may be -replaced with HKDF or another more standard KDF in the future.
+inode's encryption xattr. Then, it uses a KDF (as described in Key +derivation function_) to derive the file's key from the master key +and nonce.

Key derivation was chosen over key wrapping because wrapped keys would require larger xattrs which would be less likely to fit in-line in the
@@ -176,6 +249,37 @@ rejected as it would have prevented ext4 filesystems from being
resized, and by itself still wouldn't have been sufficient to prevent the same key from being directly reused for both XTS and CTS-CBC.

+DIRECT_KEY and per-mode keys
+----------------------------
+
+The Adiantum encryption mode (see Encryption modes and usage_) is +suitable for both contents and filenames encryption, and it accepts +long IVs --- long enough to hold both an 8-byte logical block number +and a 16-byte per-file nonce. Also, the overhead of each Adiantum key +is greater than that of an AES-256-XTS key.
+
+Therefore, to improve performance and save memory, for Adiantum a +"direct key" configuration is supported. When the user has enabled +this by setting FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY in the fscrypt policy, +per-file keys are not used. Instead, whenever any data (contents or +filenames) is encrypted, the file's 16-byte nonce is included in the +IV. Moreover:
+

+- For v1 encryption policies, the encryption is done directly with the
+  master key.  Because of this, users **must not** use the same master
+  key for any other purpose, even for other v1 policies.
+
+- For v2 encryption policies, the encryption is done with a per-mode
+  key derived using the KDF.  Users may use the same master key for
+  other v2 encryption policies.

+
+Key identifiers
+---------------
+
+For master keys used for v2 encryption policies, a unique 16-byte "key +identifier" is also derived using the KDF. This value is stored in +the clear, since it is needed to reliably identify the key itself. +
Encryption modes and usage
=============

@@ -271,21 +375,38 @@ Setting an encryption policy
The FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl sets an encryption policy on an empty directory or verifies that a directory or regular file already has the specified encryption policy. It takes in a pointer to a
-:c:type:struct fscrypt_policy, defined as follows::
+:c:type:struct fscrypt_policy_v1 or a :c:type:struct +fscrypt_policy_v2, defined as follows::

- #define FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE 8
-

-    struct fscrypt_policy {
+    #define FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1               0
+    #define FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE     8
+    struct fscrypt_policy_v1 {
             __u8 version;
             __u8 contents_encryption_mode;
             __u8 filenames_encryption_mode;
             __u8 flags;
             __u8 master_key_descriptor[FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
     };
+    #define fscrypt_policy  fscrypt_policy_v1
+
+    #define FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2               2
+    #define FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE     16
+    struct fscrypt_policy_v2 {
+            __u8 version;
+            __u8 contents_encryption_mode;
+            __u8 filenames_encryption_mode;
+            __u8 flags;
+            __u8 __reserved[4];
+            __u8 master_key_identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE];

+ };

This structure must be initialized as follows:

-- ``version`` must be 0.

+- ``version`` must be FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1 (0) if the struct is
+  :c:type:`fscrypt_policy_v1` or FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2 (2) if the struct
+  is :c:type:`fscrypt_policy_v2`.  (Note: we refer to the original
+  policy version as "v1", though its version code is really 0.)  For
+  new encrypted directories, use v2 policies.

- ``contents_encryption_mode`` and ``filenames_encryption_mode`` must be set to constants from ``<linux/fs.h>`` which identify the
@@ -295,21 +416,30 @@ This structure must be initialized as follows:

- ``flags`` must contain a value from ``<linux/fs.h>`` which identifies the amount of NUL-padding to use when encrypting

-  filenames.  If unsure, use FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32 (0x3).  In
-  addition, if the chosen encryption modes are both
+  filenames.  If unsure, use FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32 (0x3).
+  Additionally, if the encryption modes are both
   FSCRYPT_MODE_ADIANTUM, this can contain
-  FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY to specify that the master key should
-  be used directly, without key derivation.
+  FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY; see `DIRECT_KEY and per-mode keys`_.

-- ``master_key_descriptor`` specifies how to find the master key in

-  the keyring; see `Adding keys`_.  It is up to userspace to choose a
-  unique ``master_key_descriptor`` for each master key.  The e4crypt
-  and fscrypt tools use the first 8 bytes of
+- For v2 encryption policies, ``__reserved`` must be zeroed.
+
+- For v1 encryption policies, ``master_key_descriptor`` specifies how
+  to find the master key in a keyring; see `Adding keys`_.  It is up
+  to userspace to choose a unique ``master_key_descriptor`` for each
+  master key.  The e4crypt and fscrypt tools use the first 8 bytes of

``SHA-512(SHA-512(master_key))``, but this particular scheme is not required. Also, the master key need not be in the keyring yet when FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY is executed. However, it must be added before any files can be created in the encrypted directory.

+  For v2 encryption policies, ``master_key_descriptor`` has been
+  replaced with ``master_key_identifier``, which is longer and cannot
+  be arbitrarily chosen.  Instead, the key must first be added using
+  FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, as described in `Adding keys`_.  Then,
+  the ``key_spec.u.identifier`` the kernel returned in the
+  :c:type:`struct fscrypt_add_key_arg` must be used as the
+  ``master_key_identifier`` in the :c:type:`struct fscrypt_policy_v2`.

+
If the file is not yet encrypted, then FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY verifies that the file is an empty directory. If so, the specified encryption policy is assigned to the directory, turning it into an
@@ -325,6 +455,15 @@ policy exactly matches the actual one. If they match, then the ioctl
returns 0. Otherwise, it fails with EEXIST. This works on both
regular files and directories, including nonempty directories.

+When a v2 encryption policy is assigned to a directory, it is also +required that either the specified key has been added by the current +user or that the caller has CAP_FOWNER in the initial user namespace. +(This is needed to prevent a user from encrypting their data with +another user's key.) The key must remain added while +FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY is executing. However, if the new +encrypted directory does not need to be accessed immediately, then the +key can be removed right away afterwards.
+
Note that the ext4 filesystem does not allow the root directory to be encrypted, even if it is empty. Users who want to encrypt an entire filesystem with one key should consider using dm-crypt instead.
@@ -337,7 +476,11 @@ FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can fail with the following errors:
- ``EEXIST``: the file is already encrypted with an encryption policy different from the one specified
- ``EINVAL``: an invalid encryption policy was specified (invalid
- version, mode(s), or flags)
+ version, mode(s), or flags; or reserved bits were set)

+- ``ENOKEY``: a v2 encryption policy was specified, but the key with
+  the specified ``master_key_identifier`` has not been added, nor does
+  the process have the CAP_FOWNER capability in the initial user
+  namespace

- ``ENOTDIR``: the file is unencrypted and is a regular file, not a directory
- ``ENOTEMPTY``: the file is unencrypted and is a nonempty directory
@@ -356,25 +499,78 @@ FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can fail with the following errors:
Getting an encryption policy
----------------------------

-The FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl retrieves the :c:type:struct -fscrypt_policy, if any, for a directory or regular file. See above -for the struct definition. No additional permissions are required -beyond the ability to open the file.
+Two ioctls are available to get a file's encryption policy:
+

+- FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX
+- FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY

+
+The extended (_EX) version of the ioctl is more general and is +recommended to use when possible. However, on older kernels only the +original ioctl is available. Applications should try the extended +version, and if it fails with ENOTTY fall back to the original +version.
+
+Preferred method
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX ioctl retrieves the encryption +policy, if any, for a directory or regular file. No additional +permissions are required beyond the ability to open the file. It +takes in a pointer to a :c:type:struct fscrypt_get_policy_ex_arg, +defined as follows::
+
+ struct fscrypt_get_policy_ex_arg {
+ __u64 policy_size; /* input/output */
+ union {

+                    __u8 version;
+                    struct fscrypt_policy_v1 v1;
+                    struct fscrypt_policy_v2 v2;

+ } policy; /* output */
+ };
+
+The caller must initialize ``policy_size`` to the size available for +the policy struct, i.e. ``sizeof(arg.policy)``.
+
+On success, the policy struct is returned in ``policy``, and its +actual size is returned in ``policy_size``. ``policy.version`` should +be checked to determine the version of policy returned. Note that the +version code for the "v1" policy is actually 0 (FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1).

-FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can fail with the following errors:
+FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX can fail with the following errors:

- ``EINVAL``: the file is encrypted, but it uses an unrecognized
- encryption context format
+ encryption policy version
- ``ENODATA``: the file is not encrypted
-- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement encryption

+- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement encryption,
+  or this kernel is too old to support FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX
+  (try FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY instead)
 - ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with encryption
   support for this filesystem
+- ``EOVERFLOW``: the file is encrypted and uses a recognized
+  encryption policy version, but the policy struct does not fit into
+  the provided buffer

Note: if you only need to know whether a file is encrypted or not, on most filesystems it is also possible to use the FS_IOC_GETFLAGS ioctl and check for FS_ENCRYPT_FL, or to use the statx() system call and check for STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED in stx_attributes.

+Legacy method
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl can also retrieve the +encryption policy, if any, for a directory or regular file. However, +unlike the extended version (FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX), +FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY only supports the original policy +version. It takes in a pointer directly to a :c:type:struct +fscrypt_policy_v1 rather than a :c:type:struct +fscrypt_get_policy_ex_arg.
+
+The error codes for FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY are the same as those +for FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX, except that +FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY also returns ``EINVAL`` if the file is +encrypted using a newer encryption policy version.
+
Getting the per-filesystem salt
-------------------------------

@@ -390,8 +586,98 @@ generate and manage any needed salt(s) in userspace.
Adding keys
-----------

-To provide a master key, userspace must add it to an appropriate -keyring using the add_key() system call (see:
+Preferred method
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl adds a master encryption key to +the filesystem, making all files on the filesystem which were +encrypted using that key appear "unlocked", i.e. in plaintext form. +It can be executed on any file or directory on the target filesystem, +but using the filesystem's root directory is recommended. It takes in +a pointer to a :c:type:struct fscrypt_add_key_arg, defined as +follows::
+
+ struct fscrypt_add_key_arg {

+            struct fscrypt_key_specifier key_spec;
+            __u32 raw_size;
+            __u32 __reserved[9];
+            __u8 raw[];
+    };
+
+    struct fscrypt_key_specifier {
+    #define FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR        1
+    #define FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER        2
+            __u32 type;
+            __u32 __reserved;
+            union {
+                    __u8 __reserved[32]; /* reserve some extra space */
+                    __u8 descriptor[FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
+                    __u8 identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE];

+ } u;
+ };
+
+:c:type:struct fscrypt_add_key_arg must be zeroed, then initialized +as follows:
+

+- If the key is being added for use by v1 encryption policies, then
+  ``key_spec.type`` must contain FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR, and
+  ``key_spec.u.descriptor`` must contain the descriptor of the key
+  being added, corresponding to the value in the
+  ``master_key_descriptor`` field of :c:type:`struct
+  fscrypt_policy_v1`.  To add this type of key, the calling process
+  must have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the initial user
+  namespace.
+
+  Alternatively, if the key is being added for use by v2 encryption
+  policies, then ``key_spec.type`` must contain
+  FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER, and ``key_spec.u.identifier`` is
+  an *output* field which the kernel fills in with a cryptographic
+  hash of the key.  To add this type of key, the calling process does
+  not need any privileges.  However, the number of keys that can be
+  added is limited by the user's quota for the keyrings service (see
+  ``Documentation/security/keys/core.rst``).
+
+- ``raw_size`` must be the size of the ``raw`` key provided, in bytes.
+
+- ``raw`` is a variable-length field which must contain the actual
+  key, ``raw_size`` bytes long.
+
+FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY can fail with the following errors:
+
+- ``EACCES``: FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR was specified, but the
+  caller does not have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the initial
+  user namespace
+- ``EDQUOT``: the key quota for this user would be exceeded by adding
+  the key
+- ``EINVAL``: invalid key size or key specifier type, or reserved bits
+  were set
+- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement encryption
+- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with encryption
+  support for this filesystem, or the filesystem superblock has not
+  had encryption enabled on it

+
+Legacy method
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+For v1 encryption policies, a master encryption key can also be +provided by adding it to a process-subscribed keyring, e.g. to a +session keyring, or to a user keyring if the user keyring is linked +into the session keyring.
+
+This method is deprecated (and not supported for v2 encryption +policies) for several reasons. First, it cannot be used in
+combination with FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY (see Removing keys_), +so for removing a key a workaround such as keyctl_unlink() in +combination with ``sync; echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches`` would
+have to be used. Second, it doesn't match the fact that the +locked/unlocked status of encrypted files (i.e. whether they appear to +be in plaintext form or in ciphertext form) is global. This mismatch +has caused much confusion as well as real problems when processes +running under different UIDs, such as a ``sudo`` command, need to +access encrypted files.
+
+Nevertheless, to add a key to one of the process-subscribed keyrings, +the add_key() system call can be used (see:
``Documentation/security/keys/core.rst``). The key type must be "logon"; keys of this type are kept in kernel memory and cannot be
read back by userspace. The key description must be "fscrypt:"
@@ -399,12 +685,12 @@ followed by the 16-character lower case hex representation of the
``master_key_descriptor`` that was set in the encryption policy. The key payload must conform to the following structure::

- #define FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE 64
+ #define FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE 64

     struct fscrypt_key {
-            u32 mode;
-            u8 raw[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
-            u32 size;
+            __u32 mode;
+            __u8 raw[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+            __u32 size;
     };

``mode`` is ignored; just set it to 0. The actual key is provided in
@@ -416,26 +702,145 @@ with a filesystem-specific prefix such as "ext4:". However, the
filesystem-specific prefixes are deprecated and should not be used in new programs.

-There are several different types of keyrings in which encryption keys -may be placed, such as a session keyring, a user session keyring, or a -user keyring. Each key must be placed in a keyring that is "attached" -to all processes that might need to access files encrypted with it, in -the sense that request_key() will find the key. Generally, if only -processes belonging to a specific user need to access a given -encrypted directory and no session keyring has been installed, then -that directory's key should be placed in that user's user session -keyring or user keyring. Otherwise, a session keyring should be -installed if needed, and the key should be linked into that session -keyring, or in a keyring linked into that session keyring. -
-Note: introducing the complex visibility semantics of keyrings here -was arguably a mistake --- especially given that by design, after any -process successfully opens an encrypted file (thereby setting up the -per-file key), possessing the keyring key is not actually required for -any process to read/write the file until its in-memory inode is -evicted. In the future there probably should be a way to provide keys -directly to the filesystem instead, which would make the intended -semantics clearer.
+Removing keys
+-------------
+
+The FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl can be used to remove a master +encryption key from the kernel, wiping the corresponding secrets from +memory and causing any files which were "unlocked" with the key to +appear "locked" again. It can be executed on any file or directory on +the target filesystem, but using the filesystem's root directory is +recommended. It takes in a pointer to a :c:type:struct +fscrypt_remove_key_arg, defined as follows::
+
+ struct fscrypt_remove_key_arg {
+ struct fscrypt_key_specifier key_spec;
+ #define FSCRYPT_REMOVE_KEY_FLAG_ALL_USERS 0x00000001
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u32 __reserved[5];
+ };
+
+This structure must be zeroed, then initialized as follows:
+
+- The key to remove is specified by ``key_spec``:
+
+ - To remove a key used by v1 encryption policies, set

+      ``key_spec.type`` to FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR and fill
+      in ``key_spec.u.descriptor``.  To remove this type of key, the
+      calling process must have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
+      initial user namespace.
+
+    - To remove a key used by v2 encryption policies, set
+      ``key_spec.type`` to FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER and fill
+      in ``key_spec.u.identifier``.  To remove this type of key, no
+      privileges are needed.  However, users can only remove keys that
+      they added themselves, subject to privileged override with
+      FSCRYPT_REMOVE_KEY_FLAG_ALL_USERS.

+
+- ``flags`` can contain the following flags:
+
+ - ``FSCRYPT_REMOVE_KEY_FLAG_ALL_USERS`` specifies that the key

+      should be removed even if it has also been added by other users.
+      Specifying this flag requires the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in
+      the initial user namespace.
+
+FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY can fail with the following errors:
+
+- ``EACCES``: The FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR key specifier type
+  and/or the FSCRYPT_REMOVE_KEY_FLAG_ALL_USERS flag was specified, but
+  the caller does not have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the initial
+  user namespace
+- ``EBUSY``: the master key secret was wiped from memory, but some
+  files which were unlocked with it are still in use.  Such files
+  could not be locked, nor could their per-file keys be wiped from
+  memory.  The ioctl may be retried later to re-attempt locking the
+  remaining files.  Note: if the files cease being used, the key
+  removal may (but is not guaranteed to) complete before this ioctl is
+  retried; in this case, retrying this ioctl will return ``ENOKEY``.
+- ``EINVAL``: invalid flags or key specifier type, or reserved bits
+  were set
+- ``ENOKEY``: the key is not present or has already been fully removed
+- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement encryption
+- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with encryption
+  support for this filesystem, or the filesystem superblock has not
+  had encryption enabled on it
+- ``EUSERS``: the key cannot be removed because other users have added
+  it too

+
+Before using this ioctl, read the Kernel memory compromise_ section +for a discussion of the security goals and limitations of this ioctl. +
+Getting key status
+------------------
+
+The FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS ioctl retrieves the status of a +master encryption key. It can be executed on any file or directory on +the target filesystem, but using the filesystem's root directory is +recommended. It takes in a pointer to a :c:type:struct +fscrypt_get_key_status_arg, defined as follows::
+
+ struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg {

+            /* input */
+            struct fscrypt_key_specifier key_spec;
+            __u32 __reserved[6];
+
+            /* output */
+    #define FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_ABSENT               1
+    #define FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_PRESENT              2
+    #define FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_INCOMPLETELY_REMOVED 3
+            __u32 status;
+    #define FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_FLAG_ADDED_BY_SELF   0x00000001
+            __u32 status_flags;
+            __u32 user_count;
+            __u32 __out_reserved[13];

+ };
+
+The caller must zero all input fields, then fill in ``key_spec``:
+
+ - To get the status of a key for v1 encryption policies, set
+ ``key_spec.type`` to FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR and fill
+ in ``key_spec.u.descriptor``.
+
+ - To get the status of a key for v2 encryption policies, set
+ ``key_spec.type`` to FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER and fill
+ in ``key_spec.u.identifier``.
+
+On success, 0 is returned and the kernel fills in the output fields:
+

+- ``status`` indicates whether the key is absent, present, or
+  incompletely removed.  Incompletely removed means that the master
+  secret has been removed, but some files are still in use; i.e.,
+  FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY returned EBUSY.

+
+- ``status_flags`` can contain the following flags:
+
+ - ``FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_FLAG_ADDED_BY_SELF`` indicates that the key
+ has added by the current user. This is only set for keys
+ identified by ``identifier`` rather than by ``descriptor``.
+

+- ``user_count`` specifies the number of users who have added the key.
+  This is only set for keys identified by ``identifier`` rather than
+  by ``descriptor``.
+
+FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS can fail with the following errors:
+
+- ``EINVAL``: invalid key specifier type, or reserved bits were set
+- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement encryption
+- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with encryption
+  support for this filesystem, or the filesystem superblock has not
+  had encryption enabled on it

+
+Among other use cases, FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS might be +useful for determining whether the key for a given encrypted directory +needs to be added before prompting the user for the passphrase needed +to derive the key.
+
+FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS can only get the status of keys in +the filesystem-level keyring, i.e. the keyring managed by +FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY and FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY. It cannot +get the status of a key that has only been added for use by v1 +encryption policies using the legacy mechanism involving +process-subscribed keyrings.

Access semantics
========
@@ -498,7 +903,7 @@ Without the key

Some filesystem operations may be performed on encrypted regular files, directories, and symlinks even before their encryption key has
-been provided:
+been added, or after their encryption key has been removed:

- File metadata may be read, e.g. using stat().

@@ -563,20 +968,20 @@ Encryption context
------------------

An encryption policy is represented on-disk by a :c:type:`struct
-fscrypt_context`. It is up to individual filesystems to decide where -to store it, but normally it would be stored in a hidden extended -attribute. It should *not* be exposed by the xattr-related system -calls such as getxattr() and setxattr() because of the special -semantics of the encryption xattr. (In particular, there would be -much confusion if an encryption policy were to be added to or removed -from anything other than an empty directory.) The struct is defined -as follows::
+fscrypt_context_v1 or a :c:type:struct fscrypt_context_v2`. It is +up to individual filesystems to decide where to store it, but normally +it would be stored in a hidden extended attribute. It should *not* be +exposed by the xattr-related system calls such as getxattr() and +setxattr() because of the special semantics of the encryption xattr. +(In particular, there would be much confusion if an encryption policy +were to be added to or removed from anything other than an empty +directory.) These structs are defined as follows::

- #define FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE 8

     #define FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE 16

- struct fscrypt_context {
- u8 format;
+ #define FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE 8
+ struct fscrypt_context_v1 {

+            u8 version;
             u8 contents_encryption_mode;
             u8 filenames_encryption_mode;
             u8 flags;
@@ -584,12 +989,23 @@ as follows::
             u8 nonce[FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE];
     };

-Note that :c:type:struct fscrypt_context contains the same -information as :c:type:struct fscrypt_policy (see Setting an -encryption policy_), except that :c:type:struct fscrypt_context -also contains a nonce. The nonce is randomly generated by the kernel -and is used to derive the inode's encryption key as described in -Per-file keys_.
+ #define FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE 16
+ struct fscrypt_context_v2 {

+            u8 version;
+            u8 contents_encryption_mode;
+            u8 filenames_encryption_mode;
+            u8 flags;
+            u8 __reserved[4];
+            u8 master_key_identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE];
+            u8 nonce[FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE];

+ };
+
+The context structs contain the same information as the corresponding +policy structs (see Setting an encryption policy_), except that the +context structs also contain a nonce. The nonce is randomly generated +by the kernel and is used as KDF input or as a tweak to cause +different files to be encrypted differently; see Per-file keys_ and +DIRECT_KEY and per-mode keys_.

Data path changes
-----------------

Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
maintainer
#17 lore raw
In reply to Eric Biggers
Quoted 7 lines · Eric Biggers

This patchset makes major improvements to how keys are added, removed, and derived in fscrypt, aka ext4/f2fs/ubifs encryption. It does this by adding new ioctls that add and remove encryption keys directly to/from the filesystem, and by adding a new encryption policy version ("v2") where the user-provided keys are only used as input to HKDF-SHA512 and are identified by their cryptographic hash.

Do you have userspace programs which use these new ioctl's? What's are testing strategy for these new ioctls?

Thanks,

- Ted

author maintainer
#18 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 7 lines · Eric Biggers

This patchset makes major improvements to how keys are added, removed, and derived in fscrypt, aka ext4/f2fs/ubifs encryption. It does this by adding new ioctls that add and remove encryption keys directly to/from the filesystem, and by adding a new encryption policy version ("v2") where the user-provided keys are only used as input to HKDF-SHA512 and are identified by their cryptographic hash.

Quoted 6 lines

Do you have userspace programs which use these new ioctl's? What's are testing strategy for these new ioctls?

Thanks,

- Ted

This was answered in the cover letter, quoted below:

I've written xfstests for the new APIs. They test the APIs themselves as well as verify the correctness of the ciphertext stored on-disk for v2 encryption policies. The tests can be found at:

Repository: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/xfstests-dev.git
Branch: fscrypt-key-mgmt-improvements

The xfstests depend on new xfs_io commands which can be found at:

Repository: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/xfsprogs-dev.git
Branch: fscrypt-key-mgmt-improvements

I've also made proof-of-concept changes to the 'fscrypt' userspace program (https://github.com/google/fscrypt) to make it support v2 encryption policies. You can find these changes in git at:

Repository: https://github.com/ebiggers/fscrypt.git
Branch: fscrypt-key-mgmt-improvements

To make the 'fscrypt' userspace program experimentally use v2 encryption policies on new encrypted directories, add the following to /etc/fscrypt.conf within the "options" section:

	"policy_version": "2"

Finally, it's also planned for Android and Chromium OS to switch to the new ioctls and eventually to v2 encryption policies. Work-in-progress, proof-of-concept changes by Satya Tangirala for AOSP can be found at
https://android-review.googlesource.com/q/topic:fscrypt-key-mgmt-improvements

- Eric

maintainer
#19 lore raw
Quoted 2 lines · Eric Biggers

This was answered in the cover letter, quoted below:

Oops, thanks. My bad, I stopped reading when I saw the changelog, and missed that part of the description.

- Ted