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Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.

PATCH Superseded Jaskaran Khurana 2 participants 3 messages May 24, 2019 – Jun 7, 2019

Subsystems (3)

v2 of 7 Superseded Latest is v7 →

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.

This patch set adds in-kernel pkcs7 signature checking for the roothash of the dm-verity hash tree.
The verification is to support cases where the roothash is not secured by Trusted Boot, UEFI Secureboot or similar technologies.
One of the use cases for this is for dm-verity volumes mounted after boot, the root hash provided during the creation of the dm-verity volume has to be secure and thus in-kernel validation implemented here will be used before we trust the root hash and allow the block device to be created.

Why we are doing validation in the Kernel?

The reason is to still be secure in cases where the attacker is able to compromise the user mode application in which case the user mode validation could not have been trusted.
The root hash signature validation in the kernel along with existing dm-verity implementation gives a higher level of confidence in the executable code or the protected data. Before allowing the creation of the device mapper block device the kernel code will check that the detached pkcs7 signature passed to it validates the roothash and the signature is trusted by builtin keys set at kernel creation. The kernel should be secured using Verified boot, UEFI Secure Boot or similar technologies so we can trust it.

What about attacker mounting non dm-verity volumes to run executable code?

This verification can be used to have a security architecture where a LSM can enforce this verification for all the volumes and by doing this it can ensure that all executable code runs from signed and trusted dm-verity volumes.

Further patches will be posted that build on this and enforce this verification based on policy for all the volumes on the system.

How are these changes tested?

veritysetup part of cryptsetup library was modified to take a optional root-hash-sig parameter.

Commandline used to test the changes:

veritysetup open <data_device> <name> <hash_device> <root_hash>
--root-hash-sig=<root_hash_pkcs7_detached_sig>

The changes for veritysetup are in a topic branch for now at:
https://github.com/jaskarankhurana/veritysetup/tree/veritysetup_add_sig

Changelog:
v2:
- Code review feedback to pass the signature binary blob as a key that can be looked up in the kernel and be used to verify the roothash. [Suggested by Milan Broz]
- Made the code related change suggested in review of v1. [Suggested by Balbir Singh]

v1:
- Add kconfigs to control dm-verity root has signature verification and use the signature if specified to verify the root hash.

Jaskaran Khurana (1):
Adds in-kernel pkcs7 sig checking the roothash of the dm-verity hash
tree

 drivers/md/Kconfig                |  23 +++++
 drivers/md/Makefile               |   2 +-
 drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c     |  34 +++++++-
 drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h |  31 +++++++
 5 files changed, 222 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 Add dm verity root hash pkcs7 sig validation.

The verification is to support cases where the roothash is not secured by Trusted Boot, UEFI Secureboot or similar technologies.
One of the use cases for this is for dm-verity volumes mounted after boot, the root hash provided during the creation of the dm-verity volume has to be secure and thus in-kernel validation implemented here will be used before we trust the root hash and allow the block device to be created.

The signature being provided for verification must verify the root hash and must be trusted by the builtin keyring for verification to succeed.

The hash is added as a key of type "user" and the description is passed to the kernel so it can look it up and use it for verification.

Adds DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG: roothash verification against the roothash signature file *if* specified, if signature file is specified verification must succeed prior to creation of device mapper block device.

Adds DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_FORCE: roothash signature *must* be specified for all dm verity volumes and verification must succeed prior to creation of device mapper block device.

---
 drivers/md/Kconfig                |  23 +++++
 drivers/md/Makefile               |   2 +-
 drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c     |  34 +++++++-
 drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h |  31 +++++++
 5 files changed, 222 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h
drivers/md/Kconfig +23 -0
index db269a348b20..da4115753f25 100644
@@ -489,6 +489,29 @@ config DM_VERITY
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG
+	def_bool n
+	bool "Verity data device root hash signature verification support"
+	depends on DM_VERITY
+	select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+	  help
+	  The device mapper target created by DM-VERITY can be validated if the
+	  pre-generated tree of cryptographic checksums passed has a pkcs#7
+	  signature file that can validate the roothash of the tree.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_FORCE
+	def_bool n
+	bool "Forces all dm verity data device root hash should be signed"
+	depends on DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG
+	  help
+	  The device mapper target created by DM-VERITY will succeed only if the
+	  pre-generated tree of cryptographic checksums passed also has a pkcs#7
+	  signature file that can validate the roothash of the tree.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
 config DM_VERITY_FEC
 	bool "Verity forward error correction support"
 	depends on DM_VERITY
drivers/md/Makefile +1 -1
index be7a6eb92abc..8a8c142bcfe1 100644
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DM_LOG_USERSPACE)	+= dm-log-userspace.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_DM_ZERO)		+= dm-zero.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_DM_RAID)	+= dm-raid.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_DM_THIN_PROVISIONING)	+= dm-thin-pool.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_DM_VERITY)		+= dm-verity.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_DM_VERITY)		+= dm-verity.o dm-verity-verify-sig.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_DM_CACHE)		+= dm-cache.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_DM_CACHE_SMQ)	+= dm-cache-smq.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_DM_ERA)		+= dm-era.o
drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c +30 -4
index f4c31ffaa88e..56276669ac20 100644
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 
 #include "dm-verity.h"
 #include "dm-verity-fec.h"
-
+#include "dm-verity-verify-sig.h"
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/reboot.h>
 
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@
 #define DM_VERITY_OPT_IGN_ZEROES	"ignore_zero_blocks"
 #define DM_VERITY_OPT_AT_MOST_ONCE	"check_at_most_once"
 
-#define DM_VERITY_OPTS_MAX		(2 + DM_VERITY_OPTS_FEC)
+#define DM_VERITY_OPTS_MAX		(2 + DM_VERITY_OPTS_FEC + \
+					 DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPTS)
 
 static unsigned dm_verity_prefetch_cluster = DM_VERITY_DEFAULT_PREFETCH_SIZE;
 
@@ -855,7 +856,8 @@ static int verity_alloc_zero_digest(struct dm_verity *v)
 	return r;
 }
 
-static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v)
+static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v,
+				 struct dm_verity_sig_opts *verify_args)
 {
 	int r;
 	unsigned argc;
@@ -904,6 +906,14 @@ static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v)
 			if (r)
 				return r;
 			continue;
+		} else if (verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg(arg_name)) {
+			r = verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(as, v,
+							     verify_args,
+							     &argc, arg_name);
+			if (r)
+				return r;
+			continue;
+
 		}
 
 		ti->error = "Unrecognized verity feature request";
@@ -930,6 +940,7 @@ static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v)
 static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv)
 {
 	struct dm_verity *v;
+	struct dm_verity_sig_opts verify_args = {0};
 	struct dm_arg_set as;
 	unsigned int num;
 	unsigned long long num_ll;
@@ -937,6 +948,7 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv)
 	int i;
 	sector_t hash_position;
 	char dummy;
+	char *root_hash_digest_to_validate = NULL;
 
 	v = kzalloc(sizeof(struct dm_verity), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!v) {
@@ -1070,6 +1082,7 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv)
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto bad;
 	}
+	root_hash_digest_to_validate = argv[8];
 
 	if (strcmp(argv[9], "-")) {
 		v->salt_size = strlen(argv[9]) / 2;
@@ -1095,11 +1108,20 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv)
 		as.argc = argc;
 		as.argv = argv;
 
-		r = verity_parse_opt_args(&as, v);
+		r = verity_parse_opt_args(&as, v, &verify_args);
 		if (r < 0)
 			goto bad;
 	}
 
+	/* Root hash signature is  a optional parameter*/
+	r = verity_verify_root_hash(root_hash_digest_to_validate,
+				    strlen(root_hash_digest_to_validate),
+				    verify_args.sig,
+				    verify_args.sig_size);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		ti->error = "Root hash verification failed";
+		goto bad;
+	}
 	v->hash_per_block_bits =
 		__fls((1 << v->hash_dev_block_bits) / v->digest_size);
 
@@ -1165,9 +1187,13 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv)
 	ti->per_io_data_size = roundup(ti->per_io_data_size,
 				       __alignof__(struct dm_verity_io));
 
+	verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(&verify_args);
+
 	return 0;
 
 bad:
+
+	verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(&verify_args);
 	verity_dtr(ti);
 
 	return r;
drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c new file +137 -0

137 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h new file +31 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4cdb5eeb90d4
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Microsoft Corporation.
+ *
+ * Author:  Jaskaran Singh Khurana <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * This file is released under the GPLv2.
+ */
+#ifndef DM_VERITY_SIG_VERIFICATION_H
+#define DM_VERITY_SIG_VERIFICATION_H
+
+#define DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION "DM Verity Sig Verification"
+#define DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPT_SIG_KEY "root_hash_sig_key_desc"
+#define DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPTS 2
+
+struct dm_verity_sig_opts {
+	unsigned int sig_size;
+	u8 *sig;
+};
+int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *data, size_t data_len,
+			    const void *sig_data, size_t sig_len);
+
+bool verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg(const char *arg_name);
+
+int verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v,
+				    struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts,
+				    unsigned int *argc, const char *arg_name);
+
+void verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts);
+
+#endif /* DM_VERITY_SIG_VERIFICATION_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#2 lore raw
Quoted 137 lines · Jaskaran Khurana

The verification is to support cases where the roothash is not secured by Trusted Boot, UEFI Secureboot or similar technologies.
One of the use cases for this is for dm-verity volumes mounted after boot, the root hash provided during the creation of the dm-verity volume has to be secure and thus in-kernel validation implemented here will be used before we trust the root hash and allow the block device to be created.

The signature being provided for verification must verify the root hash and must be trusted by the builtin keyring for verification to succeed.

The hash is added as a key of type "user" and the description is passed to the kernel so it can look it up and use it for verification.

Adds DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG: roothash verification against the roothash signature file *if* specified, if signature file is specified verification must succeed prior to creation of device mapper block device.

Adds DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_FORCE: roothash signature *must* be specified for all dm verity volumes and verification must succeed prior to creation of device mapper block device.

---

drivers/md/Kconfig                |  23 +++++
drivers/md/Makefile               |   2 +-
drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c     |  34 +++++++-
drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h |  31 +++++++
5 files changed, 222 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

create mode 100644 drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c create mode 100644 drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h

drivers/md/Kconfig +23 -0
index db269a348b20..da4115753f25 100644
@@ -489,6 +489,29 @@ config DM_VERITY
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG
+	def_bool n
+	bool "Verity data device root hash signature verification support"
+	depends on DM_VERITY
+	select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+	  help
+	  The device mapper target created by DM-VERITY can be validated if the
+	  pre-generated tree of cryptographic checksums passed has a pkcs#7
+	  signature file that can validate the roothash of the tree.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_FORCE
+	def_bool n
+	bool "Forces all dm verity data device root hash should be signed"
+	depends on DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG
+	  help
+	  The device mapper target created by DM-VERITY will succeed only if the
+	  pre-generated tree of cryptographic checksums passed also has a pkcs#7
+	  signature file that can validate the roothash of the tree.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+

config DM_VERITY_FEC
bool "Verity forward error correction support" depends on DM_VERITY

drivers/md/Makefile +0 -0
index be7a6eb92abc..8a8c142bcfe1 100644
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DM_LOG_USERSPACE)	+= dm-log-userspace.o

obj-$(CONFIG_DM_ZERO) += dm-zero.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DM_RAID) += dm-raid.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DM_THIN_PROVISIONING) += dm-thin-pool.o

drivers/md/Makefile +1 -1
-obj-$(CONFIG_DM_VERITY)		+= dm-verity.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_DM_VERITY)		+= dm-verity.o dm-verity-verify-sig.o

obj-$(CONFIG_DM_CACHE) += dm-cache.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DM_CACHE_SMQ) += dm-cache-smq.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DM_ERA) += dm-era.o

drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c +14 -3
index f4c31ffaa88e..56276669ac20 100644
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 
 #include "dm-verity.h"
 #include "dm-verity-fec.h"
-
+#include "dm-verity-verify-sig.h"
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/reboot.h>
 
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@
 #define DM_VERITY_OPT_IGN_ZEROES	"ignore_zero_blocks"
 #define DM_VERITY_OPT_AT_MOST_ONCE	"check_at_most_once"
 
-#define DM_VERITY_OPTS_MAX		(2 + DM_VERITY_OPTS_FEC)
+#define DM_VERITY_OPTS_MAX		(2 + DM_VERITY_OPTS_FEC + \
+					 DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPTS)
 
 static unsigned dm_verity_prefetch_cluster = DM_VERITY_DEFAULT_PREFETCH_SIZE;
 
@@ -855,7 +856,8 @@ static int verity_alloc_zero_digest(struct dm_verity *v)
 	return r;
 }
 
-static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v)
+static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v,
+				 struct dm_verity_sig_opts *verify_args)
 {
 	int r;
 	unsigned argc;
@@ -904,6 +906,14 @@ static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v)
 			if (r)
 				return r;
 			continue;
+		} else if (verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg(arg_name)) {
+			r = verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(as, v,
+							     verify_args,
+							     &argc, arg_name);
+			if (r)
+				return r;
+			continue;
+
 		}
 
 		ti->error = "Unrecognized verity feature request";
@@ -930,6 +940,7 @@ static int verity_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v)
 static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv)
 {
 	struct dm_verity *v;
+	struct dm_verity_sig_opts verify_args = {0};
 	struct dm_arg_set as;
 	unsigned int num;
 	unsigned long long num_ll;

drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv) · line 951

Quoted 4 lines
drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c +1 -0
@@ -937,6 +948,7 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv)
 	int i;
 	sector_t hash_position;
 	char dummy;
+	char *root_hash_digest_to_validate = NULL;

Does it need to be initialized here? There's nothing that relies on this logic later.

Quoted 11 lines
drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c +1 -0
 	v = kzalloc(sizeof(struct dm_verity), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!v) {
@@ -1070,6 +1082,7 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv)
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto bad;
 	}
+	root_hash_digest_to_validate = argv[8];
 
 	if (strcmp(argv[9], "-")) {
 		v->salt_size = strlen(argv[9]) / 2;

drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv) · line 1116

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c +2 -1
@@ -1095,11 +1108,20 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv)
 		as.argc = argc;
 		as.argv = argv;
 
-		r = verity_parse_opt_args(&as, v);
+		r = verity_parse_opt_args(&as, v, &verify_args);
 		if (r < 0)
 			goto bad;
 	}
 
+	/* Root hash signature is  a optional parameter*/

an

Quoted 31 lines
drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c +10 -0
+	r = verity_verify_root_hash(root_hash_digest_to_validate,
+				    strlen(root_hash_digest_to_validate),
+				    verify_args.sig,
+				    verify_args.sig_size);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		ti->error = "Root hash verification failed";
+		goto bad;
+	}
 	v->hash_per_block_bits =
 		__fls((1 << v->hash_dev_block_bits) / v->digest_size);
 
@@ -1165,9 +1187,13 @@ static int verity_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned argc, char **argv)
 	ti->per_io_data_size = roundup(ti->per_io_data_size,
 				       __alignof__(struct dm_verity_io));
 
+	verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(&verify_args);
+
 	return 0;
 

bad:

drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c +2 -0
+
+	verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(&verify_args);
	verity_dtr(ti);

	return r;
drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c new file +0 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ba87c9342d55

drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c line 7

Quoted 7 lines
drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c new file +7 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Microsoft Corporation.
+ *
+ * Author:  Jaskaran Singh Khurana <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * This file is released under the GPLv2.

There's no need to explicitly state licensing here, we have the SPDX line at the beginning for that.

Quoted 6 lines
drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c new file +6 -0
+ */
+#include <linux/device-mapper.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include "dm-verity.h"
+#include "dm-verity-verify-sig.h"

drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c line 23

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c new file +10 -0
+
+#define DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR(s) DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION " " s
+
+
+bool verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg(const char *arg_name)
+{
+	return (!strcasecmp(arg_name,
+			    DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPT_SIG_KEY));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg);

Why are you exporting all these symbols?

Quoted 46 lines
drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c new file +46 -0
+static int verity_verify_get_sig_from_key(const char *key_desc,
+					struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts)
+{
+	struct key *key;
+	const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	key = request_key(&key_type_user,
+			key_desc, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(key))
+		return PTR_ERR(key);
+
+	down_read(&key->sem);
+
+	ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
+	if (!ukp) {
+		ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
+		goto end;
+	}
+
+	sig_opts->sig = kmalloc(ukp->datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sig_opts->sig) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto end;
+	}
+	sig_opts->sig_size = ukp->datalen;
+
+	memcpy(sig_opts->sig, ukp->data, sig_opts->sig_size);
+
+end:
+	up_read(&key->sem);
+	key_put(key);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as,
+				     struct dm_verity *v,
+				     struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts,
+				     unsigned int *argc,
+				     const char *arg_name)
+{
+	struct dm_target *ti = v->ti;
+	int ret = 0;
+	const char *sig_key = NULL;
+

drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c line 80

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c new file +10 -0
+	if (!*argc) {
+		ti->error = DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR("Signature key not specified");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	sig_key = dm_shift_arg(as);
+	(*argc)--;
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG))
+		return 0;

Do we need to explicitly check it here? It would be nicer if we just rely on verity_verify_get_sig_from_key() to "succeed" if the config option isn't set.

Quoted 21 lines
drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c new file +21 -0
+
+	ret = verity_verify_get_sig_from_key(sig_key, sig_opts);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		ti->error = DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR("Invalid key specified");
+
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG
+/*
+ * verify_verify_roothash - Verify the root hash of the verity hash device
+ *			     using builtin trusted keys.
+ *
+ * @root_hash: For verity, the roothash/data to be verified.
+ * @root_hash_len: Size of the roothash/data to be verified.
+ * @sig_data: The trusted signature that verifies the roothash/data.
+ * @sig_len: Size of the signature.
+ *
+ */
+int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *root_hash, size_t root_hash_len,

drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c line 111

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c new file +10 -0
+			    const void *sig_data, size_t sig_len)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!root_hash || root_hash_len == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!sig_data  || sig_len == 0) {
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_FORCE))
+			return -EINVAL;

Is -EINVAL the right error here?

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c new file +10 -0
+		else
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(root_hash, root_hash_len, sig_data,
+				sig_len, NULL, VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
+				NULL, NULL);
+
+	return ret;
+}

drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c line 131

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c new file +10 -0
+#else
+int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *root_hash, size_t root_hash_len,
+			    const void *sig_data, size_t sig_len)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verity_verify_root_hash);
+
+void verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts)

Why doesn't all of this cleanup code live in verity_dtr()?

--
Thanks,
Sasha

Quoted 46 lines
drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c new file +6 -0
+{
+	kfree(sig_opts->sig);
+	sig_opts->sig = NULL;
+	sig_opts->sig_size = 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup);
drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.h new file +31 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4cdb5eeb90d4
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Microsoft Corporation.
+ *
+ * Author:  Jaskaran Singh Khurana <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * This file is released under the GPLv2.
+ */
+#ifndef DM_VERITY_SIG_VERIFICATION_H
+#define DM_VERITY_SIG_VERIFICATION_H
+
+#define DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION "DM Verity Sig Verification"
+#define DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPT_SIG_KEY "root_hash_sig_key_desc"
+#define DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPTS 2
+
+struct dm_verity_sig_opts {
+	unsigned int sig_size;
+	u8 *sig;
+};
+int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *data, size_t data_len,
+			    const void *sig_data, size_t sig_len);
+
+bool verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg(const char *arg_name);
+
+int verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v,
+				    struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts,
+				    unsigned int *argc, const char *arg_name);
+
+void verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts);
+
+#endif /* DM_VERITY_SIG_VERIFICATION_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1