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Port over meta-integrity

PATCH New Armin Kuster 1 participant 15 messages May 27, 2019

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cover Port over meta-integrity

Copied meta-integrity from meta-intel-iot-security that Intel created, to carry on maintenance.

This update that code base to work on master.

runtime test passes on Arm H/w and qemux86-64

Armin Kuster (14):
meta-integrity: port over from meta-intel-iot-security layer.conf: add LAYERSERIES_COMPAT
README: update
ima-evm-utils: cleanup and update to tip ima.cfg: update to 5.0 kernel
linux: update bbappend
base-files: add appending to automount securityfs
ima-policy-hashed: add new recipe
ima_policy_simple: add another sample policy
policy: add ima appraise all policy
data: remove policies
initramfs: clean up to pull in packages. runtime qa: moderize ima test
image: add image for testing

 meta-integrity/README.md                      | 250 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta-integrity/classes/ima-evm-rootfs.bbclass |  92 +++++++
 meta-integrity/conf/layer.conf                |  24 ++
 .../data/debug-keys/privkey_ima.pem           |  16 ++
 meta-integrity/data/debug-keys/x509_ima.der   | Bin 0 -> 707 bytes
 meta-integrity/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/ima.py  | 129 +++++++++
 .../base-files/base-files-ima.inc             |   5 +
 .../base-files/base-files_%.bbappend          |   1 +
 .../images/integrity-image-minimal.bb         |  22 ++
 .../initrdscripts/initramfs-framework-ima.bb  |  28 ++
 .../initrdscripts/initramfs-framework-ima/ima |  52 ++++
 .../packagegroup-ima-evm-utils.bb             |   9 +
 .../systemd/files/machine-id-commit-sync.conf |   2 +
 .../systemd/files/random-seed-sync.conf       |   3 +
 .../recipes-core/systemd/systemd_%.bbappend   |  13 +
 .../recipes-kernel/linux/linux-%.bbappend     |   3 +
 .../0001-ima-fix-ima_inode_post_setattr.patch |  51 ++++
 ...for-creating-files-using-the-mknodat.patch | 138 ++++++++++
 ...-file-hash-setting-by-user-to-fix-an.patch |  60 +++++
 .../recipes-kernel/linux/linux/ima.cfg        |  18 ++
 .../linux/linux/ima_evm_root_ca.cfg           |   3 +
 ...link-to-libcrypto-instead-of-OpenSSL.patch |  65 +++++
 ...ls-replace-INCLUDES-with-AM_CPPFLAGS.patch |  43 +++
 ...clude-hash-info.gen-into-distributio.patch |  31 +++
 ...ma-evm-utils-update-.gitignore-files.patch |  34 +++
 ...nd-line-apply-operation-to-all-paths.patch |  68 +++++
 .../ima-evm-utils/disable-doc-creation.patch  |  50 ++++
 ...t-depend-on-xattr.h-with-IMA-defines.patch |  47 ++++
 .../ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils_git.bb        |  41 +++
 .../files/ima_policy_appraise_all             |  29 ++
 .../ima-policy-appraise-all_1.0.bb            |  18 ++
 .../ima_policy_hashed/files/ima_policy_hashed |  77 ++++++
 .../ima-policy-hashed_1.0.bb                  |  20 ++
 .../ima_policy_simple/files/ima_policy_simple |   4 +
 .../ima-policy-simple_1.0.bb                  |  18 ++
 meta-integrity/scripts/ima-gen-CA-signed.sh   |  48 ++++
 meta-integrity/scripts/ima-gen-local-ca.sh    |  42 +++
 meta-integrity/scripts/ima-gen-self-signed.sh |  41 +++
 38 files changed, 1595 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/README.md
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/classes/ima-evm-rootfs.bbclass
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/conf/layer.conf
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/data/debug-keys/privkey_ima.pem
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/data/debug-keys/x509_ima.der
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/ima.py
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-core/base-files/base-files-ima.inc
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-core/base-files/base-files_%.bbappend
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-core/images/integrity-image-minimal.bb
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-core/initrdscripts/initramfs-framework-ima.bb
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-core/initrdscripts/initramfs-framework-ima/ima
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-core/packagegroups/packagegroup-ima-evm-utils.bb
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-core/systemd/files/machine-id-commit-sync.conf
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-core/systemd/files/random-seed-sync.conf
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_%.bbappend
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-%.bbappend
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/0001-ima-fix-ima_inode_post_setattr.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/0002-ima-add-support-for-creating-files-using-the-mknodat.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/Revert-ima-limit-file-hash-setting-by-user-to-fix-an.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/ima.cfg
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/ima_evm_root_ca.cfg
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/0001-ima-evm-utils-link-to-libcrypto-instead-of-OpenSSL.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/0002-ima-evm-utils-replace-INCLUDES-with-AM_CPPFLAGS.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/0003-ima-evm-utils-include-hash-info.gen-into-distributio.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/0004-ima-evm-utils-update-.gitignore-files.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/command-line-apply-operation-to-all-paths.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/disable-doc-creation.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/evmctl.c-do-not-depend-on-xattr.h-with-IMA-defines.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils_git.bb
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_appraise_all/files/ima_policy_appraise_all
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_appraise_all/ima-policy-appraise-all_1.0.bb
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_hashed/files/ima_policy_hashed
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_hashed/ima-policy-hashed_1.0.bb
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_simple/files/ima_policy_simple
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_simple/ima-policy-simple_1.0.bb
 create mode 100755 meta-integrity/scripts/ima-gen-CA-signed.sh
 create mode 100755 meta-integrity/scripts/ima-gen-local-ca.sh
 create mode 100755 meta-integrity/scripts/ima-gen-self-signed.sh
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/14 meta-integrity: port over from meta-intel-iot-security

---
 meta-integrity/README.md                      | 253 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta-integrity/classes/ima-evm-rootfs.bbclass |  92 +++++++
 meta-integrity/conf/layer.conf                |  22 ++
 .../data/debug-keys/privkey_ima.pem           |  16 ++
 meta-integrity/data/debug-keys/x509_ima.der   | Bin 0 -> 707 bytes
 meta-integrity/data/ima_policy_appraise_all   |  29 ++
 meta-integrity/data/ima_policy_hashed         |  77 ++++++
 meta-integrity/data/ima_policy_simple         |   4 +
 meta-integrity/lib/oeqa/runtime/__init__.py   |   0
 meta-integrity/lib/oeqa/runtime/ima.py        |  82 ++++++
 .../initrdscripts/initramfs-framework-ima.bb  |  32 +++
 .../initrdscripts/initramfs-framework-ima/ima |  52 ++++
 .../packagegroup-ima-evm-utils.bb             |   9 +
 .../systemd/files/machine-id-commit-sync.conf |   2 +
 .../systemd/files/random-seed-sync.conf       |   3 +
 .../recipes-core/systemd/systemd_%.bbappend   |  13 +
 .../recipes-kernel/linux/linux-%.bbappend     | 116 ++++++++
 .../0001-ima-fix-ima_inode_post_setattr.patch |  51 ++++
 ...for-creating-files-using-the-mknodat.patch | 138 ++++++++++
 ...-file-hash-setting-by-user-to-fix-an.patch |  60 +++++
 .../recipes-kernel/linux/linux/ima.cfg        |  16 ++
 .../linux/linux/ima_evm_root_ca.cfg           |   3 +
 .../ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils.inc           |  19 ++
 ...nd-line-apply-operation-to-all-paths.patch |  68 +++++
 .../ima-evm-utils/disable-doc-creation.patch  |  50 ++++
 ...t-depend-on-xattr.h-with-IMA-defines.patch |  47 ++++
 .../ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils_git.bb        |  17 ++
 meta-integrity/scripts/ima-gen-CA-signed.sh   |  48 ++++
 meta-integrity/scripts/ima-gen-local-ca.sh    |  42 +++
 meta-integrity/scripts/ima-gen-self-signed.sh |  41 +++
 30 files changed, 1402 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/README.md
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/classes/ima-evm-rootfs.bbclass
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/conf/layer.conf
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/data/debug-keys/privkey_ima.pem
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/data/debug-keys/x509_ima.der
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/data/ima_policy_appraise_all
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/data/ima_policy_hashed
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/data/ima_policy_simple
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/lib/oeqa/runtime/__init__.py
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/lib/oeqa/runtime/ima.py
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-core/initrdscripts/initramfs-framework-ima.bb
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-core/initrdscripts/initramfs-framework-ima/ima
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-core/packagegroups/packagegroup-ima-evm-utils.bb
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-core/systemd/files/machine-id-commit-sync.conf
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-core/systemd/files/random-seed-sync.conf
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_%.bbappend
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-%.bbappend
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/0001-ima-fix-ima_inode_post_setattr.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/0002-ima-add-support-for-creating-files-using-the-mknodat.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/Revert-ima-limit-file-hash-setting-by-user-to-fix-an.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/ima.cfg
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/ima_evm_root_ca.cfg
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils.inc
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/command-line-apply-operation-to-all-paths.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/disable-doc-creation.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/evmctl.c-do-not-depend-on-xattr.h-with-IMA-defines.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils_git.bb
 create mode 100755 meta-integrity/scripts/ima-gen-CA-signed.sh
 create mode 100755 meta-integrity/scripts/ima-gen-local-ca.sh
 create mode 100755 meta-integrity/scripts/ima-gen-self-signed.sh
meta-integrity/README.md new file +253 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba96d8e
@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+This README file contains information on the contents of the
+integrity layer.
+
+Please see the corresponding sections below for details.
+
+
+Dependencies
+============
+
+This layer depends on:
+
+    URI: git://git.openembedded.org/bitbake
+    branch: master
+
+    URI: git://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core
+    layers: meta
+    branch: master
+
+    URI: git://github.com/01org/meta-security/meta-integrate
+    layers: security-framework
+    branch: master
+
+
+Patches
+=======
+
+Please submit any patches against the integrity layer via Github
+pull requests.
+
+For discussion or patch submission via email, use the
[email protected] mailing list. When submitting patches that way,
+make sure to copy the maintainer and add a "[meta-]"
+prefix to the subject of the mails.
+
+Maintainer: Armin Kuster <[email protected]>
+
+
+Table of Contents
+=================
+
+1. Adding the integrity layer to your build
+2. Usage
+3. Known Issues
+
+
+1. Adding the integrity layer to your build
+===========================================
+
+In order to use this layer, you need to make the build system aware of
+it.
+
+Assuming the security repository exists at the top-level of your
+yocto build tree, you can add it to the build system by adding the
+location of the integrity layer to bblayers.conf, along with any
+other layers needed. e.g.:
+
+    BBLAYERS ?= " \
+      /path/to/yocto/meta \
+      /path/to/yocto/meta-yocto \
+      /path/to/yocto/meta-yocto-bsp \
+      /path/to/yocto/meta-security/meta-integrity \
+      "
+
+It has some dependencies on a suitable BSP; in particular the kernel
+must have a recent enough IMA/EVM subsystem. The layer was tested with
+Linux 3.19 and uses some features (like loading X509 certificates
+directly from the kernel) which were added in that release. Your
+mileage may vary with older kernels.
+
+The necessary kernel configuration parameters are added to all kernel
+versions by this layer. Watch out for QA warnings about unused kernel
+configuration parameters: those indicate that the kernel used by the BSP
+does not have the necessary IMA/EVM features.
+
+Adding the layer only enables IMA (see below regarding EVM) during
+compilation of the Linux kernel. To also activate it when building
+the image, enable image signing in the local.conf like this:
+
+    INHERIT += "ima-evm-rootfs"
+    IMA_EVM_KEY_DIR = "${IMA_EVM_BASE}/data/debug-keys"
+
+This uses the default keys provided in the "data" directory of the layer.
+Because everyone has access to these private keys, such an image
+should never be used in production!
+
+For that, create your own keys first. All tools and scripts required
+for that are included in the layer. This is also how the
+``debug-keys`` were generated:
+
+    # Choose a directory for storing keys. Preserve this
+    # across builds and keep its private keys secret!
+    export IMA_EVM_KEY_DIR=/tmp/imaevm
+    mkdir -p $IMA_EVM_KEY_DIR
+    # Build the required tools.
+    bitbake openssl-native
+    # Set up shell for use of the tools.
+    bitbake -c devshell openssl-native
+    cd $IMA_EVM_KEY_DIR
+    # In that shell, create the keys. Several options exist:
+
+    # 1. Self-signed keys.
+    $IMA_EVM_BASE/scripts/ima-gen-self-signed.sh
+
+    # 2. Keys signed by a new CA.
+    # When asked for a PEM passphrase, that will be for the root CA.
+    # Signing images then will not require entering that passphrase,
+    # only creating new certificates does. Most likely the default
+    # attributes for these certificates need to be adapted; modify
+    # the scripts as needed.
+    # $IMA_EVM_BASE/scripts/ima-gen-local-ca.sh
+    # $IMA_EVM_BASE/scripts/ima-gen-CA-signed.sh
+
+    # 3. Keys signed by an existing CA.
+    # $IMA_EVM_BASE/scripts/ima-gen-CA-signed.sh <CA.pem> <CA.priv>
+    exit
+
+When using ``ima-self-signed.sh`` as described above, self-signed keys
+are created. Alternatively, one can also use keys signed by a CA.  The
+``ima-gen-local-ca.sh`` and ``ima-gen.sh`` scripts create a root CA
+and sign the signing keys with it. The ``ima-evm-rootfs.bbclass`` then
+supports adding tha CA's public key to the kernel's system keyring by
+compiling it directly into the kernel. Because it is unknown whether
+that is necessary (for example, the CA might also get added to the
+system key ring via UEFI Secure Boot), one has to enable compilation
+into the kernel explicitly in a local.conf with:
+
+    IMA_EVM_ROOT_CA = "<path to .x509 file, for example the ima-local-ca.x509 created by ima-gen-local-ca.sh>"
+
+
+
+
+To use the personal keys, override the default IMA_EVM_KEY_DIR in your
+local.conf and/or override the individual variables from
+ima-evm-rootfs.bbclass:
+
+    IMA_EVM_KEY_DIR = "<full path>"
+    IMA_EVM_PRIVKEY = "<some other path/privkey_ima.pem>"
+
+By default, the entire file system gets signed. When using a policy which
+does not require that, the set of files to be labelled can be chosen
+by overriding the default "find" expression, for example like this:
+
+    IMA_EVM_ROOTFS_FILES = "usr sbin bin lib -type f"
+
+
+2. Usage
+========
+
+After creating an image with IMA/EVM enabled, one needs to enable
+the built-in policies before IMA/EVM is active at runtime. To do this,
+add one or both of these boot parameters:
+
+    ima_tcb # measures all files read as root and all files executed
+    ima_appraise_tcb # appraises all files owned by root, beware of
+                     # the known issue mentioned below
+
+Instead of booting with default policies, one can also activate custom
+policies in different ways. First, boot without any IMA policy and
+then cat a policy file into
+`/sys/kernel/security/ima/policy`. This can only be done once
+after booting and is useful for debugging.
+
+In production, the long term goal is to load a verified policy
+directly from the kernel, using a patch which still needs to be
+included upstream ("ima: load policy from the kernel",
+<https://lwn.net/Articles/595759/>).
+
+Loading via systemd also works with systemd, but is considered less
+secure (policy file is not checked before activating it). Beware that
+IMA policy loading became broken in systemd 2.18. The modified systemd
+2.19 in meta-security-smack has a patch reverting the broken
+changes. To activate policy loading via systemd, place a policy file
+in `/etc/ima/ima-policy`, for example with:
+
+    IMA_EVM_POLICY_SYSTEMD = "${IMA_EVM_BASE}/data/ima_policy_simple"
+
+To check that measuring works, look at `/sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements`
+
+To check that appraisal works, try modifying executables and ensure
+that executing them fails:
+
+    echo "foobar" >>/usr/bin/rpm
+    evmctl ima_verify /usr/bin/rpm
+    rpm --version
+
+Depending on the current appraisal policy, the `echo` command may
+already fail because writing is not allowed. If the file was modified
+and the current appraisal policy allows reading, then `evmctl` will
+report (the errno value seems to be printed always and is unrelated to
+the actual verification failure here):
+
+    Verification failed: 35
+    errno: No such file or directory (2)
+
+After enabling a suitable IMA appraisal policy, reading and/or
+executing the file is no longer allowed:
+
+    # evmctl ima_verify /usr/bin/rpm
+    Failed to open: /usr/bin/rpm
+    errno: Permission denied (13)
+    # rpm --version
+    -sh: /usr/bin/rpm: Permission denied
+
+Enabling the audit kernel subsystem may help to debug appraisal
+issues. Enable it by adding the meta-security-framework layer and
+changing your local.conf:
+    SRC_URI_append_pn-linux-yocto = " file://audit.cfg"
+    CORE_IMAGE_EXTRA_INSTALL += "auditd"
+
+Then boot with "ima_appraise=log ima_appraise_tcb".
+
+Adding auditd is not strictly necessary but helps to capture a
+more complete set of events in /var/log/audit/ and search in
+them with ausearch.
+
+
+3. Known Issues
+===============
+
+EVM is not enabled, for multiple reasons:
+* Signing files in advance with a X509 certificate and then not having
+  any confidential keys on the device would be the most useful mode,
+  but is not supported by EVM [1].
+* EVM signing in advance would only work on the final file system and thus
+  will require further integration work with image creation. The content
+  of the files can be signed for IMA in the rootfs, with the extended
+  attributes remaining valid when copying the files to the final image.
+  But for EVM that copy operation changes relevant parameters (for example,
+  inode) and thus invalidates the EVM hash.
+* On device creation of EVM hashes depends on secure key handling on the
+  device (TPM) and booting at least once in a special mode (file system
+  writable, evm=fix as boot parameter, reboot after opening all files);
+  such a mode is too device specific to be implemented in a generic way.
+
+IMA appraisal with "ima_appraise_tcb" enables rules which are too strict
+for most distros. For example, systemd needs to write certain files
+as root, which is prevented by the ima_appraise_tcb appraise rules. As
+a result, the system fails to boot:
+
+    [FAILED] Failed to start Commit a transient machine-id on disk.
+    See "systemctl status systemd-machine-id-commit.service" for details.
+    ...
+    [FAILED] Failed to start Network Service.
+    See "systemctl status systemd-networkd.service" for details.
+    [FAILED] Failed to start Login Service.
+    See "systemctl status systemd-logind.service" for details.
+
+No package manager is integrated with IMA/EVM. When updating packages,
+files will end up getting installed without correct IMA/EVM attributes
+and thus will not be usable when appraisal is turned on.
+
+[1] http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.handhelds.tizen.devel/6281
+[2] http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.handhelds.tizen.devel/6275
meta-integrity/classes/ima-evm-rootfs.bbclass new file +92 -0

92 lines not on this page · raw message

meta-integrity/conf/layer.conf new file +22 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8bb268
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# We have a conf and classes directory, add to BBPATH
+BBPATH =. "${LAYERDIR}:"
+
+# We have a packages directory, add to BBFILES
+BBFILES := "${BBFILES} \
+            ${LAYERDIR}/recipes-*/*/*.bb \
+            ${LAYERDIR}/recipes-*/*/*.bbappend"
+
+BBFILE_COLLECTIONS += "integrity"
+BBFILE_PATTERN_integrity := "^${LAYERDIR}/"
+BBFILE_PRIORITY_integrity = "6"
+
+# Set a variable to get to the top of the metadata location. Needed
+# for finding scripts (when following the README.md instructions) and
+# default debug keys (in ima-evm-rootfs.bbclass).
+IMA_EVM_BASE := '${LAYERDIR}'
+
+# We must not export this path to all shell scripts (as in "export
+# IMA_EVM_BASE"), because that causes problems with sstate (becames
+# dependent on location of the layer). Exporting it to just the
+# interactive shell is enough.
+OE_TERMINAL_EXPORTS += "IMA_EVM_BASE"
meta-integrity/data/debug-keys/privkey_ima.pem new file +16 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..502a0b6
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIICdQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAl8wggJbAgEAAoGBAJw2G3d0fM36rcQU
+Bt8V/SapJe0lxWJ+CY+HcMx8AhWY9XQ66AXcqBsRHiUnYCaFGXFI35VKGC6d/Gs6
+IWlHgI0tcTyzy5eul+BKRLy/3PNjkK2jJETlbetQy+gE6gUtg4RmPV5ALGksK74p
+OrAfKnahoMi82NVIiBitwmRimms1AgMBAAECgYBTxciRFU1hAVBy2PKebKJoO0n1
+lc329fSWnmHlp5NOlcr8XCLWEfGtIk7ySd2MitCMKjKNU0EIrv0RXAlS9l9/gBYW
+HY+eEaa6l80sp8q4aPKImSi0pb3LVNqWKXJg8qr4AZ45/TEL/fzILFv5QcY8xDjV
+aj6DOlEnNDjlBlBbQQJBAMyYDlKItes/Rnmtp9roXj3XUfiBDHTLY2HVgDBe87sA
+TOSnbgIv+6urd1h9XvBmJlRYH7YKJmBSZWcSlfdC6XkCQQDDdfkUMxQZo9PC/Eue
+WYzytx4xUm3ItWcuKILtFgcNh3c4s4dMx4X/WhQj5/H/nVOIWDioQ0mrW3ap/qcb
+SBydAkAf/gb/UPFhf9t9W3JMANn7wZfHzCYufT9lJQWOisqCC2H6v1Osc+Rey8k1
+xST7Yn3L4pvS03N8zGWe4IEi0QvBAkAWdTWbNos2rvYjzy05Enz5XkTf0eK/Tuh+
+CzWP3BoPWeM+5pHDJqGkx0rNHVdW0VLJtak83A5Y2/d0bMfygISZAkBFGui4HW+Q
+1BlpmDeslsE11wm5jSmm6Ti12a2dVKGFo9QLQcSj4bfgxtqU2dQaYRmajXtSBrGQ
+3vVaxg2EfqB1
+-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
meta-integrity/data/debug-keys/x509_ima.der new file binary +0 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..087ca6bea53c172e7eb9a269183a32b3ecbd3aaa
GIT binary patch
meta-integrity/data/ima_policy_appraise_all new file +29 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36e71a7
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+#
+# Integrity measure policy (http://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/#measure-nothing-appraise-everything)
+# 
+# Do not measure anything, but appraise everything
+#
+# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0
+# SYSFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572
+# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x64626720
+# TMPFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994
+# RAMFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6
+# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x1cd1
+# BIFMT
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x42494e4d
+# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673
+# SELINUXFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+# NSFS_MAGIC (introduced in 3.19, see cd025f7 and e149ed2 in the upstream Linux kernel)
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x6e736673
+# EFIVARFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0xde5e81e4
+
+appraise
meta-integrity/data/ima_policy_hashed new file +77 -0

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meta-integrity/data/ima_policy_simple new file +4 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38ca8f5
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# Very simple policy demonstrating the systemd policy loading bug
+# (policy with one line works, two lines don't).
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572
meta-integrity/lib/oeqa/runtime/__init__.py new file +0 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e69de29
meta-integrity/lib/oeqa/runtime/ima.py new file +82 -0

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meta-integrity/recipes-core/initrdscripts/initramfs-framework-ima.bb new file +32 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aca38b7
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# This recipe creates a module for the initramfs-framework in OE-core
+# which initializes IMA by loading a policy before transferring
+# control to the init process in the rootfs. The advantage over having
+# that init process doing the policy loading (which systemd could do)
+# is that already the integrity of the init binary itself will be
+# checked by the kernel.
+
+SUMMARY = "IMA module for the modular initramfs system"
+LICENSE = "MIT"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://${COREBASE}/meta/COPYING.MIT;md5=3da9cfbcb788c80a0384361b4de20420"
+RDEPENDS_${PN} += "initramfs-framework-base"
+
+# This policy file will get installed as /etc/ima/ima-policy.
+# It is located via the normal file search path, so a .bbappend
+# to this recipe can just point towards one of its own files.
+IMA_POLICY ?= "ima_policy_hashed"
+FILESEXTRAPATHS =. "${IMA_EVM_BASE}/data:"
+
+SRC_URI = " \
+    file://${IMA_POLICY} \
+    file://ima \
+"
+
+do_install () {
+    install -d ${D}/${sysconfdir}/ima
+    install ${WORKDIR}/${IMA_POLICY}  ${D}/${sysconfdir}/ima-policy
+    install -d ${D}/init.d
+    install ${WORKDIR}/ima  ${D}/init.d/20-ima
+}
+
+FILES_${PN} = "/init.d ${sysconfdir}"
+RDEPENDS_${PN} = "keyutils"
meta-integrity/recipes-core/initrdscripts/initramfs-framework-ima/ima new file +52 -0

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meta-integrity/recipes-core/packagegroups/packagegroup-ima-evm-utils.bb new file +9 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18acc9d
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+SUMMARY = "IMA/EVM userspace tools"
+LICENSE = "MIT"
+
+inherit packagegroup
+
+# Only one at the moment, but perhaps more will come in the future.
+RDEPENDS_${PN} = " \
+    ima-evm-utils \
+"
meta-integrity/recipes-core/systemd/files/machine-id-commit-sync.conf new file +2 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d6d3240
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+[Service]
+ExecStartPost=/bin/sync
meta-integrity/recipes-core/systemd/files/random-seed-sync.conf new file +3 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4c170b
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+[Service]
+ExecStopPost=/bin/sync
+ExecStartPost=/bin/sync
meta-integrity/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_%.bbappend new file +13 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b45541
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+FILESEXTRAPATHS_prepend := "${THISDIR}/files:"
+
+SRC_URI += " \
+    file://machine-id-commit-sync.conf \
+    file://random-seed-sync.conf \
+"
+
+do_install_append () {
+    for i in machine-id-commit random-seed; do
+        install -d ${D}/${systemd_system_unitdir}/systemd-$i.service.d
+        install -m 0644 ${WORKDIR}/$i-sync.conf ${D}/${systemd_system_unitdir}/systemd-$i.service.d
+    done
+}
meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-%.bbappend new file +116 -0

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meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/0001-ima-fix-ima_inode_post_setattr.patch new file +51 -0

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meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/0002-ima-add-support-for-creating-files-using-the-mknodat.patch new file +138 -0

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meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/Revert-ima-limit-file-hash-setting-by-user-to-fix-an.patch new file +60 -0

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meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/ima.cfg new file +16 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02381aa
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# Enable bare minimum IMA measurement and appraisal as needed by this layer.
+
+CONFIG_SECURITY=y
+CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y
+
+# measurement
+CONFIG_IMA=y
+
+# appraisal
+CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE=y
+CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE=y
+CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS=y
+
+# Kernel will get built with embedded X.509 root CA key and all keys
+# need to be signed with that.
+CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y
meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/ima_evm_root_ca.cfg new file +3 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7338232
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+CONFIG_KEYS=y
+CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y
+CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS=""
meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils.inc new file +19 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72a13f7
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+DESCRIPTION = "IMA/EVM control utility"
+LICENSE = "GPL-2.0-with-OpenSSL-exception"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=b234ee4d69f5fce4486a80fdaf4a4263"
+
+DEPENDS = " \
+openssl \
+attr \
+keyutils \
+pkgconfig \
+"
+
+# blkid is called by evmctl when creating evm checksums.
+# This is less useful when signing files on the build host,
+# so disable it when compiling on the host.
+RDEPENDS_${PN}_append_class-target = " util-linux-blkid"
+
+inherit autotools
+
+BBCLASSEXTEND = "native"
meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/command-line-apply-operation-to-all-paths.patch new file +68 -0

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meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/disable-doc-creation.patch new file +50 -0

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meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/evmctl.c-do-not-depend-on-xattr.h-with-IMA-defines.patch new file +47 -0

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meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils_git.bb new file +17 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a9999f
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+require ima-evm-utils.inc
+
+PV = "1.0+git${SRCPV}"
+SRCREV = "3e2a67bdb0673581a97506262e62db098efef6d7"
+SRC_URI = "git://git.code.sf.net/p/linux-ima/ima-evm-utils"
+S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
+
+# Documentation depends on asciidoc, which we do not have, so
+# do not build documentation.
+SRC_URI += "file://disable-doc-creation.patch"
+
+# Workaround for upstream incompatibility with older Linux distros.
+# Relevant for us when compiling ima-evm-utils-native.
+SRC_URI += "file://evmctl.c-do-not-depend-on-xattr.h-with-IMA-defines.patch"
+
+# Required for xargs with more than one path as argument (better for performance).
+SRC_URI += "file://command-line-apply-operation-to-all-paths.patch"
meta-integrity/scripts/ima-gen-CA-signed.sh new file +48 -0

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meta-integrity/scripts/ima-gen-local-ca.sh new file +42 -0

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meta-integrity/scripts/ima-gen-self-signed.sh new file +41 -0

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Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/14 layer.conf: add LAYERSERIES_COMPAT

In reply to Armin Kuster
---
 meta-integrity/conf/layer.conf | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta-integrity/conf/layer.conf +2 -0
index e8bb268..2f696cf 100644
@@ -20,3 +20,5 @@ IMA_EVM_BASE := '${LAYERDIR}'
 # dependent on location of the layer). Exporting it to just the
 # interactive shell is enough.
 OE_TERMINAL_EXPORTS += "IMA_EVM_BASE"
+
+LAYERSERIES_COMPAT_integrity = "warrior"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/14 README: update

In reply to Armin Kuster
---
 meta-integrity/README.md | 5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
meta-integrity/README.md +1 -4
index ba96d8e..5bef76e 100644
@@ -24,12 +24,9 @@ This layer depends on:
 Patches
 =======
 
-Please submit any patches against the integrity layer via Github
-pull requests.
-
 For discussion or patch submission via email, use the
 [email protected] mailing list. When submitting patches that way,
-make sure to copy the maintainer and add a "[meta-]"
+make sure to copy the maintainer and add a "[meta-integrity]"
 prefix to the subject of the mails.
 
 Maintainer: Armin Kuster <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/14 ima-evm-utils: cleanup and update to tip

In reply to Armin Kuster

update to tip
backported patches to fix build issues.
fix native support

---
 .../ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils.inc           | 19 ------
 ...link-to-libcrypto-instead-of-OpenSSL.patch | 65 +++++++++++++++++++
 ...ls-replace-INCLUDES-with-AM_CPPFLAGS.patch | 43 ++++++++++++
 ...clude-hash-info.gen-into-distributio.patch | 31 +++++++++
 ...ma-evm-utils-update-.gitignore-files.patch | 34 ++++++++++
 .../ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils_git.bb        | 30 ++++++++-
 6 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils.inc
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/0001-ima-evm-utils-link-to-libcrypto-instead-of-OpenSSL.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/0002-ima-evm-utils-replace-INCLUDES-with-AM_CPPFLAGS.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/0003-ima-evm-utils-include-hash-info.gen-into-distributio.patch
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/0004-ima-evm-utils-update-.gitignore-files.patch
meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils.inc deleted +0 -19
deleted file mode 100644
index 72a13f7..0000000
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-DESCRIPTION = "IMA/EVM control utility"
-LICENSE = "GPL-2.0-with-OpenSSL-exception"
-LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=b234ee4d69f5fce4486a80fdaf4a4263"
-
-DEPENDS = " \
-openssl \
-attr \
-keyutils \
-pkgconfig \
-"
-
-# blkid is called by evmctl when creating evm checksums.
-# This is less useful when signing files on the build host,
-# so disable it when compiling on the host.
-RDEPENDS_${PN}_append_class-target = " util-linux-blkid"
-
-inherit autotools
-
-BBCLASSEXTEND = "native"
meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/0001-ima-evm-utils-link-to-libcrypto-instead-of-OpenSSL.patch new file +65 -0

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meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/0002-ima-evm-utils-replace-INCLUDES-with-AM_CPPFLAGS.patch new file +43 -0

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meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/0003-ima-evm-utils-include-hash-info.gen-into-distributio.patch new file +31 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3d250d2
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From c587ec307a6259a990bfab727cea7db28dba4c23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 01:22:30 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 3/4] ima-evm-utils: include hash-info.gen into distribution
+
+Include hash-info.gen into tarball and call it from the sourcedir to fix
+out-of-tree build (and thus 'make distcheck').
+
+Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/Makefile.am | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/Makefile.am b/src/Makefile.am
+index 164e7e4..9c037e2 100644
+--- a/src/Makefile.am
++++ b/src/Makefile.am
+@@ -11,8 +11,9 @@ include_HEADERS = imaevm.h
+ 
+ nodist_libimaevm_la_SOURCES = hash_info.h
+ BUILT_SOURCES = hash_info.h
++EXTRA_DIST = hash_info.gen
+ hash_info.h: Makefile
+-	./hash_info.gen $(KERNEL_HEADERS) >$@
++	$(srcdir)/hash_info.gen $(KERNEL_HEADERS) >$@
+ 
+ bin_PROGRAMS = evmctl
+ 
+-- 
+2.17.1
+
meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils/0004-ima-evm-utils-update-.gitignore-files.patch new file +34 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ada1a2
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From b9f327c5c513ccea9cb56d4bbd50c1f66d629099 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2019 01:24:04 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 4/4] ima-evm-utils: update .gitignore files
+
+Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <[email protected]>
+---
+ .gitignore     | 1 +
+ src/.gitignore | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 src/.gitignore
+
+diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
+index ca7a06e..cb82166 100644
+--- a/.gitignore
++++ b/.gitignore
+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ cscope.*
+ ncscope.*
+ 
+ # Generated documentation
++*.1
+ *.8
+ *.5
+ manpage.links
+diff --git a/src/.gitignore b/src/.gitignore
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..38e8e3c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/src/.gitignore
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++hash_info.h
+-- 
+2.17.1
+
meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima-evm-utils/ima-evm-utils_git.bb +27 -3
index 8a9999f..929d853 100644
@@ -1,9 +1,14 @@
-require ima-evm-utils.inc
+DESCRIPTION = "IMA/EVM control utility"
+LICENSE = "GPL-2.0-with-OpenSSL-exception"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=b234ee4d69f5fce4486a80fdaf4a4263"
+
+DEPENDS += "openssl attr keyutils"
+
+DEPENDS_class-native += "openssl-native keyutils-native"
 
 PV = "1.0+git${SRCPV}"
-SRCREV = "3e2a67bdb0673581a97506262e62db098efef6d7"
+SRCREV = "0267fa16990fd0ddcc89984a8e55b27d43e80167"
 SRC_URI = "git://git.code.sf.net/p/linux-ima/ima-evm-utils"
-S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 
 # Documentation depends on asciidoc, which we do not have, so
 # do not build documentation.
@@ -15,3 +20,22 @@ SRC_URI += "file://evmctl.c-do-not-depend-on-xattr.h-with-IMA-defines.patch"
 
 # Required for xargs with more than one path as argument (better for performance).
 SRC_URI += "file://command-line-apply-operation-to-all-paths.patch"
+
+SRC_URI += "\
+    file://0001-ima-evm-utils-link-to-libcrypto-instead-of-OpenSSL.patch \
+    file://0002-ima-evm-utils-replace-INCLUDES-with-AM_CPPFLAGS.patch \
+    file://0003-ima-evm-utils-include-hash-info.gen-into-distributio.patch \
+    file://0004-ima-evm-utils-update-.gitignore-files.patch \
+"
+S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
+
+inherit pkgconfig autotools
+
+EXTRA_OECONF_append_class-target = " --with-kernel-headers=${STAGING_KERNEL_BUILDDIR}"
+
+# blkid is called by evmctl when creating evm checksums.
+# This is less useful when signing files on the build host,
+# so disable it when compiling on the host.
+RDEPENDS_${PN}_append_class-target = " util-linux-blkid libcrypto attr libattr keyutils"
+
+BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/14 ima.cfg: update to 5.0 kernel

In reply to Armin Kuster
---
 .../recipes-kernel/linux/linux/ima.cfg        | 28 ++++++++++---------
 .../linux/linux/ima_evm_root_ca.cfg           |  6 ++--
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/ima.cfg +15 -13
index 02381aa..b3e47ba 100644
@@ -1,16 +1,18 @@
-# Enable bare minimum IMA measurement and appraisal as needed by this layer.
-
-CONFIG_SECURITY=y
-CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y
-
-# measurement
 CONFIG_IMA=y
-
-# appraisal
+CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX=10
+CONFIG_IMA_NG_TEMPLATE=y
+CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE="ima-ng"
+CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1=y
+CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH="sha1"
 CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE=y
-CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE=y
-CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS=y
-
-# Kernel will get built with embedded X.509 root CA key and all keys
-# need to be signed with that.
+CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=y
 CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y
+CONFIG_SIGNATURE=y
+CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY=y
+CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY=y
+CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509=y
+CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH="/etc/keys/x509_ima.der"
+
+#CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE=y
+#CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS=y
+#CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y
meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux/ima_evm_root_ca.cfg +3 -3
index 7338232..9a45425 100644
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-CONFIG_KEYS=y
-CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y
-CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS=""
+# CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT is not set
+CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509=y
+CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH="/etc/keys/x509_evm.der"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/14 linux: update bbappend

In reply to Armin Kuster

remove untested code

---
 .../recipes-kernel/linux/linux-%.bbappend     | 117 +-----------------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-)
meta-integrity/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-%.bbappend +2 -115
index 48560b1..931854e 100644
@@ -1,116 +1,3 @@
-IMA_ENABLED_HERE := "${@'yes' if bb.data.inherits_class('kernel', d) and 'ima' in d.getVar('DISTRO_FEATURES', True).split() else 'no'}"
+FILESEXTRAPATHS_prepend := "${THISDIR}/linux:"
 
-IMA_FILESEXTRAPATHS_yes := "${THISDIR}/linux:"
-IMA_FILESEXTRAPATHS_no := ""
-FILESEXTRAPATHS_prepend := "${IMA_FILESEXTRAPATHS_${IMA_ENABLED_HERE}}"
-
-# These two patches are necessary to unpack archives with security.ima xattr
-# such that security.ima is taken from the archive. If the policy
-# allows hashing, unpatched kernels (at least up to 4.3) will replace
-# a signed hash in security.ima with a locally computed hash.
-#
-# Note that only bsdtar/libarchive are known to work; GNU tar sets
-# the security.ima on an empty file and the tries re-opening it for
-# writing its content, which then fails due to the IMA hash mismatch.
-#
-# Kernels >= 4.7 have the patches, while older kernels are likely to
-# need the patches. So apply them by default. To avoid that,
-# set IMA_EVM_SETATTR_PATCH_x.y.z (where x.y.z == linux kernel version)
-# to an empty string (to avoid patching) or some other patch files
-# suitable for that kernel.
-def ima_evm_setattr_patch(d):
-    result = []
-    linux_version = d.getVar('LINUX_VERSION', True) or ''
-    # These two patches are known to be included upstream.
-    if bb.utils.vercmp_string_op(linux_version, '4.7', '<'):
-        patches = d.getVar('IMA_EVM_SETATTR_PATCH_' + linux_version, True)
-        if patches != None:
-            # Patches explicitly chosen, may be empty.
-            result.append(patches)
-        else:
-            # Enabled by default.
-            result.append('file://0001-ima-fix-ima_inode_post_setattr.patch file://0002-ima-add-support-for-creating-files-using-the-mknodat.patch')
-    # This one addresses a problem added in 4.2. The upstream revert will land
-    # in some future kernel. We need to extend version check once we know
-    # which kernels have the patch.
-    if bb.utils.vercmp_string_op(linux_version, '4.2', '>='):
-        patches = d.getVar('IMA_EVM_SETATTR_REVERT_PATCH_' + linux_version, True)
-        if patches != None:
-            # Patches explicitly chosen, may be empty.
-            result.append(patches)
-        else:
-            # Enabled by default.
-            result.append('file://Revert-ima-limit-file-hash-setting-by-user-to-fix-an.patch')
-    return ' '.join(result)
-
-# Edison kernel too old, patch not applicable -> swupd is broken in Ostro OS for Edison.
-IMA_EVM_SETATTR_PATCH_3.10.98 = ""
-
-# Kernel config fragment enabling IMA/EVM and (where necessary and possible)
-# also patching the kernel.
-IMA_EVM_CFG_yes = " file://ima.cfg \
-                    ${@ ima_evm_setattr_patch(d)} \
-                  "
-IMA_EVM_CFG_no = ""
-SRC_URI_append = "${IMA_EVM_CFG_${IMA_ENABLED_HERE}}"
-
-# IMA_EVM_ROOT_CA, if set, is the absolute path to a der-encoded
-# x509 CA certificate which will get compiled into the kernel.
-# The kernel will then use it to validate additional certificates,
-# like the one loaded dynamically for IMA.
-#
-# Depending on the kernel version, there are two ways to add the
-# CA certificate:
-# - For Linux < 4.3, we put the x509 file into the source directory
-#   where the kernel compilation will find it automatically
-#   (http://lxr.free-electrons.com/source/kernel/Makefile?v=4.2#L115).
-# - For Linux >= 4.3, we set SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS
-#   (http://lxr.free-electrons.com/source/certs/Kconfig?v=4.3#L29).
-#   The ima_evm_root_ca.cfg only contains a blank file name.
-#   The actual file name gets patched in after the file was used
-#   to configure the kernel (see do_kernel_configme_append).
-#   This has to point to a single file, i.e. using it for IMA has to
-#   be coordinated with other usages.
-#
-# The IMA_EVM_ROOT_CA default is set globally in ima-evm-rootfs.bbclass.
-# Need weaker default here in case that ima-evm-rootfs.bbclass is not
-# inherited.
-IMA_EVM_ROOT_CA ??= ""
-
-# Add CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS (for recent kernels) and
-# copy the root certificate into the build directory. By using
-# the normal fetcher mechanism for the certificate we ensure that
-# a rebuild is triggered when the file name or content change.
-#
-# Recompiling on name change is a bit too aggressive and causes
-# unnecessary rebuilds when only the location of the file, but not its
-# content change. This may need further work, should it become a problem
-# in practice. For example, IMA_EVM_ROOT_CA could be redefined as
-# an URL that then gets found via the normal file lookup.
-#
-# The fetcher does not expand SRC_URI. We have to enforce that here.
-IMA_EVM_ROOT_CA_CFG_yes = "${@ \
- ((' file://ima_evm_root_ca.cfg' if bb.utils.vercmp_string_op('${LINUX_VERSION}', '4.3', '>=') else '') + \
-   ' file://${IMA_EVM_ROOT_CA}') \
- if '${IMA_EVM_ROOT_CA}' else ''}"
-IMA_EVM_ROOT_CA_CFG_no = ""
-
-SRC_URI_append = "${IMA_EVM_ROOT_CA_CFG_${IMA_ENABLED_HERE}}"
-
-do_kernel_configme_append () {
-    if [ '${IMA_EVM_ROOT_CA}' ] && grep -q '^CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS=' ${B}/.config; then
-        # We can replace a blank value from ima_evm_root_ca.cfg,
-        # but when we find some other value, then we have to abort
-        # because we can't set more than one value.
-        eval `grep '^CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS='`
-        if [ "$CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS" ] && [ "$CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS" != "${IMA_EVM_ROOT_CA}" ]; then
-            bbfatal "CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS already set to $CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS, cannot replace with IMA_EVM_ROOT_CA = ${IMA_EVM_ROOT_CA}"
-            exit 1
-        fi
-        pemcert=${B}/`basename ${IMA_EVM_ROOT_CA}`.pem
-        openssl x509 -inform der -in ${IMA_EVM_ROOT_CA} -out $pemcert
-        sed -i -e "s;^CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS=.*;CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS=\"$pemcert\";" ${B}/.config
-    fi
-}
-
-do_kernel_configme[depends] += "${@ 'openssl-native:do_populate_sysroot' if '${IMA_ENABLED_HERE}' == 'yes' and '${IMA_EVM_ROOT_CA}' else '' }"
+SRC_URI += "${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'ima', ' file://ima.cfg', '', d)}"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/14 base-files: add appending to automount securityfs

In reply to Armin Kuster
---
 meta-integrity/recipes-core/base-files/base-files-ima.inc    | 5 +++++
 meta-integrity/recipes-core/base-files/base-files_%.bbappend | 1 +
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-core/base-files/base-files-ima.inc
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-core/base-files/base-files_%.bbappend
meta-integrity/recipes-core/base-files/base-files-ima.inc new file +5 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e9e210
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# Append iversion option for auto types
+do_install_append() {
+    sed -i 's/\s*auto\s*defaults/&,iversion/' "${D}${sysconfdir}/fstab"
+    echo 'securityfs  /sys/kernel/security  securityfs  defaults  0  0' >> "${D}${sysconfdir}/fstab"
+}
meta-integrity/recipes-core/base-files/base-files_%.bbappend new file +1 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c006f0e
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+require ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'ima', 'base-files-ima.inc', '', d)}
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/14 ima-policy-hashed: add new recipe

In reply to Armin Kuster
---
 .../ima_policy_hashed/files/ima_policy_hashed | 77 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../ima-policy-hashed_1.0.bb                  | 20 +++++
 2 files changed, 97 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_hashed/files/ima_policy_hashed
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_hashed/ima-policy-hashed_1.0.bb
meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_hashed/files/ima_policy_hashed new file +77 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f89c8d
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# With this policy, all files on regular partitions are
+# appraised. Files with signed IMA hash and normal hash are
+# accepted. Signed files cannot be modified while hashed files can be
+# (which will also update the hash). However, signed files can
+# be deleted, so in practice it is still possible to replace them
+# with a modified version.
+#
+# Without EVM, this is obviously not very secure, so this policy is
+# just an example and/or basis for further improvements. For that
+# purpose, some comments show what could be added to make the policy
+# more secure.
+#
+# With EVM the situation might be different because access
+# to the EVM key can be restricted.
+#
+# Files which are appraised are also measured. This allows
+# debugging whether a file is in policy by looking at
+# /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements
+
+# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
+# SYSFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
+# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x64626720
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
+# TMPFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
+# RAMFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x858458f6
+# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x1cd1
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
+# BIFMT
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x42494e4d
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
+# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
+# SELINUXFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+# NSFS_MAGIC (introduced in 3.19, see cd025f7 and e149ed2 in the upstream Linux kernel)
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x6e736673
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
+# SMACK_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x43415d53
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x43415d53
+# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x27e0eb
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
+# EFIVARFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0xde5e81e4
+dont_measure fsmagic=0xde5e81e4
+
+# Special partition, no checking done.
+# dont_measure  fsuuid=a11234...
+# dont_appraise fsuuid=a11243...
+
+# Special immutable group.
+# appraise appraise_type=imasig func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ fgroup=200
+
+# All executables must be signed - too strict, we need to
+# allow installing executables on the device.
+# appraise appraise_type=imasig func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
+# appraise appraise_type=imasig func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
+
+# Default rule. Would be needed also when other rules were added that
+# determine what to do in case of reading (mask=MAY_READ or
+# mask=MAY_EXEC) because otherwise writing does not update the file
+# hash.
+appraise
+measure
meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_hashed/ima-policy-hashed_1.0.bb new file +20 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3352daa
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+SUMMARY = "IMA sample hash policy"
+LICENSE = "MIT"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://${COREBASE}/meta/COPYING.MIT;md5=3da9cfbcb788c80a0384361b4de20420"
+
+# This policy file will get installed as /etc/ima/ima-policy.
+# It is located via the normal file search path, so a .bbappend
+# to this recipe can just point towards one of its own files.
+IMA_POLICY ?= "ima_policy_hashed"
+
+SRC_URI = " \
+    file://${IMA_POLICY} \
+"
+
+do_install () {
+    install -d ${D}/${sysconfdir}/ima
+    install ${WORKDIR}/${IMA_POLICY}  ${D}/${sysconfdir}/ima/ima-policy
+}
+
+FILES_${PN} = "${sysconfdir}/ima"
+RDEPENDS_${PN} = "ima-evm-utils"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/14 ima_policy_simple: add another sample policy

In reply to Armin Kuster
---
 .../ima_policy_simple/files/ima_policy_simple  |  4 ++++
 .../ima_policy_simple/ima-policy-simple_1.0.bb | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_simple/files/ima_policy_simple
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_simple/ima-policy-simple_1.0.bb
meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_simple/files/ima_policy_simple new file +4 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38ca8f5
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# Very simple policy demonstrating the systemd policy loading bug
+# (policy with one line works, two lines don't).
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572
meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_simple/ima-policy-simple_1.0.bb new file +18 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..17132aa
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+SUMMARY = "IMA sample simple policy"
+LICENSE = "MIT"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://${COREBASE}/meta/COPYING.MIT;md5=3da9cfbcb788c80a0384361b4de20420"
+
+# This policy file will get installed as /etc/ima/ima-policy.
+# It is located via the normal file search path, so a .bbappend
+# to this recipe can just point towards one of its own files.
+IMA_POLICY ?= "ima_policy_simple"
+
+SRC_URI = " file://${IMA_POLICY}"
+
+do_install () {
+    install -d ${D}/${sysconfdir}/ima
+    install ${WORKDIR}/${IMA_POLICY}  ${D}/${sysconfdir}/ima/ima-policy
+}
+
+FILES_${PN} = "${sysconfdir}/ima"
+RDEPENDS_${PN} = "ima-evm-utils"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/14 policy: add ima appraise all policy

In reply to Armin Kuster
---
 .../files/ima_policy_appraise_all             | 29 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../ima-policy-appraise-all_1.0.bb            | 18 ++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_appraise_all/files/ima_policy_appraise_all
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_appraise_all/ima-policy-appraise-all_1.0.bb
meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_appraise_all/files/ima_policy_appraise_all new file +29 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36e71a7
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+#
+# Integrity measure policy (http://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/#measure-nothing-appraise-everything)
+# 
+# Do not measure anything, but appraise everything
+#
+# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0
+# SYSFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572
+# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x64626720
+# TMPFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994
+# RAMFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6
+# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x1cd1
+# BIFMT
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x42494e4d
+# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673
+# SELINUXFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+# NSFS_MAGIC (introduced in 3.19, see cd025f7 and e149ed2 in the upstream Linux kernel)
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0x6e736673
+# EFIVARFS_MAGIC
+dont_appraise fsmagic=0xde5e81e4
+
+appraise
meta-integrity/recipes-security/ima_policy_appraise_all/ima-policy-appraise-all_1.0.bb new file +18 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b58d3fe
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+SUMMARY = "IMA sample simple appraise policy "
+LICENSE = "MIT"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://${COREBASE}/meta/COPYING.MIT;md5=3da9cfbcb788c80a0384361b4de20420"
+
+# This policy file will get installed as /etc/ima/ima-policy.
+# It is located via the normal file search path, so a .bbappend
+# to this recipe can just point towards one of its own files.
+IMA_POLICY ?= "ima_policy_appraise_all"
+
+SRC_URI = " file://${IMA_POLICY}"
+
+do_install () {
+    install -d ${D}/${sysconfdir}/ima
+    install ${WORKDIR}/${IMA_POLICY}  ${D}/${sysconfdir}/ima/ima-policy
+}
+
+FILES_${PN} = "${sysconfdir}/ima"
+RDEPENDS_${PN} = "ima-evm-utils"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/14 data: remove policies

In reply to Armin Kuster
---
 meta-integrity/data/ima_policy_appraise_all | 29 --------
 meta-integrity/data/ima_policy_hashed       | 77 ---------------------
 meta-integrity/data/ima_policy_simple       |  4 --
 3 files changed, 110 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 meta-integrity/data/ima_policy_appraise_all
 delete mode 100644 meta-integrity/data/ima_policy_hashed
 delete mode 100644 meta-integrity/data/ima_policy_simple
meta-integrity/data/ima_policy_appraise_all deleted +0 -29
deleted file mode 100644
index 36e71a7..0000000
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-#
-# Integrity measure policy (http://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/#measure-nothing-appraise-everything)
-# 
-# Do not measure anything, but appraise everything
-#
-# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
-dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0
-# SYSFS_MAGIC
-dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572
-# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
-dont_appraise fsmagic=0x64626720
-# TMPFS_MAGIC
-dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994
-# RAMFS_MAGIC
-dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6
-# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
-dont_appraise fsmagic=0x1cd1
-# BIFMT
-dont_appraise fsmagic=0x42494e4d
-# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
-dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673
-# SELINUXFS_MAGIC
-dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
-# NSFS_MAGIC (introduced in 3.19, see cd025f7 and e149ed2 in the upstream Linux kernel)
-dont_appraise fsmagic=0x6e736673
-# EFIVARFS_MAGIC
-dont_appraise fsmagic=0xde5e81e4
-
-appraise
meta-integrity/data/ima_policy_hashed deleted +0 -77

77 lines not on this page · raw message

meta-integrity/data/ima_policy_simple deleted +0 -4
deleted file mode 100644
index 38ca8f5..0000000
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-# Very simple policy demonstrating the systemd policy loading bug
-# (policy with one line works, two lines don't).
-dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0
-dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#12 lore raw

PATCH 12/14 initramfs: clean up to pull in packages.

In reply to Armin Kuster
---
 .../initrdscripts/initramfs-framework-ima.bb         | 12 ++++--------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
meta-integrity/recipes-core/initrdscripts/initramfs-framework-ima.bb +4 -8
index aca38b7..6057e8d 100644
@@ -8,25 +8,21 @@
 SUMMARY = "IMA module for the modular initramfs system"
 LICENSE = "MIT"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://${COREBASE}/meta/COPYING.MIT;md5=3da9cfbcb788c80a0384361b4de20420"
-RDEPENDS_${PN} += "initramfs-framework-base"
 
 # This policy file will get installed as /etc/ima/ima-policy.
 # It is located via the normal file search path, so a .bbappend
 # to this recipe can just point towards one of its own files.
 IMA_POLICY ?= "ima_policy_hashed"
-FILESEXTRAPATHS =. "${IMA_EVM_BASE}/data:"
 
-SRC_URI = " \
-    file://${IMA_POLICY} \
-    file://ima \
-"
+SRC_URI = " file://ima"
 
 do_install () {
     install -d ${D}/${sysconfdir}/ima
-    install ${WORKDIR}/${IMA_POLICY}  ${D}/${sysconfdir}/ima-policy
     install -d ${D}/init.d
     install ${WORKDIR}/ima  ${D}/init.d/20-ima
 }
 
 FILES_${PN} = "/init.d ${sysconfdir}"
-RDEPENDS_${PN} = "keyutils"
+
+RDEPENDS_${PN} = "keyutils ${IMA_POLICY}"
+RDEPENDS_${PN} += "initramfs-framework-base"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#13 lore raw

PATCH 13/14 runtime qa: moderize ima test

In reply to Armin Kuster
---
 meta-integrity/lib/oeqa/runtime/__init__.py  |   0
 meta-integrity/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/ima.py | 129 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta-integrity/lib/oeqa/runtime/ima.py       |  82 ------------
 3 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 meta-integrity/lib/oeqa/runtime/__init__.py
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/ima.py
 delete mode 100644 meta-integrity/lib/oeqa/runtime/ima.py
meta-integrity/lib/oeqa/runtime/__init__.py deleted +0 -0
deleted file mode 100644
index e69de29..0000000
meta-integrity/lib/oeqa/runtime/cases/ima.py new file +129 -0

129 lines not on this page · raw message

meta-integrity/lib/oeqa/runtime/ima.py deleted +0 -82

82 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#14 lore raw

PATCH 14/14 image: add image for testing

In reply to Armin Kuster
---
 .../images/integrity-image-minimal.bb         | 22 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta-integrity/recipes-core/images/integrity-image-minimal.bb
meta-integrity/recipes-core/images/integrity-image-minimal.bb new file +22 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ed724d
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+DESCRIPTION = "An image as an exmaple for Ima support"
+
+IMAGE_FEATURES += "ssh-server-openssh"
+
+
+IMAGE_INSTALL = "\
+    packagegroup-base \
+    packagegroup-core-boot \
+    packagegroup-ima-evm-utils \
+    os-release"
+
+
+LICENSE = "MIT"
+
+inherit core-image
+
+export IMAGE_BASENAME = "integrity-image-minimal"
+
+INHERIT += "ima-evm-rootfs"
+IMA_EVM_KEY_DIR = "${IMA_EVM_BASE}/data/debug-keys"
+
+QB_KERNEL_CMDLINE_APPEND_append = " ima_appraise=fix ima_policy=tcb ima_policy=appraise_tcb"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1