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package/libopenssl: security bump to version 1.1.1c

PATCH New Peter Korsgaard 1 participant 3 messages May 30, 2019 – Jun 6, 2019

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PATCH 1/1 package/libopenssl: security bump to version 1.1.1c

Fixes the following security issues:

Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305 (CVE-2019-1543)

ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are ignored.

It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a reused nonce.

Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.

---
 package/libopenssl/libopenssl.hash | 2 +-
 package/libopenssl/libopenssl.mk   | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
package/libopenssl/libopenssl.hash +1 -1
index 3a8192c46c..753f447abe 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # From https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-1.1.1b.tar.gz.sha256
-sha256	5c557b023230413dfb0756f3137a13e6d726838ccd1430888ad15bfb2b43ea4b	openssl-1.1.1b.tar.gz
+sha256	f6fb3079ad15076154eda9413fed42877d668e7069d9b87396d0804fdb3f4c90	openssl-1.1.1c.tar.gz
 
 # License files
 sha256	c32913b33252e71190af2066f08115c69bc9fddadf3bf29296e20c835389841c	LICENSE
package/libopenssl/libopenssl.mk +1 -1
index b7eff06c80..064b71bb2e 100644
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 #
 ################################################################################
 
-LIBOPENSSL_VERSION = 1.1.1b
+LIBOPENSSL_VERSION = 1.1.1c
 LIBOPENSSL_SITE = https://www.openssl.org/source
 LIBOPENSSL_SOURCE = openssl-$(LIBOPENSSL_VERSION).tar.gz
 LIBOPENSSL_LICENSE = OpenSSL or SSLeay
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 package/libopenssl: security bump to version 1.1.1c

Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

"Peter" == Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]> writes:

Fixes the following security issues:
Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305 (CVE-2019-1543)

ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are ignored.

It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a reused nonce.

Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.

Quoted 1 line

Committed, thanks.

Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
#2 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 package/libopenssl: security bump to version 1.1.1c

In reply to Peter Korsgaard
Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

"Peter" == Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]> writes:

Fixes the following security issues:
Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305 (CVE-2019-1543)

ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are ignored.

It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a reused nonce.

Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.

Quoted 1 line

Committed to 2019.02.x, thanks.

Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard