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rapidio: fix a NULL pointer dereference when create_workqueue() fails

PATCH New Sasha Levin 1 participant 56 messages Jun 1, 2019

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Sasha Levin

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/141 rapidio: fix a NULL pointer dereference when create_workqueue() fails

From: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 23015b22e47c5409620b1726a677d69e5cd032ba ]

In case create_workqueue fails, the fix releases resources and returns -ENOMEM to avoid NULL pointer dereference.

---
 drivers/rapidio/rio_cm.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/rapidio/rio_cm.c +8 -0
index bad0e0ea4f305..ef989a15aefc4 100644
@@ -2145,6 +2145,14 @@ static int riocm_add_mport(struct device *dev,
 	mutex_init(&cm->rx_lock);
 	riocm_rx_fill(cm, RIOCM_RX_RING_SIZE);
 	cm->rx_wq = create_workqueue(DRV_NAME "/rxq");
+	if (!cm->rx_wq) {
+		riocm_error("failed to allocate IBMBOX_%d on %s",
+			    cmbox, mport->name);
+		rio_release_outb_mbox(mport, cmbox);
+		kfree(cm);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
 	INIT_WORK(&cm->rx_work, rio_ibmsg_handler);
 
 	cm->tx_slot = 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/141 fs/fat/file.c: issue flush after the writeback of FAT

From: Hou Tao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bd8309de0d60838eef6fb575b0c4c7e95841cf73 ]

fsync() needs to make sure the data & meta-data of file are persistent after the return of fsync(), even when a power-failure occurs later. In the case of fat-fs, the FAT belongs to the meta-data of file, so we need to issue a flush after the writeback of FAT instead before.

Also bail out early when any stage of fsync fails.

---
 fs/fat/file.c | 11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/fat/file.c +8 -3
index 4f3d72fb1e60d..f86ea08bd6ce4 100644
@@ -193,12 +193,17 @@ static int fat_file_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 int fat_file_fsync(struct file *filp, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = filp->f_mapping->host;
-	int res, err;
+	int err;
+
+	err = __generic_file_fsync(filp, start, end, datasync);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
 
-	res = generic_file_fsync(filp, start, end, datasync);
 	err = sync_mapping_buffers(MSDOS_SB(inode->i_sb)->fat_inode->i_mapping);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
 
-	return res ? res : err;
+	return blkdev_issue_flush(inode->i_sb->s_bdev, GFP_KERNEL, NULL);
 }
 
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/141 sysctl: return -EINVAL if val violates minmax

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e260ad01f0aa9e96b5386d5cd7184afd949dc457 ]

Currently when userspace gives us a values that overflow e.g. file-max and other callers of __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax() we simply ignore the new value and leave the current value untouched.

This can be problematic as it gives the illusion that the limit has indeed be bumped when in fact it failed. This commit makes sure to return EINVAL when an overflow is detected. Please note that this is a userspace facing change.

---
 kernel/sysctl.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/sysctl.c +4 -2
index 9a85c7ae73621..f8576509c7bef 100644
@@ -2791,8 +2791,10 @@ static int __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(void *data, struct ctl_table *table, int
 			if (neg)
 				continue;
 			val = convmul * val / convdiv;
-			if ((min && val < *min) || (max && val > *max))
-				continue;
+			if ((min && val < *min) || (max && val > *max)) {
+				err = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
 			*i = val;
 		} else {
 			val = convdiv * (*i) / convmul;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 4/141 ipc: prevent lockup on alloc_msg and free_msg

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Li Rongqing <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d6a2946a88f524a47cc9b79279667137899db807 ]

msgctl10 of ltp triggers the following lockup When CONFIG_KASAN is enabled on large memory SMP systems, the pages initialization can take a long time, if msgctl10 requests a huge block memory, and it will block rcu scheduler, so release cpu actively.

After adding schedule() in free_msg, free_msg can not be called when holding spinlock, so adding msg to a tmp list, and free it out of spinlock

  rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
  rcu:     Tasks blocked on level-1 rcu_node (CPUs 16-31): P32505
  rcu:     Tasks blocked on level-1 rcu_node (CPUs 48-63): P34978
  rcu:     (detected by 11, t=35024 jiffies, g=44237529, q=16542267)
  msgctl10        R  running task    21608 32505   2794 0x00000082
  Call Trace:
   preempt_schedule_irq+0x4c/0xb0
   retint_kernel+0x1b/0x2d
  RIP: 0010:__is_insn_slot_addr+0xfb/0x250
  Code: 82 1d 00 48 8b 9b 90 00 00 00 4c 89 f7 49 c1 ee 03 e8 59 83 1d 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 39 eb 48 89 9d 58 ff ff ff <41> c6 04 06 f8 74 66 4c 8d 75 98 4c 89 f1 48 c1 e9 03 48 01 c8 48
  RSP: 0018:ffff88bce041f758 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
  RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff8471bc50 RCX: ffffffff828a2a57
  RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88bce041f780
  RBP: ffff88bce041f828 R08: ffffed15f3f4c5b3 R09: ffffed15f3f4c5b3
  R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed15f3f4c5b2 R12: 000000318aee9b73
  R13: ffffffff8471bc50 R14: 1ffff1179c083ef0 R15: 1ffff1179c083eec
   kernel_text_address+0xc1/0x100
   __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30
   unwind_get_return_address+0x2f/0x50
   __save_stack_trace+0x92/0x100
   create_object+0x380/0x650
   __kmalloc+0x14c/0x2b0
   load_msg+0x38/0x1a0
   do_msgsnd+0x19e/0xcf0
   do_syscall_64+0x117/0x400
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

  rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
  rcu:     Tasks blocked on level-1 rcu_node (CPUs 0-15): P32170
  rcu:     (detected by 14, t=35016 jiffies, g=44237525, q=12423063)
  msgctl10        R  running task    21608 32170  32155 0x00000082
  Call Trace:
   preempt_schedule_irq+0x4c/0xb0
   retint_kernel+0x1b/0x2d
  RIP: 0010:lock_acquire+0x4d/0x340
  Code: 48 81 ec c0 00 00 00 45 89 c6 4d 89 cf 48 8d 6c 24 20 48 89 3c 24 48 8d bb e4 0c 00 00 89 74 24 0c 48 c7 44 24 20 b3 8a b5 41 <48> c1 ed 03 48 c7 44 24 28 b4 25 18 84 48 c7 44 24 30 d0 54 7a 82
  RSP: 0018:ffff88af83417738 EFLAGS: 00000282 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
  RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88bd335f3080 RCX: 0000000000000002
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88bd335f3d64
  RBP: ffff88af83417758 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed13f3f745b2 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
   is_bpf_text_address+0x32/0xe0
   kernel_text_address+0xec/0x100
   __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30
   unwind_get_return_address+0x2f/0x50
   __save_stack_trace+0x92/0x100
   save_stack+0x32/0xb0
   __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180
   kfree+0xfa/0x2d0
   free_msg+0x24/0x50
   do_msgrcv+0x508/0xe60
   do_syscall_64+0x117/0x400
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Davidlohr said:
"So after releasing the lock, the msg rbtree/list is empty and new
calls will not see those in the newly populated tmp_msg list, and therefore they cannot access the delayed msg freeing pointers, which is good. Also the fact that the node_cache is now freed before the actual messages seems to be harmless as this is wanted for msg_insert() avoiding GFP_ATOMIC allocations, and after releasing the info->lock the thing is freed anyway so it should not change things"

---
 ipc/mqueue.c  | 10 ++++++++--
 ipc/msgutil.c |  6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
ipc/mqueue.c +8 -2
index c0d58f390c3b4..bce7af1546d9c 100644
@@ -391,7 +391,8 @@ static void mqueue_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
 	struct user_struct *user;
 	unsigned long mq_bytes, mq_treesize;
 	struct ipc_namespace *ipc_ns;
-	struct msg_msg *msg;
+	struct msg_msg *msg, *nmsg;
+	LIST_HEAD(tmp_msg);
 
 	clear_inode(inode);
 
@@ -402,10 +403,15 @@ static void mqueue_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
 	info = MQUEUE_I(inode);
 	spin_lock(&info->lock);
 	while ((msg = msg_get(info)) != NULL)
-		free_msg(msg);
+		list_add_tail(&msg->m_list, &tmp_msg);
 	kfree(info->node_cache);
 	spin_unlock(&info->lock);
 
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(msg, nmsg, &tmp_msg, m_list) {
+		list_del(&msg->m_list);
+		free_msg(msg);
+	}
+
 	/* Total amount of bytes accounted for the mqueue */
 	mq_treesize = info->attr.mq_maxmsg * sizeof(struct msg_msg) +
 		min_t(unsigned int, info->attr.mq_maxmsg, MQ_PRIO_MAX) *
ipc/msgutil.c +6 -0
index 84598025a6ade..e65593742e2be 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
 #include <linux/proc_ns.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
 
 #include "util.h"
 
@@ -64,6 +65,9 @@ static struct msg_msg *alloc_msg(size_t len)
 	pseg = &msg->next;
 	while (len > 0) {
 		struct msg_msgseg *seg;
+
+		cond_resched();
+
 		alen = min(len, DATALEN_SEG);
 		seg = kmalloc(sizeof(*seg) + alen, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 		if (seg == NULL)
@@ -176,6 +180,8 @@ void free_msg(struct msg_msg *msg)
 	kfree(msg);
 	while (seg != NULL) {
 		struct msg_msgseg *tmp = seg->next;
+
+		cond_resched();
 		kfree(seg);
 		seg = tmp;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 5/141 drm/pl111: Initialize clock spinlock early

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3e01ae2612bdd7975c74ec7123d7f8f5e6eed795 ]

The following warning is seen on systems with broken clock divider.

INFO: trying to register non-static key.
the code is fine but needs lockdep annotation.
turning off the locking correctness validator.

CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.1.0-09698-g1fb3b52 #1
Hardware name: ARM Integrator/CP (Device Tree)
[<c0011be8>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c000ebb8>] (show_stack+0x10/0x18)
[<c000ebb8>] (show_stack) from [<c07d3fd0>] (dump_stack+0x18/0x24)
[<c07d3fd0>] (dump_stack) from [<c0060d48>] (register_lock_class+0x674/0x6f8)
[<c0060d48>] (register_lock_class) from [<c005de2c>]
	(__lock_acquire+0x68/0x2128)
[<c005de2c>] (__lock_acquire) from [<c0060408>] (lock_acquire+0x110/0x21c)
[<c0060408>] (lock_acquire) from [<c07f755c>] (_raw_spin_lock+0x34/0x48)
[<c07f755c>] (_raw_spin_lock) from [<c0536c8c>]
	(pl111_display_enable+0xf8/0x5fc)
[<c0536c8c>] (pl111_display_enable) from [<c0502f54>]
	(drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x1ec/0x244)

Since commit eedd6033b4c8 ("drm/pl111: Support variants with broken clock divider"), the spinlock is not initialized if the clock divider is broken. Initialize it earlier to fix the problem.

Fixes eedd6033b4c8 ("drm/pl111: Support variants with broken clock divider")
Cc Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/pl111/pl111_display.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/pl111/pl111_display.c +3 -2
index 754f6b25f2652..6d9f78612deeb 100644
@@ -531,14 +531,15 @@ pl111_init_clock_divider(struct drm_device *drm)
 		dev_err(drm->dev, "CLCD: unable to get clcdclk.\n");
 		return PTR_ERR(parent);
 	}
+
+	spin_lock_init(&priv->tim2_lock);
+
 	/* If the clock divider is broken, use the parent directly */
 	if (priv->variant->broken_clockdivider) {
 		priv->clk = parent;
 		return 0;
 	}
 	parent_name = __clk_get_name(parent);
-
-	spin_lock_init(&priv->tim2_lock);
 	div->init = &init;
 
 	ret = devm_clk_hw_register(drm->dev, div);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 6/141 ARM: prevent tracing IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit be167862ae7dd85c56d385209a4890678e1b0488 ]

Patch series "compiler: allow all arches to enable CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING", v3.

This patch (of 11):

When function tracing for IPIs is enabled, we get a warning for an overflow of the ipi_types array with the IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE type as triggered by raise_nmi():

arch/arm/kernel/smp.c: In function 'raise_nmi':
arch/arm/kernel/smp.c:489:2: error: array subscript is above array bounds [-Werror=array-bounds]

    trace_ipi_raise(target, ipi_types[ipinr]);

This is a correct warning as we actually overflow the array here.

This patch raise_nmi() to call __smp_cross_call() instead of smp_cross_call(), to avoid calling into ftrace. For clarification, I'm also adding a two new code comments describing how this one is special.

The warning appears to have shown up after commit e7273ff49acf ("ARM:
8488/1: Make IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE a "non-secure" SGI"), which changed the number assignment from '15' to '8', but as far as I can tell has existed since the IPI tracepoints were first introduced. If we decide to backport this patch to stable kernels, we probably need to backport e7273ff49acf as well.

[[email protected]: rebase on v5.1-rc1]
Fixes e7273ff49acf ("ARM: 8488/1: Make IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE a "non-secure" SGI")
Fixes 365ec7b17327 ("ARM: add IPI tracepoints") # v3.17
Cc Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Cc Mathieu Malaterre <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc Stefan Agner <[email protected]>
Cc Boris Brezillon <[email protected]>
Cc Miquel Raynal <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc Brian Norris <[email protected]>
Cc Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
Cc Russell King <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/hardirq.h | 1 +
 arch/arm/kernel/smp.c          | 6 +++++-
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/hardirq.h +1 -0
index cba23eaa60721..7a88f160b1fbe 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include <linux/threads.h>
 #include <asm/irq.h>
 
+/* number of IPIS _not_ including IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE */
 #define NR_IPI	7
 
 typedef struct {
arch/arm/kernel/smp.c +5 -1
index a3ce7c5365fa8..bada66ef44193 100644
@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ enum ipi_msg_type {
 	IPI_CPU_STOP,
 	IPI_IRQ_WORK,
 	IPI_COMPLETION,
+	/*
+	 * CPU_BACKTRACE is special and not included in NR_IPI
+	 * or tracable with trace_ipi_*
+	 */
 	IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE,
 	/*
 	 * SGI8-15 can be reserved by secure firmware, and thus may
@@ -803,7 +807,7 @@ core_initcall(register_cpufreq_notifier);
 
 static void raise_nmi(cpumask_t *mask)
 {
-	smp_cross_call(mask, IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE);
+	__smp_cross_call(mask, IPI_CPU_BACKTRACE);
 }
 
 void arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace(const cpumask_t *mask, bool exclude_self)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 7/141 mm/hmm: select mmu notifier when selecting HMM

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jérôme Glisse <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 734fb89968900b5c5f8edd5038bd4cdeab8c61d2 ]

To avoid random config build issue, select mmu notifier when HMM is selected. In any cases when HMM get selected it will be by users that will also wants the mmu notifier.

---
 mm/Kconfig | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/Kconfig +1 -1
index de64ea658716a..b457e94ae6182 100644
@@ -700,12 +700,12 @@ config DEV_PAGEMAP_OPS
 
 config HMM
 	bool
+	select MMU_NOTIFIER
 	select MIGRATE_VMA_HELPER
 
 config HMM_MIRROR
 	bool "HMM mirror CPU page table into a device page table"
 	depends on ARCH_HAS_HMM
-	select MMU_NOTIFIER
 	select HMM
 	help
 	  Select HMM_MIRROR if you want to mirror range of the CPU page table of a
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 8/141 hugetlbfs: on restore reserve error path retain subpool reservation

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0919e1b69ab459e06df45d3ba6658d281962db80 ]

When a huge page is allocated, PagePrivate() is set if the allocation consumed a reservation. When freeing a huge page, PagePrivate is checked. If set, it indicates the reservation should be restored. PagePrivate being set at free huge page time mostly happens on error paths.

When huge page reservations are created, a check is made to determine if the mapping is associated with an explicitly mounted filesystem. If so, pages are also reserved within the filesystem. The default action when freeing a huge page is to decrement the usage count in any associated explicitly mounted filesystem. However, if the reservation is to be restored the reservation/use count within the filesystem should not be decrementd. Otherwise, a subsequent page allocation and free for the same mapping location will cause the file filesystem usage to go 'negative'.

Filesystem Size Used Avail Use% Mounted on
nodev 4.0G -4.0M 4.1G - /opt/hugepool

To fix, when freeing a huge page do not adjust filesystem usage if PagePrivate() is set to indicate the reservation should be restored.

I did not cc stable as the problem has been around since reserves were added to hugetlbfs and nobody has noticed.

---
 mm/hugetlb.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
mm/hugetlb.c +16 -5
index 0bbb033d7d8c8..65179513c2b25 100644
@@ -1256,12 +1256,23 @@ void free_huge_page(struct page *page)
 	ClearPagePrivate(page);
 
 	/*
-	 * A return code of zero implies that the subpool will be under its
-	 * minimum size if the reservation is not restored after page is free.
-	 * Therefore, force restore_reserve operation.
+	 * If PagePrivate() was set on page, page allocation consumed a
+	 * reservation.  If the page was associated with a subpool, there
+	 * would have been a page reserved in the subpool before allocation
+	 * via hugepage_subpool_get_pages().  Since we are 'restoring' the
+	 * reservtion, do not call hugepage_subpool_put_pages() as this will
+	 * remove the reserved page from the subpool.
 	 */
-	if (hugepage_subpool_put_pages(spool, 1) == 0)
-		restore_reserve = true;
+	if (!restore_reserve) {
+		/*
+		 * A return code of zero implies that the subpool will be
+		 * under its minimum size if the reservation is not restored
+		 * after page is free.  Therefore, force restore_reserve
+		 * operation.
+		 */
+		if (hugepage_subpool_put_pages(spool, 1) == 0)
+			restore_reserve = true;
+	}
 
 	spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
 	clear_page_huge_active(page);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 9/141 mem-hotplug: fix node spanned pages when we have a node with only ZONE_MOVABLE

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Linxu Fang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 299c83dce9ea3a79bb4b5511d2cb996b6b8e5111 ]

342332e6a925 ("mm/page_alloc.c: introduce kernelcore=mirror option") and later patches rewrote the calculation of node spanned pages.

e506b99696a2 ("mem-hotplug: fix node spanned pages when we have a movable node"), but the current code still has problems,

When we have a node with only zone_movable and the node id is not zero, the size of node spanned pages is double added.

That's because we have an empty normal zone, and zone_start_pfn or zone_end_pfn is not between arch_zone_lowest_possible_pfn and arch_zone_highest_possible_pfn, so we need to use clamp to constrain the range just like the commit <96e907d13602> (bootmem: Reimplement __absent_pages_in_range() using for_each_mem_pfn_range()).

e.g.
Zone ranges:

  DMA      [mem 0x0000000000001000-0x0000000000ffffff]
  DMA32    [mem 0x0000000001000000-0x00000000ffffffff]
  Normal   [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000023fffffff]

Movable zone start for each node
Node 0: 0x0000000100000000
Node 1: 0x0000000140000000
Early memory node ranges

  node   0: [mem 0x0000000000001000-0x000000000009efff]
  node   0: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000bffdffff]
  node   0: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000013fffffff]
  node   1: [mem 0x0000000140000000-0x000000023fffffff]

node 0 DMA spanned:0xfff present:0xf9e absent:0x61
node 0 DMA32 spanned:0xff000 present:0xbefe0 absent:0x40020
node 0 Normal spanned:0 present:0 absent:0
node 0 Movable spanned:0x40000 present:0x40000 absent:0
On node 0 totalpages(node_present_pages): 1048446 node_spanned_pages:1310719
node 1 DMA spanned:0 present:0 absent:0
node 1 DMA32 spanned:0 present:0 absent:0
node 1 Normal spanned:0x100000 present:0x100000 absent:0
node 1 Movable spanned:0x100000 present:0x100000 absent:0
On node 1 totalpages(node_present_pages): 2097152 node_spanned_pages:2097152
Memory: 6967796K/12582392K available (16388K kernel code, 3686K rwdata, 4468K rodata, 2160K init, 10444K bss, 5614596K reserved, 0K cma-reserved)

It shows that the current memory of node 1 is double added. After this patch, the problem is fixed.

node 0 DMA spanned:0xfff present:0xf9e absent:0x61
node 0 DMA32 spanned:0xff000 present:0xbefe0 absent:0x40020
node 0 Normal spanned:0 present:0 absent:0
node 0 Movable spanned:0x40000 present:0x40000 absent:0
On node 0 totalpages(node_present_pages): 1048446 node_spanned_pages:1310719
node 1 DMA spanned:0 present:0 absent:0
node 1 DMA32 spanned:0 present:0 absent:0
node 1 Normal spanned:0 present:0 absent:0
node 1 Movable spanned:0x100000 present:0x100000 absent:0
On node 1 totalpages(node_present_pages): 1048576 node_spanned_pages:1048576
memory: 6967796K/8388088K available (16388K kernel code, 3686K rwdata, 4468K rodata, 2160K init, 10444K bss, 1420292K reserved, 0K cma-reserved)

---
 mm/page_alloc.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/page_alloc.c +4 -2
index 8e6932a140b82..2d04bd2e1ced7 100644
@@ -5937,13 +5937,15 @@ static unsigned long __meminit zone_spanned_pages_in_node(int nid,
 					unsigned long *zone_end_pfn,
 					unsigned long *ignored)
 {
+	unsigned long zone_low = arch_zone_lowest_possible_pfn[zone_type];
+	unsigned long zone_high = arch_zone_highest_possible_pfn[zone_type];
 	/* When hotadd a new node from cpu_up(), the node should be empty */
 	if (!node_start_pfn && !node_end_pfn)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Get the start and end of the zone */
-	*zone_start_pfn = arch_zone_lowest_possible_pfn[zone_type];
-	*zone_end_pfn = arch_zone_highest_possible_pfn[zone_type];
+	*zone_start_pfn = clamp(node_start_pfn, zone_low, zone_high);
+	*zone_end_pfn = clamp(node_end_pfn, zone_low, zone_high);
 	adjust_zone_range_for_zone_movable(nid, zone_type,
 				node_start_pfn, node_end_pfn,
 				zone_start_pfn, zone_end_pfn);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 10/141 mm/cma.c: fix crash on CMA allocation if bitmap allocation fails

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Yue Hu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1df3a339074e31db95c4790ea9236874b13ccd87 ]

f022d8cb7ec7 ("mm: cma: Don't crash on allocation if CMA area can't be activated") fixes the crash issue when activation fails via setting cma->count as 0, same logic exists if bitmap allocation fails.

---
 mm/cma.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/cma.c +3 -1
index bfe9f5397165c..6ce6e22f82d9c 100644
@@ -106,8 +106,10 @@ static int __init cma_activate_area(struct cma *cma)
 
 	cma->bitmap = kzalloc(bitmap_size, GFP_KERNEL);
 
-	if (!cma->bitmap)
+	if (!cma->bitmap) {
+		cma->count = 0;
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(!pfn_valid(pfn));
 	zone = page_zone(pfn_to_page(pfn));
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 11/141 initramfs: free initrd memory if opening /initrd.image fails

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 54c7a8916a887f357088f99e9c3a7720cd57d2c8 ]

Patch series "initramfs tidyups".

I've spent some time chasing down behavior in initramfs and found plenty of opportunity to improve the code. A first stab on that is contained in this series.

This patch (of 7):

We free the initrd memory for all successful or error cases except for the case where opening /initrd.image fails, which looks like an oversight.

Steven said:

: This also changes the behaviour when CONFIG_INITRAMFS_FORCE is enabled : - specifically it means that the initrd is freed (previously it was : ignored and never freed). But that seems like reasonable behaviour and : the previous behaviour looks like another oversight.

---
 init/initramfs.c | 14 ++++++--------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
init/initramfs.c +6 -8
index f6f4a1e4cd547..cd5fb00fcb549 100644
@@ -612,13 +612,12 @@ static int __init populate_rootfs(void)
 		printk(KERN_INFO "Trying to unpack rootfs image as initramfs...\n");
 		err = unpack_to_rootfs((char *)initrd_start,
 			initrd_end - initrd_start);
-		if (!err) {
-			free_initrd();
+		if (!err)
 			goto done;
-		} else {
-			clean_rootfs();
-			unpack_to_rootfs(__initramfs_start, __initramfs_size);
-		}
+
+		clean_rootfs();
+		unpack_to_rootfs(__initramfs_start, __initramfs_size);
+
 		printk(KERN_INFO "rootfs image is not initramfs (%s)"
 				"; looks like an initrd\n", err);
 		fd = ksys_open("/initrd.image",
@@ -632,7 +631,6 @@ static int __init populate_rootfs(void)
 				       written, initrd_end - initrd_start);
 
 			ksys_close(fd);
-			free_initrd();
 		}
 	done:
 		/* empty statement */;
@@ -642,9 +640,9 @@ static int __init populate_rootfs(void)
 			initrd_end - initrd_start);
 		if (err)
 			printk(KERN_EMERG "Initramfs unpacking failed: %s\n", err);
-		free_initrd();
 #endif
 	}
+	free_initrd();
 	flush_delayed_fput();
 	/*
 	 * Try loading default modules from initramfs.  This gives
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 12/141 mm/cma.c: fix the bitmap status to show failed allocation reason

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Yue Hu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2b59e01a3aa665f751d1410b99fae9336bd424e1 ]

Currently one bit in cma bitmap represents number of pages rather than one page, cma->count means cma size in pages. So to find available pages via find_next_zero_bit()/find_next_bit() we should use cma size not in pages but in bits although current free pages number is correct due to zero value of order_per_bit. Once order_per_bit is changed the bitmap status will be incorrect.

The size input in cma_debug_show_areas() is not correct. It will affect the available pages at some position to debug the failure issue.

This is an example with order_per_bit = 1

Before this change:

[    4.120060] cma: number of available pages: 1@93+4@108+7@121+7@137+7@153+7@169+7@185+7@201+3@213+3@221+3@229+3@237+3@245+3@253+3@261+3@269+3@277+3@285+3@293+3@301+3@309+3@317+3@325+19@333+15@369+512@512=> 638 free of 1024 total pages

After this change:

[    4.143234] cma: number of available pages: 2@93+8@108+14@121+14@137+14@153+14@169+14@185+14@201+6@213+6@221+6@229+6@237+6@245+6@253+6@261+6@269+6@277+6@285+6@293+6@301+6@309+6@317+6@325+38@333+30@369=> 252 free of 1024 total pages

Obviously the bitmap status before is incorrect.

---
 mm/cma.c | 19 +++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
mm/cma.c +11 -8
index 6ce6e22f82d9c..476dfe13a701f 100644
@@ -371,23 +371,26 @@ int __init cma_declare_contiguous(phys_addr_t base,
 #ifdef CONFIG_CMA_DEBUG
 static void cma_debug_show_areas(struct cma *cma)
 {
-	unsigned long next_zero_bit, next_set_bit;
+	unsigned long next_zero_bit, next_set_bit, nr_zero;
 	unsigned long start = 0;
-	unsigned int nr_zero, nr_total = 0;
+	unsigned long nr_part, nr_total = 0;
+	unsigned long nbits = cma_bitmap_maxno(cma);
 
 	mutex_lock(&cma->lock);
 	pr_info("number of available pages: ");
 	for (;;) {
-		next_zero_bit = find_next_zero_bit(cma->bitmap, cma->count, start);
-		if (next_zero_bit >= cma->count)
+		next_zero_bit = find_next_zero_bit(cma->bitmap, nbits, start);
+		if (next_zero_bit >= nbits)
 			break;
-		next_set_bit = find_next_bit(cma->bitmap, cma->count, next_zero_bit);
+		next_set_bit = find_next_bit(cma->bitmap, nbits, next_zero_bit);
 		nr_zero = next_set_bit - next_zero_bit;
-		pr_cont("%s%u@%lu", nr_total ? "+" : "", nr_zero, next_zero_bit);
-		nr_total += nr_zero;
+		nr_part = nr_zero << cma->order_per_bit;
+		pr_cont("%s%lu@%lu", nr_total ? "+" : "", nr_part,
+			next_zero_bit);
+		nr_total += nr_part;
 		start = next_zero_bit + nr_zero;
 	}
-	pr_cont("=> %u free of %lu total pages\n", nr_total, cma->count);
+	pr_cont("=> %lu free of %lu total pages\n", nr_total, cma->count);
 	mutex_unlock(&cma->lock);
 }
 #else
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 13/141 mm: page_mkclean vs MADV_DONTNEED race

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 024eee0e83f0df52317be607ca521e0fc572aa07 ]

MADV_DONTNEED is handled with mmap_sem taken in read mode. We call page_mkclean without holding mmap_sem.

MADV_DONTNEED implies that pages in the region are unmapped and subsequent access to the pages in that range is handled as a new page fault. This implies that if we don't have parallel access to the region when MADV_DONTNEED is run we expect those range to be unallocated.

w.r.t page_mkclean() we need to make sure that we don't break the MADV_DONTNEED semantics. MADV_DONTNEED check for pmd_none without holding pmd_lock. This implies we skip the pmd if we temporarily mark pmd none. Avoid doing that while marking the page clean.

Keep the sequence same for dax too even though we don't support MADV_DONTNEED for dax mapping

The bug was noticed by code review and I didn't observe any failures w.r.t test run. This is similar to

commit 58ceeb6bec86d9140f9d91d71a710e963523d063

Author: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Date:   Thu Apr 13 14:56:26 2017 -0700

thp: fix MADV_DONTNEED vs. MADV_FREE race

commit ced108037c2aa542b3ed8b7afd1576064ad1362a

Author: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Date:   Thu Apr 13 14:56:20 2017 -0700

thp: fix MADV_DONTNEED vs. numa balancing race

---
 fs/dax.c  | 2 +-
 mm/rmap.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/dax.c +1 -1
index 004c8ac1117c4..75a289c31c7e5 100644
@@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ static void dax_mapping_entry_mkclean(struct address_space *mapping,
 				goto unlock_pmd;
 
 			flush_cache_page(vma, address, pfn);
-			pmd = pmdp_huge_clear_flush(vma, address, pmdp);
+			pmd = pmdp_invalidate(vma, address, pmdp);
 			pmd = pmd_wrprotect(pmd);
 			pmd = pmd_mkclean(pmd);
 			set_pmd_at(vma->vm_mm, address, pmdp, pmd);
mm/rmap.c +1 -1
index 85b7f94233526..f048c2651954b 100644
@@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ static bool page_mkclean_one(struct page *page, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 				continue;
 
 			flush_cache_page(vma, address, page_to_pfn(page));
-			entry = pmdp_huge_clear_flush(vma, address, pmd);
+			entry = pmdp_invalidate(vma, address, pmd);
 			entry = pmd_wrprotect(entry);
 			entry = pmd_mkclean(entry);
 			set_pmd_at(vma->vm_mm, address, pmd, entry);
Signature · 6 lines
2.20.1

_______________________________________________
Linux-nvdimm mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-nvdimm
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 14/141 mm/cma_debug.c: fix the break condition in cma_maxchunk_get()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Yue Hu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f0fd50504a54f5548eb666dc16ddf8394e44e4b7 ]

If not find zero bit in find_next_zero_bit(), it will return the size parameter passed in, so the start bit should be compared with bitmap_maxno rather than cma->count. Although getting maxchunk is working fine due to zero value of order_per_bit currently, the operation will be stuck if order_per_bit is set as non-zero.

---
 mm/cma_debug.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/cma_debug.c +1 -1
index ad6723e9d110a..3e0415076cc9e 100644
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static int cma_maxchunk_get(void *data, u64 *val)
 	mutex_lock(&cma->lock);
 	for (;;) {
 		start = find_next_zero_bit(cma->bitmap, bitmap_maxno, end);
-		if (start >= cma->count)
+		if (start >= bitmap_maxno)
 			break;
 		end = find_next_bit(cma->bitmap, bitmap_maxno, start);
 		maxchunk = max(end - start, maxchunk);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 15/141 mm/slab.c: fix an infinite loop in leaks_show()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Qian Cai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 745e10146c31b1c6ed3326286704ae251b17f663 ]

"cat /proc/slab_allocators" could hang forever on SMP machines with kmemleak or object debugging enabled due to other CPUs running do_drain() will keep making kmemleak_object or debug_objects_cache dirty and unable to escape the first loop in leaks_show(),

do {
	set_store_user_clean(cachep);
	drain_cpu_caches(cachep);
	...

} while (!is_store_user_clean(cachep));

For example,

do_drain
slabs_destroy

    slab_destroy
      kmem_cache_free
        __cache_free
          ___cache_free
            kmemleak_free_recursive
              delete_object_full
                __delete_object
                  put_object
                    free_object_rcu
                      kmem_cache_free
                        cache_free_debugcheck --> dirty kmemleak_object

One approach is to check cachep->name and skip both kmemleak_object and debug_objects_cache in leaks_show(). The other is to set store_user_clean after drain_cpu_caches() which leaves a small window between drain_cpu_caches() and set_store_user_clean() where per-CPU caches could be dirty again lead to slightly wrong information has been stored but could also speed up things significantly which sounds like a good compromise. For example,

 # cat /proc/slab_allocators
 0m42.778s # 1st approach
 0m0.737s  # 2nd approach
[[email protected]: tweak comment]
Fixes d31676dfde25 ("mm/slab: alternative implementation for DEBUG_SLAB_LEAK")
Cc Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
---
 mm/slab.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/slab.c +5 -1
index 018d32496e8d1..46f21e73db2f8 100644
@@ -4326,8 +4326,12 @@ static int leaks_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p)
 	 * whole processing.
 	 */
 	do {
-		set_store_user_clean(cachep);
 		drain_cpu_caches(cachep);
+		/*
+		 * drain_cpu_caches() could make kmemleak_object and
+		 * debug_objects_cache dirty, so reset afterwards.
+		 */
+		set_store_user_clean(cachep);
 
 		x[1] = 0;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 16/141 kernel/sys.c: prctl: fix false positive in validate_prctl_map()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a9e73998f9d705c94a8dca9687633adc0f24a19a ]

While validating new map we require the @start_data to be strictly less than @end_data, which is fine for regular applications (this is why this nit didn't trigger for that long). These members are set from executable loaders such as elf handers, still it is pretty valid to have a loadable data section with zero size in file, in such case the start_data is equal to end_data once kernel loader finishes.

As a result when we're trying to restore such programs the procedure fails and the kernel returns -EINVAL. From the image dump of a program:

 | "mm_start_code": "0x400000",
 | "mm_end_code": "0x8f5fb4",
 | "mm_start_data": "0xf1bfb0",
 | "mm_end_data": "0xf1bfb0",

Thus we need to change validate_prctl_map from strictly less to less or equal operator use.

Fixes f606b77f1a9e3 ("prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation")
Cc Andrey Vagin <[email protected]>
Cc Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
Cc Pavel Emelyanov <[email protected]>
---
 kernel/sys.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/sys.c +1 -1
index 123bd73046ec6..096932a450466 100644
@@ -1919,7 +1919,7 @@ static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map)
 	((unsigned long)prctl_map->__m1 __op				\
 	 (unsigned long)prctl_map->__m2) ? 0 : -EINVAL
 	error  = __prctl_check_order(start_code, <, end_code);
-	error |= __prctl_check_order(start_data, <, end_data);
+	error |= __prctl_check_order(start_data,<=, end_data);
 	error |= __prctl_check_order(start_brk, <=, brk);
 	error |= __prctl_check_order(arg_start, <=, arg_end);
 	error |= __prctl_check_order(env_start, <=, env_end);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 17/141 thermal: rcar_gen3_thermal: disable interrupt in .remove

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jiada Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 63f55fcea50c25ae5ad45af92d08dae3b84534c2 ]

Currently IRQ remains enabled after .remove, later if device is probed, IRQ is requested before .thermal_init, this may cause IRQ function be called before device is initialized.

this patch disables interrupt in .remove, to ensure irq function only be called after device is fully initialized.

---
 drivers/thermal/rcar_gen3_thermal.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/thermal/rcar_gen3_thermal.c +3 -0
index 7aed5337bdd35..704c8ad045bb5 100644
@@ -328,6 +328,9 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, rcar_gen3_thermal_dt_ids);
 static int rcar_gen3_thermal_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
+	struct rcar_gen3_thermal_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+	rcar_thermal_irq_set(priv, false);
 
 	pm_runtime_put(dev);
 	pm_runtime_disable(dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH 18/141 drivers: thermal: tsens: Don't print error message on -EPROBE_DEFER

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Amit Kucheria <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fc7d18cf6a923cde7f5e7ba2c1105bb106d3e29a ]

We print a calibration failure message on -EPROBE_DEFER from nvmem/qfprom as follows:

[    3.003090] qcom-tsens 4a9000.thermal-sensor: version: 1.4
[    3.005376] qcom-tsens 4a9000.thermal-sensor: tsens calibration failed
[    3.113248] qcom-tsens 4a9000.thermal-sensor: version: 1.4

This confuses people when, in fact, calibration succeeds later when nvmem/qfprom device is available. Don't print this message on a -EPROBE_DEFER.

---
 drivers/thermal/qcom/tsens.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/thermal/qcom/tsens.c +2 -1
index a2c9bfae3d867..b139713289a42 100644
@@ -171,7 +171,8 @@ static int tsens_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (tmdev->ops->calibrate) {
 		ret = tmdev->ops->calibrate(tmdev);
 		if (ret < 0) {
-			dev_err(dev, "tsens calibration failed\n");
+			if (ret != -EPROBE_DEFER)
+				dev_err(dev, "tsens calibration failed\n");
 			return ret;
 		}
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#18 lore raw

PATCH 19/141 mfd: tps65912-spi: Add missing of table registration

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Daniel Gomez <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9e364e87ad7f2c636276c773d718cda29d62b741 ]

MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, <of_match_table> should be called to complete DT OF mathing mechanism and register it.

Before this patch:
modinfo drivers/mfd/tps65912-spi.ko | grep alias
alias: spi:tps65912

After this patch:
modinfo drivers/mfd/tps65912-spi.ko | grep alias

alias:          of:N*T*Cti,tps65912C*
alias:          of:N*T*Cti,tps65912
alias:          spi:tps65912
---
 drivers/mfd/tps65912-spi.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/mfd/tps65912-spi.c +1 -0
index 3bd75061f7776..f78be039e4637 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ static const struct of_device_id tps65912_spi_of_match_table[] = {
 	{ .compatible = "ti,tps65912", },
 	{ /* sentinel */ }
 };
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, tps65912_spi_of_match_table);
 
 static int tps65912_spi_probe(struct spi_device *spi)
 {
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#19 lore raw

PATCH 20/141 mfd: intel-lpss: Set the device in reset state when init

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Binbin Wu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dad06532292d77f37fbe831a02948a593500f682 ]

In virtualized setup, when system reboots due to warm reset interrupt storm is seen.

Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack+0x70/0xa5
__report_bad_irq+0x2e/0xc0
note_interrupt+0x248/0x290
? add_interrupt_randomness+0x30/0x220
handle_irq_event_percpu+0x54/0x80
handle_irq_event+0x39/0x60
handle_fasteoi_irq+0x91/0x150
handle_irq+0x108/0x180
do_IRQ+0x52/0xf0
common_interrupt+0xf/0xf
</IRQ>
RIP: 0033:0x76fc2cfabc1d
Code: 24 28 bf 03 00 00 00 31 c0 48 8d 35 63 77 0e 00 48 8d 15 2e

94 0e 00 4c 89 f9 49 89 d9 4c 89 d3 e8 b8 e2 01 00 48 8b 54 24 18 <48> 89 ef 48 89 de 4c 89 e1 e8 d5 97 01 00 84 c0 74 2d 48 8b 04 24
RSP: 002b:00007ffd247c1fc0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffda
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007ffd247c1ff0 RCX: 000000000003d3ce
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffd247c1ff0 RDI: 000076fc2cbb6010
RBP: 000076fc2cded010 R08: 00007ffd247c2210 R09: 00007ffd247c22a0
R10: 000076fc29465470 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00007ffd247c1fc0
R13: 000076fc2ce8e470 R14: 000076fc27ec9960 R15: 0000000000000414 handlers:
[<000000000d3fa913>] idma64_irq
Disabling IRQ #27

To avoid interrupt storm, set the device in reset state before bringing out the device from reset state.

Changelog v2:
- correct the subject line by adding "mfd: "

---
 drivers/mfd/intel-lpss.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/mfd/intel-lpss.c +3 -0
index 50bffc3382d77..ff3fba16e7359 100644
@@ -273,6 +273,9 @@ static void intel_lpss_init_dev(const struct intel_lpss *lpss)
 {
 	u32 value = LPSS_PRIV_SSP_REG_DIS_DMA_FIN;
 
+	/* Set the device in reset state */
+	writel(0, lpss->priv + LPSS_PRIV_RESETS);
+
 	intel_lpss_deassert_reset(lpss);
 
 	intel_lpss_set_remap_addr(lpss);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#20 lore raw

PATCH 21/141 drm/nouveau/disp/dp: respect sink limits when selecting failsafe link configuration

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ben Skeggs <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 13d03e9daf70dab032c03dc172e75bb98ad899c4 ]

Where possible, we want the failsafe link configuration (one which won't hang the OR during modeset because of not enough bandwidth for the mode) to also be supported by the sink.

This prevents "link rate unsupported by sink" messages when link training fails.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/engine/disp/dp.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/engine/disp/dp.c +9 -2
index 5f301e632599b..818d21bd28d31 100644
@@ -365,8 +365,15 @@ nvkm_dp_train(struct nvkm_dp *dp, u32 dataKBps)
 	 * and it's better to have a failed modeset than that.
 	 */
 	for (cfg = nvkm_dp_rates; cfg->rate; cfg++) {
-		if (cfg->nr <= outp_nr && cfg->nr <= outp_bw)
-			failsafe = cfg;
+		if (cfg->nr <= outp_nr && cfg->nr <= outp_bw) {
+			/* Try to respect sink limits too when selecting
+			 * lowest link configuration.
+			 */
+			if (!failsafe ||
+			    (cfg->nr <= sink_nr && cfg->bw <= sink_bw))
+				failsafe = cfg;
+		}
+
 		if (failsafe && cfg[1].rate < dataKBps)
 			break;
 	}
Signature · 6 lines
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[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/dri-devel
author maintainer
#21 lore raw

PATCH 22/141 mfd: twl6040: Fix device init errors for ACCCTL register

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 48171d0ea7caccf21c9ee3ae75eb370f2a756062 ]

I noticed that we can get a -EREMOTEIO errors on at least omap4 duovero:

twl6040 0-004b: Failed to write 2d = 19: -121

And then any following register access will produce errors.

There 2d offset above is register ACCCTL that gets written on twl6040 powerup. With error checking added to the related regcache_sync() call, the -EREMOTEIO error is reproducable on twl6040 powerup at least duovero.

To fix the error, we need to wait until twl6040 is accessible after the powerup. Based on tests on omap4 duovero, we need to wait over 8ms after powerup before register write will complete without failures. Let's also make sure we warn about possible errors too.

Note that we have twl6040_patch[] reg_sequence with the ACCCTL register configuration and regcache_sync() will write the new value to ACCCTL.

---
 drivers/mfd/twl6040.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mfd/twl6040.c +12 -1
index dd19f17a1b637..2b8c479dbfa6e 100644
@@ -322,8 +322,19 @@ int twl6040_power(struct twl6040 *twl6040, int on)
 			}
 		}
 
+		/*
+		 * Register access can produce errors after power-up unless we
+		 * wait at least 8ms based on measurements on duovero.
+		 */
+		usleep_range(10000, 12000);
+
 		/* Sync with the HW */
-		regcache_sync(twl6040->regmap);
+		ret = regcache_sync(twl6040->regmap);
+		if (ret) {
+			dev_err(twl6040->dev, "Failed to sync with the HW: %i\n",
+				ret);
+			goto out;
+		}
 
 		/* Default PLL configuration after power up */
 		twl6040->pll = TWL6040_SYSCLK_SEL_LPPLL;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#22 lore raw

PATCH 23/141 perf/x86/intel: Allow PEBS multi-entry in watermark mode

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c7a286577d7592720c2f179aadfb325a1ff48c95 ]

This patch fixes a restriction/bug introduced by:

583feb08e7f7 ("perf/x86/intel: Fix handling of wakeup_events for multi-entry PEBS")

The original patch prevented using multi-entry PEBS when wakeup_events != 0. However given that wakeup_events is part of a union with wakeup_watermark, it means that in watermark mode, PEBS multi-entry is also disabled which is not the intent. This patch fixes this by checking is watermark mode is enabled.

Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes 583feb08e7f7 ("perf/x86/intel: Fix handling of wakeup_events for multi-entry PEBS")
---
 arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +1 -1
index a759e59990fbd..eb4568b5d0d19 100644
@@ -3068,7 +3068,7 @@ static int intel_pmu_hw_config(struct perf_event *event)
 		return ret;
 
 	if (event->attr.precise_ip) {
-		if (!(event->attr.freq || event->attr.wakeup_events)) {
+		if (!(event->attr.freq || (event->attr.wakeup_events && !event->attr.watermark))) {
 			event->hw.flags |= PERF_X86_EVENT_AUTO_RELOAD;
 			if (!(event->attr.sample_type &
 			      ~intel_pmu_large_pebs_flags(event)))
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#23 lore raw

PATCH 24/141 drm/nouveau/kms/gf119-gp10x: push HeadSetControlOutputResource() mthd when encoders change

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ben Skeggs <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a0b694d0af21c9993d1a39a75fd814bd48bf7eb4 ]

HW has error checks in place which check that pixel depth is explicitly provided on DP, while HDMI has a "default" setting that we use.

In multi-display configurations with identical modelines, but different protocols (HDMI + DP, in this case), it was possible for the DP head to get swapped to the head which previously drove the HDMI output, without updating HeadSetControlOutputResource(), triggering the error check and hanging the core update.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/head.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/head.c +1 -1
index 4f57e53797968..d81a99bb2ac31 100644
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ nv50_head_atomic_check(struct drm_crtc *crtc, struct drm_crtc_state *state)
 			asyh->set.or = head->func->or != NULL;
 		}
 
-		if (asyh->state.mode_changed)
+		if (asyh->state.mode_changed || asyh->state.connectors_changed)
 			nv50_head_atomic_check_mode(head, asyh);
 
 		if (asyh->state.color_mgmt_changed ||
Signature · 6 lines
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_______________________________________________
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[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/nouveau
author maintainer
#24 lore raw

PATCH 25/141 drm/bridge: adv7511: Fix low refresh rate selection

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Matt Redfearn <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 67793bd3b3948dc8c8384b6430e036a30a0ecb43 ]

The driver currently sets register 0xfb (Low Refresh Rate) based on the value of mode->vrefresh. Firstly, this field is specified to be in Hz, but the magic numbers used by the code are Hz * 1000. This essentially leads to the low refresh rate always being set to 0x01, since the vrefresh value will always be less than 24000. Fix the magic numbers to be in Hz.
Secondly, according to the comment in drm_modes.h, the field is not supposed to be used in a functional way anyway. Instead, use the helper function drm_mode_vrefresh().

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/adv7511/adv7511_drv.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/adv7511/adv7511_drv.c +3 -3
index 85c2d407a52e1..e7ddd3e3db920 100644
@@ -747,11 +747,11 @@ static void adv7511_mode_set(struct adv7511 *adv7511,
 			vsync_polarity = 1;
 	}
 
-	if (mode->vrefresh <= 24000)
+	if (drm_mode_vrefresh(mode) <= 24)
 		low_refresh_rate = ADV7511_LOW_REFRESH_RATE_24HZ;
-	else if (mode->vrefresh <= 25000)
+	else if (drm_mode_vrefresh(mode) <= 25)
 		low_refresh_rate = ADV7511_LOW_REFRESH_RATE_25HZ;
-	else if (mode->vrefresh <= 30000)
+	else if (drm_mode_vrefresh(mode) <= 30)
 		low_refresh_rate = ADV7511_LOW_REFRESH_RATE_30HZ;
 	else
 		low_refresh_rate = ADV7511_LOW_REFRESH_RATE_NONE;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#25 lore raw

PATCH 26/141 objtool: Don't use ignore flag for fake jumps

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e6da9567959e164f82bc81967e0d5b10dee870b4 ]

The ignore flag is set on fake jumps in order to keep add_jump_destinations() from setting their jump_dest, since it already got set when the fake jump was created.

But using the ignore flag is a bit of a hack. It's normally used to skip validation of an instruction, which doesn't really make sense for fake jumps.

Also, after the next patch, using the ignore flag for fake jumps can trigger a false "why am I validating an ignored function?" warning.

Instead just add an explicit check in add_jump_destinations() to skip fake jumps.

---
 tools/objtool/check.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
tools/objtool/check.c +5 -3
index 46be345766203..02a47e365e52d 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
 #include <linux/hashtable.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 
+#define FAKE_JUMP_OFFSET -1
+
 struct alternative {
 	struct list_head list;
 	struct instruction *insn;
@@ -501,7 +503,7 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file)
 		    insn->type != INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL)
 			continue;
 
-		if (insn->ignore)
+		if (insn->ignore || insn->offset == FAKE_JUMP_OFFSET)
 			continue;
 
 		rela = find_rela_by_dest_range(insn->sec, insn->offset,
@@ -670,10 +672,10 @@ static int handle_group_alt(struct objtool_file *file,
 		clear_insn_state(&fake_jump->state);
 
 		fake_jump->sec = special_alt->new_sec;
-		fake_jump->offset = -1;
+		fake_jump->offset = FAKE_JUMP_OFFSET;
 		fake_jump->type = INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL;
 		fake_jump->jump_dest = list_next_entry(last_orig_insn, list);
-		fake_jump->ignore = true;
+		fake_jump->func = orig_insn->func;
 	}
 
 	if (!special_alt->new_len) {
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#26 lore raw

PATCH 27/141 drm/nouveau/kms/gv100-: fix spurious window immediate interlocks

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ben Skeggs <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d2434e4d942c32cadcbdbcd32c58f35098f3b604 ]

Cursor position updates were accidentally causing us to attempt to interlock window with window immediate, and without a matching window immediate update, NVDisplay could hang forever in some circumstances.

Fixes suspend/resume on (at least) Quadro RTX4000 (TU104).

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/disp.h     | 1 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/wimmc37b.c | 1 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/wndw.c     | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/disp.h +1 -0
index e48c5eb35b498..66c125a6b0b3c 100644
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ struct nv50_disp_interlock {
 		NV50_DISP_INTERLOCK__SIZE
 	} type;
 	u32 data;
+	u32 wimm;
 };
 
 void corec37d_ntfy_init(struct nouveau_bo *, u32);
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/wimmc37b.c +1 -0
index 9103b8494279c..f7dbd965e4e72 100644
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ wimmc37b_init_(const struct nv50_wimm_func *func, struct nouveau_drm *drm,
 		return ret;
 	}
 
+	wndw->interlock.wimm = wndw->interlock.data;
 	wndw->immd = func;
 	return 0;
 }
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/wndw.c +1 -1
index 2187922e8dc28..b3db4553098d5 100644
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ nv50_wndw_flush_set(struct nv50_wndw *wndw, u32 *interlock,
 	if (asyw->set.point) {
 		if (asyw->set.point = false, asyw->set.mask)
 			interlock[wndw->interlock.type] |= wndw->interlock.data;
-		interlock[NV50_DISP_INTERLOCK_WIMM] |= wndw->interlock.data;
+		interlock[NV50_DISP_INTERLOCK_WIMM] |= wndw->interlock.wimm;
 
 		wndw->immd->point(wndw, asyw);
 		wndw->immd->update(wndw, interlock);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#27 lore raw

PATCH 28/141 bpf: fix undefined behavior in narrow load handling

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Krzesimir Nowak <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e2f7fc0ac6957cabff4cecf6c721979b571af208 ]

Commit 31fd85816dbe ("bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields") made the verifier add AND instructions to clear the unwanted bits with a mask when doing a narrow load. The mask is computed with

(1 << size * 8) - 1

where "size" is the size of the narrow load. When doing a 4 byte load of a an 8 byte field the verifier shifts the literal 1 by 32 places to the left. This results in an overflow of a signed integer, which is an undefined behavior. Typically, the computed mask was zero, so the result of the narrow load ended up being zero too.

Cast the literal to long long to avoid overflows. Note that narrow load of the 4 byte fields does not have the undefined behavior, because the load size can only be either 1 or 2 bytes, so shifting 1 by 8 or 16 places will not overflow it. And reading 4 bytes would not be a narrow load of a 4 bytes field.

Fixes 31fd85816dbe ("bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields")
Cc Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +1 -1
index acc2305ad8957..d3580a68dbefa 100644
@@ -5743,7 +5743,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 									insn->dst_reg,
 									shift);
 				insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
-								(1 << size * 8) - 1);
+								(1ULL << size * 8) - 1);
 			}
 		}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#28 lore raw

PATCH 29/141 EDAC/mpc85xx: Prevent building as a module

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2b8358a951b1e2a534a54924cd8245e58a1c5fb8 ]

The mpc85xx EDAC driver can be configured as a module but then fails to build because it uses two unexported symbols:

ERROR: ".pci_find_hose_for_OF_device" [drivers/edac/mpc85xx_edac_mod.ko] undefined!
ERROR: ".early_find_capability" [drivers/edac/mpc85xx_edac_mod.ko] undefined!

We don't want to export those symbols just for this driver, so make the driver only configurable as a built-in.

This seems to have been broken since at least

c92132f59806 ("edac/85xx: Add PCIe error interrupt edac support")

(Nov 2013).

[ bp: make it depend on EDAC=y so that the EDAC core doesn't get built
as a module. ]

---
 drivers/edac/Kconfig | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/edac/Kconfig +2 -2
index 57304b2e989f2..b00cc03ad6b67 100644
@@ -250,8 +250,8 @@ config EDAC_PND2
 	  micro-server but may appear on others in the future.
 
 config EDAC_MPC85XX
-	tristate "Freescale MPC83xx / MPC85xx"
-	depends on FSL_SOC
+	bool "Freescale MPC83xx / MPC85xx"
+	depends on FSL_SOC && EDAC=y
 	help
 	  Support for error detection and correction on the Freescale
 	  MPC8349, MPC8560, MPC8540, MPC8548, T4240
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#29 lore raw

PATCH 30/141 NFS4: Fix v4.0 client state corruption when mount

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: ZhangXiaoxu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f02f3755dbd14fb935d24b14650fff9ba92243b8 ]

stat command with soft mount never return after server is stopped.

When alloc a new client, the state of the client will be set to NFS4CLNT_LEASE_EXPIRED.

When the server is stopped, the state manager will work, and accord the state to recover. But the state is NFS4CLNT_LEASE_EXPIRED, it will drain the slot table and lead other task to wait queue, until the client recovered. Then the stat command is hung.

When discover server trunking, the client will renew the lease, but check the client state, it lead the client state corruption.

So, we need to call state manager to recover it when detect server ip trunking.

---
 fs/nfs/nfs4state.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
fs/nfs/nfs4state.c +4 -0
index d2f645d34eb13..3ba2087469ac8 100644
@@ -159,6 +159,10 @@ int nfs40_discover_server_trunking(struct nfs_client *clp,
 		/* Sustain the lease, even if it's empty.  If the clientid4
 		 * goes stale it's of no use for trunking discovery. */
 		nfs4_schedule_state_renewal(*result);
+
+		/* If the client state need to recover, do it. */
+		if (clp->cl_state)
+			nfs4_schedule_state_manager(clp);
 	}
 out:
 	return status;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#30 lore raw

PATCH 31/141 pwm: meson: Use the spin-lock only to protect register modifications

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Martin Blumenstingl <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f173747fffdf037c791405ab4f1ec0eb392fc48e ]

Holding the spin-lock for all of the code in meson_pwm_apply() can result in a "BUG: scheduling while atomic". This can happen because clk_get_rate() (which is called from meson_pwm_calc()) may sleep. Only hold the spin-lock when modifying registers to solve this.

The reason why we need a spin-lock in the driver is because the REG_MISC_AB register is shared between the two channels provided by one PWM controller. The only functions where REG_MISC_AB is modified are meson_pwm_enable() and meson_pwm_disable() so the register reads/writes in there need to be protected by the spin-lock.

The original code also used the spin-lock to protect the values in struct meson_pwm_channel. This could be necessary if two consumers can use the same PWM channel. However, PWM core doesn't allow this so we don't need to protect the values in struct meson_pwm_channel with a lock.

Fixes 211ed630753d2f ("pwm: Add support for Meson PWM Controller")
---
 drivers/pwm/pwm-meson.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/pwm/pwm-meson.c +17 -8
index c1ed641b3e266..f6e738ad7bd92 100644
@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@ struct meson_pwm {
 	const struct meson_pwm_data *data;
 	void __iomem *base;
 	u8 inverter_mask;
+	/*
+	 * Protects register (write) access to the REG_MISC_AB register
+	 * that is shared between the two PWMs.
+	 */
 	spinlock_t lock;
 };
 
@@ -235,6 +239,7 @@ static void meson_pwm_enable(struct meson_pwm *meson,
 {
 	u32 value, clk_shift, clk_enable, enable;
 	unsigned int offset;
+	unsigned long flags;
 
 	switch (id) {
 	case 0:
@@ -255,6 +260,8 @@ static void meson_pwm_enable(struct meson_pwm *meson,
 		return;
 	}
 
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&meson->lock, flags);
+
 	value = readl(meson->base + REG_MISC_AB);
 	value &= ~(MISC_CLK_DIV_MASK << clk_shift);
 	value |= channel->pre_div << clk_shift;
@@ -267,11 +274,14 @@ static void meson_pwm_enable(struct meson_pwm *meson,
 	value = readl(meson->base + REG_MISC_AB);
 	value |= enable;
 	writel(value, meson->base + REG_MISC_AB);
+
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meson->lock, flags);
 }
 
 static void meson_pwm_disable(struct meson_pwm *meson, unsigned int id)
 {
 	u32 value, enable;
+	unsigned long flags;
 
 	switch (id) {
 	case 0:
@@ -286,9 +296,13 @@ static void meson_pwm_disable(struct meson_pwm *meson, unsigned int id)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&meson->lock, flags);
+
 	value = readl(meson->base + REG_MISC_AB);
 	value &= ~enable;
 	writel(value, meson->base + REG_MISC_AB);
+
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meson->lock, flags);
 }
 
 static int meson_pwm_apply(struct pwm_chip *chip, struct pwm_device *pwm,
@@ -296,19 +310,16 @@ static int meson_pwm_apply(struct pwm_chip *chip, struct pwm_device *pwm,
 {
 	struct meson_pwm_channel *channel = pwm_get_chip_data(pwm);
 	struct meson_pwm *meson = to_meson_pwm(chip);
-	unsigned long flags;
 	int err = 0;
 
 	if (!state)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&meson->lock, flags);
-
 	if (!state->enabled) {
 		meson_pwm_disable(meson, pwm->hwpwm);
 		channel->state.enabled = false;
 
-		goto unlock;
+		return 0;
 	}
 
 	if (state->period != channel->state.period ||
@@ -329,7 +340,7 @@ static int meson_pwm_apply(struct pwm_chip *chip, struct pwm_device *pwm,
 		err = meson_pwm_calc(meson, channel, pwm->hwpwm,
 				     state->duty_cycle, state->period);
 		if (err < 0)
-			goto unlock;
+			return err;
 
 		channel->state.polarity = state->polarity;
 		channel->state.period = state->period;
@@ -341,9 +352,7 @@ static int meson_pwm_apply(struct pwm_chip *chip, struct pwm_device *pwm,
 		channel->state.enabled = true;
 	}
 
-unlock:
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meson->lock, flags);
-	return err;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void meson_pwm_get_state(struct pwm_chip *chip, struct pwm_device *pwm,
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#31 lore raw

PATCH 32/141 mailbox: stm32-ipcc: check invalid irq

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Fabien Dessenne <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 68a1c8485cf83734d4da9d81cd3b5d2ae7c0339b ]

On failure of_irq_get() returns a negative value or zero, which is not handled as an error in the existing implementation. Instead of using this API, use platform_get_irq() that returns exclusively a negative value on failure.
Also, do not output an error log in case of defer probe error.

---
 drivers/mailbox/stm32-ipcc.c | 13 ++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/mailbox/stm32-ipcc.c +8 -5
index 533b0da5235d4..ca1f993c0de30 100644
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
 #include <linux/bitfield.h>
 #include <linux/clk.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/mailbox_controller.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/of_irq.h>
 #include <linux/platform_device.h>
 #include <linux/pm_wakeirq.h>
 
@@ -240,9 +240,11 @@ static int stm32_ipcc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	/* irq */
 	for (i = 0; i < IPCC_IRQ_NUM; i++) {
-		ipcc->irqs[i] = of_irq_get_byname(dev->of_node, irq_name[i]);
+		ipcc->irqs[i] = platform_get_irq_byname(pdev, irq_name[i]);
 		if (ipcc->irqs[i] < 0) {
-			dev_err(dev, "no IRQ specified %s\n", irq_name[i]);
+			if (ipcc->irqs[i] != -EPROBE_DEFER)
+				dev_err(dev, "no IRQ specified %s\n",
+					irq_name[i]);
 			ret = ipcc->irqs[i];
 			goto err_clk;
 		}
@@ -263,9 +265,10 @@ static int stm32_ipcc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	/* wakeup */
 	if (of_property_read_bool(np, "wakeup-source")) {
-		ipcc->wkp = of_irq_get_byname(dev->of_node, "wakeup");
+		ipcc->wkp = platform_get_irq_byname(pdev, "wakeup");
 		if (ipcc->wkp < 0) {
-			dev_err(dev, "could not get wakeup IRQ\n");
+			if (ipcc->wkp != -EPROBE_DEFER)
+				dev_err(dev, "could not get wakeup IRQ\n");
 			ret = ipcc->wkp;
 			goto err_clk;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#32 lore raw

PATCH 33/141 ntp: Allow TAI-UTC offset to be set to zero

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Miroslav Lichvar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fdc6bae940ee9eb869e493990540098b8c0fd6ab ]

The ADJ_TAI adjtimex mode sets the TAI-UTC offset of the system clock. It is typically set by NTP/PTP implementations and it is automatically updated by the kernel on leap seconds. The initial value is zero (which applications may interpret as unknown), but this value cannot be set by adjtimex. This limitation seems to go back to the original "nanokernel" implementation by David Mills.

Change the ADJ_TAI check to accept zero as a valid TAI-UTC offset in order to allow setting it back to the initial value.

---
 kernel/time/ntp.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/time/ntp.c +1 -1
index c5e0cba3b39cc..6b23cd584295f 100644
@@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ static inline void process_adjtimex_modes(const struct timex *txc, s32 *time_tai
 		time_constant = max(time_constant, 0l);
 	}
 
-	if (txc->modes & ADJ_TAI && txc->constant > 0)
+	if (txc->modes & ADJ_TAI && txc->constant >= 0)
 		*time_tai = txc->constant;
 
 	if (txc->modes & ADJ_OFFSET)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#33 lore raw

PATCH 34/141 f2fs: fix to avoid panic in do_recover_data()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 22d61e286e2d9097dae36f75ed48801056b77cac ]

As Jungyeon reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203227

- Overview
When mounting the attached crafted image, following errors are reported. Additionally, it hangs on sync after trying to mount it.

The image is intentionally fuzzed from a normal f2fs image for testing. Compile options for F2FS are as follows.
CONFIG_F2FS_FS=y
CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS=y
CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR=y
CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS=y

- Reproduces
mkdir test
mount -t f2fs tmp.img test
sync

- Messages
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/recovery.c:549!

 RIP: 0010:recover_data+0x167a/0x1780
 Call Trace:
  f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x613/0x710
  f2fs_fill_super+0x1043/0x1aa0
  mount_bdev+0x16d/0x1a0
  mount_fs+0x4a/0x170
  vfs_kern_mount+0x5d/0x100
  do_mount+0x200/0xcf0
  ksys_mount+0x79/0xc0
  __x64_sys_mount+0x1c/0x20
  do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

During recovery, if ofs_of_node is inconsistent in between recovered node page and original checkpointed node page, let's just fail recovery instead of making kernel panic.

---
 fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/recovery.c +9 -1
index ae0e5f2e67b4a..bf5c5f4fa77ea 100644
@@ -485,7 +485,15 @@ static int do_recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct inode *inode,
 		goto err;
 
 	f2fs_bug_on(sbi, ni.ino != ino_of_node(page));
-	f2fs_bug_on(sbi, ofs_of_node(dn.node_page) != ofs_of_node(page));
+
+	if (ofs_of_node(dn.node_page) != ofs_of_node(page)) {
+		f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+			"Inconsistent ofs_of_node, ino:%lu, ofs:%u, %u",
+			inode->i_ino, ofs_of_node(dn.node_page),
+			ofs_of_node(page));
+		err = -EFAULT;
+		goto err;
+	}
 
 	for (; start < end; start++, dn.ofs_in_node++) {
 		block_t src, dest;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#34 lore raw

PATCH 35/141 f2fs: fix to avoid panic in f2fs_inplace_write_data()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 05573d6ccf702df549a7bdeabef31e4753df1a90 ]

As Jungyeon reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203239

- Overview
When mounting the attached crafted image and running program, following errors are reported. Additionally, it hangs on sync after running program.

The image is intentionally fuzzed from a normal f2fs image for testing. Compile options for F2FS are as follows.
CONFIG_F2FS_FS=y
CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS=y
CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR=y
CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS=y

- Reproduces
cc poc_15.c
./run.sh f2fs
sync

- Kernel messages

 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:3162!
 RIP: 0010:f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x12d/0x160
 Call Trace:
  f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x3c1/0x820
  __write_data_page+0x156/0x720
  f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x20d/0x460
  f2fs_write_data_pages+0x1b4/0x300
  do_writepages+0x15/0x60
  __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x7c/0xb0
  file_write_and_wait_range+0x2c/0x80
  f2fs_do_sync_file+0x102/0x810
  do_fsync+0x33/0x60
  __x64_sys_fsync+0xb/0x10
  do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The reason is f2fs_inplace_write_data() will trigger kernel panic due to data block locates in node type segment.

To avoid panic, let's just return error code and set SBI_NEED_FSCK to give a hint to fsck for latter repairing.

---
 fs/f2fs/segment.c | 9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/segment.c +7 -2
index ac038563273de..4c6406bbe01e8 100644
@@ -3068,13 +3068,18 @@ int f2fs_inplace_write_data(struct f2fs_io_info *fio)
 {
 	int err;
 	struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = fio->sbi;
+	unsigned int segno;
 
 	fio->new_blkaddr = fio->old_blkaddr;
 	/* i/o temperature is needed for passing down write hints */
 	__get_segment_type(fio);
 
-	f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !IS_DATASEG(get_seg_entry(sbi,
-			GET_SEGNO(sbi, fio->new_blkaddr))->type));
+	segno = GET_SEGNO(sbi, fio->new_blkaddr);
+
+	if (!IS_DATASEG(get_seg_entry(sbi, segno)->type)) {
+		set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
 
 	stat_inc_inplace_blocks(fio->sbi);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#35 lore raw

PATCH 36/141 f2fs: fix to avoid panic in f2fs_remove_inode_page()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8b6810f8acfe429fde7c7dad4714692cc5f75651 ]

As Jungyeon reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203219

- Overview
When mounting the attached crafted image and running program, I got this error. Additionally, it hangs on sync after running the program.

The image is intentionally fuzzed from a normal f2fs image for testing and I enabled option CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS on.

- Reproduces
cc poc_06.c
mkdir test
mount -t f2fs tmp.img test
cp a.out test
cd test
sudo ./a.out
sync

- Messages
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/node.c:1183!

 RIP: 0010:f2fs_remove_inode_page+0x294/0x2d0
 Call Trace:
  f2fs_evict_inode+0x2a3/0x3a0
  evict+0xba/0x180
  __dentry_kill+0xbe/0x160
  dentry_kill+0x46/0x180
  dput+0xbb/0x100
  do_renameat2+0x3c9/0x550
  __x64_sys_rename+0x17/0x20
  do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The reason is f2fs_remove_inode_page() will trigger kernel panic due to inconsistent i_blocks value of inode.

To avoid panic, let's just print debug message and set SBI_NEED_FSCK to give a hint to fsck for latter repairing of potential image corruption.

[Jaegeuk Kim: fix build warning and add unlikely]
---
 fs/f2fs/node.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/node.c +8 -2
index 19a0d83aae653..807a77518a491 100644
@@ -1180,8 +1180,14 @@ int f2fs_remove_inode_page(struct inode *inode)
 		f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);
 		return -EIO;
 	}
-	f2fs_bug_on(F2FS_I_SB(inode),
-			inode->i_blocks != 0 && inode->i_blocks != 8);
+
+	if (unlikely(inode->i_blocks != 0 && inode->i_blocks != 8)) {
+		f2fs_msg(F2FS_I_SB(inode)->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+			"Inconsistent i_blocks, ino:%lu, iblocks:%llu",
+			inode->i_ino,
+			(unsigned long long)inode->i_blocks);
+		set_sbi_flag(F2FS_I_SB(inode), SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+	}
 
 	/* will put inode & node pages */
 	err = truncate_node(&dn);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#36 lore raw

PATCH 37/141 f2fs: fix to do sanity check on free nid

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 626bcf2b7ce87211dba565f2bfa7842ba5be5c1b ]

As Jungyeon reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203225

- Overview
When mounting the attached crafted image and unmounting it, following errors are reported. Additionally, it hangs on sync after unmounting.

The image is intentionally fuzzed from a normal f2fs image for testing. Compile options for F2FS are as follows.
CONFIG_F2FS_FS=y
CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS=y
CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR=y
CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS=y

- Reproduces
mkdir test
mount -t f2fs tmp.img test
touch test/t
umount test
sync

- Messages
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/node.c:3073!

 RIP: 0010:f2fs_destroy_node_manager+0x2f0/0x300
 Call Trace:
  f2fs_put_super+0xf4/0x270
  generic_shutdown_super+0x62/0x110
  kill_block_super+0x1c/0x50
  kill_f2fs_super+0xad/0xd0
  deactivate_locked_super+0x35/0x60
  cleanup_mnt+0x36/0x70
  task_work_run+0x75/0x90
  exit_to_usermode_loop+0x93/0xa0
  do_syscall_64+0xba/0xf0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
 RIP: 0010:f2fs_destroy_node_manager+0x2f0/0x300

NAT table is corrupted, so reserved meta/node inode ids were added into free list incorrectly, during file creation, since reserved id has cached in inode hash, so it fails the creation and preallocated nid can not be released later, result in kernel panic.

To fix this issue, let's do nid boundary check during free nid loading.

---
 fs/f2fs/node.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/f2fs/node.c +3 -0
index 807a77518a491..34c3f732601c3 100644
@@ -2079,6 +2079,9 @@ static bool add_free_nid(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
 	if (unlikely(nid == 0))
 		return false;
 
+	if (unlikely(f2fs_check_nid_range(sbi, nid)))
+		return false;
+
 	i = f2fs_kmem_cache_alloc(free_nid_slab, GFP_NOFS);
 	i->nid = nid;
 	i->state = FREE_NID;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#37 lore raw

PATCH 38/141 f2fs: fix to clear dirty inode in error path of f2fs_iget()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 546d22f070d64a7b96f57c93333772085d3a5e6d ]

As Jungyeon reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203217

- Overview
When mounting the attached crafted image and running program, I got this error. Additionally, it hangs on sync after running the program.

The image is intentionally fuzzed from a normal f2fs image for testing and I enabled option CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS on.

- Reproduces
cc poc_test_05.c
mkdir test
mount -t f2fs tmp.img test
sudo ./a.out
sync

- Messages
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:707!

 RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x33f/0x3a0
 Call Trace:
  evict+0xba/0x180
  f2fs_iget+0x598/0xdf0
  f2fs_lookup+0x136/0x320
  __lookup_slow+0x92/0x140
  lookup_slow+0x30/0x50
  walk_component+0x1c1/0x350
  path_lookupat+0x62/0x200
  filename_lookup+0xb3/0x1a0
  do_readlinkat+0x56/0x110
  __x64_sys_readlink+0x16/0x20
  do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

During inode loading, __recover_inline_status() can recovery inode status and set inode dirty, once we failed in following process, it will fail the check in f2fs_evict_inode, result in trigger BUG_ON().

Let's clear dirty inode in error path of f2fs_iget() to avoid panic.

---
 fs/f2fs/inode.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/f2fs/inode.c +1 -0
index dd608b819a3c3..fae9570e6860e 100644
@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ struct inode *f2fs_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino)
 	return inode;
 
 bad_inode:
+	f2fs_inode_synced(inode);
 	iget_failed(inode);
 	trace_f2fs_iget_exit(inode, ret);
 	return ERR_PTR(ret);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#38 lore raw

PATCH 39/141 f2fs: fix to avoid panic in dec_valid_block_count()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5e159cd349bf3a31fb7e35c23a93308eb30f4f71 ]

As Jungyeon reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203209

- Overview
When mounting the attached crafted image and running program, I got this error. Additionally, it hangs on sync after the this script.

The image is intentionally fuzzed from a normal f2fs image for testing and I enabled option CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS on.

- Reproduces
cc poc_01.c
./run.sh f2fs
sync

kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:1788!

 RIP: 0010:f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range+0x342/0x350
 Call Trace:
  f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x36d/0x3c0
  f2fs_truncate+0x88/0x110
  f2fs_setattr+0x3e1/0x460
  notify_change+0x2da/0x400
  do_truncate+0x6d/0xb0
  do_sys_ftruncate+0xf1/0x160
  do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The reason is dec_valid_block_count() will trigger kernel panic due to inconsistent count in between inode.i_blocks and actual block.

To avoid panic, let's just print debug message and set SBI_NEED_FSCK to give a hint to fsck for latter repairing.

[Jaegeuk Kim: fix build warning and add unlikely]
---
 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 12 ++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +10 -2
index 1f5d5f62bb77d..1f3bf039a90e8 100644
@@ -1733,6 +1733,7 @@ static inline int inc_valid_block_count(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
 	return -ENOSPC;
 }
 
+void f2fs_msg(struct super_block *sb, const char *level, const char *fmt, ...);
 static inline void dec_valid_block_count(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
 						struct inode *inode,
 						block_t count)
@@ -1741,13 +1742,21 @@ static inline void dec_valid_block_count(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
 
 	spin_lock(&sbi->stat_lock);
 	f2fs_bug_on(sbi, sbi->total_valid_block_count < (block_t) count);
-	f2fs_bug_on(sbi, inode->i_blocks < sectors);
 	sbi->total_valid_block_count -= (block_t)count;
 	if (sbi->reserved_blocks &&
 		sbi->current_reserved_blocks < sbi->reserved_blocks)
 		sbi->current_reserved_blocks = min(sbi->reserved_blocks,
 					sbi->current_reserved_blocks + count);
 	spin_unlock(&sbi->stat_lock);
+	if (unlikely(inode->i_blocks < sectors)) {
+		f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
+			"Inconsistent i_blocks, ino:%lu, iblocks:%llu, sectors:%llu",
+			inode->i_ino,
+			(unsigned long long)inode->i_blocks,
+			(unsigned long long)sectors);
+		set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
+		return;
+	}
 	f2fs_i_blocks_write(inode, count, false, true);
 }
 
@@ -2716,7 +2725,6 @@ static inline void f2fs_update_iostat(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
 
 bool f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
 					block_t blkaddr, int type);
-void f2fs_msg(struct super_block *sb, const char *level, const char *fmt, ...);
 static inline void verify_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
 					block_t blkaddr, int type)
 {
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#39 lore raw

PATCH 40/141 f2fs: fix to use inline space only if inline_xattr is enable

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 622927f3b8809206f6da54a6a7ed4df1a7770fce ]

With below mkfs and mount option:

MKFS_OPTIONS -- -O extra_attr -O project_quota -O inode_checksum -O flexible_inline_xattr -O inode_crtime -f MOUNT_OPTIONS -- -o noinline_xattr

We may miss xattr data with below testcase:
- mkdir dir
- setfattr -n "user.name" -v 0 dir
- for ((i = 0; i < 190; i++)) do touch dir/$i; done
- umount
- mount
- getfattr -n "user.name" dir

user.name: No such attribute

The root cause is that we persist xattr data into reserved inline xattr space, even if inline_xattr is not enable in inline directory inode, after inline dentry conversion, reserved space no longer exists, so that xattr data missed.

Let's use inline xattr space only if inline_xattr flag is set on inode to fix this iusse.

Fixes 6afc662e68b5 ("f2fs: support flexible inline xattr size")
---
 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +3 -1
index 1f3bf039a90e8..51eea636719a2 100644
@@ -2486,7 +2486,9 @@ static inline void *inline_xattr_addr(struct inode *inode, struct page *page)
 
 static inline int inline_xattr_size(struct inode *inode)
 {
-	return get_inline_xattr_addrs(inode) * sizeof(__le32);
+	if (f2fs_has_inline_xattr(inode))
+		return get_inline_xattr_addrs(inode) * sizeof(__le32);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int f2fs_has_inline_data(struct inode *inode)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#40 lore raw

PATCH 41/141 f2fs: fix to do sanity check on valid block count of segment

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e95bcdb2fefa129f37bd9035af1d234ca92ee4ef ]

As Jungyeon reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203233

- Overview
When mounting the attached crafted image and running program, following errors are reported. Additionally, it hangs on sync after running program.

The image is intentionally fuzzed from a normal f2fs image for testing. Compile options for F2FS are as follows.
CONFIG_F2FS_FS=y
CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS=y
CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR=y
CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS=y

- Reproduces
cc poc_13.c
mkdir test
mount -t f2fs tmp.img test
cp a.out test
cd test
sudo ./a.out
sync

- Kernel messages
F2FS-fs (sdb): Bitmap was wrongly set, blk:4608
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2102!

 RIP: 0010:update_sit_entry+0x394/0x410
 Call Trace:
  f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x16f/0x660
  do_write_page+0x62/0x170
  f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x33/0xa0
  __write_node_page+0x270/0x4e0
  f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x5df/0x670
  f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x372/0x1400
  f2fs_sync_fs+0xa3/0x130
  f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1a6/0x810
  do_fsync+0x33/0x60
  __x64_sys_fsync+0xb/0x10
  do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

sit.vblocks and sum valid block count in sit.valid_map may be inconsistent, segment w/ zero vblocks will be treated as free segment, while allocating in free segment, we may allocate a free block, if its bitmap is valid previously, it can cause kernel crash due to bitmap verification failure.

Anyway, to avoid further serious metadata inconsistence and corruption, it is necessary and worth to detect SIT inconsistence. So let's enable check_block_count() to verify vblocks and valid_map all the time rather than do it only CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS is enabled.

---
 fs/f2fs/segment.h | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/segment.h +1 -2
index b3d9e317ff0c1..5079532cb176b 100644
@@ -660,7 +660,6 @@ static inline void verify_block_addr(struct f2fs_io_info *fio, block_t blk_addr)
 static inline int check_block_count(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
 		int segno, struct f2fs_sit_entry *raw_sit)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS
 	bool is_valid  = test_bit_le(0, raw_sit->valid_map) ? true : false;
 	int valid_blocks = 0;
 	int cur_pos = 0, next_pos;
@@ -687,7 +686,7 @@ static inline int check_block_count(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
 		set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-#endif
+
 	/* check segment usage, and check boundary of a given segment number */
 	if (unlikely(GET_SIT_VBLOCKS(raw_sit) > sbi->blocks_per_seg
 					|| segno > TOTAL_SEGS(sbi) - 1)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#41 lore raw

PATCH 42/141 f2fs: fix to do checksum even if inode page is uptodate

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b42b179bda9ff11075a6fc2bac4d9e400513679a ]

As Jungyeon reported in bugzilla:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203221

- Overview
When mounting the attached crafted image and running program, this error is reported.

The image is intentionally fuzzed from a normal f2fs image for testing and I enabled option CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS on.

- Reproduces
cc poc_07.c
mkdir test
mount -t f2fs tmp.img test
cp a.out test
cd test
sudo ./a.out

- Messages
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/node.c:1279!

 RIP: 0010:read_node_page+0xcf/0xf0
 Call Trace:
  __get_node_page+0x6b/0x2f0
  f2fs_iget+0x8f/0xdf0
  f2fs_lookup+0x136/0x320
  __lookup_slow+0x92/0x140
  lookup_slow+0x30/0x50
  walk_component+0x1c1/0x350
  path_lookupat+0x62/0x200
  filename_lookup+0xb3/0x1a0
  do_fchmodat+0x3e/0xa0
  __x64_sys_chmod+0x12/0x20
  do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

On below paths, we can have opportunity to readahead inode page
- gc_node_segment -> f2fs_ra_node_page
- gc_data_segment -> f2fs_ra_node_page
- f2fs_fill_dentries -> f2fs_ra_node_page

Unlike synchronized read, on readahead path, we can set page uptodate before verifying page's checksum, then read_node_page() will trigger kernel panic once it encounters a uptodated page w/ incorrect checksum.

So considering readahead scenario, we have to do checksum each time when loading inode page even if it is uptodated.

---
 fs/f2fs/inode.c | 4 ++--
 fs/f2fs/node.c  | 7 ++++---
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/inode.c +2 -2
index fae9570e6860e..0f31df01e36c6 100644
@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ bool f2fs_inode_chksum_verify(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct page *page)
 
 	if (provided != calculated)
 		f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
-			"checksum invalid, ino = %x, %x vs. %x",
-			ino_of_node(page), provided, calculated);
+			"checksum invalid, nid = %lu, ino_of_node = %x, %x vs. %x",
+			page->index, ino_of_node(page), provided, calculated);
 
 	return provided == calculated;
 }
fs/f2fs/node.c +4 -3
index 34c3f732601c3..e2d9edad758cd 100644
@@ -1282,9 +1282,10 @@ static int read_node_page(struct page *page, int op_flags)
 	int err;
 
 	if (PageUptodate(page)) {
-#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS
-		f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !f2fs_inode_chksum_verify(sbi, page));
-#endif
+		if (!f2fs_inode_chksum_verify(sbi, page)) {
+			ClearPageUptodate(page);
+			return -EBADMSG;
+		}
 		return LOCKED_PAGE;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#42 lore raw

PATCH 43/141 percpu: remove spurious lock dependency between percpu and sched

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: John Sperbeck <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 198790d9a3aeaef5792d33a560020861126edc22 ]

In free_percpu() we sometimes call pcpu_schedule_balance_work() to queue a work item (which does a wakeup) while holding pcpu_lock. This creates an unnecessary lock dependency between pcpu_lock and the scheduler's pi_lock. There are other places where we call pcpu_schedule_balance_work() without hold pcpu_lock, and this case doesn't need to be different.

Moving the call outside the lock prevents the following lockdep splat when running tools/testing/selftests/bpf/{test_maps,test_progs} in sequence with lockdep enabled:

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.1.0-dbg-DEV #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/23:255/18872 is trying to acquire lock:
000000000bc79290 (&(&pool->lock)->rlock){-.-.}, at: __queue_work+0xb2/0x520

but task is already holding lock:
00000000e3e7a6aa (pcpu_lock){..-.}, at: free_percpu+0x36/0x260

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #4 (pcpu_lock){..-.}:

       lock_acquire+0x9e/0x180
       _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3a/0x50
       pcpu_alloc+0xfa/0x780
       __alloc_percpu_gfp+0x12/0x20
       alloc_htab_elem+0x184/0x2b0
       __htab_percpu_map_update_elem+0x252/0x290
       bpf_percpu_hash_update+0x7c/0x130
       __do_sys_bpf+0x1912/0x1be0
       __x64_sys_bpf+0x1a/0x20
       do_syscall_64+0x59/0x400
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

-> #3 (&htab->buckets[i].lock){....}:

       lock_acquire+0x9e/0x180
       _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3a/0x50
       htab_map_update_elem+0x1af/0x3a0

-> #2 (&rq->lock){-.-.}:

       lock_acquire+0x9e/0x180
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
       task_fork_fair+0x37/0x160
       sched_fork+0x211/0x310
       copy_process.part.43+0x7b1/0x2160
       _do_fork+0xda/0x6b0
       kernel_thread+0x29/0x30
       rest_init+0x22/0x260
       arch_call_rest_init+0xe/0x10
       start_kernel+0x4fd/0x520
       x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x26
       x86_64_start_kernel+0x6f/0x72
       secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0

-> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}:

       lock_acquire+0x9e/0x180
       _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3a/0x50
       try_to_wake_up+0x41/0x600
       wake_up_process+0x15/0x20
       create_worker+0x16b/0x1e0
       workqueue_init+0x279/0x2ee
       kernel_init_freeable+0xf7/0x288
       kernel_init+0xf/0x180
       ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30

-> #0 (&(&pool->lock)->rlock){-.-.}:

       __lock_acquire+0x101f/0x12a0
       lock_acquire+0x9e/0x180
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
       __queue_work+0xb2/0x520
       queue_work_on+0x38/0x80
       free_percpu+0x221/0x260
       pcpu_freelist_destroy+0x11/0x20
       stack_map_free+0x2a/0x40
       bpf_map_free_deferred+0x3c/0x50
       process_one_work+0x1f7/0x580
       worker_thread+0x54/0x410
       kthread+0x10f/0x150
       ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  &(&pool->lock)->rlock --> &htab->buckets[i].lock --> pcpu_lock

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(pcpu_lock);
                               lock(&htab->buckets[i].lock);
                               lock(pcpu_lock);

lock(&(&pool->lock)->rlock);

*** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by kworker/23:255/18872:
#0: 00000000b36a6e16 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.},

     at: process_one_work+0x17a/0x580
 #1: 00000000dfd966f0 ((work_completion)(&map->work)){+.+.},
     at: process_one_work+0x17a/0x580
 #2: 00000000e3e7a6aa (pcpu_lock){..-.},
     at: free_percpu+0x36/0x260
stack backtrace:
CPU: 23 PID: 18872 Comm: kworker/23:255 Not tainted 5.1.0-dbg-DEV #1
Hardware name: ...
Workqueue: events bpf_map_free_deferred
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x67/0x95
 print_circular_bug.isra.38+0x1c6/0x220
 check_prev_add.constprop.50+0x9f6/0xd20
 __lock_acquire+0x101f/0x12a0
 lock_acquire+0x9e/0x180
 _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
 __queue_work+0xb2/0x520
 queue_work_on+0x38/0x80
 free_percpu+0x221/0x260
 pcpu_freelist_destroy+0x11/0x20
 stack_map_free+0x2a/0x40
 bpf_map_free_deferred+0x3c/0x50
 process_one_work+0x1f7/0x580
 worker_thread+0x54/0x410
 kthread+0x10f/0x150
 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
---
 mm/percpu.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/percpu.c +5 -1
index 41e58f3d8fbf2..c66149ce1fe6a 100644
@@ -1721,6 +1721,7 @@ void free_percpu(void __percpu *ptr)
 	struct pcpu_chunk *chunk;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int off;
+	bool need_balance = false;
 
 	if (!ptr)
 		return;
@@ -1742,7 +1743,7 @@ void free_percpu(void __percpu *ptr)
 
 		list_for_each_entry(pos, &pcpu_slot[pcpu_nr_slots - 1], list)
 			if (pos != chunk) {
-				pcpu_schedule_balance_work();
+				need_balance = true;
 				break;
 			}
 	}
@@ -1750,6 +1751,9 @@ void free_percpu(void __percpu *ptr)
 	trace_percpu_free_percpu(chunk->base_addr, off, ptr);
 
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pcpu_lock, flags);
+
+	if (need_balance)
+		pcpu_schedule_balance_work();
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(free_percpu);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#43 lore raw

PATCH 44/141 tracing: Fix partial reading of trace event's id file

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Elazar Leibovich <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cbe08bcbbe787315c425dde284dcb715cfbf3f39 ]

When reading only part of the id file, the ppos isn't tracked correctly. This is taken care by simple_read_from_buffer.

Reading a single byte, and then the next byte would result EOF.

While this seems like not a big deal, this breaks abstractions that reads information from files unbuffered. See for example
https://github.com/golang/go/issues/29399

This code was mentioned as problematic in commit cd458ba9d5a5
("tracing: Do not (ab)use trace_seq in event_id_read()")

An example C code that show this bug is:

  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <stdint.h>

  #include <sys/types.h>
  #include <sys/stat.h>
  #include <fcntl.h>
  #include <unistd.h>

  int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    if (argc < 2)
      return 1;
    int fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY);
    char c;
    read(fd, &c, 1);
    printf("First  %c\n", c);
    read(fd, &c, 1);
    printf("Second %c\n", c);
  }

Then run with, e.g.

sudo ./a.out /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/tcp/tcp_set_state/id

You'll notice you're getting the first character twice, instead of the first two characters in the id file.

Cc Orit Wasserman <[email protected]>
Cc Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Fixes 23725aeeab10b ("ftrace: provide an id file for each event")
---
 kernel/trace/trace_events.c | 3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
kernel/trace/trace_events.c +0 -3
index f94be0c2827b0..7345f5f8f3fe6 100644
@@ -1318,9 +1318,6 @@ event_id_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf, size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)
 	char buf[32];
 	int len;
 
-	if (*ppos)
-		return 0;
-
 	if (unlikely(!id))
 		return -ENODEV;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#44 lore raw

PATCH 45/141 configfs: fix possible use-after-free in configfs_register_group

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: YueHaibing <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 35399f87e271f7cf3048eab00a421a6519ac8441 ]

In configfs_register_group(), if create_default_group() failed, we forget to unlink the group. It will left a invalid item in the parent list, which may trigger the use-after-free issue seen below:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_add_valid+0xd4/0xe0 lib/list_debug.c:26
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881ef61ae20 by task syz-executor.0/5996

CPU: 1 PID: 5996 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G         C        5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0xa9/0x10e lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
 kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
 __list_add_valid+0xd4/0xe0 lib/list_debug.c:26
 __list_add include/linux/list.h:60 [inline]
 list_add_tail include/linux/list.h:93 [inline]
 link_obj+0xb0/0x190 fs/configfs/dir.c:759
 link_group+0x1c/0x130 fs/configfs/dir.c:784
 configfs_register_group+0x56/0x1e0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1751
 configfs_register_default_group+0x72/0xc0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1834
 ? 0xffffffffc1be0000
 iio_sw_trigger_init+0x23/0x1000 [industrialio_sw_trigger]
 do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:887
 do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
 load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
 __do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f494ecbcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f494ecbcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f494ecbd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004

Allocated by task 5987:
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:497
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline]
 configfs_register_default_group+0x4c/0xc0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1829
 0xffffffffc1bd0023
 do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:887
 do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
 load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
 __do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Freed by task 5987:
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:459
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1429 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1456 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3003 [inline]
 kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3955
 configfs_register_default_group+0x9a/0xc0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1836
 0xffffffffc1bd0023
 do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:887
 do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
 load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
 __do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881ef61ae00
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of
 192-byte region [ffff8881ef61ae00, ffff8881ef61aec0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007bd8680 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c03000 index:0xffff8881ef61a700
flags: 0x2fffc0000000200(slab)
raw: 02fffc0000000200 ffffea0007ca4740 0000000500000005 ffff8881f6c03000
raw: ffff8881ef61a700 000000008010000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8881ef61ad00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff8881ef61ad80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8881ef61ae00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                               ^
 ffff8881ef61ae80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff8881ef61af00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes 5cf6a51e6062 ("configfs: allow dynamic group creation")
---
 fs/configfs/dir.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/configfs/dir.c +12 -5
index 39843fa7e11b0..920d350df37b6 100644
@@ -1755,12 +1755,19 @@ int configfs_register_group(struct config_group *parent_group,
 
 	inode_lock_nested(d_inode(parent), I_MUTEX_PARENT);
 	ret = create_default_group(parent_group, group);
-	if (!ret) {
-		spin_lock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
-		configfs_dir_set_ready(group->cg_item.ci_dentry->d_fsdata);
-		spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
-	}
+	if (ret)
+		goto err_out;
+
+	spin_lock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
+	configfs_dir_set_ready(group->cg_item.ci_dentry->d_fsdata);
+	spin_unlock(&configfs_dirent_lock);
+	inode_unlock(d_inode(parent));
+	return 0;
+err_out:
 	inode_unlock(d_inode(parent));
+	mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
+	unlink_group(group);
+	mutex_unlock(&subsys->su_mutex);
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(configfs_register_group);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#45 lore raw

PATCH 46/141 uml: fix a boot splat wrt use of cpu_all_mask

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Maciej Żenczykowski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 689a58605b63173acb0a8cf954af6a8f60440c93 ]

Memory: 509108K/542612K available (3835K kernel code, 919K rwdata, 1028K rodata, 129K init, 211K bss, 33504K reserved, 0K cma-reserved)
NR_IRQS: 15
clocksource: timer: mask: 0xffffffffffffffff max_cycles: 0x1cd42e205, max_idle_ns: 881590404426 ns

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/time/clockevents.c:458 clockevents_register_device+0x72/0x140
posix-timer cpumask == cpu_all_mask, using cpu_possible_mask instead
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.1.0-rc4-00048-ged79cc87302b #4
Stack:
 604ebda0 603c5370 604ebe20 6046fd17
 00000000 6006fcbb 604ebdb0 603c53b5
 604ebe10 6003bfc4 604ebdd0 9000001ca
Call Trace:
 [<6006fcbb>] ? printk+0x0/0x94
 [<60083160>] ? clockevents_register_device+0x72/0x140
 [<6001f16e>] show_stack+0x13b/0x155
 [<603c5370>] ? dump_stack_print_info+0xe2/0xeb
 [<6006fcbb>] ? printk+0x0/0x94
 [<603c53b5>] dump_stack+0x2a/0x2c
 [<6003bfc4>] __warn+0x10e/0x13e
 [<60070320>] ? vprintk_func+0xc8/0xcf
 [<60030fd6>] ? block_signals+0x0/0x16
 [<6006fcbb>] ? printk+0x0/0x94
 [<6003c08b>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x97/0x99
 [<600311a1>] ? set_signals+0x0/0x3f
 [<6003bff4>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x0/0x99
 [<600842cb>] ? tick_oneshot_mode_active+0x44/0x4f
 [<60030fd6>] ? block_signals+0x0/0x16
 [<6006fcbb>] ? printk+0x0/0x94
 [<6007d2d5>] ? __clocksource_select+0x20/0x1b1
 [<60030fd6>] ? block_signals+0x0/0x16
 [<6006fcbb>] ? printk+0x0/0x94
 [<60083160>] clockevents_register_device+0x72/0x140
 [<60031192>] ? get_signals+0x0/0xf
 [<60030fd6>] ? block_signals+0x0/0x16
 [<6006fcbb>] ? printk+0x0/0x94
 [<60002eec>] um_timer_setup+0xc8/0xca
 [<60001b59>] start_kernel+0x47f/0x57e
 [<600035bc>] start_kernel_proc+0x49/0x4d
 [<6006c483>] ? kmsg_dump_register+0x82/0x8a
 [<6001de62>] new_thread_handler+0x81/0xb2
 [<60003571>] ? kmsg_dumper_stdout_init+0x1a/0x1c
 [<60020c75>] uml_finishsetup+0x54/0x59

random: get_random_bytes called from init_oops_id+0x27/0x34 with crng_init=0

---[ end trace 00173d0117a88acb ]---

Calibrating delay loop... 6941.90 BogoMIPS (lpj=34709504)

---
 arch/um/kernel/time.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/um/kernel/time.c +1 -1
index 052de4c8acb2e..0c572a48158e8 100644
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static int itimer_one_shot(struct clock_event_device *evt)
 static struct clock_event_device timer_clockevent = {
 	.name			= "posix-timer",
 	.rating			= 250,
-	.cpumask		= cpu_all_mask,
+	.cpumask		= cpu_possible_mask,
 	.features		= CLOCK_EVT_FEAT_PERIODIC |
 				  CLOCK_EVT_FEAT_ONESHOT,
 	.set_state_shutdown	= itimer_shutdown,
Signature · 7 lines
2.20.1


_______________________________________________
linux-um mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-um
author maintainer
#46 lore raw

PATCH 47/141 PCI: dwc: Free MSI in dw_pcie_host_init() error path

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jisheng Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9e2b5de5604a6ff2626c51e77014d92c9299722c ]

If we ever did MSI-related initializations, we need to call dw_pcie_free_msi() in the error code path.

Remove the IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PCI_MSI) check for MSI init because pci_msi_enabled() already has a stub for !CONFIG_PCI_MSI.

---
 drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-designware-host.c | 9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-designware-host.c +6 -3
index b56e22262a774..4eedb2c54ab38 100644
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ int dw_pcie_host_init(struct pcie_port *pp)
 	if (ret)
 		pci->num_viewport = 2;
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PCI_MSI) && pci_msi_enabled()) {
+	if (pci_msi_enabled()) {
 		/*
 		 * If a specific SoC driver needs to change the
 		 * default number of vectors, it needs to implement
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ int dw_pcie_host_init(struct pcie_port *pp)
 	if (pp->ops->host_init) {
 		ret = pp->ops->host_init(pp);
 		if (ret)
-			goto error;
+			goto err_free_msi;
 	}
 
 	pp->root_bus_nr = pp->busn->start;
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ int dw_pcie_host_init(struct pcie_port *pp)
 
 	ret = pci_scan_root_bus_bridge(bridge);
 	if (ret)
-		goto error;
+		goto err_free_msi;
 
 	bus = bridge->bus;
 
@@ -507,6 +507,9 @@ int dw_pcie_host_init(struct pcie_port *pp)
 	pci_bus_add_devices(bus);
 	return 0;
 
+err_free_msi:
+	if (pci_msi_enabled() && !pp->ops->msi_host_init)
+		dw_pcie_free_msi(pp);
 error:
 	pci_free_host_bridge(bridge);
 	return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#47 lore raw

PATCH 48/141 PCI: dwc: Free MSI IRQ page in dw_pcie_free_msi()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jisheng Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dc69a3d567941784c3d00e1d0834582b42b0b3e7 ]

To avoid a memory leak, free the page allocated for MSI IRQ in dw_pcie_free_msi().

---
 drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-designware-host.c | 12 ++++++++----
 drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-designware.h      |  1 +
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-designware-host.c +8 -4
index 4eedb2c54ab38..acd50920c2ffd 100644
@@ -303,20 +303,24 @@ void dw_pcie_free_msi(struct pcie_port *pp)
 
 	irq_domain_remove(pp->msi_domain);
 	irq_domain_remove(pp->irq_domain);
+
+	if (pp->msi_page)
+		__free_page(pp->msi_page);
 }
 
 void dw_pcie_msi_init(struct pcie_port *pp)
 {
 	struct dw_pcie *pci = to_dw_pcie_from_pp(pp);
 	struct device *dev = pci->dev;
-	struct page *page;
 	u64 msi_target;
 
-	page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-	pp->msi_data = dma_map_page(dev, page, 0, PAGE_SIZE, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+	pp->msi_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	pp->msi_data = dma_map_page(dev, pp->msi_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE,
+				    DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
 	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, pp->msi_data)) {
 		dev_err(dev, "Failed to map MSI data\n");
-		__free_page(page);
+		__free_page(pp->msi_page);
+		pp->msi_page = NULL;
 		return;
 	}
 	msi_target = (u64)pp->msi_data;
drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-designware.h +1 -0
index 9f1a5e399b703..14dcf66466996 100644
@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ struct pcie_port {
 	struct irq_domain	*irq_domain;
 	struct irq_domain	*msi_domain;
 	dma_addr_t		msi_data;
+	struct page		*msi_page;
 	u32			num_vectors;
 	u32			irq_status[MAX_MSI_CTRLS];
 	raw_spinlock_t		lock;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#48 lore raw

PATCH 49/141 ovl: do not generate duplicate fsnotify events for "fake" path

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d989903058a83e8536cc7aadf9256a47d5c173fe ]

Overlayfs "fake" path is used for stacked file operations on underlying files. Operations on files with "fake" path must not generate fsnotify events with path data, because those events have already been generated at overlayfs layer and because the reported event->fd for fanotify marks on underlying inode/filesystem will have the wrong path (the overlayfs path).

---
 fs/overlayfs/file.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/overlayfs/file.c +4 -3
index 986313da0c889..dbf39e715e6aa 100644
@@ -29,10 +29,11 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file,
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct file *realfile;
 	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	int flags = file->f_flags | O_NOATIME | FMODE_NONOTIFY;
 
 	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
-	realfile = open_with_fake_path(&file->f_path, file->f_flags | O_NOATIME,
-				       realinode, current_cred());
+	realfile = open_with_fake_path(&file->f_path, flags, realinode,
+				       current_cred());
 	revert_creds(old_cred);
 
 	pr_debug("open(%p[%pD2/%c], 0%o) -> (%p, 0%o)\n",
@@ -50,7 +51,7 @@ static int ovl_change_flags(struct file *file, unsigned int flags)
 	int err;
 
 	/* No atime modificaton on underlying */
-	flags |= O_NOATIME;
+	flags |= O_NOATIME | FMODE_NONOTIFY;
 
 	/* If some flag changed that cannot be changed then something's amiss */
 	if (WARN_ON((file->f_flags ^ flags) & ~OVL_SETFL_MASK))
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#49 lore raw

PATCH 50/141 mmc: mmci: Prevent polling for busy detection in IRQ context

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ludovic Barre <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8520ce1e17799b220ff421d4f39438c9c572ade3 ]

The IRQ handler, mmci_irq(), loops until all status bits have been cleared. However, the status bit signaling busy in variant->busy_detect_flag, may be set even if busy detection isn't monitored for the current request.

This may be the case for the CMD11 when switching the I/O voltage, which leads to that mmci_irq() busy loops in IRQ context. Fix this problem, by clearing the status bit for busy, before continuing to validate the condition for the loop. This is safe, because the busy status detection has already been taken care of by mmci_cmd_irq().

---
 drivers/mmc/host/mmci.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mmc/host/mmci.c +3 -2
index 1841d250e9e2c..eb1a65cb878f0 100644
@@ -1295,9 +1295,10 @@ static irqreturn_t mmci_irq(int irq, void *dev_id)
 		}
 
 		/*
-		 * Don't poll for busy completion in irq context.
+		 * Busy detection has been handled by mmci_cmd_irq() above.
+		 * Clear the status bit to prevent polling in IRQ context.
 		 */
-		if (host->variant->busy_detect && host->busy_status)
+		if (host->variant->busy_detect_flag)
 			status &= ~host->variant->busy_detect_flag;
 
 		ret = 1;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#50 lore raw

PATCH 51/141 netfilter: nf_flow_table: fix missing error check for rhashtable_insert_fast

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 43c8f131184faf20c07221f3e09724611c6525d8 ]

rhashtable_insert_fast() may return an error value when memory allocation fails, but flow_offload_add() does not check for errors. This patch just adds missing error checking.

Fixes ac2a66665e23 ("netfilter: add generic flow table infrastructure")
---
 net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_core.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_core.c +18 -7
index e1537ace2b90c..5df7486bb4164 100644
@@ -185,14 +185,25 @@ static const struct rhashtable_params nf_flow_offload_rhash_params = {
 
 int flow_offload_add(struct nf_flowtable *flow_table, struct flow_offload *flow)
 {
-	flow->timeout = (u32)jiffies;
+	int err;
 
-	rhashtable_insert_fast(&flow_table->rhashtable,
-			       &flow->tuplehash[FLOW_OFFLOAD_DIR_ORIGINAL].node,
-			       nf_flow_offload_rhash_params);
-	rhashtable_insert_fast(&flow_table->rhashtable,
-			       &flow->tuplehash[FLOW_OFFLOAD_DIR_REPLY].node,
-			       nf_flow_offload_rhash_params);
+	err = rhashtable_insert_fast(&flow_table->rhashtable,
+				     &flow->tuplehash[0].node,
+				     nf_flow_offload_rhash_params);
+	if (err < 0)
+		return err;
+
+	err = rhashtable_insert_fast(&flow_table->rhashtable,
+				     &flow->tuplehash[1].node,
+				     nf_flow_offload_rhash_params);
+	if (err < 0) {
+		rhashtable_remove_fast(&flow_table->rhashtable,
+				       &flow->tuplehash[0].node,
+				       nf_flow_offload_rhash_params);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	flow->timeout = (u32)jiffies;
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(flow_offload_add);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#51 lore raw

PATCH 52/141 netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: restore boundary check correctness

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jakub Jankowski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f5e85ce8e733c2547827f6268136b70b802eabdb ]

Since commit bc7d811ace4a ("netfilter: nf_ct_h323: Convert CHECK_BOUND macro to function"), NAT traversal for H.323 doesn't work, failing to parse H323-UserInformation. nf_h323_error_boundary() compares contents of the bitstring, not the addresses, preventing valid H.323 packets from being conntrack'd.

This looks like an oversight from when CHECK_BOUND macro was converted to a function.

To fix it, stop dereferencing bs->cur and bs->end.

Fixes bc7d811ace4a ("netfilter: nf_ct_h323: Convert CHECK_BOUND macro to function")
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c +1 -1
index 1601275efe2d1..4c2ef42e189cb 100644
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static int nf_h323_error_boundary(struct bitstr *bs, size_t bytes, size_t bits)
 	if (bits % BITS_PER_BYTE > 0)
 		bytes++;
 
-	if (*bs->cur + bytes > *bs->end)
+	if (bs->cur + bytes > bs->end)
 		return 1;
 
 	return 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#52 lore raw

PATCH 53/141 mips: Make sure dt memory regions are valid

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Serge Semin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 93fa5b280761a4dbb14c5330f260380385ab2b49 ]

There are situations when memory regions coming from dts may be too big for the platform physical address space. This especially concerns XPA-capable systems. Bootloader may determine more than 4GB memory available and pass it to the kernel over dts memory node, while kernel is built without XPA/64BIT support. In this case the region may either simply be truncated by add_memory_region() method or by u64->phys_addr_t type casting. But in worst case the method can even drop the memory region if it exceeds PHYS_ADDR_MAX size. So lets make sure the retrieved from dts memory regions are valid, and if some of them aren't, just manually truncate them with a warning printed out.

Cc Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc James Hogan <[email protected]>
Cc Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]>
Cc Huacai Chen <[email protected]>
Cc Stefan Agner <[email protected]>
Cc Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]>
Cc Alexandre Belloni <[email protected]>
Cc Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Cc Serge Semin <[email protected]>
---
 arch/mips/kernel/prom.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/mips/kernel/prom.c +13 -1
index 89950b7bf536b..bdaf3536241a2 100644
@@ -41,7 +41,19 @@ char *mips_get_machine_name(void)
 #ifdef CONFIG_USE_OF
 void __init early_init_dt_add_memory_arch(u64 base, u64 size)
 {
-	return add_memory_region(base, size, BOOT_MEM_RAM);
+	if (base >= PHYS_ADDR_MAX) {
+		pr_warn("Trying to add an invalid memory region, skipped\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Truncate the passed memory region instead of type casting */
+	if (base + size - 1 >= PHYS_ADDR_MAX || base + size < base) {
+		pr_warn("Truncate memory region %llx @ %llx to size %llx\n",
+			size, base, PHYS_ADDR_MAX - base);
+		size = PHYS_ADDR_MAX - base;
+	}
+
+	add_memory_region(base, size, BOOT_MEM_RAM);
 }
 
 int __init early_init_dt_reserve_memory_arch(phys_addr_t base,
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#53 lore raw

PATCH 54/141 netfilter: nf_tables: fix base chain stat rcu_dereference usage

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit edbd82c5fba009f68d20b5db585be1e667c605f6 ]

Following splat gets triggered when nfnetlink monitor is running while xtables-nft selftests are running:

net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1272 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this:

1 lock held by xtables-nft-mul/27006:
#0: 00000000e0f85be9 (&net->nft.commit_mutex){+.+.}, at: nf_tables_valid_genid+0x1a/0x50

Call Trace:
 nf_tables_fill_chain_info.isra.45+0x6cc/0x6e0
 nf_tables_chain_notify+0xf8/0x1a0
 nf_tables_commit+0x165c/0x1740

nf_tables_fill_chain_info() can be called both from dumps (rcu read locked) or from the transaction path if a userspace process subscribed to nftables notifications.

In the 'table dump' case, rcu_access_pointer() cannot be used: We do not hold transaction mutex so the pointer can be NULLed right after the check. Just unconditionally fetch the value, then have the helper return immediately if its NULL.

In the notification case we don't hold the rcu read lock, but updates are prevented due to transaction mutex. Use rcu_dereference_check() to make lockdep aware of this.

---
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +7 -2
index ebfcfe1dcbdbb..29ff59dd99ace 100644
@@ -1142,6 +1142,9 @@ static int nft_dump_stats(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nft_stats __percpu *stats)
 	u64 pkts, bytes;
 	int cpu;
 
+	if (!stats)
+		return 0;
+
 	memset(&total, 0, sizeof(total));
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
 		cpu_stats = per_cpu_ptr(stats, cpu);
@@ -1199,6 +1202,7 @@ static int nf_tables_fill_chain_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net,
 	if (nft_is_base_chain(chain)) {
 		const struct nft_base_chain *basechain = nft_base_chain(chain);
 		const struct nf_hook_ops *ops = &basechain->ops;
+		struct nft_stats __percpu *stats;
 		struct nlattr *nest;
 
 		nest = nla_nest_start(skb, NFTA_CHAIN_HOOK);
@@ -1220,8 +1224,9 @@ static int nf_tables_fill_chain_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net,
 		if (nla_put_string(skb, NFTA_CHAIN_TYPE, basechain->type->name))
 			goto nla_put_failure;
 
-		if (rcu_access_pointer(basechain->stats) &&
-		    nft_dump_stats(skb, rcu_dereference(basechain->stats)))
+		stats = rcu_dereference_check(basechain->stats,
+					      lockdep_commit_lock_is_held(net));
+		if (nft_dump_stats(skb, stats))
 			goto nla_put_failure;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#54 lore raw

PATCH 55/141 watchdog: Use depends instead of select for pretimeout governors

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f627ac0e12cd2736e60b9f5782ecec1d97251f77 ]

Watchdog pretimeout governors were enabled from the default governor selection using "select". As a result, the default governor was always built into the kernel, even if no watchdog driver was loaded. By using "depends on" instead of "select", we are in better control, and the governors can all be built as modules. At the same time, set the default configuration option for pretimeout governors to match WATCHDOG_CORE (meaning all pretimeout governors are by default enabled if pretimeout support is enabled).

The practical impact of this change is minimal. Previously, selecting a default governor automatically enabled that governor. Now, a default governor can only be selected if that governor has been enabled. Consequently, the order of governor selection is now reversed: The governor selection is now first, followed by default governor selection.

---
 drivers/watchdog/Kconfig | 30 ++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/watchdog/Kconfig +16 -14
index 5ea8909a41f95..8c9ea3cd9c601 100644
@@ -1972,6 +1972,20 @@ config WATCHDOG_PRETIMEOUT_GOV
 
 if WATCHDOG_PRETIMEOUT_GOV
 
+config WATCHDOG_PRETIMEOUT_GOV_NOOP
+	tristate "Noop watchdog pretimeout governor"
+	default WATCHDOG_CORE
+	help
+	  Noop watchdog pretimeout governor, only an informational
+	  message is added to kernel log buffer.
+
+config WATCHDOG_PRETIMEOUT_GOV_PANIC
+	tristate "Panic watchdog pretimeout governor"
+	default WATCHDOG_CORE
+	help
+	  Panic watchdog pretimeout governor, on watchdog pretimeout
+	  event put the kernel into panic.
+
 choice
 	prompt "Default Watchdog Pretimeout Governor"
 	default WATCHDOG_PRETIMEOUT_DEFAULT_GOV_PANIC
@@ -1982,7 +1996,7 @@ choice
 
 config WATCHDOG_PRETIMEOUT_DEFAULT_GOV_NOOP
 	bool "noop"
-	select WATCHDOG_PRETIMEOUT_GOV_NOOP
+	depends on WATCHDOG_PRETIMEOUT_GOV_NOOP
 	help
 	  Use noop watchdog pretimeout governor by default. If noop
 	  governor is selected by a user, write a short message to
@@ -1990,7 +2004,7 @@ config WATCHDOG_PRETIMEOUT_DEFAULT_GOV_NOOP
 
 config WATCHDOG_PRETIMEOUT_DEFAULT_GOV_PANIC
 	bool "panic"
-	select WATCHDOG_PRETIMEOUT_GOV_PANIC
+	depends on WATCHDOG_PRETIMEOUT_GOV_PANIC
 	help
 	  Use panic watchdog pretimeout governor by default, if
 	  a watchdog pretimeout event happens, consider that
@@ -1998,18 +2012,6 @@ config WATCHDOG_PRETIMEOUT_DEFAULT_GOV_PANIC
 
 endchoice
 
-config WATCHDOG_PRETIMEOUT_GOV_NOOP
-	tristate "Noop watchdog pretimeout governor"
-	help
-	  Noop watchdog pretimeout governor, only an informational
-	  message is added to kernel log buffer.
-
-config WATCHDOG_PRETIMEOUT_GOV_PANIC
-	tristate "Panic watchdog pretimeout governor"
-	help
-	  Panic watchdog pretimeout governor, on watchdog pretimeout
-	  event put the kernel into panic.
-
 endif # WATCHDOG_PRETIMEOUT_GOV
 
 endif # WATCHDOG
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#55 lore raw

PATCH 56/141 watchdog: imx2_wdt: Fix set_timeout for big timeout values

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Georg Hofmann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b07e228eee69601addba98b47b1a3850569e5013 ]

The documentated behavior is: if max_hw_heartbeat_ms is implemented, the minimum of the set_timeout argument and max_hw_heartbeat_ms should be used. This patch implements this behavior.
Previously only the first 7bits were used and the input argument was returned.

---
 drivers/watchdog/imx2_wdt.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/watchdog/imx2_wdt.c +3 -1
index 2b52514eaa86a..7e7bdcbbc741b 100644
@@ -178,8 +178,10 @@ static void __imx2_wdt_set_timeout(struct watchdog_device *wdog,
 static int imx2_wdt_set_timeout(struct watchdog_device *wdog,
 				unsigned int new_timeout)
 {
-	__imx2_wdt_set_timeout(wdog, new_timeout);
+	unsigned int actual;
 
+	actual = min(new_timeout, wdog->max_hw_heartbeat_ms * 1000);
+	__imx2_wdt_set_timeout(wdog, actual);
 	wdog->timeout = new_timeout;
 	return 0;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1