Additional fixes on Talitos driver
Subsystems (2)
v4 cover Additional fixes on Talitos driver
This series is the last set of fixes for the Talitos driver.
We now get a fully clean boot on both SEC1 (SEC1.2 on mpc885) and SEC2 (SEC2.2 on mpc8321E) with CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS:
[ 3.385197] bus: 'platform': really_probe: probing driver talitos with device ff020000.crypto [ 3.450982] random: fast init done [ 12.252548] alg: No test for authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(aes)) (authenc-hmac-md5-cbc-aes-talitos-hsna) [ 12.262226] alg: No test for authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(des3_ede)) (authenc-hmac-md5-cbc-3des-talitos-hsna) [ 43.310737] Bug in SEC1, padding ourself [ 45.603318] random: crng init done [ 54.612333] talitos ff020000.crypto: fsl,sec1.2 algorithms registered in /proc/crypto [ 54.620232] driver: 'talitos': driver_bound: bound to device 'ff020000.crypto'
[ 1.193721] bus: 'platform': really_probe: probing driver talitos with device b0030000.crypto [ 1.229197] random: fast init done [ 2.714920] alg: No test for authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(aes)) (authenc-hmac-sha224-cbc-aes-talitos) [ 2.724312] alg: No test for authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(aes)) (authenc-hmac-sha224-cbc-aes-talitos-hsna) [ 4.482045] alg: No test for authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(aes)) (authenc-hmac-md5-cbc-aes-talitos) [ 4.490940] alg: No test for authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(aes)) (authenc-hmac-md5-cbc-aes-talitos-hsna) [ 4.500280] alg: No test for authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(des3_ede)) (authenc-hmac-md5-cbc-3des-talitos) [ 4.509727] alg: No test for authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(des3_ede)) (authenc-hmac-md5-cbc-3des-talitos-hsna) [ 6.631781] random: crng init done [ 11.521795] talitos b0030000.crypto: fsl,sec2.2 algorithms registered in /proc/crypto [ 11.529803] driver: 'talitos': driver_bound: bound to device 'b0030000.crypto'
v2: dropped patch 1 which was irrelevant due to a rebase weirdness. Added Cc to stable on the 2 first patches.
v3:
- removed stable reference in patch 1
- reworded patch 1 to include name of patch 2 for the dependency.
- mentionned this dependency in patch 2 as well.
- corrected the Fixes: sha1 in patch 4
v4:
- using scatterwalk_ffwd() instead of opencodying SG list forwarding.
- Added a patch to fix sg_copy_to_buffer() when sg->offset() is greater than PAGE_SIZE, otherwise sg_copy_to_buffer() fails when the list has been forwarded with scatterwalk_ffwd().
- taken the patch "crypto: talitos - eliminate unneeded 'done' functions at build time" out of the series because it is independent.
- added a helper to find the header field associated to a request in flush_channe()
Christophe Leroy (4):
lib/scatterlist: Fix mapping iterator when sg->offset is greater than
PAGE_SIZE
crypto: talitos - move struct talitos_edesc into talitos.h
crypto: talitos - fix hash on SEC1.
crypto: talitos - drop icv_ool
drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++++---------------------------- drivers/crypto/talitos.h | 28 +++++++++++++ lib/scatterlist.c | 9 ++++- 3 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.13.3
PATCH v4 1/4 lib/scatterlist: Fix mapping iterator when sg->offset is greater than PAGE_SIZE
All mapping iterator logic is based on the assumption that sg->offset is always lower than PAGE_SIZE.
But there are situations where sg->offset is such that the SG item is on the second page. In that case sg_copy_to_buffer() fails properly copying the data into the buffer. One of the reason is that the data will be outside the kmapped area used to access that data.
This patch fixes the issue by adjusting the mapping iterator offset and pgoffset fields such that offset is always lower than PAGE_SIZE.
--- lib/scatterlist.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
lib/scatterlist.c +7 -2
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ static bool sg_miter_get_next_page(struct sg_mapping_iter *miter) {if (!miter->__remaining) {struct scatterlist *sg; -unsigned long pgoffset; +unsigned long pgoffset, offset;if (!__sg_page_iter_next (&miter->piter))return false;
@@ -686,7 +686,12 @@ static bool sg_miter_get_next_page(struct sg_mapping_iter *miter) sg = miter->piter.sg; pgoffset = miter->piter.sg_pgoffset; - miter->__offset = pgoffset ?0 : sg->offset; + offset = pgoffset ?0 : sg->offset; +while (offset >=PAGE_SIZE ) { + miter->piter.sg_pgoffset = ++pgoffset; + offset -=PAGE_SIZE ; + } + miter->__offset = offset; miter->__remaining = sg->offset + sg->length - (pgoffset <<PAGE_SHIFT ) - miter->__offset; miter->__remaining = min_t(unsigned long, miter->__remaining,
Signature · 1 line
2.13.3
Herbert Xu
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 1/4] lib/scatterlist: Fix mapping iterator when sg->offset is greater than PAGE_SIZE
Quoted 13 lines · Christophe Leroy
All mapping iterator logic is based on the assumption that
sg->offsetis always lower thanPAGE_SIZE.But there are situations where
sg->offsetis such that the SG item is on the second page. In that casesg_copy_to_buffer()fails properly copying the data into the buffer. One of the reason is that the data will be outside the kmapped area used to access that data.This patch fixes the issue by adjusting the mapping iterator offset and pgoffset fields such that offset is always lower than
PAGE_SIZE.
Quoted 6 lines
Signed-off-by Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>Fixes 4225fc8555a9 ("lib/scatterlist: use page iterator in the mapping iterator")--- lib/scatterlist.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Good catch.
lib/scatterlist.c static bool sg_miter_get_next_page(struct sg_mapping_iter *miter) · line 693
Quoted 10 lines
lib/scatterlist.c +5
-1@@ -686,7 +686,12 @@ static bool sg_miter_get_next_page(struct sg_mapping_iter *miter) sg = miter->piter.sg; pgoffset = miter->piter.sg_pgoffset; - miter->__offset = pgoffset ?0 : sg->offset; + offset = pgoffset ?0 : sg->offset; +while (offset >=PAGE_SIZE ) { + miter->piter.sg_pgoffset = ++pgoffset; + offset -=PAGE_SIZE ; + }
How about
miter->piter.sg_pgoffset += offset >> PAGE_SHIFT; offset &= PAGE_SIZE - 1;
Thanks,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Re: [PATCH v4 1/4] lib/scatterlist: Fix mapping iterator when sg->offset is greater than PAGE_SIZE
Hi,
Quoted 6 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 5 lines · Christophe Leroy
All mapping iterator logic is based on the assumption that
sg->offsetis always lower thanPAGE_SIZE.But there are situations where
sg->offsetis such that the SG item is on the second page.
could you explain how sg->offset becomes >= PAGE_SIZE?
--Imre
Quoted 39 lines
Quoted 9 lines
In that case
sg_copy_to_buffer()fails
properly copying the data into the buffer. One of the reason is that the data will be outside the kmapped area used to access that data.This patch fixes the issue by adjusting the mapping iterator offset and pgoffset fields such that offset is always lower than
PAGE_SIZE.Quoted 6 lines
Signed-off-by Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>Fixes 4225fc8555a9 ("lib/scatterlist: use page iterator in the mapping iterator")--- lib/scatterlist.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)Good catch.
lib/scatterlist.c static bool sg_miter_get_next_page(struct sg_mapping_iter *miter) · line 693
Quoted 10 lines
lib/scatterlist.c +5
-1@@ -686,7 +686,12 @@ static bool sg_miter_get_next_page(struct sg_mapping_iter *miter) sg = miter->piter.sg; pgoffset = miter->piter.sg_pgoffset; - miter->__offset = pgoffset ?0 : sg->offset; + offset = pgoffset ?0 : sg->offset; +while (offset >=PAGE_SIZE ) { + miter->piter.sg_pgoffset = ++pgoffset; + offset -=PAGE_SIZE ; + }How about
miter->piter.sg_pgoffset += offset >> PAGE_SHIFT; offset &= PAGE_SIZE - 1;Thanks,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Herbert Xu
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 1/4] lib/scatterlist: Fix mapping iterator when sg->offset is greater than PAGE_SIZE
Quoted 11 lines · Imre Deak
Hi,
Quoted 6 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 5 lines · Christophe Leroy
All mapping iterator logic is based on the assumption that
sg->offsetis always lower thanPAGE_SIZE.But there are situations where
sg->offsetis such that the SG item is on the second page.could you explain how
sg->offsetbecomes >=PAGE_SIZE?
The network stack can produce SG list elements that are longer than PAGE_SIZE. If you the iterate over it one page at a time then the offset can exceed PAGE_SIZE.
Cheers,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
PATCH v4 2/4 crypto: talitos - move struct talitos_edesc into talitos.h
In reply to Christophe LeroyMoves struct talitos_edesc into talitos.h so that it can be used from any place in talitos.c
It will be required for next patch ("crypto: talitos - fix hash on SEC1")
--- drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 30 ------------------------------ drivers/crypto/talitos.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/talitos.c +0 -30
@@ -951,36 +951,6 @@ static int aead_des3_setkey(struct crypto_aead *authenc, goto out; } -/* -* talitos_edesc - s/w-extended descriptor -* @src_nents: number of segments in input scatterlist -* @dst_nents: number of segments in output scatterlist -* @icv_ool: whether ICV is out-of-line -* @iv_dma: dma address of iv for checking continuity and link table -* @dma_len: length of dma mapped link_tbl space -* @dma_link_tbl: bus physical address of link_tbl/buf -* @desc: h/w descriptor -* @link_tbl: input and output h/w link tables (if {src,dst}_nents > 1) (SEC2) -* @buf: input and output buffeur (if {src,dst}_nents > 1) (SEC1) -* -* if decrypting (with authcheck), or either one of src_nents or dst_nents -* is greater than 1, an integrity check value is concatenated to the end -* of link_tbl data -*/ -struct talitos_edesc { -int src_nents; -int dst_nents; -bool icv_ool; -dma_addr_t iv_dma; -int dma_len; -dma_addr_t dma_link_tbl; -struct talitos_desc desc; -union { -struct talitos_ptr link_tbl[0 ]; -u8 buf[0 ]; - }; -}; - static void talitos_sg_unmap(struct device *dev, struct talitos_edesc *edesc, struct scatterlist *src,
drivers/crypto/talitos.h +30 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,36 @@ struct talitos_desc {#define TALITOS_DESC_SIZE (sizeof(struct talitos_desc) - sizeof(__be32)) +/* +* talitos_edesc - s/w-extended descriptor +* @src_nents: number of segments in input scatterlist +* @dst_nents: number of segments in output scatterlist +* @icv_ool: whether ICV is out-of-line +* @iv_dma: dma address of iv for checking continuity and link table +* @dma_len: length of dma mapped link_tbl space +* @dma_link_tbl: bus physical address of link_tbl/buf +* @desc: h/w descriptor +* @link_tbl: input and output h/w link tables (if {src,dst}_nents > 1) (SEC2) +* @buf: input and output buffeur (if {src,dst}_nents > 1) (SEC1) +* +* if decrypting (with authcheck), or either one of src_nents or dst_nents +* is greater than 1, an integrity check value is concatenated to the end +* of link_tbl data +*/ +struct talitos_edesc { +int src_nents; +int dst_nents; +bool icv_ool; +dma_addr_t iv_dma; +int dma_len; +dma_addr_t dma_link_tbl; +struct talitos_desc desc; +union { +struct talitos_ptr link_tbl[0 ]; +u8 buf[0 ]; + }; +}; +/** * talitos_request - descriptor submission request * @desc: descriptor pointer (kernel virtual)
Signature · 1 line
2.13.3
PATCH v4 3/4 crypto: talitos - fix hash on SEC1.
In reply to Christophe LeroyOn SEC1, hash provides wrong result when performing hashing in several steps with input data SG list has more than one element. This was detected with CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS:
[ 44.185947] alg: hash: md5-talitos test failed (wrong result) on test vector 6, cfg="random: may_sleep use_finup src_divs=[<reimport>25.88%@+8063, <flush>24.19%@+9588, 28.63%@+16333, <reimport>4.60%@+6756, 16.70%@+16281] dst_divs=[71.61%@alignmask+16361, 14.36%@+7756, 14.3%@+" [ 44.325122] alg: hash: sha1-talitos test failed (wrong result) on test vector 3, cfg="random: inplace use_final src_divs=[<flush,nosimd>16.56%@+16378, <reimport>52.0%@+16329, 21.42%@alignmask+16380, 10.2%@alignmask+16380] iv_offset=39" [ 44.493500] alg: hash: sha224-talitos test failed (wrong result) on test vector 4, cfg="random: use_final nosimd src_divs=[<reimport>52.27%@+7401, <reimport>17.34%@+16285, <flush>17.71%@+26, 12.68%@+10644] iv_offset=43" [ 44.673262] alg: hash: sha256-talitos test failed (wrong result) on test vector 4, cfg="random: may_sleep use_finup src_divs=[<reimport>60.6%@+12790, 17.86%@+1329, <reimport>12.64%@alignmask+16300, 8.29%@+15, 0.40%@+13506, <reimport>0.51%@+16322, <reimport>0.24%@+16339] dst_divs"
This is due to two issues:
- We have an overlap between the buffer used for copying the input data (SEC1 doesn't do scatter/gather) and the chained descriptor.
- Data copy is wrong when the previous hash left less than one blocksize of data to hash, implying a complement of the previous block with a few bytes from the new request.
Fix it by:
- Moving the second descriptor after the buffer, as moving the buffer after the descriptor would make it more complex for other cipher operations (AEAD, ABLKCIPHER)
- Skip the bytes taken from the new request to complete the previous one by moving the SG list forward.
--- drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/talitos.c +41 -28
@@ -320,6 +320,21 @@ static int talitos_submit(struct device *dev, int ch, struct talitos_desc *desc,return -EINPROGRESS ; } +static __be32 get_request_hdr (struct talitos_request *request,bool is_sec1) +{ +struct talitos_edesc *edesc; + +if (!is_sec1) +return request->desc->hdr; + +if (!request->desc->next_desc) +return request->desc->hdr1; + + edesc = container_of(request->desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc); + +return ((struct talitos_desc *)(edesc->buf + edesc->dma_len))->hdr1; +} +/* * process what was done, notify callback of error if not */
@@ -341,12 +356,7 @@ static void flush_channel(struct device *dev, int ch, int error, int reset_ch)/* descriptors with their done bits set don't get the error */ rmb (); -if (!is_sec1) - hdr = request->desc->hdr; -else if (request->desc->next_desc) - hdr = (request->desc +1 )->hdr1; -else - hdr = request->desc->hdr1; + hdr =get_request_hdr (request, is_sec1);if ((hdr &DESC_HDR_DONE ) ==DESC_HDR_DONE ) status =0 ;
@@ -476,8 +486,14 @@ static u32 current_desc_hdr(struct device *dev, int ch) } } -if (priv->chan[ch].fifo[iter].desc->next_desc == cur_desc) -return (priv->chan[ch].fifo[iter].desc +1 )->hdr; +if (priv->chan[ch].fifo[iter].desc->next_desc == cur_desc) { +struct talitos_edesc *edesc; + + edesc =container_of (priv->chan[ch].fifo[iter].desc, + struct talitos_edesc, desc); +return ((struct talitos_desc *) + (edesc->buf + edesc->dma_len))->hdr; + }return priv->chan[ch].fifo[iter].desc->hdr; }
@@ -1402,15 +1418,11 @@ static struct talitos_edesc *talitos_edesc_alloc(struct device *dev, edesc->dst_nents = dst_nents; edesc->iv_dma = iv_dma; edesc->dma_len = dma_len; -if (dma_len) { -void *addr = &edesc->link_tbl[0 ]; - -if (is_sec1 && !dst) - addr +=sizeof (struct talitos_desc ); - edesc->dma_link_tbl =dma_map_single (dev, addr, +if (dma_len) + edesc->dma_link_tbl =dma_map_single (dev, &edesc->link_tbl[0 ], edesc->dma_len,DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL ); - } +return edesc; }
@@ -1722,14 +1734,16 @@ static void common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(struct device *dev,struct talitos_private *priv =dev_get_drvdata (dev);bool is_sec1 =has_ftr_sec1 (priv);struct talitos_desc *desc = &edesc->desc; -struct talitos_desc *desc2 = desc +1 ; +struct talitos_desc *desc2 = (struct talitos_desc *) + (edesc->buf + edesc->dma_len);unmap_single_talitos_ptr (dev, &edesc->desc.ptr[5 ],DMA_FROM_DEVICE );if (desc->next_desc && desc->ptr[5 ].ptr != desc2->ptr[5 ].ptr)unmap_single_talitos_ptr (dev, &desc2->ptr[5 ],DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); -talitos_sg_unmap (dev, edesc, req_ctx->psrc,NULL ,0 ,0 ); +if (req_ctx->psrc) +talitos_sg_unmap (dev, edesc, req_ctx->psrc,NULL ,0 ,0 );/* When using hashctx-in, must unmap it. */ if (from_talitos_ptr_len (&edesc->desc.ptr[1 ], is_sec1))
@@ -1796,7 +1810,6 @@ static void talitos_handle_buggy_hash(struct talitos_ctx *ctx,static int common_nonsnoop_hash (struct talitos_edesc *edesc,struct ahash_request *areq,unsigned int length, -unsigned int offset,void (*callback) (struct device *dev,struct talitos_desc *desc,void *context,int error))
@@ -1835,9 +1848,7 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, sg_count = edesc->src_nents ?:1 ;if (is_sec1 && sg_count >1 ) -sg_pcopy_to_buffer (req_ctx->psrc, sg_count, - edesc->buf +sizeof (struct talitos_desc ), - length, req_ctx->nbuf); +sg_copy_to_buffer (req_ctx->psrc, sg_count, edesc->buf, length);else if (length) sg_count =dma_map_sg (dev, req_ctx->psrc, sg_count,DMA_TO_DEVICE );
@@ -1850,7 +1861,7 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, DMA_TO_DEVICE); }else { sg_count =talitos_sg_map (dev, req_ctx->psrc, length, edesc, - &desc->ptr[3 ], sg_count, offset,0 ); + &desc->ptr[3 ], sg_count,0 ,0 );if (sg_count >1 ) sync_needed = true; }
@@ -1874,7 +1885,8 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc,talitos_handle_buggy_hash (ctx, edesc, &desc->ptr[3 ]);if (is_sec1 && req_ctx->nbuf && length) { -struct talitos_desc *desc2 = desc +1 ; +struct talitos_desc *desc2 = (struct talitos_desc *) + (edesc->buf + edesc->dma_len);dma_addr_t next_desc;memset (desc2,0 ,sizeof (*desc2));
@@ -1895,7 +1907,7 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, DMA_TO_DEVICE);copy_talitos_ptr (&desc2->ptr[2 ], &desc->ptr[2 ], is_sec1); sg_count =talitos_sg_map (dev, req_ctx->psrc, length, edesc, - &desc2->ptr[3 ], sg_count, offset,0 ); + &desc2->ptr[3 ], sg_count,0 ,0 );if (sg_count >1 ) sync_needed = true;copy_talitos_ptr (&desc2->ptr[5 ], &desc->ptr[5 ], is_sec1);
@@ -2006,7 +2018,6 @@ static int ahash_process_req(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes)struct device *dev = ctx->dev;struct talitos_private *priv =dev_get_drvdata (dev);bool is_sec1 =has_ftr_sec1 (priv); -int offset =0 ;u8 *ctx_buf = req_ctx->buf[req_ctx->buf_idx];if (!req_ctx->last && (nbytes + req_ctx->nbuf <= blocksize)) {
@@ -2046,6 +2057,8 @@ static int ahash_process_req(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes)sg_chain (req_ctx->bufsl,2 , areq->src); req_ctx->psrc = req_ctx->bufsl; }else if (is_sec1 && req_ctx->nbuf && req_ctx->nbuf < blocksize) { +int offset; +if (nbytes_to_hash > blocksize) offset = blocksize - req_ctx->nbuf;else
@@ -2058,7 +2071,8 @@ static int ahash_process_req(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes)sg_copy_to_buffer (areq->src, nents, ctx_buf + req_ctx->nbuf, offset); req_ctx->nbuf += offset; - req_ctx->psrc = areq->src; + req_ctx->psrc =scatterwalk_ffwd (req_ctx->bufsl, areq->src, + offset); }else req_ctx->psrc = areq->src;
@@ -2098,8 +2112,7 @@ static int ahash_process_req(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes)if (ctx->keylen && (req_ctx->first || req_ctx->last)) edesc->desc.hdr |=DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_HMAC ; -return common_nonsnoop_hash (edesc, areq, nbytes_to_hash, offset, - ahash_done); +return common_nonsnoop_hash (edesc, areq, nbytes_to_hash, ahash_done); }static int ahash_update (struct ahash_request *areq)
Signature · 1 line
2.13.3
PATCH v4 4/4 crypto: talitos - drop icv_ool
In reply to Christophe Leroyicv_ool is not used anymore, drop it.
--- drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 3 --- drivers/crypto/talitos.h | 2 -- 2 files changed, 5 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/talitos.c +0 -3
@@ -1285,9 +1285,6 @@ static int ipsec_esp(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, struct aead_request *areq, is_ipsec_esp && !encrypt); tbl_off += ret; -/* ICV data */ - edesc->icv_ool = !encrypt; -if (!encrypt && is_ipsec_esp) {struct talitos_ptr *tbl_ptr = &edesc->link_tbl[tbl_off];
drivers/crypto/talitos.h +0 -2
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ struct talitos_desc {* talitos_edesc - s/w-extended descriptor * @src_nents: number of segments in input scatterlist * @dst_nents: number of segments in output scatterlist -* @icv_ool: whether ICV is out-of-line * @iv_dma: dma address of iv for checking continuity and link table * @dma_len: length of dma mapped link_tbl space * @dma_link_tbl: bus physical address of link_tbl/buf
@@ -61,7 +60,6 @@ struct talitos_desc {struct talitos_edesc {int src_nents;int dst_nents; -bool icv_ool;dma_addr_t iv_dma;int dma_len;dma_addr_t dma_link_tbl;
Signature · 1 line
2.13.3