core: ofnode: Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index
PATCH RESEND 1/1 core: ofnode: Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index
Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index function to fetch the address and size of the reg space based on index.
---
Previous discussion can be found here:
* https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/999659/
drivers/core/ofnode.c | 13 ++++++++++--- include/dm/ofnode.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/core/ofnode.c +10 -3
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ int ofnode_read_size(ofnode node, const char *propname)return -EINVAL ; } -fdt_addr_t ofnode_get_addr_index (ofnode node,int index) +fdt_addr_t ofnode_get_addr_size_index (ofnode node,int index,fdt_size_t *size) {int na, ns;
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ fdt_addr_t ofnode_get_addr_index(ofnode node, int index)uint flags; prop_val =of_get_address (ofnode_to_np (node), index, -NULL , &flags); + (u64 *)size, &flags);if (!prop_val)return FDT_ADDR_T_NONE ;
@@ -277,12 +277,19 @@ fdt_addr_t ofnode_get_addr_index(ofnode node, int index) ns =ofnode_read_simple_size_cells (ofnode_get_parent (node));return fdtdec_get_addr_size_fixed (gd->fdt_blob,ofnode_to_offset (node),"reg" , - index, na, ns,NULL , true); + index, na, ns, size, true); }return FDT_ADDR_T_NONE ; } +fdt_addr_t ofnode_get_addr_index (ofnode node,int index) +{ +fdt_size_t size; + +return ofnode_get_addr_size_index (node, index, &size); +} +fdt_addr_t ofnode_get_addr (ofnode node) {return ofnode_get_addr_index (node,0 );
include/dm/ofnode.h +14 -0
@@ -354,6 +354,20 @@ ofnode ofnode_get_by_phandle(uint phandle);*/ int ofnode_read_size (ofnode node,const char *propname); +/** +* ofnode_get_addr_size_index() - get an address/size from a node +* based on index +* +* This reads the register address/size from a node based on index +* +* @node: node to read from +* @index: Index of address to read (0 for first) +* @size: Pointer to size of the address +* @return address, or FDT_ADDR_T_NONE if not present or invalid +*/ +phys_addr_t ofnode_get_addr_size_index (ofnode node,int index, +fdt_size_t *size); +/** * ofnode_get_addr_index() - get an address from a node *
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH RESEND 1/1 core: ofnode: Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index
Quoted 7 lines · Keerthy
Add
ofnode_get_addr_size_indexfunction to fetch the address and size of the reg space based on index.Signed-off-by Keerthy <[email protected]>---
Quoted 7 lines
Previous discussion can be found here:
* https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/999659/
drivers/core/ofnode.c | 13 ++++++++++--- include/dm/ofnode.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
PATCH RESEND 1/1 core: ofnode: Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index
Quoted 11 lines · Simon Glass
Quoted 9 lines · Keerthy
Add
ofnode_get_addr_size_indexfunction to fetch the address and size of the reg space based on index.Signed-off-by Keerthy <[email protected]>---
Previous discussion can be found here:
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
* https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/999659/
drivers/core/ofnode.c | 13 ++++++++++--- include/dm/ofnode.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)Reviewed-by Simon Glass <[email protected]>
Applied to u-boot-dm, thanks!
PATCH RESEND 1/1 core: ofnode: Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index
In reply to KeerthyHi All,
Quoted 7 lines · Keerthy
Add
ofnode_get_addr_size_indexfunction to fetch the address and size of the reg space based on index.Signed-off-by Keerthy <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Simon Glass <[email protected]>---
Quoted 7 lines
Previous discussion can be found here:
* https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/999659/
drivers/core/ofnode.c | 13 ++++++++++--- include/dm/ofnode.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
jFYI/FWIW, this patch, present in U-Boot/master as commit [1], revives the issue fixed in [2]. More precisely, when compiling the sandbox U-Boot with -fsanitize=address and linking it against -lasan, the following backtrace pops up during boot [3].
[1] https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/commit/e679d03b08fb
("core: ofnode: Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index")
[2] https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/commit/9bfacf249b10
("core: ofnode: Fix ASAN-reported stack-buffer-overflow in of_get_address")
[3] The same issue as fixed in [2], now reproduced on v2019.07
==5996==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffc65f869a0 at pc 0x564834c6cd89 bp 0x7ffc65f867b0 sp 0x7ffc65f867a0 WRITE of size 8 at 0x7ffc65f869a0 thread T0
#0 0x564834c6cd88 in of_get_address drivers/core/of_addr.c:154
#1 0x564834c74fac in ofnode_get_addr_size_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:262
#2 0x564834c75232 in ofnode_get_addr_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:290
#3 0x564834d35a4f in sb_eth_ofdata_to_platdata drivers/net/sandbox.c:422
#4 0x564834c5ad22 in device_probe drivers/core/device.c:407
#5 0x564834f2f1c4 in eth_initialize net/eth-uclass.c:399
#6 0x564834bf9c34 in initr_net common/board_r.c:565
#7 0x564834bfa580 in initcall_run_list include/initcall.h:38
#8 0x564834bfa580 in board_init_r common/board_r.c:867
#9 0x564834b8156d in main arch/sandbox/cpu/start.c:362
#10 0x7f2fe7912b6a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x26b6a)
#11 0x564834b85b29 in _start (/srv/R/u-boot-master/u-boot+0x792b29)Address 0x7ffc65f869a0 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
#0 0x564834c751c4 in ofnode_get_addr_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:287
This frame has 1 object(s):
[32, 36) 'size' (line 288) <== Memory access@offset 32 partially overflows this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
(longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow drivers/core/of_addr.c:154 in of_get_address Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x10000cbe8ce0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8cf0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8d00: 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 04 f2 04 f3 f3 f3 00 00
0x10000cbe8d10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1
0x10000cbe8d20: 04 f2 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x10000cbe8d30: f1 f1 f1 f1[04]f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8d40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00
0x10000cbe8d50: f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8d60: f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8d70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc
==5996==ABORTING
Signature · 2 lines
Best Regards, Eugeniu.
PATCH RESEND 1/1 core: ofnode: Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index
Hi Keethy,
Quoted 85 lines · Eugeniu Rosca
Hi All,
Quoted 7 lines · Keerthy
Add
ofnode_get_addr_size_indexfunction to fetch the address and size of the reg space based on index.Signed-off-by Keerthy <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Simon Glass <[email protected]>---
Quoted 7 lines
Previous discussion can be found here:
* https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/999659/
drivers/core/ofnode.c | 13 ++++++++++--- include/dm/ofnode.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)jFYI/FWIW, this patch, present in U-Boot/master as commit [1], revives the issue fixed in [2]. More precisely, when compiling the sandbox U-Boot with -fsanitize=address and linking it against -lasan, the following backtrace pops up during boot [3].
[1] https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/commit/e679d03b08fb
("core: ofnode: Addofnode_get_addr_size_index")
[2] https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/commit/9bfacf249b10
("core: ofnode: Fix ASAN-reported stack-buffer-overflow inof_get_address")
[3] The same issue as fixed in [2], now reproduced on v2019.07==5996==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address
0x7ffc65f869a0at pc0x564834c6cd89bp0x7ffc65f867b0sp0x7ffc65f867a0WRITE of size 8 at0x7ffc65f869a0thread T0#0 0x564834c6cd88 in of_get_address drivers/core/of_addr.c:154 #1 0x564834c74fac in ofnode_get_addr_size_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:262 #2 0x564834c75232 in ofnode_get_addr_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:290 #3 0x564834d35a4f in sb_eth_ofdata_to_platdata drivers/net/sandbox.c:422 #4 0x564834c5ad22 in device_probe drivers/core/device.c:407 #5 0x564834f2f1c4 in eth_initialize net/eth-uclass.c:399 #6 0x564834bf9c34 in initr_net common/board_r.c:565 #7 0x564834bfa580 in initcall_run_list include/initcall.h:38 #8 0x564834bfa580 in board_init_r common/board_r.c:867 #9 0x564834b8156d in main arch/sandbox/cpu/start.c:362 #10 0x7f2fe7912b6a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x26b6a) #11 0x564834b85b29 in _start (/srv/R/u-boot-master/u-boot+0x792b29)Address
0x7ffc65f869a0is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame#0 0x564834c751c4 in ofnode_get_addr_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:287This frame has 1 object(s):
[32, 36) 'size' (line 288) <== Memory access@offset 32 partially overflows this variableHINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
(longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflowdrivers/core/of_addr.c:154inof_get_addressShadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x10000cbe8ce0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8cf0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8d00: 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 04 f2 04 f3 f3 f3 00 00
0x10000cbe8d10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1
0x10000cbe8d20: 04 f2 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x10000cbe8d30: f1 f1 f1 f1[04]f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8d40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00
0x10000cbe8d50: f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8d60: f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8d70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc
Quoted 2 lines
==5996==ABORTING
Can you please take a look?
Regards,
Simon
PATCH RESEND 1/1 core: ofnode: Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index
Quoted 91 lines · Simon Glass
Hi Keethy,
Quoted 85 lines · Eugeniu Rosca
Hi All,
Quoted 7 lines · Keerthy
Add
ofnode_get_addr_size_indexfunction to fetch the address and size of the reg space based on index.Signed-off-by Keerthy <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Simon Glass <[email protected]>---
Quoted 7 lines
Previous discussion can be found here:
* https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/999659/
drivers/core/ofnode.c | 13 ++++++++++--- include/dm/ofnode.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)jFYI/FWIW, this patch, present in U-Boot/master as commit [1], revives the issue fixed in [2]. More precisely, when compiling the sandbox U-Boot with -fsanitize=address and linking it against -lasan, the following backtrace pops up during boot [3].
[1] https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/commit/e679d03b08fb
("core: ofnode: Addofnode_get_addr_size_index")
[2] https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/commit/9bfacf249b10
("core: ofnode: Fix ASAN-reported stack-buffer-overflow inof_get_address")
[3] The same issue as fixed in [2], now reproduced on v2019.07==5996==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address
0x7ffc65f869a0at pc0x564834c6cd89bp0x7ffc65f867b0sp0x7ffc65f867a0WRITE of size 8 at0x7ffc65f869a0thread T0#0 0x564834c6cd88 in of_get_address drivers/core/of_addr.c:154 #1 0x564834c74fac in ofnode_get_addr_size_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:262 #2 0x564834c75232 in ofnode_get_addr_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:290 #3 0x564834d35a4f in sb_eth_ofdata_to_platdata drivers/net/sandbox.c:422 #4 0x564834c5ad22 in device_probe drivers/core/device.c:407 #5 0x564834f2f1c4 in eth_initialize net/eth-uclass.c:399 #6 0x564834bf9c34 in initr_net common/board_r.c:565 #7 0x564834bfa580 in initcall_run_list include/initcall.h:38 #8 0x564834bfa580 in board_init_r common/board_r.c:867 #9 0x564834b8156d in main arch/sandbox/cpu/start.c:362 #10 0x7f2fe7912b6a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x26b6a) #11 0x564834b85b29 in _start (/srv/R/u-boot-master/u-boot+0x792b29)Address
0x7ffc65f869a0is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame#0 0x564834c751c4 in ofnode_get_addr_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:287This frame has 1 object(s):
[32, 36) 'size' (line 288) <== Memory access@offset 32 partially overflows this variableHINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
(longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflowdrivers/core/of_addr.c:154inof_get_addressShadow bytes around the buggy address:0x10000cbe8ce0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8cf0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d00: 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 04 f2 04 f3 f3 f3 00 00 0x10000cbe8d10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 0x10000cbe8d20: 04 f2 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00=>0x10000cbe8d30: f1 f1 f1 f1[04]f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x10000cbe8d40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 000x10000cbe8d50: f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 000x10000cbe8d60: f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 000x10000cbe8d70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 000x10000cbe8d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: ccQuoted 2 lines
==5996==ABORTING
Quoted 1 line
Can you please take a look?
Sure.
Quoted 4 lines
Regards,
Simon
PATCH RESEND 1/1 core: ofnode: Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index
Quoted 106 lines · Keerthy
Quoted 103 lines · Simon Glass
Hi Keethy,
Quoted 98 lines · Eugeniu Rosca
Hi All,
Quoted 7 lines · Keerthy
Add
ofnode_get_addr_size_indexfunction to fetch the address and size of the reg space based on index.Signed-off-by Keerthy <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Simon Glass <[email protected]>---
Quoted 7 lines
Previous discussion can be found here:
* https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/999659/
drivers/core/ofnode.c| 13 ++++++++++---
include/dm/ofnode.h | 14 ++++++++++++++2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)jFYI/FWIW, this patch, present in U-Boot/master as commit [1], revives the issue fixed in [2]. More precisely, when compiling the sandbox U-Boot with -fsanitize=address and linking it against -lasan, the following backtrace pops up during boot [3].
[1] https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/commit/e679d03b08fb
("core: ofnode: Addofnode_get_addr_size_index")
[2] https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/commit/9bfacf249b10
("core: ofnode: Fix ASAN-reported stack-buffer-overflow inof_get_address")
[3] The same issue as fixed in [2], now reproduced on v2019.07==5996==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address
0x7ffc65f869a0at pc0x564834c6cd89bp0x7ffc65f867b0sp0x7ffc65f867a0WRITE of size 8 at0x7ffc65f869a0thread T0
#00x564834c6cd88inof_get_addressdrivers/core/of_addr.c:154#10x564834c74facinofnode_get_addr_size_indexdrivers/core/ofnode.c:262
#20x564834c75232inofnode_get_addr_indexdrivers/core/ofnode.c:290
#30x564834d35a4finsb_eth_ofdata_to_platdatadrivers/net/sandbox.c:422
#40x564834c5ad22indevice_probedrivers/core/device.c:407#50x564834f2f1c4ineth_initializenet/eth-uclass.c:399#60x564834bf9c34ininitr_netcommon/board_r.c:565
#70x564834bfa580ininitcall_run_listinclude/initcall.h:38#80x564834bfa580inboard_init_rcommon/board_r.c:867#90x564834b8156din mainarch/sandbox/cpu/start.c:362#100x7f2fe7912b6ain__libc_start_main(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x26b6a)
#110x564834b85b29in_start(/srv/R/u-boot-master/u-boot+0x792b29)Address
0x7ffc65f869a0is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
#00x564834c751c4inofnode_get_addr_indexdrivers/core/ofnode.c:287This frame has 1 object(s):
[32, 36) 'size' (line 288) <== Memory access@offset 32 partially overflows this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
(longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflowdrivers/core/of_addr.c:154inof_get_address
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x10000cbe8ce0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 000x10000cbe8cf0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 000x10000cbe8d00: 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 04 f2 04 f3 f3 f3 00 000x10000cbe8d10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f10x10000cbe8d20: 04 f2 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x10000cbe8d30: f1 f1 f1 f1[04]f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 000x10000cbe8d40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 000x10000cbe8d50: f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 000x10000cbe8d60: f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 000x10000cbe8d70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 000x10000cbe8d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
Shadow gap: cc
==5996==ABORTING
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Can you please take a look?
Sure.
Eugeniu,
Could you kindly help me with the steps to reproduce the issue?
I am sending out a fix patch to convert all the size instances to fdt_size_t type.
I have posted: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1146830/
I believe the above should fix the size mismatch.
Regards,
Keerthy
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Regards,
Simon_______________________________________________
U-Boot mailing list
U-Boot at lists.denx.de
https://lists.denx.de/listinfo/u-boot
PATCH RESEND 1/1 core: ofnode: Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index
Hi Keerthy,
Quoted 3 lines · Keerthy
Eugeniu,
Could you kindly help me with the steps to reproduce the issue?
Sure. My pleasure. See [0].
Quoted 6 lines
I am sending out a fix patch to convert all the size instances to
fdt_size_ttype.I have posted: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1146830/
I believe the above should fix the size mismatch.
The patch appears to fix the problem. Thanks!
[0] Steps to reproduce the issue reported in
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1090094/#2212555
* Apply patch [1] to u-boot/master
* u-boot (master) gcc --version
gcc (Ubuntu 7.4.0-1ubuntu1~16.04~ppa1) 7.4.0
* u-boot (master) make defconfig all -j12
* u-boot (master) ./u-boot -d arch/sandbox/dts/test.dtb
[1] Dirty patch to enable ASAN in sandbox U-Boot (v2019.10-rc2):
Makefile +2 -1
@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ KBUILD_CPPFLAGS := -D__KERNEL__ -D__UBOOT__ KBUILD_CFLAGS := -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes \ -Wno-format-security \ - -fno-builtin -ffreestanding $(CSTD_FLAG) + -fno-builtin -ffreestanding $(CSTD_FLAG) -fsanitize=address KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar -fno-strict-aliasing KBUILD_AFLAGS := -D__ASSEMBLY__
@@ -768,6 +768,7 @@ PLATFORM_LIBGCC = arch/$(ARCH)/lib/lib.a else PLATFORM_LIBGCC := -L $(shell dirname `$(CC) $(c_flags) -print-libgcc-file-name`) -lgcc endif +PLATFORM_LIBS := -lasan $(PLATFORM_LIBS) PLATFORM_LIBS += $(PLATFORM_LIBGCC) ifdef CONFIG_CC_COVERAGE
Signature · 2 lines
Best Regards, Eugeniu.
PATCH RESEND 1/1 core: ofnode: Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index
Quoted 9 lines · Eugeniu Rosca
Hi Keerthy,
Quoted 3 lines · Keerthy
Eugeniu,
Could you kindly help me with the steps to reproduce the issue?
Sure. My pleasure. See [0].
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I am sending out a fix patch to convert all the size instances to
fdt_size_ttype.I have posted: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1146830/
I believe the above should fix the size mismatch.
The patch appears to fix the problem. Thanks!
Thanks for testing it. If all your tests have passed please post your Tested-by on that patch.
Quoted 3 lines
[0] Steps to reproduce the issue reported in
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1090094/#2212555
Thanks for the instructions. I will make sure i test this before posting any patch related to drivers/core/of
Best Regards,
Keerthy
Quoted 31 lines
* Apply patch [1] to u-boot/master
* u-boot (master) gcc --version
gcc (Ubuntu 7.4.0-1ubuntu1~16.04~ppa1) 7.4.0
* u-boot (master) make defconfig all -j12
* u-boot (master) ./u-boot -darch/sandbox/dts/test.dtb[1] Dirty patch to enable ASAN in sandbox U-Boot (v2019.10-rc2):
Makefile +2
-1@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ KBUILD_CPPFLAGS := -D__KERNEL__ -D__UBOOT__ KBUILD_CFLAGS := -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes \ -Wno-format-security \ - -fno-builtin -ffreestanding $(CSTD_FLAG) + -fno-builtin -ffreestanding $(CSTD_FLAG) -fsanitize=address KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar -fno-strict-aliasing KBUILD_AFLAGS := -D__ASSEMBLY__@@ -768,6 +768,7 @@ PLATFORM_LIBGCC = arch/$(ARCH)/lib/lib.a else PLATFORM_LIBGCC := -L $(shell dirname `$(CC) $(c_flags) -print-libgcc-file-name`) -lgcc endif +PLATFORM_LIBS := -lasan $(PLATFORM_LIBS) PLATFORM_LIBS += $(PLATFORM_LIBGCC) ifdef CONFIG_CC_COVERAGE