security: Add kernel lockdown functionality
Subsystems (37)
v36 cover security: Add kernel lockdown functionality
Minor changes to the previous set, other than a significant rework of the "Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param" patch to deal with the early parsing of that parameter under certain circumstances.
PATCH v36 1/29 security: Support early LSMs
The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later. Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator isn't initialised yet).
--- include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 8 ++++- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++ include/linux/security.h | 1 + init/main.c | 1 + security/security.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 5 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h +7 -1
@@ -215,8 +215,13 @@ __start_lsm_info = .; \ KEEP(*(.lsm_info.init)) \ __end_lsm_info = .; +#define EARLY_LSM_TABLE () . = ALIGN(8); \ + __start_early_lsm_info = .; \ + KEEP(*(.early_lsm_info.init)) \ + __end_early_lsm_info = .;#else #define LSM_TABLE () +#define EARLY_LSM_TABLE ()#endif #define ___OF_TABLE (cfg, name) _OF_TABLE_##cfg(name)
@@ -616,7 +621,8 @@ ACPI_PROBE_TABLE(irqchip) \ ACPI_PROBE_TABLE(timer) \ EARLYCON_TABLE() \ - LSM_TABLE() + LSM_TABLE() \ + EARLY_LSM_TABLE()#define INIT_TEXT \ *(.init.text .init.text.*) \
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +6 -0
@@ -2104,12 +2104,18 @@ struct lsm_info { };extern struct lsm_info __start_lsm_info[], __end_lsm_info[]; +extern struct lsm_info __start_early_lsm_info[], __end_early_lsm_info[];#define DEFINE_LSM (lsm) \ static struct lsm_info __lsm_##lsm \ __used __section(.lsm_info.init) \ __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)) +#define DEFINE_EARLY_LSM (lsm) \ + static struct lsm_info __early_lsm_##lsm \ + __used __section(.early_lsm_info.init) \ + __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)) +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE /* * Assuring the safety of deleting a security module is up to
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);/* prototypes */ extern int security_init (void ); +extern int early_security_init (void );/* Security operations */ int security_binder_set_context_mgr (struct task_struct *mgr);
init/main.c +1 -0
@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)boot_cpu_init ();page_address_init ();pr_notice ("%s" , linux_banner); +early_security_init ();setup_arch (&command_line);mm_init_cpumask (&init_mm);setup_command_line (command_line);
security/security.c +42 -8
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Re: [PATCH V36 01/29] security: Support early LSMs
Quoted 10 lines · Matthew Garrett
The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to
kmalloc()yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later. Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via boot parameters, and cannot make use ofkmalloc()(since the allocator isn't initialised yet).Signed-off-by Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>Acked-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Quoted 182 lines
--- include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 8 ++++- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++ include/linux/security.h | 1 + init/main.c | 1 + security/security.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 5 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h +7
-1@@ -215,8 +215,13 @@ __start_lsm_info = .; \ KEEP(*(.lsm_info.init)) \ __end_lsm_info = .; +#define EARLY_LSM_TABLE () . = ALIGN(8); \ + __start_early_lsm_info = .; \ + KEEP(*(.early_lsm_info.init)) \ + __end_early_lsm_info = .;#else #define LSM_TABLE () +#define EARLY_LSM_TABLE ()#endif #define ___OF_TABLE (cfg, name) _OF_TABLE_##cfg(name)@@ -616,7 +621,8 @@ ACPI_PROBE_TABLE(irqchip) \ ACPI_PROBE_TABLE(timer) \ EARLYCON_TABLE() \ - LSM_TABLE() + LSM_TABLE() \ + EARLY_LSM_TABLE()#define INIT_TEXT \ *(.init.text .init.text.*) \include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +6
-0@@ -2104,12 +2104,18 @@ struct lsm_info { };extern struct lsm_info __start_lsm_info[], __end_lsm_info[]; +extern struct lsm_info __start_early_lsm_info[], __end_early_lsm_info[];#define DEFINE_LSM (lsm) \ static struct lsm_info __lsm_##lsm \ __used __section(.lsm_info.init) \ __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)) +#define DEFINE_EARLY_LSM (lsm) \ + static struct lsm_info __early_lsm_##lsm \ + __used __section(.early_lsm_info.init) \ + __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)) +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE /* * Assuring the safety of deleting a security module is up to include/linux/security.h +1
-0@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);/* prototypes */ extern int security_init (void ); +extern int early_security_init (void );/* Security operations */ int security_binder_set_context_mgr (struct task_struct *mgr);init/main.c +1
-0@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)boot_cpu_init ();page_address_init ();pr_notice ("%s" , linux_banner); +early_security_init ();setup_arch (&command_line);mm_init_cpumask (&init_mm);setup_command_line (command_line);security/security.c +42
-8@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@/* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */ #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info) +#define EARLY_LSM_COUNT (__end_early_lsm_info - __start_early_lsm_info) struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD (blocking_lsm_notifier_chain);@@ -277,6 +278,8 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)static void __init lsm_early_cred (struct cred *cred);static void __init lsm_early_task (struct task_struct *task); +static int lsm_append (const char *new,char **result); +static void __init ordered_lsm_init (void ) {struct lsm_info **lsm;@@ -323,6 +326,26 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)kfree (ordered_lsms); } +int __init early_security_init (void ) +{ +int i; +struct hlist_head *list = (struct hlist_head *) &security_hook_heads; +struct lsm_info *lsm; + +for (i =0 ; i <sizeof (security_hook_heads) /sizeof (struct hlist_head ); + i++) +INIT_HLIST_HEAD (&list[i]); + +for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { +if (!lsm->enabled) + lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; +prepare_lsm (lsm); +initialize_lsm (lsm); + } + +return 0 ; +} +/** * security_init - initializes the security framework * @@ -330,14 +353,18 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)*/ int __init security_init (void ) { -int i; -struct hlist_head *list = (struct hlist_head *) &security_hook_heads; +struct lsm_info *lsm;pr_info ("Security Framework initializing\n" ); -for (i =0 ; i <sizeof (security_hook_heads) /sizeof (struct hlist_head ); - i++) -INIT_HLIST_HEAD (&list[i]); +/* +* Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is +* available +*/ +for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { +if (lsm->enabled) +lsm_append (lsm->name, &lsm_names); + }/* Load LSMs in specified order. */ ordered_lsm_init ();@@ -384,7 +411,7 @@ static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm)return !strcmp (last, lsm); } -static int lsm_append (char *new,char **result) +static int lsm_append (const char *new,char **result) {char *cp;@@ -422,8 +449,15 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, hooks[i].lsm = lsm;hlist_add_tail_rcu (&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); } -if (lsm_append (lsm, &lsm_names) <0 ) -panic ("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n" , __func__); + +/* +* Don't try to append during early_security_init(), we'll come back +* and fix this up afterwards. +*/ +if (slab_is_available ()) { +if (lsm_append (lsm, &lsm_names) <0 ) +panic ("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n" , __func__); + } }int call_blocking_lsm_notifier (enum lsm_event event,void *data)
PATCH v36 2/29 security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook
In reply to Matthew GarrettAdd a mechanism to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be permitted.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 ++ include/linux/security.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +2 -0
@@ -1807,6 +1807,7 @@ union security_list_options {int (*bpf_prog_alloc_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);void (*bpf_prog_free_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ +int (*locked_down)(enum lockdown_reason what); };struct security_hook_heads {
@@ -2046,6 +2047,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {struct hlist_head bpf_prog_alloc_security;struct hlist_head bpf_prog_free_security;#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ +struct hlist_head locked_down; } __randomize_layout;/*
include/linux/security.h +32 -0
@@ -77,6 +77,33 @@ enum lsm_event { LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, }; +/* +* These are reasons that can be passed to the security_locked_down() +* LSM hook. Lockdown reasons that protect kernel integrity (ie, the +* ability for userland to modify kernel code) are placed before +* LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX. Lockdown reasons that protect kernel +* confidentiality (ie, the ability for userland to extract +* information from the running kernel that would otherwise be +* restricted) are placed before LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX. +* +* LSM authors should note that the semantics of any given lockdown +* reason are not guaranteed to be stable - the same reason may block +* one set of features in one kernel release, and a slightly different +* set of features in a later kernel release. LSMs that seek to expose +* lockdown policy at any level of granularity other than "none", +* "integrity" or "confidentiality" are responsible for either +* ensuring that they expose a consistent level of functionality to +* userland, or ensuring that userland is aware that this is +* potentially a moving target. It is easy to misuse this information +* in a way that could break userspace. Please be careful not to do +* so. +*/ +enum lockdown_reason { +LOCKDOWN_NONE , +LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX , +LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX , +}; +/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable (const struct cred *cred,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,unsigned int opts);
@@ -393,6 +420,7 @@ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);int security_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen); +int security_locked_down (enum lockdown_reason what);#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ static inline int call_blocking_lsm_notifier (enum lsm_event event,void *data)
@@ -1205,6 +1233,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +static inline int security_locked_down (enum lockdown_reason what) +{ +return 0 ; +}#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
security/security.c +6 -0
@@ -2392,3 +2392,9 @@ void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux); }#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ + +int security_locked_down (enum lockdown_reason what) +{ +return call_int_hook (locked_down,0 , what); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_locked_down);
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Re: [PATCH V36 02/29] security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook
Quoted 6 lines · Matthew Garrett
Add a mechanism to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be permitted.
Signed-off-by Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>Acked-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Quoted 97 lines
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 ++ include/linux/security.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+)include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +2
-0@@ -1807,6 +1807,7 @@ union security_list_options {int (*bpf_prog_alloc_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);void (*bpf_prog_free_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ +int (*locked_down)(enum lockdown_reason what); };struct security_hook_heads {@@ -2046,6 +2047,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {struct hlist_head bpf_prog_alloc_security;struct hlist_head bpf_prog_free_security;#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ +struct hlist_head locked_down; } __randomize_layout;/* include/linux/security.h +32
-0@@ -77,6 +77,33 @@ enum lsm_event { LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, }; +/* +* These are reasons that can be passed to the security_locked_down() +* LSM hook. Lockdown reasons that protect kernel integrity (ie, the +* ability for userland to modify kernel code) are placed before +* LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX. Lockdown reasons that protect kernel +* confidentiality (ie, the ability for userland to extract +* information from the running kernel that would otherwise be +* restricted) are placed before LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX. +* +* LSM authors should note that the semantics of any given lockdown +* reason are not guaranteed to be stable - the same reason may block +* one set of features in one kernel release, and a slightly different +* set of features in a later kernel release. LSMs that seek to expose +* lockdown policy at any level of granularity other than "none", +* "integrity" or "confidentiality" are responsible for either +* ensuring that they expose a consistent level of functionality to +* userland, or ensuring that userland is aware that this is +* potentially a moving target. It is easy to misuse this information +* in a way that could break userspace. Please be careful not to do +* so. +*/ +enum lockdown_reason { +LOCKDOWN_NONE , +LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX , +LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX , +}; +/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable (const struct cred *cred,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,unsigned int opts);@@ -393,6 +420,7 @@ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);int security_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen); +int security_locked_down (enum lockdown_reason what);#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ static inline int call_blocking_lsm_notifier (enum lsm_event event,void *data)@@ -1205,6 +1233,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +static inline int security_locked_down (enum lockdown_reason what) +{ +return 0 ; +}#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK security/security.c +6
-0@@ -2392,3 +2392,9 @@ void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux); }#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ + +int security_locked_down (enum lockdown_reason what) +{ +return call_int_hook (locked_down,0 , what); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_locked_down);
PATCH v36 3/29 security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM
In reply to Matthew GarrettWhile existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy, distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward static policy. This patch adds a simple LSM that can be configured to reject either integrity or all lockdown queries, and can be configured at runtime (through securityfs), boot time (via a kernel parameter) or build time (via a kconfig option). Based on initial code by David Howells.
--- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 + include/linux/security.h | 3 + security/Kconfig | 11 +- security/Makefile | 2 + security/lockdown/Kconfig | 47 +++++ security/lockdown/Makefile | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 172 ++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 240 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/lockdown/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/lockdown/Makefile create mode 100644 security/lockdown/lockdown.c
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +9 -0
@@ -2248,6 +2248,15 @@ lockd.nlm_udpport=M [NFS] Assign UDP port. Format: <integer> + lockdown= [SECURITY] + { integrity | confidentiality } + Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to + integrity, kernel features that allow userland to + modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to + confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland + to extract confidential information from the kernel + are also disabled. + locktorture.nreaders_stress= [KNL] Set the number of locking read-acquisition kthreads. Defaults to being automatically set based on the
include/linux/security.h +3 -0
@@ -97,6 +97,9 @@ enum lsm_event {* potentially a moving target. It is easy to misuse this information * in a way that could break userspace. Please be careful not to do * so. +* +* If you add to this, remember to extend lockdown_reasons in +* security/lockdown/lockdown.c. */ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_NONE ,
security/Kconfig +6 -5
@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ source "security/apparmor/Kconfig" source "security/loadpin/Kconfig" source "security/yama/Kconfig" source "security/safesetid/Kconfig" +source "security/lockdown/Kconfig" source "security/integrity/Kconfig"
@@ -276,11 +277,11 @@ endchoice config LSM string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs" - default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK - default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR - default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO - default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC - default "yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC + default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor" help A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order. Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be
security/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown # always enable default capabilities obj-y += commoncap.o
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o # Object integrity file lists
security/lockdown/Kconfig new file +47 -0
47 lines not on this page · raw message
security/lockdown/Makefile new file +1 -0
@@ -0,0 +1 @@ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown.o
security/lockdown/lockdown.c new file +172 -0
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PATCH v36 4/29 Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: David Howells <[email protected]>
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid signatures that we can verify.
I have adjusted the errors generated:
(1) If there's no signature (ENODATA) or we can't check it (ENOPKG, ENOKEY), then:
(a) If signatures are enforced then EKEYREJECTED is returned.
(b) If there's no signature or we can't check it, but the kernel is locked down then EPERM is returned (this is then consistent with other lockdown cases).
(2) If the signature is unparseable (EBADMSG, EINVAL), the signature fails the check (EKEYREJECTED) or a system error occurs (eg. ENOMEM), we return the error we got.
Note that the X.509 code doesn't check for key expiry as the RTC might not be valid or might not have been transferred to the kernel's clock yet.
[Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA integration. This will
be replaced with integration with the IMA architecture policy patchset.]
--- include/linux/security.h | 1 + kernel/module.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ enum lsm_event {*/ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_NONE , +LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE ,LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX ,LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX , };
kernel/module.c +30 -7
@@ -2753,8 +2753,9 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG static int module_sig_check (struct load_info *info,int flags) { -int err = -ENOKEY ; +int err = -ENODATA ;const unsigned long markerlen =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ; +const char *reason;const void *mod = info->hdr;/*
@@ -2769,16 +2770,38 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) err = mod_verify_sig(mod, info); } -if (!err) { +switch (err) { +case 0 : info->sig_ok = true;return 0 ; - } -/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */ -if (err == -ENOKEY && !is_module_sig_enforced ()) - err =0 ; +/* We don't permit modules to be loaded into trusted kernels +* without a valid signature on them, but if we're not +* enforcing, certain errors are non-fatal. +*/ +case -ENODATA : + reason ="Loading of unsigned module" ; + goto decide; +case -ENOPKG : + reason ="Loading of module with unsupported crypto" ; + goto decide; +case -ENOKEY : + reason ="Loading of module with unavailable key" ; + decide: +if (is_module_sig_enforced ()) { +pr_notice ("%s is rejected\n" , reason); +return -EKEYREJECTED ; + } -return err; +return security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE ); + +/* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable +* signatures and signature check failures - even if signatures +* aren't required. +*/ +default : +return err; + } }#else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ static int module_sig_check (struct load_info *info,int flags)
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ static enum lockdown_reason kernel_locked_down;static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX +1 ] = { [LOCKDOWN_NONE ] ="none" , + [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE ] ="unsigned module loading" , [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX ] ="integrity" , [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX ] ="confidentiality" , };
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2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
PATCH v36 5/29 Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked down
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
Allowing users to read and write to core kernel memory makes it possible for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions, and also to steal cryptographic information.
Disallow /dev/mem and /dev/kmem from being opened this when the kernel has been locked down to prevent this.
Also disallow /dev/port from being opened to prevent raw ioport access and thus DMA from being used to accomplish the same thing.
--- drivers/char/mem.c | 7 +++++-- include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/mem.c +5 -2
@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@#include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/uio.h> -#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #ifdef CONFIG_IA64 # include <linux/efi.h>
@@ -786,7 +786,10 @@ static loff_t memory_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int orig)static int open_port (struct inode *inode,struct file *filp) { -return capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ) ?0 : -EPERM ; +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +return -EPERM ; + +return security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM ); }#define zero_lseek null_lseek
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ enum lsm_event {enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_NONE ,LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE , +LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM ,LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX ,LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX , };
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ static enum lockdown_reason kernel_locked_down;static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX +1 ] = { [LOCKDOWN_NONE ] ="none" , [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE ] ="unsigned module loading" , + [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM ] ="/dev/mem,kmem,port" , [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX ] ="integrity" , [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX ] ="confidentiality" , };
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2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
PATCH v36 6/29 kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
The kexec_load() syscall permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It makes sense to disable kexec_load() in this situation.
This does not affect kexec_file_load() syscall which can check for a signature on the image to be booted.
--- include/linux/security.h | 1 + kernel/kexec.c | 8 ++++++++ security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_NONE ,LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE ,LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM , +LOCKDOWN_KEXEC ,LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX , LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };
kernel/kexec.c +8 -0
@@ -205,6 +205,14 @@ static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments,if (result <0 )return result; +/* +* kexec can be used to circumvent module loading restrictions, so +* prevent loading in that case +*/ + result =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_KEXEC ); +if (result) +return result; +/* * Verify we have a legal set of flags * This leaves us room for future extensions.
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none", [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", + [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };
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PATCH v36 7/29 Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: Dave Young <[email protected]>
Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided by secure boot.
Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original kernel.
secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot.
--- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +1 -0
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,if (efi_enabled (EFI_OLD_MEMMAP ))return 0 ; + params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot; ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature; ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab; ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;
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2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
PATCH v36 8/29 kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: Jiri Bohac <[email protected]>
This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown. A locked down kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with kexec_file_load(). Currently, the only way to force the signature verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This prevents loading usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime.
This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE. Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be loaded. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 20 +++++++++---- crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 4 ++- include/linux/kexec.h | 4 +-- kernel/kexec_file.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
arch/x86/Kconfig +15 -5
@@ -2026,20 +2026,30 @@ config KEXEC_FILE config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY def_bool KEXEC_FILE -config KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG +config KEXEC_SIG bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" depends on KEXEC_FILE ---help--- - This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for - the kexec_file_load() syscall. - In addition to that option, you need to enable signature + This option makes the kexec_file_load() syscall check for a valid + signature of the kernel image. The image can still be loaded without + a valid signature unless you also enable KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, though if + there's a signature that we can check, then it must be valid. + + In addition to this option, you need to enable signature verification for the corresponding kernel image type being loaded in order for this to work. +config KEXEC_SIG_FORCE + bool "Require a valid signature in kexec_file_load() syscall" + depends on KEXEC_SIG + ---help--- + This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for + the kexec_file_load() syscall. + config KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG bool "Enable bzImage signature verification support" - depends on KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG + depends on KEXEC_SIG depends on SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING ---help---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c +3 -1
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,if (!ddir->certs.virtual_address || !ddir->certs.size) {pr_debug ("Unsigned PE binary\n" ); -return -EKEYREJECTED ; +return -ENODATA ; } chkaddr(ctx->header_size, ddir->certs.virtual_address,
@@ -403,6 +403,8 @@ static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen,* (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust * keyring, or: * +* (*) -ENODATA if there is no signature present. +* * (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a * chain. *
include/linux/kexec.h +2 -2
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ typedef void *(kexec_load_t)(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, unsigned long cmdline_len);typedef int (kexec_cleanup_t )(void *loader_data); -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG typedef int (kexec_verify_sig_t )(const char *kernel_buf,unsigned long kernel_len);#endif
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ struct kexec_file_ops {kexec_probe_t *probe;kexec_load_t *load;kexec_cleanup_t *cleanup; -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG kexec_verify_sig_t *verify_sig;#endif };
kernel/kexec_file.c +35 -6
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PATCH v36 9/29 kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: Jiri Bohac <[email protected]>
When KEXEC_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not load images through kexec_file systemcall if the kernel is locked down.
[Modified by David Howells to fit with modifications to the previous patch
and to return -EPERM if the kernel is locked down for consistency with other lockdowns. Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA integration, which will be replaced by integrating with the IMA architecture policy patches.]
--- kernel/kexec_file.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/kexec_file.c +4 -1
@@ -228,7 +228,10 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, goto out; } - ret =0 ; + ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_KEXEC ); +if (ret) + goto out; +break ;/* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable
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2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
PATCH v36 10/29 hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>
There is currently no way to verify the resume image when returning from hibernate. This might compromise the signed modules trust model, so until we can work with signed hibernate images we disable it when the kernel is locked down.
--- include/linux/security.h | 1 + kernel/power/hibernate.c | 3 ++- security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE ,LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM ,LOCKDOWN_KEXEC , +LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION ,LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX , LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };
kernel/power/hibernate.c +2 -1
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@#include <linux/ctype.h> #include <linux/genhd.h> #include <linux/ktime.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <trace/events/power.h> #include "power.h"
@@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static const struct platform_hibernation_ops *hibernation_ops;bool hibernation_available (void ) { -return (nohibernate ==0 ); +return nohibernate ==0 && !security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION ); }/**
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", + [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };
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2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
PATCH v36 11/29 PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code, allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing. Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.
--- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ drivers/pci/proc.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- drivers/pci/syscall.c | 4 +++- include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +16 -0
@@ -903,6 +903,11 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,unsigned int size = count;loff_t init_off = off;u8 *data = (u8 *) buf; +int ret; + + ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS ); +if (ret) +return ret;if (off > dev->cfg_size)return 0 ;
@@ -1164,6 +1169,11 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,int bar = (unsigned long )attr->private;enum pci_mmap_state mmap_type;struct resource *res = &pdev->resource[bar]; +int ret; + + ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS ); +if (ret) +return ret;if (res->flags &IORESOURCE_MEM &&iomem_is_exclusive (res->start))return -EINVAL ;
@@ -1240,6 +1250,12 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off, size_t count) { + int ret; + + ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS ); +if (ret) +return ret; +return pci_resource_io (filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true); }
drivers/pci/proc.c +12 -2
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <asm/byteorder.h> #include "pci.h"
@@ -115,7 +116,11 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,struct pci_dev *dev =PDE_DATA (ino);int pos = *ppos;int size = dev->cfg_size; -int cnt; +int cnt, ret; + + ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS ); +if (ret) +return ret;if (pos >= size)return 0 ;
@@ -196,6 +201,10 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,#endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */ int ret =0 ; + ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS ); +if (ret) +return ret; +switch (cmd) {case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER : ret =pci_domain_nr (dev->bus);
@@ -238,7 +247,8 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;int i, ret, write_combine =0 , res_bit =IORESOURCE_MEM ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ) || +security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS ))return -EPERM ;if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io) {
drivers/pci/syscall.c +3 -1
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@#include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/pci.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include "pci.h"
@@ -90,7 +91,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn,u32 dword;int err =0 ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) || +security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS ))return -EPERM ; dev =pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot (0 , bus, dfn);
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM ,LOCKDOWN_KEXEC ,LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION , +LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS ,LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX , LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", + [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };
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2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
PATCH v36 12/29 x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock it down by default.
This also implicitly locks down the KDADDIO, KDDELIO, KDENABIO and KDDISABIO console ioctls.
--- arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 7 +++++-- include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c +5 -2
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@#include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/ioport.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/smp.h> #include <linux/stddef.h> #include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -31,7 +32,8 @@ long ksys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num >IO_BITMAP_BITS ))return -EINVAL ; -if (turn_on && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (turn_on && (!capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ) || +security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_IOPORT )))return -EPERM ;/*
@@ -126,7 +128,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(iopl, unsigned int, level)return -EINVAL ;/* Trying to gain more privileges? */ if (level > old) { -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ) || +security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_IOPORT ))return -EPERM ; } regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) |
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_KEXEC ,LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION ,LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS , +LOCKDOWN_IOPORT ,LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX , LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", + [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };
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PATCH v36 13/29 x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if the kernel is locked down, since it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode. Based on a patch by Kees Cook.
--- arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 8 ++++++++ include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/msr.c +8 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@#include <linux/notifier.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/gfp.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/msr.h>
@@ -79,6 +80,10 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,int err =0 ;ssize_t bytes =0 ; + err =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_MSR ); +if (err) +return err; +if (count %8 )return -EINVAL ;/* Invalid chunk size */
@@ -130,6 +135,9 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioc, unsigned long arg) err = -EFAULT ;break ; } + err =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_MSR ); +if (err) +break ; err =wrmsr_safe_regs_on_cpu (cpu, regs);if (err)break ;
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION ,LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS ,LOCKDOWN_IOPORT , +LOCKDOWN_MSR ,LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX , LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access", + [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };
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2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
PATCH v36 14/29 ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
custom_method effectively allows arbitrary access to system memory, making it possible for an attacker to circumvent restrictions on module loading. Disable it if the kernel is locked down.
--- drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/acpi/custom_method.c +6 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/debugfs.h> #include <linux/acpi.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include "internal.h"
@@ -29,6 +30,11 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,struct acpi_table_header table;acpi_status status; +int ret; + + ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES ); +if (ret) +return ret;if (!(*ppos)) {/* parse the table header to get the table length */
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS ,LOCKDOWN_IOPORT ,LOCKDOWN_MSR , +LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES ,LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX , LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access", [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access", + [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };
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2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
PATCH v36 15/29 acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>
This option allows userspace to pass the RSDP address to the kernel, which makes it possible for a user to modify the workings of hardware. Reject the option when the kernel is locked down. This requires some reworking of the existing RSDP command line logic, since the early boot code also makes use of a command-line passed RSDP when locating the SRAT table before the lockdown code has been initialised. This is achieved by separating the command line RSDP path in the early boot code from the generic RSDP path, and then copying the command line RSDP into boot params in the kernel proper if lockdown is not enabled. If lockdown is enabled and an RSDP is provided on the command line, this will only be used when parsing SRAT (which shouldn't permit kernel code execution) and will be ignored in the rest of the kernel.
(Modified by Matthew Garrett in order to handle the early boot RSDP environment)
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 5 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 1 + drivers/acpi/osl.c | 14 +++++++++++++- include/linux/acpi.h | 6 ++++++ 7 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/acpi.c +13 -6
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ struct mem_vector immovable_mem[MAX_NUMNODES*2];*/ #define MAX_ADDR_LEN 19 -static acpi_physical_address get_acpi_rsdp (void ) +static acpi_physical_address get_cmdline_acpi_rsdp (void ) {acpi_physical_address addr =0 ;
@@ -278,10 +278,7 @@ acpi_physical_address get_rsdp_addr(void) {acpi_physical_address pa; - pa =get_acpi_rsdp (); - -if (!pa) - pa = boot_params->acpi_rsdp_addr; + pa = boot_params->acpi_rsdp_addr;/* * Try to get EFI data from setup_data. This can happen when we're a
@@ -311,7 +308,17 @@ static unsigned long get_acpi_srat_table(void)char arg[10 ];u8 *entry; - rsdp = (struct acpi_table_rsdp *)(long )boot_params->acpi_rsdp_addr; +/* +* Check whether we were given an RSDP on the command line. We don't +* stash this in boot params because the kernel itself may have +* different ideas about whether to trust a command-line parameter. +*/ + rsdp = (struct acpi_table_rsdp *)get_cmdline_acpi_rsdp (); + +if (!rsdp) + rsdp = (struct acpi_table_rsdp *)(long ) + boot_params->acpi_rsdp_addr; +if (!rsdp)return 0 ;
arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h +9 -0
@@ -117,6 +117,12 @@ static inline bool acpi_has_cpu_in_madt(void)return !!acpi_lapic; } +#define ACPI_HAVE_ARCH_SET_ROOT_POINTER +static inline void acpi_arch_set_root_pointer (u64 addr) +{ + x86_init.acpi.set_root_pointer (addr); +} +#define ACPI_HAVE_ARCH_GET_ROOT_POINTER static inline u64 acpi_arch_get_root_pointer (void ) {
@@ -125,6 +131,7 @@ static inline u64 acpi_arch_get_root_pointer(void)void acpi_generic_reduced_hw_init (void ); +void x86_default_set_root_pointer (u64 addr);u64 x86_default_get_root_pointer (void );#else /* !CONFIG_ACPI */
@@ -138,6 +145,8 @@ static inline void disable_acpi(void) { }static inline void acpi_generic_reduced_hw_init (void ) { } +static inline void x86_default_set_root_pointer (u64 addr) { } +static inline u64 x86_default_get_root_pointer (void ) {return 0 ;
arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h +2 -0
@@ -134,10 +134,12 @@ struct x86_hyper_init {/** * struct x86_init_acpi - x86 ACPI init functions +* @set_root_poitner: set RSDP address * @get_root_pointer: get RSDP address * @reduced_hw_early_init: hardware reduced platform early init */ struct x86_init_acpi { +void (*set_root_pointer)(u64 addr);u64 (*get_root_pointer)(void );void (*reduced_hw_early_init)(void ); };
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c +5 -0
@@ -1760,6 +1760,11 @@ void __init arch_reserve_mem_area(acpi_physical_address addr, size_t size)e820__update_table_print (); } +void x86_default_set_root_pointer (u64 addr) +{ + boot_params.acpi_rsdp_addr = addr; +} +u64 x86_default_get_root_pointer (void ) {return boot_params.acpi_rsdp_addr;
arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c +1 -0
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ struct x86_init_ops x86_init __initdata = { }, .acpi = { + .set_root_pointer = x86_default_set_root_pointer, .get_root_pointer = x86_default_get_root_pointer, .reduced_hw_early_init = acpi_generic_reduced_hw_init, },
drivers/acpi/osl.c +13 -1
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@#include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/jiffies.h> #include <linux/semaphore.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <asm/io.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -180,8 +181,19 @@ acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void)acpi_physical_address pa;#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC -if (acpi_rsdp) +/* +* We may have been provided with an RSDP on the command line, +* but if a malicious user has done so they may be pointing us +* at modified ACPI tables that could alter kernel behaviour - +* so, we check the lockdown status before making use of +* it. If we trust it then also stash it in an architecture +* specific location (if appropriate) so it can be carried +* over further kexec()s. +*/ +if (acpi_rsdp && !security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES )) { +acpi_arch_set_root_pointer (acpi_rsdp);return acpi_rsdp; + }#endif pa =acpi_arch_get_root_pointer ();if (pa)
include/linux/acpi.h +6 -0
@@ -639,6 +639,12 @@ bool acpi_gtdt_c3stop(int type);int acpi_arch_timer_mem_init (struct arch_timer_mem *timer_mem,int *timer_count);#endif +#ifndef ACPI_HAVE_ARCH_SET_ROOT_POINTER +static inline void acpi_arch_set_root_pointer (u64 addr) +{ +} +#endif +#ifndef ACPI_HAVE_ARCH_GET_ROOT_POINTER static inline u64 acpi_arch_get_root_pointer (void ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
PATCH v36 16/29 acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: Linn Crosetto <[email protected]>
Quoted 1 line
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an instrumented, modified one.
When lockdown is enabled, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if the kernel is locked down.
--- drivers/acpi/tables.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/acpi/tables.c +6 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@#include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/earlycpio.h> #include <linux/initrd.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include "internal.h" #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_CUSTOM_DSDT
@@ -578,6 +579,11 @@ void __init acpi_table_upgrade(void)if (table_nr ==0 )return ; +if (security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES )) { +pr_notice ("kernel is locked down, ignoring table override\n" ); +return ; + } + acpi_tables_addr =memblock_find_in_range (0 ,ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE_MAX_PHYS , all_tables_size,PAGE_SIZE );
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
PATCH v36 17/29 Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: David Howells <[email protected]>
Prohibit replacement of the PCMCIA Card Information Structure when the kernel is locked down.
--- drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c | 5 +++++ include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c +5 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@#include <linux/pci.h> #include <linux/ioport.h> #include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <asm/byteorder.h> #include <asm/unaligned.h>
@@ -1575,6 +1576,10 @@ static ssize_t pccard_store_cis(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,struct pcmcia_socket *s;int error; + error =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS ); +if (error) +return error; + s = to_socket(container_of(kobj, struct device, kobj));if (off)
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_IOPORT ,LOCKDOWN_MSR ,LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES , +LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS ,LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX , LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access", [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access", [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables", + [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
PATCH v36 18/29 Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: David Howells <[email protected]>
Lock down TIOCSSERIAL as that can be used to change the ioport and irq settings on a serial port. This only appears to be an issue for the serial drivers that use the core serial code. All other drivers seem to either ignore attempts to change port/irq or give an error.
--- drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c | 5 +++++ include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c +5 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@#include <linux/serial_core.h> #include <linux/delay.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/irq.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -862,6 +863,10 @@ static int uart_set_info(struct tty_struct *tty, struct tty_port *port, goto check_and_exit; } + retval =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL ); +if (retval && (change_irq || change_port)) + goto exit; +/* * Ask the low level driver to verify the settings. */
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_MSR ,LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES ,LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS , +LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL ,LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX , LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access", [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables", [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage", + [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
PATCH v36 19/29 Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: David Howells <[email protected]>
Provided an annotation for module parameters that specify hardware parameters (such as io ports, iomem addresses, irqs, dma channels, fixed dma buffers and other types).
--- include/linux/security.h | 1 + kernel/params.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES ,LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS ,LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL , +LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS ,LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX , LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };
kernel/params.c +23 -5
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@#include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/ctype.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS /* Protects all built-in parameters, modules use their own param_lock */
@@ -96,13 +97,20 @@ bool parameq(const char *a, const char *b)return parameqn (a, b,strlen (a)+1 ); } -static void param_check_unsafe (const struct kernel_param *kp) +static bool param_check_unsafe (const struct kernel_param *kp, +const char *doing) { +if (kp->flags &KERNEL_PARAM_FL_HWPARAM && +security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS )) +return false; +if (kp->flags &KERNEL_PARAM_FL_UNSAFE ) {pr_notice ("Setting dangerous option %s - tainting kernel\n" , kp->name);add_taint (TAINT_USER ,LOCKDEP_STILL_OK ); } + +return true; } static int parse_one(char *param,
@@ -132,8 +140,10 @@ static int parse_one(char *param,pr_debug ("handling %s with %p\n" , param, params[i].ops->set);kernel_param_lock (params[i].mod); -param_check_unsafe (¶ms[i]); - err = params[i].ops->set (val, ¶ms[i]); +if (param_check_unsafe (¶ms[i], doing)) + err = params[i].ops->set (val, ¶ms[i]); +else + err = -EPERM ;kernel_param_unlock (params[i].mod);return err; }
@@ -541,6 +551,12 @@ static ssize_t param_attr_show(struct module_attribute *mattr,return count; } +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES +#define mod_name (mod) ((mod)->name) +#else +#define mod_name (mod) "unknown" +#endif +/* sysfs always hands a nul-terminated string in buf. We rely on that. */ static ssize_t param_attr_store(struct module_attribute *mattr, struct module_kobject *mk,
@@ -553,8 +569,10 @@ static ssize_t param_attr_store(struct module_attribute *mattr,return -EPERM ;kernel_param_lock (mk->mod); -param_check_unsafe (attribute->param); - err = attribute->param->ops->set (buf, attribute->param); +if (param_check_unsafe (attribute->param,mod_name (mk->mod))) + err = attribute->param->ops->set (buf, attribute->param); +else + err = -EPERM ;kernel_param_unlock (mk->mod);if (!err)return len;
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables", [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage", [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO", + [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
Re: [PATCH V36 19/29] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
Quoted 7 lines · Matthew Garrett
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
Provided an annotation for module parameters that specify hardware parameters (such as io ports, iomem addresses, irqs, dma channels, fixed dma buffers and other types).
Quoted 5 lines
Suggested-by Alan Cox <[email protected]>Signed-off-by David Howells <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Cc Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
Jessica, any feedback on this?
PATCH v36 20/29 x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: David Howells <[email protected]>
The testmmiotrace module shouldn't be permitted when the kernel is locked down as it can be used to arbitrarily read and write MMIO space. This is a runtime check rather than buildtime in order to allow configurations where the same kernel may be run in both locked down or permissive modes depending on local policy.
--- arch/x86/mm/testmmiotrace.c | 5 +++++ include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
arch/x86/mm/testmmiotrace.c +5 -0
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/mmiotrace.h> +#include <linux/security.h> static unsigned long mmio_address;module_param_hw (mmio_address, ulong, iomem,0 );
@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ static void do_test_bulk_ioremapping(void)static int __init init (void ) {unsigned long size = (read_far) ? (8 <<20 ) : (16 <<10 ); +int ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE ); + +if (ret) +return ret;if (mmio_address ==0 ) {pr_err ("you have to use the module argument mmio_address.\n" );
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS ,LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL ,LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS , +LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE ,LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX , LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage", [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO", [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters", + [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
Re: [PATCH V36 20/29] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
Quoted 10 lines · Matthew Garrett
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
The testmmiotrace module shouldn't be permitted when the kernel is locked down as it can be used to arbitrarily read and write MMIO space. This is a runtime check rather than buildtime in order to allow configurations where the same kernel may be run in both locked down or permissive modes depending on local policy.
Suggested-by Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Signed-off-by David Howells <[email protected]
-Kees
Quoted 63 lines
Signed-off-by Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>cc Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/mm/testmmiotrace.c | 5 +++++ include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)arch/x86/mm/testmmiotrace.c +5
-0@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/mmiotrace.h> +#include <linux/security.h> static unsigned long mmio_address;module_param_hw (mmio_address, ulong, iomem,0 );@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ static void do_test_bulk_ioremapping(void)static int __init init (void ) {unsigned long size = (read_far) ? (8 <<20 ) : (16 <<10 ); +int ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE ); + +if (ret) +return ret;if (mmio_address ==0 ) {pr_err ("you have to use the module argument mmio_address.\n" );include/linux/security.h +1
-0@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS ,LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL ,LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS , +LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE ,LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX , LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1
-0@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage", [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO", [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters", + [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
PATCH v36 21/29 Lock down /proc/kcore
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: David Howells <[email protected]>
Disallow access to /proc/kcore when the kernel is locked down to prevent access to cryptographic data. This is limited to lockdown confidentiality mode and is still permitted in integrity mode.
--- fs/proc/kcore.c | 5 +++++ include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
fs/proc/kcore.c +5 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@#include <linux/ioport.h> #include <linux/memory.h> #include <linux/sched/task.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <asm/sections.h> #include "internal.h"
@@ -545,6 +546,10 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)static int open_kcore (struct inode *inode,struct file *filp) { +int ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_KCORE ); + +if (ret) +return ret;if (!capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ))return -EPERM ;
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS ,LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE ,LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX , +LOCKDOWN_KCORE , LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters", [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", + [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
PATCH v36 22/29 Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: David Howells <[email protected]>
Disallow the creation of perf and ftrace kprobes when the kernel is locked down in confidentiality mode by preventing their registration. This prevents kprobes from being used to access kernel memory to steal crypto data, but continues to allow the use of kprobes from signed modules.
--- include/linux/security.h | 1 + kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c | 5 +++++ security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE ,LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX ,LOCKDOWN_KCORE , +LOCKDOWN_KPROBES , LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };
kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c +5 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@#include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/rculist.h> #include <linux/error-injection.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include "trace_dynevent.h" #include "trace_kprobe_selftest.h"
@@ -415,6 +416,10 @@ static int __register_trace_kprobe(struct trace_kprobe *tk) {int i, ret; + ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_KPROBES ); +if (ret) +return ret; +if (trace_probe_is_registered (&tk->tp))return -EINVAL ;
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", + [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
PATCH v36 23/29 bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: David Howells <[email protected]>
bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel has been locked down in confidentiality mode.
--- include/linux/security.h | 1 + kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 10 ++++++++++ security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX ,LOCKDOWN_KCORE ,LOCKDOWN_KPROBES , +LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ , LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +10 -0
@@ -142,8 +142,13 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read, void *, dst, u32, size, const void *, unsafe_ptr) {int ret; + ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ ); +if (ret <0 ) + goto out; + ret =probe_kernel_read (dst, unsafe_ptr, size);if (unlikely (ret <0 )) +out:memset (dst,0 , size);return ret;
@@ -569,6 +574,10 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_str, void *, dst, u32, size, {int ret; + ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ ); +if (ret <0 ) + goto out; +/* * The strncpy_from_unsafe() call will likely not fill the entire * buffer, but that's okay in this circumstance as we're probing
@@ -580,6 +589,7 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_str, void *, dst, u32, size,*/ ret =strncpy_from_unsafe (dst, unsafe_ptr, size);if (unlikely (ret <0 )) +out:memset (dst,0 , size);return ret;
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", + [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
Re: [PATCH V36 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
Quoted 8 lines · Matthew Garrett
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
bpf_read()andbpf_read_str()could potentially be abused to (eg) allow private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel has been locked down in confidentiality mode.Suggested-by Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
-Kees
Quoted 74 lines
cc Chun-Yi Lee <[email protected]>cc Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>Cc Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 1 + kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 10 ++++++++++ security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)include/linux/security.h +1
-0@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX ,LOCKDOWN_KCORE ,LOCKDOWN_KPROBES , +LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ , LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +10
-0@@ -142,8 +142,13 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read, void *, dst, u32, size, const void *, unsafe_ptr) {int ret; + ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ ); +if (ret <0 ) + goto out; + ret =probe_kernel_read (dst, unsafe_ptr, size);if (unlikely (ret <0 )) +out:memset (dst,0 , size);return ret;@@ -569,6 +574,10 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_str, void *, dst, u32, size, {int ret; + ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ ); +if (ret <0 ) + goto out; +/* * The strncpy_from_unsafe() call will likely not fill the entire * buffer, but that's okay in this circumstance as we're probing @@ -580,6 +589,7 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_str, void *, dst, u32, size,*/ ret =strncpy_from_unsafe (dst, unsafe_ptr, size);if (unlikely (ret <0 )) +out:memset (dst,0 , size);return ret;security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1
-0@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", + [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Re: [PATCH V36 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
In reply to Matthew GarrettQuoted 10 lines · Matthew Garrett
bpf_read()andbpf_read_str()could potentially be abused to (eg) allow private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel has been locked down in confidentiality mode.Suggested-by Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>cc Chun-Yi Lee <[email protected]>cc Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>Cc Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Any further feedback on this?
PATCH v36 24/29 Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: David Howells <[email protected]>
Disallow the use of certain perf facilities that might allow userspace to access kernel data.
--- include/linux/security.h | 1 + kernel/events/core.c | 7 +++++++ security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_KCORE ,LOCKDOWN_KPROBES ,LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ , +LOCKDOWN_PERF , LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };
kernel/events/core.c +7 -0
@@ -10806,6 +10806,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))return -EACCES ; + err =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_PERF ); +if (err && (attr.sample_type &PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR )) +/* REGS_INTR can leak data, lockdown must prevent this */ +return err; + + err =0 ; +/* * In cgroup mode, the pid argument is used to pass the fd * opened to the cgroup directory in cgroupfs. The cpu argument
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", + [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
PATCH v36 25/29 kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
In reply to Matthew GarrettSystems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels. For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type, and if so permit kexec_file() even if the kernel is otherwise locked down. This is restricted to cases where CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime.
--- include/linux/ima.h | 9 ++++++ kernel/kexec_file.c | 12 +++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/ima.h +9 -0
@@ -131,4 +131,13 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,return 0 ; }#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE ) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING ) +extern bool ima_appraise_signature (enum kernel_read_file_id func); +#else +static inline bool ima_appraise_signature (enum kernel_read_file_id func) +{ +return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */ #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
kernel/kexec_file.c +10 -2
@@ -228,9 +228,17 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, goto out; } - ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_KEXEC ); -if (ret) + ret =0 ; + +/* If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec +* image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked +* down. +*/ +if (!ima_appraise_signature (READING_KEXEC_IMAGE ) && +security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_KEXEC )) { + ret = -EPERM ; goto out; + }break ;
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2 -0
@@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr {u64 count; }; +extern const int read_idmap[]; +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC void ima_load_kexec_buffer (void );#else
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1 -1
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)return 0 ; } -static const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID ] = { +const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID ] = { [READING_FIRMWARE ] =FIRMWARE_CHECK , [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER ] =FIRMWARE_CHECK , [READING_MODULE ] =MODULE_CHECK ,
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +50 -0
53 lines not on this page · raw message
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2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
PATCH v36 26/29 debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
In reply to Matthew GarrettFrom: David Howells <[email protected]>
Disallow opening of debugfs files that might be used to muck around when the kernel is locked down as various drivers give raw access to hardware through debugfs. Given the effort of auditing all 2000 or so files and manually fixing each one as necessary, I've chosen to apply a heuristic instead. The following changes are made:
(1) chmod and chown are disallowed on debugfs objects (though the root dir can be modified by mount and remount, but I'm not worried about that).
(2) When the kernel is locked down, only files with the following criteria are permitted to be opened:
- The file must have mode 00444
- The file must not have ioctl methods
- The file must not have mmap
(3) When the kernel is locked down, files may only be opened for reading.
Normal device interaction should be done through configfs, sysfs or a miscdev, not debugfs.
Note that this makes it unnecessary to specifically lock down show_dsts(), show_devs() and show_call() in the asus-wmi driver.
I would actually prefer to lock down all files by default and have the the files unlocked by the creator. This is tricky to manage correctly, though, as there are 19 creation functions and ~1600 call sites (some of them in loops scanning tables).
--- fs/debugfs/file.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/debugfs/inode.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/debugfs/file.c +30 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@#include <linux/atomic.h> #include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/poll.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include "internal.h"
@@ -136,6 +137,25 @@ void debugfs_file_put(struct dentry *dentry) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (debugfs_file_put); +/* +* Only permit access to world-readable files when the kernel is locked down. +* We also need to exclude any file that has ways to write or alter it as root +* can bypass the permissions check. +*/ +static bool debugfs_is_locked_down (struct inode *inode, +struct file *filp, +const struct file_operations *real_fops) +{ +if ((inode->i_mode &07777 ) ==0444 && + !(filp->f_mode &FMODE_WRITE ) && + !real_fops->unlocked_ioctl && + !real_fops->compat_ioctl && + !real_fops->mmap) +return false; + +return security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS ); +} +static int open_proxy_open (struct inode *inode,struct file *filp) {struct dentry *dentry =F_DENTRY (filp);
@@ -147,6 +167,11 @@ static int open_proxy_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)return r == -EIO ? -ENOENT : r; real_fops =debugfs_real_fops (filp); + + r =debugfs_is_locked_down (inode, filp, real_fops); +if (r) + goto out; + real_fops =fops_get (real_fops);if (!real_fops) {/* Huh? Module did not clean up after itself at exit? */
@@ -272,6 +297,11 @@ static int full_proxy_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)return r == -EIO ? -ENOENT : r; real_fops =debugfs_real_fops (filp); + + r =debugfs_is_locked_down (inode, filp, real_fops); +if (r) + goto out; + real_fops =fops_get (real_fops);if (!real_fops) {/* Huh? Module did not cleanup after itself at exit? */
fs/debugfs/inode.c +30 -2
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@#include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/magic.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include "internal.h"
@@ -35,6 +36,32 @@ static struct vfsmount *debugfs_mount;static int debugfs_mount_count;static bool debugfs_registered; +/* +* Don't allow access attributes to be changed whilst the kernel is locked down +* so that we can use the file mode as part of a heuristic to determine whether +* to lock down individual files. +*/ +static int debugfs_setattr (struct dentry *dentry,struct iattr *ia) +{ +int ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS ); + +if (ret && (ia->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE |ATTR_UID |ATTR_GID ))) +return ret; +return simple_setattr (dentry, ia); +} + +static const struct inode_operations debugfs_file_inode_operations = { + .setattr = debugfs_setattr, +}; +static const struct inode_operations debugfs_dir_inode_operations = { + .lookup = simple_lookup, + .setattr = debugfs_setattr, +}; +static const struct inode_operations debugfs_symlink_inode_operations = { + .get_link = simple_get_link, + .setattr = debugfs_setattr, +}; +static struct inode *debugfs_get_inode (struct super_block *sb) {struct inode *inode =new_inode (sb);
@@ -369,6 +396,7 @@ static struct dentry *__debugfs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode, inode->i_mode = mode; inode->i_private = data; + inode->i_op = &debugfs_file_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = proxy_fops; dentry->d_fsdata = (void *)((unsigned long )real_fops |DEBUGFS_FSDATA_IS_REAL_FOPS_BIT );
@@ -532,7 +560,7 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent) } inode->i_mode =S_IFDIR |S_IRWXU |S_IRUGO |S_IXUGO ; - inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations; + inode->i_op = &debugfs_dir_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;/* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
@@ -632,7 +660,7 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_create_symlink(const char *name, struct dentry *parent,return failed_creating (dentry); } inode->i_mode =S_IFLNK |S_IRWXUGO ; - inode->i_op = &simple_symlink_inode_operations; + inode->i_op = &debugfs_symlink_inode_operations; inode->i_link = link;d_instantiate (dentry, inode);return end_creating (dentry);
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL ,LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS ,LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE , +LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS ,LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX ,LOCKDOWN_KCORE , LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO", [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters", [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio", + [LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
PATCH v36 27/29 tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
In reply to Matthew GarrettTracefs may release more information about the kernel than desirable, so restrict it when the kernel is locked down in confidentiality mode by preventing open().
--- fs/tracefs/inode.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/tracefs/inode.c +37 -1
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@#include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/magic.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #define TRACEFS_DEFAULT_MODE 0700
@@ -27,6 +28,23 @@ static struct vfsmount *tracefs_mount;static int tracefs_mount_count;static bool tracefs_registered; +static int default_open_file (struct inode *inode,struct file *filp) +{ +struct dentry *dentry = filp->f_path.dentry; +struct file_operations *real_fops; +int ret; + +if (!dentry) +return -EINVAL ; + + ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS ); +if (ret) +return ret; + + real_fops = dentry->d_fsdata; +return real_fops->open (inode, filp); +} +static ssize_t default_read_file (struct file *file,char __user *buf,size_t count,loff_t *ppos) {
@@ -221,6 +239,12 @@ static int tracefs_apply_options(struct super_block *sb)return 0 ; } +static void tracefs_destroy_inode (struct inode *inode) +{ +if (S_ISREG (inode->i_mode)) +kfree (inode->i_fop); +} +static int tracefs_remount (struct super_block *sb,int *flags,char *data) {int err;
@@ -256,6 +280,7 @@ static int tracefs_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root)static const struct super_operations tracefs_super_operations = { .statfs = simple_statfs, + .destroy_inode = tracefs_destroy_inode, .remount_fs = tracefs_remount, .show_options = tracefs_show_options, };
@@ -387,6 +412,7 @@ struct dentry *tracefs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode, struct dentry *parent, void *data, const struct file_operations *fops) { + struct file_operations *proxy_fops;struct dentry *dentry;struct inode *inode;
@@ -402,8 +428,18 @@ struct dentry *tracefs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,if (unlikely (!inode))return failed_creating (dentry); + proxy_fops =kzalloc (sizeof (struct file_operations ),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!proxy_fops) +return failed_creating (dentry); + +if (!fops) + fops = &tracefs_file_operations; + + dentry->d_fsdata = (void *)fops; +memcpy (proxy_fops, fops,sizeof (*proxy_fops)); + proxy_fops->open = default_open_file; inode->i_mode = mode; - inode->i_fop = fops ? fops : &tracefs_file_operations; + inode->i_fop = proxy_fops; inode->i_private = data;d_instantiate (dentry, inode);fsnotify_create (dentry->d_parent->d_inode, dentry);
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_KPROBES ,LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ ,LOCKDOWN_PERF , +LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS , LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf", + [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
Steven Rostedt
maintainerRe: [PATCH V36 27/29] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
Quoted 9 lines · On Thu, 18 Jul 2019 12:44:13 -0700 Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>…
fs/tracefs/inode.c +1
-0@@ -387,6 +412,7 @@ struct dentry *tracefs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode, struct dentry *parent, void *data, const struct file_operations *fops) { + struct file_operations *proxy_fops;struct dentry *dentry;struct inode *inode;
fs/tracefs/inode.c struct dentry *tracefs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode, · line 432
Quoted 5 lines
fs/tracefs/inode.c +2
-0@@ -402,8 +428,18 @@ struct dentry *tracefs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,if (unlikely (!inode))return failed_creating (dentry); + proxy_fops =kzalloc (sizeof (struct file_operations ),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!proxy_fops)
I believe we need "iput(inode);" here. Or move the allocation before the inode allocation and free it on inode failure.
-- Steve
Quoted 14 lines
fs/tracefs/inode.c +9
-1+return failed_creating (dentry); + +if (!fops) + fops = &tracefs_file_operations; + + dentry->d_fsdata = (void *)fops; +memcpy (proxy_fops, fops,sizeof (*proxy_fops)); + proxy_fops->open = default_open_file; inode->i_mode = mode; - inode->i_fop = fops ? fops : &tracefs_file_operations; + inode->i_fop = proxy_fops; inode->i_private = data;d_instantiate (dentry, inode);fsnotify_create (dentry->d_parent->d_inode, dentry);
PATCH 1/1 tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
Tracefs may release more information about the kernel than desirable, so restrict it when the kernel is locked down in confidentiality mode by preventing open().
---
Added the iput()
fs/tracefs/inode.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/tracefs/inode.c +39 -1
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@#include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/magic.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #define TRACEFS_DEFAULT_MODE 0700
@@ -27,6 +28,23 @@ static struct vfsmount *tracefs_mount;static int tracefs_mount_count;static bool tracefs_registered; +static int default_open_file (struct inode *inode,struct file *filp) +{ +struct dentry *dentry = filp->f_path.dentry; +struct file_operations *real_fops; +int ret; + +if (!dentry) +return -EINVAL ; + + ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS ); +if (ret) +return ret; + + real_fops = dentry->d_fsdata; +return real_fops->open (inode, filp); +} +static ssize_t default_read_file (struct file *file,char __user *buf,size_t count,loff_t *ppos) {
@@ -221,6 +239,12 @@ static int tracefs_apply_options(struct super_block *sb)return 0 ; } +static void tracefs_destroy_inode (struct inode *inode) +{ +if (S_ISREG (inode->i_mode)) +kfree (inode->i_fop); +} +static int tracefs_remount (struct super_block *sb,int *flags,char *data) {int err;
@@ -256,6 +280,7 @@ static int tracefs_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root)static const struct super_operations tracefs_super_operations = { .statfs = simple_statfs, + .destroy_inode = tracefs_destroy_inode, .remount_fs = tracefs_remount, .show_options = tracefs_show_options, };
@@ -387,6 +412,7 @@ struct dentry *tracefs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode, struct dentry *parent, void *data, const struct file_operations *fops) { + struct file_operations *proxy_fops;struct dentry *dentry;struct inode *inode;
@@ -402,8 +428,20 @@ struct dentry *tracefs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,if (unlikely (!inode))return failed_creating (dentry); + proxy_fops =kzalloc (sizeof (struct file_operations ),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (unlikely (!proxy_fops)) { +iput (inode); +return failed_creating (dentry); + } + +if (!fops) + fops = &tracefs_file_operations; + + dentry->d_fsdata = (void *)fops; +memcpy (proxy_fops, fops,sizeof (*proxy_fops)); + proxy_fops->open = default_open_file; inode->i_mode = mode; - inode->i_fop = fops ? fops : &tracefs_file_operations; + inode->i_fop = proxy_fops; inode->i_private = data;d_instantiate (dentry, inode);fsnotify_create (dentry->d_parent->d_inode, dentry);
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {LOCKDOWN_KPROBES ,LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ ,LOCKDOWN_PERF , +LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS , LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, };
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +1 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf", + [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", };
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.770.g0f2c4a37fd-goog
Re: [PATCH] tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
Quoted 6 lines · On Tue, 30 Jul 2019 11:47:34 -0700 Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>…
Tracefs may release more information about the kernel than desirable, so restrict it when the kernel is locked down in confidentiality mode by preventing
open().Signed-off-by Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>Cc Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
-- Steve
PATCH v36 28/29 efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
In reply to Matthew Garrettefivar_ssdt_load allows the kernel to import arbitrary ACPI code from an EFI variable, which gives arbitrary code execution in ring 0. Prevent that when the kernel is locked down.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +6 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@#include <linux/acpi.h> #include <linux/ucs2_string.h> #include <linux/memblock.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <asm/early_ioremap.h>
@@ -242,6 +243,11 @@ static void generic_ops_unregister(void)static char efivar_ssdt[EFIVAR_SSDT_NAME_MAX ]__initdata ;static int __init efivar_ssdt_setup (char *str) { +int ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES ); + +if (ret) +return ret; +if (strlen (str) <sizeof (efivar_ssdt))memcpy (efivar_ssdt, str,strlen (str));else
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2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
PATCH v36 29/29 lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
In reply to Matthew GarrettPrint the content of current->comm in messages generated by lockdown to indicate a restriction that was hit. This makes it a bit easier to find out what caused the message.
The message now patterned something like:
Lockdown: <comm>: <what> is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7
--- fs/proc/kcore.c | 5 +++-- security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 8 ++++++-- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/proc/kcore.c +3 -2
@@ -548,11 +548,12 @@ static int open_kcore(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) {int ret =security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_KCORE ); -if (ret) -return ret;if (!capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ))return -EPERM ; +if (ret) +return ret; + filp->private_data =kmalloc (PAGE_SIZE ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!filp->private_data)return -ENOMEM ;
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +6 -2
@@ -81,10 +81,14 @@ early_param("lockdown", lockdown_param);*/ static int lockdown_is_locked_down (enum lockdown_reason what) { +if (WARN (what >=LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX , +"Invalid lockdown reason" )) +return -EPERM ; +if (kernel_locked_down >= what) {if (lockdown_reasons[what]) -pr_notice ("Lockdown: %s is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n" , - lockdown_reasons[what]); +pr_notice ("Lockdown: %s: %s is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n" , + current->comm, lockdown_reasons[what]);return -EPERM ; }
Signature · 1 line
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