overlayfs override_creds=off
Subsystems (4)
v11 cover overlayfs override_creds=off
Patch series:
overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh
fs: __vfs_getxattr nesting paradigm
overlayfs: internal getxattr operations without sepolicy checking
overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred
The first three patches address fundamental security issues that should be solved regardless of the override_creds=off feature.
on them).
The fourth adds the feature depends on these other fixes.
By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are checked against the caller's credentials.
If the principles of least privilege are applied for sepolicy, the mounter's credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's when accessing the overlayfs filesystem. For example, a file that a lower DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the generally higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector.
We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the caller's credentials. The module boolean parameter and mount option override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature", existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/overlay_creds
---
v11:
- Squish out v10 introduced patch 2 and 3 in the series, then and use per-thread flag instead for nesting.
- Switch name to ovl_do_vds_getxattr for __vds_getxattr wrapper.
- Add sb argument to ovl_revert_creds to match future work.
v10:
- Return NULL on CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
- Add __get xattr method to solve sepolicy logging issue
- Drop unnecessary sys_admin sepolicy checking for administrative driver internal xattr functions.
v6:
- Drop CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS.
- Do better with the documentation, drop rationalizations.
- pr_warn message adjusted to report consequences.
v5:
- beefed up the caveats in the Documentation
- Is dependent on
"overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh" "overlayfs: check CAP_MKNOD before issuing vfs_whiteout"
- Added prwarn when override_creds=off
v4:
- spelling and grammar errors in text
v3:
- Change name from caller_credentials / creator_credentials to the boolean override_creds.
- Changed from creator to mounter credentials.
- Updated and fortified the documentation.
- Added CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS
v2:
- Forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error.
- altered commit message.
PATCH v11 1/4 overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh
Assumption never checked, should fail if the mounter creds are not sufficient.
---
v11 - Rebase
v10:
- return NULL rather than ERR_PTR(-EPERM)
- did _not_ add it ovl_can_decode_fh() because of changes since last review, suspect needs to be added to ovl_lower_uuid_ok()?
v8 + v9:
- rebase
v7:
- This time for realz
v6:
- rebase
v5:
- dependency of "overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred"
--- fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/overlayfs/namei.c +3 -0
@@ -161,6 +161,9 @@ struct dentry *ovl_decode_real_fh(struct ovl_fh *fh, struct vfsmount *mnt,if (!uuid_equal (&fh->uuid, &mnt->mnt_sb->s_uuid))return NULL ; +if (!capable (CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH )) +return NULL ; + bytes = (fh->len - offsetof(struct ovl_fh , fid)); real = exportfs_decode_fh(mnt, (struct fid *)fh->fid, bytes >> 2, (int)fh->type,
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.770.g0f2c4a37fd-goog
PATCH v11 2/4 fs: __vfs_getxattr nesting paradigm
In reply to Mark SalyzynAdd a per-thread PF_NO_SECURITY flag that ensures that nested calls that result in vfs_getxattr do not fall under security framework scrutiny. Use cases include selinux when acquiring the xattr data to evaluate security, and internal trusted xattr data soleley managed by the filesystem drivers.
This handles the case of a union filesystem driver that is being requested by the security layer to report back the data that is the target label or context embedded into wrapped filesystem's xattr.
For the use case where access is to be blocked by the security layer.
The path then could be security(dentry) -> __vfs_getxattr(dentry) -> handler->get(dentry) -> __vfs_getxattr(lower_dentry) -> lower_handler->get(lower_dentry) which would report back through the chain data and success as expected, but the logging security layer at the top would have the data to determine the access permissions and report back the target context that was blocked.
Without the nesting check, the path on a union filesystem would be the errant security(dentry) -> __vfs_getxattr(dentry) -> handler->get(dentry) -> vfs_getxattr(lower_dentry) -> *nested* security(lower_dentry, log off) -> lower_handler->get(lower_dentry) which would report back through the chain no data, and -EACCES.
For selinux for both cases, this would translate to a correctly determined blocked access. In the first corrected case a correct avc log would be reported, in the second legacy case an incorrect avc log would be reported against an uninitialized u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 context making the logs cosmetically useless for audit2allow.
---
v11 - squish out v10 introduced patch 2 and 3 in the series,
then use per-thread flag instead for nesting.
--- fs/xattr.c | 10 +++++++++- include/linux/sched.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/xattr.c +9 -1
@@ -302,13 +302,19 @@ __vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *value, size_t size) {const struct xattr_handler *handler; +ssize_t ret; +unsigned int flags; handler =xattr_resolve_name (inode, &name);if (IS_ERR (handler))return PTR_ERR (handler);if (!handler->get)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; -return handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name, value, size); + flags = current->flags; + current->flags |=PF_NO_SECURITY ; + ret = handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name, value, size); +current_restore_flags (flags,PF_NO_SECURITY ); +return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (__vfs_getxattr);
@@ -318,6 +324,8 @@ vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *value, size_t size)struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;int error; +if (unlikely (current->flags &PF_NO_SECURITY )) + goto nolsm; error =xattr_permission (inode, name,MAY_READ );if (error)return error;
include/linux/sched.h +1 -0
@@ -1468,6 +1468,7 @@ extern struct pid *cad_pid;#define PF_NO_SETAFFINITY 0x04000000/* Userland is not allowed to meddle with cpus_mask */ #define PF_MCE_EARLY 0x08000000/* Early kill for mce process policy */ #define PF_MEMALLOC_NOCMA 0x10000000/* All allocation request will have _GFP_MOVABLE cleared */ +#define PF_NO_SECURITY 0x20000000/* nested security context */ #define PF_FREEZER_SKIP 0x40000000/* Freezer should not count it as freezable */ #define PF_SUSPEND_TASK 0x80000000/* This thread called freeze_processes() and should not be frozen */
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.770.g0f2c4a37fd-goog
PATCH v11 3/4 overlayfs: internal getxattr operations without sepolicy checking
In reply to Mark SalyzynCheck impure, opaque, origin & meta xattr with no sepolicy audit (using __vfs_getxattr) since these operations are internal to overlayfs operations and do not disclose any data. This became an issue for credential override off since sys_admin would have been required by the caller; whereas would have been inherently present for the creator since it performed the mount.
This is a change in operations since we do not check in the new ovl_do_vfs_getxattr function if the credential override is off or not. Reasoning is that the sepolicy check is unnecessary overhead, especially since the check can be expensive.
Because for override credentials off, this affects _everyone_ that underneath performs private xattr calls without the appropriate sepolicy permissions and sys_admin capability. Providing blanket support for sys_admin would be bad for all possible callers.
For the override credentials on, this will affect only the mounter, should it lack sepolicy permissions. Not considered a security problem since mounting by definition has sys_admin capabilities, but sepolicy contexts would still need to be crafted.
It should be noted that there is precedence, __vfs_getxattr is used in other filesystems for their own internal trusted xattr management.
---
v11 - Switch name to ovl_do_vfs_getxattr, fortify comment.
v10 - Added to patch series.
--- fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 12 +++++++----- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 2 ++ fs/overlayfs/util.c | 24 +++++++++++++++--------- 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
fs/overlayfs/namei.c +7 -5
@@ -106,10 +106,11 @@ int ovl_check_fh_len(struct ovl_fh *fh, int fh_len)static struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_fh (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name) { -int res, err; +ssize_t res; +int err;struct ovl_fh *fh =NULL ; - res =vfs_getxattr (dentry, name,NULL ,0 ); + res =ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (dentry, name,NULL ,0 );if (res <0 ) {if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP )return NULL ;
@@ -123,7 +124,7 @@ static struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_fh(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)if (!fh)return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); - res =vfs_getxattr (dentry, name, fh, res); + res =ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (dentry, name, fh, res);if (res <0 ) goto fail;
@@ -141,10 +142,11 @@ static struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_fh(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)return NULL ; fail: -pr_warn_ratelimited ("overlayfs: failed to get origin (%i)\n" , res); +pr_warn_ratelimited ("overlayfs: failed to get origin (%zi)\n" , res); goto out; invalid: -pr_warn_ratelimited ("overlayfs: invalid origin (%*phN)\n" , res, fh); +pr_warn_ratelimited ("overlayfs: invalid origin (%*phN)\n" , + (int )res, fh); goto out; }
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +2 -0
@@ -205,6 +205,8 @@ int ovl_want_write(struct dentry *dentry);void ovl_drop_write (struct dentry *dentry);struct dentry *ovl_workdir (struct dentry *dentry);const struct cred *ovl_override_creds (struct super_block *sb); +ssize_t ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,void *buf, +size_t size);struct super_block *ovl_same_sb (struct super_block *sb);int ovl_can_decode_fh (struct super_block *sb);struct dentry *ovl_indexdir (struct super_block *sb);
fs/overlayfs/util.c +15 -9
@@ -40,6 +40,12 @@ const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb)return override_creds (ofs->creator_cred); } +ssize_t ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,void *buf, +size_t size) +{ +return __vfs_getxattr (dentry,d_inode (dentry), name, buf, size); +} +struct super_block *ovl_same_sb (struct super_block *sb) {struct ovl_fs *ofs = sb->s_fs_info;
@@ -537,9 +543,9 @@ void ovl_copy_up_end(struct dentry *dentry)bool ovl_check_origin_xattr (struct dentry *dentry) { -int res; +ssize_t res; - res =vfs_getxattr (dentry,OVL_XATTR_ORIGIN ,NULL ,0 ); + res =ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (dentry,OVL_XATTR_ORIGIN ,NULL ,0 );/* Zero size value means "copied up but origin unknown" */ if (res >=0 )
@@ -550,13 +556,13 @@ bool ovl_check_origin_xattr(struct dentry *dentry)bool ovl_check_dir_xattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name) { -int res; +ssize_t res;char val;if (!d_is_dir (dentry))return false; - res =vfs_getxattr (dentry, name, &val,1 ); + res =ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (dentry, name, &val,1 );if (res ==1 && val =='y' )return true;
@@ -837,13 +843,13 @@ int ovl_lock_rename_workdir(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir)/* err < 0, 0 if no metacopy xattr, 1 if metacopy xattr found */ int ovl_check_metacopy_xattr (struct dentry *dentry) { -int res; +ssize_t res;/* Only regular files can have metacopy xattr */ if (!S_ISREG (d_inode (dentry)->i_mode))return 0 ; - res =vfs_getxattr (dentry,OVL_XATTR_METACOPY ,NULL ,0 ); + res =ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (dentry,OVL_XATTR_METACOPY ,NULL ,0 );if (res <0 ) {if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP )return 0 ;
@@ -852,7 +858,7 @@ int ovl_check_metacopy_xattr(struct dentry *dentry)return 1 ; out: -pr_warn_ratelimited ("overlayfs: failed to get metacopy (%i)\n" , res); +pr_warn_ratelimited ("overlayfs: failed to get metacopy (%zi)\n" , res);return res; }
@@ -878,7 +884,7 @@ ssize_t ovl_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, char **value,ssize_t res;char *buf =NULL ; - res =vfs_getxattr (dentry, name,NULL ,0 ); + res =ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (dentry, name,NULL ,0 );if (res <0 ) {if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP )return -ENODATA ;
@@ -890,7 +896,7 @@ ssize_t ovl_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, char **value,if (!buf)return -ENOMEM ; - res =vfs_getxattr (dentry, name, buf, res); + res =ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (dentry, name, buf, res);if (res <0 ) goto fail; }
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.770.g0f2c4a37fd-goog
PATCH v11 4/4 overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred
In reply to Mark SalyzynBy default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are checked against the caller's credentials.
If the principles of least privilege are applied, the mounter's credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's when accessing the overlayfs filesystem. For example, a file that a lower DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the generally higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector.
We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the caller's credentials. The module boolean parameter and mount option override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature", existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/override_creds.
It was not always this way. Circa 4.6 there was no recorded mounter's credentials, instead privileged access to upper or work directories were temporarily increased to perform the operations. The MAC (selinux) policies were caller's in all cases. override_creds=off partially returns us to this older access model minus the insecure temporary credential increases. This is to permit use in a system with non-overlapping security models for each executable including the agent that mounts the overlayfs filesystem. In Android this is the case since init, which performs the mount operations, has a minimal MAC set of privileges to reduce any attack surface, and services that use the content have a different set of MAC privileges (eg: read, for vendor labelled configuration, execute for vendor libraries and modules). The caveats are not a problem in the Android usage model, however they should be fixed for completeness and for general use in time.
---
v11:
- Add sb argument to ovl_revert_creds to match future work.
v10:
- Rebase (and expand because of increased revert_cred usage)
v9:
- Add to the caveats
v8:
- drop pr_warn message after straw poll to remove it.
- added a use case in the commit message
v7:
- change name of internal parameter to ovl_override_creds_def
- report override_creds only if different than default
v6:
- Drop CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS.
- Do better with the documentation.
- pr_warn message adjusted to report consequences.
v5:
- beefed up the caveats in the Documentation
- Is dependent on
"overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh" "overlayfs: check CAP_MKNOD before issuing vfs_whiteout"
- Added prwarn when override_creds=off
v4:
- spelling and grammar errors in text
v3:
- Change name from caller_credentials / creator_credentials to the boolean override_creds.
- Changed from creator to mounter credentials.
- Updated and fortified the documentation.
- Added CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS
v2:
- Forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error.
- altered commit message.
a
--- Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 2 +- fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 11 ++++++----- fs/overlayfs/file.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 18 +++++++++--------- fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 6 +++--- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 1 + fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 1 + fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 4 ++-- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++- fs/overlayfs/util.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 11 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt +23 -0
@@ -102,6 +102,29 @@ Only the lists of names from directories are merged. Other content such as metadata and extended attributes are reported for the upper directory only. These attributes of the lower directory are hidden. +credentials +----------- + +By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the +recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are +checked against the caller's credentials. + +In the case where caller MAC or DAC credentials do not overlap, a +use case available in older versions of the driver, the +override_creds mount flag can be turned off and help when the use +pattern has caller with legitimate credentials where the mounter +does not. Several unintended side effects will occur though. The +caller without certain key capabilities or lower privilege will not +always be able to delete files or directories, create nodes, or +search some restricted directories. The ability to search and read +a directory entry is spotty as a result of the cache mechanism not +retesting the credentials because of the assumption, a privileged +caller can fill cache, then a lower privilege can read the directory +cache. The uneven security model where cache, upperdir and workdir +are opened at privilege, but accessed without creating a form of +privilege escalation, should only be used with strict understanding +of the side effects and of the security policies. + whiteouts and opaque directories --------------------------------
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c +1 -1
@@ -886,7 +886,7 @@ int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags)dput (parent);dput (next); } -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return err; }
fs/overlayfs/dir.c +6 -5
@@ -563,7 +563,8 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;if (!attr->hardlink) { err =security_dentry_create_files_as (dentry, - attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred, + attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, + old_cred ? old_cred :current_cred (), override_cred);if (err) {put_cred (override_cred);
@@ -579,7 +580,7 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, err =ovl_create_over_whiteout (dentry, inode, attr); } out_revert_creds: -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return err; }
@@ -655,7 +656,7 @@ static int ovl_set_link_redirect(struct dentry *dentry) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); err =ovl_set_redirect (dentry, false); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return err; }
@@ -851,7 +852,7 @@ static int ovl_do_remove(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir) err =ovl_remove_upper (dentry, is_dir, &list); else err =ovl_remove_and_whiteout (dentry, &list); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);if (!err) {if (is_dir)clear_nlink (dentry->d_inode);
@@ -1221,7 +1222,7 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct inode *olddir, struct dentry *old, out_unlock:unlock_rename (new_upperdir, old_upperdir); out_revert_creds: -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (old->d_sb, old_cred);if (update_nlink)ovl_nlink_end (new); out_drop_write:
fs/overlayfs/file.c +10 -10
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file, old_cred =ovl_override_creds (inode->i_sb); realfile =open_with_fake_path (&file->f_path, flags, realinode,current_cred ()); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (inode->i_sb, old_cred); pr_debug("open(%p[%pD2/%c], 0%o) -> (%p, 0%o)\n", file, file, ovl_whatisit(inode, realinode), file->f_flags,
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static loff_t ovl_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (inode->i_sb); ret =vfs_llseek (real.file, offset, whence); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (inode->i_sb, old_cred); file->f_pos = real.file->f_pos;inode_unlock (inode);
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static ssize_t ovl_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb); ret =vfs_iter_read (real.file, iter, &iocb->ki_pos,ovl_iocb_to_rwf (iocb)); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);ovl_file_accessed (file);
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ static ssize_t ovl_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) ret =vfs_iter_write (real.file, iter, &iocb->ki_pos,ovl_iocb_to_rwf (iocb));file_end_write (real.file); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);/* Update size */ ovl_copyattr (ovl_inode_real (inode), inode);
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static int ovl_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync)if (file_inode (real.file) ==ovl_inode_upper (file_inode (file))) { old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb); ret =vfs_fsync_range (real.file, start, end, datasync); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred); }fdput (real);
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static int ovl_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb); ret =call_mmap (vma->vm_file, vma); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);if (ret) {/* Drop reference count from new vm_file value */
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ static long ovl_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb); ret =vfs_fallocate (real.file, mode, offset, len); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);/* Update size */ ovl_copyattr (ovl_inode_real (inode), inode);
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ static int ovl_fadvise(struct file *file, loff_t offset, loff_t len, int advice) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb); ret =vfs_fadvise (real.file, offset, len, advice); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);fdput (real);
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static long ovl_real_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb); ret =vfs_ioctl (real.file, cmd, arg); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);fdput (real);
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ static loff_t ovl_copyfile(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in, flags);break ; } -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);/* Update size */ ovl_copyattr (ovl_inode_real (inode_out), inode_out);
fs/overlayfs/inode.c +9 -9
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)inode_lock (upperdentry->d_inode); old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); err =notify_change (upperdentry, attr,NULL ); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);if (!err)ovl_copyattr (upperdentry->d_inode, dentry->d_inode);inode_unlock (upperdentry->d_inode);
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ int ovl_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, stat->nlink = dentry->d_inode->i_nlink; out: -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return err; }
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) mask |=MAY_READ ; } err =inode_permission (realinode, mask); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (inode->i_sb, old_cred);return err; }
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static const char *ovl_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); p =vfs_get_link (ovl_dentry_real (dentry), done); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return p; }
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,WARN_ON (flags !=XATTR_REPLACE ); err =vfs_removexattr (realdentry, name); } -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);/* copy c/mtime */ ovl_copyattr (d_inode (realdentry), inode);
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); res =vfs_getxattr (realdentry, name, value, size); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return res; }
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); res =vfs_listxattr (realdentry, list, size); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);if (res <=0 || size ==0 )return res;
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (inode->i_sb); acl =get_acl (realinode, type); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (inode->i_sb, old_cred);return acl; }
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static int ovl_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo,filemap_write_and_wait (realinode->i_mapping); err = realinode->i_op->fiemap (realinode, fieinfo, start, len); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (inode->i_sb, old_cred);return err; }
fs/overlayfs/namei.c +3 -3
@@ -1079,7 +1079,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, goto out_free_oe; } -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);if (origin_path) {dput (origin_path->dentry);kfree (origin_path);
@@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,kfree (upperredirect); out:kfree (d.redirect); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return ERR_PTR (err); }
@@ -1160,7 +1160,7 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry)dput (this); } } -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return positive; }
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +1 -0
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ int ovl_want_write(struct dentry *dentry);void ovl_drop_write (struct dentry *dentry);struct dentry *ovl_workdir (struct dentry *dentry);const struct cred *ovl_override_creds (struct super_block *sb); +void ovl_revert_creds (struct super_block *sb,const struct cred *oldcred);ssize_t ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,void *buf,size_t size);struct super_block *ovl_same_sb (struct super_block *sb);
fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h +1 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ struct ovl_config {bool nfs_export;int xino;bool metacopy; +bool override_creds; };struct ovl_sb {
fs/overlayfs/readdir.c +2 -2
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static int ovl_check_whiteouts(struct dentry *dir, struct ovl_readdir_data *rdd) }inode_unlock (dir->d_inode); } -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (rdd->dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return err; }
@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ int ovl_check_empty_dir(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); err =ovl_dir_read_merged (dentry, list, &root); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);if (err)return err;
fs/overlayfs/super.c +21 -1
@@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ module_param_named(xino_auto, ovl_xino_auto_def, bool, 0644);MODULE_PARM_DESC (xino_auto,"Auto enable xino feature" ); +static bool __read_mostly ovl_override_creds_def = true; +module_param_named (override_creds, ovl_override_creds_def, bool,0644 ); +MODULE_PARM_DESC (ovl_override_creds_def, +"Use mounter's credentials for accesses" ); +static void ovl_entry_stack_free (struct ovl_entry *oe) {unsigned int i;
@@ -362,6 +367,9 @@ static int ovl_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *dentry)if (ofs->config.metacopy != ovl_metacopy_def)seq_printf (m,",metacopy=%s" , ofs->config.metacopy ?"on" :"off" ); +if (ofs->config.override_creds != ovl_override_creds_def) +seq_show_option (m,"override_creds" , + ofs->config.override_creds ?"on" :"off" );return 0 ; }
@@ -402,6 +410,8 @@ enum {OPT_XINO_AUTO ,OPT_METACOPY_ON ,OPT_METACOPY_OFF , +OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_ON , +OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_OFF , OPT_ERR, };
@@ -420,6 +430,8 @@ static const match_table_t ovl_tokens = { {OPT_XINO_AUTO, "xino=auto"}, {OPT_METACOPY_ON, "metacopy=on"}, {OPT_METACOPY_OFF, "metacopy=off"}, + {OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_ON, "override_creds=on"}, + {OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_OFF, "override_creds=off"}, {OPT_ERR, NULL} };
@@ -478,6 +490,7 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config) config->redirect_mode =kstrdup (ovl_redirect_mode_def (),GFP_KERNEL );if (!config->redirect_mode)return -ENOMEM ; + config->override_creds = ovl_override_creds_def;while ((p =ovl_next_opt (&opt)) !=NULL ) {int token;
@@ -558,6 +571,14 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config) config->metacopy = false;break ; +case OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_ON : + config->override_creds = true; +break ; + +case OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_OFF : + config->override_creds = false; +break ; +default :pr_err ("overlayfs: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" or missing value\n" , p);return -EINVAL ;
@@ -1672,7 +1693,6 @@ static int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) ovl_dentry_lower(root_dentry), NULL); sb->s_root = root_dentry; -return 0 ; out_free_oe:
fs/overlayfs/util.c +10 -2
@@ -37,9 +37,17 @@ const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb) {struct ovl_fs *ofs = sb->s_fs_info; +if (!ofs->config.override_creds) +return NULL ;return override_creds (ofs->creator_cred); } +void ovl_revert_creds (struct super_block *sb,const struct cred *old_cred) +{ +if (old_cred) +revert_creds (old_cred); +} +ssize_t ovl_do_vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,void *buf,size_t size) {
@@ -797,7 +805,7 @@ int ovl_nlink_start(struct dentry *dentry)* value relative to the upper inode nlink in an upper inode xattr. */ err =ovl_set_nlink_upper (dentry); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred); out:if (err)
@@ -815,7 +823,7 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb);ovl_cleanup_index (dentry); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred); }ovl_inode_unlock (inode);
Signature · 1 line
2.22.0.770.g0f2c4a37fd-goog