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4.14.136-stable review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 5 participants 32 messages Aug 2, 2019 – Aug 3, 2019

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Greg Kroah-Hartman

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover 4.14.136-stable review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.136 release. There are 25 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun 04 Aug 2019 09:19:34 AM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.136-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 4.14.136-rc1

Yan, Zheng <[email protected]>
ceph: hold i_ceph_lock when removing caps for freeing inode

Yoshinori Sato <[email protected]>
Fix allyesconfig output.

Miroslav Lichvar <[email protected]>
drivers/pps/pps.c: clear offset flags in PPS_SETPARAMS ioctl

Jann Horn <[email protected]>

    sched/fair: Don't free p->numa_faults with concurrent readers

Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: hci_uart: check for missing tty operations

Sunil Muthuswamy <[email protected]>
hv_sock: Add support for delayed close

Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
iommu/iova: Fix compilation error with !CONFIG_IOMMU_IOVA

Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>
iommu/vt-d: Don't queue_iova() if there is no flush queue

Luke Nowakowski-Krijger <[email protected]>
media: radio-raremono: change devm_k*alloc to k*alloc

Benjamin Coddington <[email protected]>
NFS: Cleanup if nfs_match_client is interrupted

Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
media: pvrusb2: use a different format for warnings

Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
media: cpia2_usb: first wake up, then free in disconnect

Fabio Estevam <[email protected]>
ath10k: Change the warning message string

Sean Young <[email protected]>
media: au0828: fix null dereference in error path

Phong Tran <[email protected]>
ISDN: hfcsusb: checking idx of ep configuration

Todd Kjos <[email protected]>
binder: fix possible UAF when freeing buffer

Will Deacon <[email protected]>
arm64: compat: Provide definition for COMPAT_SIGMINSTKSZ

Abhishek Sahu <[email protected]>
i2c: qup: fixed releasing dma without flush operation completion

allen yan <[email protected]>
arm64: dts: marvell: Fix A37xx UART0 register size

Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
NFSv4: Fix lookup revalidate of regular files

Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
NFS: Refactor nfs_lookup_revalidate()

Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
NFS: Fix dentry revalidation on NFSv4 lookup

Sunil Muthuswamy <[email protected]>
vsock: correct removal of socket from the list

Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
VSOCK: use TCP state constants for sk_state

-------------

Diffstat:

 .../devicetree/bindings/serial/mvebu-uart.txt      |   2 +-
 Makefile                                           |   4 +-
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-37xx.dtsi       |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/compat.h                    |   1 +
 arch/sh/boards/Kconfig                             |  14 +-
 drivers/android/binder.c                           |  16 +-
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_ath.c                        |   3 +
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c                        |   3 +
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_intel.c                      |   3 +
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c                      |  13 +
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_mrvl.c                       |   3 +
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_uart.h                       |   1 +
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-qup.c                       |   2 +
 drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c                        |   2 +-
 drivers/iommu/iova.c                               |  18 +-
 drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcsusb.c              |   3 +
 drivers/media/radio/radio-raremono.c               |  30 ++-
 drivers/media/usb/au0828/au0828-core.c             |  12 +-
 drivers/media/usb/cpia2/cpia2_usb.c                |   3 +-
 drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-hdw.c            |   4 +-
 drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-i2c-core.c       |   6 +-
 drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-std.c            |   2 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/usb.c              |   2 +-
 drivers/pps/pps.c                                  |   8 +
 fs/ceph/caps.c                                     |   7 +-
 fs/exec.c                                          |   2 +-
 fs/nfs/client.c                                    |   4 +-
 fs/nfs/dir.c                                       | 295 +++++++++++----------
 fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c                                  |  15 +-
 include/linux/iova.h                               |   6 +
 include/linux/sched/numa_balancing.h               |   4 +-
 include/net/af_vsock.h                             |   3 -
 kernel/fork.c                                      |   2 +-
 kernel/sched/fair.c                                |  24 +-
 net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c                           |  84 +++---
 net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c                   | 118 ++++++---
 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport.c                   |   2 +-
 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c            |  22 +-
 net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c                     |  34 +--
 net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport_notify.c              |   2 +-
 net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport_notify_qstate.c       |   2 +-
 41 files changed, 472 insertions(+), 311 deletions(-)
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/25 VSOCK: use TCP state constants for sk_state

From: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>

commit 3b4477d2dcf2709d0be89e2a8dced3d0f4a017f2 upstream.

There are two state fields: socket->state and sock->sk_state. The socket->state field uses SS_UNCONNECTED, SS_CONNECTED, etc while the sock->sk_state typically uses values that match TCP state constants (TCP_CLOSE, TCP_ESTABLISHED). AF_VSOCK does not follow this convention and instead uses SS_* constants for both fields.

The sk_state field will be exposed to userspace through the vsock_diag interface for ss(8), netstat(8), and other programs.

This patch switches sk_state to TCP state constants so that the meaning of this field is consistent with other address families. Not just AF_INET and AF_INET6 use the TCP constants, AF_UNIX and others do too.

The following mapping was used to convert the code:

SS_FREE -> TCP_CLOSE
SS_UNCONNECTED -> TCP_CLOSE
SS_CONNECTING -> TCP_SYN_SENT
SS_CONNECTED -> TCP_ESTABLISHED
SS_DISCONNECTING -> TCP_CLOSING
VSOCK_SS_LISTEN -> TCP_LISTEN

In __vsock_create() the sk_state initialization was dropped because sock_init_data() already initializes sk_state to TCP_CLOSE.

[Adjusted net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c since the commit b4562ca7925a ("hv_sock: add locking in the open/close/release code paths") and the commit
c9d3fe9da094 ("VSOCK: fix outdated sk_state value in hvs_release()") were backported before 3b4477d2dcf2.]

---
 include/net/af_vsock.h                       |    3 -
 net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c                     |   46 +++++++++++++++------------
 net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c             |   12 +++----
 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport.c             |    2 -
 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c      |   22 ++++++------
 net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c               |   34 +++++++++----------
 net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport_notify.c        |    2 -
 net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport_notify_qstate.c |    2 -
 8 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
include/net/af_vsock.h +0 -3
@@ -22,9 +22,6 @@
 
 #include "vsock_addr.h"
 
-/* vsock-specific sock->sk_state constants */
-#define VSOCK_SS_LISTEN 255
-
 #define LAST_RESERVED_PORT 1023
 
 #define vsock_sk(__sk)    ((struct vsock_sock *)__sk)
net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c +27 -19

160 lines not on this page · raw message

net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c +6 -6
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ static void hvs_close_connection(struct
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
 
-	sk->sk_state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
+	sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
 	sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE);
 	vsk->peer_shutdown |= SEND_SHUTDOWN | RCV_SHUTDOWN;
 
@@ -336,8 +336,8 @@ static void hvs_open_connection(struct v
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
 
-	if ((conn_from_host && sk->sk_state != VSOCK_SS_LISTEN) ||
-	    (!conn_from_host && sk->sk_state != SS_CONNECTING))
+	if ((conn_from_host && sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) ||
+	    (!conn_from_host && sk->sk_state != TCP_SYN_SENT))
 		goto out;
 
 	if (conn_from_host) {
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ static void hvs_open_connection(struct v
 		if (!new)
 			goto out;
 
-		new->sk_state = SS_CONNECTING;
+		new->sk_state = TCP_SYN_SENT;
 		vnew = vsock_sk(new);
 		hvs_new = vnew->trans;
 		hvs_new->chan = chan;
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ static void hvs_open_connection(struct v
 	hvs_set_channel_pending_send_size(chan);
 
 	if (conn_from_host) {
-		new->sk_state = SS_CONNECTED;
+		new->sk_state = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
 		sk->sk_ack_backlog++;
 
 		hvs_addr_init(&vnew->local_addr, if_type);
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static void hvs_open_connection(struct v
 
 		vsock_enqueue_accept(sk, new);
 	} else {
-		sk->sk_state = SS_CONNECTED;
+		sk->sk_state = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
 		sk->sk_socket->state = SS_CONNECTED;
 
 		vsock_insert_connected(vsock_sk(sk));
net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport.c +1 -1
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ static void virtio_vsock_event_fill(stru
 static void virtio_vsock_reset_sock(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	lock_sock(sk);
-	sk->sk_state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
+	sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
 	sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET;
 	sk->sk_error_report(sk);
 	release_sock(sk);
net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c +11 -11
@@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ static void virtio_transport_do_close(st
 	sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE);
 	vsk->peer_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
 	if (vsock_stream_has_data(vsk) <= 0)
-		sk->sk_state = SS_DISCONNECTING;
+		sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSING;
 	sk->sk_state_change(sk);
 
 	if (vsk->close_work_scheduled &&
@@ -756,8 +756,8 @@ static bool virtio_transport_close(struc
 {
 	struct sock *sk = &vsk->sk;
 
-	if (!(sk->sk_state == SS_CONNECTED ||
-	      sk->sk_state == SS_DISCONNECTING))
+	if (!(sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED ||
+	      sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSING))
 		return true;
 
 	/* Already received SHUTDOWN from peer, reply with RST */
@@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ virtio_transport_recv_connecting(struct
 
 	switch (le16_to_cpu(pkt->hdr.op)) {
 	case VIRTIO_VSOCK_OP_RESPONSE:
-		sk->sk_state = SS_CONNECTED;
+		sk->sk_state = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
 		sk->sk_socket->state = SS_CONNECTED;
 		vsock_insert_connected(vsk);
 		sk->sk_state_change(sk);
@@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ virtio_transport_recv_connecting(struct
 
 destroy:
 	virtio_transport_reset(vsk, pkt);
-	sk->sk_state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
+	sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
 	sk->sk_err = skerr;
 	sk->sk_error_report(sk);
 	return err;
@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ virtio_transport_recv_connected(struct s
 			vsk->peer_shutdown |= SEND_SHUTDOWN;
 		if (vsk->peer_shutdown == SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
 		    vsock_stream_has_data(vsk) <= 0)
-			sk->sk_state = SS_DISCONNECTING;
+			sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSING;
 		if (le32_to_cpu(pkt->hdr.flags))
 			sk->sk_state_change(sk);
 		break;
@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ virtio_transport_recv_listen(struct sock
 
 	lock_sock_nested(child, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
 
-	child->sk_state = SS_CONNECTED;
+	child->sk_state = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
 
 	vchild = vsock_sk(child);
 	vsock_addr_init(&vchild->local_addr, le64_to_cpu(pkt->hdr.dst_cid),
@@ -1031,18 +1031,18 @@ void virtio_transport_recv_pkt(struct vi
 		sk->sk_write_space(sk);
 
 	switch (sk->sk_state) {
-	case VSOCK_SS_LISTEN:
+	case TCP_LISTEN:
 		virtio_transport_recv_listen(sk, pkt);
 		virtio_transport_free_pkt(pkt);
 		break;
-	case SS_CONNECTING:
+	case TCP_SYN_SENT:
 		virtio_transport_recv_connecting(sk, pkt);
 		virtio_transport_free_pkt(pkt);
 		break;
-	case SS_CONNECTED:
+	case TCP_ESTABLISHED:
 		virtio_transport_recv_connected(sk, pkt);
 		break;
-	case SS_DISCONNECTING:
+	case TCP_CLOSING:
 		virtio_transport_recv_disconnecting(sk, pkt);
 		virtio_transport_free_pkt(pkt);
 		break;
net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c +17 -17
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ static int vmci_transport_recv_stream_cb
 		/* The local context ID may be out of date, update it. */
 		vsk->local_addr.svm_cid = dst.svm_cid;
 
-		if (sk->sk_state == SS_CONNECTED)
+		if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED)
 			vmci_trans(vsk)->notify_ops->handle_notify_pkt(
 					sk, pkt, true, &dst, &src,
 					&bh_process_pkt);
@@ -834,7 +834,9 @@ static void vmci_transport_handle_detach
 		 * left in our consume queue.
 		 */
 		if (vsock_stream_has_data(vsk) <= 0) {
-			if (sk->sk_state == SS_CONNECTING) {
+			sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
+
+			if (sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_SENT) {
 				/* The peer may detach from a queue pair while
 				 * we are still in the connecting state, i.e.,
 				 * if the peer VM is killed after attaching to
@@ -843,12 +845,10 @@ static void vmci_transport_handle_detach
 				 * event like a reset.
 				 */
 
-				sk->sk_state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
 				sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET;
 				sk->sk_error_report(sk);
 				return;
 			}
-			sk->sk_state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
 		}
 		sk->sk_state_change(sk);
 	}
@@ -916,17 +916,17 @@ static void vmci_transport_recv_pkt_work
 	vsock_sk(sk)->local_addr.svm_cid = pkt->dg.dst.context;
 
 	switch (sk->sk_state) {
-	case VSOCK_SS_LISTEN:
+	case TCP_LISTEN:
 		vmci_transport_recv_listen(sk, pkt);
 		break;
-	case SS_CONNECTING:
+	case TCP_SYN_SENT:
 		/* Processing of pending connections for servers goes through
 		 * the listening socket, so see vmci_transport_recv_listen()
 		 * for that path.
 		 */
 		vmci_transport_recv_connecting_client(sk, pkt);
 		break;
-	case SS_CONNECTED:
+	case TCP_ESTABLISHED:
 		vmci_transport_recv_connected(sk, pkt);
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ static int vmci_transport_recv_listen(st
 		vsock_sk(pending)->local_addr.svm_cid = pkt->dg.dst.context;
 
 		switch (pending->sk_state) {
-		case SS_CONNECTING:
+		case TCP_SYN_SENT:
 			err = vmci_transport_recv_connecting_server(sk,
 								    pending,
 								    pkt);
@@ -1105,7 +1105,7 @@ static int vmci_transport_recv_listen(st
 	vsock_add_pending(sk, pending);
 	sk->sk_ack_backlog++;
 
-	pending->sk_state = SS_CONNECTING;
+	pending->sk_state = TCP_SYN_SENT;
 	vmci_trans(vpending)->produce_size =
 		vmci_trans(vpending)->consume_size = qp_size;
 	vmci_trans(vpending)->queue_pair_size = qp_size;
@@ -1229,11 +1229,11 @@ vmci_transport_recv_connecting_server(st
 	 * the socket will be valid until it is removed from the queue.
 	 *
 	 * If we fail sending the attach below, we remove the socket from the
-	 * connected list and move the socket to SS_UNCONNECTED before
+	 * connected list and move the socket to TCP_CLOSE before
 	 * releasing the lock, so a pending slow path processing of an incoming
 	 * packet will not see the socket in the connected state in that case.
 	 */
-	pending->sk_state = SS_CONNECTED;
+	pending->sk_state = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
 
 	vsock_insert_connected(vpending);
 
@@ -1264,7 +1264,7 @@ vmci_transport_recv_connecting_server(st
 
 destroy:
 	pending->sk_err = skerr;
-	pending->sk_state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
+	pending->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
 	/* As long as we drop our reference, all necessary cleanup will handle
 	 * when the cleanup function drops its reference and our destruct
 	 * implementation is called.  Note that since the listen handler will
@@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ vmci_transport_recv_connecting_client(st
 		 * accounting (it can already be found since it's in the bound
 		 * table).
 		 */
-		sk->sk_state = SS_CONNECTED;
+		sk->sk_state = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
 		sk->sk_socket->state = SS_CONNECTED;
 		vsock_insert_connected(vsk);
 		sk->sk_state_change(sk);
@@ -1370,7 +1370,7 @@ vmci_transport_recv_connecting_client(st
 destroy:
 	vmci_transport_send_reset(sk, pkt);
 
-	sk->sk_state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
+	sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
 	sk->sk_err = skerr;
 	sk->sk_error_report(sk);
 	return err;
@@ -1558,7 +1558,7 @@ static int vmci_transport_recv_connected
 		sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE);
 		vsk->peer_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
 		if (vsock_stream_has_data(vsk) <= 0)
-			sk->sk_state = SS_DISCONNECTING;
+			sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSING;
 
 		sk->sk_state_change(sk);
 		break;
@@ -1826,7 +1826,7 @@ static int vmci_transport_connect(struct
 		err = vmci_transport_send_conn_request(
 			sk, vmci_trans(vsk)->queue_pair_size);
 		if (err < 0) {
-			sk->sk_state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
+			sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
 			return err;
 		}
 	} else {
@@ -1836,7 +1836,7 @@ static int vmci_transport_connect(struct
 				sk, vmci_trans(vsk)->queue_pair_size,
 				supported_proto_versions);
 		if (err < 0) {
-			sk->sk_state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
+			sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
 			return err;
 		}
 
net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport_notify.c +1 -1
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ vmci_transport_notify_pkt_poll_in(struct
 		 * queue. Ask for notifications when there is something to
 		 * read.
 		 */
-		if (sk->sk_state == SS_CONNECTED) {
+		if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
 			if (!send_waiting_read(sk, 1))
 				return -1;
 
net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport_notify_qstate.c +1 -1
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ vmci_transport_notify_pkt_poll_in(struct
 		 * queue. Ask for notifications when there is something to
 		 * read.
 		 */
-		if (sk->sk_state == SS_CONNECTED)
+		if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED)
 			vsock_block_update_write_window(sk);
 		*data_ready_now = false;
 	}
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/25 vsock: correct removal of socket from the list

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sunil Muthuswamy <[email protected]>

commit d5afa82c977ea06f7119058fa0eb8519ea501031 upstream.

The current vsock code for removal of socket from the list is both subject to race and inefficient. It takes the lock, checks whether the socket is in the list, drops the lock and if the socket was on the list, deletes it from the list. This is subject to race because as soon as the lock is dropped once it is checked for presence, that condition cannot be relied upon for any decision. It is also inefficient because if the socket is present in the list, it takes the lock twice.

---
 net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c |   38 +++++++-------------------------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c +7 -31
@@ -288,7 +288,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vsock_insert_connected
 void vsock_remove_bound(struct vsock_sock *vsk)
 {
 	spin_lock_bh(&vsock_table_lock);
-	__vsock_remove_bound(vsk);
+	if (__vsock_in_bound_table(vsk))
+		__vsock_remove_bound(vsk);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&vsock_table_lock);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vsock_remove_bound);
@@ -296,7 +297,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vsock_remove_bound);
 void vsock_remove_connected(struct vsock_sock *vsk)
 {
 	spin_lock_bh(&vsock_table_lock);
-	__vsock_remove_connected(vsk);
+	if (__vsock_in_connected_table(vsk))
+		__vsock_remove_connected(vsk);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&vsock_table_lock);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vsock_remove_connected);
@@ -332,35 +334,10 @@ struct sock *vsock_find_connected_socket
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vsock_find_connected_socket);
 
-static bool vsock_in_bound_table(struct vsock_sock *vsk)
-{
-	bool ret;
-
-	spin_lock_bh(&vsock_table_lock);
-	ret = __vsock_in_bound_table(vsk);
-	spin_unlock_bh(&vsock_table_lock);
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static bool vsock_in_connected_table(struct vsock_sock *vsk)
-{
-	bool ret;
-
-	spin_lock_bh(&vsock_table_lock);
-	ret = __vsock_in_connected_table(vsk);
-	spin_unlock_bh(&vsock_table_lock);
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
 void vsock_remove_sock(struct vsock_sock *vsk)
 {
-	if (vsock_in_bound_table(vsk))
-		vsock_remove_bound(vsk);
-
-	if (vsock_in_connected_table(vsk))
-		vsock_remove_connected(vsk);
+	vsock_remove_bound(vsk);
+	vsock_remove_connected(vsk);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vsock_remove_sock);
 
@@ -491,8 +468,7 @@ static void vsock_pending_work(struct wo
 	 * incoming packets can't find this socket, and to reduce the reference
 	 * count.
 	 */
-	if (vsock_in_connected_table(vsk))
-		vsock_remove_connected(vsk);
+	vsock_remove_connected(vsk);
 
 	sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
 
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/25 NFS: Fix dentry revalidation on NFSv4 lookup

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>

commit be189f7e7f03de35887e5a85ddcf39b91b5d7fc1 upstream.

We need to ensure that inode and dentry revalidation occurs correctly on reopen of a file that is already open. Currently, we can end up not revalidating either in the case of NFSv4.0, due to the 'cached open' path.
Let's fix that by ensuring that we only do cached open for the special cases of open recovery and delegation return.

---
 fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c |   15 ++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +12 -3
@@ -1317,12 +1317,20 @@ static bool nfs4_mode_match_open_stateid
 	return false;
 }
 
-static int can_open_cached(struct nfs4_state *state, fmode_t mode, int open_mode)
+static int can_open_cached(struct nfs4_state *state, fmode_t mode,
+		int open_mode, enum open_claim_type4 claim)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	if (open_mode & (O_EXCL|O_TRUNC))
 		goto out;
+	switch (claim) {
+	case NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_NULL:
+	case NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_FH:
+		goto out;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
 	switch (mode & (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE)) {
 		case FMODE_READ:
 			ret |= test_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags) != 0
@@ -1617,7 +1625,7 @@ static struct nfs4_state *nfs4_try_open_
 
 	for (;;) {
 		spin_lock(&state->owner->so_lock);
-		if (can_open_cached(state, fmode, open_mode)) {
+		if (can_open_cached(state, fmode, open_mode, claim)) {
 			update_open_stateflags(state, fmode);
 			spin_unlock(&state->owner->so_lock);
 			goto out_return_state;
@@ -2141,7 +2149,8 @@ static void nfs4_open_prepare(struct rpc
 	if (data->state != NULL) {
 		struct nfs_delegation *delegation;
 
-		if (can_open_cached(data->state, data->o_arg.fmode, data->o_arg.open_flags))
+		if (can_open_cached(data->state, data->o_arg.fmode,
+					data->o_arg.open_flags, claim))
 			goto out_no_action;
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		delegation = rcu_dereference(NFS_I(data->state->inode)->delegation);
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/25 NFS: Refactor nfs_lookup_revalidate()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>

commit 5ceb9d7fdaaf6d8ced6cd7861cf1deb9cd93fa47 upstream.

Refactor the code in nfs_lookup_revalidate() as a stepping stone towards optimising and fixing nfs4_lookup_revalidate().

---
 fs/nfs/dir.c |  222 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
 1 file changed, 126 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/dir.c +126 -96
@@ -1059,6 +1059,100 @@ int nfs_neg_need_reval(struct inode *dir
 	return !nfs_check_verifier(dir, dentry, flags & LOOKUP_RCU);
 }
 
+static int
+nfs_lookup_revalidate_done(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			   struct inode *inode, int error)
+{
+	switch (error) {
+	case 1:
+		dfprintk(LOOKUPCACHE, "NFS: %s(%pd2) is valid\n",
+			__func__, dentry);
+		return 1;
+	case 0:
+		nfs_mark_for_revalidate(dir);
+		if (inode && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
+			/* Purge readdir caches. */
+			nfs_zap_caches(inode);
+			/*
+			 * We can't d_drop the root of a disconnected tree:
+			 * its d_hash is on the s_anon list and d_drop() would hide
+			 * it from shrink_dcache_for_unmount(), leading to busy
+			 * inodes on unmount and further oopses.
+			 */
+			if (IS_ROOT(dentry))
+				return 1;
+		}
+		dfprintk(LOOKUPCACHE, "NFS: %s(%pd2) is invalid\n",
+				__func__, dentry);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	dfprintk(LOOKUPCACHE, "NFS: %s(%pd2) lookup returned error %d\n",
+				__func__, dentry, error);
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int
+nfs_lookup_revalidate_negative(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			       unsigned int flags)
+{
+	int ret = 1;
+	if (nfs_neg_need_reval(dir, dentry, flags)) {
+		if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
+			return -ECHILD;
+		ret = 0;
+	}
+	return nfs_lookup_revalidate_done(dir, dentry, NULL, ret);
+}
+
+static int
+nfs_lookup_revalidate_delegated(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+				struct inode *inode)
+{
+	nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
+	return nfs_lookup_revalidate_done(dir, dentry, inode, 1);
+}
+
+static int
+nfs_lookup_revalidate_dentry(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct nfs_fh *fhandle;
+	struct nfs_fattr *fattr;
+	struct nfs4_label *label;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	fhandle = nfs_alloc_fhandle();
+	fattr = nfs_alloc_fattr();
+	label = nfs4_label_alloc(NFS_SERVER(inode), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (fhandle == NULL || fattr == NULL || IS_ERR(label))
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = NFS_PROTO(dir)->lookup(dir, &dentry->d_name, fhandle, fattr, label);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		if (ret == -ESTALE || ret == -ENOENT)
+			ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ret = 0;
+	if (nfs_compare_fh(NFS_FH(inode), fhandle))
+		goto out;
+	if (nfs_refresh_inode(inode, fattr) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	nfs_setsecurity(inode, fattr, label);
+	nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
+
+	/* set a readdirplus hint that we had a cache miss */
+	nfs_force_use_readdirplus(dir);
+	ret = 1;
+out:
+	nfs_free_fattr(fattr);
+	nfs_free_fhandle(fhandle);
+	nfs4_label_free(label);
+	return nfs_lookup_revalidate_done(dir, dentry, inode, ret);
+}
+
 /*
  * This is called every time the dcache has a lookup hit,
  * and we should check whether we can really trust that
@@ -1070,58 +1164,36 @@ int nfs_neg_need_reval(struct inode *dir
  * If the parent directory is seen to have changed, we throw out the
  * cached dentry and do a new lookup.
  */
-static int nfs_lookup_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
+static int
+nfs_do_lookup_revalidate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			 unsigned int flags)
 {
-	struct inode *dir;
 	struct inode *inode;
-	struct dentry *parent;
-	struct nfs_fh *fhandle = NULL;
-	struct nfs_fattr *fattr = NULL;
-	struct nfs4_label *label = NULL;
 	int error;
 
-	if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
-		parent = ACCESS_ONCE(dentry->d_parent);
-		dir = d_inode_rcu(parent);
-		if (!dir)
-			return -ECHILD;
-	} else {
-		parent = dget_parent(dentry);
-		dir = d_inode(parent);
-	}
 	nfs_inc_stats(dir, NFSIOS_DENTRYREVALIDATE);
 	inode = d_inode(dentry);
 
-	if (!inode) {
-		if (nfs_neg_need_reval(dir, dentry, flags)) {
-			if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
-				return -ECHILD;
-			goto out_bad;
-		}
-		goto out_valid;
-	}
+	if (!inode)
+		return nfs_lookup_revalidate_negative(dir, dentry, flags);
 
 	if (is_bad_inode(inode)) {
-		if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
-			return -ECHILD;
 		dfprintk(LOOKUPCACHE, "%s: %pd2 has dud inode\n",
 				__func__, dentry);
 		goto out_bad;
 	}
 
 	if (NFS_PROTO(dir)->have_delegation(inode, FMODE_READ))
-		goto out_set_verifier;
+		return nfs_lookup_revalidate_delegated(dir, dentry, inode);
 
 	/* Force a full look up iff the parent directory has changed */
 	if (!nfs_is_exclusive_create(dir, flags) &&
 	    nfs_check_verifier(dir, dentry, flags & LOOKUP_RCU)) {
 		error = nfs_lookup_verify_inode(inode, flags);
 		if (error) {
-			if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
-				return -ECHILD;
 			if (error == -ESTALE)
-				goto out_zap_parent;
-			goto out_error;
+				nfs_zap_caches(dir);
+			goto out_bad;
 		}
 		nfs_advise_use_readdirplus(dir);
 		goto out_valid;
@@ -1133,81 +1205,39 @@ static int nfs_lookup_revalidate(struct
 	if (NFS_STALE(inode))
 		goto out_bad;
 
-	error = -ENOMEM;
-	fhandle = nfs_alloc_fhandle();
-	fattr = nfs_alloc_fattr();
-	if (fhandle == NULL || fattr == NULL)
-		goto out_error;
-
-	label = nfs4_label_alloc(NFS_SERVER(inode), GFP_NOWAIT);
-	if (IS_ERR(label))
-		goto out_error;
-
 	trace_nfs_lookup_revalidate_enter(dir, dentry, flags);
-	error = NFS_PROTO(dir)->lookup(dir, &dentry->d_name, fhandle, fattr, label);
+	error = nfs_lookup_revalidate_dentry(dir, dentry, inode);
 	trace_nfs_lookup_revalidate_exit(dir, dentry, flags, error);
-	if (error == -ESTALE || error == -ENOENT)
-		goto out_bad;
-	if (error)
-		goto out_error;
-	if (nfs_compare_fh(NFS_FH(inode), fhandle))
-		goto out_bad;
-	if ((error = nfs_refresh_inode(inode, fattr)) != 0)
-		goto out_bad;
-
-	nfs_setsecurity(inode, fattr, label);
-
-	nfs_free_fattr(fattr);
-	nfs_free_fhandle(fhandle);
-	nfs4_label_free(label);
+	return error;
+out_valid:
+	return nfs_lookup_revalidate_done(dir, dentry, inode, 1);
+out_bad:
+	if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
+		return -ECHILD;
+	return nfs_lookup_revalidate_done(dir, dentry, inode, 0);
+}
 
-	/* set a readdirplus hint that we had a cache miss */
-	nfs_force_use_readdirplus(dir);
+static int
+nfs_lookup_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	struct dentry *parent;
+	struct inode *dir;
+	int ret;
 
-out_set_verifier:
-	nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
- out_valid:
 	if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
+		parent = ACCESS_ONCE(dentry->d_parent);
+		dir = d_inode_rcu(parent);
+		if (!dir)
+			return -ECHILD;
+		ret = nfs_do_lookup_revalidate(dir, dentry, flags);
 		if (parent != ACCESS_ONCE(dentry->d_parent))
 			return -ECHILD;
-	} else
+	} else {
+		parent = dget_parent(dentry);
+		ret = nfs_do_lookup_revalidate(d_inode(parent), dentry, flags);
 		dput(parent);
-	dfprintk(LOOKUPCACHE, "NFS: %s(%pd2) is valid\n",
-			__func__, dentry);
-	return 1;
-out_zap_parent:
-	nfs_zap_caches(dir);
- out_bad:
-	WARN_ON(flags & LOOKUP_RCU);
-	nfs_free_fattr(fattr);
-	nfs_free_fhandle(fhandle);
-	nfs4_label_free(label);
-	nfs_mark_for_revalidate(dir);
-	if (inode && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
-		/* Purge readdir caches. */
-		nfs_zap_caches(inode);
-		/*
-		 * We can't d_drop the root of a disconnected tree:
-		 * its d_hash is on the s_anon list and d_drop() would hide
-		 * it from shrink_dcache_for_unmount(), leading to busy
-		 * inodes on unmount and further oopses.
-		 */
-		if (IS_ROOT(dentry))
-			goto out_valid;
 	}
-	dput(parent);
-	dfprintk(LOOKUPCACHE, "NFS: %s(%pd2) is invalid\n",
-			__func__, dentry);
-	return 0;
-out_error:
-	WARN_ON(flags & LOOKUP_RCU);
-	nfs_free_fattr(fattr);
-	nfs_free_fhandle(fhandle);
-	nfs4_label_free(label);
-	dput(parent);
-	dfprintk(LOOKUPCACHE, "NFS: %s(%pd2) lookup returned error %d\n",
-			__func__, dentry, error);
-	return error;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/25 NFSv4: Fix lookup revalidate of regular files

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>

commit c7944ebb9ce9461079659e9e6ec5baaf73724b3b upstream.

If we're revalidating an existing dentry in order to open a file, we need to ensure that we check the directory has not changed before we optimise away the lookup.

---
 fs/nfs/dir.c |   79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------
 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/dir.c +39 -40
@@ -1218,7 +1218,8 @@ out_bad:
 }
 
 static int
-nfs_lookup_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
+__nfs_lookup_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags,
+			int (*reval)(struct inode *, struct dentry *, unsigned int))
 {
 	struct dentry *parent;
 	struct inode *dir;
@@ -1229,17 +1230,22 @@ nfs_lookup_revalidate(struct dentry *den
 		dir = d_inode_rcu(parent);
 		if (!dir)
 			return -ECHILD;
-		ret = nfs_do_lookup_revalidate(dir, dentry, flags);
+		ret = reval(dir, dentry, flags);
 		if (parent != ACCESS_ONCE(dentry->d_parent))
 			return -ECHILD;
 	} else {
 		parent = dget_parent(dentry);
-		ret = nfs_do_lookup_revalidate(d_inode(parent), dentry, flags);
+		ret = reval(d_inode(parent), dentry, flags);
 		dput(parent);
 	}
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int nfs_lookup_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	return __nfs_lookup_revalidate(dentry, flags, nfs_do_lookup_revalidate);
+}
+
 /*
  * A weaker form of d_revalidate for revalidating just the d_inode(dentry)
  * when we don't really care about the dentry name. This is called when a
@@ -1590,62 +1596,55 @@ no_open:
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfs_atomic_open);
 
-static int nfs4_lookup_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
+static int
+nfs4_do_lookup_revalidate(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			  unsigned int flags)
 {
 	struct inode *inode;
-	int ret = 0;
 
 	if (!(flags & LOOKUP_OPEN) || (flags & LOOKUP_DIRECTORY))
-		goto no_open;
+		goto full_reval;
 	if (d_mountpoint(dentry))
-		goto no_open;
-	if (NFS_SB(dentry->d_sb)->caps & NFS_CAP_ATOMIC_OPEN_V1)
-		goto no_open;
+		goto full_reval;
 
 	inode = d_inode(dentry);
 
 	/* We can't create new files in nfs_open_revalidate(), so we
 	 * optimize away revalidation of negative dentries.
 	 */
-	if (inode == NULL) {
-		struct dentry *parent;
-		struct inode *dir;
-
-		if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
-			parent = ACCESS_ONCE(dentry->d_parent);
-			dir = d_inode_rcu(parent);
-			if (!dir)
-				return -ECHILD;
-		} else {
-			parent = dget_parent(dentry);
-			dir = d_inode(parent);
-		}
-		if (!nfs_neg_need_reval(dir, dentry, flags))
-			ret = 1;
-		else if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
-			ret = -ECHILD;
-		if (!(flags & LOOKUP_RCU))
-			dput(parent);
-		else if (parent != ACCESS_ONCE(dentry->d_parent))
-			return -ECHILD;
-		goto out;
-	}
+	if (inode == NULL)
+		goto full_reval;
+
+	if (NFS_PROTO(dir)->have_delegation(inode, FMODE_READ))
+		return nfs_lookup_revalidate_delegated(dir, dentry, inode);
 
 	/* NFS only supports OPEN on regular files */
 	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
-		goto no_open;
+		goto full_reval;
+
 	/* We cannot do exclusive creation on a positive dentry */
-	if (flags & LOOKUP_EXCL)
-		goto no_open;
+	if (flags & (LOOKUP_EXCL | LOOKUP_REVAL))
+		goto reval_dentry;
+
+	/* Check if the directory changed */
+	if (!nfs_check_verifier(dir, dentry, flags & LOOKUP_RCU))
+		goto reval_dentry;
 
 	/* Let f_op->open() actually open (and revalidate) the file */
-	ret = 1;
+	return 1;
+reval_dentry:
+	if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
+		return -ECHILD;
+	return nfs_lookup_revalidate_dentry(dir, dentry, inode);;
 
-out:
-	return ret;
+full_reval:
+	return nfs_do_lookup_revalidate(dir, dentry, flags);
+}
 
-no_open:
-	return nfs_lookup_revalidate(dentry, flags);
+static int nfs4_lookup_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	return __nfs_lookup_revalidate(dentry, flags,
+			nfs4_do_lookup_revalidate);
 }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_NFSV4 */
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/25 arm64: dts: marvell: Fix A37xx UART0 register size

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: allen yan <[email protected]>

commit c737abc193d16e62e23e2fb585b8b7398ab380d8 upstream.

Armada-37xx UART0 registers are 0x200 bytes wide. Right next to them are the UART1 registers that should not be declared in this node.

Update the example in DT bindings document accordingly.

---
 Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/mvebu-uart.txt |    2 +-
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-37xx.dtsi            |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/mvebu-uart.txt +1 -1
@@ -8,6 +8,6 @@ Required properties:
 Example:
 	serial@12000 {
 		compatible = "marvell,armada-3700-uart";
-		reg = <0x12000 0x400>;
+		reg = <0x12000 0x200>;
 		interrupts = <43>;
 	};
arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-37xx.dtsi +1 -1
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@
 
 			uart0: serial@12000 {
 				compatible = "marvell,armada-3700-uart";
-				reg = <0x12000 0x400>;
+				reg = <0x12000 0x200>;
 				interrupts = <GIC_SPI 11 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 				status = "disabled";
 			};
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/25 i2c: qup: fixed releasing dma without flush operation completion

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Abhishek Sahu <[email protected]>

commit 7239872fb3400b21a8f5547257f9f86455867bd6 upstream.

The QUP BSLP BAM generates the following error sometimes if the current I2C DMA transfer fails and the flush operation has been scheduled

“bam-dma-engine 7884000.dma: Cannot free busy channel”

If any I2C error comes during BAM DMA transfer, then the QUP I2C interrupt will be generated and the flush operation will be carried out to make I2C consume all scheduled DMA transfer. Currently, the same completion structure is being used for BAM transfer which has already completed without reinit. It will make flush operation wait_for_completion_timeout completed immediately and will proceed for freeing the DMA resources where the descriptors are still in process.

---
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-qup.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-qup.c +2 -0
@@ -844,6 +844,8 @@ static int qup_i2c_bam_do_xfer(struct qu
 	}
 
 	if (ret || qup->bus_err || qup->qup_err) {
+		reinit_completion(&qup->xfer);
+
 		if (qup_i2c_change_state(qup, QUP_RUN_STATE)) {
 			dev_err(qup->dev, "change to run state timed out");
 			goto desc_err;
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/25 arm64: compat: Provide definition for COMPAT_SIGMINSTKSZ

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>

commit 24951465cbd279f60b1fdc2421b3694405bcff42 upstream.

arch/arm/ defines a SIGMINSTKSZ of 2k, so we should use the same value for compat tasks.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/compat.h |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/compat.h +1 -0
@@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ static inline compat_uptr_t ptr_to_compa
 }
 
 #define compat_user_stack_pointer() (user_stack_pointer(task_pt_regs(current)))
+#define COMPAT_MINSIGSTKSZ	2048
 
 static inline void __user *arch_compat_alloc_user_space(long len)
 {
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/25 binder: fix possible UAF when freeing buffer

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Todd Kjos <[email protected]>

commit a370003cc301d4361bae20c9ef615f89bf8d1e8a upstream.

There is a race between the binder driver cleaning up a completed transaction via binder_free_transaction() and a user calling binder_ioctl(BC_FREE_BUFFER) to release a buffer. It doesn't matter which is first but they need to be protected against running concurrently which can result in a UAF.

---
 drivers/android/binder.c |   16 ++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +14 -2
@@ -1903,8 +1903,18 @@ static struct binder_thread *binder_get_
 
 static void binder_free_transaction(struct binder_transaction *t)
 {
-	if (t->buffer)
-		t->buffer->transaction = NULL;
+	struct binder_proc *target_proc = t->to_proc;
+
+	if (target_proc) {
+		binder_inner_proc_lock(target_proc);
+		if (t->buffer)
+			t->buffer->transaction = NULL;
+		binder_inner_proc_unlock(target_proc);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * If the transaction has no target_proc, then
+	 * t->buffer->transaction has already been cleared.
+	 */
 	kfree(t);
 	binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION);
 }
@@ -3426,10 +3436,12 @@ static int binder_thread_write(struct bi
 				     buffer->debug_id,
 				     buffer->transaction ? "active" : "finished");
 
+			binder_inner_proc_lock(proc);
 			if (buffer->transaction) {
 				buffer->transaction->buffer = NULL;
 				buffer->transaction = NULL;
 			}
+			binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
 			if (buffer->async_transaction && buffer->target_node) {
 				struct binder_node *buf_node;
 				struct binder_work *w;
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/25 ISDN: hfcsusb: checking idx of ep configuration

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Phong Tran <[email protected]>

commit f384e62a82ba5d85408405fdd6aeff89354deaa9 upstream.

The syzbot test with random endpoint address which made the idx is overflow in the table of endpoint configuations.

this adds the checking for fixing the error report from syzbot

KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds Read in hfcsusb_probe [1]

The patch tested by syzbot [2]

Reported-by [email protected]

[1]:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=30a04378dac680c5d521304a00a86156bb913522
[2]:
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/syzkaller-bugs/_6HBdge8F3E/OJn7wVNpBAAJ

---
 drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcsusb.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcsusb.c +3 -0
@@ -1963,6 +1963,9 @@ hfcsusb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf
 
 				/* get endpoint base */
 				idx = ((ep_addr & 0x7f) - 1) * 2;
+				if (idx > 15)
+					return -EIO;
+
 				if (ep_addr & 0x80)
 					idx++;
 				attr = ep->desc.bmAttributes;
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/25 media: au0828: fix null dereference in error path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sean Young <[email protected]>

commit 6d0d1ff9ff21fbb06b867c13a1d41ce8ddcd8230 upstream.

au0828_usb_disconnect() gets the au0828_dev struct via usb_get_intfdata, so it needs to set up for the error paths.

---
 drivers/media/usb/au0828/au0828-core.c |   12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/media/usb/au0828/au0828-core.c +6 -6
@@ -623,6 +623,12 @@ static int au0828_usb_probe(struct usb_i
 	/* Setup */
 	au0828_card_setup(dev);
 
+	/*
+	 * Store the pointer to the au0828_dev so it can be accessed in
+	 * au0828_usb_disconnect
+	 */
+	usb_set_intfdata(interface, dev);
+
 	/* Analog TV */
 	retval = au0828_analog_register(dev, interface);
 	if (retval) {
@@ -641,12 +647,6 @@ static int au0828_usb_probe(struct usb_i
 	/* Remote controller */
 	au0828_rc_register(dev);
 
-	/*
-	 * Store the pointer to the au0828_dev so it can be accessed in
-	 * au0828_usb_disconnect
-	 */
-	usb_set_intfdata(interface, dev);
-
 	pr_info("Registered device AU0828 [%s]\n",
 		dev->board.name == NULL ? "Unset" : dev->board.name);
 
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 12/25 ath10k: Change the warning message string

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Fabio Estevam <[email protected]>

commit 265df32eae5845212ad9f55f5ae6b6dcb68b187b upstream.

The "WARNING" string confuses syzbot, which thinks it found a crash [1].

Change the string to avoid such problem.

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/5/9/243

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/usb.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/usb.c +1 -1
@@ -1025,7 +1025,7 @@ static int ath10k_usb_probe(struct usb_i
 	}
 
 	/* TODO: remove this once USB support is fully implemented */
-	ath10k_warn(ar, "WARNING: ath10k USB support is incomplete, don't expect anything to work!\n");
+	ath10k_warn(ar, "Warning: ath10k USB support is incomplete, don't expect anything to work!\n");
 
 	return 0;
 
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 13/25 media: cpia2_usb: first wake up, then free in disconnect

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>

commit eff73de2b1600ad8230692f00bc0ab49b166512a upstream.

Kasan reported a use after free in cpia2_usb_disconnect() It first freed everything and then woke up those waiting. The reverse order is correct.

Fixes 6c493f8b28c67 ("[media] cpia2: major overhaul to get it in a working state again")
---
 drivers/media/usb/cpia2/cpia2_usb.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/usb/cpia2/cpia2_usb.c +2 -1
@@ -901,7 +901,6 @@ static void cpia2_usb_disconnect(struct
 	cpia2_unregister_camera(cam);
 	v4l2_device_disconnect(&cam->v4l2_dev);
 	mutex_unlock(&cam->v4l2_lock);
-	v4l2_device_put(&cam->v4l2_dev);
 
 	if(cam->buffers) {
 		DBG("Wakeup waiting processes\n");
@@ -913,6 +912,8 @@ static void cpia2_usb_disconnect(struct
 	DBG("Releasing interface\n");
 	usb_driver_release_interface(&cpia2_driver, intf);
 
+	v4l2_device_put(&cam->v4l2_dev);
+
 	LOG("CPiA2 camera disconnected.\n");
 }
 
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 14/25 media: pvrusb2: use a different format for warnings

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>

commit 1753c7c4367aa1201e1e5d0a601897ab33444af1 upstream.

When the pvrusb2 driver detects that there's something wrong with the device, it prints a warning message. Right now those message are printed in two different formats:

1. ***WARNING*** message here
2. WARNING: message here

There's an issue with the second format. Syzkaller recognizes it as a message produced by a WARN_ON(), which is used to indicate a bug in the kernel. However pvrusb2 prints those warnings to indicate an issue with the device, not the bug in the kernel.

This patch changes the pvrusb2 driver to consistently use the first warning message format. This will unblock syzkaller testing of this driver.

---
 drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-hdw.c      |    4 ++--
 drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-i2c-core.c |    6 +++---
 drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-std.c      |    2 +-
 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-hdw.c +2 -2
@@ -1680,7 +1680,7 @@ static int pvr2_decoder_enable(struct pv
 	}
 	if (!hdw->flag_decoder_missed) {
 		pvr2_trace(PVR2_TRACE_ERROR_LEGS,
-			   "WARNING: No decoder present");
+			   "***WARNING*** No decoder present");
 		hdw->flag_decoder_missed = !0;
 		trace_stbit("flag_decoder_missed",
 			    hdw->flag_decoder_missed);
@@ -2365,7 +2365,7 @@ struct pvr2_hdw *pvr2_hdw_create(struct
 	if (hdw_desc->flag_is_experimental) {
 		pvr2_trace(PVR2_TRACE_INFO, "**********");
 		pvr2_trace(PVR2_TRACE_INFO,
-			   "WARNING: Support for this device (%s) is experimental.",
+			   "***WARNING*** Support for this device (%s) is experimental.",
 							      hdw_desc->description);
 		pvr2_trace(PVR2_TRACE_INFO,
 			   "Important functionality might not be entirely working.");
drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-i2c-core.c +3 -3
@@ -343,11 +343,11 @@ static int i2c_hack_cx25840(struct pvr2_
 
 	if ((ret != 0) || (*rdata == 0x04) || (*rdata == 0x0a)) {
 		pvr2_trace(PVR2_TRACE_ERROR_LEGS,
-			   "WARNING: Detected a wedged cx25840 chip; the device will not work.");
+			   "***WARNING*** Detected a wedged cx25840 chip; the device will not work.");
 		pvr2_trace(PVR2_TRACE_ERROR_LEGS,
-			   "WARNING: Try power cycling the pvrusb2 device.");
+			   "***WARNING*** Try power cycling the pvrusb2 device.");
 		pvr2_trace(PVR2_TRACE_ERROR_LEGS,
-			   "WARNING: Disabling further access to the device to prevent other foul-ups.");
+			   "***WARNING*** Disabling further access to the device to prevent other foul-ups.");
 		// This blocks all further communication with the part.
 		hdw->i2c_func[0x44] = NULL;
 		pvr2_hdw_render_useless(hdw);
drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-std.c +1 -1
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ struct v4l2_standard *pvr2_std_create_en
 		bcnt = pvr2_std_id_to_str(buf,sizeof(buf),fmsk);
 		pvr2_trace(
 			PVR2_TRACE_ERROR_LEGS,
-			"WARNING: Failed to classify the following standard(s): %.*s",
+			"***WARNING*** Failed to classify the following standard(s): %.*s",
 			bcnt,buf);
 	}
 
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 15/25 NFS: Cleanup if nfs_match_client is interrupted

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Benjamin Coddington <[email protected]>

commit 9f7761cf0409465075dadb875d5d4b8ef2f890c8 upstream.

Don't bail out before cleaning up a new allocation if the wait for searching for a matching nfs client is interrupted. Memory leaks.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 950a578c6128 ("NFS: make nfs_match_client killable")
---
 fs/nfs/client.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/client.c +2 -2
@@ -416,10 +416,10 @@ struct nfs_client *nfs_get_client(const
 		clp = nfs_match_client(cl_init);
 		if (clp) {
 			spin_unlock(&nn->nfs_client_lock);
-			if (IS_ERR(clp))
-				return clp;
 			if (new)
 				new->rpc_ops->free_client(new);
+			if (IS_ERR(clp))
+				return clp;
 			return nfs_found_client(cl_init, clp);
 		}
 		if (new) {
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 16/25 media: radio-raremono: change devm_k*alloc to k*alloc

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Luke Nowakowski-Krijger <[email protected]>

commit c666355e60ddb4748ead3bdd983e3f7f2224aaf0 upstream.

Change devm_k*alloc to k*alloc to manually allocate memory

The manual allocation and freeing of memory is necessary because when the USB radio is disconnected, the memory associated with devm_k*alloc is freed. Meaning if we still have unresolved references to the radio device, then we get use-after-free errors.

This patch fixes this by manually allocating memory, and freeing it in the v4l2.release callback that gets called when the last radio device exits.

Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]
[[email protected]: cleaned up two small checkpatch.pl warnings]
[[email protected]: prefix subject with driver name]
---
 drivers/media/radio/radio-raremono.c |   30 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/media/radio/radio-raremono.c +23 -7
@@ -283,6 +283,14 @@ static int vidioc_g_frequency(struct fil
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void raremono_device_release(struct v4l2_device *v4l2_dev)
+{
+	struct raremono_device *radio = to_raremono_dev(v4l2_dev);
+
+	kfree(radio->buffer);
+	kfree(radio);
+}
+
 /* File system interface */
 static const struct v4l2_file_operations usb_raremono_fops = {
 	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
@@ -307,12 +315,14 @@ static int usb_raremono_probe(struct usb
 	struct raremono_device *radio;
 	int retval = 0;
 
-	radio = devm_kzalloc(&intf->dev, sizeof(struct raremono_device), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (radio)
-		radio->buffer = devm_kmalloc(&intf->dev, BUFFER_LENGTH, GFP_KERNEL);
-
-	if (!radio || !radio->buffer)
+	radio = kzalloc(sizeof(*radio), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!radio)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	radio->buffer = kmalloc(BUFFER_LENGTH, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!radio->buffer) {
+		kfree(radio);
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 
 	radio->usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
 	radio->intf = intf;
@@ -336,7 +346,8 @@ static int usb_raremono_probe(struct usb
 	if (retval != 3 ||
 	    (get_unaligned_be16(&radio->buffer[1]) & 0xfff) == 0x0242) {
 		dev_info(&intf->dev, "this is not Thanko's Raremono.\n");
-		return -ENODEV;
+		retval = -ENODEV;
+		goto free_mem;
 	}
 
 	dev_info(&intf->dev, "Thanko's Raremono connected: (%04X:%04X)\n",
@@ -345,7 +356,7 @@ static int usb_raremono_probe(struct usb
 	retval = v4l2_device_register(&intf->dev, &radio->v4l2_dev);
 	if (retval < 0) {
 		dev_err(&intf->dev, "couldn't register v4l2_device\n");
-		return retval;
+		goto free_mem;
 	}
 
 	mutex_init(&radio->lock);
@@ -357,6 +368,7 @@ static int usb_raremono_probe(struct usb
 	radio->vdev.ioctl_ops = &usb_raremono_ioctl_ops;
 	radio->vdev.lock = &radio->lock;
 	radio->vdev.release = video_device_release_empty;
+	radio->v4l2_dev.release = raremono_device_release;
 
 	usb_set_intfdata(intf, &radio->v4l2_dev);
 
@@ -372,6 +384,10 @@ static int usb_raremono_probe(struct usb
 	}
 	dev_err(&intf->dev, "could not register video device\n");
 	v4l2_device_unregister(&radio->v4l2_dev);
+
+free_mem:
+	kfree(radio->buffer);
+	kfree(radio);
 	return retval;
 }
 
author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH 17/25 iommu/vt-d: Dont queue_iova() if there is no flush queue

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]>

commit effa467870c7612012885df4e246bdb8ffd8e44c upstream.

Intel VT-d driver was reworked to use common deferred flushing implementation. Previously there was one global per-cpu flush queue, afterwards - one per domain.

Before deferring a flush, the queue should be allocated and initialized.

Currently only domains with IOMMU_DOMAIN_DMA type initialize their flush queue. It's probably worth to init it for static or unmanaged domains too, but it may be arguable - I'm leaving it to iommu folks.

Prevent queuing an iova flush if the domain doesn't have a queue. The defensive check seems to be worth to keep even if queue would be initialized for all kinds of domains. And is easy backportable.

On 4.19.43 stable kernel it has a user-visible effect: previously for devices in si domain there were crashes, on sata devices:

 BUG: spinlock bad magic on CPU#6, swapper/0/1
  lock: 0xffff88844f582008, .magic: 00000000, .owner: <none>/-1, .owner_cpu: 0
 CPU: 6 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.19.43 #1
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  dump_stack+0x61/0x7e
  spin_bug+0x9d/0xa3
  do_raw_spin_lock+0x22/0x8e
  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x32/0x3a
  queue_iova+0x45/0x115
  intel_unmap+0x107/0x113
  intel_unmap_sg+0x6b/0x76
  __ata_qc_complete+0x7f/0x103
  ata_qc_complete+0x9b/0x26a
  ata_qc_complete_multiple+0xd0/0xe3
  ahci_handle_port_interrupt+0x3ee/0x48a
  ahci_handle_port_intr+0x73/0xa9
  ahci_single_level_irq_intr+0x40/0x60
  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x7f/0x19a
  handle_irq_event_percpu+0x32/0x72
  handle_irq_event+0x38/0x56
  handle_edge_irq+0x102/0x121
  handle_irq+0x147/0x15c
  do_IRQ+0x66/0xf2
  common_interrupt+0xf/0xf
 RIP: 0010:__do_softirq+0x8c/0x2df

The same for usb devices that use ehci-pci:

 BUG: spinlock bad magic on CPU#0, swapper/0/1
  lock: 0xffff88844f402008, .magic: 00000000, .owner: <none>/-1, .owner_cpu: 0
 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.19.43 #4
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  dump_stack+0x61/0x7e
  spin_bug+0x9d/0xa3
  do_raw_spin_lock+0x22/0x8e
  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x32/0x3a
  queue_iova+0x77/0x145
  intel_unmap+0x107/0x113
  intel_unmap_page+0xe/0x10
  usb_hcd_unmap_urb_setup_for_dma+0x53/0x9d
  usb_hcd_unmap_urb_for_dma+0x17/0x100
  unmap_urb_for_dma+0x22/0x24
  __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x51/0xc3
  usb_giveback_urb_bh+0x97/0xde
  tasklet_action_common.isra.4+0x5f/0xa1
  tasklet_action+0x2d/0x30
  __do_softirq+0x138/0x2df
  irq_exit+0x7d/0x8b
  smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x10f/0x151
  apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20
  </IRQ>
 RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x17/0x39
Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Cc Lu Baolu <[email protected]>
Cc <[email protected]> # 4.14+
Fixes 13cf01744608 ("iommu/vt-d: Make use of iova deferred flushing")

[v4.14-port notes:
o minor conflict with untrusted IOMMU devices check under if-condition
o setup_timer() near one chunk is timer_setup() in v5.3]

---
 drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c |    2 +-
 drivers/iommu/iova.c        |   18 ++++++++++++++----
 include/linux/iova.h        |    6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c +1 -1
@@ -3702,7 +3702,7 @@ static void intel_unmap(struct device *d
 
 	freelist = domain_unmap(domain, start_pfn, last_pfn);
 
-	if (intel_iommu_strict) {
+	if (intel_iommu_strict || !has_iova_flush_queue(&domain->iovad)) {
 		iommu_flush_iotlb_psi(iommu, domain, start_pfn,
 				      nrpages, !freelist, 0);
 		/* free iova */
drivers/iommu/iova.c +14 -4
@@ -58,9 +58,14 @@ init_iova_domain(struct iova_domain *iov
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_iova_domain);
 
+bool has_iova_flush_queue(struct iova_domain *iovad)
+{
+	return !!iovad->fq;
+}
+
 static void free_iova_flush_queue(struct iova_domain *iovad)
 {
-	if (!iovad->fq)
+	if (!has_iova_flush_queue(iovad))
 		return;
 
 	if (timer_pending(&iovad->fq_timer))
@@ -78,13 +83,14 @@ static void free_iova_flush_queue(struct
 int init_iova_flush_queue(struct iova_domain *iovad,
 			  iova_flush_cb flush_cb, iova_entry_dtor entry_dtor)
 {
+	struct iova_fq __percpu *queue;
 	int cpu;
 
 	atomic64_set(&iovad->fq_flush_start_cnt,  0);
 	atomic64_set(&iovad->fq_flush_finish_cnt, 0);
 
-	iovad->fq = alloc_percpu(struct iova_fq);
-	if (!iovad->fq)
+	queue = alloc_percpu(struct iova_fq);
+	if (!queue)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	iovad->flush_cb   = flush_cb;
@@ -93,13 +99,17 @@ int init_iova_flush_queue(struct iova_do
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
 		struct iova_fq *fq;
 
-		fq = per_cpu_ptr(iovad->fq, cpu);
+		fq = per_cpu_ptr(queue, cpu);
 		fq->head = 0;
 		fq->tail = 0;
 
 		spin_lock_init(&fq->lock);
 	}
 
+	smp_wmb();
+
+	iovad->fq = queue;
+
 	setup_timer(&iovad->fq_timer, fq_flush_timeout, (unsigned long)iovad);
 	atomic_set(&iovad->fq_timer_on, 0);
 
include/linux/iova.h +6 -0
@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ struct iova *reserve_iova(struct iova_do
 void copy_reserved_iova(struct iova_domain *from, struct iova_domain *to);
 void init_iova_domain(struct iova_domain *iovad, unsigned long granule,
 	unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long pfn_32bit);
+bool has_iova_flush_queue(struct iova_domain *iovad);
 int init_iova_flush_queue(struct iova_domain *iovad,
 			  iova_flush_cb flush_cb, iova_entry_dtor entry_dtor);
 struct iova *find_iova(struct iova_domain *iovad, unsigned long pfn);
@@ -234,6 +235,11 @@ static inline void init_iova_domain(stru
 {
 }
 
+bool has_iova_flush_queue(struct iova_domain *iovad)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
 static inline int init_iova_flush_queue(struct iova_domain *iovad,
 					iova_flush_cb flush_cb,
 					iova_entry_dtor entry_dtor)

_______________________________________________
iommu mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu

author maintainer
#18 lore raw

PATCH 18/25 iommu/iova: Fix compilation error with !CONFIG_IOMMU_IOVA

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>

commit 201c1db90cd643282185a00770f12f95da330eca upstream.

The stub function for !CONFIG_IOMMU_IOVA needs to be 'static inline'.

Fixes effa467870c76 ('iommu/vt-d: Don't queue_iova() if there is no flush queue')
---
 include/linux/iova.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/iova.h +1 -1
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ static inline void init_iova_domain(stru
 {
 }
 
-bool has_iova_flush_queue(struct iova_domain *iovad)
+static inline bool has_iova_flush_queue(struct iova_domain *iovad)
 {
 	return false;
 }
author maintainer
#19 lore raw

PATCH 19/25 hv_sock: Add support for delayed close

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sunil Muthuswamy <[email protected]>

commit a9eeb998c28d5506616426bd3a216bd5735a18b8 upstream.

Currently, hvsock does not implement any delayed or background close logic. Whenever the hvsock socket is closed, a FIN is sent to the peer, and the last reference to the socket is dropped, which leads to a call to .destruct where the socket can hang indefinitely waiting for the peer to close it's side. The can cause the user application to hang in the close() call.

This change implements proper STREAM(TCP) closing handshake mechanism by sending the FIN to the peer and the waiting for the peer's FIN to arrive for a given timeout. On timeout, it will try to terminate the connection (i.e. a RST). This is in-line with other socket providers such as virtio.

This change does not address the hang in the vmbus_hvsock_device_unregister where it waits indefinitely for the host to rescind the channel. That should be taken up as a separate fix.

---
 net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c |  110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 78 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c +78 -32
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@
 /* The MTU is 16KB per the host side's design */
 #define HVS_MTU_SIZE		(1024 * 16)
 
+/* How long to wait for graceful shutdown of a connection */
+#define HVS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT (8 * HZ)
+
 struct vmpipe_proto_header {
 	u32 pkt_type;
 	u32 data_size;
@@ -290,19 +293,32 @@ static void hvs_channel_cb(void *ctx)
 		sk->sk_write_space(sk);
 }
 
-static void hvs_close_connection(struct vmbus_channel *chan)
+static void hvs_do_close_lock_held(struct vsock_sock *vsk,
+				   bool cancel_timeout)
 {
-	struct sock *sk = get_per_channel_state(chan);
-	struct vsock_sock *vsk = vsock_sk(sk);
-
-	lock_sock(sk);
+	struct sock *sk = sk_vsock(vsk);
 
-	sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
 	sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE);
-	vsk->peer_shutdown |= SEND_SHUTDOWN | RCV_SHUTDOWN;
-
+	vsk->peer_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
+	if (vsock_stream_has_data(vsk) <= 0)
+		sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSING;
 	sk->sk_state_change(sk);
+	if (vsk->close_work_scheduled &&
+	    (!cancel_timeout || cancel_delayed_work(&vsk->close_work))) {
+		vsk->close_work_scheduled = false;
+		vsock_remove_sock(vsk);
+
+		/* Release the reference taken while scheduling the timeout */
+		sock_put(sk);
+	}
+}
+
+static void hvs_close_connection(struct vmbus_channel *chan)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = get_per_channel_state(chan);
 
+	lock_sock(sk);
+	hvs_do_close_lock_held(vsock_sk(sk), true);
 	release_sock(sk);
 }
 
@@ -446,50 +462,80 @@ static int hvs_connect(struct vsock_sock
 	return vmbus_send_tl_connect_request(&h->vm_srv_id, &h->host_srv_id);
 }
 
+static void hvs_shutdown_lock_held(struct hvsock *hvs, int mode)
+{
+	struct vmpipe_proto_header hdr;
+
+	if (hvs->fin_sent || !hvs->chan)
+		return;
+
+	/* It can't fail: see hvs_channel_writable_bytes(). */
+	(void)hvs_send_data(hvs->chan, (struct hvs_send_buf *)&hdr, 0);
+	hvs->fin_sent = true;
+}
+
 static int hvs_shutdown(struct vsock_sock *vsk, int mode)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sk_vsock(vsk);
-	struct vmpipe_proto_header hdr;
-	struct hvs_send_buf *send_buf;
-	struct hvsock *hvs;
 
 	if (!(mode & SEND_SHUTDOWN))
 		return 0;
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
-
-	hvs = vsk->trans;
-	if (hvs->fin_sent)
-		goto out;
-
-	send_buf = (struct hvs_send_buf *)&hdr;
-
-	/* It can't fail: see hvs_channel_writable_bytes(). */
-	(void)hvs_send_data(hvs->chan, send_buf, 0);
-
-	hvs->fin_sent = true;
-out:
+	hvs_shutdown_lock_held(vsk->trans, mode);
 	release_sock(sk);
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void hvs_release(struct vsock_sock *vsk)
+static void hvs_close_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
 {
+	struct vsock_sock *vsk =
+		container_of(work, struct vsock_sock, close_work.work);
 	struct sock *sk = sk_vsock(vsk);
-	struct hvsock *hvs = vsk->trans;
-	struct vmbus_channel *chan;
 
+	sock_hold(sk);
 	lock_sock(sk);
+	if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
+		hvs_do_close_lock_held(vsk, false);
 
-	sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSING;
-	vsock_remove_sock(vsk);
-
+	vsk->close_work_scheduled = false;
 	release_sock(sk);
+	sock_put(sk);
+}
 
-	chan = hvs->chan;
-	if (chan)
-		hvs_shutdown(vsk, RCV_SHUTDOWN | SEND_SHUTDOWN);
+/* Returns true, if it is safe to remove socket; false otherwise */
+static bool hvs_close_lock_held(struct vsock_sock *vsk)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sk_vsock(vsk);
+
+	if (!(sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED ||
+	      sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSING))
+		return true;
+
+	if ((sk->sk_shutdown & SHUTDOWN_MASK) != SHUTDOWN_MASK)
+		hvs_shutdown_lock_held(vsk->trans, SHUTDOWN_MASK);
+
+	if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
+		return true;
+
+	/* This reference will be dropped by the delayed close routine */
+	sock_hold(sk);
+	INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&vsk->close_work, hvs_close_timeout);
+	vsk->close_work_scheduled = true;
+	schedule_delayed_work(&vsk->close_work, HVS_CLOSE_TIMEOUT);
+	return false;
+}
 
+static void hvs_release(struct vsock_sock *vsk)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sk_vsock(vsk);
+	bool remove_sock;
+
+	lock_sock(sk);
+	remove_sock = hvs_close_lock_held(vsk);
+	release_sock(sk);
+	if (remove_sock)
+		vsock_remove_sock(vsk);
 }
 
 static void hvs_destruct(struct vsock_sock *vsk)
author maintainer
#20 lore raw

PATCH 20/25 Bluetooth: hci_uart: check for missing tty operations

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>

commit b36a1552d7319bbfd5cf7f08726c23c5c66d4f73 upstream.

Certain ttys operations (pty_unix98_ops) lack tiocmget() and tiocmset() functions which are called by the certain HCI UART protocols (hci_ath, hci_bcm, hci_intel, hci_mrvl, hci_qca) via hci_uart_set_flow_control() or directly. This leads to an execution at NULL and can be triggered by an unprivileged user. Fix this by adding a helper function and a check for the missing tty operations in the protocols code.

This fixes CVE-2019-10207. The Fixes: lines list commits where calls to tiocm[gs]et() or hci_uart_set_flow_control() were added to the HCI UART protocols.

Reported-by [email protected]
Cc [email protected] # v2.6.36+
Fixes b3190df62861 ("Bluetooth: Support for Atheros AR300x serial chip")
Fixes 118612fb9165 ("Bluetooth: hci_bcm: Add suspend/resume PM functions")
Fixes ff2895592f0f ("Bluetooth: hci_intel: Add Intel baudrate configuration support")
Fixes 162f812f23ba ("Bluetooth: hci_uart: Add Marvell support")
Fixes fa9ad876b8e0 ("Bluetooth: hci_qca: Add support for Qualcomm Bluetooth chip wcn3990")
---
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_ath.c   |    3 +++
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c   |    3 +++
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_intel.c |    3 +++
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c |   13 +++++++++++++
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_mrvl.c  |    3 +++
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_uart.h  |    1 +
 6 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
drivers/bluetooth/hci_ath.c +3 -0
@@ -101,6 +101,9 @@ static int ath_open(struct hci_uart *hu)
 
 	BT_DBG("hu %p", hu);
 
+	if (!hci_uart_has_flow_control(hu))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	ath = kzalloc(sizeof(*ath), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ath)
 		return -ENOMEM;
drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c +3 -0
@@ -305,6 +305,9 @@ static int bcm_open(struct hci_uart *hu)
 
 	bt_dev_dbg(hu->hdev, "hu %p", hu);
 
+	if (!hci_uart_has_flow_control(hu))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	bcm = kzalloc(sizeof(*bcm), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!bcm)
 		return -ENOMEM;
drivers/bluetooth/hci_intel.c +3 -0
@@ -406,6 +406,9 @@ static int intel_open(struct hci_uart *h
 
 	BT_DBG("hu %p", hu);
 
+	if (!hci_uart_has_flow_control(hu))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	intel = kzalloc(sizeof(*intel), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!intel)
 		return -ENOMEM;
drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c +13 -0
@@ -297,6 +297,19 @@ static int hci_uart_send_frame(struct hc
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/* Check the underlying device or tty has flow control support */
+bool hci_uart_has_flow_control(struct hci_uart *hu)
+{
+	/* serdev nodes check if the needed operations are present */
+	if (hu->serdev)
+		return true;
+
+	if (hu->tty->driver->ops->tiocmget && hu->tty->driver->ops->tiocmset)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 /* Flow control or un-flow control the device */
 void hci_uart_set_flow_control(struct hci_uart *hu, bool enable)
 {
drivers/bluetooth/hci_mrvl.c +3 -0
@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ static int mrvl_open(struct hci_uart *hu
 
 	BT_DBG("hu %p", hu);
 
+	if (!hci_uart_has_flow_control(hu))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	mrvl = kzalloc(sizeof(*mrvl), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!mrvl)
 		return -ENOMEM;
drivers/bluetooth/hci_uart.h +1 -0
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ void hci_uart_unregister_device(struct h
 int hci_uart_tx_wakeup(struct hci_uart *hu);
 int hci_uart_init_ready(struct hci_uart *hu);
 void hci_uart_set_baudrate(struct hci_uart *hu, unsigned int speed);
+bool hci_uart_has_flow_control(struct hci_uart *hu);
 void hci_uart_set_flow_control(struct hci_uart *hu, bool enable);
 void hci_uart_set_speeds(struct hci_uart *hu, unsigned int init_speed,
 			 unsigned int oper_speed);
author maintainer
#21 lore raw

PATCH 21/25 sched/fair: Dont free p->numa_faults with concurrent readers

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>

commit 16d51a590a8ce3befb1308e0e7ab77f3b661af33 upstream.

When going through execve(), zero out the NUMA fault statistics instead of freeing them.

During execve, the task is reachable through procfs and the scheduler. A concurrent /proc/*/sched reader can read data from a freed ->numa_faults allocation (confirmed by KASAN) and write it back to userspace. I believe that it would also be possible for a use-after-free read to occur through a race between a NUMA fault and execve(): task_numa_fault() can lead to task_numa_compare(), which invokes task_weight() on the currently running task of a different CPU.

Another way to fix this would be to make ->numa_faults RCU-managed or add extra locking, but it seems easier to wipe the NUMA fault statistics on execve.

Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Fixes 82727018b0d3 ("sched/numa: Call task_numa_free() from do_execve()")
---
 fs/exec.c                            |    2 +-
 include/linux/sched/numa_balancing.h |    4 ++--
 kernel/fork.c                        |    2 +-
 kernel/sched/fair.c                  |   24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c +1 -1
@@ -1808,7 +1808,7 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, st
 	current->in_execve = 0;
 	membarrier_execve(current);
 	acct_update_integrals(current);
-	task_numa_free(current);
+	task_numa_free(current, false);
 	free_bprm(bprm);
 	kfree(pathbuf);
 	putname(filename);
include/linux/sched/numa_balancing.h +2 -2
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 extern void task_numa_fault(int last_node, int node, int pages, int flags);
 extern pid_t task_numa_group_id(struct task_struct *p);
 extern void set_numabalancing_state(bool enabled);
-extern void task_numa_free(struct task_struct *p);
+extern void task_numa_free(struct task_struct *p, bool final);
 extern bool should_numa_migrate_memory(struct task_struct *p, struct page *page,
 					int src_nid, int dst_cpu);
 #else
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static inline pid_t task_numa_group_id(s
 static inline void set_numabalancing_state(bool enabled)
 {
 }
-static inline void task_numa_free(struct task_struct *p)
+static inline void task_numa_free(struct task_struct *p, bool final)
 {
 }
 static inline bool should_numa_migrate_memory(struct task_struct *p,
kernel/fork.c +1 -1
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ void __put_task_struct(struct task_struc
 	WARN_ON(tsk == current);
 
 	cgroup_free(tsk);
-	task_numa_free(tsk);
+	task_numa_free(tsk, true);
 	security_task_free(tsk);
 	exit_creds(tsk);
 	delayacct_tsk_free(tsk);
kernel/sched/fair.c +20 -4
@@ -2358,13 +2358,23 @@ no_join:
 	return;
 }
 
-void task_numa_free(struct task_struct *p)
+/*
+ * Get rid of NUMA staticstics associated with a task (either current or dead).
+ * If @final is set, the task is dead and has reached refcount zero, so we can
+ * safely free all relevant data structures. Otherwise, there might be
+ * concurrent reads from places like load balancing and procfs, and we should
+ * reset the data back to default state without freeing ->numa_faults.
+ */
+void task_numa_free(struct task_struct *p, bool final)
 {
 	struct numa_group *grp = p->numa_group;
-	void *numa_faults = p->numa_faults;
+	unsigned long *numa_faults = p->numa_faults;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int i;
 
+	if (!numa_faults)
+		return;
+
 	if (grp) {
 		spin_lock_irqsave(&grp->lock, flags);
 		for (i = 0; i < NR_NUMA_HINT_FAULT_STATS * nr_node_ids; i++)
@@ -2377,8 +2387,14 @@ void task_numa_free(struct task_struct *
 		put_numa_group(grp);
 	}
 
-	p->numa_faults = NULL;
-	kfree(numa_faults);
+	if (final) {
+		p->numa_faults = NULL;
+		kfree(numa_faults);
+	} else {
+		p->total_numa_faults = 0;
+		for (i = 0; i < NR_NUMA_HINT_FAULT_STATS * nr_node_ids; i++)
+			numa_faults[i] = 0;
+	}
 }
 
 /*
author maintainer
#22 lore raw

PATCH 22/25 drivers/pps/pps.c: clear offset flags in PPS_SETPARAMS ioctl

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Miroslav Lichvar <[email protected]>

commit 5515e9a6273b8c02034466bcbd717ac9f53dab99 upstream.

The PPS assert/clear offset corrections are set by the PPS_SETPARAMS ioctl in the pps_ktime structs, which also contain flags. The flags are not initialized by applications (using the timepps.h header) and they are not used by the kernel for anything except returning them back in the PPS_GETPARAMS ioctl.

Set the flags to zero to make it clear they are unused and avoid leaking uninitialized data of the PPS_SETPARAMS caller to other applications that have a read access to the PPS device.

---
 drivers/pps/pps.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/pps/pps.c +8 -0
@@ -166,6 +166,14 @@ static long pps_cdev_ioctl(struct file *
 			pps->params.mode |= PPS_CANWAIT;
 		pps->params.api_version = PPS_API_VERS;
 
+		/*
+		 * Clear unused fields of pps_kparams to avoid leaking
+		 * uninitialized data of the PPS_SETPARAMS caller via
+		 * PPS_GETPARAMS
+		 */
+		pps->params.assert_off_tu.flags = 0;
+		pps->params.clear_off_tu.flags = 0;
+
 		spin_unlock_irq(&pps->lock);
 
 		break;
author maintainer
#23 lore raw

PATCH 23/25 Fix allyesconfig output.

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yoshinori Sato <[email protected]>

commit 1b496469d0c020e09124e03e66a81421c21272a7 upstream.

Conflict JCore-SoC and SolutionEngine 7619.

---
 arch/sh/boards/Kconfig |   14 +++-----------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/sh/boards/Kconfig +3 -11
@@ -8,27 +8,19 @@ config SH_ALPHA_BOARD
 	bool
 
 config SH_DEVICE_TREE
-	bool "Board Described by Device Tree"
+	bool
 	select OF
 	select OF_EARLY_FLATTREE
 	select TIMER_OF
 	select COMMON_CLK
 	select GENERIC_CALIBRATE_DELAY
-	help
-	  Select Board Described by Device Tree to build a kernel that
-	  does not hard-code any board-specific knowledge but instead uses
-	  a device tree blob provided by the boot-loader. You must enable
-	  drivers for any hardware you want to use separately. At this
-	  time, only boards based on the open-hardware J-Core processors
-	  have sufficient driver coverage to use this option; do not
-	  select it if you are using original SuperH hardware.
 
 config SH_JCORE_SOC
 	bool "J-Core SoC"
-	depends on SH_DEVICE_TREE && (CPU_SH2 || CPU_J2)
+	select SH_DEVICE_TREE
 	select CLKSRC_JCORE_PIT
 	select JCORE_AIC
-	default y if CPU_J2
+	depends on CPU_J2
 	help
 	  Select this option to include drivers core components of the
 	  J-Core SoC, including interrupt controllers and timers.
author maintainer
#24 lore raw

PATCH 24/25 ceph: hold i_ceph_lock when removing caps for freeing inode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yan, Zheng <[email protected]>

commit d6e47819721ae2d9d090058ad5570a66f3c42e39 upstream.

ceph_d_revalidate(, LOOKUP_RCU) may call __ceph_caps_issued_mask() on a freeing inode.

---
 fs/ceph/caps.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/caps.c +5 -2
@@ -1119,20 +1119,23 @@ static int send_cap_msg(struct cap_msg_a
 }
 
 /*
- * Queue cap releases when an inode is dropped from our cache.  Since
- * inode is about to be destroyed, there is no need for i_ceph_lock.
+ * Queue cap releases when an inode is dropped from our cache.
  */
 void ceph_queue_caps_release(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode);
 	struct rb_node *p;
 
+	/* lock i_ceph_lock, because ceph_d_revalidate(..., LOOKUP_RCU)
+	 * may call __ceph_caps_issued_mask() on a freeing inode. */
+	spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
 	p = rb_first(&ci->i_caps);
 	while (p) {
 		struct ceph_cap *cap = rb_entry(p, struct ceph_cap, ci_node);
 		p = rb_next(p);
 		__ceph_remove_cap(cap, true);
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
 }
 
 /*
author maintainer
#25 lore raw

PATCH 25/25 sched/fair: Use RCU accessors consistently for ->numa_group

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>

commit cb361d8cdef69990f6b4504dc1fd9a594d983c97 upstream.

The old code used RCU annotations and accessors inconsistently for ->numa_group, which can lead to use-after-frees and NULL dereferences.

Let all accesses to ->numa_group use proper RCU helpers to prevent such issues.

Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Fixes 8c8a743c5087 ("sched/numa: Use {cpu, pid} to create task groups for shared faults")
include/linux/sched.h +9 -1
index 8dc1811487f5..9f51932bd543 100644
@@ -1092,7 +1092,15 @@ struct task_struct {
 	u64				last_sum_exec_runtime;
 	struct callback_head		numa_work;
 
-	struct numa_group		*numa_group;
+	/*
+	 * This pointer is only modified for current in syscall and
+	 * pagefault context (and for tasks being destroyed), so it can be read
+	 * from any of the following contexts:
+	 *  - RCU read-side critical section
+	 *  - current->numa_group from everywhere
+	 *  - task's runqueue locked, task not running
+	 */
+	struct numa_group __rcu		*numa_group;
 
 	/*
 	 * numa_faults is an array split into four regions:
kernel/sched/fair.c +81 -39

308 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#26 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.14 25/25] sched/fair: Use RCU accessors consistently for ->numa_group

Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>

commit cb361d8cdef69990f6b4504dc1fd9a594d983c97 upstream.

The old code used RCU annotations and accessors inconsistently for ->numa_group, which can lead to use-after-frees and NULL dereferences.

Let all accesses to ->numa_group use proper RCU helpers to prevent such issues.

Quoted 12 lines
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Fixes 8c8a743c5087 ("sched/numa: Use {cpu, pid} to create task groups for shared faults")

Oops, nope, this didn't apply, sorry about that, it needs to be properly backported to 4.14.y and older before it can go here.

thanks,

greg k-h

#27 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.136 release. There are 25 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun 04 Aug 2019 09:19:34 AM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.136-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

All tests passing for Tegra...

Test results for stable-v4.14:

    8 builds:   8 pass, 0 fail
    16 boots:   16 pass, 0 fail
    24 tests:   24 pass, 0 fail
Linux version:  4.14.136-rc1-g0931704b8bef
Boards tested:  tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,
                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Thierry

author maintainer
#28 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 5 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.136 release. There are 25 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Quoted 8 lines

Responses should be made by Sun 04 Aug 2019 09:19:34 AM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.136-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

-rc2 is out to match up with the failure of one patch to apply, and the ip tunnel patch added.

https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.136-rc2.gz

thanks,

greg k-h

#29 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.136 release. There are 25 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun 04 Aug 2019 09:19:34 AM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

      https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.136-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

-rc2 is out to match up with the failure of one patch to apply, and the ip tunnel patch added.

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.14.136-rc2
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.14.y
git commit: 8c06cc9d417294ee552cee5025f8dad9a982a026
git describe: v4.14.134-319-g8c06cc9d4172
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.14-oe/build/v4.14.134-319-g8c06cc9d4172

No regressions (compared to build v4.14.134)

No fixes (compared to build v4.14.134)

Ran 23868 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64

Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* perf
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* v4l2-compliance
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* network-basic-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* kvm-unit-tests
* ssuite
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none

Signature · 2 lines
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
#30 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.136 release. There are 25 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun 04 Aug 2019 09:19:34 AM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 9 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.136-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

#31 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.136 release. There are 25 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun 04 Aug 2019 09:19:34 AM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build results:

	total: 172 pass: 172 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 346 pass: 346 fail: 0

Guenter