s390/qeth: streamline SNMP cmd code
[ Kees, could we make copy_from_user() just fail if size is more than
INT_MAX? ]
Hello Julian Wiedmann,
The patch d4c08afafa04: "s390/qeth: streamline SNMP cmd code" from Jun 27, 2019, leads to the following static checker warning:
drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c:4381 qeth_snmp_command() error: check that 'req_len' is capped
drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c
4355 static int qeth_snmp_command(struct qeth_card *card, char __user *udata) 4356 {
4357 struct qeth_snmp_ureq __user *ureq;
4358 struct qeth_cmd_buffer *iob;
4359 unsigned int req_len;
4360 struct qeth_arp_query_info qinfo = {0, };
4361 int rc = 0; 4362
4363 QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 3, "snmpcmd");
4364
4365 if (IS_VM_NIC(card))
4366 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
4367
4368 if ((!qeth_adp_supported(card, IPA_SETADP_SET_SNMP_CONTROL)) &&
4369 IS_LAYER3(card))
4370 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
4371
4372 ureq = (struct qeth_snmp_ureq __user *) udata;
4373 if (get_user(qinfo.udata_len, &ureq->hdr.data_len) ||
4374 get_user(req_len, &ureq->hdr.req_len))
4375 return -EFAULT;
4376
4377 iob = qeth_get_adapter_cmd(card, IPA_SETADP_SET_SNMP_CONTROL, req_len);
The problem is that qeth_get_adapter_cmd() doesn't guard against integer overflows if reg_len is >= UINT_MAX - offsetof(struct qeth_ipacmd_setadpparms, data)).
4378 if (!iob)
4379 return -ENOMEM;
4380
4381 if (copy_from_user(&__ipa_cmd(iob)->data.setadapterparms.data.snmp,
4382 &ureq->cmd, req_len)) {So then this copy_from_user() could overflow. The original code had a similar problem but it only affect 32 bit systems. I'm not sure what is a good upper bound for req_len.
4383 qeth_put_cmd(iob); 4384 return -EFAULT; 4385 } 4386 4387 qinfo.udata = kzalloc(qinfo.udata_len, GFP_KERNEL);
regards,
dan carpenter
Quoted 5 lines · Dan Carpenter
[ Kees, could we make
copy_from_user()just fail if size is more than
INT_MAX? ]Hello Julian Wiedmann,
Heya Dan - thanks! Agreed, that looks wrong. I'll put together a fix...
Quoted 54 lines
The patch
d4c08afafa04: "s390/qeth: streamline SNMP cmd code" from Jun 27, 2019, leads to the following static checker warning:drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c:4381 qeth_snmp_command() error: check that 'req_len' is capped
drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c
4355 static intqeth_snmp_command(struct qeth_card *card, char __user *udata)4356 {4357 struct qeth_snmp_ureq __user *ureq; 4358 struct qeth_cmd_buffer *iob; 4359 unsigned int req_len; 4360 struct qeth_arp_query_info qinfo = {0, }; 4361 int rc = 0;4362
4363QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 3, "snmpcmd");
4364
4365 if (IS_VM_NIC(card))
4366 return-EOPNOTSUPP;
4367
4368 if ((!qeth_adp_supported(card,IPA_SETADP_SET_SNMP_CONTROL)) &&
4369IS_LAYER3(card))
4370 return-EOPNOTSUPP;
4371
4372 ureq = (structqeth_snmp_ureq__user*) udata;
4373 if (get_user(qinfo.udata_len, &ureq->hdr.data_len)||
4374get_user(req_len, &ureq->hdr.req_len))
4375 return-EFAULT;
4376
4377 iob =qeth_get_adapter_cmd(card, IPA_SETADP_SET_SNMP_CONTROL, req_len);The problem is that
qeth_get_adapter_cmd()doesn't guard against integer overflows ifreg_lenis >=UINT_MAX-offsetof(struct qeth_ipacmd_setadpparms, data)).4378 if (!iob) 4379 return -ENOMEM; 4380 4381 if (copy_from_user(&__ipa_cmd(iob)->data.setadapterparms.data.snmp, 4382 &ureq->cmd, req_len)) {So then this
copy_from_user()could overflow. The original code had a similar problem but it only affect 32 bit systems. I'm not sure what is a good upper bound forreq_len.4383 qeth_put_cmd(iob); 4384 return -EFAULT; 4385 } 4386 4387 qinfo.udata = kzalloc(qinfo.udata_len, GFP_KERNEL);regards,
dan carpenter
Quoted 2 lines · Dan Carpenter
[ Kees, could we make
copy_from_user()just fail if size is more than
INT_MAX? ]
We already have similar limits in the VFS and other helpers. We might as well do it in copy_*_user() too. Let me put together a patch...
-Kees
Quoted 56 lines
Hello Julian Wiedmann,
The patch
d4c08afafa04: "s390/qeth: streamline SNMP cmd code" from Jun 27, 2019, leads to the following static checker warning:drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c:4381 qeth_snmp_command() error: check that 'req_len' is capped
drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c
4355 static intqeth_snmp_command(struct qeth_card *card, char __user *udata)4356 {4357 struct qeth_snmp_ureq __user *ureq; 4358 struct qeth_cmd_buffer *iob; 4359 unsigned int req_len; 4360 struct qeth_arp_query_info qinfo = {0, }; 4361 int rc = 0;4362
4363QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 3, "snmpcmd");
4364
4365 if (IS_VM_NIC(card))
4366 return-EOPNOTSUPP;
4367
4368 if ((!qeth_adp_supported(card,IPA_SETADP_SET_SNMP_CONTROL)) &&
4369IS_LAYER3(card))
4370 return-EOPNOTSUPP;
4371
4372 ureq = (structqeth_snmp_ureq__user*) udata;
4373 if (get_user(qinfo.udata_len, &ureq->hdr.data_len)||
4374get_user(req_len, &ureq->hdr.req_len))
4375 return-EFAULT;
4376
4377 iob =qeth_get_adapter_cmd(card, IPA_SETADP_SET_SNMP_CONTROL, req_len);The problem is that
qeth_get_adapter_cmd()doesn't guard against integer overflows ifreg_lenis >=UINT_MAX-offsetof(struct qeth_ipacmd_setadpparms, data)).4378 if (!iob) 4379 return -ENOMEM; 4380 4381 if (copy_from_user(&__ipa_cmd(iob)->data.setadapterparms.data.snmp, 4382 &ureq->cmd, req_len)) {So then this
copy_from_user()could overflow. The original code had a similar problem but it only affect 32 bit systems. I'm not sure what is a good upper bound forreq_len.4383 qeth_put_cmd(iob); 4384 return -EFAULT; 4385 } 4386 4387 qinfo.udata = kzalloc(qinfo.udata_len, GFP_KERNEL);regards,
dan carpenter
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook