LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
Subsystems (30)
Casey Schaufler
maintainerv8 cover LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
This patchset provides the changes required for the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v8: Incorporate feedback from v7
- Minor clean-up in display value management
- refactor "compound" context creation to use a common append_ctx() function.
v7: Incorporate feedback from v6
- Make setting the display a privileged operation. The availability of compound contexts reduces the need for setting the display.
v6: Incorporate feedback from v5
- Add subj_<lsm>= and obj_<lsm>= fields to audit records
- Add /proc/.../attr/context to get the full context in lsmname\0value\0... format as suggested by Simon McVittie
- Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for getsockopt() to get the full context in the same format, also suggested by Simon McVittie.
- Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm_display_default to provide the display default value.
v5: Incorporate feedback from v4
- Initialize the lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx()
- Clear the lsmcontext in all security_release_secctx() cases
- Don't use the "display" on strictly internal context interfaces.
- The SELinux binder hooks check for cases where the context "display" isn't compatible with SELinux.
v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
- Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
- Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the slot value.
- Validate slot values used in security.c
- Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
- fix display value check in dentry_init_security
- Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting the audit log
v3: Incorporate feedback from v2
- Make lsmblob parameter and variable names more meaningful, changing "le" and "l" to "blob".
- Improve consistency of constant naming.
- Do more sanity checking during LSM initialization.
- Be a bit clearer about what is temporary scaffolding.
- Rather than clutter security_getpeersec_dgram with otherwise unnecessary checks remove the apparmor stub, which does nothing useful.
Patches 0001-0003 complete the process of moving management of security blobs that might be shared from the individual modules to the infrastructure.
Patches 0004-0014 replace system use of a "secid" with a structure "lsmblob" containing information from the security modules to be held and reused later. At this point lsmblob contains an array of u32 secids, one "slot" for each of the security modules compiled into the kernel that used secids. A "slot" is allocated when a security module requests one.
The infrastructure is changed to use the slot number to pass the correct secid to or from the security module hooks.
It is important that the lsmblob be a fixed size entity that does not have to be allocated. Several of the places where it is used would have performance and/or locking issues with dynamic allocation.
Patch 0015 provides a mechanism for a process to identify which security module's hooks should be used when displaying or converting a security context string. A new interface /proc/.../attr/display contains the name of the security module to show. Reading from this file will present the name of the module, while writing to it will set the value. Only names of active security modules are accepted. Internally, the name is translated to the appropriate "slot" number for the module which is then stored in the task security blob. Setting the display requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN.
Patch 0016 Starts the process of changing how a security context is represented. Since it is possible for a security context to have been generated by more than one security module it is now necessary to note which module created a security context so that the correct "release" hook can be called. There are several places where the module that created a security context cannot be inferred.
This is achieved by introducing a "lsmcontext" structure which contains the context string, its length and the "slot" number of the security module that created it. The security_release_secctx() interface is changed, replacing the (string,len) pointer pair with a lsmcontext pointer.
Patches 0017-0019 convert the security interfaces from (string,len) pointer pairs to a lsmcontext pointer. The slot number identifying the creating module is added by the infrastructure. Where the security context is stored for extended periods the data type is changed.
The Netlabel code is converted to save lsmblob structures instead of secids in Patches 0020-21.
Patch 0022 adds checks to the SELinux binder hooks which verify that if either "display" used is SELinux both are.
Patches 0023-24 add addition data to the audit records to identify the LSM specific data for all active modules.
Patches 0025-0027 add new interfaces for getting the compound security contexts.
Finally, with all interference on the AppArmor hooks removed, Patch 0028 removes the exclusive bit from AppArmor. An unnecessary stub hook was also removed.
The Ubuntu project is using an earlier version of this patchset in their distribution to enable stacking for containers.
Performance measurements to date have the change within the "noise". The sockperf and dbench results are on the order of 0.2% to 0.8% difference, with better performance being as common as worse. The benchmarks were run with AppArmor and Smack on Ubuntu.
https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.2-v8-apparmor
--- arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + drivers/android/binder.c | 24 +- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 5 +- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 35 +- fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 22 +- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 20 +- fs/proc/base.c | 2 + include/linux/audit.h | 1 + include/linux/cred.h | 3 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 39 +- include/linux/security.h | 184 ++++++++-- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +- include/net/scm.h | 15 +- include/uapi/asm-generic/socket.h | 1 + kernel/audit.c | 70 +++- kernel/audit.h | 9 +- kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 1 + kernel/auditfilter.c | 10 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 129 ++++--- kernel/cred.c | 12 +- net/core/sock.c | 7 +- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 6 +- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 20 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 11 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 26 +- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 13 +- net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 5 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 98 ++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 + net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 + security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 85 ++--- security/commoncap.c | 7 +- security/inode.c | 22 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 10 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 36 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +- security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 1 + security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +- security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +- security/security.c | 632 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 213 +++++------ security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 18 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 + security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 7 +- security/smack/smack.h | 19 + security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 185 +++++----- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 +- security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 +- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 +- 65 files changed, 1503 insertions(+), 686 deletions(-)
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 1/28 LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/security.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++---- security/selinux/hooks.c | 58 ++++++++++++------------------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 6 ++++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +- security/smack/smack.h | 6 ++++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 35 +++++-------------- 7 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +1 -0
@@ -2047,6 +2047,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {int lbs_cred;int lbs_file;int lbs_inode; +int lbs_superblock;int lbs_ipc;int lbs_msg_msg;int lbs_task;
security/security.c +39 -7
75 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/hooks.c +22 -36
188 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/include/objsec.h +6 -0
@@ -188,4 +188,10 @@ static inline struct ipc_security_struct *selinux_ipc( return ipc->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc; } +static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock ( +const struct super_block *superblock) +{ +return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; +} +#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
security/selinux/ss/services.c +2 -1
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@#include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include "flask.h"
@@ -2751,7 +2752,7 @@ int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)struct sidtab *sidtab;int rc =0 ;struct ocontext *c; -struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; +struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =selinux_superblock (sb);const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;read_lock (&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
security/smack/smack.h +6 -0
@@ -375,6 +375,12 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc; } +static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock ( +const struct super_block *superblock) +{ +return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; +} +/* * Is the directory transmuting? */
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +9 -26
@@ -540,12 +540,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)*/ static int smack_sb_alloc_security (struct super_block *sb) { -struct superblock_smack *sbsp; - - sbsp =kzalloc (sizeof (struct superblock_smack ),GFP_KERNEL ); - -if (sbsp ==NULL ) -return -ENOMEM ; +struct superblock_smack *sbsp =smack_superblock (sb); sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor; sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
@@ -554,22 +549,10 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)/* * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc. */ - sb->s_security = sbsp;return 0 ; } -/** -* smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob -* @sb: the superblock getting the blob -* -*/ -static void smack_sb_free_security (struct super_block *sb) -{ -kfree (sb->s_security); - sb->s_security =NULL ; -} -struct smack_mnt_opts {const char *fsdefault, *fsfloor, *fshat, *fsroot, *fstransmute; };
@@ -781,7 +764,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, {struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;struct inode *inode =d_backing_inode (root); -struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security; +struct superblock_smack *sp =smack_superblock (sb);struct inode_smack *isp;struct smack_known *skp;struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
@@ -880,7 +863,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,*/ static int smack_sb_statfs (struct dentry *dentry) { -struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security; +struct superblock_smack *sbp =smack_superblock (dentry->d_sb);int rc;struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -917,7 +900,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)if (isp->smk_task ==NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)return 0 ; - sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security; + sbsp =smack_superblock (inode->i_sb);if ((sbsp->smk_flags &SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED ) && isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)return 0 ;
@@ -1168,7 +1151,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,*/ static int smack_inode_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask) { -struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security; +struct superblock_smack *sbsp =smack_superblock (inode->i_sb);struct smk_audit_info ad;int no_block = mask &MAY_NOT_BLOCK ;int rc;
@@ -1410,7 +1393,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)*/ if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACK ) ==0 ) {struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb; -struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security; +struct superblock_smack *sbsp =smack_superblock (sbp); isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC ) ==0 )
@@ -1680,7 +1663,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file, isp =smack_inode (file_inode (file));if (isp->smk_mmap ==NULL )return 0 ; - sbsp =file_inode (file)->i_sb->s_security; + sbsp =smack_superblock (file_inode (file)->i_sb);if (sbsp->smk_flags &SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED && isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)return -EACCES ;
@@ -3288,7 +3271,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) goto unlockandout; sbp = inode->i_sb; - sbsp = sbp->s_security; + sbsp =smack_superblock (sbp);/* * We're going to use the superblock default label * if there's no label on the file.
@@ -4575,6 +4558,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack), .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *), .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *), + .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack), }; static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -4586,7 +4570,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (fs_context_parse_param, smack_fs_context_parse_param),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_free_mnt_opts, smack_free_mnt_opts),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_eat_lsm_opts, smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v8 01/28] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
Quoted 5 lines · Casey Schaufler
Move management of the
superblock->sb_securityblob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there.
This doesn't appear to be needed to stack AA? That said, I have no objections to converting all of the security blobs over to infrastructure management just to be consistent.
Quoted 4 lines
Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Quoted 491 lines
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/security.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++---- security/selinux/hooks.c | 58 ++++++++++++------------------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 6 ++++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +- security/smack/smack.h | 6 ++++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 35 +++++-------------- 7 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +1
-0@@ -2047,6 +2047,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {int lbs_cred;int lbs_file;int lbs_inode; +int lbs_superblock;int lbs_ipc;int lbs_msg_msg;int lbs_task;security/security.c +39
-7@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); +lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); }@@ -300,12 +301,13 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)prepare_lsm (*lsm); -init_debug ("cred blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_cred); -init_debug ("file blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_file); -init_debug ("inode blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_inode); -init_debug ("ipc blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); -init_debug ("msg_msg blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); -init_debug ("task blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_task); +init_debug ("cred blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_cred); +init_debug ("file blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_file); +init_debug ("inode blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_inode); +init_debug ("ipc blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); +init_debug ("msg_msg blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); +init_debug ("superblock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); +init_debug ("task blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_task);/* * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs @@ -603,6 +605,27 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)panic ("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n" , __func__); } +/** +* lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob +* @sb: the superblock that needs a blob +* +* Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules +* +* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. +*/ +static int lsm_superblock_alloc (struct super_block *sb) +{ +if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock ==0 ) { + sb->s_security =NULL ; +return 0 ; + } + + sb->s_security =kzalloc (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (sb->s_security ==NULL ) +return -ENOMEM ; +return 0 ; +} +/* * Hook list operation macros. * @@ -776,12 +799,21 @@ int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *int security_sb_alloc (struct super_block *sb) { -return call_int_hook (sb_alloc_security,0 , sb); +int rc =lsm_superblock_alloc (sb); + +if (unlikely (rc)) +return rc; + rc =call_int_hook (sb_alloc_security,0 , sb); +if (unlikely (rc)) +security_sb_free (sb); +return rc; }void security_sb_free (struct super_block *sb) {call_void_hook (sb_free_security, sb); +kfree (sb->s_security); + sb->s_security =NULL ; }void security_free_mnt_opts (void **mnt_opts)security/selinux/hooks.c +22
-36@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)if (!isec)return ; - sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; + sbsec =selinux_superblock (inode->i_sb);/* * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste @@ -366,11 +366,7 @@ static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)static int superblock_alloc_security (struct super_block *sb) { -struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; - - sbsec =kzalloc (sizeof (struct superblock_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!sbsec) -return -ENOMEM ; +struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =selinux_superblock (sb);mutex_init (&sbsec->lock);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&sbsec->isec_head);@@ -379,18 +375,10 @@ static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) sbsec->sid =SECINITSID_UNLABELED ; sbsec->def_sid =SECINITSID_FILE ; sbsec->mntpoint_sid =SECINITSID_UNLABELED ; - sb->s_security = sbsec;return 0 ; } -static void superblock_free_security (struct super_block *sb) -{ -struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; - sb->s_security =NULL ; -kfree (sbsec); -} -struct selinux_mnt_opts {const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext; };@@ -507,7 +495,7 @@ static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt (struct super_block *sb) { -struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; +struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =selinux_superblock (sb);/* * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new @@ -535,7 +523,7 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)static int sb_finish_set_opts (struct super_block *sb) { -struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; +struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =selinux_superblock (sb);struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;struct inode *root_inode =d_backing_inode (root);int rc =0 ;@@ -648,7 +636,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long *set_kern_flags) {const struct cred *cred =current_cred (); -struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; +struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =selinux_superblock (sb);struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;@@ -881,8 +869,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,static int selinux_cmp_sb_context (const struct super_block *oldsb,const struct super_block *newsb) { -struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security; -struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security; +struct superblock_security_struct *old =selinux_superblock (oldsb); +struct superblock_security_struct *new =selinux_superblock (newsb);char oldflags = old->flags &SE_MNTMASK ;char newflags = new->flags &SE_MNTMASK ;@@ -914,8 +902,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, unsigned long *set_kern_flags) {int rc =0 ; -const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security; -struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security; +const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = +selinux_superblock (oldsb); +struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec =selinux_superblock (newsb);int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags &FSCONTEXT_MNT );int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags &CONTEXT_MNT );@@ -1085,7 +1074,7 @@ static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)static int selinux_sb_show_options (struct seq_file *m,struct super_block *sb) { -struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; +struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =selinux_superblock (sb);int rc;if (!(sbsec->flags &SE_SBINITIALIZED ))@@ -1377,7 +1366,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentif (isec->sclass ==SECCLASS_FILE ) isec->sclass =inode_mode_to_security_class (inode->i_mode); - sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; + sbsec =selinux_superblock (inode->i_sb);if (!(sbsec->flags &SE_SBINITIALIZED )) {/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, after the initial policy is loaded and the security @@ -1767,7 +1756,8 @@ selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass, u32 *_new_isid) { - const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; + const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = +selinux_superblock (dir->i_sb);if ((sbsec->flags &SE_SBINITIALIZED ) && (sbsec->behavior ==SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT )) {@@ -1798,7 +1788,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,int rc; dsec =inode_security (dir); - sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; + sbsec =selinux_superblock (dir->i_sb); sid = tsec->sid;@@ -1947,7 +1937,7 @@ static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;u32 sid =cred_sid (cred); - sbsec = sb->s_security; + sbsec =selinux_superblock (sb);return avc_has_perm (&selinux_state, sid, sbsec->sid,SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM , perms, ad); }@@ -2578,11 +2568,6 @@ static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)return superblock_alloc_security (sb); } -static void selinux_sb_free_security (struct super_block *sb) -{ -superblock_free_security (sb); -} -static inline int opt_len (const char *s) {bool open_quote = false;@@ -2653,7 +2638,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)static int selinux_sb_remount (struct super_block *sb,void *mnt_opts) {struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; -struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; +struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =selinux_superblock (sb);u32 sid;int rc;@@ -2877,7 +2862,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,int rc;char *context; - sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; + sbsec =selinux_superblock (dir->i_sb); newsid = tsec->create_sid;@@ -3115,7 +3100,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,return dentry_has_perm (current_cred (), dentry,FILE__SETATTR ); } - sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; + sbsec =selinux_superblock (inode->i_sb);if (!(sbsec->flags &SBLABEL_MNT ))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;@@ -3296,13 +3281,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode); -struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; +struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;u32 newsid;int rc;if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX ))return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + sbsec =selinux_superblock (inode->i_sb);if (!(sbsec->flags &SBLABEL_MNT ))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;@@ -6647,6 +6633,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), + .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), }; static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {@@ -6675,7 +6662,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),security/selinux/include/objsec.h +6
-0@@ -188,4 +188,10 @@ static inline struct ipc_security_struct *selinux_ipc( return ipc->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc; } +static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock ( +const struct super_block *superblock) +{ +return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; +} +#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */ security/selinux/ss/services.c +2
-1@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@#include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include "flask.h" @@ -2751,7 +2752,7 @@ int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)struct sidtab *sidtab;int rc =0 ;struct ocontext *c; -struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; +struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =selinux_superblock (sb);const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;read_lock (&state->ss->policy_rwlock);security/smack/smack.h +6
-0@@ -375,6 +375,12 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc; } +static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock ( +const struct super_block *superblock) +{ +return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; +} +/* * Is the directory transmuting? */ security/smack/smack_lsm.c +9
-26@@ -540,12 +540,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)*/ static int smack_sb_alloc_security (struct super_block *sb) { -struct superblock_smack *sbsp; - - sbsp =kzalloc (sizeof (struct superblock_smack ),GFP_KERNEL ); - -if (sbsp ==NULL ) -return -ENOMEM ; +struct superblock_smack *sbsp =smack_superblock (sb); sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor; sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;@@ -554,22 +549,10 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)/* * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc. */ - sb->s_security = sbsp;return 0 ; } -/** -* smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob -* @sb: the superblock getting the blob -* -*/ -static void smack_sb_free_security (struct super_block *sb) -{ -kfree (sb->s_security); - sb->s_security =NULL ; -} -struct smack_mnt_opts {const char *fsdefault, *fsfloor, *fshat, *fsroot, *fstransmute; };@@ -781,7 +764,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, {struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;struct inode *inode =d_backing_inode (root); -struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security; +struct superblock_smack *sp =smack_superblock (sb);struct inode_smack *isp;struct smack_known *skp;struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;@@ -880,7 +863,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,*/ static int smack_sb_statfs (struct dentry *dentry) { -struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security; +struct superblock_smack *sbp =smack_superblock (dentry->d_sb);int rc;struct smk_audit_info ad;@@ -917,7 +900,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)if (isp->smk_task ==NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)return 0 ; - sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security; + sbsp =smack_superblock (inode->i_sb);if ((sbsp->smk_flags &SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED ) && isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)return 0 ;@@ -1168,7 +1151,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,*/ static int smack_inode_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask) { -struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security; +struct superblock_smack *sbsp =smack_superblock (inode->i_sb);struct smk_audit_info ad;int no_block = mask &MAY_NOT_BLOCK ;int rc;@@ -1410,7 +1393,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)*/ if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACK ) ==0 ) {struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb; -struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security; +struct superblock_smack *sbsp =smack_superblock (sbp); isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default; }else if (strcmp (name,XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC ) ==0 )@@ -1680,7 +1663,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file, isp =smack_inode (file_inode (file));if (isp->smk_mmap ==NULL )return 0 ; - sbsp =file_inode (file)->i_sb->s_security; + sbsp =smack_superblock (file_inode (file)->i_sb);if (sbsp->smk_flags &SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED && isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)return -EACCES ;@@ -3288,7 +3271,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) goto unlockandout; sbp = inode->i_sb; - sbsp = sbp->s_security; + sbsp =smack_superblock (sbp);/* * We're going to use the superblock default label * if there's no label on the file. @@ -4575,6 +4558,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack), .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *), .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *), + .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack), }; static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {@@ -4586,7 +4570,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (fs_context_parse_param, smack_fs_context_parse_param),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_free_mnt_opts, smack_free_mnt_opts),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_eat_lsm_opts, smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 2/28 LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
In reply to Casey SchauflerMove management of the sock->sk_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++----------- security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 78 +++++++++++++++---------------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++ security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++----- security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 64 ++++++++++++------------- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 ++-- 10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +1 -0
@@ -2047,6 +2047,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {int lbs_cred;int lbs_file;int lbs_inode; +int lbs_sock;int lbs_superblock;int lbs_ipc;int lbs_msg_msg;
security/apparmor/include/net.h +5 -1
@@ -55,7 +55,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {struct aa_label *peer; }; -#define SK_CTX (X ) ((X)->sk_security) +static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock (const struct sock *sk) +{ +return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} +#define SOCK_ctx (X ) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET (NAME ,OP ,SK ,F ,T ,P ) \ struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
security/apparmor/lsm.c +10 -28
@@ -757,33 +757,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginforeturn error; } -/** -* apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field -*/ -static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t flags) -{ -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; - - ctx =kzalloc (sizeof (*ctx), flags); -if (!ctx) -return -ENOMEM ; - -SK_CTX (sk) = ctx; - -return 0 ; -} -/** * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field */ static void apparmor_sk_free_security (struct sock *sk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk); -SK_CTX (sk) =NULL ;aa_put_label (ctx->label);aa_put_label (ctx->peer); -kfree (ctx); }/**
@@ -792,8 +774,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)static void apparmor_sk_clone_security (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); -struct aa_sk_ctx *new =SK_CTX (newsk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *new =aa_sock (newsk); new->label =aa_get_label (ctx->label); new->peer =aa_get_label (ctx->peer);
@@ -844,7 +826,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, label =aa_get_current_label ();if (sock->sk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sock->sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sock->sk);aa_put_label (ctx->label); ctx->label =aa_get_label (label);
@@ -1029,7 +1011,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)*/ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!skb->secmark)return 0 ;
@@ -1042,7 +1024,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label (struct sock *sk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (ctx->peer)return ctx->peer;
@@ -1126,7 +1108,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,*/ static void apparmor_sock_graft (struct sock *sk,struct socket *parent) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!ctx->label) ctx->label =aa_get_current_label ();
@@ -1136,7 +1118,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)static int apparmor_inet_conn_request (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb,struct request_sock *req) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!skb->secmark)return 0 ;
@@ -1153,6 +1135,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *), .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx), .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), + .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx), }; static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1189,7 +1172,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),LSM_HOOK_INIT (setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
@@ -1581,7 +1563,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,if (sk ==NULL )return NF_ACCEPT ; - ctx =SK_CTX (sk); + ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!apparmor_secmark_check (ctx->label,OP_SENDMSG ,AA_MAY_SEND , skb->secmark, sk))return NF_ACCEPT ;
security/security.c +35 -1
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@#include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/msg.h> #include <net/flow.h> +#include <net/sock.h> #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -172,6 +173,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); +lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); }
@@ -306,6 +308,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)init_debug ("inode blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_inode);init_debug ("ipc blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);init_debug ("msg_msg blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); +init_debug ("sock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_sock);init_debug ("superblock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);init_debug ("task blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_task);
@@ -605,6 +608,28 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)panic ("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n" , __func__); } +/** +* lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob +* @sock: the sock that needs a blob +* @priority: allocation mode +* +* Allocate the sock blob for all the modules +* +* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. +*/ +static int lsm_sock_alloc (struct sock *sock,gfp_t priority) +{ +if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock ==0 ) { + sock->sk_security =NULL ; +return 0 ; + } + + sock->sk_security =kzalloc (blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority); +if (sock->sk_security ==NULL ) +return -ENOMEM ; +return 0 ; +} +/** * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
@@ -2048,12 +2073,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);int security_sk_alloc (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority) { -return call_int_hook (sk_alloc_security,0 , sk, family, priority); +int rc =lsm_sock_alloc (sk, priority); + +if (unlikely (rc)) +return rc; + rc =call_int_hook (sk_alloc_security,0 , sk, family, priority); +if (unlikely (rc)) +security_sk_free (sk); +return rc; }void security_sk_free (struct sock *sk) {call_void_hook (sk_free_security, sk); +kfree (sk->sk_security); + sk->sk_security =NULL ; }void security_sk_clone (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk)
security/selinux/hooks.c +37 -41
249 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/include/objsec.h +5 -0
@@ -194,4 +194,9 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock( return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; } +static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock (const struct sock *sock) +{ +return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} +#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
security/selinux/netlabel.c +12 -11
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@#include <linux/gfp.h> #include <linux/ip.h> #include <linux/ipv6.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include <net/ip.h>
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr (struct sock *sk) {int rc; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;if (sksec->nlbl_secattr !=NULL )
@@ -114,7 +115,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr( const struct sock *sk, u32 sid) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;if (secattr ==NULL )
@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */ sk =skb_to_full_sk (skb);if (sk !=NULL ) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (sksec->nlbl_state !=NLBL_REQSKB )return 0 ;
@@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, {int rc;struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (ep->base.sk);struct sockaddr *addr;struct sockaddr_in addr4;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IPV6 )
@@ -370,7 +371,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)*/ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone (struct sock *sk,u16 family) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (family ==PF_INET ) sksec->nlbl_state =NLBL_LABELED ;
@@ -388,8 +389,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)*/ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone (struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; -struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk); +struct sk_security_struct *newsksec =selinux_sock (newsk); newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state; }
@@ -407,7 +408,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create (struct sock *sk,u16 family) {int rc; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;if (family !=PF_INET && family !=PF_INET6 )
@@ -522,7 +523,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, {int rc =0 ;struct sock *sk = sock->sk; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
@@ -560,7 +561,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr) {int rc; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
@@ -599,7 +600,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked (struct sock *sk,struct sockaddr *addr) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (sksec->nlbl_state !=NLBL_REQSKB && sksec->nlbl_state !=NLBL_CONNLABELED )
security/smack/smack.h +5 -0
@@ -375,6 +375,11 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc; } +static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock (const struct sock *sock) +{ +return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} +static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock (const struct super_block *superblock) {
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +30 -34
225 lines not on this page · raw message
security/smack/smack_netfilter.c +4 -4
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,struct socket_smack *ssp;struct smack_known *skp; -if (sk && sk->sk_security) { - ssp = sk->sk_security; +if (sk &&smack_sock (sk)) { + ssp =smack_sock (sk); skp = ssp->smk_out; skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid; }
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,struct socket_smack *ssp;struct smack_known *skp; -if (sk && sk->sk_security) { - ssp = sk->sk_security; +if (sk &&smack_sock (sk)) { + ssp =smack_sock (sk); skp = ssp->smk_out; skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v8 02/28] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
Quoted 9 lines · Casey Schaufler
Move management of the
sock->sk_securityblob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there.Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
One oddity noted below, but it isn't introduced by this patch so you can add my:
Quoted 30 lines
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++----------- security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 78 +++++++++++++++---------------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++ security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++----- security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 64 ++++++++++++------------- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 ++-- 10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +1
-0@@ -2047,6 +2047,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {int lbs_cred;int lbs_file;int lbs_inode; +int lbs_sock;int lbs_superblock;int lbs_ipc;int lbs_msg_msg;security/apparmor/include/net.h +0
-0
security/apparmor/include/net.h struct aa_sk_ctx { · line 63
Quoted 10 lines
security/apparmor/include/net.h +5
-1@@ -55,7 +55,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {struct aa_label *peer; }; -#define SK_CTX (X ) ((X)->sk_security) +static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock (const struct sock *sk) +{ +return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} +#define SOCK_ctx (X ) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
This use of i_security looks suspicious, but SOCK_ctx doesn't appear to be used presently. Probably should be removed in a separate patch.
Quoted 896 lines
security/apparmor/include/net.h +0
-0#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET (NAME ,OP ,SK ,F ,T ,P ) \ struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \security/apparmor/lsm.c +10
-28@@ -757,33 +757,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginforeturn error; } -/** -* apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field -*/ -static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t flags) -{ -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; - - ctx =kzalloc (sizeof (*ctx), flags); -if (!ctx) -return -ENOMEM ; - -SK_CTX (sk) = ctx; - -return 0 ; -} -/** * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field */ static void apparmor_sk_free_security (struct sock *sk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk); -SK_CTX (sk) =NULL ;aa_put_label (ctx->label);aa_put_label (ctx->peer); -kfree (ctx); }/** @@ -792,8 +774,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)static void apparmor_sk_clone_security (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); -struct aa_sk_ctx *new =SK_CTX (newsk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *new =aa_sock (newsk); new->label =aa_get_label (ctx->label); new->peer =aa_get_label (ctx->peer);@@ -844,7 +826,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, label =aa_get_current_label ();if (sock->sk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sock->sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sock->sk);aa_put_label (ctx->label); ctx->label =aa_get_label (label);@@ -1029,7 +1011,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)*/ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!skb->secmark)return 0 ;@@ -1042,7 +1024,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label (struct sock *sk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (ctx->peer)return ctx->peer;@@ -1126,7 +1108,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,*/ static void apparmor_sock_graft (struct sock *sk,struct socket *parent) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!ctx->label) ctx->label =aa_get_current_label ();@@ -1136,7 +1118,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)static int apparmor_inet_conn_request (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb,struct request_sock *req) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!skb->secmark)return 0 ;@@ -1153,6 +1135,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *), .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx), .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), + .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx), }; static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {@@ -1189,7 +1172,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),LSM_HOOK_INIT (setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),@@ -1581,7 +1563,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,if (sk ==NULL )return NF_ACCEPT ; - ctx =SK_CTX (sk); + ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!apparmor_secmark_check (ctx->label,OP_SENDMSG ,AA_MAY_SEND , skb->secmark, sk))return NF_ACCEPT ;security/security.c +35
-1@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@#include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/msg.h> #include <net/flow.h> +#include <net/sock.h> #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2@@ -172,6 +173,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); +lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); }@@ -306,6 +308,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)init_debug ("inode blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_inode);init_debug ("ipc blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);init_debug ("msg_msg blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); +init_debug ("sock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_sock);init_debug ("superblock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);init_debug ("task blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_task);@@ -605,6 +608,28 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)panic ("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n" , __func__); } +/** +* lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob +* @sock: the sock that needs a blob +* @priority: allocation mode +* +* Allocate the sock blob for all the modules +* +* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. +*/ +static int lsm_sock_alloc (struct sock *sock,gfp_t priority) +{ +if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock ==0 ) { + sock->sk_security =NULL ; +return 0 ; + } + + sock->sk_security =kzalloc (blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority); +if (sock->sk_security ==NULL ) +return -ENOMEM ; +return 0 ; +} +/** * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob @@ -2048,12 +2073,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);int security_sk_alloc (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority) { -return call_int_hook (sk_alloc_security,0 , sk, family, priority); +int rc =lsm_sock_alloc (sk, priority); + +if (unlikely (rc)) +return rc; + rc =call_int_hook (sk_alloc_security,0 , sk, family, priority); +if (unlikely (rc)) +security_sk_free (sk); +return rc; }void security_sk_free (struct sock *sk) {call_void_hook (sk_free_security, sk); +kfree (sk->sk_security); + sk->sk_security =NULL ; }void security_sk_clone (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk)security/selinux/hooks.c +37
-41@@ -4319,7 +4319,7 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,static int sock_has_perm (struct sock *sk,u32 perms) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct common_audit_data ad;struct lsm_network_audit net = {0 ,};@@ -4376,7 +4376,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, isec->initialized =LABEL_INITIALIZED ;if (sock->sk) { - sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; + sksec =selinux_sock (sock->sk); sksec->sclass = sclass; sksec->sid = sid;/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */ @@ -4392,8 +4392,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,static int selinux_socket_socketpair (struct socket *socka,struct socket *sockb) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a =selinux_sock (socka->sk); +struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b =selinux_sock (sockb->sk); sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid; sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;@@ -4408,7 +4408,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,static int selinux_socket_bind (struct socket *sock,struct sockaddr *address,int addrlen) {struct sock *sk = sock->sk; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);u16 family;int err;@@ -4540,7 +4540,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) {struct sock *sk = sock->sk; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);int err; err =sock_has_perm (sk,SOCKET__CONNECT );@@ -4711,9 +4711,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock); +struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other =selinux_sock (other); +struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new =selinux_sock (newsk);struct common_audit_data ad;struct lsm_network_audit net = {0 ,};int err;@@ -4745,8 +4745,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send (struct socket *sock,struct socket *other) { -struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; -struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *ssec =selinux_sock (sock->sk); +struct sk_security_struct *osec =selinux_sock (other->sk);struct common_audit_data ad;struct lsm_network_audit net = {0 ,};@@ -4788,7 +4788,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family) {int err =0 ; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;struct common_audit_data ad;struct lsm_network_audit net = {0 ,};@@ -4821,7 +4821,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb) {int err; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);u16 family = sk->sk_family;u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;struct common_audit_data ad;@@ -4889,13 +4889,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)return err; } -static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream (struct socket *sock,char __user *optval, -int __user *optlen,unsigned len) +static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream (struct socket *sock, +char __user *optval, +int __user *optlen, +unsigned int len) {int err =0 ;char *scontext;u32 scontext_len; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sock->sk);u32 peer_sid =SECSID_NULL ; if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||@@ -4955,34 +4957,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *static int selinux_sk_alloc_security (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec; - - sksec =kzalloc (sizeof (*sksec), priority); -if (!sksec) -return -ENOMEM ; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk); sksec->peer_sid =SECINITSID_UNLABELED ; sksec->sid =SECINITSID_UNLABELED ; sksec->sclass =SECCLASS_SOCKET ;selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset (sksec); - sk->sk_security = sksec;return 0 ; }static void selinux_sk_free_security (struct sock *sk) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk); - sk->sk_security =NULL ;selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free (sksec); -kfree (sksec); }static void selinux_sk_clone_security (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; -struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk); +struct sk_security_struct *newsksec =selinux_sock (newsk); newsksec->sid = sksec->sid; newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;@@ -4996,7 +4991,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)if (!sk) *secid =SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET ;else { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk); *secid = sksec->sid; }@@ -5006,7 +5001,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) {struct inode_security_struct *isec =inode_security_novalidate (SOCK_INODE (parent)); -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (sk->sk_family ==PF_INET || sk->sk_family ==PF_INET6 || sk->sk_family ==PF_UNIX )@@ -5021,7 +5016,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request (struct sctp_endpoint *ep,struct sk_buff *skb) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (ep->base.sk);struct common_audit_data ad;struct lsm_network_audit net = {0 ,};u8 peerlbl_active;@@ -5172,8 +5167,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone (struct sctp_endpoint *ep,struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; -struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk); +struct sk_security_struct *newsksec =selinux_sock (newsk);/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call * the non-sctp clone version. @@ -5190,7 +5185,7 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,static int selinux_inet_conn_request (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb,struct request_sock *req) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);int err;u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;u32 connsid;@@ -5211,7 +5206,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,static void selinux_inet_csk_clone (struct sock *newsk,const struct request_sock *req) { -struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *newsksec =selinux_sock (newsk); newsksec->sid = req->secid; newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;@@ -5228,7 +5223,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,static void selinux_inet_conn_established (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb) {u16 family = sk->sk_family; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ if (family ==PF_INET6 && skb->protocol ==htons (ETH_P_IP ))@@ -5312,7 +5307,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)static int selinux_tun_dev_attach (struct sock *sk,void *security) {struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply @@ -5353,7 +5348,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)int err =0 ;u32 perm;struct nlmsghdr *nlh; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (skb->len <NLMSG_HDRLEN ) { err = -EINVAL ;@@ -5494,7 +5489,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,return NF_ACCEPT ;/* standard practice, label using the parent socket */ - sksec = sk->sk_security; + sksec =selinux_sock (sk); sid = sksec->sid; }else sid =SECINITSID_KERNEL ;@@ -5533,7 +5528,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,if (sk ==NULL )return NF_ACCEPT ; - sksec = sk->sk_security; + sksec =selinux_sock (sk); ad.type =LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET ; ad.u.net = &net;@@ -5625,7 +5620,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,u32 skb_sid;struct sk_security_struct *sksec; - sksec = sk->sk_security; + sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid (skb, family, &skb_sid))return NF_DROP ;/* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL @@ -5654,7 +5649,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, }else {/* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the * associated socket. */ -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk); peer_sid = sksec->sid; secmark_perm =PACKET__SEND ; }@@ -6633,6 +6628,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), + .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct), .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), };security/selinux/include/objsec.h +5
-0@@ -194,4 +194,9 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock( return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; } +static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock (const struct sock *sock) +{ +return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} +#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */ security/selinux/netlabel.c +12
-11@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@#include <linux/gfp.h> #include <linux/ip.h> #include <linux/ipv6.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include <net/ip.h> @@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr (struct sock *sk) {int rc; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;if (sksec->nlbl_secattr !=NULL )@@ -114,7 +115,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr( const struct sock *sk, u32 sid) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;if (secattr ==NULL )@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */ sk =skb_to_full_sk (skb);if (sk !=NULL ) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (sksec->nlbl_state !=NLBL_REQSKB )return 0 ;@@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, {int rc;struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (ep->base.sk);struct sockaddr *addr;struct sockaddr_in addr4;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IPV6 )@@ -370,7 +371,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)*/ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone (struct sock *sk,u16 family) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (family ==PF_INET ) sksec->nlbl_state =NLBL_LABELED ;@@ -388,8 +389,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)*/ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone (struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; -struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk); +struct sk_security_struct *newsksec =selinux_sock (newsk); newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state; }@@ -407,7 +408,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create (struct sock *sk,u16 family) {int rc; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;if (family !=PF_INET && family !=PF_INET6 )@@ -522,7 +523,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, {int rc =0 ;struct sock *sk = sock->sk; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&@@ -560,7 +561,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr) {int rc; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family @@ -599,7 +600,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked (struct sock *sk,struct sockaddr *addr) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (sksec->nlbl_state !=NLBL_REQSKB && sksec->nlbl_state !=NLBL_CONNLABELED )security/smack/smack.h +5
-0@@ -375,6 +375,11 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc; } +static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock (const struct sock *sock) +{ +return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} +static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock (const struct super_block *superblock) {security/smack/smack_lsm.c +30
-34@@ -1439,7 +1439,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,if (sock ==NULL || sock->sk ==NULL )return -EOPNOTSUPP ; - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + ssp =smack_sock (sock->sk);if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPIN ) ==0 ) isp = ssp->smk_in;@@ -1821,7 +1821,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)if (inode->i_sb->s_magic ==SOCKFS_MAGIC ) { sock =SOCKET_I (inode); - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + ssp =smack_sock (sock->sk); tsp =smack_cred (current_cred ());/* * If the receiving process can't write to the @@ -2231,11 +2231,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)static int smack_sk_alloc_security (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t gfp_flags) {struct smack_known *skp =smk_of_current (); -struct socket_smack *ssp; - - ssp =kzalloc (sizeof (struct socket_smack ), gfp_flags); -if (ssp ==NULL ) -return -ENOMEM ; +struct socket_smack *ssp =smack_sock (sk);/* * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label. @@ -2249,11 +2245,10 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags) } ssp->smk_packet =NULL ; - sk->sk_security = ssp; -return 0 ; } +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING /** * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob * @sk: the socket @@ -2262,7 +2257,6 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)*/ static void smack_sk_free_security (struct sock *sk) { -#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING struct smk_port_label *spp;if (sk->sk_family ==PF_INET6 ) {@@ -2275,9 +2269,8 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) }rcu_read_unlock (); } -#endif -kfree (sk->sk_security); } +#endif /** * smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions @@ -2395,7 +2388,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)static int smack_netlabel (struct sock *sk,int labeled) {struct smack_known *skp; -struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; +struct socket_smack *ssp =smack_sock (sk);int rc =0 ;/* @@ -2440,7 +2433,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)int rc;int sk_lbl;struct smack_known *hkp; -struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; +struct socket_smack *ssp =smack_sock (sk);struct smk_audit_info ad;rcu_read_lock ();@@ -2516,7 +2509,7 @@ static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address) {struct sock *sk = sock->sk;struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6; -struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; +struct socket_smack *ssp =smack_sock (sock->sk);struct smk_port_label *spp;unsigned short port =0 ;@@ -2603,7 +2596,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act) {struct smk_port_label *spp; -struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; +struct socket_smack *ssp =smack_sock (sk);struct smack_known *skp =NULL ;unsigned short port;struct smack_known *object;@@ -2697,7 +2690,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,if (sock ==NULL || sock->sk ==NULL )return -EOPNOTSUPP ; - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + ssp =smack_sock (sock->sk);if (strcmp (name,XATTR_SMACK_IPIN ) ==0 ) ssp->smk_in = skp;@@ -2745,7 +2738,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,* Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label. */ if (unlikely (current->flags &PF_KTHREAD )) { - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + ssp =smack_sock (sock->sk); ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web; ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web; }@@ -2770,8 +2763,8 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,static int smack_socket_socketpair (struct socket *socka,struct socket *sockb) { -struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security; -struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security; +struct socket_smack *asp =smack_sock (socka->sk); +struct socket_smack *bsp =smack_sock (sockb->sk); asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out; bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;@@ -2825,7 +2818,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,return 0 ;#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + ssp =smack_sock (sock->sk);#endif switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {@@ -3566,9 +3559,9 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, {struct smack_known *skp;struct smack_known *okp; -struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security; -struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security; -struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security; +struct socket_smack *ssp =smack_sock (sock); +struct socket_smack *osp =smack_sock (other); +struct socket_smack *nsp =smack_sock (newsk);struct smk_audit_info ad;int rc =0 ;#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT @@ -3614,8 +3607,8 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,*/ static int smack_unix_may_send (struct socket *sock,struct socket *other) { -struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; -struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security; +struct socket_smack *ssp =smack_sock (sock->sk); +struct socket_smack *osp =smack_sock (other->sk);struct smk_audit_info ad;int rc;@@ -3652,7 +3645,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;#endif #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING -struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; +struct socket_smack *ssp =smack_sock (sock->sk);struct smack_known *rsp;#endif int rc =0 ;@@ -3817,7 +3810,7 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb) {struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; -struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; +struct socket_smack *ssp =smack_sock (sk);struct smack_known *skp =NULL ;int rc =0 ;struct smk_audit_info ad;@@ -3934,7 +3927,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,int slen =1 ;int rc =0 ; - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + ssp =smack_sock (sock->sk);if (ssp->smk_packet !=NULL ) { rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known; slen =strlen (rcp) +1 ;@@ -3984,7 +3977,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,switch (family) {case PF_UNIX : - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + ssp =smack_sock (sock->sk); s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;break ;case PF_INET :@@ -3997,7 +3990,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,* Translate what netlabel gave us. */ if (sock !=NULL && sock->sk !=NULL ) - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + ssp =smack_sock (sock->sk);netlbl_secattr_init (&secattr); rc =netlbl_skbuff_getattr (skb, family, &secattr);if (rc ==0 ) {@@ -4035,7 +4028,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)) return; - ssp = sk->sk_security; + ssp =smack_sock (sk); ssp->smk_in = skp; ssp->smk_out = skp;/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */ @@ -4055,7 +4048,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, {u16 family = sk->sk_family;struct smack_known *skp; -struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; +struct socket_smack *ssp =smack_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;struct sockaddr_in addr;struct iphdr *hdr;@@ -4154,7 +4147,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,static void smack_inet_csk_clone (struct sock *sk,const struct request_sock *req) { -struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; +struct socket_smack *ssp =smack_sock (sk);struct smack_known *skp;if (req->peer_secid !=0 ) {@@ -4558,6 +4551,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack), .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *), .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *), + .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack), .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack), };@@ -4667,7 +4661,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),LSM_HOOK_INIT (socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security), +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELINGLSM_HOOK_INIT (sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security), +#endifLSM_HOOK_INIT (sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),LSM_HOOK_INIT (inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),security/smack/smack_netfilter.c +4
-4@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,struct socket_smack *ssp;struct smack_known *skp; -if (sk && sk->sk_security) { - ssp = sk->sk_security; +if (sk &&smack_sock (sk)) { + ssp =smack_sock (sk); skp = ssp->smk_out; skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid; }@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,struct socket_smack *ssp;struct smack_known *skp; -if (sk && sk->sk_security) { - ssp = sk->sk_security; +if (sk &&smack_sock (sk)) { + ssp =smack_sock (sk); skp = ssp->smk_out; skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid; }
John Johansen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v8 02/28] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
Quoted 48 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 9 lines · Casey Schaufler
Move management of the
sock->sk_securityblob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there.Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>One oddity noted below, but it isn't introduced by this patch so you can add my:
Reviewed-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Quoted 33 lines
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++----------- security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 78 +++++++++++++++----------------security/selinux/include/objsec.h| 5 ++ security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++----- security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 64 ++++++++++++------------- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 ++--10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +1
-0@@ -2047,6 +2047,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes { int lbs_cred; int lbs_file; int lbs_inode; + int lbs_sock; int lbs_superblock; int lbs_ipc; int lbs_msg_msg;security/apparmor/include/net.h +0
-0@@ -55,7 +55,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx { struct aa_label *peer; }; -#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
Quoted 9 lines
security/apparmor/include/net.h struct aa_sk_ctx { · line 63
Quoted 6 lines
security/apparmor/include/net.h +5
-0+static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock (const struct sock *sk) +{ + return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} + #define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_securityThis use of
i_securitylooks suspicious, butSOCK_ctxdoesn't appear to be used presently. Probably should be removed in a separate patch.
yes this leaked is from some in dev patches that leaked into the base socket mediation patch. I can put together a patch to remove it
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 3/28 LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob
In reply to Casey SchauflerFrom: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Move management of the key->security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/security.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 23 +++++------------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 7 ++++++ security/smack/smack.h | 7 ++++++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 33 ++++++++++++------------- 6 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +1 -0
@@ -2050,6 +2050,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {int lbs_sock;int lbs_superblock;int lbs_ipc; +int lbs_key;int lbs_msg_msg;int lbs_task; };
security/security.c +39 -1
@@ -172,6 +172,9 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) blob_sizes.lbs_inode =sizeof (struct rcu_head );lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_key, &blob_sizes.lbs_key); +#endif lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
@@ -307,6 +310,9 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)init_debug ("file blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_file);init_debug ("inode blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_inode);init_debug ("ipc blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +init_debug ("key blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_key); +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ init_debug ("msg_msg blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);init_debug ("sock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_sock);init_debug ("superblock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
@@ -573,6 +579,29 @@ static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)return 0 ; } +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +/** +* lsm_key_alloc - allocate a composite key blob +* @key: the key that needs a blob +* +* Allocate the key blob for all the modules +* +* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. +*/ +static int lsm_key_alloc (struct key *key) +{ +if (blob_sizes.lbs_key ==0 ) { + key->security =NULL ; +return 0 ; + } + + key->security =kzalloc (blob_sizes.lbs_key,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (key->security ==NULL ) +return -ENOMEM ; +return 0 ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ +/** * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob
@@ -2339,12 +2368,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);int security_key_alloc (struct key *key,const struct cred *cred,unsigned long flags) { -return call_int_hook (key_alloc,0 , key, cred, flags); +int rc =lsm_key_alloc (key); + +if (unlikely (rc)) +return rc; + rc =call_int_hook (key_alloc,0 , key, cred, flags); +if (unlikely (rc)) +security_key_free (key); +return rc; }void security_key_free (struct key *key) {call_void_hook (key_free, key); +kfree (key->security); + key->security =NULL ; } int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
security/selinux/hooks.c +6 -17
@@ -6353,11 +6353,7 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags) {const struct task_security_struct *tsec; -struct key_security_struct *ksec; - - ksec =kzalloc (sizeof (struct key_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!ksec) -return -ENOMEM ; +struct key_security_struct *ksec =selinux_key (k); tsec =selinux_cred (cred);if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
@@ -6365,18 +6361,9 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,else ksec->sid = tsec->sid; - k->security = ksec;return 0 ; } -static void selinux_key_free (struct key *k) -{ -struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security; - - k->security =NULL ; -kfree (ksec); -} -static int selinux_key_permission (key_ref_t key_ref,const struct cred *cred,unsigned perm)
@@ -6394,7 +6381,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, sid =cred_sid (cred); key =key_ref_to_ptr (key_ref); - ksec = key->security; + ksec =selinux_key (key);return avc_has_perm (&selinux_state, sid, ksec->sid,SECCLASS_KEY , perm,NULL );
@@ -6402,7 +6389,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,static int selinux_key_getsecurity (struct key *key,char **_buffer) { -struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; +struct key_security_struct *ksec =selinux_key (key);char *context =NULL ;unsigned len;int rc;
@@ -6627,6 +6614,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct), .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), .lbs_ipc =sizeof (struct ipc_security_struct ), +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + .lbs_key = sizeof(struct key_security_struct), +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ .lbs_msg_msg =sizeof (struct msg_security_struct ), .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct), .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
@@ -6842,7 +6832,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS LSM_HOOK_INIT (key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (key_free, selinux_key_free),LSM_HOOK_INIT (key_permission, selinux_key_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity), #endif
security/selinux/include/objsec.h +7 -0
@@ -194,6 +194,13 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; } +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +static inline struct key_security_struct *selinux_key (const struct key *key) +{ +return key->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_key; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ +static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock (const struct sock *sock) {return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
security/smack/smack.h +7 -0
@@ -386,6 +386,13 @@ static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; } +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +static inline struct smack_known **smack_key (const struct key *key) +{ +return key->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_key; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ +/* * Is the directory transmuting? */
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +15 -18
@@ -4179,23 +4179,13 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,static int smack_key_alloc (struct key *key,const struct cred *cred,unsigned long flags) { +struct smack_known **blob =smack_key (key);struct smack_known *skp =smk_of_task (smack_cred (cred)); - key->security = skp; + *blob = skp;return 0 ; } -/** -* smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob -* @key: the object -* -* Clear the blob pointer -*/ -static void smack_key_free (struct key *key) -{ - key->security =NULL ; -} -/** * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key * @key_ref: gets to the object
@@ -4208,6 +4198,8 @@ static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)static int smack_key_permission (key_ref_t key_ref,const struct cred *cred,unsigned perm) { +struct smack_known **blob; +struct smack_known *skp;struct key *keyp;struct smk_audit_info ad;struct smack_known *tkp =smk_of_task (smack_cred (cred));
@@ -4227,7 +4219,9 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,* If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that * it may do so. */ -if (keyp->security ==NULL ) + blob =smack_key (keyp); + skp = *blob; +if (skp ==NULL )return 0 ;/* * This should not occur
@@ -4247,8 +4241,8 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, request |=MAY_READ ;if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE |KEY_NEED_LINK |KEY_NEED_SETATTR )) request |=MAY_WRITE ; - rc =smk_access (tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad); - rc =smk_bu_note ("key access" , tkp, keyp->security, request, rc); + rc =smk_access (tkp, skp, request, &ad); + rc =smk_bu_note ("key access" , tkp, skp, request, rc);return rc; }
@@ -4263,11 +4257,12 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,*/ static int smack_key_getsecurity (struct key *key,char **_buffer) { -struct smack_known *skp = key->security; +struct smack_known **blob =smack_key (key); +struct smack_known *skp = *blob;size_t length;char *copy; -if (key->security ==NULL ) { +if (skp ==NULL ) { *_buffer =NULL ;return 0 ; }
@@ -4550,6 +4545,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *), .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack), .lbs_ipc =sizeof (struct smack_known *), +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + .lbs_key = sizeof(struct smack_known *), +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ .lbs_msg_msg =sizeof (struct smack_known *), .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack), .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
@@ -4671,7 +4669,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {/* key management security hooks */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS LSM_HOOK_INIT (key_alloc, smack_key_alloc), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (key_free, smack_key_free),LSM_HOOK_INIT (key_permission, smack_key_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity), #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v8 03/28] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob
Quoted 7 lines · Casey Schaufler
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Move management of the
key->securityblob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there.
As with the superblock blob, I don't see that this is needed for stacking AA but I don't object to moving all the security blobs to infrastructure management for consistency.
Quoted 305 lines
Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/security.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 23 +++++------------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 7 ++++++ security/smack/smack.h | 7 ++++++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 33 ++++++++++++------------- 6 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +1
-0@@ -2050,6 +2050,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {int lbs_sock;int lbs_superblock;int lbs_ipc; +int lbs_key;int lbs_msg_msg;int lbs_task; };security/security.c +39
-1@@ -172,6 +172,9 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) blob_sizes.lbs_inode =sizeof (struct rcu_head );lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_key, &blob_sizes.lbs_key); +#endif lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);@@ -307,6 +310,9 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)init_debug ("file blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_file);init_debug ("inode blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_inode);init_debug ("ipc blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +init_debug ("key blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_key); +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ init_debug ("msg_msg blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);init_debug ("sock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_sock);init_debug ("superblock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);@@ -573,6 +579,29 @@ static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)return 0 ; } +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +/** +* lsm_key_alloc - allocate a composite key blob +* @key: the key that needs a blob +* +* Allocate the key blob for all the modules +* +* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. +*/ +static int lsm_key_alloc (struct key *key) +{ +if (blob_sizes.lbs_key ==0 ) { + key->security =NULL ; +return 0 ; + } + + key->security =kzalloc (blob_sizes.lbs_key,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (key->security ==NULL ) +return -ENOMEM ; +return 0 ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ +/** * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob @@ -2339,12 +2368,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);int security_key_alloc (struct key *key,const struct cred *cred,unsigned long flags) { -return call_int_hook (key_alloc,0 , key, cred, flags); +int rc =lsm_key_alloc (key); + +if (unlikely (rc)) +return rc; + rc =call_int_hook (key_alloc,0 , key, cred, flags); +if (unlikely (rc)) +security_key_free (key); +return rc; }void security_key_free (struct key *key) {call_void_hook (key_free, key); +kfree (key->security); + key->security =NULL ; } int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,security/selinux/hooks.c +6
-17@@ -6353,11 +6353,7 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags) {const struct task_security_struct *tsec; -struct key_security_struct *ksec; - - ksec =kzalloc (sizeof (struct key_security_struct ),GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!ksec) -return -ENOMEM ; +struct key_security_struct *ksec =selinux_key (k); tsec =selinux_cred (cred);if (tsec->keycreate_sid)@@ -6365,18 +6361,9 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,else ksec->sid = tsec->sid; - k->security = ksec;return 0 ; } -static void selinux_key_free (struct key *k) -{ -struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security; - - k->security =NULL ; -kfree (ksec); -} -static int selinux_key_permission (key_ref_t key_ref,const struct cred *cred,unsigned perm)@@ -6394,7 +6381,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, sid =cred_sid (cred); key =key_ref_to_ptr (key_ref); - ksec = key->security; + ksec =selinux_key (key);return avc_has_perm (&selinux_state, sid, ksec->sid,SECCLASS_KEY , perm,NULL );@@ -6402,7 +6389,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,static int selinux_key_getsecurity (struct key *key,char **_buffer) { -struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; +struct key_security_struct *ksec =selinux_key (key);char *context =NULL ;unsigned len;int rc;@@ -6627,6 +6614,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct), .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), .lbs_ipc =sizeof (struct ipc_security_struct ), +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + .lbs_key = sizeof(struct key_security_struct), +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ .lbs_msg_msg =sizeof (struct msg_security_struct ), .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct), .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),@@ -6842,7 +6832,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS LSM_HOOK_INIT (key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (key_free, selinux_key_free),LSM_HOOK_INIT (key_permission, selinux_key_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity), #endifsecurity/selinux/include/objsec.h +7
-0@@ -194,6 +194,13 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; } +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +static inline struct key_security_struct *selinux_key (const struct key *key) +{ +return key->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_key; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ +static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock (const struct sock *sock) {return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;security/smack/smack.h +7
-0@@ -386,6 +386,13 @@ static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; } +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +static inline struct smack_known **smack_key (const struct key *key) +{ +return key->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_key; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ +/* * Is the directory transmuting? */ security/smack/smack_lsm.c +15
-18@@ -4179,23 +4179,13 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,static int smack_key_alloc (struct key *key,const struct cred *cred,unsigned long flags) { +struct smack_known **blob =smack_key (key);struct smack_known *skp =smk_of_task (smack_cred (cred)); - key->security = skp; + *blob = skp;return 0 ; } -/** -* smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob -* @key: the object -* -* Clear the blob pointer -*/ -static void smack_key_free (struct key *key) -{ - key->security =NULL ; -} -/** * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key * @key_ref: gets to the object @@ -4208,6 +4198,8 @@ static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)static int smack_key_permission (key_ref_t key_ref,const struct cred *cred,unsigned perm) { +struct smack_known **blob; +struct smack_known *skp;struct key *keyp;struct smk_audit_info ad;struct smack_known *tkp =smk_of_task (smack_cred (cred));@@ -4227,7 +4219,9 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,* If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that * it may do so. */ -if (keyp->security ==NULL ) + blob =smack_key (keyp); + skp = *blob; +if (skp ==NULL )return 0 ;/* * This should not occur @@ -4247,8 +4241,8 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, request |=MAY_READ ;if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE |KEY_NEED_LINK |KEY_NEED_SETATTR )) request |=MAY_WRITE ; - rc =smk_access (tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad); - rc =smk_bu_note ("key access" , tkp, keyp->security, request, rc); + rc =smk_access (tkp, skp, request, &ad); + rc =smk_bu_note ("key access" , tkp, skp, request, rc);return rc; }@@ -4263,11 +4257,12 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,*/ static int smack_key_getsecurity (struct key *key,char **_buffer) { -struct smack_known *skp = key->security; +struct smack_known **blob =smack_key (key); +struct smack_known *skp = *blob;size_t length;char *copy; -if (key->security ==NULL ) { +if (skp ==NULL ) { *_buffer =NULL ;return 0 ; }@@ -4550,6 +4545,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *), .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack), .lbs_ipc =sizeof (struct smack_known *), +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + .lbs_key = sizeof(struct smack_known *), +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ .lbs_msg_msg =sizeof (struct smack_known *), .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack), .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),@@ -4671,7 +4669,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {/* key management security hooks */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS LSM_HOOK_INIT (key_alloc, smack_key_alloc), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (key_free, smack_key_free),LSM_HOOK_INIT (key_permission, smack_key_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity), #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 4/28 LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
In reply to Casey SchauflerWhen more than one security module is exporting data to audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a structure to be used instead.
The lsmblob structure is currently an array of u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the security modules built into the system that would use secids if active. The system assigns the module a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are compiled in but not registered there will be unused slots.
A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +++++-- include/linux/security.h | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 +++- security/commoncap.c | 7 +++- security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 ++++- security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 ++++- security/security.c | 31 ++++++++++++++---- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 +++- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 ++++- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 +++- 11 files changed, 152 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +10 -2
@@ -2029,6 +2029,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ } __randomize_layout; +/* +* Information that identifies a security module. +*/ +struct lsm_id { +const char *lsm;/* Name of the LSM */ +int slot;/* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */ +}; +/* * Security module hook list structure. * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
@@ -2037,7 +2045,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {struct hlist_node list;struct hlist_head *head;union security_list_options hook; -char *lsm; +struct lsm_id *lsmid; } __randomize_layout;/*
@@ -2068,7 +2076,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;extern char *lsm_names;extern void security_add_hooks (struct security_hook_list *hooks,int count, -char *lsm); +struct lsm_id *lsmid);#define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)#define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)
include/linux/security.h +66 -0
72 lines not on this page · raw message
security/apparmor/lsm.c +6 -1
@@ -1138,6 +1138,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx), }; +static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="apparmor" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -1679,7 +1684,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) goto buffers_out; }security_add_hooks (apparmor_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (apparmor_hooks), -"apparmor" ); + &apparmor_lsmid);/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ apparmor_initialized =1 ;
security/commoncap.c +6 -1
@@ -1344,6 +1344,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="capability" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (capable, cap_capable), LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
@@ -1368,7 +1373,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {static int __init capability_init (void ) {security_add_hooks (capability_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (capability_hooks), -"capability" ); + &capability_lsmid);return 0 ; }
security/loadpin/loadpin.c +7 -1
@@ -181,6 +181,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)return loadpin_read_file (NULL , (enum kernel_read_file_id ) id); } +static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="loadpin" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),LSM_HOOK_INIT (kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
@@ -191,7 +196,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void) {pr_info ("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n" , enforce ?"" :"not " ); -security_add_hooks (loadpin_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (loadpin_hooks),"loadpin" ); +security_add_hooks (loadpin_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (loadpin_hooks), + &loadpin_lsmid);return 0 ; }
security/safesetid/lsm.c +7 -1
@@ -255,6 +255,11 @@ void flush_safesetid_whitelist_entries(void) } } +static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="safesetid" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; +static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),LSM_HOOK_INIT (capable, safesetid_security_capable)
@@ -263,7 +268,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {static int __init safesetid_security_init (void ) {security_add_hooks (safesetid_security_hooks, -ARRAY_SIZE (safesetid_security_hooks),"safesetid" ); +ARRAY_SIZE (safesetid_security_hooks), + &safesetid_lsmid);/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */ safesetid_initialized =1 ;
security/security.c +24 -7
@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)init_debug ("sock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_sock);init_debug ("superblock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);init_debug ("task blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_task); +init_debug ("lsmblob size = %lu\n" ,sizeof (struct lsmblob ));/* * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
@@ -399,7 +400,7 @@ static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm)return !strcmp (last, lsm); } -static int lsm_append (char *new,char **result) +static int lsm_append (const char *new,char **result) {char *cp;
@@ -420,24 +421,40 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)return 0 ; } +/* +* Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list. +*/ +static int lsm_slot__initdata ; +/** * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. * @hooks: the hooks to add * @count: the number of hooks to add -* @lsm: the name of the security module +* @lsmid: the identification information for the security module * * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure. +* If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot +* for it in the lsmblob. */ void __init security_add_hooks (struct security_hook_list *hooks,int count, -char *lsm) +struct lsm_id *lsmid) {int i; +if (lsmid->slot ==LSMBLOB_NEEDED ) { +if (lsm_slot >=LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ) +panic ("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n" , __func__); + lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++; +init_debug ("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n" , lsmid->lsm, + lsmid->slot); + } +for (i =0 ; i < count; i++) { - hooks[i].lsm = lsm; + hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;hlist_add_tail_rcu (&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); } -if (lsm_append (lsm, &lsm_names) <0 ) + +if (lsm_append (lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) <0 )panic ("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n" , __func__); }
@@ -1917,7 +1934,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,struct security_hook_list *hp;hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { -if (lsm !=NULL &&strcmp (lsm, hp->lsm)) +if (lsm !=NULL &&strcmp (lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))continue ;return hp->hook.getprocattr (p, name, value); }
@@ -1930,7 +1947,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,struct security_hook_list *hp;hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { -if (lsm !=NULL &&strcmp (lsm, hp->lsm)) +if (lsm !=NULL &&strcmp (lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))continue ;return hp->hook.setprocattr (name, value, size); }
security/selinux/hooks.c +7 -1
@@ -6622,6 +6622,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), }; +static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="selinux" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),LSM_HOOK_INIT (binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
@@ -6877,7 +6882,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)hashtab_cache_init (); -security_add_hooks (selinux_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (selinux_hooks),"selinux" ); +security_add_hooks (selinux_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (selinux_hooks), + &selinux_lsmid);if (avc_add_callback (selinux_netcache_avc_callback,AVC_CALLBACK_RESET ))panic ("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n" );
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +6 -1
@@ -4553,6 +4553,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack), }; +static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="smack" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -4743,7 +4748,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)/* * Register with LSM */ -security_add_hooks (smack_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (smack_hooks),"smack" ); +security_add_hooks (smack_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid); smack_enabled =1 ;pr_info ("Smack: Initializing.\n" );
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +7 -1
@@ -529,6 +529,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task) } } +static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="tomoyo" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; +/* * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for * registering TOMOYO.
@@ -581,7 +586,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)struct tomoyo_task *s =tomoyo_task (current);/* register ourselves with the security framework */ -security_add_hooks (tomoyo_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (tomoyo_hooks),"tomoyo" ); +security_add_hooks (tomoyo_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (tomoyo_hooks), + &tomoyo_lsmid);pr_info ("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n" ); s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;atomic_inc (&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
security/yama/yama_lsm.c +6 -1
@@ -425,6 +425,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)return rc; } +static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="yama" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -482,7 +487,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }static int __init yama_init (void ) {pr_info ("Yama: becoming mindful.\n" ); -security_add_hooks (yama_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (yama_hooks),"yama" ); +security_add_hooks (yama_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);yama_init_sysctl ();return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v8 04/28] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
Quoted 5 lines · Casey Schaufler
When more than one security module is exporting data to audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a structure to be used instead.
Quoted 7 lines
The lsmblob structure is currently an array of u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the security modules built into the system that would use secids if active. The system assigns the module a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are compiled in but not registered there will be unused slots.
I won't obstruct the patch on naming but I do have to wonder about the use of lsmblob here given that we use the term "security blobs" elsewhere to refer to what the ->security fields reference and this is not the same thing. Not sure why it wasn't just lsmsecids or similar, but whatever.
Quoted 5 lines
A new
lsm_idstructure, which contains the name of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
Is it really desirable/necessary to duplicate the module name, once in the lsm_id and once in the lsm_info? Again, not a blocker for me but seems unfortunate.
Quoted 85 lines
Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +++++-- include/linux/security.h | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 +++- security/commoncap.c | 7 +++- security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 ++++- security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 ++++- security/security.c | 31 ++++++++++++++---- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 +++- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 ++++- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 +++- 11 files changed, 152 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +10
-2@@ -2029,6 +2029,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ } __randomize_layout; +/* +* Information that identifies a security module. +*/ +struct lsm_id { +const char *lsm;/* Name of the LSM */ +int slot;/* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */ +}; +/* * Security module hook list structure. * For use with generic list macros for common operations. @@ -2037,7 +2045,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {struct hlist_node list;struct hlist_head *head;union security_list_options hook; -char *lsm; +struct lsm_id *lsmid; } __randomize_layout;/* @@ -2068,7 +2076,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;extern char *lsm_names;extern void security_add_hooks (struct security_hook_list *hooks,int count, -char *lsm); +struct lsm_id *lsmid);#define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)#define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)include/linux/security.h +22
-0@@ -76,6 +76,72 @@ enum lsm_event { LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, }; +/* +* Data exported by the security modules +* +* Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included. +*/ +#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0)) + +struct lsmblob { +u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ]; +}; + +#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1/* Not a valid LSM slot number */ +#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2/* Slot requested on initialization */ +#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3/* Slot not requested */ + +/** +* lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure. +* @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize +* @secid: The initial secid value
include/linux/security.h enum lsm_event { · line 110
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/security.h +10
-0+* +* Set all secid for all modules to the specified value. +*/ +static inline void lsmblob_init (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 secid) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) + blob->secid[i] = secid; +}
This seems nonsensical for any value other than 0. Otherwise, we should only set it for the module that produced the secid originally? And if setting them all to zero, you could just do a memset.
Quoted 5 lines
include/linux/security.h +5
-0+ +/** +* lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob +* @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data +*
include/linux/security.h enum lsm_event { · line 125
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/security.h +10
-0+* Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise +*/ +static inline bool lsmblob_is_set (struct lsmblob *blob) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) +if (blob->secid[i] !=0 ) +return true; +return false;
memcmp against the all-zeroes lsmblob?
Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/security.h +7
-0+} + +/** +* lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal +* @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data +* @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data +*
include/linux/security.h enum lsm_event { · line 142
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/security.h +10
-0+* Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise +*/ +static inline bool lsmblob_equal (struct lsmblob *bloba,struct lsmblob *blobb) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) +if (bloba->secid[i] != blobb->secid[i]) +return false; +return true;
memcmp of the two blobs?
Quoted 294 lines
include/linux/security.h +2
-0+} +/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable (const struct cred *cred,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,unsigned int opts);security/apparmor/lsm.c +6
-1@@ -1138,6 +1138,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx), }; +static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="apparmor" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),@@ -1679,7 +1684,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) goto buffers_out; }security_add_hooks (apparmor_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (apparmor_hooks), -"apparmor" ); + &apparmor_lsmid);/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ apparmor_initialized =1 ;security/commoncap.c +6
-1@@ -1344,6 +1344,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="capability" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (capable, cap_capable), LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),@@ -1368,7 +1373,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {static int __init capability_init (void ) {security_add_hooks (capability_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (capability_hooks), -"capability" ); + &capability_lsmid);return 0 ; }security/loadpin/loadpin.c +7
-1@@ -181,6 +181,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)return loadpin_read_file (NULL , (enum kernel_read_file_id ) id); } +static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="loadpin" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),LSM_HOOK_INIT (kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),@@ -191,7 +196,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void) {pr_info ("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n" , enforce ?"" :"not " ); -security_add_hooks (loadpin_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (loadpin_hooks),"loadpin" ); +security_add_hooks (loadpin_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (loadpin_hooks), + &loadpin_lsmid);return 0 ; }security/safesetid/lsm.c +7
-1@@ -255,6 +255,11 @@ void flush_safesetid_whitelist_entries(void) } } +static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="safesetid" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; +static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),LSM_HOOK_INIT (capable, safesetid_security_capable)@@ -263,7 +268,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {static int __init safesetid_security_init (void ) {security_add_hooks (safesetid_security_hooks, -ARRAY_SIZE (safesetid_security_hooks),"safesetid" ); +ARRAY_SIZE (safesetid_security_hooks), + &safesetid_lsmid);/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */ safesetid_initialized =1 ;security/security.c +24
-7@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)init_debug ("sock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_sock);init_debug ("superblock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);init_debug ("task blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_task); +init_debug ("lsmblob size = %lu\n" ,sizeof (struct lsmblob ));/* * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs @@ -399,7 +400,7 @@ static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm)return !strcmp (last, lsm); } -static int lsm_append (char *new,char **result) +static int lsm_append (const char *new,char **result) {char *cp;@@ -420,24 +421,40 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)return 0 ; } +/* +* Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list. +*/ +static int lsm_slot__initdata ; +/** * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. * @hooks: the hooks to add * @count: the number of hooks to add -* @lsm: the name of the security module +* @lsmid: the identification information for the security module * * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure. +* If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot +* for it in the lsmblob. */ void __init security_add_hooks (struct security_hook_list *hooks,int count, -char *lsm) +struct lsm_id *lsmid) {int i; +if (lsmid->slot ==LSMBLOB_NEEDED ) { +if (lsm_slot >=LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ) +panic ("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n" , __func__); + lsmid->slot = lsm_slot++; +init_debug ("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n" , lsmid->lsm, + lsmid->slot); + } +for (i =0 ; i < count; i++) { - hooks[i].lsm = lsm; + hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;hlist_add_tail_rcu (&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); } -if (lsm_append (lsm, &lsm_names) <0 ) + +if (lsm_append (lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names) <0 )panic ("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n" , __func__); }@@ -1917,7 +1934,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,struct security_hook_list *hp;hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { -if (lsm !=NULL &&strcmp (lsm, hp->lsm)) +if (lsm !=NULL &&strcmp (lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))continue ;return hp->hook.getprocattr (p, name, value); }@@ -1930,7 +1947,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,struct security_hook_list *hp;hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { -if (lsm !=NULL &&strcmp (lsm, hp->lsm)) +if (lsm !=NULL &&strcmp (lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))continue ;return hp->hook.setprocattr (name, value, size); }security/selinux/hooks.c +7
-1@@ -6622,6 +6622,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), }; +static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="selinux" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),LSM_HOOK_INIT (binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),@@ -6877,7 +6882,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)hashtab_cache_init (); -security_add_hooks (selinux_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (selinux_hooks),"selinux" ); +security_add_hooks (selinux_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (selinux_hooks), + &selinux_lsmid);if (avc_add_callback (selinux_netcache_avc_callback,AVC_CALLBACK_RESET ))panic ("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n" );security/smack/smack_lsm.c +6
-1@@ -4553,6 +4553,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack), }; +static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="smack" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),@@ -4743,7 +4748,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)/* * Register with LSM */ -security_add_hooks (smack_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (smack_hooks),"smack" ); +security_add_hooks (smack_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid); smack_enabled =1 ;pr_info ("Smack: Initializing.\n" );security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +7
-1@@ -529,6 +529,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task) } } +static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="tomoyo" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; +/* * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for * registering TOMOYO. @@ -581,7 +586,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)struct tomoyo_task *s =tomoyo_task (current);/* register ourselves with the security framework */ -security_add_hooks (tomoyo_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (tomoyo_hooks),"tomoyo" ); +security_add_hooks (tomoyo_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (tomoyo_hooks), + &tomoyo_lsmid);pr_info ("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n" ); s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;atomic_inc (&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);security/yama/yama_lsm.c +6
-1@@ -425,6 +425,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)return rc; } +static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="yama" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),@@ -482,7 +487,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }static int __init yama_init (void ) {pr_info ("Yama: becoming mindful.\n" ); -security_add_hooks (yama_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (yama_hooks),"yama" ); +security_add_hooks (yama_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);yama_init_sysctl ();return 0 ; }
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v8 04/28] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
Quoted 14 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines · Casey Schaufler
When more than one security module is exporting data to audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a structure to be used instead.
Quoted 7 lines
The lsmblob structure is currently an array of u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the security modules built into the system that would use secids if active. The system assigns the module a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are compiled in but not registered there will be unused slots.
Quoted 1 line
I won't obstruct the patch on naming but I do have to wonder about the use of lsmblob here given that we use the term "security blobs" elsewhere to refer to what the ->security fields reference and this is not the same thing. Not sure why it wasn't just lsmsecids or similar, but whatever.
In earlier versions of the patch I used "struct secids" and found it incredibly difficult to recognize the difference between uses of a secid and a struct secids. Brains trained in the English language tend to treat an ending 's' as a modifier, making the distinction difficult to see. I also have not given up on the possibility of moving the interfaces away from using secids at some point in the future.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
A new
lsm_idstructure, which contains the name of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.Is it really desirable/necessary to duplicate the module name, once in the
lsm_idand once in the lsm_info? Again, not a blocker for me but seems unfortunate.
Possibly not, but with one of them being __init data it's really hard to justify putting a lot of effort into avoiding the duplication.
Quoted 85 lines
Quoted 85 lines
Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 +++++-- include/linux/security.h | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 +++-
security/commoncap.c | 7 +++-security/loadpin/loadpin.c| 8 ++++- security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 ++++-
security/security.c | 31 ++++++++++++++---- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++-security/smack/smack_lsm.c| 7 +++- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 ++++- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 +++-11 files changed, 152 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +0
-0@@ -2029,6 +2029,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads { #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ } __randomize_layout;+/*
+ * Information that identifies a security module.
+ */include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +5
-0+struct lsm_id { + const char *lsm; /* Name of the LSM */ + int slot; /* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */ +}; +/*
* Security module hook list structure.
* For use with generic list macros for common operations.include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +2
-2@@ -2037,7 +2045,7 @@ struct security_hook_list { struct hlist_node list; struct hlist_head *head; union security_list_options hook; - char *lsm; + struct lsm_id *lsmid; } __randomize_layout; /*@@ -2068,7 +2076,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads; extern char *lsm_names; extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, - char *lsm); + struct lsm_id *lsmid); #define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0) #define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)include/linux/security.h +0
-0@@ -76,6 +76,72 @@ enum lsm_event { LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, };+/*
+ * Data exported by the security modules
+ *
+ * Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included.
+ */include/linux/security.h +21
-0+#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0)) + +struct lsmblob { + u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES]; +}; + +#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1/* Not a valid LSM slot number */ +#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2/* Slot requested on initialization */ +#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3/* Slot not requested */ + +/** +* lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure. +* @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize +* @secid: The initial secid value +* +* Set all secid for all modules to the specified value. +*/ +static inline void lsmblob_init (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 secid)
Quoted 8 lines
include/linux/security.h enum lsm_event { · line 110
Quoted 6 lines
include/linux/security.h +6
-0+{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++) + blob->secid[i] = secid; +}This seems nonsensical for any value other than 0. Otherwise, we should only set it for the module that produced the secid originally? And if setting them all to zero, you could just do a memset.
Yes, it does, but it isn't. There are cases where setting all of the secids to a value other than zero makes sense, at least when there's scaffolding involved. One example is with secmarks, where we know the secid value, but not necessarily which security module is responsible for it. We know that it will be set and consumed by the same module, but not which it is at that point. You can argue this should be lsmblob_set() instead of lsmblob_init(), but that's confusing, too.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/security.h +9
-0+ +/** +* lsmblob_is_set - report if there is an value in the lsmblob +* @blob: Pointer to the exported LSM data +* +* Returns true if there is a secid set, false otherwise +*/ +static inline bool lsmblob_is_set (struct lsmblob *blob) +{
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ if (blob->secid[i] != 0)
+ return true;
+ return false;memcmp against the all-zeroes lsmblob?
Sure.
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
include/linux/security.h +11
-0+} + +/** +* lsmblob_equal - report if the two lsmblob's are equal +* @bloba: Pointer to one LSM data +* @blobb: Pointer to the other LSM data +* +* Returns true if all entries in the two are equal, false otherwise +*/ +static inline bool lsmblob_equal (struct lsmblob *bloba,struct lsmblob *blobb) +{
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ if (bloba->secid[i] != blobb->secid[i]) + return false;
+ return true;memcmp of the two blobs?
Sure.
Quoted 270 lines
Quoted 269 lines
include/linux/security.h +2
-0+} +/* These functions are in
security/commoncap.c*/
extern intcap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, unsigned int opts);security/apparmor/lsm.c +5
-1@@ -1138,6 +1138,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx), }; +static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm = "apparmor", + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),@@ -1679,7 +1684,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) goto buffers_out; } security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks), - "apparmor"); + &apparmor_lsmid); /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ apparmor_initialized = 1;security/commoncap.c +5
-1@@ -1344,6 +1344,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm = "capability", + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable), LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),@@ -1368,7 +1373,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { static int __init capability_init(void) { security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks), - "capability"); + &capability_lsmid); return 0; }diff --git
a/security/loadpin/loadpin.cb/security/loadpin/loadpin.cindex055fb0a64169..7b23fdf24e27100644security/loadpin/loadpin.c +6
-1@@ -181,6 +181,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id); } +static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm = "loadpin", + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),@@ -191,7 +196,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void) { pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n", enforce ? "" : "not "); - security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin"); + security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), + &loadpin_lsmid); return 0; }diff --git
a/security/safesetid/lsm.cb/security/safesetid/lsm.cindexcecd38e2ac80..4a96cd8c0d15100644security/safesetid/lsm.c +6
-1@@ -255,6 +255,11 @@ void flush_safesetid_whitelist_entries(void) } } +static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm = "safesetid", + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)@@ -263,7 +268,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = { static int __init safesetid_security_init(void) { security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks, - ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid"); + ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), + &safesetid_lsmid); /* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */ safesetid_initialized = 1;security/security.c +2
-0@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock); init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task); + init_debug("lsmblob size = %lu\n", sizeof(struct lsmblob)); /** Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs @@ -399,7 +400,7 @@ static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm) return !strcmp(last, lsm); } -static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result) +static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result) { char *cp; @@ -420,24 +421,40 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list.
+ */security/security.c +2
-0+static int lsm_slot__initdata ; +/**
*security_add_hooks- Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
* @hooks: the hooks to add
* @count: the number of hooks to add
- * @lsm: the name of the security module
+ * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module
*
* Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
+ * If the LSM is using hooks that export secids allocate a slot
+ * for it in the lsmblob.
*/
void__initsecurity_add_hooks(structsecurity_hook_list*hooks, int count,
- char *lsm)
+ structlsm_id*lsmid)
{
int i;
+ if (lsmid->slot==LSMBLOB_NEEDED) {
+ if (lsm_slot>=LSMBLOB_ENTRIES)
+panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
+lsmid->slot= lsm_slot++;
+ init_debug("%s assigned lsmblob slot %d\n",lsmid->lsm,
+lsmid->slot);
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
+ hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
}
- if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names)< 0)
+
+ if (lsm_append(lsmid->lsm, &lsm_names)< 0)
panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
}
@@ -1917,7 +1934,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(structtask_struct*p, const char *lsm, char *name, structsecurity_hook_list*hp;
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list){
- if (lsm != NULL &&strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
+ if (lsm != NULL &&strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
continue;
returnhp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
}security/security.c +1
-1@@ -1930,7 +1947,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, struct security_hook_list *hp; hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { - if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) + if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm)) continue; return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); }security/selinux/hooks.c +6
-0@@ -6622,6 +6622,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), }; +static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm = "selinux", + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),@@ -6877,7 +6882,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void) hashtab_cache_init(); - security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux"); + security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), + &selinux_lsmid); if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET)) panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");security/smack/smack_lsm.c +5
-1@@ -4553,6 +4553,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack), }; +static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm = "smack", + .slot = LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),@@ -4743,7 +4748,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) /* * Register with LSM */ - security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack"); + security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid); smack_enabled = 1; pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +6
-1@@ -529,6 +529,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task) } } +static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm = "tomoyo", + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + /** tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for * registering TOMOYO. @@ -581,7 +586,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void) struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current); /* register ourselves with the security framework */ - security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo"); + security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), + &tomoyo_lsmid); pr_info("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n"); s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain; atomic_inc(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);security/yama/yama_lsm.c +5
-1@@ -425,6 +425,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) return rc; } +static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm = "yama", + .slot = LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),@@ -482,7 +487,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { } static int __init yama_init(void) { pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n"); - security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), "yama"); + security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid); yama_init_sysctl(); return 0; }
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 5/28 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the lsmblob instead of a u32. In some cases this requires a temporary conversion using lsmblob_init() that will go away when other interfaces get converted.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditfilter.c | 7 +++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++-- security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -1761,7 +1761,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY int security_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **lsmrule);int security_audit_rule_known (struct audit_krule *krule); -int security_audit_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op,void *lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_match (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 field,u32 op, +void *lsmrule);void security_audit_rule_free (void *lsmrule);#else
@@ -1777,8 +1778,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)return 0 ; } -static inline int security_audit_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op, -void *lsmrule) +static inline int security_audit_rule_match (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 field, +u32 op,void *lsmrule) {return 0 ; }
kernel/auditfilter.c +5 -2
@@ -1324,6 +1324,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];pid_t pid;u32 sid; +struct lsmblob blob;switch (f->type) {case AUDIT_PID :
@@ -1354,8 +1355,10 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR :if (f->lsm_rule) {security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); - result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, - f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); + result =security_audit_rule_match ( + &blob, f->type, + f->op, f->lsm_rule); }break ;case AUDIT_EXE :
kernel/auditsc.c +10 -4
@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,const struct cred *cred;int i, need_sid =1 ;u32 sid; +struct lsmblob blob;unsigned int sessionid; cred =rcu_dereference_check (tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
@@ -630,7 +631,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,security_task_getsecid (tsk, &sid); need_sid =0 ; } - result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, f->type, +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); + result =security_audit_rule_match (&blob, + f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); }
@@ -645,15 +648,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,if (f->lsm_rule) {/* Find files that match */ if (name) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, name->osid); result =security_audit_rule_match ( - name->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); }else if (ctx) {list_for_each_entry (n, &ctx->names_list, list) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, n->osid);if (security_audit_rule_match ( - n->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule)) {
@@ -665,7 +670,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,/* Find ipc objects that match */ if (!ctx || ctx->type !=AUDIT_IPC )break ; -if (security_audit_rule_match (ctx->ipc.osid, +lsmblob_init (&blob, ctx->ipc.osid); +if (security_audit_rule_match (&blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule)) ++result;
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2 -2
@@ -307,8 +307,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,return -EINVAL ; } -static inline int security_filter_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op, -void *lsmrule) +static inline int security_filter_rule_match (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 field, +u32 op,void *lsmrule) {return -EINVAL ; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +5 -2
@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) {int rc =0 ;u32 osid; +struct lsmblob blob;int retried =0 ;if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
@@ -337,7 +338,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_OBJ_ROLE :case LSM_OBJ_TYPE :security_inode_getsecid (inode, &osid); - rc =security_filter_rule_match (osid, +lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); + rc =security_filter_rule_match (&blob, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule);
@@ -345,7 +347,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_SUBJ_USER :case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE :case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE : - rc =security_filter_rule_match (secid, +lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); + rc =security_filter_rule_match (&blob, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rule);
security/security.c +15 -3
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)/* * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list. */ -static int lsm_slot__initdata ; +static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;/** * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
@@ -2433,9 +2433,21 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); } -int security_audit_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op,void *lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_match (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 field,u32 op, +void *lsmrule) { -return call_int_hook (audit_rule_match,0 , secid, field, op, lsmrule); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc; + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match (blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], + field, op, lsmrule); +if (rc !=0 ) +return rc; + } +return 0 ; }#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 6/28 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_kernel_act_as interface to use a lsmblob structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of module stacking. Change it's only caller, set_security_override, to do the same. Change that one's only caller, set_security_override_from_ctx, to call it with the new parameter type.
--- include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- kernel/cred.c | 10 ++++++---- security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
include/linux/cred.h +2 -1
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@struct cred ;struct inode ; +struct lsmblob ;/* * COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);extern void revert_creds (const struct cred *);extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred (struct task_struct *);extern int change_create_files_as (struct cred *,struct inode *); -extern int set_security_override (struct cred *,u32 ); +extern int set_security_override (struct cred *,struct lsmblob *);extern int set_security_override_from_ctx (struct cred *,const char *);extern int set_create_files_as (struct cred *,struct inode *);extern int cred_fscmp (const struct cred *,const struct cred *);
include/linux/security.h +3 -2
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);int security_prepare_creds (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old,gfp_t gfp);void security_transfer_creds (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old);void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,u32 *secid); -int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,u32 secid); +int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_kernel_create_files_as (struct cred *new,struct inode *inode);int security_kernel_module_request (char *kmod_name);int security_kernel_load_data (enum kernel_load_data_id id);
@@ -971,7 +971,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, { } -static inline int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *cred,u32 secid) +static inline int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob) {return 0 ; }
kernel/cred.c +6 -4
@@ -701,14 +701,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);/** * set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials * @new: The credentials to alter -* @secid: The LSM security ID to set +* @blob: The LSM security information to set * * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used. */ -int set_security_override (struct cred *new,u32 secid) +int set_security_override (struct cred *new,struct lsmblob *blob) { -return security_kernel_act_as (new, secid); +return security_kernel_act_as (new, blob); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (set_security_override);
@@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);*/ int set_security_override_from_ctx (struct cred *new,const char *secctx) { +struct lsmblob blob;u32 secid;int ret;
@@ -731,7 +732,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)if (ret <0 )return ret; -return set_security_override (new, secid); +lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); +return set_security_override (new, &blob); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (set_security_override_from_ctx);
security/security.c +12 -2
@@ -1627,9 +1627,19 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_cred_getsecid); -int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,u32 secid) +int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,struct lsmblob *blob) { -return call_int_hook (kernel_act_as,0 , new, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc; + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.kernel_act_as (new, blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); +if (rc !=0 ) +return rc; + } +return 0 ; }int security_kernel_create_files_as (struct cred *new,struct inode *inode)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 7/28 net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the data used in UDS SO_PEERSEC processing from a secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update the security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() interface to use the lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code that will come out when the security_secid_to_secctx() code is brought in line with the lsmblob.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++-- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/scm.h | 8 +++++--- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 +++++--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +++--- security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +5 -2
@@ -1280,7 +1280,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);int security_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_socket_getpeersec_stream (struct socket *sock,char __user *optval,int __user *optlen,unsigned len); -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid); +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsmblob *blob);int security_sk_alloc (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority);void security_sk_free (struct sock *sk);void security_sk_clone (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1418,7 +1419,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __return -ENOPROTOOPT ; } -static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid) +static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock, +struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsmblob *blob) {return -ENOPROTOOPT ; }
include/net/af_unix.h +1 -1
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {kgid_t gid;struct scm_fp_list *fp;/* Passed files */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK -u32 secid;/* Security ID */ +struct lsmblob lsmblob;/* Security LSM data */ #endif u32 consumed; } __randomize_layout;
include/net/scm.h +5 -3
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {struct scm_fp_list *fp;/* Passed files */ struct scm_creds creds;/* Skb credentials */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK -u32 secid;/* Passed security ID */ +struct lsmblob lsmblob;/* Passed LSM data */ #endif };
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK static __inline__void unix_get_peersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct scm_cookie *scm) { -security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (sock,NULL , &scm->secid); +security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (sock,NULL , &scm->lsmblob); }#else static __inline__void unix_get_peersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct scm_cookie *scm)
@@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scint err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen); +/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */ + err =security_secid_to_secctx (scm->lsmblob.secid[0 ], + &secdata, &seclen);if (!err) {put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata);
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +5 -3
@@ -130,15 +130,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,static void ip_cmsg_recv_security (struct msghdr *msg,struct sk_buff *skb) { +struct lsmblob lb;char *secdata; -u32 seclen, secid; +u32 seclen;int err; - err =security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (NULL , skb, &secid); + err =security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (NULL , skb, &lb);if (err)return ; - err =security_secid_to_secctx (secid, &secdata, &seclen); +/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */ + err =security_secid_to_secctx (lb.secid[0 ], &secdata, &seclen);if (err)return ;
net/unix/af_unix.c +3 -3
@@ -143,17 +143,17 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK static void unix_get_secdata (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb) { -UNIXCB (skb).secid = scm->secid; +UNIXCB (skb).lsmblob = scm->lsmblob; }static inline void unix_set_secdata (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb) { - scm->secid =UNIXCB (skb).secid; + scm->lsmblob =UNIXCB (skb).lsmblob; }static inline bool unix_secdata_eq (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb) { -return (scm->secid ==UNIXCB (skb).secid); +return lsmblob_equal (&scm->lsmblob, &(UNIXCB (skb).lsmblob)); }#else static inline void unix_get_secdata (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb)
security/security.c +15 -3
@@ -2120,10 +2120,22 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, optval, optlen, len); } -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid) +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsmblob *blob) { -return call_int_hook (socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT , sock, - skb, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT ; + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram, + list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram (sock, skb, + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); +if (rc !=0 ) +break ; + } +return rc; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 8/28 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange security_secctx_to_secid() to fill in a lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. Multiple LSMs may be able to interpret the string, and this allows for setting whichever secid is appropriate. In some cases there is scaffolding where other interfaces have yet to be converted.
--- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- kernel/cred.c | 4 +--- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 13 ++++++------- net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 5 ++++- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 14 ++++++++------ security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +3 -2
@@ -447,7 +447,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name);int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); -int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid); +int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen);void security_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode);
@@ -1230,7 +1231,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclestatic inline int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, -u32 *secid) +struct lsmblob *blob) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
kernel/cred.c +1 -3
@@ -725,14 +725,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);int set_security_override_from_ctx (struct cred *new,const char *secctx) {struct lsmblob blob; -u32 secid;int ret; - ret =security_secctx_to_secid (secctx,strlen (secctx), &secid); + ret =security_secctx_to_secid (secctx,strlen (secctx), &blob);if (ret <0 )return ret; -lsmblob_init (&blob, secid);return set_security_override (new, &blob); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (set_security_override_from_ctx);
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c +6 -7
@@ -576,21 +576,20 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {static int nft_secmark_compute_secid (struct nft_secmark *priv) { -u32 tmp_secid =0 ; +struct lsmblob blob;int err; - err =security_secctx_to_secid (priv->ctx,strlen (priv->ctx), &tmp_secid); + err =security_secctx_to_secid (priv->ctx,strlen (priv->ctx), &blob);if (err)return err; -if (!tmp_secid) -return -ENOENT ; - - err =security_secmark_relabel_packet (tmp_secid); +/* Using le[0] is scaffolding */ + err =security_secmark_relabel_packet (blob.secid[0 ]);if (err)return err; - priv->secid = tmp_secid; +/* Using le[0] is scaffolding */ + priv->secid = blob.secid[0 ];return 0 ; }
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c +4 -1
@@ -49,13 +49,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)static int checkentry_lsm (struct xt_secmark_target_info *info) { +struct lsmblob blob;int err; info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX -1 ] ='\0' ; info->secid =0 ; err =security_secctx_to_secid (info->secctx,strlen (info->secctx), - &info->secid); + &blob);if (err) {if (err == -EINVAL ) pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
@@ -63,6 +64,8 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)return err; } +/* scaffolding during the transition */ + info->secid = blob.secid[0 ];if (!info->secid) {pr_info_ratelimited ("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n" , info->secctx);
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +8 -6
@@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,void *addr;void *mask;u32 addr_len; -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;struct netlbl_audit audit_info;/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -919,12 +919,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb, ret_val =security_secctx_to_secid (nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]),nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]), - &secid); + &blob);if (ret_val !=0 )return ret_val; +/* scaffolding with the [0] */ return netlbl_unlhsh_add (&init_net, - dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid, + dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0 ], &audit_info); }
@@ -946,7 +947,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,void *addr;void *mask;u32 addr_len; -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;struct netlbl_audit audit_info;/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -968,12 +969,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb, ret_val =security_secctx_to_secid (nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]),nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]), - &secid); + &blob);if (ret_val !=0 )return ret_val; +/* scaffolding with the [0] */ return netlbl_unlhsh_add (&init_net, -NULL , addr, mask, addr_len, secid, +NULL , addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0 ], &audit_info); }
security/security.c +15 -3
@@ -1982,10 +1982,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secid_to_secctx); -int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid) +int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; -return call_int_hook (secctx_to_secid,0 , secdata, seclen, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid (secdata, seclen, + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); +if (rc !=0 ) +return rc; + } +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secctx_to_secid);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 9/28 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange security_secid_to_secctx() to take a lsmblob as input instead of a u32 secid. It will then call the LSM hooks using the lsmblob element allocated for that module. The callers have been updated as well. This allows for the possibility that more than one module may be called upon to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the audit code.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 4 +++- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- include/net/scm.h | 5 ++--- kernel/audit.c | 9 +++++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++---- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 8 ++++++-- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 +++- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 8 ++++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 6 +++--- security/security.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 12 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +3 -1
@@ -3120,9 +3120,11 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &secid); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz); +lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ; return_error_param = ret;
include/linux/security.h +3 -2
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, size_t size);int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name); -int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen);
@@ -1224,7 +1224,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)return 0 ; } -static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob, +char **secdata,u32 *seclen) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
include/net/scm.h +2 -3
@@ -97,9 +97,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scint err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { -/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */ - err =security_secid_to_secctx (scm->lsmblob.secid[0 ], - &secdata, &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &secdata, + &seclen);if (!err) {put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata);
kernel/audit.c +7 -2
@@ -1430,7 +1430,10 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO : len =0 ;if (audit_sig_sid) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len); +struct lsmblob blob; + +lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_sig_sid); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len);if (err)return err; }
@@ -2073,12 +2076,14 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)unsigned len;int error;u32 sid; +struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (current, &sid);if (!sid)return 0 ; - error =security_secid_to_secctx (sid, &ctx, &len); +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); + error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len);if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL ) goto error_path;
kernel/auditsc.c +10 -4
@@ -947,6 +947,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len;int rc =0 ; +struct lsmblob blob; ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_OBJ_PID );if (!ab)
@@ -956,7 +957,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);if (sid) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (sid, &ctx, &len)) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else {
@@ -1198,7 +1200,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)if (osid) {char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len; -if (security_secid_to_secctx (osid, &ctx, &len)) { +struct lsmblob blob; + +lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , osid); *call_panic =1 ; }else {
@@ -1349,9 +1354,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,if (n->osid !=0 ) {char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len; +struct lsmblob blob; -if (security_secid_to_secctx ( - n->osid, &ctx, &len)) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, n->osid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , n->osid);if (call_panic) *call_panic =2 ;
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +1 -2
@@ -139,8 +139,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)if (err)return ; -/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */ - err =security_secid_to_secctx (lb.secid[0 ], &secdata, &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &secdata, &seclen);if (err)return ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +6 -2
@@ -330,8 +330,10 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)struct nlattr *nest_secctx;int len, ret;char *secctx; +struct lsmblob blob; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (ct->secmark, &secctx, &len); +lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len);if (ret)return 0 ;
@@ -615,8 +617,10 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct) {#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK int len, ret; +struct lsmblob blob; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (ct->secmark,NULL , &len); +lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob,NULL , &len);if (ret)return 0 ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +3 -1
@@ -175,8 +175,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)int ret;u32 len;char *secctx; +struct lsmblob blob; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (ct->secmark, &secctx, &len); +lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len);if (ret)return ;
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +6 -2
@@ -309,13 +309,17 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata) {u32 seclen =0 ;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK ) +struct lsmblob blob; +if (!skb || !sk_fullsock (skb->sk))return 0 ;read_lock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); -if (skb->secmark) -security_secid_to_secctx (skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen); +if (skb->secmark) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, skb->secmark); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, secdata, &seclen); + }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);#endif
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +14 -4
@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf =NULL ;char *secctx =NULL ;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob;if (addr_len !=sizeof (struct in_addr ) && addr_len !=sizeof (struct in6_addr ))
@@ -451,7 +452,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net, unlhsh_add_return:rcu_read_unlock ();if (audit_buf !=NULL ) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (secid, +lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx);
@@ -488,6 +490,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,struct net_device *dev;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock); list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -507,8 +510,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net, addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev); +if (entry !=NULL ) +lsmblob_init (&blob, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (entry->secid, +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx);security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -550,6 +555,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,struct net_device *dev;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock); list_entry =netlbl_af6list_remove (addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -568,8 +574,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net, addr, mask);if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev); +if (entry !=NULL ) +lsmblob_init (&blob, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (entry->secid, +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx);security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1090,6 +1098,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,u32 secid;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob; data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid, cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1144,7 +1153,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd, secid = addr6->secid; } - ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (secid, &secctx, &secctx_len); +lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); + ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +3 -3
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob;if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )return NULL ;
@@ -112,10 +113,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid), audit_info->sessionid); +lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_info->secid);if (audit_info->secid !=0 && -security_secid_to_secctx (audit_info->secid, - &secctx, - &secctx_len) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , secctx);security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); }
security/security.c +13 -3
@@ -1975,10 +1975,20 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_ismaclabel); -int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) { -return call_int_hook (secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , secid, secdata, - seclen); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc; + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx (blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], + secdata, seclen); +if (rc !=0 ) +return rc; + } +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secid_to_secctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 10/28 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerThere may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The audit data structure containing the secid will be updated later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 5 ++++- security/security.c | 12 +++++++++--- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);void security_task_to_inode (struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode);int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,short flag); -void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,u32 *secid); +void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg *msg);void security_msg_msg_free (struct msg_msg *msg);int security_msg_queue_alloc (struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -1102,9 +1102,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,return 0 ; } -static inline void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,u32 *secid) +static inline void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, +struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); }static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg *msg)
kernel/auditsc.c +4 -1
@@ -2268,11 +2268,14 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)void __audit_ipc_obj (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) {struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); +struct lsmblob blob; context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; context->ipc.has_perm =0 ; -security_ipc_getsecid (ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); +security_ipc_getsecid (ipcp, &blob); +/* scaffolding on the [0] - change "osid" to a lsmblob */ + context->ipc.osid = blob.secid[0 ]; context->type =AUDIT_IPC ; }
security/security.c +9 -3
@@ -1795,10 +1795,16 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)return call_int_hook (ipc_permission,0 , ipcp, flag); } -void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,u32 *secid) +void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; -call_void_hook (ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + hp->hook.ipc_getsecid (ipcp, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } }int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg *msg)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 11/28 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_task_getsecid() interface to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all possible secids for possible reporting.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 4 +--- include/linux/security.h | 7 +++--- kernel/audit.c | 6 ++--- kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +--- kernel/auditsc.c | 22 ++++++++++++------ net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 +++- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 33 +++++++++++++++------------ security/security.c | 12 +++++++--- 10 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +1 -3
@@ -3119,11 +3119,9 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->priority =task_nice (current);if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) { -u32 secid;struct lsmblob blob; -security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &secid); -lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); +security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &blob); ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ;
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,int security_task_setpgid (struct task_struct *p,pid_t pgid);int security_task_getpgid (struct task_struct *p);int security_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p); -void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid); +void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p,int nice);int security_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p,int ioprio);int security_task_getioprio (struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1029,9 +1029,10 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)return 0 ; } -static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid) +static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p, +struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); }static inline int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p,int nice)
kernel/audit.c +2 -4
@@ -2075,14 +2075,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)char *ctx =NULL ;unsigned len;int error; -u32 sid;struct lsmblob blob; -security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); -if (!sid) +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))return 0 ; -lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len);if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL )
kernel/auditfilter.c +1 -3
@@ -1323,7 +1323,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)for (i =0 ; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];pid_t pid; -u32 sid;struct lsmblob blob;switch (f->type) {
@@ -1354,8 +1353,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN :case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR :if (f->lsm_rule) { -security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); -lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); result =security_audit_rule_match ( &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
kernel/auditsc.c +15 -7
@@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, {const struct cred *cred;int i, need_sid =1 ; -u32 sid;struct lsmblob blob;unsigned int sessionid;
@@ -628,10 +627,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,logged upon error */ if (f->lsm_rule) {if (need_sid) { -security_task_getsecid (tsk, &sid); +security_task_getsecid (tsk, &blob); need_sid =0 ; } -lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob, f->type, f->op,
@@ -2365,12 +2363,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)void __audit_ptrace (struct task_struct *t) {struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); +struct lsmblob blob; context->target_pid =task_tgid_nr (t); context->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); context->target_uid =task_uid (t); context->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &context->target_sid); +security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); +/* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */ + context->target_sid = blob.secid[0 ];memcpy (context->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); }
@@ -2387,6 +2388,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;struct audit_context *ctx =audit_context ();kuid_t uid =current_uid (), auid, t_uid =task_uid (t); +struct lsmblob blob; if (auditd_test_task(t) && (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2397,7 +2399,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; -security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_sig_sid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */ + audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0 ]; }if (!audit_signals ||audit_dummy_context ())
@@ -2410,7 +2414,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &ctx->target_sid); +security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); +/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ + ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0 ];memcpy (ctx->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN );return 0 ; }
@@ -2431,7 +2437,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_loginuid (t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); +security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); +/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ + axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0 ];memcpy (axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); axp->pid_count++;
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +4 -1
@@ -1552,11 +1552,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)int ret_val;struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;struct netlbl_audit audit_info; +struct lsmblob blob;/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */ -security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_info.secid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */ + audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0 ]; audit_info.loginuid =GLOBAL_ROOT_UID ; audit_info.sessionid =0 ;
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h +5 -1
@@ -48,7 +48,11 @@static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo (struct sk_buff *skb,struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { -security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_info->secid); +struct lsmblob blob; + +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding until secid is converted */ + audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0 ]; audit_info->loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current); audit_info->sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (current); }
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +3 -1
@@ -51,11 +51,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)int ima_must_appraise (struct inode *inode,int mask,enum ima_hooks func) {u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;if (!ima_appraise)return 0 ; -security_task_getsecid (current, &secid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +lsmblob_secid (&blob, &secid);return ima_match_policy (inode,current_cred (), secid, func, mask,IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ,NULL ); }
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +19 -14
@@ -335,12 +335,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,*/ int ima_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long prot) { -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;if (file && (prot &PROT_EXEC )) { -security_task_getsecid (current, &secid); -return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), secid,NULL , -0 ,MAY_EXEC ,MMAP_CHECK ); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */ +return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], +NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,MMAP_CHECK ); }return 0 ;
@@ -363,10 +364,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) {int ret;u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob; -security_task_getsecid (current, &secid); - ret =process_measurement (bprm->file,current_cred (), secid,NULL ,0 , -MAY_EXEC ,BPRM_CHECK ); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ + ret =process_measurement (bprm->file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], +NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,BPRM_CHECK );if (ret)return ret;
@@ -387,10 +390,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)*/ int ima_file_check (struct file *file,int mask) { -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob; -security_task_getsecid (current, &secid); -return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), secid,NULL ,0 , +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ +return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ],NULL ,0 , mask & (MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE |MAY_EXEC |MAY_APPEND ),FILE_CHECK ); }
@@ -499,7 +503,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) {enum ima_hooks func; -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;if (!file && read_id ==READING_FIRMWARE ) { if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
@@ -521,9 +525,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, } func = read_idmap[read_id] ?:FILE_CHECK ; -security_task_getsecid (current, &secid); -return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), secid, buf, size, -MAY_READ , func); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ +return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], buf, + size,MAY_READ , func); }/**
security/security.c +9 -3
@@ -1712,10 +1712,16 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)return call_int_hook (task_getsid,0 , p); } -void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid) +void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; -call_void_hook (task_getsecid, p, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + hp->hook.task_getsecid (p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_task_getsecid);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 12/28 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided for IMA and audit.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 +--- security/security.c | 11 +++++++++-- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);int security_inode_getsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,void **buffer,bool alloc);int security_inode_setsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size,int flags);int security_inode_listsecurity (struct inode *inode,char *buffer,size_t buffer_size); -void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid); +void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new);int security_inode_copy_up_xattr (const char *name);int security_file_permission (struct file *file,int mask);
@@ -858,9 +858,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,return 0 ; } -static inline void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid) +static inline void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode, +struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); }static inline int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new)
kernel/auditsc.c +5 -1
@@ -1910,13 +1910,17 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,void audit_copy_inode (struct audit_names *name,const struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,unsigned int flags) { +struct lsmblob blob; + name->ino = inode->i_ino; name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; name->mode = inode->i_mode; name->uid = inode->i_uid; name->gid = inode->i_gid; name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; -security_inode_getsecid (inode, &name->osid); +security_inode_getsecid (inode, &blob); +/* scaffolding until osid is updated */ + name->osid = blob.secid[0 ];if (flags &AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL ) { name->fcap_ver =-1 ;return ;
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1 -3
@@ -326,7 +326,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,return false;for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) {int rc =0 ; -u32 osid;struct lsmblob blob;int retried =0 ;
@@ -337,8 +336,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_OBJ_USER :case LSM_OBJ_ROLE :case LSM_OBJ_TYPE : -security_inode_getsecid (inode, &osid); -lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); +security_inode_getsecid (inode, &blob); rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
security/security.c +9 -2
@@ -1404,9 +1404,16 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_listsecurity); -void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid) +void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,struct lsmblob *blob) { -call_void_hook (inode_getsecid, inode, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + hp->hook.inode_getsecid (inode, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } }int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 13/28 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_cred_getsecid() interface to fill in a lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. The associated data elements in the audit sub-system are changed from a secid to a lsmblob to accommodate multiple possible LSM audit users.
--- include/linux/security.h | 2 +- kernel/audit.c | 14 +++++------- kernel/audit.h | 5 +++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 37 +++++++++++-------------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 8 +++---- security/security.c | 12 +++++++--- 6 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +1 -1
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);void security_cred_free (struct cred *cred);int security_prepare_creds (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old,gfp_t gfp);void security_transfer_creds (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old); -void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,u32 *secid); +void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_kernel_create_files_as (struct cred *new,struct inode *inode);int security_kernel_module_request (char *kmod_name);
kernel/audit.c +6 -8
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static u32 audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;/* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */ kuid_t audit_sig_uid =INVALID_UID ;pid_t audit_sig_pid =-1 ; -u32 audit_sig_sid =0 ; +struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;/* Records can be lost in several ways: 0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1429,23 +1429,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) }case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO : len =0 ; -if (audit_sig_sid) { -struct lsmblob blob; - -lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_sig_sid); - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len); +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx, + &len);if (err)return err; } sig_data =kmalloc (sizeof (*sig_data) + len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!sig_data) { -if (audit_sig_sid) +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm))security_release_secctx (ctx, len);return -ENOMEM ; } sig_data->uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid); sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid; -if (audit_sig_sid) { +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) {memcpy (sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);security_release_secctx (ctx, len); }
kernel/audit.h +3 -2
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@#include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h> #include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context {kuid_t target_auid;kuid_t target_uid;unsigned int target_sessionid; -u32 target_sid; +struct lsmblob target_lsm;char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN ];struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
@@ -338,7 +339,7 @@ extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid; -extern u32 audit_sig_sid; +extern struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;extern int audit_filter (int msgtype,unsigned int listtype);
kernel/auditsc.c +13 -24
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ];kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ];unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ]; -u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ]; +struct lsmblob target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ];char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ][TASK_COMM_LEN ];int pid_count; };
@@ -938,14 +938,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) }static int audit_log_pid_context (struct audit_context *context,pid_t pid, -kuid_t auid,kuid_t uid,unsigned int sessionid, -u32 sid,char *comm) +kuid_t auid,kuid_t uid, +unsigned int sessionid, +struct lsmblob *blob,char *comm) {struct audit_buffer *ab;char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len;int rc =0 ; -struct lsmblob blob; ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_OBJ_PID );if (!ab)
@@ -954,9 +954,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,audit_log_format (ab,"opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d" , pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid),from_kuid (&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid); -if (sid) { -lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) { +if (lsmblob_is_set (blob)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else {
@@ -1527,7 +1526,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) axs->target_auid[i], axs->target_uid[i], axs->target_sessionid[i], - axs->target_sid[i], + &axs->target_lsm[i], axs->target_comm[i])) call_panic = 1; }
@@ -1536,7 +1535,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)audit_log_pid_context (context, context->target_pid, context->target_auid, context->target_uid, context->target_sessionid, - context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) + &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm)) call_panic = 1;if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -1713,7 +1712,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) context->aux =NULL ; context->aux_pids =NULL ; context->target_pid =0 ; - context->target_sid =0 ; +lsmblob_init (&context->target_lsm,0 ); context->sockaddr_len =0 ; context->type =0 ; context->fds[0 ] =-1 ;
@@ -2367,15 +2366,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)void __audit_ptrace (struct task_struct *t) {struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); -struct lsmblob blob; context->target_pid =task_tgid_nr (t); context->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); context->target_uid =task_uid (t); context->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); -/* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */ - context->target_sid = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (t, &context->target_lsm);memcpy (context->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); }
@@ -2392,7 +2388,6 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;struct audit_context *ctx =audit_context ();kuid_t uid =current_uid (), auid, t_uid =task_uid (t); -struct lsmblob blob; if (auditd_test_task(t) && (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2403,9 +2398,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; -security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */ - audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_sig_lsm); }if (!audit_signals ||audit_dummy_context ())
@@ -2418,9 +2411,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); -/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ - ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (t, &ctx->target_lsm);memcpy (ctx->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN );return 0 ; }
@@ -2441,9 +2432,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_loginuid (t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); -/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ - axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]);memcpy (axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); axp->pid_count++;
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +4 -4
@@ -363,7 +363,6 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)int ima_bprm_check (struct linux_binprm *bprm) {int ret; -u32 secid;struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob);
@@ -373,9 +372,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)if (ret)return ret; -security_cred_getsecid (bprm->cred, &secid); -return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid,NULL ,0 , -MAY_EXEC ,CREDS_CHECK ); +security_cred_getsecid (bprm->cred, &blob); +/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ +return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0 ], +NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,CREDS_CHECK ); }/**
security/security.c +9 -3
@@ -1627,10 +1627,16 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)call_void_hook (cred_transfer, new, old); } -void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,u32 *secid) +void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; -call_void_hook (cred_getsecid, c, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.cred_getsecid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + hp->hook.cred_getsecid (c, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_cred_getsecid);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 14/28 IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
In reply to Casey SchauflerThe IMA interfaces ima_get_action() and ima_match_policy() call LSM functions that use lsmblobs. Change the IMA functions to pass the lsmblob to be compatible with the LSM functions.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 10 ++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 +--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 27 +++++++++++---------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 ++++++------ 5 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +6 -4
@@ -192,8 +192,9 @@ enum ima_hooks { };/* LIM API function definitions */ -int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -int mask,enum ima_hooks func,int *pcr); +int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob,int mask,enum ima_hooks func, +int *pcr);int ima_must_measure (struct inode *inode,int mask,enum ima_hooks func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -213,8 +214,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);const char *ima_d_path (const struct path *path,char **pathbuf,char *filename);/* IMA policy related functions */ -int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -enum ima_hooks func,int mask,int flags,int *pcr); +int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob,enum ima_hooks func,int mask, +int flags,int *pcr);void ima_init_policy (void );void ima_update_policy (void );void ima_update_policy_flag (void );
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +5 -4
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy. * @inode: pointer to inode to measure * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate -* @secid: secid of the task being validated +* @blob: LSM data of the task being validated * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC, * MAY_APPEND) * @func: caller identifier
@@ -175,14 +175,15 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask. * */ -int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -int mask,enum ima_hooks func,int *pcr) +int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob,int mask,enum ima_hooks func, +int *pcr) {int flags =IMA_MEASURE |IMA_AUDIT |IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ; flags &= ima_policy_flag; -return ima_match_policy (inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr); +return ima_match_policy (inode, cred, blob, func, mask, flags, pcr); }/*
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +1 -3
@@ -50,15 +50,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)*/ int ima_must_appraise (struct inode *inode,int mask,enum ima_hooks func) { -u32 secid;struct lsmblob blob;if (!ima_appraise)return 0 ;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -lsmblob_secid (&blob, &secid); -return ima_match_policy (inode,current_cred (), secid, func, mask, +return ima_match_policy (inode,current_cred (), &blob, func, mask,IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ,NULL ); }
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +11 -16
@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) }static int process_measurement (struct file *file,const struct cred *cred, -u32 secid,char *buf,loff_t size,int mask, -enum ima_hooks func) +struct lsmblob *blob,char *buf,loff_t size, +int mask,enum ima_hooks func) {struct inode *inode =file_inode (file);struct integrity_iint_cache *iint =NULL ;
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. * Included is the appraise submask. */ - action =ima_get_action (inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr); + action =ima_get_action (inode, cred, blob, mask, func, &pcr); violation_check = ((func ==FILE_CHECK || func ==MMAP_CHECK ) && (ima_policy_flag &IMA_MEASURE ));if (!action && !violation_check)
@@ -339,8 +339,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)if (file && (prot &PROT_EXEC )) {security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */ -return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], +return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), &blob,NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,MMAP_CHECK ); }
@@ -366,16 +365,14 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ - ret =process_measurement (bprm->file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], -NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,BPRM_CHECK ); + ret =process_measurement (bprm->file,current_cred (), &blob,NULL ,0 , +MAY_EXEC ,BPRM_CHECK );if (ret)return ret;security_cred_getsecid (bprm->cred, &blob); -/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ -return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0 ], -NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,CREDS_CHECK ); +return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, &blob,NULL ,0 , +MAY_EXEC ,CREDS_CHECK ); }/**
@@ -393,8 +390,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ -return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ],NULL ,0 , +return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), &blob,NULL ,0 , mask & (MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE |MAY_EXEC |MAY_APPEND ),FILE_CHECK ); }
@@ -526,9 +522,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, func = read_idmap[read_id] ?:FILE_CHECK ;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ -return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], buf, - size,MAY_READ , func); +return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), &blob, buf, size, +MAY_READ , func); }/**
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +6 -6
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)* Returns true on rule match, false on failure. */ static bool ima_match_rules (struct ima_rule_entry *rule,struct inode *inode, -const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, +const struct cred *cred,struct lsmblob *blob,enum ima_hooks func,int mask) {int i;
@@ -345,7 +345,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_SUBJ_USER :case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE :case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE : -lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
@@ -394,7 +393,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is * being made -* @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated +* @blob: LSM data of the task to be validated * @func: IMA hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
@@ -406,8 +405,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)* list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. */ -int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -enum ima_hooks func,int mask,int flags,int *pcr) +int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob,enum ima_hooks func,int mask, +int flags,int *pcr) {struct ima_rule_entry *entry;int action =0 , actmask = flags | (flags <<1 );
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,if (!(entry->action & actmask))continue ; -if (!ima_match_rules (entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask)) +if (!ima_match_rules (entry, inode, cred, blob, func, mask))continue ; action |= entry->flags &IMA_ACTION_FLAGS ;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 15/28 LSM: Specify which LSM to display
In reply to Casey SchauflerCreate a new entry "display" in /proc/.../attr for controlling which LSM security information is displayed for a process. The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for human readable data may be written to "display" to set the value. This requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN privilege. The name of the LSM currently in use can be read from "display". At this point there can only be one LSM capable of display active. A helper function lsm_task_display() is provided to get the display slot for a task_struct.
Note that procfs restricts writes in the attr directory to 'self'.
--- fs/proc/base.c | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 15 ++++ security/security.c | 148 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
fs/proc/base.c +1 -0
@@ -2618,6 +2618,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {ATTR (NULL ,"fscreate" ,0666 ),ATTR (NULL ,"keycreate" ,0666 ),ATTR (NULL ,"sockcreate" ,0666 ), +ATTR (NULL ,"display" ,0666 ), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACKDIR ("smack" ,0555 , proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +15 -0
@@ -2134,4 +2134,19 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,extern int lsm_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode); +/** +* lsm_task_display - the "display LSM for this task +* @task: The task to report on +* +* Returns the task's display LSM slot. +*/ +static inline int lsm_task_display (struct task_struct *task) +{ +int *display = task->security; + +if (display) +return *display; +return LSMBLOB_INVALID ; +} +#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
security/security.c +131 -17
253 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 16/28 LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
In reply to Casey SchauflerAdd a new lsmcontext data structure to hold all the information about a "security context", including the string, its size and which LSM allocated the string. The allocation information is necessary because LSMs have different policies regarding the lifecycle of these strings. SELinux allocates and destroys them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer to an entry in a list that never goes away.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 10 +++++-- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 10 +++++-- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 7 +++-- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 8 +++-- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 7 +++-- include/linux/security.h | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/net/scm.h | 5 +++- kernel/audit.c | 14 ++++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++++++-- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 ++- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 ++- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 ++- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 13 ++++++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 19 +++++++++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 4 ++- security/security.c | 18 ++++++++---- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 14 ++++++--- 17 files changed, 148 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +7 -3
@@ -2876,6 +2876,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,int t_debug_id =atomic_inc_return (&binder_last_id);char *secctx =NULL ;u32 secctx_sz =0 ; +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ e =binder_transaction_log_add (&binder_transaction_log); e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
@@ -3158,7 +3159,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer (&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer, buf_offset, secctx, secctx_sz); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_sz); +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); secctx =NULL ; } t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
@@ -3479,8 +3481,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->buffer->transaction =NULL ;binder_alloc_free_buf (&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer); err_binder_alloc_buf_failed: -if (secctx) -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_sz); +if (secctx) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + } err_get_secctx_failed:kfree (tcomplete);binder_stats_deleted (BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE );
fs/kernfs/dir.c +7 -3
@@ -532,9 +532,13 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)kfree_const (kn->name);if (kn->iattr) { -if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) -security_release_secctx (kn->iattr->ia_secdata, - kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len); +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ + +if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, kn->iattr->ia_secdata, + kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + }simple_xattrs_free (&kn->iattr->xattrs);kmem_cache_free (kernfs_iattrs_cache, kn->iattr); }
fs/kernfs/inode.c +5 -2
@@ -349,6 +349,7 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, {struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs; +struct lsmcontext context;void *secdata;u32 secdata_len =0 ;int error;
@@ -368,8 +369,10 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, error =kernfs_node_setsecdata (attrs, &secdata, &secdata_len);mutex_unlock (&kernfs_mutex); -if (secdata) -security_release_secctx (secdata, secdata_len); +if (secdata) { +lsmcontext_init (&context, secdata, secdata_len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context); + }return error; }
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +6 -2
@@ -131,8 +131,12 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,static inline void nfs4_label_release_security (struct nfs4_label *label) { -if (label) -security_release_secctx (label->label, label->len); +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ + +if (label) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, label->label, label->len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + } }static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask (struct nfs_server *server,struct nfs4_label *label) {
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +5 -2
@@ -2420,6 +2420,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,__be32 status;int err;struct nfs4_acl *acl =NULL ; +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ void *context =NULL ;int contextlen;bool contextsupport = false;
@@ -2919,8 +2920,10 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp, out:#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL -if (context) -security_release_secctx (context, contextlen); +if (context) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, context, contextlen,0 );/*scaffolding*/ +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + }#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */ kfree (acl);if (tempfh) {
include/linux/security.h +37 -2
@@ -76,6 +76,41 @@ enum lsm_event { LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, }; +/* +* A "security context" is the text representation of +* the information used by LSMs. +* This structure contains the string, its length, and which LSM +* it is useful for. +*/ +struct lsmcontext { +char *context;/* Provided by the module */ +u32 len; +int slot;/* Identifies the module */ +}; + +/** +* lsmcontext_init - initialize an lsmcontext structure. +* @cp: Pointer to the context to initialize +* @context: Initial context, or NULL +* @size: Size of context, or 0 +* @slot: Which LSM provided the context +* +* Fill in the lsmcontext from the provided information. +* This is a scaffolding function that will be removed when +* lsmcontext integration is complete. +*/ +static inline void lsmcontext_init (struct lsmcontext *cp,char *context, +u32 size,int slot) +{ + cp->slot = slot; + cp->context = context; + +if (context ==NULL || size ==0 ) + cp->len =0 ; +else + cp->len =strlen (context); +} +/* * Data exported by the security modules *
@@ -449,7 +484,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsmblob *blob); -void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen); +void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp);void security_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode);int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1240,7 +1275,7 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } -static inline void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen) +static inline void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp) { }
include/net/scm.h +4 -1
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK static inline void scm_passec (struct socket *sock,struct msghdr *msg,struct scm_cookie *scm) { +struct lsmcontext context;char *secdata;u32 seclen;int err;
@@ -102,7 +103,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scif (!err) {put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata); -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +/*scaffolding*/ +lsmcontext_init (&context, secdata, seclen,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context); } } }
kernel/audit.c +10 -4
@@ -1193,6 +1193,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len; +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ err =audit_netlink_ok (skb, msg_type);if (err)
@@ -1437,15 +1438,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) } sig_data =kmalloc (sizeof (*sig_data) + len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!sig_data) { -if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + }return -ENOMEM ; } sig_data->uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid); sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) {memcpy (sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); }audit_send_reply (skb, seq,AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO ,0 ,0 , sig_data,sizeof (*sig_data) + len);
@@ -2074,6 +2078,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)unsigned len;int error;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ security_task_getsecid (current, &blob);if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))
@@ -2087,7 +2092,8 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) }audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff);return 0 ; error_path:
kernel/auditsc.c +9 -3
@@ -943,6 +943,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm) { struct audit_buffer *ab; +struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len;int rc =0 ;
@@ -960,7 +961,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, rc =1 ; }else {audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 );/*scaffolding*/ +security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); } }audit_log_format (ab," ocomm=" );
@@ -1172,6 +1174,7 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)static void show_special (struct audit_context *context,int *call_panic) { +struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;struct audit_buffer *ab;int i;
@@ -1205,7 +1208,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) *call_panic =1 ; }else {audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); } }if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
@@ -1352,6 +1356,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;lsmblob_init (&blob, n->osid);if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
@@ -1360,7 +1365,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n, *call_panic =2 ; }else {audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ +security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); } }
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +3 -1
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,static void ip_cmsg_recv_security (struct msghdr *msg,struct sk_buff *skb) { +struct lsmcontext context;struct lsmblob lb;char *secdata;u32 seclen;
@@ -144,7 +145,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)return ;put_cmsg (msg,SOL_IP ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata); -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secdata, seclen,0 );/* scaffolding */ +security_release_secctx (&context); }static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr (struct msghdr *msg,struct sk_buff *skb)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +3 -1
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)int len, ret;char *secctx;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len);
@@ -348,7 +349,8 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct) ret =0 ; nla_put_failure: -security_release_secctx (secctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ +security_release_secctx (&context); return ret; }#else
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +3 -1
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)u32 len;char *secctx;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len);
@@ -184,7 +185,8 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)seq_printf (s,"secctx=%s " , secctx); - security_release_secctx(secctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ + security_release_secctx(&context); }#else static inline void ct_show_secctx (struct seq_file *s,const struct nf_conn *ct)
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +9 -4
@@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var (ctinfo );struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;bool csum_verify; +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ char *secdata =NULL ;u32 seclen =0 ;
@@ -629,8 +630,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, } nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len; -if (seclen) -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +if (seclen) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secdata, seclen,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + }return skb; nla_put_failure:
@@ -638,8 +641,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,kfree_skb (skb);net_err_ratelimited ("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n" ); nlmsg_failure: -if (seclen) -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +if (seclen) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secdata, seclen,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + }return NULL ; }
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +15 -4
@@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,struct net_device *dev;struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf =NULL ; +struct lsmcontext context;char *secctx =NULL ;u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -457,7 +458,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +/* scaffolding */ +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , ret_val ==0 ?1 :0 );audit_log_end (audit_buf);
@@ -488,6 +491,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev; +struct lsmcontext context;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -516,7 +520,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net, security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +/* scaffolding */ +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , entry !=NULL ?1 :0 );audit_log_end (audit_buf);
@@ -553,6 +559,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev; +struct lsmcontext context;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -580,7 +587,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net, security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , entry !=NULL ?1 :0 );audit_log_end (audit_buf);
@@ -1094,6 +1102,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,int ret_val = -ENOMEM ;struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;struct net_device *dev; +struct lsmcontext context;void *data;u32 secid;char *secctx;
@@ -1161,7 +1170,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX , secctx_len, secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +/* scaffolding */ +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure;
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +3 -1
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) {struct audit_buffer *audit_buf; +struct lsmcontext context;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -117,7 +118,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,if (audit_info->secid !=0 &&security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 );/*scaffolding*/ +security_release_secctx (&context); }return audit_buf;
security/security.c +12 -6
@@ -2135,17 +2135,23 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secctx_to_secid); -void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen) +void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp) {struct security_hook_list *hp; -int *display = current->security; +bool found = false;hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list) -if (display ==NULL || *display ==LSMBLOB_INVALID || - *display == hp->lsmid->slot) { - hp->hook.release_secctx (secdata, seclen); -return ; +if (cp->slot == hp->lsmid->slot) { + hp->hook.release_secctx (cp->context, cp->len); + found = true; +break ; } + +memset (cp,0 ,sizeof (*cp)); + +if (!found) +pr_warn ("%s context \"%s\" from slot %d not released\n" , + __func__, cp->context, cp->slot); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_release_secctx);
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +10 -4
@@ -4439,11 +4439,16 @@ static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)return 0 ; } -/* -* There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook -* that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector. -* Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost. +/** +* smack_release_secctx - do everything necessary to free a context +* @secdata: Unused +* @seclen: Unused +* +* Do nothing but hold a slot in the hooks list. */ +static void smack_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen) +{ +}static int smack_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen) {
@@ -4688,6 +4693,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),LSM_HOOK_INIT (secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),LSM_HOOK_INIT (secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid), +LSM_HOOK_INIT (release_secctx, smack_release_secctx),LSM_HOOK_INIT (inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),LSM_HOOK_INIT (inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 17/28 LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
In reply to Casey SchauflerReplace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier along with the context and context length. This allows security_release_secctx() to know how to release the context. Callers have been modified to use or save the returned data from the new structure.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 24 ++++++--------- include/linux/security.h | 4 +-- include/net/scm.h | 10 ++----- kernel/audit.c | 29 +++++++----------- kernel/auditsc.c | 31 +++++++------------ net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 7 ++--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 14 +++++---- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 7 ++--- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 5 +++- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 40 ++++++++----------------- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 7 ++--- security/security.c | 10 +++++-- 12 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +9 -15
@@ -2874,9 +2874,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off =0 ;struct binder_context *context = proc->context;int t_debug_id =atomic_inc_return (&binder_last_id); -char *secctx =NULL ; -u32 secctx_sz =0 ; -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ +struct lsmcontext lsmctx = { }; e =binder_transaction_log_add (&binder_transaction_log); e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
@@ -3123,14 +3121,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &blob); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx);if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ; return_error_param = ret; return_error_line = __LINE__; goto err_get_secctx_failed; } - extra_buffers_size +=ALIGN (secctx_sz,sizeof (u64)); + extra_buffers_size +=ALIGN (lsmctx.len,sizeof (u64)); }trace_binder_transaction (reply, t, target_node);
@@ -3149,19 +3147,17 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->buffer =NULL ; goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed; } -if (secctx) { +if (lsmctx.context) {size_t buf_offset =ALIGN (tr->data_size,sizeof (void *)) +ALIGN (tr->offsets_size,sizeof (void *)) +ALIGN (extra_buffers_size,sizeof (void *)) - -ALIGN (secctx_sz,sizeof (u64)); +ALIGN (lsmctx.len,sizeof (u64)); t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t )t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset;binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer (&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer, buf_offset, - secctx, secctx_sz); -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - secctx =NULL ; + lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len); +security_release_secctx (&lsmctx); } t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id; t->buffer->transaction = t;
@@ -3481,10 +3477,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->buffer->transaction =NULL ;binder_alloc_free_buf (&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer); err_binder_alloc_buf_failed: -if (secctx) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +if (lsmctx.context) +security_release_secctx (&lsmctx); err_get_secctx_failed:kfree (tcomplete);binder_stats_deleted (BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE );
include/linux/security.h +2 -2
@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, size_t size);int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name); -int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob, -char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +struct lsmcontext *cp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
include/net/scm.h +3 -7
@@ -93,18 +93,14 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,static inline void scm_passec (struct socket *sock,struct msghdr *msg,struct scm_cookie *scm) {struct lsmcontext context; -char *secdata; -u32 seclen;int err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &secdata, - &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &context);if (!err) { -put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata); -/*scaffolding*/ -lsmcontext_init (&context, secdata, seclen,0 ); +put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , + context.len, context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); } }
kernel/audit.c +11 -18
@@ -1191,9 +1191,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)struct audit_buffer *ab;u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;struct audit_sig_info *sig_data; -char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len; -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ +struct lsmcontext context = { }; err =audit_netlink_ok (skb, msg_type);if (err)
@@ -1431,25 +1430,22 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO : len =0 ;if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx, - &len); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, + &context);if (err)return err; } sig_data =kmalloc (sizeof (*sig_data) + len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!sig_data) { -if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) +security_release_secctx (&context);return -ENOMEM ; } sig_data->uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid); sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { -memcpy (sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); +memcpy (sig_data->ctx, context.context, context.len); +security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_send_reply (skb, seq,AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO ,0 ,0 , sig_data,sizeof (*sig_data) + len);
@@ -2074,26 +2070,23 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab) { -char *ctx =NULL ; -unsigned len;int error;struct lsmblob blob; -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ +struct lsmcontext context;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob);if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))return 0 ; - error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len); + error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL ) goto error_path;return 0 ; } -audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , ctx); -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); +audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , context.context); +security_release_secctx (&context);return 0 ; error_path:
kernel/auditsc.c +11 -20
@@ -943,9 +943,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm) { struct audit_buffer *ab; -struct lsmcontext lsmcxt; -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len; +struct lsmcontext lsmctx;int rc =0 ; ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_OBJ_PID );
@@ -956,13 +954,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);if (lsmblob_is_set (blob)) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &ctx, &len)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmctx)) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 );/*scaffolding*/ -security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); +audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , lsmctx.context); +security_release_secctx (&lsmctx); } }audit_log_format (ab," ocomm=" );
@@ -1174,7 +1171,6 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)static void show_special (struct audit_context *context,int *call_panic) { -struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;struct audit_buffer *ab;int i;
@@ -1198,17 +1194,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)from_kgid (&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid), context->ipc.mode);if (osid) { -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len; +struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;struct lsmblob blob;lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmcxt)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , osid); *call_panic =1 ; }else { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 ); +audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , lsmcxt.context);security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); } }
@@ -1353,20 +1347,17 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,MAJOR (n->rdev), MINOR(n->rdev));if (n->osid !=0 ) { -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len;struct lsmblob blob; -struct lsmcontext lsmcxt; +struct lsmcontext lsmctx;lsmblob_init (&blob, n->osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , n->osid);if (call_panic) *call_panic =2 ; }else { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ -security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); +audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , lsmctx.context); +security_release_secctx (&lsmctx); } }
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +2 -5
@@ -132,20 +132,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb) {struct lsmcontext context;struct lsmblob lb; -char *secdata; -u32 seclen;int err; err =security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (NULL , skb, &lb);if (err)return ; - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &secdata, &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &context);if (err)return ; -put_cmsg (msg,SOL_IP ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata); -lsmcontext_init (&context, secdata, seclen,0 );/* scaffolding */ +put_cmsg (msg,SOL_IP ,SCM_SECURITY , context.len, context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +8 -6
@@ -328,13 +328,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx (struct sk_buff *skb,const struct nf_conn *ct) {struct nlattr *nest_secctx; -int len, ret; -char *secctx; +int ret;struct lsmblob blob;struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (ret)return 0 ;
@@ -343,13 +342,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)if (!nest_secctx) goto nla_put_failure; -if (nla_put_string (skb,CTA_SECCTX_NAME , secctx)) +if (nla_put_string (skb,CTA_SECCTX_NAME , context.context)) goto nla_put_failure;nla_nest_end (skb, nest_secctx); ret =0 ; nla_put_failure: -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ security_release_secctx (&context);return ret; }
@@ -620,12 +618,16 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK int len, ret;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob,NULL , &len); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (ret)return 0 ; + len = context.len; +security_release_secctx (&context); +return nla_total_size (0 )/* CTA_SECCTX */ +nla_total_size (sizeof (char ) * len);/* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */ #else
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +2 -5
@@ -173,19 +173,16 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)static void ct_show_secctx (struct seq_file *s,const struct nf_conn *ct) {int ret; -u32 len; -char *secctx;struct lsmblob blob;struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (ret)return ; -seq_printf (s,"secctx=%s " , secctx); +seq_printf (s,"secctx=%s " , context.context); -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ security_release_secctx (&context); }#else
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +4 -1
@@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)u32 seclen =0 ;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK )struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context = { };if (!skb || !sk_fullsock (skb->sk))return 0 ;
@@ -318,10 +319,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)if (skb->secmark) {lsmblob_init (&blob, skb->secmark); -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, secdata, &seclen); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + *secdata = context.context; }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); + seclen = context.len;#endif return seclen; }
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +12 -28
@@ -388,8 +388,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf =NULL ;struct lsmcontext context; -char *secctx =NULL ; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob; if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
@@ -454,12 +452,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,rcu_read_unlock ();if (audit_buf !=NULL ) {lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, - &secctx, - &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -/* scaffolding */ -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , + context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , ret_val ==0 ?1 :0 );
@@ -492,8 +487,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev;struct lsmcontext context; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -517,11 +510,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,if (entry !=NULL )lsmblob_init (&blob, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, - &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -/* scaffolding */ -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , + context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , entry !=NULL ?1 :0 );
@@ -560,8 +551,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev;struct lsmcontext context; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -584,10 +573,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,if (entry !=NULL )lsmblob_init (&blob, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, - &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , + context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , entry !=NULL ?1 :0 );
@@ -1105,8 +1093,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,struct lsmcontext context;void *data;u32 secid; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob; data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
@@ -1163,15 +1149,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd, }lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); - ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len); + ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; ret_val =nla_put (cb_arg->skb,NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX , - secctx_len, - secctx); -/* scaffolding */ -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); + context.len, + context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure;
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +2 -5
@@ -99,8 +99,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type, {struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct lsmcontext context; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )
@@ -116,9 +114,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_info->secid);if (audit_info->secid !=0 && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , secctx); -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 );/*scaffolding*/ +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }
security/security.c +7 -3
@@ -2100,18 +2100,22 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_ismaclabel); -int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp) {struct security_hook_list *hp;int display =lsm_task_display (current); +memset (cp,0 ,sizeof (*cp)); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))continue ; -if (display ==LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) +if (display ==LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) { + cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx ( blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], - secdata, seclen); + &cp->context, &cp->len); + } }return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 18/28 LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_dentry_init_security() interface to fill an lsmcontext structure instead of a void * data area and a length. The lone caller of this interface is NFS4, which may make copies of the data using its own mechanisms. A rework of the nfs4 code to use the lsmcontext properly is a significant project, so the coward's way out is taken, and the lsmcontext data from security_dentry_init_security() is copied, then released directly.
This interface does not use the "display". There is currently not case where that is useful or reasonable.
--- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++---------- include/linux/security.h | 7 +++---- security/security.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +16 -10
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ static inline struct nfs4_label * nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *sattr, struct nfs4_label *label) { + struct lsmcontext context;int err;if (label ==NULL )
@@ -122,21 +123,26 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,return NULL ; err =security_dentry_init_security (dentry, sattr->ia_mode, - &dentry->d_name, (void **)&label->label, &label->len); -if (err ==0 ) -return label; + &dentry->d_name, &context); + +if (err) +return NULL ; + + label->label =kmemdup (context.context, context.len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (label->label ==NULL ) + label =NULL ; +else + label->len = context.len; + +security_release_secctx (&context); + +return label; -return NULL ; }static inline void nfs4_label_release_security (struct nfs4_label *label) { -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ - -if (label) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, label->label, label->len,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +kfree (label->label); }static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask (struct nfs_server *server,struct nfs4_label *label) {
include/linux/security.h +3 -4
@@ -352,8 +352,8 @@ int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,int security_add_mnt_opt (const char *option,const char *val,int len,void **mnt_opts);int security_dentry_init_security (struct dentry *dentry,int mode, -const struct qstr *name,void **ctx, -u32 *ctxlen); +const struct qstr *name, +struct lsmcontext *ctx); int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, struct qstr *name, const struct cred *old,
@@ -724,8 +724,7 @@ static inline void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)static inline int security_dentry_init_security (struct dentry *dentry,int mode,const struct qstr *name, -void **ctx, -u32 *ctxlen) +struct lsmcontext *ctx) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
security/security.c +25 -4
@@ -1029,12 +1029,33 @@ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) inode_free_by_rcu); } +/* +* security_dentry_init_security - initial context for a dentry +* @dentry: directory entry +* @mode: access mode +* @name: path name +* @context: resulting security context +* +* Use at most one security module to get the initial +* security context. Do not use the "display". +* +* Returns -EOPNOTSUPP if not supplied by any module or the module result. +*/ int security_dentry_init_security (struct dentry *dentry,int mode, -const struct qstr *name,void **ctx, -u32 *ctxlen) +const struct qstr *name, +struct lsmcontext *cp) { -return call_int_hook (dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP , dentry, mode, - name, ctx, ctxlen); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security, + list) { + cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot; +return hp->hook.dentry_init_security (dentry, mode, name, + (void **)&cp->context, + &cp->len); + } + +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_dentry_init_security);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 19/28 LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill a lsmcontext structure instead of data and length pointers. This provides the information about which LSM created the context so that security_release_secctx() can use the correct hook. A lsmcontext is used within kernfs to store the security information as well.
security_inode_getsecctx() does not use the "display" value. There's only one possible user at any time at this point, and the use is only internal.
--- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 9 ++------- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 34 ++++++++++++---------------------- fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +-- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 23 +++++++++-------------- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- security/security.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 6 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
fs/kernfs/dir.c +2 -7
@@ -532,13 +532,8 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)kfree_const (kn->name);if (kn->iattr) { -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ - -if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, kn->iattr->ia_secdata, - kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +if (kn->iattr->ia_context.context) +security_release_secctx (&kn->iattr->ia_context);simple_xattrs_free (&kn->iattr->xattrs);kmem_cache_free (kernfs_iattrs_cache, kn->iattr); }
fs/kernfs/inode.c +12 -22
@@ -135,21 +135,14 @@ int kernfs_iop_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)return error; } -static int kernfs_node_setsecdata (struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs,void **secdata, -u32 *secdata_len) +static void kernfs_node_setsecdata (struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs, +struct lsmcontext *cp) { -void *old_secdata; -size_t old_secdata_len; +struct lsmcontext old_context; - old_secdata = attrs->ia_secdata; - old_secdata_len = attrs->ia_secdata_len; - - attrs->ia_secdata = *secdata; - attrs->ia_secdata_len = *secdata_len; - - *secdata = old_secdata; - *secdata_len = old_secdata_len; -return 0 ; + old_context = attrs->ia_context; + attrs->ia_context = *cp; + *cp = old_context; }ssize_t kernfs_iop_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry,char *buf,size_t size)
@@ -192,8 +185,8 @@ static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)* persistent copy in kernfs_node. */ set_inode_attr (inode, &attrs->ia_iattr); -security_inode_notifysecctx (inode, attrs->ia_secdata, - attrs->ia_secdata_len); +security_inode_notifysecctx (inode, attrs->ia_context.context, + attrs->ia_context.len); }if (kernfs_type (kn) ==KERNFS_DIR )
@@ -350,8 +343,6 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;struct lsmcontext context; -void *secdata; -u32 secdata_len =0 ;int error; attrs =kernfs_iattrs (kn);
@@ -361,18 +352,17 @@ static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, error =security_inode_setsecurity (inode, suffix, value, size, flags);if (error)return error; - error =security_inode_getsecctx (inode, &secdata, &secdata_len); + error =security_inode_getsecctx (inode, &context);if (error)return error;mutex_lock (&kernfs_mutex); - error =kernfs_node_setsecdata (attrs, &secdata, &secdata_len); +kernfs_node_setsecdata (attrs, &context);mutex_unlock (&kernfs_mutex); -if (secdata) { -lsmcontext_init (&context, secdata, secdata_len,0 ); +if (context.context)security_release_secctx (&context); - } +return error; }
fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h +1 -2
@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@struct kernfs_iattrs {struct iattr ia_iattr; -void *ia_secdata; -u32 ia_secdata_len; +struct lsmcontext ia_context;struct simple_xattrs xattrs; };
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +9 -14
@@ -2304,11 +2304,11 @@ nfsd4_encode_layout_types(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 layout_types)#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL static inline __be32 nfsd4_encode_security_label (struct xdr_stream *xdr,struct svc_rqst *rqstp, -void *context,int len) +struct lsmcontext *context) {__be32 *p; - p =xdr_reserve_space (xdr, len +4 +4 +4 ); + p =xdr_reserve_space (xdr, context->len +4 +4 +4 );if (!p)return nfserr_resource;
@@ -2318,13 +2318,13 @@ nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,*/ *p++ =cpu_to_be32 (0 );/* lfs */ *p++ =cpu_to_be32 (0 );/* pi */ - p =xdr_encode_opaque (p, context, len); + p =xdr_encode_opaque (p, context->context, context->len); return 0; }#else static inline __be32 nfsd4_encode_security_label (struct xdr_stream *xdr,struct svc_rqst *rqstp, -void *context,int len) +struct lsmcontext *context) {return 0 ; }#endif
@@ -2420,9 +2420,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,__be32 status;int err;struct nfs4_acl *acl =NULL ; -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ -void *context =NULL ; -int contextlen; +struct lsmcontext context = { };bool contextsupport = false;struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;u32 minorversion = resp->cstate.minorversion;
@@ -2479,7 +2477,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp, bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {if (exp->ex_flags &NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL ) err =security_inode_getsecctx (d_inode (dentry), - &context, &contextlen); + &context);else err = -EOPNOTSUPP ; contextsupport = (err ==0 );
@@ -2908,8 +2906,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp, }if (bmval2 &FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL ) { - status =nfsd4_encode_security_label (xdr, rqstp, context, - contextlen); + status =nfsd4_encode_security_label (xdr, rqstp, &context);if (status) goto out; }
@@ -2920,10 +2917,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp, out:#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL -if (context) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, context, contextlen,0 );/*scaffolding*/ -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +if (context.context) +security_release_secctx (&context);#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */ kfree (acl);if (tempfh) {
include/linux/security.h +3 -2
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);void security_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode);int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);int security_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen); -int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen); +int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsmcontext *cp);#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ static inline int call_lsm_notifier (enum lsm_event event,void *data)
@@ -1290,7 +1290,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } -static inline int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen) +static inline int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode, +struct lsmcontext *cp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
security/security.c +11 -2
@@ -2198,9 +2198,18 @@ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_setsecctx); -int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen) +int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsmcontext *cp) { -return call_int_hook (inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , inode, ctx, ctxlen); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +memset (cp,0 ,sizeof (*cp)); + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list) { + cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot; +return hp->hook.inode_getsecctx (inode, (void **)&cp->context, + &cp->len); + } +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_getsecctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 20/28 LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange netlink netfilter interfaces to use lsmcontext pointers, and remove scaffolding.
--- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 32 +++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +13 -19
@@ -305,12 +305,10 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)return -1 ; } -static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (struct sk_buff *skb,char **secdata) +static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (struct sk_buff *skb,struct lsmcontext *context) { -u32 seclen =0 ;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK )struct lsmblob blob; -struct lsmcontext context = { };if (!skb || !sk_fullsock (skb->sk))return 0 ;
@@ -318,15 +316,16 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)read_lock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);if (skb->secmark) { +/* Any LSM might be looking for the secmark */ lsmblob_init (&blob, skb->secmark); -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); - *secdata = context.context; +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, context); }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); - seclen = context.len; +return context->len; +#else +return 0 ;#endif -return seclen; }static u32 nfqnl_get_bridge_size (struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
@@ -402,8 +401,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var (ctinfo );struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;bool csum_verify; -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ -char *secdata =NULL ; +struct lsmcontext context = { };u32 seclen =0 ; size =nlmsg_total_size (sizeof (struct nfgenmsg ))
@@ -470,7 +468,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, }if ((queue->flags &NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX ) && entskb->sk) { - seclen =nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (entskb, &secdata); + seclen =nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (entskb, &context);if (seclen) size +=nla_total_size (seclen); }
@@ -605,7 +603,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(skb, entskb->sk) < 0) goto nla_put_failure; -if (seclen &&nla_put (skb,NFQA_SECCTX , seclen, secdata)) +if (seclen &&nla_put (skb,NFQA_SECCTX , context.len, context.context)) goto nla_put_failure;if (ct && nfnl_ct->build (skb, ct, ctinfo,NFQA_CT ,NFQA_CT_INFO ) <0 )
@@ -633,10 +631,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, } nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len; -if (seclen) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secdata, seclen,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +if (seclen) +security_release_secctx (&context);return skb; nla_put_failure:
@@ -644,10 +640,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,kfree_skb (skb);net_err_ratelimited ("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n" ); nlmsg_failure: -if (seclen) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secdata, seclen,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +if (seclen) +security_release_secctx (&context);return NULL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 21/28 NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
In reply to Casey SchauflerNetlabel uses LSM interfaces requiring an lsmblob and the internal storage is used to pass information between these interfaces, so change the internal data from a secid to a lsmblob. Update the netlabel interfaces and their callers to accommodate the change. This requires that the modules using netlabel use the lsm_id.slot to access the correct secid when using netlabel.
--- include/net/netlabel.h | 8 ++-- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 6 ++- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 57 +++++++++++------------------ net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +- security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 + security/selinux/netlabel.c | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +- security/smack/smack.h | 1 + security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 ++- security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 +++-- 12 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
include/net/netlabel.h +4 -4
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {* @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label * @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap * @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level -* @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token +* @attr.lsmblob: LSM specific data * * Description: * This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;u32 lvl; } mls; -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob lsmblob; } attr; };
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u16 family, - u32 secid, + struct lsmblob *lsmblob, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info); int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net, const char *dev_name,
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u16 family, - u32 secid, + struct lsmblob *lsmblob, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { return -ENOSYS;
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c +4 -2
@@ -1481,7 +1481,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def, buffer[0 ] =CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL ; buffer[1 ] =CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN ; - *(u32 *)&buffer[2 ] = secattr->attr.secid; +/* only one netlabel user - the first */ + *(u32 *)&buffer[2 ] = secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[0 ];return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN ; }
@@ -1501,7 +1502,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,const unsigned char *tag, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { - secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2]; +/* only one netlabel user - the first */ + secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[0] = *(u32 *)&tag[2]; secattr->flags |=NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ;return 0 ;
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c +3 -3
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,* @addr: IP address in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr) * @mask: address mask in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr) * @family: address family -* @secid: LSM secid value for the entry +* @lsmblob: LSM data value for the entry * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information * * Description:
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u16 family, - u32 secid, + struct lsmblob *lsmblob, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { u32 addr_len;
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,return netlbl_unlhsh_add (net, dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, - secid, audit_info); + lsmblob, audit_info); }/**
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +22 -35
207 lines not on this page · raw message
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h +1 -1
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u32 addr_len, - u32 secid, + struct lsmblob *lsmblob, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info); int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net, const char *dev_name,
security/selinux/hooks.c +1 -1
@@ -6622,7 +6622,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), }; -static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { +struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lsm ="selinux" , .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
security/selinux/include/security.h +1 -0
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@struct netlbl_lsm_secattr ;extern int selinux_enabled; +extern struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid;/* Policy capabilities */ enum {
security/selinux/netlabel.c +1 -1
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(return NULL ;if ((secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ) && - (secattr->attr.secid == sid)) + (secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] == sid))return secattr;return NULL ;
security/selinux/ss/services.c +2 -2
@@ -3593,7 +3593,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,if (secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE ) *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;else if (secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ) - *sid = secattr->attr.secid; + *sid = secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot];else if (secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL ) { rc = -EIDRM ; ctx =sidtab_search (sidtab,SECINITSID_NETMSG );
@@ -3666,7 +3666,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,if (secattr->domain ==NULL ) goto out; - secattr->attr.secid = sid; + secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] = sid; secattr->flags |=NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY |NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ;mls_export_netlbl_lvl (policydb, ctx, secattr); rc =mls_export_netlbl_cat (policydb, ctx, secattr);
security/smack/smack.h +1 -0
@@ -320,6 +320,7 @@ void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list);* Shared data. */ extern int smack_enabled; +extern struct lsm_id smack_lsmid;extern int smack_cipso_direct;extern int smack_cipso_mapped;extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +3 -2
@@ -3741,7 +3741,8 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,/* * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid. */ -return smack_from_secid (sap->attr.secid); +return smack_from_secid ( + sap->attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot]);/* * Without guidance regarding the smack value * for the packet fall back on the network
@@ -4558,7 +4559,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack), }; -static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { +struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lsm ="smack" , .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
security/smack/smackfs.c +7 -3
@@ -1150,6 +1150,7 @@ static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr (struct file *file,const char __user *buf,size_t count,loff_t *ppos) { +struct lsmblob lsmblob;struct smk_net4addr *snp;struct sockaddr_in newname;char *smack;
@@ -1281,10 +1282,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,* this host so that incoming packets get labeled. * but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option */ -if (rc ==0 && skp !=NULL ) +if (rc ==0 && skp !=NULL ) { +lsmblob_init (&lsmblob,0 ); + lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = snp->smk_label->smk_secid; rc =netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add (&init_net,NULL , - &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask,PF_INET , - snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info); + &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask,PF_INET , &lsmblob, + &audit_info); + }if (rc ==0 ) rc = count;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 22/28 SELinux: Verify LSM display sanity in binder
In reply to Casey SchauflerVerify that the tasks on the ends of a binder transaction use LSM display values that don't cause SELinux contexts to be interpreted by another LSM or another LSM's context to be interpreted by SELinux. No judgement is made in cases that where SELinux contexts are not used in the binder transaction.
--- include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/selinux/hooks.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
include/linux/security.h +1 -0
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ struct lsmblob {u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ]; }; +#define LSMBLOB_FIRST 0/* First valid LSM slot number */ #define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1/* Not a valid LSM slot number */ #define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2/* Slot requested on initialization */ #define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3/* Slot not requested */
security/selinux/hooks.c +34 -0
@@ -2009,6 +2009,28 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)return av; } +/* +* Verify that if the "display" LSM is SELinux for either task +* that it is for both tasks. +*/ +static inline bool compatible_task_displays (struct task_struct *here, +struct task_struct *there) +{ +int h =lsm_task_display (here); +int t =lsm_task_display (there); + +if (h == t) +return true; + +/* unspecified is only ok if SELinux isn't going to be involved */ +if (selinux_lsmid.slot ==LSMBLOB_FIRST ) +return ((h ==LSMBLOB_FIRST && t ==LSMBLOB_INVALID ) || + (t ==LSMBLOB_FIRST && h ==LSMBLOB_INVALID )); + +/* it's ok only if neither display is SELinux */ +return (h != selinux_lsmid.slot && t != selinux_lsmid.slot); +} +/* Hook functions begin here. */ static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr (struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -2016,6 +2038,9 @@ static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)u32 mysid =current_sid ();u32 mgrsid =task_sid (mgr); +if (!compatible_task_displays (current, mgr)) +return -EINVAL ; +return avc_has_perm (&selinux_state, mysid, mgrsid,SECCLASS_BINDER ,BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR ,NULL );
@@ -2029,6 +2054,9 @@ static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,u32 tosid =task_sid (to);int rc; +if (!compatible_task_displays (from, to)) +return -EINVAL ; +if (mysid != fromsid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
@@ -2048,6 +2076,9 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,u32 fromsid =task_sid (from);u32 tosid =task_sid (to); +if (!compatible_task_displays (from, to)) +return -EINVAL ; +return avc_has_perm (&selinux_state, fromsid, tosid,SECCLASS_BINDER ,BINDER__TRANSFER ,NULL );
@@ -2064,6 +2095,9 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,struct common_audit_data ad;int rc; +if (!compatible_task_displays (from, to)) +return -EINVAL ; + ad.type =LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH ; ad.u.path = file->f_path;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v8 22/28] SELinux: Verify LSM display sanity in binder
Quoted 90 lines · Casey Schaufler
Verify that the tasks on the ends of a binder transaction use LSM display values that don't cause SELinux contexts to be interpreted by another LSM or another LSM's context to be interpreted by SELinux. No judgement is made in cases that where SELinux contexts are not used in the binder transaction.
Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/selinux/hooks.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+)include/linux/security.h +1
-0@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ struct lsmblob {u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ]; }; +#define LSMBLOB_FIRST 0/* First valid LSM slot number */ #define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1/* Not a valid LSM slot number */ #define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2/* Slot requested on initialization */ #define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3/* Slot not requested */ security/selinux/hooks.c +31
-0@@ -2009,6 +2009,28 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)return av; } +/* +* Verify that if the "display" LSM is SELinux for either task +* that it is for both tasks. +*/ +static inline bool compatible_task_displays (struct task_struct *here, +struct task_struct *there) +{ +int h =lsm_task_display (here); +int t =lsm_task_display (there); + +if (h == t) +return true; + +/* unspecified is only ok if SELinux isn't going to be involved */ +if (selinux_lsmid.slot ==LSMBLOB_FIRST ) +return ((h ==LSMBLOB_FIRST && t ==LSMBLOB_INVALID ) || + (t ==LSMBLOB_FIRST && h ==LSMBLOB_INVALID )); + +/* it's ok only if neither display is SELinux */ +return (h != selinux_lsmid.slot && t != selinux_lsmid.slot); +} +/* Hook functions begin here. */ static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr (struct task_struct *mgr)@@ -2016,6 +2038,9 @@ static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)u32 mysid =current_sid ();u32 mgrsid =task_sid (mgr); +if (!compatible_task_displays (current, mgr)) +return -EINVAL ; +return avc_has_perm (&selinux_state, mysid, mgrsid,SECCLASS_BINDER ,BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR ,NULL );@@ -2029,6 +2054,9 @@ static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,u32 tosid =task_sid (to);int rc; +if (!compatible_task_displays (from, to)) +return -EINVAL ; +if (mysid != fromsid) { rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,@@ -2048,6 +2076,9 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,u32 fromsid =task_sid (from);u32 tosid =task_sid (to); +if (!compatible_task_displays (from, to)) +return -EINVAL ; +return avc_has_perm (&selinux_state, fromsid, tosid,SECCLASS_BINDER ,BINDER__TRANSFER ,NULL );
security/selinux/hooks.c static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, · line 2103
Quoted 9 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c +3
-0@@ -2064,6 +2095,9 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,struct common_audit_data ad;int rc; +if (!compatible_task_displays (from, to)) +return -EINVAL ; + ad.type =LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH ; ad.u.path = file->f_path;
The only hook that approximates where/when you want to do this check is security_binder_transaction(), so you don't need to insert the check into the other hooks. Further, the check is only needed if the server has requested peer contexts, which is indicated by the flag bit target_node->txn_security_ctx, so if you amended the hook interface to also pass that flag value, then you could avoid the check except in that situation.
As soon as any other LSM implements the binder hooks, it will also likely want an equivalent check, so sooner or later you'll probably want to take the logic to the framework and not just the security module.
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 23/28 Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary
In reply to Casey SchauflerAdd record entries to identify subject data for all of the security modules when there is more than one.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +- include/linux/audit.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 9 ++++- include/net/scm.h | 3 +- kernel/audit.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++- kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 1 + kernel/auditfilter.c | 1 + kernel/auditsc.c | 10 +++-- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 11 ++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 + net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 1 + security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 1 + security/security.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- 19 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +1 -1
@@ -3121,7 +3121,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &blob); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ; return_error_param = ret;
include/linux/audit.h +1 -0
@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ extern void audit_log_link_denied(const char *operation);extern void audit_log_lost (const char *message);extern int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab); +extern void audit_log_task_lsms (struct audit_buffer *ab);extern void audit_log_task_info (struct audit_buffer *ab);extern int audit_update_lsm_rules (void );
include/linux/security.h +7 -2
@@ -129,6 +129,8 @@ struct lsmblob {#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1/* Not a valid LSM slot number */ #define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2/* Slot requested on initialization */ #define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3/* Slot not requested */ +#define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4/* Use the "display" slot */ +#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5/* Use the default "display" slot */ /** * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
@@ -178,6 +180,8 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)return true; } +const char *security_lsm_slot_name (int slot); +/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable (const struct cred *cred,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,unsigned int opts);
@@ -482,7 +486,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, size_t size);int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name); -int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp); +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp, +int display);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1263,7 +1268,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob, -struct lsmcontext *cp) +struct lsmcontext *cp,int display) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
include/net/scm.h +2 -1
@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scint err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &context); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (!err) { put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
kernel/audit.c +38 -2
@@ -405,6 +405,7 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, u32 new, u32 old,if (rc) allow_changes =0 ;/* Something weird, deny request */ audit_log_format (ab," res=%d" , allow_changes); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab);return rc; }
@@ -1110,6 +1111,7 @@ static void audit_log_feature_change(int which, u32 old_feature, u32 new_featureaudit_log_format (ab," feature=%s old=%u new=%u old_lock=%u new_lock=%u res=%d" , audit_feature_names[which], !!old_feature, !!new_feature, !!old_lock, !!new_lock, res); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
@@ -1360,6 +1362,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) size--;audit_log_n_untrustedstring (ab, data, size); } +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }break ;
@@ -1374,6 +1377,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) msg_type ==AUDIT_ADD_RULE ?"add_rule" :"remove_rule" , audit_enabled); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab);return -EPERM ; }
@@ -1387,6 +1391,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)audit_log_common_recv_msg (audit_context (), &ab,AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE );audit_log_format (ab," op=trim res=1" ); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab);break ;case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV : {
@@ -1422,6 +1427,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)audit_log_format (ab," new=" );audit_log_untrustedstring (ab, new);audit_log_format (ab," res=%d" , !err); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab);kfree (old);kfree (new);
@@ -1431,7 +1437,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) len =0 ;if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, - &context); + &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST );if (err)return err; }
@@ -1490,6 +1496,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)" old-log_passwd=%d new-log_passwd=%d res=%d" , old.enabled, s.enabled, old.log_passwd, s.log_passwd, !err); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab);break ; }
@@ -2068,6 +2075,33 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)audit_log_format (ab,"(null)" ); } +void audit_log_task_lsms (struct audit_buffer *ab) +{ +int i; +const char *lsm; +struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context; + +/* +* Don't do anything unless there is more than one LSM +* with a security context to report. +*/ +if (security_lsm_slot_name (1 ) ==NULL ) +return ; + +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) { + lsm =security_lsm_slot_name (i); +if (lsm ==NULL ) +break ; +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context, i)) +continue ; +audit_log_format (ab," subj_%s=%s" , lsm, context.context); +security_release_secctx (&context); + } +} +int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab) {int error;
@@ -2078,7 +2112,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))return 0 ; - error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST );if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL ) goto error_path;
@@ -2185,6 +2219,7 @@ void audit_log_link_denied(const char *operation)audit_log_format (ab,"op=%s" , operation);audit_log_task_info (ab);audit_log_format (ab," res=0" ); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
@@ -2235,6 +2270,7 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid, oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ?tty_name (tty) :"(none)" , oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);audit_put_tty (tty); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
kernel/audit_fsnotify.c +1 -0
@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ static void audit_mark_log_rule_change(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark, caudit_log_untrustedstring (ab, audit_mark->path);audit_log_key (ab, rule->filterkey);audit_log_format (ab," list=%d res=1" , rule->listnr); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
kernel/auditfilter.c +1 -0
@@ -1099,6 +1099,7 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int reaudit_log_format (ab," op=%s" , action);audit_log_key (ab, rule->filterkey);audit_log_format (ab," list=%d res=%d" , rule->listnr, res); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
kernel/auditsc.c +7 -3
@@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);if (lsmblob_is_set (blob)) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmctx)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmctx,LSMBLOB_FIRST )) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else {
@@ -1198,7 +1198,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)struct lsmblob blob;lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmcxt)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmcxt, +LSMBLOB_FIRST )) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , osid); *call_panic =1 ; }else {
@@ -1351,7 +1352,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,struct lsmcontext lsmctx;lsmblob_init (&blob, n->osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx,LSMBLOB_FIRST )) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , n->osid);if (call_panic) *call_panic =2 ;
@@ -1460,6 +1461,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)audit_log_task_info (ab);audit_log_key (ab, context->filterkey); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab);for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
@@ -2569,6 +2571,7 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)return ;audit_log_task (ab);audit_log_format (ab," sig=%ld res=1" , signr); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
@@ -2595,6 +2598,7 @@ void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)audit_log_format (ab," sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x" , signr,syscall_get_arch (), syscall,in_compat_syscall (),KSTK_EIP (current), code); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +1 -1
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)if (err)return ; - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &context); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (err)return ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +2 -2
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret)return 0 ;
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret)return 0 ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +1 -1
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret)return ;
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +1 -1
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)if (skb->secmark) {/* Any LSM might be looking for the secmark */ lsmblob_init (&blob, skb->secmark); -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, context); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY ); }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +7 -4
@@ -450,7 +450,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net, unlhsh_add_return:rcu_read_unlock ();if (audit_buf !=NULL ) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);
@@ -505,7 +506,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);
@@ -565,7 +567,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);
@@ -1136,7 +1139,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd, lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob; } - ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmb, &context); + ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmb, &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST );if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +1 -1
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_info->secid);if (audit_info->secid !=0 && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +2 -0
@@ -3996,6 +3996,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_policy_add(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result, bool task_valid)xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo (task_valid, audit_buf);audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , result);xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo (xp, audit_buf); +audit_log_task_lsms (audit_buf);audit_log_end (audit_buf); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xfrm_audit_policy_add);
@@ -4011,6 +4012,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo (task_valid, audit_buf);audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , result);xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo (xp, audit_buf); +audit_log_task_lsms (audit_buf);audit_log_end (audit_buf); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xfrm_audit_policy_delete);
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +2 -0
@@ -2456,6 +2456,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_state_add(struct xfrm_state *x, int result, bool task_valid)xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo (task_valid, audit_buf);xfrm_audit_helper_sainfo (x, audit_buf);audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , result); +audit_log_task_lsms (audit_buf);audit_log_end (audit_buf); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xfrm_audit_state_add);
@@ -2470,6 +2471,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x, int result, bool task_valid)xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo (task_valid, audit_buf);xfrm_audit_helper_sainfo (x, audit_buf);audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , result); +audit_log_task_lsms (audit_buf);audit_log_end (audit_buf); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xfrm_audit_state_delete);
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +1 -0
@@ -337,6 +337,7 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,audit_log_format (ab," hash=\"%s:%s\"" , algo_name, hash);audit_log_task_info (ab); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); iint->flags |=IMA_AUDITED ;
security/integrity/integrity_audit.c +1 -0
@@ -57,5 +57,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,audit_log_format (ab," ino=%lu" , inode->i_ino); }audit_log_format (ab," res=%d" , !result); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
security/security.c +47 -4
74 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 24/28 Audit: Include object data for all security modules
In reply to Casey SchauflerWhen there is more than one context displaying security module extend what goes into the audit record by supplimenting the "obj=" with an "obj_<lsm>=" for each such security module.
--- kernel/audit.h | 4 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
kernel/audit.h +2 -2
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct audit_names {kuid_t uid;kgid_t gid;dev_t rdev; -u32 osid; +struct lsmblob oblob;struct audit_cap_data fcap;unsigned int fcap_ver;unsigned char type;/* record type */
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ struct audit_context {kuid_t uid;kgid_t gid;umode_t mode; -u32 osid; +struct lsmblob oblob;int has_perm;uid_t perm_uid;gid_t perm_gid;
kernel/auditsc.c +56 -54
186 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 25/28 LSM: Provide an user space interface for the default display
In reply to Casey SchauflerCreate /sys/kernel/security/lsm_display_default which contains the name of the security module used when no display value has been set.
--- security/inode.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/inode.c +20 -2
@@ -321,6 +321,22 @@ static const struct file_operations lsm_ops = { .read = lsm_read, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; + +static struct dentry *lsm_display_default_dentry; +static ssize_t lsm_display_default_read (struct file *filp,char __user *buf, +size_t count,loff_t *ppos) +{ +const char *name =security_lsm_slot_name (0 ); + +if (name ==NULL ) +return 0 ; +return simple_read_from_buffer (buf, count, ppos, name,strlen (name)); +} + +static const struct file_operations lsm_display_default_ops = { + .read = lsm_display_default_read, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +};#endif static int __init securityfs_init (void )
@@ -337,8 +353,10 @@ static int __init securityfs_init(void)return retval; }#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY - lsm_dentry =securityfs_create_file ("lsm" ,0444 ,NULL ,NULL , - &lsm_ops); + lsm_dentry =securityfs_create_file ("lsm" ,0444 ,NULL ,NULL , &lsm_ops); + lsm_display_default_dentry =securityfs_create_file ( +"lsm_display_default" ,0444 ,NULL , +NULL , &lsm_display_default_ops);#endif return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 26/28 NET: Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for multiple LSMs
In reply to Casey SchauflerThe getsockopt SO_PEERSEC provides the LSM based security information for a single module, but for reasons of backward compatibility cannot include the information for multiple modules. A new option SO_PEERCONTEXT is added to report the security "context" of multiple modules using a "compound" format
lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0
This is expected to be used by system services, including dbus-daemon. The exact format of a compound context has been the subject of considerable debate. This format was suggested by Simon McVittie, a dbus maintainer with a significant stake in the format being uasable.
--- arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 9 +- include/linux/security.h | 11 ++- include/uapi/asm-generic/socket.h | 1 + net/core/sock.c | 7 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 20 ++--- security/security.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 20 ++--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 31 +++---- 12 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/socket.h +1 -0
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@#define SO_RCVTIMEO_NEW 66#define SO_SNDTIMEO_NEW 67 +#define SO_PEERCONTEXT 68#if !defined(__KERNEL__)
arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/socket.h +1 -0
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@#define SO_RCVTIMEO_NEW 66#define SO_SNDTIMEO_NEW 67 +#define SO_PEERCONTEXT 68#if !defined(__KERNEL__)
arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h +1 -0
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@#define SO_RCVTIMEO_NEW 0x4040#define SO_SNDTIMEO_NEW 0x4041 +#define SO_PEERCONTEXT 0x4042#if !defined(__KERNEL__)
arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h +1 -0
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@#define SO_RCVTIMEO_NEW 0x0044#define SO_SNDTIMEO_NEW 0x0045 +#define SO_PEERCONTEXT 0x0046#if !defined(__KERNEL__)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +4 -5
@@ -864,8 +864,8 @@* SO_GETPEERSEC. For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the * socket is associated with an ipsec SA. * @sock is the local socket. -* @optval userspace memory where the security state is to be copied. -* @optlen userspace int where the module should copy the actual length +* @optval memory where the security state is to be copied. +* @optlen int where the module should copy the actual length * of the security state. * @len as input is the maximum length to copy to userspace provided * by the caller.
@@ -1697,9 +1697,8 @@ union security_list_options {int (*socket_setsockopt)(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname);int (*socket_shutdown)(struct socket *sock,int how);int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb)(struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb); -int (*socket_getpeersec_stream)(struct socket *sock, -char __user *optval, -int __user *optlen,unsigned len); +int (*socket_getpeersec_stream)(struct socket *sock,char **optval, +int *optlen,unsigned len);int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid);int (*sk_alloc_security)(struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority);
include/linux/security.h +7 -4
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ struct lsmblob {#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2/* Slot requested on initialization */ #define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3/* Slot not requested */ #define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4/* Use the "display" slot */ -#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5/* Use the default "display" slot */ +#define LSMBLOB_COMPOUND -5/* A compound "display" */ /** * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
@@ -1325,7 +1325,8 @@ int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);int security_socket_shutdown (struct socket *sock,int how);int security_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_socket_getpeersec_stream (struct socket *sock,char __user *optval, -int __user *optlen,unsigned len); +int __user *optlen,unsigned len, +int display);int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_sk_alloc (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority);
@@ -1459,8 +1460,10 @@ static inline int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk,return 0 ; } -static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream (struct socket *sock,char __user *optval, -int __user *optlen,unsigned len) +static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream (struct socket *sock, +char __user *optval, +int __user *optlen, +unsigned len,int display) {return -ENOPROTOOPT ; }
include/uapi/asm-generic/socket.h +1 -0
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@#define SO_RCVTIMEO_NEW 66#define SO_SNDTIMEO_NEW 67 +#define SO_PEERCONTEXT 68#if !defined(__KERNEL__)
net/core/sock.c +6 -1
@@ -1412,7 +1412,12 @@ int sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,break ;case SO_PEERSEC : -return security_socket_getpeersec_stream (sock, optval, optlen, len); +return security_socket_getpeersec_stream (sock, optval, optlen, + len,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY ); + +case SO_PEERCONTEXT : +return security_socket_getpeersec_stream (sock, optval, optlen, + len,LSMBLOB_COMPOUND );case SO_MARK : v.val = sk->sk_mark;
security/apparmor/lsm.c +6 -14
@@ -1037,10 +1037,8 @@ static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)* * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan */ -static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream (struct socket *sock, -char __user *optval, -int __user *optlen, -unsigned int len) +static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream (struct socket *sock,char **optval, +int *optlen,unsigned int len) {char *name;int slen, error =0 ;
@@ -1060,17 +1058,11 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,if (slen <0 ) { error = -ENOMEM ; }else { -if (slen > len) { +if (slen > len) error = -ERANGE ; - }else if (copy_to_user (optval, name, slen)) { - error = -EFAULT ; - goto out; - } -if (put_user (slen, optlen)) - error = -EFAULT ; -out: -kfree (name); - +else + *optval = name; + *optlen = slen; } done:
security/security.c +106 -10
149 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/hooks.c +6 -14
@@ -4923,10 +4923,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)return err; } -static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream (struct socket *sock, -char __user *optval, -int __user *optlen, -unsigned int len) +static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream (struct socket *sock,char **optval, +int *optlen,unsigned int len) {int err =0 ;char *scontext;
@@ -4946,18 +4944,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,if (err)return err; -if (scontext_len > len) { +if (scontext_len > len) err = -ERANGE ; - goto out_len; - } - -if (copy_to_user (optval, scontext, scontext_len)) - err = -EFAULT ; +else + *optval = scontext; -out_len: -if (put_user (scontext_len, optlen)) - err = -EFAULT ; -kfree (scontext); + *optlen = scontext_len;return err; }
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +16 -15
@@ -3919,28 +3919,29 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)* * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise */ -static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream (struct socket *sock, -char __user *optval, -int __user *optlen,unsigned len) +static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream (struct socket *sock,char **optval, +int *optlen,unsigned len) { -struct socket_smack *ssp; -char *rcp ="" ; -int slen =1 ; +struct socket_smack *ssp =smack_sock (sock->sk); +char *rcp; +int slen;int rc =0 ; - ssp =smack_sock (sock->sk); -if (ssp->smk_packet !=NULL ) { - rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known; - slen =strlen (rcp) +1 ; +if (ssp->smk_packet ==NULL ) { + *optlen =0 ; +return -EINVAL ; } + rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known; + slen =strlen (rcp) +1 ;if (slen > len) rc = -ERANGE ; -else if (copy_to_user (optval, rcp, slen) !=0 ) - rc = -EFAULT ; - -if (put_user (slen, optlen) !=0 ) - rc = -EFAULT ; +else { + *optval =kstrdup (rcp,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (*optval ==NULL ) + rc = -ENOMEM ; + } + *optlen = slen;return rc; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 27/28 LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
In reply to Casey SchauflerAdd an entry /proc/.../attr/context which displays the full process security "context" in compound format:'
lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
This entry is not writable.
--- fs/proc/base.c | 1 + security/security.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
fs/proc/base.c +1 -0
@@ -2619,6 +2619,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {ATTR (NULL ,"keycreate" ,0666 ),ATTR (NULL ,"sockcreate" ,0666 ),ATTR (NULL ,"display" ,0666 ), +ATTR (NULL ,"context" ,0666 ), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACKDIR ("smack" ,0555 , proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
security/security.c +27 -0
@@ -2082,6 +2082,10 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, char **value) {struct security_hook_list *hp; +char *final =NULL ; +char *cp; +int rc =0 ; +int finallen =0 ;int display =lsm_task_display (current);int slot =0 ;
@@ -2099,6 +2103,29 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,return -ENOMEM ; } +if (!strcmp (name,"context" )) { +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, + list) { + rc = hp->hook.getprocattr (p,"current" , &cp); +if (rc == -EINVAL || rc == -ENOPROTOOPT ) +continue ; +if (rc <0 ) { +kfree (final); +return rc; + } + rc =append_ctx (&final, &finallen, hp->lsmid->lsm, + cp, rc); +if (rc <0 ) { +kfree (final); +return rc; + } + } +if (final ==NULL ) +return -EINVAL ; + *value = final; +return finallen; + } +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {if (lsm !=NULL &&strcmp (lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))continue ;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v8 28/28 AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
In reply to Casey SchauflerWith the inclusion of the "display" process attribute mechanism AppArmor no longer needs to be treated as an "exclusive" security module. Remove the flag that indicates it is exclusive. Remove the stub getpeersec_dgram AppArmor hook as it has no effect in the single LSM case and interferes in the multiple LSM case.
--- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 20 +------------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)
security/apparmor/lsm.c +1 -19
@@ -1071,22 +1071,6 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char **optval,return error; } -/** -* apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet -* @sock: the peer socket -* @skb: packet data -* @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet -* -* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent -*/ -static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock, -struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid) - -{ -/* TODO: requires secid support */ -return -ENOPROTOOPT ; -} -/** * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket * @sk: child sock
@@ -1190,8 +1174,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {#endif LSM_HOOK_INIT (socket_getpeersec_stream, apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (socket_getpeersec_dgram, - apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft), #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
@@ -1702,7 +1684,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)DEFINE_LSM (apparmor) = { .name ="apparmor" , - .flags =LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR |LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE , + .flags =LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR , .enabled = &apparmor_enabled, .blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes, .init = apparmor_init,
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerQuoted 2 lines · Casey Schaufler
This patchset provides the changes required for the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
What more needs doing before we can land this airship? The only outstanding issue I know about is the uses of current_security() in SELinux, and Stephen has a patch for that. I could see rebasing it, as security-next is a little bit behind the times, but that's just merge work. We could bikeshed the "compound" context format if we have to, and argue about what capabilities are required for /proc/self/attr/display if we must.
If there's objection to the number of patches (28 > 15) there are reasonable ways to squash them. If there's objection to the amount of change there are rational stages.
I'm heading off on holiday, and will be limiting my screen time for the next couple weeks. Think about it.
Thank you.
Quoted 204 lines
v8: Incorporate feedback from v7
- Minor clean-up in display value management
- refactor "compound" context creation to use a commonappend_ctx()function.v7: Incorporate feedback from v6
- Make setting the display a privileged operation. The availability of compound contexts reduces the need for setting the display.v6: Incorporate feedback from v5
- Add subj_<lsm>= and obj_<lsm>= fields to audit records
- Add/proc/.../attr/contextto get the full context in lsmname\0value\0... format as suggested by Simon McVittie
- AddSO_PEERCONTEXTforgetsockopt()to get the full context in the same format, also suggested by Simon McVittie.
- Add/sys/kernel/security/lsm_display_defaultto provide the display default value.v5: Incorporate feedback from v4
- Initialize the lsmcontext insecurity_secid_to_secctx()
- Clear the lsmcontext in allsecurity_release_secctx()cases
- Don't use the "display" on strictly internal context interfaces.
- The SELinux binder hooks check for cases where the context "display" isn't compatible with SELinux.v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
- Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
- Replace the lsm and slot fields of thesecurity_hook_listwith a pointer to a LSM allocatedlsm_idstructure. The LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use thelsm_idrather than makesecurity_add_hooksreturn the slot value.
- Validate slot values used insecurity.c
- Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
- fix display value check indentry_init_security
- Replaceaudit_logof secids with '?' instead of deleting the audit logv3: Incorporate feedback from v2
- Make lsmblob parameter and variable names more meaningful, changing "le" and "l" to "blob".
- Improve consistency of constant naming.
- Do more sanity checking during LSM initialization.
- Be a bit clearer about what is temporary scaffolding.
- Rather than cluttersecurity_getpeersec_dgramwith otherwise unnecessary checks remove the apparmor stub, which does nothing useful.Patches 0001-0003 complete the process of moving management of security blobs that might be shared from the individual modules to the infrastructure.
Patches 0004-0014 replace system use of a "secid" with a structure "lsmblob" containing information from the security modules to be held and reused later. At this point lsmblob contains an array of u32 secids, one "slot" for each of the security modules compiled into the kernel that used secids. A "slot" is allocated when a security module requests one.
The infrastructure is changed to use the slot number to pass the correct secid to or from the security module hooks.It is important that the lsmblob be a fixed size entity that does not have to be allocated. Several of the places where it is used would have performance and/or locking issues with dynamic allocation.
Patch 0015 provides a mechanism for a process to identify which security module's hooks should be used when displaying or converting a security context string. A new interface
/proc/.../attr/displaycontains the name of the security module to show. Reading from this file will present the name of the module, while writing to it will set the value. Only names of active security modules are accepted. Internally, the name is translated to the appropriate "slot" number for the module which is then stored in the task security blob. Setting the display requiresCAP_MAC_ADMIN.Patch 0016 Starts the process of changing how a security context is represented. Since it is possible for a security context to have been generated by more than one security module it is now necessary to note which module created a security context so that the correct "release" hook can be called. There are several places where the module that created a security context cannot be inferred.
This is achieved by introducing a "lsmcontext" structure which contains the context string, its length and the "slot" number of the security module that created it. The
security_release_secctx()interface is changed, replacing the (string,len) pointer pair with a lsmcontext pointer.Patches 0017-0019 convert the security interfaces from (string,len) pointer pairs to a lsmcontext pointer. The slot number identifying the creating module is added by the infrastructure. Where the security context is stored for extended periods the data type is changed.
The Netlabel code is converted to save lsmblob structures instead of secids in Patches 0020-21.
Patch 0022 adds checks to the SELinux binder hooks which verify that if either "display" used is SELinux both are.
Patches 0023-24 add addition data to the audit records to identify the LSM specific data for all active modules.
Patches 0025-0027 add new interfaces for getting the compound security contexts.
Finally, with all interference on the AppArmor hooks removed, Patch 0028 removes the exclusive bit from AppArmor. An unnecessary stub hook was also removed.
The Ubuntu project is using an earlier version of this patchset in their distribution to enable stacking for containers.
Performance measurements to date have the change within the "noise". The sockperf and dbench results are on the order of 0.2% to 0.8% difference, with better performance being as common as worse. The benchmarks were run with AppArmor and Smack on Ubuntu.
https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.2-v8-apparmor
Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + drivers/android/binder.c | 24 +- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 5 +- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 35 +- fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 22 +- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 20 +- fs/proc/base.c | 2 + include/linux/audit.h | 1 + include/linux/cred.h | 3 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 39 +- include/linux/security.h | 184 ++++++++-- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +- include/net/scm.h | 15 +- include/uapi/asm-generic/socket.h | 1 + kernel/audit.c | 70 +++- kernel/audit.h | 9 +- kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 1 + kernel/auditfilter.c | 10 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 129 ++++--- kernel/cred.c | 12 +- net/core/sock.c | 7 +- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 6 +- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 20 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 11 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 26 +- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 13 +- net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 5 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 98 ++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 + net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 + security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 85 ++--- security/commoncap.c | 7 +- security/inode.c | 22 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 10 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 36 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +- security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 1 + security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +- security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +- security/security.c | 632 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 213 +++++------ security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 18 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 + security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 7 +- security/smack/smack.h | 19 + security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 185 +++++----- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 +- security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 +- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 +- 65 files changed, 1503 insertions(+), 686 deletions(-)
Quoted 13 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Casey Schaufler
This patchset provides the changes required for the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
What more needs doing before we can land this airship? The only outstanding issue I know about is the uses of
current_security()in SELinux, and Stephen has a patch for that. I could see rebasing it, as security-next is a little bit behind the times, but that's just merge work. We could bikeshed the "compound" context format if we have to, and argue about what capabilities are required for/proc/self/attr/displayif we must.
Quoted 6 lines
If there's objection to the number of patches (28 > 15) there are reasonable ways to squash them. If there's objection to the amount of change there are rational stages.
I'm heading off on holiday, and will be limiting my screen time for the next couple weeks. Think about it.
My $0.02, roughly in order from what I think will be the largest obstacles to merging to the smallest:
1) Changes outside of the security subsystem:
1a) Userspace API changes e.g. /proc/self/attr/context,/proc/self/attr/display, and SO_PEERCONTEXT, likely needs vetting by linux-api and the latter by netdev, and audit record changes, needs vetting by linux-audit.
1b) lsmblob changes to core kernel data structures and code, likely
needs vetting by relevant subsystem maintainers e.g. netdev for unix_skb_parms and scm_cookie changes, linux-audit for audit changes, ...
Whether or not these changes are deemed acceptable by their
respective maintainers is key to whether this patch set is viable irrespective of what any LSM or security module maintainer may think.
2) Controlling setting of /proc/pid/attr/display:
CAP_MAC_ADMIN isn't an appropriate check for this operation for
SELinux. The security modules need to be able to provide their own access control logic for setting display just as with the other attributes, which they could do if you just called the hooks prior to setting the display. At present, in SELinux, CAP_MAC_ADMIN is used only to control what processes can get or set file security labels that are unknown to the currently loaded policy, as a means of supporting package managers that might set down file security labels before loading new policy modules or OS image generators that might be generating a filesystem image with a policy that differs from the build host OS policy. The set of processes that need that ability are quite different from the set of processes that will need to set the display, and we do not want to conflate them in policy. I think you are worried that if given the opportunity, the security module authors will just block setting the display to any value other than their own or setting it at all. How about we just agree to not do that, and if you see a patch doing that you can NAK it?
3) Code review and testing by at least the major LSM maintainers:
At least an Acked-by and preferably Reviewed-by and Tested-by lines
from the major security module maintainers, not only for changes that directly touch the code of their module but all of the patches in the series. Because any of these changes could break or undermine the security of any of the security modules.
Testing also needs to cover new functionality that wasn't previously
possible, e.g. the new userspace APIs, actual stacking of AA with other modules, etc. So merely running existing testsuites isn't going to suffice.
Quoted 208 lines
Thank you.
Quoted 204 lines
v8: Incorporate feedback from v7
- Minor clean-up in display value management
- refactor "compound" context creation to use a commonappend_ctx()function.v7: Incorporate feedback from v6
- Make setting the display a privileged operation. The availability of compound contexts reduces the need for setting the display.v6: Incorporate feedback from v5
- Add subj_<lsm>= and obj_<lsm>= fields to audit records
- Add/proc/.../attr/contextto get the full context in lsmname\0value\0... format as suggested by Simon McVittie
- AddSO_PEERCONTEXTforgetsockopt()to get the full context in the same format, also suggested by Simon McVittie.
- Add/sys/kernel/security/lsm_display_defaultto provide the display default value.v5: Incorporate feedback from v4
- Initialize the lsmcontext insecurity_secid_to_secctx()
- Clear the lsmcontext in allsecurity_release_secctx()cases
- Don't use the "display" on strictly internal context interfaces.
- The SELinux binder hooks check for cases where the context "display" isn't compatible with SELinux.v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
- Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
- Replace the lsm and slot fields of thesecurity_hook_listwith a pointer to a LSM allocatedlsm_idstructure. The LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use thelsm_idrather than makesecurity_add_hooksreturn the slot value.
- Validate slot values used insecurity.c
- Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
- fix display value check indentry_init_security
- Replaceaudit_logof secids with '?' instead of deleting the audit logv3: Incorporate feedback from v2
- Make lsmblob parameter and variable names more meaningful, changing "le" and "l" to "blob".
- Improve consistency of constant naming.
- Do more sanity checking during LSM initialization.
- Be a bit clearer about what is temporary scaffolding.
- Rather than cluttersecurity_getpeersec_dgramwith otherwise unnecessary checks remove the apparmor stub, which does nothing useful.Patches 0001-0003 complete the process of moving management of security blobs that might be shared from the individual modules to the infrastructure.
Patches 0004-0014 replace system use of a "secid" with a structure "lsmblob" containing information from the security modules to be held and reused later. At this point lsmblob contains an array of u32 secids, one "slot" for each of the security modules compiled into the kernel that used secids. A "slot" is allocated when a security module requests one.
The infrastructure is changed to use the slot number to pass the correct secid to or from the security module hooks.It is important that the lsmblob be a fixed size entity that does not have to be allocated. Several of the places where it is used would have performance and/or locking issues with dynamic allocation.
Patch 0015 provides a mechanism for a process to identify which security module's hooks should be used when displaying or converting a security context string. A new interface
/proc/.../attr/displaycontains the name of the security module to show. Reading from this file will present the name of the module, while writing to it will set the value. Only names of active security modules are accepted. Internally, the name is translated to the appropriate "slot" number for the module which is then stored in the task security blob. Setting the display requiresCAP_MAC_ADMIN.Patch 0016 Starts the process of changing how a security context is represented. Since it is possible for a security context to have been generated by more than one security module it is now necessary to note which module created a security context so that the correct "release" hook can be called. There are several places where the module that created a security context cannot be inferred.
This is achieved by introducing a "lsmcontext" structure which contains the context string, its length and the "slot" number of the security module that created it. The
security_release_secctx()interface is changed, replacing the (string,len) pointer pair with a lsmcontext pointer.Patches 0017-0019 convert the security interfaces from (string,len) pointer pairs to a lsmcontext pointer. The slot number identifying the creating module is added by the infrastructure. Where the security context is stored for extended periods the data type is changed.
The Netlabel code is converted to save lsmblob structures instead of secids in Patches 0020-21.
Patch 0022 adds checks to the SELinux binder hooks which verify that if either "display" used is SELinux both are.
Patches 0023-24 add addition data to the audit records to identify the LSM specific data for all active modules.
Patches 0025-0027 add new interfaces for getting the compound security contexts.
Finally, with all interference on the AppArmor hooks removed, Patch 0028 removes the exclusive bit from AppArmor. An unnecessary stub hook was also removed.
The Ubuntu project is using an earlier version of this patchset in their distribution to enable stacking for containers.
Performance measurements to date have the change within the "noise". The sockperf and dbench results are on the order of 0.2% to 0.8% difference, with better performance being as common as worse. The benchmarks were run with AppArmor and Smack on Ubuntu.
https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.2-v8-apparmor
Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 + drivers/android/binder.c | 24 +- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 5 +- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 35 +- fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 22 +- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 20 +- fs/proc/base.c | 2 + include/linux/audit.h | 1 + include/linux/cred.h | 3 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 39 +- include/linux/security.h | 184 ++++++++-- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +- include/net/scm.h | 15 +- include/uapi/asm-generic/socket.h | 1 + kernel/audit.c | 70 +++- kernel/audit.h | 9 +- kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 1 + kernel/auditfilter.c | 10 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 129 ++++--- kernel/cred.c | 12 +- net/core/sock.c | 7 +- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 6 +- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 20 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 11 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 26 +- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 13 +- net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 5 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 98 ++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 + net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 + security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 85 ++--- security/commoncap.c | 7 +- security/inode.c | 22 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 10 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 36 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +- security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 1 + security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +- security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +- security/security.c | 632 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 213 +++++------ security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 18 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 + security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 7 +- security/smack/smack.h | 19 + security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 185 +++++----- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 +- security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 +- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 +- 65 files changed, 1503 insertions(+), 686 deletions(-)