dmaengine: ti: dma-crossbar: Fix a memory leak bug
Subsystems (4)
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 1/6 dmaengine: ti: dma-crossbar: Fix a memory leak bug
From: Wenwen Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2c231c0c1dec42192aca0f87f2dc68b8f0cbc7d2 ]
In ti_dra7_xbar_probe(), 'rsv_events' is allocated through kcalloc(). Then of_property_read_u32_array() is invoked to search for the property. However, if this process fails, 'rsv_events' is not deallocated, leading to a memory leak bug. To fix this issue, free 'rsv_events' before returning the error.
--- drivers/dma/ti-dma-crossbar.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/dma/ti-dma-crossbar.c +3 -1
@@ -395,8 +395,10 @@ static int ti_dra7_xbar_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) ret =of_property_read_u32_array (node, pname, (u32 *)rsv_events, nelm *2 ); -if (ret) +if (ret) { +kfree (rsv_events);return ret; + }for (i =0 ; i < nelm; i++) { ti_dra7_xbar_reserve(rsv_events[i][0], rsv_events[i][1],
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 2/6 dmaengine: ti: omap-dma: Add cleanup in omap_dma_probe()
From: Wenwen Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 962411b05a6d3342aa649e39cda1704c1fc042c6 ]
If devm_request_irq() fails to disable all interrupts, no cleanup is performed before retuning the error. To fix this issue, invoke omap_dma_free() to do the cleanup.
--- drivers/dma/omap-dma.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/dma/omap-dma.c +3 -1
@@ -1429,8 +1429,10 @@ static int omap_dma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) rc =devm_request_irq (&pdev->dev, irq, omap_dma_irq,IRQF_SHARED ,"omap-dma-engine" , od); -if (rc) +if (rc) { +omap_dma_free (od);return rc; + } }if (omap_dma_glbl_read (od,CAPS_0 ) &CAPS_0_SUPPORT_LL123 )
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 3/6 x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flags into __get_user() argument evaluation
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9b8bd476e78e89c9ea26c3b435ad0201c3d7dbf5 ]
Identical to __put_user(); the __get_user() argument evalution will too leak UBSAN crud into the __uaccess_begin() / __uaccess_end() region. While uncommon this was observed to happen for:
drivers/xen/gntdev.c: if (__get_user(old_status, batch->status[i]))
where UBSAN added array bound checking.
This complements commit:
6ae865615fc4 ("x86/uaccess: Dont leak the AC flag into __put_user() argument evaluation")
Tested-by Sedat Dilek <[email protected]>
--- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +3 -1
@@ -438,8 +438,10 @@ do { \ ({ \ int __gu_err; \ __inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \ + __typeof__(ptr) __gu_ptr = (ptr); \ + __typeof__(size) __gu_size = (size); \ __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \ - __get_user_size(__gu_val, (ptr), (size), __gu_err, -EFAULT); \ + __get_user_size(__gu_val, __gu_ptr, __gu_size, __gu_err, -EFAULT); \ __uaccess_end(); \ (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \ __builtin_expect(__gu_err, 0); \
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 4/6 configfs_register_group() shouldn't be (and isn't) called in rmdirable parts
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Al Viro <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f19e4ed1e1edbfa3c9ccb9fed17759b7d6db24c6 ]
revert cc57c07343bd "configfs: fix registered group removal" It was an attempt to handle something that fundamentally doesn't work - configfs_register_group() should never be done in a part of tree that can be rmdir'ed. And in mainline it never had been, so let's not borrow trouble; the fix was racy anyway, it would take a lot more to make that work and desired semantics is not clear.
--- fs/configfs/dir.c | 11 ----------- 1 file changed, 11 deletions(-)
fs/configfs/dir.c +0 -11
@@ -1782,16 +1782,6 @@ void configfs_unregister_group(struct config_group *group)struct dentry *dentry = group->cg_item.ci_dentry;struct dentry *parent = group->cg_item.ci_parent->ci_dentry; -mutex_lock (&subsys->su_mutex); -if (!group->cg_item.ci_parent->ci_group) { -/* -* The parent has already been unlinked and detached -* due to a rmdir. -*/ - goto unlink_group; - } -mutex_unlock (&subsys->su_mutex); -inode_lock_nested (d_inode (parent),I_MUTEX_PARENT );spin_lock (&configfs_dirent_lock);configfs_detach_prep (dentry,NULL );
@@ -1806,7 +1796,6 @@ void configfs_unregister_group(struct config_group *group)dput (dentry);mutex_lock (&subsys->su_mutex); -unlink_group:unlink_group (group);mutex_unlock (&subsys->su_mutex); }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 5/6 keys: Fix missing null pointer check in request_key_auth_describe()
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Hillf Danton <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d41a3effbb53b1bcea41e328d16a4d046a508381 ]
If a request_key authentication token key gets revoked, there's a window in which request_key_auth_describe() can see it with a NULL payload - but it makes no check for this and something like the following oops may occur:
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000038 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000004ddf30 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] ... NIP [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x90/0xd0 LR [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 Call Trace: [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 (unreliable) [...] proc_keys_show+0x308/0x4c0 [...] seq_read+0x3d0/0x540 [...] proc_reg_read+0x90/0x110 [...] __vfs_read+0x3c/0x70 [...] vfs_read+0xb4/0x1b0 [...] ksys_read+0x7c/0x130 [...] system_call+0x5c/0x70
Fix this by checking for a NULL pointer when describing such a key.
Also make the read routine check for a NULL pointer to be on the safe side.
[DH: Modified to not take already-held rcu lock and modified to also check
in the read routine]
--- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
security/keys/request_key_auth.c +6 -0
@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key, {struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0 ]; +if (!rka) +return ; +seq_puts (m,"key:" );seq_puts (m, key->description);if (key_is_positive (key))
@@ -88,6 +91,9 @@ static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key,size_t datalen;long ret; +if (!rka) +return -EKEYREVOKED ; + datalen = rka->callout_len; ret = datalen;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 6/6 iommu/amd: Fix race in increase_address_space()
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 754265bcab78a9014f0f99cd35e0d610fcd7dfa7 ]
After the conversion to lock-less dma-api call the increase_address_space() function can be called without any locking. Multiple CPUs could potentially race for increasing the address space, leading to invalid domain->mode settings and invalid page-tables. This has been happening in the wild under high IO load and memory pressure.
Fix the race by locking this operation. The function is called infrequently so that this does not introduce a performance regression in the dma-api path again.
--- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c +11 -5
@@ -1321,18 +1321,21 @@ static void domain_flush_devices(struct protection_domain *domain)* another level increases the size of the address space by 9 bits to a size up * to 64 bits. */ -static bool increase_address_space (struct protection_domain *domain, +static void increase_address_space (struct protection_domain *domain,gfp_t gfp) { +unsigned long flags;u64 *pte; -if (domain->mode ==PAGE_MODE_6_LEVEL ) +spin_lock_irqsave (&domain->lock, flags); + +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (domain->mode ==PAGE_MODE_6_LEVEL ))/* address space already 64 bit large */ -return false; + goto out; pte = (void *)get_zeroed_page (gfp);if (!pte) -return false; + goto out; *pte =PM_LEVEL_PDE (domain->mode,virt_to_phys (domain->pt_root));
@@ -1340,7 +1343,10 @@ static bool increase_address_space(struct protection_domain *domain, domain->mode +=1 ; domain->updated = true; -return true; +out: +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&domain->lock, flags); + +return ; } static u64 *alloc_pte(struct protection_domain *domain,
Signature · 6 lines
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