selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded
PATCH v2 1/1 selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded
Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the security.selinux xattr on an inode without a policy first being loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible to have newly created files with the correct label before actually loading the policy.
This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently races with other processes trying to access those same files.
Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]). One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g. laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former, labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when populating the new filesystem.
This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways:
1. allow setxattr if we're not initialized
2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized; instead leave it as LABEL_INVALID so that revalidation may be attempted at a later time
Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't accepted.
[1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html
[2] https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/94
[3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html
---
v2:
- return early in selinux_inode_setxattr if policy hasn't been loaded
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
security/selinux/hooks.c +12 -0
@@ -3142,6 +3142,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,return dentry_has_perm (current_cred (), dentry,FILE__SETATTR ); } +if (!selinux_state.initialized) +return (inode_owner_or_capable (inode) ?0 : -EPERM ); + sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;if (!(sbsec->flags &SBLABEL_MNT ))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
@@ -3225,6 +3228,15 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,return ; } +if (!selinux_state.initialized) { +/* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate +* against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may +* resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if +* we've since initialized. +*/ +return ; + } + rc =security_context_to_sid_force (&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid);if (rc) {
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Quoted 41 lines · Jonathan Lebon
Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the
security.selinuxxattr on an inode without a policy first being loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible to have newly created files with the correct label before actually loading the policy.This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently races with other processes trying to access those same files.
Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]). One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g. laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former, labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when populating the new filesystem.
This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways:
1. allowsetxattrif we're not initialized
2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized; instead leave it asLABEL_INVALIDso that revalidation may be attempted at a later timeNote the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't accepted.
Co-developed-by Victor Kamensky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Victor Kamensky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jonathan Lebon <[email protected]>[1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html
[2] https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/94
[3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html---
Quoted 7 lines
v2:
- return early inselinux_inode_setxattrif policy hasn't been loaded---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
Merged into selinux/next, thanks!
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com