4.19.74-stable review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.74 release. There are 50 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Fri 20 Sep 2019 06:09:47 AM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.74-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 4.19.74-rc1

Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
x86/build: Add -Wnoaddress-of-packed-member to REALMODE_CFLAGS, to silence GCC9 build warning

Jean Delvare <[email protected]>
nvmem: Use the same permissions for eeprom as for nvmem

Hui Peng <[email protected]>
rsi: fix a double free bug in rsi_91x_deinit()

Steffen Dirkwinkel <[email protected]>
platform/x86: pmc_atom: Add CB4063 Beckhoff Automation board to critclk_systems DMI table

Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
modules: fix compile error if don't have strict module rwx

Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
modules: fix BUG when load module with rodata=n

Olivier Moysan <[email protected]>
iio: adc: stm32-dfsdm: fix data type

Mario Limonciello <[email protected]>
Revert "Bluetooth: btusb: driver to enable the usb-wakeup feature"

Nishka Dasgupta <[email protected]>
drm/mediatek: mtk_drm_drv.c: Add of_node_put() before goto

Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
drm: panel-orientation-quirks: Add extra quirk table entry for GPD MicroPC

Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>
firmware: ti_sci: Always request response from firmware

Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
crypto: talitos - HMAC SNOOP NO AFEU mode requires SW icv checking.

Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>

    crypto: talitos - Do not modify req->cryptlen on decryption.

Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
crypto: talitos - fix ECB algs ivsize

Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
crypto: talitos - check data blocksize in ablkcipher.

Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
crypto: talitos - fix CTR alg blocksize

Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
crypto: talitos - check AES key size

Muchun Song <[email protected]>
driver core: Fix use-after-free and double free on glue directory

Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
ubifs: Correctly use tnc_next() in search_dh_cookie()

Kent Gibson <[email protected]>
gpio: fix line flag validation in lineevent_create

Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
PCI: Always allow probing with driver_override

Xiaolei Li <[email protected]>
mtd: rawnand: mtk: Fix wrongly assigned OOB buffer pointer issue

Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
clk: rockchip: Don't yell about bad mmc phases when getting

Neil Armstrong <[email protected]>
drm/meson: Add support for XBGR8888 & ABGR8888 formats

Suraj Jitindar Singh <[email protected]>
powerpc: Add barrier_nospec to raw_copy_in_user()

Steve Wahl <[email protected]>
x86/purgatory: Change compiler flags from -mcmodel=kernel to -mcmodel=large to fix kexec relocation errors

Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
KVM: nVMX: handle page fault in vmread

Fuqian Huang <[email protected]>
KVM: x86: work around leak of uninitialized stack contents

Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
KVM: s390: Do not leak kernel stack data in the KVM_S390_INTERRUPT ioctl

Igor Mammedov <[email protected]>
KVM: s390: kvm_s390_vm_start_migration: check dirty_bitmap before using it as target for memset()

Yunfeng Ye <[email protected]>
genirq: Prevent NULL pointer dereference in resend_irqs()

Alexander Duyck <[email protected]>
ixgbe: Prevent u8 wrapping of ITR value to something less than 10us

Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Btrfs: fix assertion failure during fsync and use of stale transaction

Kent Gibson <[email protected]>
gpio: fix line flag validation in linehandle_create

Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
gpiolib: acpi: Add gpiolib_acpi_run_edge_events_on_boot option and blacklist

Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
tun: fix use-after-free when register netdev failed

Xin Long <[email protected]>
tipc: add NULL pointer check before calling kfree_rcu

Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
tcp: fix tcp_ecn_withdraw_cwr() to clear TCP_ECN_QUEUE_CWR

Xin Long <[email protected]>
sctp: use transport pf_retrans in sctp_do_8_2_transport_strike

Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>
sctp: Fix the link time qualifier of 'sctp_ctrlsock_exit()'

Cong Wang <[email protected]>
sch_hhf: ensure quantum and hhf_non_hh_weight are non-zero

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
net: sched: fix reordering issues

Stefan Chulski <[email protected]>
net: phylink: Fix flow control resolution

Shmulik Ladkani <[email protected]>
net: gso: Fix skb_segment splat when splitting gso_size mangled skb having linear-headed frag_list

Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <[email protected]>
net: Fix null de-reference of device refcount

Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
ixgbe: Fix secpath usage for IPsec TX offload.

Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
isdn/capi: check message length in capi_write()

Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>
ipv6: Fix the link time qualifier of 'ping_v6_proc_exit_net()'

Bjørn Mork <[email protected]>
cdc_ether: fix rndis support for Mediatek based smartphones

Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>
bridge/mdb: remove wrong use of NLM_F_MULTI

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                       |  4 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h             |  1 +
 arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c                      | 10 ++++
 arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c                       |  4 +-
 arch/x86/Makefile                              |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                             |  7 ++-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                             |  7 +++
 arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile                    | 35 ++++++++------
 drivers/base/core.c                            | 53 +++++++++++++++++++-
 drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c                      |  5 --
 drivers/clk/rockchip/clk-mmc-phase.c           |  4 +-
 drivers/crypto/talitos.c                       | 67 +++++++++++++++++++-------
 drivers/firmware/ti_sci.c                      |  8 +--
 drivers/gpio/gpiolib-acpi.c                    | 42 ++++++++++++++--
 drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c                         | 16 ++++--
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_panel_orientation_quirks.c | 12 +++++
 drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_drv.c         |  5 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_plane.c            | 16 ++++++
 drivers/iio/adc/stm32-dfsdm-adc.c              |  4 +-
 drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c                       | 10 +++-
 drivers/mtd/nand/raw/mtk_nand.c                | 21 ++++----
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c  |  8 ++-
 drivers/net/phy/phylink.c                      |  6 +--
 drivers/net/tun.c                              | 16 ++++--
 drivers/net/usb/cdc_ether.c                    | 13 +++--
 drivers/net/wireless/rsi/rsi_91x_usb.c         |  1 -
 drivers/nvmem/core.c                           | 15 ++++--
 drivers/pci/pci-driver.c                       |  3 +-
 drivers/platform/x86/pmc_atom.c                |  8 +++
 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c                            |  8 +--
 fs/ubifs/tnc.c                                 | 16 ++++--
 include/uapi/linux/isdn/capicmd.h              |  1 +
 kernel/irq/resend.c                            |  2 +
 kernel/module.c                                | 22 ++++++---
 net/bridge/br_mdb.c                            |  2 +-
 net/core/dev.c                                 |  2 +
 net/core/skbuff.c                              | 19 ++++++++
 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c                           |  2 +-
 net/ipv6/ping.c                                |  2 +-
 net/sched/sch_generic.c                        |  9 +++-
 net/sched/sch_hhf.c                            |  2 +-
 net/sctp/protocol.c                            |  2 +-
 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c                       |  2 +-
 net/tipc/name_distr.c                          |  3 +-
 44 files changed, 377 insertions(+), 119 deletions(-)

From: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 94a72b3f024fc7e9ab640897a1e38583a470659d ]

NLM_F_MULTI must be used only when a NLMSG_DONE message is sent at the end. In fact, NLMSG_DONE is sent only at the end of a dump.

Libraries like libnl will wait forever for NLMSG_DONE.

---
 net/bridge/br_mdb.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ static int nlmsg_populate_rtr_fill(struc
 	struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
 	struct nlattr *nest;
 
-	nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, pid, seq, type, sizeof(*bpm), NLM_F_MULTI);
+	nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, pid, seq, type, sizeof(*bpm), 0);
 	if (!nlh)
 		return -EMSGSIZE;
 

From: "Bjørn Mork" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4d7ffcf3bf1be98d876c570cab8fc31d9fa92725 ]

A Mediatek based smartphone owner reports problems with USB tethering in Linux. The verbose USB listing shows a rndis_host interface pair (e0/01/03 + 10/00/00), but the driver fails to bind with

[  355.960428] usb 1-4: bad CDC descriptors

The problem is a failsafe test intended to filter out ACM serial functions using the same 02/02/ff class/subclass/protocol as RNDIS. The serial functions are recognized by their non-zero bmCapabilities.

No RNDIS function with non-zero bmCapabilities were known at the time this failsafe was added. But it turns out that some Wireless class RNDIS functions are using the bmCapabilities field. These functions are uniquely identified as RNDIS by their class/subclass/protocol, so the failing test can safely be disabled. The same applies to the two types of Misc class RNDIS functions.

Applying the failsafe to Communication class functions only retains the original functionality, and fixes the problem for the Mediatek based smartphone.

Tow examples of CDC functional descriptors with non-zero bmCapabilities from Wireless class RNDIS functions are:

0e8d:000a Mediatek Crosscall Spider X5 3G Phone

CDC Header:
bcdCDC 1.10
CDC ACM:
bmCapabilities 0x0f
connection notifications
sends break
line coding and serial state
get/set/clear comm features
CDC Union:
bMasterInterface 0
bSlaveInterface 1
CDC Call Management:
bmCapabilities 0x03
call management
use DataInterface
bDataInterface 1

and

19d2:1023 ZTE K4201-z

CDC Header:
bcdCDC 1.10
CDC ACM:
bmCapabilities 0x02
line coding and serial state
CDC Call Management:
bmCapabilities 0x03
call management
use DataInterface
bDataInterface 1
CDC Union:
bMasterInterface 0
bSlaveInterface 1

The Mediatek example is believed to apply to most smartphones with Mediatek firmware. The ZTE example is most likely also part of a larger family of devices/firmwares.

---
 drivers/net/usb/cdc_ether.c |   13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -221,9 +221,16 @@ int usbnet_generic_cdc_bind(struct usbne
 		goto bad_desc;
 	}
 skip:
-	if (	rndis &&
-		header.usb_cdc_acm_descriptor &&
-		header.usb_cdc_acm_descriptor->bmCapabilities) {
+	/* Communcation class functions with bmCapabilities are not
+	 * RNDIS.  But some Wireless class RNDIS functions use
+	 * bmCapabilities for their own purpose. The failsafe is
+	 * therefore applied only to Communication class RNDIS
+	 * functions.  The rndis test is redundant, but a cheap
+	 * optimization.
+	 */
+	if (rndis && is_rndis(&intf->cur_altsetting->desc) &&
+	    header.usb_cdc_acm_descriptor &&
+	    header.usb_cdc_acm_descriptor->bmCapabilities) {
 			dev_dbg(&intf->dev,
 				"ACM capabilities %02x, not really RNDIS?\n",
 				header.usb_cdc_acm_descriptor->bmCapabilities);

From: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d23dbc479a8e813db4161a695d67da0e36557846 ]

The '.exit' functions from 'pernet_operations' structure should be marked as __net_exit, not __net_init.

---
 net/ipv6/ping.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static int __net_init ping_v6_proc_init_
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void __net_init ping_v6_proc_exit_net(struct net *net)
+static void __net_exit ping_v6_proc_exit_net(struct net *net)
 {
 	remove_proc_entry("icmp6", net->proc_net);
 }

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fe163e534e5eecdfd7b5920b0dfd24c458ee85d6 ]

syzbot reported:

    BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in capi_write+0x791/0xa90 drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:700
    CPU: 0 PID: 10025 Comm: syz-executor379 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #2
    Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
    Call Trace:
      __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
      dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
      kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613
      __msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:313
      capi_write+0x791/0xa90 drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:700
      do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:703 [inline]
      do_iter_write+0x83e/0xd80 fs/read_write.c:961
      vfs_writev fs/read_write.c:1004 [inline]
      do_writev+0x397/0x840 fs/read_write.c:1039
      __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1112 [inline]
      __se_sys_writev+0x9b/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1109
      __x64_sys_writev+0x4a/0x70 fs/read_write.c:1109
      do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
      entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
    [...]

The problem is that capi_write() is reading past the end of the message. Fix it by checking the message's length in the needed places.

---
 drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c          |   10 +++++++++-
 include/uapi/linux/isdn/capicmd.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -688,6 +688,9 @@ capi_write(struct file *file, const char
 	if (!cdev->ap.applid)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
+	if (count < CAPIMSG_BASELEN)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	skb = alloc_skb(count, GFP_USER);
 	if (!skb)
 		return -ENOMEM;

@@ -698,7 +701,8 @@ capi_write(struct file *file, const char
 	}
 	mlen = CAPIMSG_LEN(skb->data);
 	if (CAPIMSG_CMD(skb->data) == CAPI_DATA_B3_REQ) {
-		if ((size_t)(mlen + CAPIMSG_DATALEN(skb->data)) != count) {
+		if (count < CAPI_DATA_B3_REQ_LEN ||
+		    (size_t)(mlen + CAPIMSG_DATALEN(skb->data)) != count) {
 			kfree_skb(skb);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}

@@ -711,6 +715,10 @@ capi_write(struct file *file, const char
 	CAPIMSG_SETAPPID(skb->data, cdev->ap.applid);
 
 	if (CAPIMSG_CMD(skb->data) == CAPI_DISCONNECT_B3_RESP) {
+		if (count < CAPI_DISCONNECT_B3_RESP_LEN) {
+			kfree_skb(skb);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 		mutex_lock(&cdev->lock);
 		capincci_free(cdev, CAPIMSG_NCCI(skb->data));
 		mutex_unlock(&cdev->lock);

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #define CAPI_MSG_BASELEN		8
 #define CAPI_DATA_B3_REQ_LEN		(CAPI_MSG_BASELEN+4+4+2+2+2)
 #define CAPI_DATA_B3_RESP_LEN		(CAPI_MSG_BASELEN+4+2)
+#define CAPI_DISCONNECT_B3_RESP_LEN	(CAPI_MSG_BASELEN+4)
 
 /*----- CAPI commands -----*/
 #define CAPI_ALERT		    0x01

From: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f39b683d35dfa93a58f1b400a8ec0ff81296b37c ]

The ixgbe driver currently does IPsec TX offloading based on an existing secpath. However, the secpath can also come from the RX side, in this case it is misinterpreted for TX offload and the packets are dropped with a "bad sa_idx" error. Fix this by using the xfrm_offload() function to test for TX offload.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <net/tc_act/tc_mirred.h>
 #include <net/vxlan.h>
 #include <net/mpls.h>
+#include <net/xfrm.h>
 
 #include "ixgbe.h"
 #include "ixgbe_common.h"

@@ -8599,7 +8600,8 @@ netdev_tx_t ixgbe_xmit_frame_ring(struct
 #endif /* IXGBE_FCOE */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_OFFLOAD
-	if (skb->sp && !ixgbe_ipsec_tx(tx_ring, first, &ipsec_tx))
+	if (xfrm_offload(skb) &&
+	    !ixgbe_ipsec_tx(tx_ring, first, &ipsec_tx))
 		goto out_drop;
 #endif
 	tso = ixgbe_tso(tx_ring, first, &hdr_len, &ipsec_tx);

From: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 10cc514f451a0f239aa34f91bc9dc954a9397840 ]

In event of failure during register_netdevice, free_netdev is invoked immediately. free_netdev assumes that all the netdevice refcounts have been dropped prior to it being called and as a result frees and clears out the refcount pointer.

However, this is not necessarily true as some of the operations in the NETDEV_UNREGISTER notifier handlers queue RCU callbacks for invocation after a grace period. The IPv4 callback in_dev_rcu_put tries to access the refcount after free_netdev is called which leads to a null de-reference-

44837.761523: <6> Unable to handle kernel paging request at

                    virtual address 0000004a88287000
44837.761651:   <2> pc : in_dev_finish_destroy+0x4c/0xc8
44837.761654:   <2> lr : in_dev_finish_destroy+0x2c/0xc8
44837.762393:   <2> Call trace:
44837.762398:   <2>  in_dev_finish_destroy+0x4c/0xc8
44837.762404:   <2>  in_dev_rcu_put+0x24/0x30
44837.762412:   <2>  rcu_nocb_kthread+0x43c/0x468
44837.762418:   <2>  kthread+0x118/0x128
44837.762424:   <2>  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x1c

Fix this by waiting for the completion of the call_rcu() in case of register_netdevice errors.

---
 net/core/dev.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -8562,6 +8562,8 @@ int register_netdevice(struct net_device
 	ret = notifier_to_errno(ret);
 	if (ret) {
 		rollback_registered(dev);
+		rcu_barrier();
+
 		dev->reg_state = NETREG_UNREGISTERED;
 	}
 	/*

From: Shmulik Ladkani <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3dcbdb134f329842a38f0e6797191b885ab00a00 ]

Historically, support for frag_list packets entering skb_segment() was limited to frag_list members terminating on exact same gso_size boundaries. This is verified with a BUG_ON since commit 89319d3801d1 ("net: Add frag_list support to skb_segment"), quote:

As such we require all frag_list members terminate on exact MSS boundaries. This is checked using BUG_ON.
As there should only be one producer in the kernel of such packets, namely GRO, this requirement should not be difficult to maintain.

However, since commit 6578171a7ff0 ("bpf: add bpf_skb_change_proto helper"), the "exact MSS boundaries" assumption no longer holds:
An eBPF program using bpf_skb_change_proto() DOES modify 'gso_size', but leaves the frag_list members as originally merged by GRO with the original 'gso_size'. Example of such programs are bpf-based NAT46 or NAT64.

This lead to a kernel BUG_ON for flows involving:
- GRO generating a frag_list skb
- bpf program performing bpf_skb_change_proto() or bpf_skb_adjust_room()
- skb_segment() of the skb

See example BUG_ON reports in [0].

In commit 13acc94eff12 ("net: permit skb_segment on head_frag frag_list skb"), skb_segment() was modified to support the "gso_size mangling" case of a frag_list GRO'ed skb, but *only* for frag_list members having head_frag==true (having a page-fragment head).

Alas, GRO packets having frag_list members with a linear kmalloced head (head_frag==false) still hit the BUG_ON.

This commit adds support to skb_segment() for a 'head_skb' packet having a frag_list whose members are *non* head_frag, with gso_size mangled, by disabling SG and thus falling-back to copying the data from the given 'head_skb' into the generated segmented skbs - as suggested by Willem de Bruijn [1].

Since this approach involves the penalty of skb_copy_and_csum_bits() when building the segments, care was taken in order to enable this solution only when required:
- untrusted gso_size, by testing SKB_GSO_DODGY is set (SKB_GSO_DODGY is set by any gso_size mangling functions in net/core/filter.c)
- the frag_list is non empty, its item is a non head_frag, *and* the headlen of the given 'head_skb' does not match the gso_size.

[0]
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20190826170724.25ff616f@pixies/
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/

[1]
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CA+FuTSfVsgNDi7c=GUU8nMg2hWxF2SjCNLXetHeVPdnxAW5K-w@mail.gmail.com/

---
 net/core/skbuff.c |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)

@@ -3530,6 +3530,25 @@ struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_bu
 	int pos;
 	int dummy;
 
+	if (list_skb && !list_skb->head_frag && skb_headlen(list_skb) &&
+	    (skb_shinfo(head_skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_DODGY)) {
+		/* gso_size is untrusted, and we have a frag_list with a linear
+		 * non head_frag head.
+		 *
+		 * (we assume checking the first list_skb member suffices;
+		 * i.e if either of the list_skb members have non head_frag
+		 * head, then the first one has too).
+		 *
+		 * If head_skb's headlen does not fit requested gso_size, it
+		 * means that the frag_list members do NOT terminate on exact
+		 * gso_size boundaries. Hence we cannot perform skb_frag_t page
+		 * sharing. Therefore we must fallback to copying the frag_list
+		 * skbs; we do so by disabling SG.
+		 */
+		if (mss != GSO_BY_FRAGS && mss != skb_headlen(head_skb))
+			features &= ~NETIF_F_SG;
+	}
+
 	__skb_push(head_skb, doffset);
 	proto = skb_network_protocol(head_skb, &dummy);
 	if (unlikely(!proto))

From: Stefan Chulski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 63b2ed4e10b2e6c913e1d8cdd728e7fba4115a3d ]

Regarding to IEEE 802.3-2015 standard section 2 28B.3 Priority resolution - Table 28-3 - Pause resolution

In case of Local device Pause=1 AsymDir=0, Link partner Pause=1 AsymDir=1, Local device resolution should be enable PAUSE transmit, disable PAUSE receive.
And in case of Local device Pause=1 AsymDir=1, Link partner Pause=1 AsymDir=0, Local device resolution should be enable PAUSE receive, disable PAUSE transmit.

---
 drivers/net/phy/phylink.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -380,8 +380,8 @@ static void phylink_get_fixed_state(stru
  *  Local device  Link partner
  *  Pause AsymDir Pause AsymDir Result
  *    1     X       1     X     TX+RX
- *    0     1       1     1     RX
- *    1     1       0     1     TX
+ *    0     1       1     1     TX
+ *    1     1       0     1     RX
  */
 static void phylink_resolve_flow(struct phylink *pl,
 				 struct phylink_link_state *state)

@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ static void phylink_resolve_flow(struct
 			new_pause = MLO_PAUSE_TX | MLO_PAUSE_RX;
 		else if (pause & MLO_PAUSE_ASYM)
 			new_pause = state->pause & MLO_PAUSE_SYM ?
-				 MLO_PAUSE_RX : MLO_PAUSE_TX;
+				 MLO_PAUSE_TX : MLO_PAUSE_RX;
 	} else {
 		new_pause = pl->link_config.pause & MLO_PAUSE_TXRX_MASK;
 	}

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b88dd52c62bb5c5d58f0963287f41fd084352c57 ]

Whenever MQ is not used on a multiqueue device, we experience serious reordering problems. Bisection found the cited commit.

The issue can be described this way :

- A single qdisc hierarchy is shared by all transmit queues. (eg : tc qdisc replace dev eth0 root fq_codel)

- When/if try_bulk_dequeue_skb_slow() dequeues a packet targetting a different transmit queue than the one used to build a packet train, we stop building the current list and save the 'bad' skb (P1) in a special queue. (bad_txq)

- When dequeue_skb() calls qdisc_dequeue_skb_bad_txq() and finds this skb (P1), it checks if the associated transmit queues is still in frozen state. If the queue is still blocked (by BQL or NIC tx ring full), we leave the skb in bad_txq and return NULL.

- dequeue_skb() calls q->dequeue() to get another packet (P2)

The other packet can target the problematic queue (that we found in frozen state for the bad_txq packet), but another cpu just ran TX completion and made room in the txq that is now ready to accept new packets.

- Packet P2 is sent while P1 is still held in bad_txq, P1 might be sent at next round. In practice P2 is the lead of a big packet train (P2,P3,P4 ...) filling the BQL budget and delaying P1 by many packets :/

To solve this problem, we have to block the dequeue process as long as the first packet in bad_txq can not be sent. Reordering issues disappear and no side effects have been seen.

---
 net/sched/sch_generic.c |    9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(default_qdisc_ops);
  * - updates to tree and tree walking are only done under the rtnl mutex.
  */
 
+#define SKB_XOFF_MAGIC ((struct sk_buff *)1UL)
+
 static inline struct sk_buff *__skb_dequeue_bad_txq(struct Qdisc *q)
 {
 	const struct netdev_queue *txq = q->dev_queue;

@@ -74,7 +76,7 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *__skb_dequ
 				q->q.qlen--;
 			}
 		} else {
-			skb = NULL;
+			skb = SKB_XOFF_MAGIC;
 		}
 	}
 

@@ -272,8 +274,11 @@ validate:
 		return skb;
 
 	skb = qdisc_dequeue_skb_bad_txq(q);
-	if (unlikely(skb))
+	if (unlikely(skb)) {
+		if (skb == SKB_XOFF_MAGIC)
+			return NULL;
 		goto bulk;
+	}
 	skb = q->dequeue(q);
 	if (skb) {
 bulk:

From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d4d6ec6dac07f263f06d847d6f732d6855522845 ]

In case of TCA_HHF_NON_HH_WEIGHT or TCA_HHF_QUANTUM is zero, it would make no progress inside the loop in hhf_dequeue() thus kernel would get stuck.

Fix this by checking this corner case in hhf_change().

---
 net/sched/sch_hhf.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static int hhf_change(struct Qdisc *sch,
 		new_hhf_non_hh_weight = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_HHF_NON_HH_WEIGHT]);
 
 	non_hh_quantum = (u64)new_quantum * new_hhf_non_hh_weight;
-	if (non_hh_quantum > INT_MAX)
+	if (non_hh_quantum == 0 || non_hh_quantum > INT_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	sch_tree_lock(sch);

From: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b456d72412ca8797234449c25815e82f4e1426c0 ]

The '.exit' functions from 'pernet_operations' structure should be marked as __net_exit, not __net_init.

---
 net/sctp/protocol.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1350,7 +1350,7 @@ static int __net_init sctp_ctrlsock_init
 	return status;
 }
 
-static void __net_init sctp_ctrlsock_exit(struct net *net)
+static void __net_exit sctp_ctrlsock_exit(struct net *net)
 {
 	/* Free the control endpoint.  */
 	inet_ctl_sock_destroy(net->sctp.ctl_sock);

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 10eb56c582c557c629271f1ee31e15e7a9b2558b ]

Transport should use its own pf_retrans to do the error_count check, instead of asoc's. Otherwise, it's meaningless to make pf_retrans per transport.

---
 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ static void sctp_do_8_2_transport_strike
 	if (net->sctp.pf_enable &&
 	   (transport->state == SCTP_ACTIVE) &&
 	   (transport->error_count < transport->pathmaxrxt) &&
-	   (transport->error_count > asoc->pf_retrans)) {
+	   (transport->error_count > transport->pf_retrans)) {
 
 		sctp_assoc_control_transport(asoc, transport,
 					     SCTP_TRANSPORT_PF,

From: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit af38d07ed391b21f7405fa1f936ca9686787d6d2 ]

Fix tcp_ecn_withdraw_cwr() to clear the correct bit:
TCP_ECN_QUEUE_CWR.

Rationale: basically, TCP_ECN_DEMAND_CWR is a bit that is purely about the behavior of data receivers, and deciding whether to reflect incoming IP ECN CE marks as outgoing TCP th->ece marks. The TCP_ECN_QUEUE_CWR bit is purely about the behavior of data senders, and deciding whether to send CWR. The tcp_ecn_withdraw_cwr() function is only called from tcp_undo_cwnd_reduction() by data senders during an undo, so it should zero the sender-side state, TCP_ECN_QUEUE_CWR. It does not make sense to stop the reflection of incoming CE bits on incoming data packets just because outgoing packets were spuriously retransmitted.

The bug has been reproduced with packetdrill to manifest in a scenario with RFC3168 ECN, with an incoming data packet with CE bit set and carrying a TCP timestamp value that causes cwnd undo. Before this fix, the IP CE bit was ignored and not reflected in the TCP ECE header bit, and sender sent a TCP CWR ('W') bit on the next outgoing data packet, even though the cwnd reduction had been undone. After this fix, the sender properly reflects the CE bit and does not set the W bit.

Note: the bug actually predates 2005 git history; this Fixes footer is chosen to be the oldest SHA1 I have tested (from Sep 2007) for which the patch applies cleanly (since before this commit the code was in a .h file).

---
 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static void tcp_ecn_accept_cwr(struct so
 
 static void tcp_ecn_withdraw_cwr(struct tcp_sock *tp)
 {
-	tp->ecn_flags &= ~TCP_ECN_DEMAND_CWR;
+	tp->ecn_flags &= ~TCP_ECN_QUEUE_CWR;
 }
 
 static void __tcp_ecn_check_ce(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 42dec1dbe38239cf91cc1f4df7830c66276ced37 ]

Unlike kfree(p), kfree_rcu(p, rcu) won't do NULL pointer check. When tipc_nametbl_remove_publ returns NULL, the panic below happens:

   BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000068
   RIP: 0010:__call_rcu+0x1d/0x290
   Call Trace:
    <IRQ>
    tipc_publ_notify+0xa9/0x170 [tipc]
    tipc_node_write_unlock+0x8d/0x100 [tipc]
    tipc_node_link_down+0xae/0x1d0 [tipc]
    tipc_node_check_dest+0x3ea/0x8f0 [tipc]
    ? tipc_disc_rcv+0x2c7/0x430 [tipc]
    tipc_disc_rcv+0x2c7/0x430 [tipc]
    ? tipc_rcv+0x6bb/0xf20 [tipc]
    tipc_rcv+0x6bb/0xf20 [tipc]
    ? ip_route_input_slow+0x9cf/0xb10
    tipc_udp_recv+0x195/0x1e0 [tipc]
    ? tipc_udp_is_known_peer+0x80/0x80 [tipc]
    udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x180/0x460
    udp_unicast_rcv_skb.isra.56+0x75/0x90
    __udp4_lib_rcv+0x4ce/0xb90
    ip_local_deliver_finish+0x11c/0x210
    ip_local_deliver+0x6b/0xe0
    ? ip_rcv_finish+0xa9/0x410
    ip_rcv+0x273/0x362

---
 net/tipc/name_distr.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -221,7 +221,8 @@ static void tipc_publ_purge(struct net *
 		       publ->key);
 	}
 
-	kfree_rcu(p, rcu);
+	if (p)
+		kfree_rcu(p, rcu);
 }
 
 /**

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 77f22f92dff8e7b45c7786a430626d38071d4670 ]

I got a UAF repport in tun driver when doing fuzzy test:

[  466.269490] ==================================================================
[  466.271792] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tun_chr_read_iter+0x2ca/0x2d0
[  466.271806] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888372139250 by task tun-test/2699
[  466.271810]
[  466.271824] CPU: 1 PID: 2699 Comm: tun-test Not tainted 5.3.0-rc1-00001-g5a9433db2614-dirty #427
[  466.271833] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[  466.271838] Call Trace:
[  466.271858]  dump_stack+0xca/0x13e
[  466.271871]  ? tun_chr_read_iter+0x2ca/0x2d0
[  466.271890]  print_address_description+0x79/0x440
[  466.271906]  ? vprintk_func+0x5e/0xf0
[  466.271920]  ? tun_chr_read_iter+0x2ca/0x2d0
[  466.271935]  __kasan_report+0x15c/0x1df
[  466.271958]  ? tun_chr_read_iter+0x2ca/0x2d0
[  466.271976]  kasan_report+0xe/0x20
[  466.271987]  tun_chr_read_iter+0x2ca/0x2d0
[  466.272013]  do_iter_readv_writev+0x4b7/0x740
[  466.272032]  ? default_llseek+0x2d0/0x2d0
[  466.272072]  do_iter_read+0x1c5/0x5e0
[  466.272110]  vfs_readv+0x108/0x180
[  466.299007]  ? compat_rw_copy_check_uvector+0x440/0x440
[  466.299020]  ? fsnotify+0x888/0xd50
[  466.299040]  ? __fsnotify_parent+0xd0/0x350
[  466.299064]  ? fsnotify_first_mark+0x1e0/0x1e0
[  466.304548]  ? vfs_write+0x264/0x510
[  466.304569]  ? ksys_write+0x101/0x210
[  466.304591]  ? do_preadv+0x116/0x1a0
[  466.304609]  do_preadv+0x116/0x1a0
[  466.309829]  do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x600
[  466.309849]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[  466.309861] RIP: 0033:0x4560f9
[  466.309875] Code: 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  466.309889] RSP: 002b:00007ffffa5166e8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000127
[  466.322992] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000400460 RCX: 00000000004560f9
[  466.322999] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00000000200008c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  466.323007] RBP: 00007ffffa516700 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000
[  466.323014] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 000000000040cb10
[  466.323021] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000006d7018 R15: 0000000000000000
[  466.323057]
[  466.323064] Allocated by task 2605:
[  466.335165]  save_stack+0x19/0x80
[  466.336240]  __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.8+0xa0/0xd0
[  466.337755]  kmem_cache_alloc+0xe8/0x320
[  466.339050]  getname_flags+0xca/0x560
[  466.340229]  user_path_at_empty+0x2c/0x50
[  466.341508]  vfs_statx+0xe6/0x190
[  466.342619]  __do_sys_newstat+0x81/0x100
[  466.343908]  do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x600
[  466.345303]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[  466.347034]
[  466.347517] Freed by task 2605:
[  466.348471]  save_stack+0x19/0x80
[  466.349476]  __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x180
[  466.350726]  kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x430
[  466.351874]  putname+0xe2/0x120
[  466.352921]  filename_lookup+0x257/0x3e0
[  466.354319]  vfs_statx+0xe6/0x190
[  466.355498]  __do_sys_newstat+0x81/0x100
[  466.356889]  do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x600
[  466.358037]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[  466.359567]
[  466.360050] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888372139100
[  466.360050]  which belongs to the cache names_cache of size 4096
[  466.363735] The buggy address is located 336 bytes inside of
[  466.363735]  4096-byte region [ffff888372139100, ffff88837213a100)
[  466.367179] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[  466.368604] page:ffffea000dc84e00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8883df1b4f00 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[  466.371582] flags: 0x2fffff80010200(slab|head)
[  466.372910] raw: 002fffff80010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff8883df1b4f00
[  466.375209] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000070007 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[  466.377778] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[  466.379730]
[  466.380288] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  466.381844]  ffff888372139100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  466.384009]  ffff888372139180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  466.386131] >ffff888372139200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  466.388257]                                                  ^
[  466.390234]  ffff888372139280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  466.392512]  ffff888372139300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  466.394667] ==================================================================

tun_chr_read_iter() accessed the memory which freed by free_netdev() called by tun_set_iff():

CPUA CPUB
tun_set_iff()
alloc_netdev_mqs()
tun_attach()
tun_chr_read_iter()
tun_get()
tun_do_read()
tun_ring_recv()
register_netdevice() <-- inject error
goto err_detach
tun_detach_all() <-- set RCV_SHUTDOWN
free_netdev() <-- called from
err_free_dev path
netdev_freemem() <-- free the memory
without check refcount
(In this path, the refcount cannot prevent
freeing the memory of dev, and the memory
will be used by dev_put() called by
tun_chr_read_iter() on CPUB.)
(Break from tun_ring_recv(), because RCV_SHUTDOWN is set)
tun_put()
dev_put() <-- use the memory
freed by netdev_freemem()

Put the publishing of tfile->tun after register_netdevice(), so tun_get() won't get the tun pointer that freed by err_detach path if register_netdevice() failed.

---
 drivers/net/tun.c |   16 +++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -801,7 +801,8 @@ static void tun_detach_all(struct net_de
 }
 
 static int tun_attach(struct tun_struct *tun, struct file *file,
-		      bool skip_filter, bool napi, bool napi_frags)
+		      bool skip_filter, bool napi, bool napi_frags,
+		      bool publish_tun)
 {
 	struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
 	struct net_device *dev = tun->dev;

@@ -881,7 +882,8 @@ static int tun_attach(struct tun_struct
 	 * initialized tfile; otherwise we risk using half-initialized
 	 * object.
 	 */
-	rcu_assign_pointer(tfile->tun, tun);
+	if (publish_tun)
+		rcu_assign_pointer(tfile->tun, tun);
 	rcu_assign_pointer(tun->tfiles[tun->numqueues], tfile);
 	tun->numqueues++;
 	tun_set_real_num_queues(tun);

@@ -2553,7 +2555,7 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net,
 
 		err = tun_attach(tun, file, ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NOFILTER,
 				 ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NAPI,
-				 ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NAPI_FRAGS);
+				 ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NAPI_FRAGS, true);
 		if (err < 0)
 			return err;
 

@@ -2652,13 +2654,17 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net,
 
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tun->disabled);
 		err = tun_attach(tun, file, false, ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NAPI,
-				 ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NAPI_FRAGS);
+				 ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NAPI_FRAGS, false);
 		if (err < 0)
 			goto err_free_flow;
 
 		err = register_netdevice(tun->dev);
 		if (err < 0)
 			goto err_detach;
+		/* free_netdev() won't check refcnt, to aovid race
+		 * with dev_put() we need publish tun after registration.
+		 */
+		rcu_assign_pointer(tfile->tun, tun);
 	}
 
 	netif_carrier_on(tun->dev);

@@ -2802,7 +2808,7 @@ static int tun_set_queue(struct file *fi
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto unlock;
 		ret = tun_attach(tun, file, false, tun->flags & IFF_NAPI,
-				 tun->flags & IFF_NAPI_FRAGS);
+				 tun->flags & IFF_NAPI_FRAGS, true);
 	} else if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_DETACH_QUEUE) {
 		tun = rtnl_dereference(tfile->tun);
 		if (!tun || !(tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE) || tfile->detached)

From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>

commit 61f7f7c8f978b1c0d80e43c83b7d110ca0496eb4 upstream.

Another day; another DSDT bug we need to workaround...

Since commit ca876c7483b6 ("gpiolib-acpi: make sure we trigger edge events at least once on boot") we call _AEI edge handlers at boot.

In some rare cases this causes problems. One example of this is the Minix Neo Z83-4 mini PC, this device has a clear DSDT bug where it has some copy and pasted code for dealing with Micro USB-B connector host/device role switching, while the mini PC does not even have a micro-USB connector. This code, which should not be there, messes with the DDC data pin from the HDMI connector (switching it to GPIO mode) breaking HDMI support.

To avoid problems like this, this commit adds a new gpiolib_acpi.run_edge_events_on_boot kernel commandline option, which allows disabling the running of _AEI edge event handlers at boot.

The default value is -1/auto which uses a DMI based blacklist, the initial version of this blacklist contains the Neo Z83-4 fixing the HDMI breakage.

---
 drivers/gpio/gpiolib-acpi.c |   42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
  * published by the Free Software Foundation.
  */
 
+#include <linux/dmi.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/gpio.h>
 #include <linux/gpio/consumer.h>

@@ -23,6 +24,11 @@
 
 #include "gpiolib.h"
 
+static int run_edge_events_on_boot = -1;
+module_param(run_edge_events_on_boot, int, 0444);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(run_edge_events_on_boot,
+		 "Run edge _AEI event-handlers at boot: 0=no, 1=yes, -1=auto");
+
 /**
  * struct acpi_gpio_event - ACPI GPIO event handler data
  *

@@ -174,10 +180,13 @@ static void acpi_gpiochip_request_irq(st
 	event->irq_requested = true;
 
 	/* Make sure we trigger the initial state of edge-triggered IRQs */
-	value = gpiod_get_raw_value_cansleep(event->desc);
-	if (((event->irqflags & IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING) && value == 1) ||
-	    ((event->irqflags & IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING) && value == 0))
-		event->handler(event->irq, event);
+	if (run_edge_events_on_boot &&
+	    (event->irqflags & (IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING | IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING))) {
+		value = gpiod_get_raw_value_cansleep(event->desc);
+		if (((event->irqflags & IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING) && value == 1) ||
+		    ((event->irqflags & IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING) && value == 0))
+			event->handler(event->irq, event);
+	}
 }
 
 static void acpi_gpiochip_request_irqs(struct acpi_gpio_chip *acpi_gpio)

@@ -1253,3 +1262,28 @@ static int acpi_gpio_handle_deferred_req
 }
 /* We must use _sync so that this runs after the first deferred_probe run */
 late_initcall_sync(acpi_gpio_handle_deferred_request_irqs);
+
+static const struct dmi_system_id run_edge_events_on_boot_blacklist[] = {
+	{
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "MINIX"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Z83-4"),
+		}
+	},
+	{} /* Terminating entry */
+};
+
+static int acpi_gpio_setup_params(void)
+{
+	if (run_edge_events_on_boot < 0) {
+		if (dmi_check_system(run_edge_events_on_boot_blacklist))
+			run_edge_events_on_boot = 0;
+		else
+			run_edge_events_on_boot = 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Directly after dmi_setup() which runs as core_initcall() */
+postcore_initcall(acpi_gpio_setup_params);

So... apparently Windows does _not_ run _AEI edge event handlers at boot, otherwise Minix would realize that fault.

Would it make sense not to do it by default, either?

Best regards,
Pavel

(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

Hi,

Right, also came the conclusion that Windows likely does not run _AEI edge event handlers at boot.

Well as the commit-msg for the commit which originally added this explains, there are at least 2 reasons to run them at boot:

1) This is necessary on at least some ms surface devices to get the initial LID state correct, otherwise the LID will be report being closed until the first time it is actually closed + opened again. Now this case we can probably quirk ourselves out of in some way.

2) The other case is Cherry Trail based tablets. The hw on these can typically do both USB device and host mode on the tablets micro-b or type-c connector. This involves a mux which switches the data lines between the host and device controllers inside the Cherry Trail SoC. This mux is controlled by an edge-triggered ACPI eventhandler connected to the ID pin of the micro-b connector.

OOTB Windows only supports host mode, I guess there might be some way to get device mode to work under Windows but tablet manufacturers do not seem to care about this.

By default many UEFI firmwares put the mux in host mode during boot, independent of the actual ID pin value since they only care about host mode and want to support e.g. booting from USB or an external kbd.

By default the ID pin on the micro-b connector is high (pulled up) an actual micro-b to host(A-female) cable pulls the ID-pin to gnd, a USB-A to micro-B cable such as used to connect the tablet to a PC leaves the ID pin floating (pulled high).

So without a host adapter inserted, we boot with the mux in host mode, and the ID pin high. Now if the user connects the tablet to a PC (or it was connected at boot) the ID pin does not change, the mux is not change and device mode does not work since the mux is set wrong. The only way to fix this is to force the ID pin to change, so that would mean inserting a host-adapter, removing it again and then connecting the tablet to a PC.

Running the _AEI handler at boot correctly puts the mux in device position fixing this. Almost all Cherry Trall devices suffer from this, makig it impossible to quirk our way out of this.

Now arguably we could limit the running of _AEI handlers at boot to Cherry Trail, I would not object to that, but the Minix Neo Z83-4 mini PC is a Cherry Trail device itself, as mentioned in the commit msg, the troublesome _AEI handler on this device is the same ID pin handler which we want to run boot on all Cherry Trail tablets. In this mini-pc case it is wrong though since the mini-pc does not even have a micro-b connector.

I hope this explains.

Regards,

Hans

From: Kent Gibson <[email protected]>

commit e95fbc130a162ba9ad956311b95aa0da269eea48 upstream.

linehandle_create should not allow both GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_INPUT and GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_OUTPUT to be set.

---
 drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

@@ -525,6 +525,14 @@ static int linehandle_create(struct gpio
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/*
+	 * Do not allow both INPUT & OUTPUT flags to be set as they are
+	 * contradictory.
+	 */
+	if ((lflags & GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_INPUT) &&
+	    (lflags & GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_OUTPUT))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
 	 * Do not allow OPEN_SOURCE & OPEN_DRAIN flags in a single request. If
 	 * the hardware actually supports enabling both at the same time the
 	 * electrical result would be disastrous.

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

commit 410f954cb1d1c79ae485dd83a175f21954fd87cd upstream.

Sometimes when fsync'ing a file we need to log that other inodes exist and when we need to do that we acquire a reference on the inodes and then drop that reference using iput() after logging them.

That generally is not a problem except if we end up doing the final iput() (dropping the last reference) on the inode and that inode has a link count of 0, which can happen in a very short time window if the logging path gets a reference on the inode while it's being unlinked.

In that case we end up getting the eviction callback, btrfs_evict_inode(), invoked through the iput() call chain which needs to drop all of the inode's items from its subvolume btree, and in order to do that, it needs to join a transaction at the helper function evict_refill_and_join(). However because the task previously started a transaction at the fsync handler, btrfs_sync_file(), it has current->journal_info already pointing to a transaction handle and therefore evict_refill_and_join() will get that transaction handle from btrfs_join_transaction(). From this point on, two different problems can happen:

1) evict_refill_and_join() will often change the transaction handle's block reserve (->block_rsv) and set its ->bytes_reserved field to a value greater than 0. If evict_refill_and_join() never commits the transaction, the eviction handler ends up decreasing the reference count (->use_count) of the transaction handle through the call to btrfs_end_transaction(), and after that point we have a transaction handle with a NULL ->block_rsv (which is the value prior to the transaction join from evict_refill_and_join()) and a ->bytes_reserved value greater than 0. If after the eviction/iput completes the inode logging path hits an error or it decides that it must fallback to a transaction commit, the btrfs fsync handle, btrfs_sync_file(), gets a non-zero value from btrfs_log_dentry_safe(), and because of that non-zero value it tries to commit the transaction using a handle with a NULL ->block_rsv and a non-zero ->bytes_reserved value. This makes the transaction commit hit an assertion failure at btrfs_trans_release_metadata() because ->bytes_reserved is not zero but the ->block_rsv is NULL. The produced stack trace for that is like the following:

   [192922.917158] assertion failed: !trans->bytes_reserved, file: fs/btrfs/transaction.c, line: 816
   [192922.917553] ------------[ cut here ]------------
   [192922.917922] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3532!
   [192922.918310] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
   [192922.918666] CPU: 2 PID: 883 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G        W         5.1.4-btrfs-next-47 #1
   [192922.919035] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.2-0-gf9626ccb91-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
   [192922.919801] RIP: 0010:assfail.constprop.25+0x18/0x1a [btrfs]
   (...)
   [192922.920925] RSP: 0018:ffffaebdc8a27da8 EFLAGS: 00010286
   [192922.921315] RAX: 0000000000000051 RBX: ffff95c9c16a41c0 RCX: 0000000000000000
   [192922.921692] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff95cab6b16838 RDI: ffff95cab6b16838
   [192922.922066] RBP: ffff95c9c16a41c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
   [192922.922442] R10: ffffaebdc8a27e70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff95ca731a0980
   [192922.922820] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff95ca84c73338 R15: ffff95ca731a0ea8
   [192922.923200] FS:  00007f337eda4e80(0000) GS:ffff95cab6b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
   [192922.923579] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
   [192922.923948] CR2: 00007f337edad000 CR3: 00000001e00f6002 CR4: 00000000003606e0
   [192922.924329] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
   [192922.924711] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
   [192922.925105] Call Trace:
   [192922.925505]  btrfs_trans_release_metadata+0x10c/0x170 [btrfs]
   [192922.925911]  btrfs_commit_transaction+0x3e/0xaf0 [btrfs]
   [192922.926324]  btrfs_sync_file+0x44c/0x490 [btrfs]
   [192922.926731]  do_fsync+0x38/0x60
   [192922.927138]  __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x13/0x20
   [192922.927543]  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1c0
   [192922.927939]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
   (...)
   [192922.934077] ---[ end trace f00808b12068168f ]---

2) If evict_refill_and_join() decides to commit the transaction, it will be able to do it, since the nested transaction join only increments the transaction handle's ->use_count reference counter and it does not prevent the transaction from getting committed. This means that after eviction completes, the fsync logging path will be using a transaction handle that refers to an already committed transaction. What happens when using such a stale transaction can be unpredictable, we are at least having a use-after-free on the transaction handle itself, since the transaction commit will call kmem_cache_free() against the handle regardless of its ->use_count value, or we can end up silently losing all the updates to the log tree after that iput() in the logging path, or using a transaction handle that in the meanwhile was allocated to another task for a new transaction, etc, pretty much unpredictable what can happen.

In order to fix both of them, instead of using iput() during logging, use btrfs_add_delayed_iput(), so that the logging path of fsync never drops the last reference on an inode, that step is offloaded to a safe context (usually the cleaner kthread).

The assertion failure issue was sporadically triggered by the test case generic/475 from fstests, which loads the dm error target while fsstress is running, which lead to fsync failing while logging inodes with -EIO errors and then trying later to commit the transaction, triggering the assertion failure.

---
 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -5107,7 +5107,7 @@ again:
 						BTRFS_I(other_inode),
 						LOG_OTHER_INODE, 0, LLONG_MAX,
 						ctx);
-				iput(other_inode);
+				btrfs_add_delayed_iput(other_inode);
 				if (err)
 					goto out_unlock;
 				else

@@ -5519,7 +5519,7 @@ process_leaf:
 			}
 
 			if (btrfs_inode_in_log(BTRFS_I(di_inode), trans->transid)) {
-				iput(di_inode);
+				btrfs_add_delayed_iput(di_inode);
 				break;
 			}
 

@@ -5531,7 +5531,7 @@ process_leaf:
 			if (!ret &&
 			    btrfs_must_commit_transaction(trans, BTRFS_I(di_inode)))
 				ret = 1;
-			iput(di_inode);
+			btrfs_add_delayed_iput(di_inode);
 			if (ret)
 				goto next_dir_inode;
 			if (ctx->log_new_dentries) {

@@ -5678,7 +5678,7 @@ static int btrfs_log_all_parents(struct
 			if (!ret && ctx && ctx->log_new_dentries)
 				ret = log_new_dir_dentries(trans, root,
 						   BTRFS_I(dir_inode), ctx);
-			iput(dir_inode);
+			btrfs_add_delayed_iput(dir_inode);
 			if (ret)
 				goto out;
 		}

From: Alexander Duyck <[email protected]>

commit 377228accbbb8b9738f615d791aa803f41c067e0 upstream.

There were a couple cases where the ITR value generated via the adaptive ITR scheme could exceed 126. This resulted in the value becoming either 0 or something less than 10. Switching back and forth between a value less than 10 and a value greater than 10 can cause issues as certain hardware features such as RSC to not function well when the ITR value has dropped that low.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -2626,7 +2626,7 @@ adjust_by_size:
 		/* 16K ints/sec to 9.2K ints/sec */
 		avg_wire_size *= 15;
 		avg_wire_size += 11452;
-	} else if (avg_wire_size <= 1980) {
+	} else if (avg_wire_size < 1968) {
 		/* 9.2K ints/sec to 8K ints/sec */
 		avg_wire_size *= 5;
 		avg_wire_size += 22420;

@@ -2659,6 +2659,8 @@ adjust_by_size:
 	case IXGBE_LINK_SPEED_2_5GB_FULL:
 	case IXGBE_LINK_SPEED_1GB_FULL:
 	case IXGBE_LINK_SPEED_10_FULL:
+		if (avg_wire_size > 8064)
+			avg_wire_size = 8064;
 		itr += DIV_ROUND_UP(avg_wire_size,
 				    IXGBE_ITR_ADAPTIVE_MIN_INC * 64) *
 		       IXGBE_ITR_ADAPTIVE_MIN_INC;

From: Yunfeng Ye <[email protected]>

commit eddf3e9c7c7e4d0707c68d1bb22cc6ec8aef7d4a upstream.

The following crash was observed:

  Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158
  Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
  pc : resend_irqs+0x68/0xb0
  lr : resend_irqs+0x64/0xb0
  ...
  Call trace:
   resend_irqs+0x68/0xb0
   tasklet_action_common.isra.6+0x84/0x138
   tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
   __do_softirq+0x120/0x324
   run_ksoftirqd+0x44/0x60
   smpboot_thread_fn+0x1ac/0x1e8
   kthread+0x134/0x138
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

The reason for this is that the interrupt resend mechanism happens in soft interrupt context, which is a asynchronous mechanism versus other operations on interrupts. free_irq() does not take resend handling into account. Thus, the irq descriptor might be already freed before the resend tasklet is executed. resend_irqs() does not check the return value of the interrupt descriptor lookup and derefences the return value unconditionally.

1):
__setup_irq
irq_startup
check_irq_resend // activate softirq to handle resend irq
2):
irq_domain_free_irqs

    irq_free_descs
      free_desc
        call_rcu(&desc->rcu, delayed_free_desc)

3):
__do_softirq
tasklet_action
resend_irqs
desc = irq_to_desc(irq) desc->handle_irq(desc) // desc is NULL --> Ooops

Fix this by adding a NULL pointer check in resend_irqs() before derefencing the irq descriptor.

---
 kernel/irq/resend.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ static void resend_irqs(unsigned long ar
 		irq = find_first_bit(irqs_resend, nr_irqs);
 		clear_bit(irq, irqs_resend);
 		desc = irq_to_desc(irq);
+		if (!desc)
+			continue;
 		local_irq_disable();
 		desc->handle_irq(desc);
 		local_irq_enable();

From: Igor Mammedov <[email protected]>

commit 13a17cc0526f08d1df9507f7484176371cd263a0 upstream.

If userspace doesn't set KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES on memslot before calling kvm_s390_vm_start_migration(), kernel will oops with:

  Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space
  Failing address: 0000000000000000 TEID: 0000000000000483
  Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE.
  AS:0000000002a2000b R2:00000001bff8c00b R3:00000001bff88007 S:00000001bff91000 P:000000000000003d
  Oops: 0004 ilc:2 [#1] SMP
  ...
  Call Trace:
  ([<001fffff804ec552>] kvm_s390_vm_set_attr+0x347a/0x3828 [kvm])
   [<001fffff804ecfc0>] kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0x6c0/0x1998 [kvm]
   [<001fffff804b67e4>] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x51c/0x11a8 [kvm]
   [<00000000008ba572>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1d2/0xe58
   [<00000000008bb284>] ksys_ioctl+0x8c/0xb8
   [<00000000008bb2e2>] sys_ioctl+0x32/0x40
   [<000000000175552c>] system_call+0x2b8/0x2d8
  INFO: lockdep is turned off.
  Last Breaking-Event-Address:
   [<0000000000dbaf60>] __memset+0xc/0xa0

due to ms->dirty_bitmap being NULL, which might crash the host.

Make sure that ms->dirty_bitmap is set before using it or return -EINVAL otherwise.

---
 arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -928,6 +928,8 @@ static int kvm_s390_vm_start_migration(s
 	/* mark all the pages in active slots as dirty */
 	for (slotnr = 0; slotnr < slots->used_slots; slotnr++) {
 		ms = slots->memslots + slotnr;
+		if (!ms->dirty_bitmap)
+			return -EINVAL;
 		/*
 		 * The second half of the bitmap is only used on x86,
 		 * and would be wasted otherwise, so we put it to good

From: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>

commit 53936b5bf35e140ae27e4bbf0447a61063f400da upstream.

When the userspace program runs the KVM_S390_INTERRUPT ioctl to inject an interrupt, we convert them from the legacy struct kvm_s390_interrupt to the new struct kvm_s390_irq via the s390int_to_s390irq() function. However, this function does not take care of all types of interrupts that we can inject into the guest later (see do_inject_vcpu()). Since we do not clear out the s390irq values before calling s390int_to_s390irq(), there is a chance that we copy random data from the kernel stack which could be leaked to the userspace later.

Specifically, the problem exists with the KVM_S390_INT_PFAULT_INIT
interrupt: s390int_to_s390irq() does not handle it, and the function __inject_pfault_init() later copies irq->u.ext which contains the random kernel stack data. This data can then be leaked either to the guest memory in __deliver_pfault_init(), or the userspace might retrieve it directly with the KVM_S390_GET_IRQ_STATE ioctl.

Fix it by handling that interrupt type in s390int_to_s390irq(), too, and by making sure that the s390irq struct is properly pre-initialized. And while we're at it, make sure that s390int_to_s390irq() now directly returns -EINVAL for unknown interrupt types, so that we immediately get a proper error code in case we add more interrupt types to do_inject_vcpu() without updating s390int_to_s390irq() sometime in the future.

---
 arch/s390/kvm/interrupt.c |   10 ++++++++++
 arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c  |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1879,6 +1879,16 @@ int s390int_to_s390irq(struct kvm_s390_i
 	case KVM_S390_MCHK:
 		irq->u.mchk.mcic = s390int->parm64;
 		break;
+	case KVM_S390_INT_PFAULT_INIT:
+		irq->u.ext.ext_params = s390int->parm;
+		irq->u.ext.ext_params2 = s390int->parm64;
+		break;
+	case KVM_S390_RESTART:
+	case KVM_S390_INT_CLOCK_COMP:
+	case KVM_S390_INT_CPU_TIMER:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }

@@ -3958,7 +3958,7 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_async_ioctl(struct fi
 	}
 	case KVM_S390_INTERRUPT: {
 		struct kvm_s390_interrupt s390int;
-		struct kvm_s390_irq s390irq;
+		struct kvm_s390_irq s390irq = {};
 
 		if (copy_from_user(&s390int, argp, sizeof(s390int)))
 			return -EFAULT;

From: Fuqian Huang <[email protected]>

commit 541ab2aeb28251bf7135c7961f3a6080eebcc705 upstream.

Emulation of VMPTRST can incorrectly inject a page fault when passed an operand that points to an MMIO address. The page fault will use uninitialized kernel stack memory as the CR2 and error code.

The right behavior would be to abort the VM with a KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR exit to userspace; however, it is not an easy fix, so for now just ensure that the error code and CR2 are zero.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

@@ -5016,6 +5016,13 @@ int kvm_write_guest_virt_system(struct k
 	/* kvm_write_guest_virt_system can pull in tons of pages. */
 	vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = true;
 
+	/*
+	 * FIXME: this should call handle_emulation_failure if X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED
+	 * is returned, but our callers are not ready for that and they blindly
+	 * call kvm_inject_page_fault.  Ensure that they at least do not leak
+	 * uninitialized kernel stack memory into cr2 and error code.
+	 */
+	memset(exception, 0, sizeof(*exception));
 	return kvm_write_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu,
 					   PFERR_WRITE_MASK, exception);
 }

From: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>

commit f7eea636c3d505fe6f1d1066234f1aaf7171b681 upstream.

The implementation of vmread to memory is still incomplete, as it lacks the ability to do vmread to I/O memory just like vmptrst.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -8757,6 +8757,7 @@ static int handle_vmread(struct kvm_vcpu
 	u32 vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
 	gva_t gva = 0;
 	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12;
+	struct x86_exception e;
 
 	if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
 		return 1;

@@ -8798,8 +8799,10 @@ static int handle_vmread(struct kvm_vcpu
 				vmx_instruction_info, true, &gva))
 			return 1;
 		/* _system ok, nested_vmx_check_permission has verified cpl=0 */
-		kvm_write_guest_virt_system(vcpu, gva, &field_value,
-					    (is_long_mode(vcpu) ? 8 : 4), NULL);
+		if (kvm_write_guest_virt_system(vcpu, gva, &field_value,
+						(is_long_mode(vcpu) ? 8 : 4),
+						NULL))
+			kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &e);
 	}
 
 	nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);

From: Steve Wahl <[email protected]>

commit e16c2983fba0fa6763e43ad10916be35e3d8dc05 upstream.

The last change to this Makefile caused relocation errors when loading a kdump kernel. Restore -mcmodel=large (not -mcmodel=kernel), -ffreestanding, and -fno-zero-initialized-bsss, without reverting to the former practice of resetting KBUILD_CFLAGS.

Purgatory.ro is a standalone binary that is not linked against the rest of the kernel. Its image is copied into an array that is linked to the kernel, and from there kexec relocates it wherever it desires.

With the previous change to compiler flags, the error "kexec: Overflow in relocation type 11 value 0x11fffd000" was encountered when trying to load the crash kernel. This is from kexec code trying to relocate the purgatory.ro object.

x86_64 ABI says:

"The R_X86_64_32 and R_X86_64_32S relocations truncate the
computed value to 32-bits. The linker must verify that the generated value for the R_X86_64_32 (R_X86_64_32S) relocation zero-extends (sign-extends) to the original 64-bit value."

This type of relocation doesn't work when kexec chooses to place the purgatory binary in memory that is not reachable with 32 bit addresses.

The compiler flag -mcmodel=kernel allows those type of relocations to be emitted, so revert to using -mcmodel=large as was done before.

Also restore the -ffreestanding and -fno-zero-initialized-bss flags because they are appropriate for a stand alone piece of object code which doesn't explicitly zero the bss, and one other report has said undefined symbols are encountered without -ffreestanding.

These identical compiler flag changes need to happen for every object that becomes part of the purgatory.ro object, so gather them together first into PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE and PURGATORY_CFLAGS, and then apply them to each of the objects that have C source. Do not apply any of these flags to kexec-purgatory.o, which is not part of the standalone object but part of the kernel proper.

---
 arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile |   35 +++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

@@ -18,37 +18,40 @@ targets += purgatory.ro
 KASAN_SANITIZE	:= n
 KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
 
+# These are adjustments to the compiler flags used for objects that
+# make up the standalone purgatory.ro
+
+PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE := -mcmodel=kernel
+PURGATORY_CFLAGS := -mcmodel=large -ffreestanding -fno-zero-initialized-in-bss
+
 # Default KBUILD_CFLAGS can have -pg option set when FTRACE is enabled. That
 # in turn leaves some undefined symbols like __fentry__ in purgatory and not
 # sure how to relocate those.
 ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_sha256.o		+= $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_purgatory.o	+= $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_string.o		+= $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_kexec-purgatory.o	+= $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
+PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE		+= $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
 endif
 
 ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_sha256.o		+= -fstack-protector
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_purgatory.o	+= -fstack-protector
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_string.o		+= -fstack-protector
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_kexec-purgatory.o	+= -fstack-protector
+PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE		+= -fstack-protector
 endif
 
 ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_sha256.o		+= -fstack-protector-strong
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_purgatory.o	+= -fstack-protector-strong
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_string.o		+= -fstack-protector-strong
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_kexec-purgatory.o	+= -fstack-protector-strong
+PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE		+= -fstack-protector-strong
 endif
 
 ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_sha256.o		+= $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS)
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_purgatory.o	+= $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS)
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_string.o		+= $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS)
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_kexec-purgatory.o	+= $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS)
+PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE		+= $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS)
 endif
 
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_purgatory.o	+= $(PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE)
+CFLAGS_purgatory.o		+= $(PURGATORY_CFLAGS)
+
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_sha256.o		+= $(PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE)
+CFLAGS_sha256.o			+= $(PURGATORY_CFLAGS)
+
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_string.o		+= $(PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE)
+CFLAGS_string.o			+= $(PURGATORY_CFLAGS)
+
 $(obj)/purgatory.ro: $(PURGATORY_OBJS) FORCE
 		$(call if_changed,ld)
 

From: Suraj Jitindar Singh <[email protected]>

commit 6fbcdd59094ade30db63f32316e9502425d7b256 upstream.

Commit ddf35cf3764b ("powerpc: Use barrier_nospec in copy_from_user()") Added barrier_nospec before loading from user-controlled pointers. The intention was to order the load from the potentially user-controlled pointer vs a previous branch based on an access_ok() check or similar.

In order to achieve the same result, add a barrier_nospec to the raw_copy_in_user() function before loading from such a user-controlled pointer.

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ extern unsigned long __copy_tofrom_user(
 static inline unsigned long
 raw_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 {
+	barrier_nospec();
 	return __copy_tofrom_user(to, from, n);
 }
 #endif /* __powerpc64__ */

From: Neil Armstrong <[email protected]>

commit 5ffff4415f9eeae834960226770963e2947e17eb upstream.

Add missing XBGR8888 & ABGR8888 formats variants from the primary plane.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/meson/meson_plane.c |   16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)

@@ -120,6 +120,13 @@ static void meson_plane_atomic_update(st
 		priv->viu.osd1_blk0_cfg[0] |= OSD_BLK_MODE_32 |
 					      OSD_COLOR_MATRIX_32_ARGB;
 		break;
+	case DRM_FORMAT_XBGR8888:
+		/* For XRGB, replace the pixel's alpha by 0xFF */
+		writel_bits_relaxed(OSD_REPLACE_EN, OSD_REPLACE_EN,
+				    priv->io_base + _REG(VIU_OSD1_CTRL_STAT2));
+		priv->viu.osd1_blk0_cfg[0] |= OSD_BLK_MODE_32 |
+					      OSD_COLOR_MATRIX_32_ABGR;
+		break;
 	case DRM_FORMAT_ARGB8888:
 		/* For ARGB, use the pixel's alpha */
 		writel_bits_relaxed(OSD_REPLACE_EN, 0,

@@ -127,6 +134,13 @@ static void meson_plane_atomic_update(st
 		priv->viu.osd1_blk0_cfg[0] |= OSD_BLK_MODE_32 |
 					      OSD_COLOR_MATRIX_32_ARGB;
 		break;
+	case DRM_FORMAT_ABGR8888:
+		/* For ARGB, use the pixel's alpha */
+		writel_bits_relaxed(OSD_REPLACE_EN, 0,
+				    priv->io_base + _REG(VIU_OSD1_CTRL_STAT2));
+		priv->viu.osd1_blk0_cfg[0] |= OSD_BLK_MODE_32 |
+					      OSD_COLOR_MATRIX_32_ABGR;
+		break;
 	case DRM_FORMAT_RGB888:
 		priv->viu.osd1_blk0_cfg[0] |= OSD_BLK_MODE_24 |
 					      OSD_COLOR_MATRIX_24_RGB;

@@ -196,7 +210,9 @@ static const struct drm_plane_funcs meso
 
 static const uint32_t supported_drm_formats[] = {
 	DRM_FORMAT_ARGB8888,
+	DRM_FORMAT_ABGR8888,
 	DRM_FORMAT_XRGB8888,
+	DRM_FORMAT_XBGR8888,
 	DRM_FORMAT_RGB888,
 	DRM_FORMAT_RGB565,
 };

From: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>

commit 6943b839721ad4a31ad2bacf6e71b21f2dfe3134 upstream.

At boot time, my rk3288-veyron devices yell with 8 lines that look like this:

  [    0.000000] rockchip_mmc_get_phase: invalid clk rate

This is because the clock framework at clk_register() time tries to get the phase but we don't have a parent yet.

While the errors appear to be harmless they are still ugly and, in general, we don't want yells like this in the log unless they are important.

There's no real reason to be yelling here. We can still return -EINVAL to indicate that the phase makes no sense without a parent. If someone really tries to do tuning and the clock is reported as 0 then we'll see the yells in rockchip_mmc_set_phase().

---
 drivers/clk/rockchip/clk-mmc-phase.c |    4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -61,10 +61,8 @@ static int rockchip_mmc_get_phase(struct
 	u32 delay_num = 0;
 
 	/* See the comment for rockchip_mmc_set_phase below */
-	if (!rate) {
-		pr_err("%s: invalid clk rate\n", __func__);
+	if (!rate)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	raw_value = readl(mmc_clock->reg) >> (mmc_clock->shift);
 

From: Xiaolei Li <[email protected]>

commit 336d4b138be2dad372b67a2388e42805c48aaa38 upstream.

One main goal of the function mtk_nfc_update_ecc_stats is to check whether sectors are all empty. If they are empty, set these sectors's data buffer and OOB buffer as 0xff.

But now, the sector OOB buffer pointer is wrongly assigned. We always do memset from sector 0.

To fix this issue, pass start sector number to make OOB buffer pointer be properly assigned.

---
 drivers/mtd/nand/raw/mtk_nand.c |   21 ++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

@@ -863,19 +863,21 @@ static int mtk_nfc_write_oob_std(struct
 	return mtk_nfc_write_page_raw(mtd, chip, NULL, 1, page);
 }
 
-static int mtk_nfc_update_ecc_stats(struct mtd_info *mtd, u8 *buf, u32 sectors)
+static int mtk_nfc_update_ecc_stats(struct mtd_info *mtd, u8 *buf, u32 start,
+				    u32 sectors)
 {
 	struct nand_chip *chip = mtd_to_nand(mtd);
 	struct mtk_nfc *nfc = nand_get_controller_data(chip);
 	struct mtk_nfc_nand_chip *mtk_nand = to_mtk_nand(chip);
 	struct mtk_ecc_stats stats;
+	u32 reg_size = mtk_nand->fdm.reg_size;
 	int rc, i;
 
 	rc = nfi_readl(nfc, NFI_STA) & STA_EMP_PAGE;
 	if (rc) {
 		memset(buf, 0xff, sectors * chip->ecc.size);
 		for (i = 0; i < sectors; i++)
-			memset(oob_ptr(chip, i), 0xff, mtk_nand->fdm.reg_size);
+			memset(oob_ptr(chip, start + i), 0xff, reg_size);
 		return 0;
 	}
 

@@ -895,7 +897,7 @@ static int mtk_nfc_read_subpage(struct m
 	u32 spare = mtk_nand->spare_per_sector;
 	u32 column, sectors, start, end, reg;
 	dma_addr_t addr;
-	int bitflips;
+	int bitflips = 0;
 	size_t len;
 	u8 *buf;
 	int rc;

@@ -962,14 +964,11 @@ static int mtk_nfc_read_subpage(struct m
 	if (rc < 0) {
 		dev_err(nfc->dev, "subpage done timeout\n");
 		bitflips = -EIO;
-	} else {
-		bitflips = 0;
-		if (!raw) {
-			rc = mtk_ecc_wait_done(nfc->ecc, ECC_DECODE);
-			bitflips = rc < 0 ? -ETIMEDOUT :
-				mtk_nfc_update_ecc_stats(mtd, buf, sectors);
-			mtk_nfc_read_fdm(chip, start, sectors);
-		}
+	} else if (!raw) {
+		rc = mtk_ecc_wait_done(nfc->ecc, ECC_DECODE);
+		bitflips = rc < 0 ? -ETIMEDOUT :
+			mtk_nfc_update_ecc_stats(mtd, buf, start, sectors);
+		mtk_nfc_read_fdm(chip, start, sectors);
 	}
 
 	dma_unmap_single(nfc->dev, addr, len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);

From: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>

commit 2d2f4273cbe9058d1f5a518e5e880d27d7b3b30f upstream.

Commit 0e7df22401a3 ("PCI: Add sysfs sriov_drivers_autoprobe to control VF driver binding") introduced the sriov_drivers_autoprobe attribute which allows users to prevent the kernel from automatically probing a driver for new VFs as they are created. This allows VFs to be spawned without automatically binding the new device to a host driver, such as in cases where the user intends to use the device only with a meta driver like vfio-pci. However, the current implementation prevents any use of drivers_probe with the VF while sriov_drivers_autoprobe=0. This blocks the now current general practice of setting driver_override followed by using drivers_probe to bind a device to a specified driver.

The kernel never automatically sets a driver_override therefore it seems we can assume a driver_override reflects the intent of the user. Also, probing a device using a driver_override match seems outside the scope of the 'auto' part of sriov_drivers_autoprobe. Therefore, let's allow driver_override matches regardless of sriov_drivers_autoprobe, which we can do by simply testing if a driver_override is set for a device as a 'can probe' condition.

---
 drivers/pci/pci-driver.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -399,7 +399,8 @@ void __weak pcibios_free_irq(struct pci_
 #ifdef CONFIG_PCI_IOV
 static inline bool pci_device_can_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 {
-	return (!pdev->is_virtfn || pdev->physfn->sriov->drivers_autoprobe);
+	return (!pdev->is_virtfn || pdev->physfn->sriov->drivers_autoprobe ||
+		pdev->driver_override);
 }
 #else
 static inline bool pci_device_can_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev)

From: Kent Gibson <[email protected]>

commit 5ca2f54b597c816df54ff1b28eb99cf7262b955d upstream.

lineevent_create should not allow any of GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_OUTPUT, GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_OPEN_DRAIN or GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_OPEN_SOURCE to be set.

---
 drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c |    8 +++-----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -924,7 +924,9 @@ static int lineevent_create(struct gpio_
 	}
 
 	/* This is just wrong: we don't look for events on output lines */
-	if (lflags & GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_OUTPUT) {
+	if ((lflags & GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_OUTPUT) ||
+	    (lflags & GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_OPEN_DRAIN) ||
+	    (lflags & GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_OPEN_SOURCE)) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out_free_label;
 	}

@@ -938,10 +940,6 @@ static int lineevent_create(struct gpio_
 
 	if (lflags & GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_ACTIVE_LOW)
 		set_bit(FLAG_ACTIVE_LOW, &desc->flags);
-	if (lflags & GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_OPEN_DRAIN)
-		set_bit(FLAG_OPEN_DRAIN, &desc->flags);
-	if (lflags & GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_OPEN_SOURCE)
-		set_bit(FLAG_OPEN_SOURCE, &desc->flags);
 
 	ret = gpiod_direction_input(desc);
 	if (ret)

From: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>

commit bacfa94b08027b9f66ede7044972e3b066766b3e upstream.

Commit c877154d307f fixed an uninitialized variable and optimized the function to not call tnc_next() in the first iteration of the loop. While this seemed perfectly legit and wise, it turned out to be illegal.
If the lookup function does not find an exact match it will rewind the cursor by 1.
The rewinded cursor will not match the name hash we are looking for and this results in a spurious -ENOENT.
So we need to move to the next entry in case of an non-exact match, but not if the match was exact.

While we are here, update the documentation to avoid further confusion.

---
 fs/ubifs/tnc.c |   16 +++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -1165,8 +1165,8 @@ static struct ubifs_znode *dirty_cow_bot
  *   o exact match, i.e. the found zero-level znode contains key @key, then %1
  *     is returned and slot number of the matched branch is stored in @n;
  *   o not exact match, which means that zero-level znode does not contain
- *     @key, then %0 is returned and slot number of the closest branch is stored
- *     in @n;
+ *     @key, then %0 is returned and slot number of the closest branch or %-1
+ *     is stored in @n; In this case calling tnc_next() is mandatory.
  *   o @key is so small that it is even less than the lowest key of the
  *     leftmost zero-level node, then %0 is returned and %0 is stored in @n.
  *

@@ -1883,13 +1883,19 @@ int ubifs_tnc_lookup_nm(struct ubifs_inf
 
 static int search_dh_cookie(struct ubifs_info *c, const union ubifs_key *key,
 			    struct ubifs_dent_node *dent, uint32_t cookie,
-			    struct ubifs_znode **zn, int *n)
+			    struct ubifs_znode **zn, int *n, int exact)
 {
 	int err;
 	struct ubifs_znode *znode = *zn;
 	struct ubifs_zbranch *zbr;
 	union ubifs_key *dkey;
 
+	if (!exact) {
+		err = tnc_next(c, &znode, n);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
 	for (;;) {
 		zbr = &znode->zbranch[*n];
 		dkey = &zbr->key;

@@ -1931,7 +1937,7 @@ static int do_lookup_dh(struct ubifs_inf
 	if (unlikely(err < 0))
 		goto out_unlock;
 
-	err = search_dh_cookie(c, key, dent, cookie, &znode, &n);
+	err = search_dh_cookie(c, key, dent, cookie, &znode, &n, err);
 
 out_unlock:
 	mutex_unlock(&c->tnc_mutex);

@@ -2718,7 +2724,7 @@ int ubifs_tnc_remove_dh(struct ubifs_inf
 		if (unlikely(err < 0))
 			goto out_free;
 
-		err = search_dh_cookie(c, key, dent, cookie, &znode, &n);
+		err = search_dh_cookie(c, key, dent, cookie, &znode, &n, err);
 		if (err)
 			goto out_free;
 	}

From: Muchun Song <[email protected]>

commit ac43432cb1f5c2950408534987e57c2071e24d8f upstream.

There is a race condition between removing glue directory and adding a new device under the glue dir. It can be reproduced in following test:

CPU1: CPU2:

device_add()
get_device_parent()
class_dir_create_and_add()
kobject_add_internal()
create_dir() // create glue_dir

device_add()
get_device_parent()
kobject_get() // get glue_dir

device_del()
cleanup_glue_dir()

    kobject_del(glue_dir)

                                                kobject_add()
                                                  kobject_add_internal()
                                                    create_dir() // in glue_dir
                                                      sysfs_create_dir_ns()
                                                        kernfs_create_dir_ns(sd)

      sysfs_remove_dir() // glue_dir->sd=NULL
      sysfs_put()        // free glue_dir->sd

                                                          // sd is freed
                                                          kernfs_new_node(sd)
                                                            kernfs_get(glue_dir)
                                                            kernfs_add_one()
                                                            kernfs_put()

Before CPU1 remove last child device under glue dir, if CPU2 add a new device under glue dir, the glue_dir kobject reference count will be increase to 2 via kobject_get() in get_device_parent(). And CPU2 has been called kernfs_create_dir_ns(), but not call kernfs_new_node(). Meanwhile, CPU1 call sysfs_remove_dir() and sysfs_put(). This result in glue_dir->sd is freed and it's reference count will be 0. Then CPU2 call kernfs_get(glue_dir) will trigger a warning in kernfs_get() and increase it's reference count to 1. Because glue_dir->sd is freed by CPU1, the next call kernfs_add_one() by CPU2 will fail(This is also use-after-free) and call kernfs_put() to decrease reference count. Because the reference count is decremented to 0, it will also call kmem_cache_free() to free the glue_dir->sd again. This will result in double free.

In order to avoid this happening, we also should make sure that kernfs_node for glue_dir is released in CPU1 only when refcount for glue_dir kobj is 1 to fix this race.

The following calltrace is captured in kernel 4.14 with the following patch applied:

commit 726e41097920 ("drivers: core: Remove glue dirs from sysfs earlier")

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

[    3.633703] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 513 at .../fs/kernfs/dir.c:494
                Here is WARN_ON(!atomic_read(&kn->count) in kernfs_get().
....
[    3.633986] Call trace:
[    3.633991]  kernfs_create_dir_ns+0xa8/0xb0
[    3.633994]  sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x54/0xe8
[    3.634001]  kobject_add_internal+0x22c/0x3f0
[    3.634005]  kobject_add+0xe4/0x118
[    3.634011]  device_add+0x200/0x870
[    3.634017]  _request_firmware+0x958/0xc38
[    3.634020]  request_firmware_into_buf+0x4c/0x70
....
[    3.634064] kernel BUG at .../mm/slub.c:294!
                Here is BUG_ON(object == fp) in set_freepointer().
....
[    3.634346] Call trace:
[    3.634351]  kmem_cache_free+0x504/0x6b8
[    3.634355]  kernfs_put+0x14c/0x1d8
[    3.634359]  kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x88/0xb0
[    3.634362]  sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x54/0xe8
[    3.634366]  kobject_add_internal+0x22c/0x3f0
[    3.634370]  kobject_add+0xe4/0x118
[    3.634374]  device_add+0x200/0x870
[    3.634378]  _request_firmware+0x958/0xc38
[    3.634381]  request_firmware_into_buf+0x4c/0x70

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

---
 drivers/base/core.c |   53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1648,12 +1648,63 @@ static inline struct kobject *get_glue_d
  */
 static void cleanup_glue_dir(struct device *dev, struct kobject *glue_dir)
 {
+	unsigned int ref;
+
 	/* see if we live in a "glue" directory */
 	if (!live_in_glue_dir(glue_dir, dev))
 		return;
 
 	mutex_lock(&gdp_mutex);
-	if (!kobject_has_children(glue_dir))
+	/**
+	 * There is a race condition between removing glue directory
+	 * and adding a new device under the glue directory.
+	 *
+	 * CPU1:                                         CPU2:
+	 *
+	 * device_add()
+	 *   get_device_parent()
+	 *     class_dir_create_and_add()
+	 *       kobject_add_internal()
+	 *         create_dir()    // create glue_dir
+	 *
+	 *                                               device_add()
+	 *                                                 get_device_parent()
+	 *                                                   kobject_get() // get glue_dir
+	 *
+	 * device_del()
+	 *   cleanup_glue_dir()
+	 *     kobject_del(glue_dir)
+	 *
+	 *                                               kobject_add()
+	 *                                                 kobject_add_internal()
+	 *                                                   create_dir() // in glue_dir
+	 *                                                     sysfs_create_dir_ns()
+	 *                                                       kernfs_create_dir_ns(sd)
+	 *
+	 *       sysfs_remove_dir() // glue_dir->sd=NULL
+	 *       sysfs_put()        // free glue_dir->sd
+	 *
+	 *                                                         // sd is freed
+	 *                                                         kernfs_new_node(sd)
+	 *                                                           kernfs_get(glue_dir)
+	 *                                                           kernfs_add_one()
+	 *                                                           kernfs_put()
+	 *
+	 * Before CPU1 remove last child device under glue dir, if CPU2 add
+	 * a new device under glue dir, the glue_dir kobject reference count
+	 * will be increase to 2 in kobject_get(k). And CPU2 has been called
+	 * kernfs_create_dir_ns(). Meanwhile, CPU1 call sysfs_remove_dir()
+	 * and sysfs_put(). This result in glue_dir->sd is freed.
+	 *
+	 * Then the CPU2 will see a stale "empty" but still potentially used
+	 * glue dir around in kernfs_new_node().
+	 *
+	 * In order to avoid this happening, we also should make sure that
+	 * kernfs_node for glue_dir is released in CPU1 only when refcount
+	 * for glue_dir kobj is 1.
+	 */
+	ref = kref_read(&glue_dir->kref);
+	if (!kobject_has_children(glue_dir) && !--ref)
 		kobject_del(glue_dir);
 	kobject_put(glue_dir);
 	mutex_unlock(&gdp_mutex);

From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>

commit 1ba34e71e9e56ac29a52e0d42b6290f3dc5bfd90 upstream.

Although the HW accepts any size and silently truncates it to the correct length, the extra tests expects EINVAL to be returned when the key size is not valid.

---
 drivers/crypto/talitos.c |   14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

@@ -1538,6 +1538,18 @@ static int ablkcipher_setkey(struct cryp
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int ablkcipher_aes_setkey(struct crypto_ablkcipher *cipher,
+				  const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	if (keylen == AES_KEYSIZE_128 || keylen == AES_KEYSIZE_192 ||
+	    keylen == AES_KEYSIZE_256)
+		return ablkcipher_setkey(cipher, key, keylen);
+
+	crypto_ablkcipher_set_flags(cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 static void common_nonsnoop_unmap(struct device *dev,
 				  struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
 				  struct ablkcipher_request *areq)

@@ -2705,6 +2717,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template drive
 				.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
 				.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
 				.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+				.setkey = ablkcipher_aes_setkey,
 			}
 		},
 		.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_COMMON_NONSNOOP_NO_AFEU |

@@ -2722,6 +2735,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template drive
 				.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
 				.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
 				.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+				.setkey = ablkcipher_aes_setkey,
 			}
 		},
 		.desc_hdr_template = DESC_HDR_TYPE_AESU_CTR_NONSNOOP |

From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>

commit b9a05b6041cb9810a291315569b2af0d63c3680a upstream.

CTR has a blocksize of 1.

---
 drivers/crypto/talitos.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -2728,7 +2728,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template drive
 		.alg.crypto = {
 			.cra_name = "ctr(aes)",
 			.cra_driver_name = "ctr-aes-talitos",
-			.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.cra_blocksize = 1,
 			.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ABLKCIPHER |
 				     CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
 			.cra_ablkcipher = {

From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>

commit ee483d32ee1a1a7f7d7e918fbc350c790a5af64a upstream.

When data size is not a multiple of the alg's block size, the SEC generates an error interrupt and dumps the registers. And for NULL size, the SEC does just nothing and the interrupt is awaited forever.

This patch ensures the data size is correct before submitting the request to the SEC engine.

---
 drivers/crypto/talitos.c |   16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)

@@ -1672,6 +1672,14 @@ static int ablkcipher_encrypt(struct abl
 	struct crypto_ablkcipher *cipher = crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(areq);
 	struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(cipher);
 	struct talitos_edesc *edesc;
+	unsigned int blocksize =
+			crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(crypto_ablkcipher_tfm(cipher));
+
+	if (!areq->nbytes)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (areq->nbytes % blocksize)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* allocate extended descriptor */
 	edesc = ablkcipher_edesc_alloc(areq, true);

@@ -1689,6 +1697,14 @@ static int ablkcipher_decrypt(struct abl
 	struct crypto_ablkcipher *cipher = crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(areq);
 	struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(cipher);
 	struct talitos_edesc *edesc;
+	unsigned int blocksize =
+			crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(crypto_ablkcipher_tfm(cipher));
+
+	if (!areq->nbytes)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (areq->nbytes % blocksize)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* allocate extended descriptor */
 	edesc = ablkcipher_edesc_alloc(areq, false);

From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>

commit d84cc9c9524ec5973a337533e6d8ccd3e5f05f2b upstream.

ECB's ivsize must be 0.

---
 drivers/crypto/talitos.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

@@ -2750,7 +2750,6 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template drive
 			.cra_ablkcipher = {
 				.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
 				.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
-				.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 				.setkey = ablkcipher_aes_setkey,
 			}
 		},

From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>

commit 7ede4c36cf7c6516986ee9d75b197c8bf73ea96f upstream.

For decrypt, req->cryptlen includes the size of the authentication part while all functions of the driver expect cryptlen to be the size of the encrypted data.

As it is not expected to change req->cryptlen, this patch implements local calculation of cryptlen.

---
 drivers/crypto/talitos.c |   31 +++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

@@ -959,11 +959,13 @@ static void talitos_sg_unmap(struct devi
 
 static void ipsec_esp_unmap(struct device *dev,
 			    struct talitos_edesc *edesc,
-			    struct aead_request *areq)
+			    struct aead_request *areq, bool encrypt)
 {
 	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(areq);
 	struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
 	unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
+	unsigned int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
+	unsigned int cryptlen = areq->cryptlen - (encrypt ? 0 : authsize);
 	bool is_ipsec_esp = edesc->desc.hdr & DESC_HDR_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP;
 	struct talitos_ptr *civ_ptr = &edesc->desc.ptr[is_ipsec_esp ? 2 : 3];
 

@@ -972,7 +974,7 @@ static void ipsec_esp_unmap(struct devic
 					 DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
 	unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, civ_ptr, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
 
-	talitos_sg_unmap(dev, edesc, areq->src, areq->dst, areq->cryptlen,
+	talitos_sg_unmap(dev, edesc, areq->src, areq->dst, cryptlen,
 			 areq->assoclen);
 
 	if (edesc->dma_len)

@@ -983,7 +985,7 @@ static void ipsec_esp_unmap(struct devic
 		unsigned int dst_nents = edesc->dst_nents ? : 1;
 
 		sg_pcopy_to_buffer(areq->dst, dst_nents, ctx->iv, ivsize,
-				   areq->assoclen + areq->cryptlen - ivsize);
+				   areq->assoclen + cryptlen - ivsize);
 	}
 }
 

@@ -1005,7 +1007,7 @@ static void ipsec_esp_encrypt_done(struc
 
 	edesc = container_of(desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc);
 
-	ipsec_esp_unmap(dev, edesc, areq);
+	ipsec_esp_unmap(dev, edesc, areq, true);
 
 	/* copy the generated ICV to dst */
 	if (edesc->icv_ool) {

@@ -1039,7 +1041,7 @@ static void ipsec_esp_decrypt_swauth_don
 
 	edesc = container_of(desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc);
 
-	ipsec_esp_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
+	ipsec_esp_unmap(dev, edesc, req, false);
 
 	if (!err) {
 		char icvdata[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];

@@ -1085,7 +1087,7 @@ static void ipsec_esp_decrypt_hwauth_don
 
 	edesc = container_of(desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc);
 
-	ipsec_esp_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
+	ipsec_esp_unmap(dev, edesc, req, false);
 
 	/* check ICV auth status */
 	if (!err && ((desc->hdr_lo & DESC_HDR_LO_ICCR1_MASK) !=

@@ -1188,6 +1190,7 @@ static int talitos_sg_map(struct device
  * fill in and submit ipsec_esp descriptor
  */
 static int ipsec_esp(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, struct aead_request *areq,
+		     bool encrypt,
 		     void (*callback)(struct device *dev,
 				      struct talitos_desc *desc,
 				      void *context, int error))

@@ -1197,7 +1200,7 @@ static int ipsec_esp(struct talitos_edes
 	struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
 	struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
 	struct talitos_desc *desc = &edesc->desc;
-	unsigned int cryptlen = areq->cryptlen;
+	unsigned int cryptlen = areq->cryptlen - (encrypt ? 0 : authsize);
 	unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
 	int tbl_off = 0;
 	int sg_count, ret;

@@ -1324,7 +1327,7 @@ static int ipsec_esp(struct talitos_edes
 
 	ret = talitos_submit(dev, ctx->ch, desc, callback, areq);
 	if (ret != -EINPROGRESS) {
-		ipsec_esp_unmap(dev, edesc, areq);
+		ipsec_esp_unmap(dev, edesc, areq, encrypt);
 		kfree(edesc);
 	}
 	return ret;

@@ -1438,9 +1441,10 @@ static struct talitos_edesc *aead_edesc_
 	unsigned int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(authenc);
 	struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc);
 	unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(authenc);
+	unsigned int cryptlen = areq->cryptlen - (encrypt ? 0 : authsize);
 
 	return talitos_edesc_alloc(ctx->dev, areq->src, areq->dst,
-				   iv, areq->assoclen, areq->cryptlen,
+				   iv, areq->assoclen, cryptlen,
 				   authsize, ivsize, icv_stashing,
 				   areq->base.flags, encrypt);
 }

@@ -1459,7 +1463,7 @@ static int aead_encrypt(struct aead_requ
 	/* set encrypt */
 	edesc->desc.hdr = ctx->desc_hdr_template | DESC_HDR_MODE0_ENCRYPT;
 
-	return ipsec_esp(edesc, req, ipsec_esp_encrypt_done);
+	return ipsec_esp(edesc, req, true, ipsec_esp_encrypt_done);
 }
 
 static int aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)

@@ -1471,8 +1475,6 @@ static int aead_decrypt(struct aead_requ
 	struct talitos_edesc *edesc;
 	void *icvdata;
 
-	req->cryptlen -= authsize;
-
 	/* allocate extended descriptor */
 	edesc = aead_edesc_alloc(req, req->iv, 1, false);
 	if (IS_ERR(edesc))

@@ -1489,7 +1491,8 @@ static int aead_decrypt(struct aead_requ
 
 		/* reset integrity check result bits */
 
-		return ipsec_esp(edesc, req, ipsec_esp_decrypt_hwauth_done);
+		return ipsec_esp(edesc, req, false,
+				 ipsec_esp_decrypt_hwauth_done);
 	}
 
 	/* Have to check the ICV with software */

@@ -1505,7 +1508,7 @@ static int aead_decrypt(struct aead_requ
 	sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req->src, edesc->src_nents ? : 1, icvdata, authsize,
 			   req->assoclen + req->cryptlen - authsize);
 
-	return ipsec_esp(edesc, req, ipsec_esp_decrypt_swauth_done);
+	return ipsec_esp(edesc, req, false, ipsec_esp_decrypt_swauth_done);
 }
 
 static int ablkcipher_setkey(struct crypto_ablkcipher *cipher,

From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>

commit 4bbfb839259a9c96a0be872e16f7471b7136aee5 upstream.

In that mode, hardware ICV verification is not supported.

---
 drivers/crypto/talitos.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1480,7 +1480,8 @@ static int aead_decrypt(struct aead_requ
 	if (IS_ERR(edesc))
 		return PTR_ERR(edesc);
 
-	if ((priv->features & TALITOS_FTR_HW_AUTH_CHECK) &&
+	if ((edesc->desc.hdr & DESC_HDR_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP) &&
+	    (priv->features & TALITOS_FTR_HW_AUTH_CHECK) &&
 	    ((!edesc->src_nents && !edesc->dst_nents) ||
 	     priv->features & TALITOS_FTR_SRC_LINK_TBL_LEN_INCLUDES_EXTENT)) {
 

From: Andrew F. Davis <[email protected]>

commit 66f030eac257a572fbedab3d9646d87d647351fd upstream.

TI-SCI firmware will only respond to messages when the TI_SCI_FLAG_REQ_ACK_ON_PROCESSED flag is set. Most messages already do this, set this for the ones that do not.

This will be enforced in future firmware that better match the TI-SCI specifications, this patch will not break users of existing firmware.

---
 drivers/firmware/ti_sci.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -463,9 +463,9 @@ static int ti_sci_cmd_get_revision(struc
 	struct ti_sci_xfer *xfer;
 	int ret;
 
-	/* No need to setup flags since it is expected to respond */
 	xfer = ti_sci_get_one_xfer(info, TI_SCI_MSG_VERSION,
-				   0x0, sizeof(struct ti_sci_msg_hdr),
+				   TI_SCI_FLAG_REQ_ACK_ON_PROCESSED,
+				   sizeof(struct ti_sci_msg_hdr),
 				   sizeof(*rev_info));
 	if (IS_ERR(xfer)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(xfer);

@@ -593,9 +593,9 @@ static int ti_sci_get_device_state(const
 	info = handle_to_ti_sci_info(handle);
 	dev = info->dev;
 
-	/* Response is expected, so need of any flags */
 	xfer = ti_sci_get_one_xfer(info, TI_SCI_MSG_GET_DEVICE_STATE,
-				   0, sizeof(*req), sizeof(*resp));
+				   TI_SCI_FLAG_REQ_ACK_ON_PROCESSED,
+				   sizeof(*req), sizeof(*resp));
 	if (IS_ERR(xfer)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(xfer);
 		dev_err(dev, "Message alloc failed(%d)\n", ret);

From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>

commit dae1ccee012ea7514af8e4a88429844157aca7dc upstream.

Newer GPD MicroPC BIOS versions have proper DMI strings, add an extra quirk table entry for these new strings. This is good news, as this means that we no longer have to update the BIOS dates list with every BIOS update.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_panel_orientation_quirks.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

@@ -82,6 +82,12 @@ static const struct drm_dmi_panel_orient
 	.orientation = DRM_MODE_PANEL_ORIENTATION_RIGHT_UP,
 };
 
+static const struct drm_dmi_panel_orientation_data lcd720x1280_rightside_up = {
+	.width = 720,
+	.height = 1280,
+	.orientation = DRM_MODE_PANEL_ORIENTATION_RIGHT_UP,
+};
+
 static const struct drm_dmi_panel_orientation_data lcd800x1280_rightside_up = {
 	.width = 800,
 	.height = 1280,

@@ -109,6 +115,12 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id orient
 		  DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "Default string"),
 		},
 		.driver_data = (void *)&gpd_micropc,
+	}, {	/* GPD MicroPC (later BIOS versions with proper DMI strings) */
+		.matches = {
+		  DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "GPD"),
+		  DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "MicroPC"),
+		},
+		.driver_data = (void *)&lcd720x1280_rightside_up,
 	}, {	/*
 		 * GPD Pocket, note that the the DMI data is less generic then
 		 * it seems, devices with a board-vendor of "AMI Corporation"

From: Nishka Dasgupta <[email protected]>

commit 165d42c012be69900f0e2f8545626cb9e7d4a832 upstream.

Each iteration of for_each_child_of_node puts the previous node, but in the case of a goto from the middle of the loop, there is no put, thus causing a memory leak. Hence add an of_node_put before the goto in two places.
Issue found with Coccinelle.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_drv.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -566,12 +566,15 @@ static int mtk_drm_probe(struct platform
 			comp = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*comp), GFP_KERNEL);
 			if (!comp) {
 				ret = -ENOMEM;
+				of_node_put(node);
 				goto err_node;
 			}
 
 			ret = mtk_ddp_comp_init(dev, node, comp, comp_id, NULL);
-			if (ret)
+			if (ret) {
+				of_node_put(node);
 				goto err_node;
+			}
 
 			private->ddp_comp[comp_id] = comp;
 		}

From: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]>

commit 1ffdb51f28e8ec6be0a2b812c1765b5cf5c44a8f upstream.

This reverts commit a0085f2510e8976614ad8f766b209448b385492f.

This commit has caused regressions in notebooks that support suspend to idle such as the XPS 9360, XPS 9370 and XPS 9380.

These notebooks will wakeup from suspend to idle from an unsolicited advertising packet from an unpaired BLE device.

In a bug report it was sugggested that this is caused by a generic lack of LE privacy support. Revert this commit until that behavior can be avoided by the kernel.

---
 drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c |    5 -----
 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)

@@ -1139,10 +1139,6 @@ static int btusb_open(struct hci_dev *hd
 	}
 
 	data->intf->needs_remote_wakeup = 1;
-	/* device specific wakeup source enabled and required for USB
-	 * remote wakeup while host is suspended
-	 */
-	device_wakeup_enable(&data->udev->dev);
 
 	if (test_and_set_bit(BTUSB_INTR_RUNNING, &data->flags))
 		goto done;

@@ -1206,7 +1202,6 @@ static int btusb_close(struct hci_dev *h
 		goto failed;
 
 	data->intf->needs_remote_wakeup = 0;
-	device_wakeup_disable(&data->udev->dev);
 	usb_autopm_put_interface(data->intf);
 
 failed:

From: Olivier Moysan <[email protected]>

commit c6013bf50e2a2a94ab3d012e191096432aa50c6f upstream.

Fix the data type as DFSDM raw output is complements 2, 24bits left aligned in a 32-bit register.
This change does not affect AUDIO path
- Set data as signed for IIO (as for AUDIO)
- Set 8 bit right shift for IIO.
The 8 LSBs bits of data contains channel info and are masked.

---
 drivers/iio/adc/stm32-dfsdm-adc.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -981,11 +981,11 @@ static int stm32_dfsdm_adc_chan_init_one
 	ch->info_mask_shared_by_all = BIT(IIO_CHAN_INFO_OVERSAMPLING_RATIO);
 
 	if (adc->dev_data->type == DFSDM_AUDIO) {
-		ch->scan_type.sign = 's';
 		ch->ext_info = dfsdm_adc_audio_ext_info;
 	} else {
-		ch->scan_type.sign = 'u';
+		ch->scan_type.shift = 8;
 	}
+	ch->scan_type.sign = 's';
 	ch->scan_type.realbits = 24;
 	ch->scan_type.storagebits = 32;
 

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

commit 2eef1399a866c57687962e15142b141a4f8e7862 upstream.

When loading a module with rodata=n, it causes an executing NX-protected page BUG.

[   32.379191] kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
[   32.382917] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc0005000
[   32.385947] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
[   32.387662] #PF: error_code(0x0011) - permissions violation
[   32.389352] PGD 240c067 P4D 240c067 PUD 240e067 PMD 421a52067 PTE 8000000421a53063
[   32.391396] Oops: 0011 [#1] SMP PTI
[   32.392478] CPU: 7 PID: 2697 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O      5.2.0-rc5+ #202
[   32.394588] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[   32.398157] RIP: 0010:ko_test_init+0x0/0x1000 [ko_test]
[   32.399662] Code: Bad RIP value.
[   32.400621] RSP: 0018:ffffc900029f3ca8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   32.402171] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   32.404332] RDX: 00000000000004c7 RSI: 0000000000000cc0 RDI: ffffffffc0005000
[   32.406347] RBP: ffffffffc0005000 R08: ffff88842fbebc40 R09: ffffffff810ede4a
[   32.408392] R10: ffffea00108e3480 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88842bee21a0
[   32.410472] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffc900029f3e78
[   32.412609] FS:  00007fb4f0c0a700(0000) GS:ffff88842fbc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   32.414722] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   32.416290] CR2: ffffffffc0004fd6 CR3: 0000000421a90004 CR4: 0000000000020ee0
[   32.418471] Call Trace:
[   32.419136]  do_one_initcall+0x41/0x1df
[   32.420199]  ? _cond_resched+0x10/0x40
[   32.421433]  ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x36/0x160
[   32.422827]  do_init_module+0x56/0x1f7
[   32.423946]  load_module+0x1e67/0x2580
[   32.424947]  ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x150/0x2c0
[   32.426413]  ? map_vm_area+0x2d/0x40
[   32.427530]  ? __vmalloc_node_range+0x1ef/0x260
[   32.428850]  ? __do_sys_init_module+0x135/0x170
[   32.430060]  ? _cond_resched+0x10/0x40
[   32.431249]  __do_sys_init_module+0x135/0x170
[   32.432547]  do_syscall_64+0x43/0x120
[   32.433853]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Because if rodata=n, set_memory_x() can't be called, fix this by calling set_memory_x in complete_formation();

---
 kernel/module.c |   11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -1956,13 +1956,9 @@ void module_enable_ro(const struct modul
 		return;
 
 	frob_text(&mod->core_layout, set_memory_ro);
-	frob_text(&mod->core_layout, set_memory_x);
 
 	frob_rodata(&mod->core_layout, set_memory_ro);
-
 	frob_text(&mod->init_layout, set_memory_ro);
-	frob_text(&mod->init_layout, set_memory_x);
-
 	frob_rodata(&mod->init_layout, set_memory_ro);
 
 	if (after_init)

@@ -2049,6 +2045,12 @@ static void module_enable_nx(const struc
 static void module_disable_nx(const struct module *mod) { }
 #endif
 
+static void module_enable_x(const struct module *mod)
+{
+	frob_text(&mod->core_layout, set_memory_x);
+	frob_text(&mod->init_layout, set_memory_x);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH
 /*
  * Persist Elf information about a module. Copy the Elf header,

@@ -3604,6 +3606,7 @@ static int complete_formation(struct mod
 
 	module_enable_ro(mod, false);
 	module_enable_nx(mod);
+	module_enable_x(mod);
 
 	/* Mark state as coming so strong_try_module_get() ignores us,
 	 * but kallsyms etc. can see us. */

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

commit 93651f80dcb616b8c9115cdafc8e57a781af22d0 upstream.

If CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX is not defined, we need stub for module_enable_nx() and module_enable_x().

If CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX is defined, but CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX is disabled, we need stub for module_enable_nx.

Move frob_text() outside of the CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX, because it is needed anyway.

---
 kernel/module.c |   11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -1884,7 +1884,7 @@ static void mod_sysfs_teardown(struct mo
 	mod_sysfs_fini(mod);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
 /*
  * LKM RO/NX protection: protect module's text/ro-data
  * from modification and any data from execution.

@@ -1907,6 +1907,7 @@ static void frob_text(const struct modul
 		   layout->text_size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
 static void frob_rodata(const struct module_layout *layout,
 			int (*set_memory)(unsigned long start, int num_pages))
 {

@@ -2039,17 +2040,21 @@ static void disable_ro_nx(const struct m
 	frob_writable_data(layout, set_memory_x);
 }
 
-#else
+#else /* !CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX */
 static void disable_ro_nx(const struct module_layout *layout) { }
 static void module_enable_nx(const struct module *mod) { }
 static void module_disable_nx(const struct module *mod) { }
-#endif
+#endif /*  CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX */
 
 static void module_enable_x(const struct module *mod)
 {
 	frob_text(&mod->core_layout, set_memory_x);
 	frob_text(&mod->init_layout, set_memory_x);
 }
+#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX */
+static void module_enable_nx(const struct module *mod) { }
+static void module_enable_x(const struct module *mod) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH
 /*

From: Steffen Dirkwinkel <[email protected]>

commit 9452fbf5c6cf5f470e0748fe7a14a683e7765f7a upstream.

The CB4063 board uses pmc_plt_clk* clocks for ethernet controllers. This adds it to the critclk_systems DMI table so the clocks are marked as CLK_CRITICAL and not turned off.

---
 drivers/platform/x86/pmc_atom.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

@@ -423,6 +423,14 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id critcl
 	},
 	{
 		/* pmc_plt_clk* - are used for ethernet controllers */
+		.ident = "Beckhoff CB4063",
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Beckhoff Automation"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "CB4063"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		/* pmc_plt_clk* - are used for ethernet controllers */
 		.ident = "Beckhoff CB6263",
 		.matches = {
 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Beckhoff Automation"),

From: Hui Peng <[email protected]>

commit 8b51dc7291473093c821195c4b6af85fadedbc2f upstream.

dev (struct rsi_91x_usbdev *) field of adapter (struct rsi_91x_usbdev *) is allocated and initialized in rsi_init_usb_interface. If any error is detected in information read from the device side, rsi_init_usb_interface will be freed. However, in the higher level error handling code in rsi_probe, if error is detected, rsi_91x_deinit is called again, in which dev will be freed again, resulting double free.

This patch fixes the double free by removing the free operation on dev in rsi_init_usb_interface, because rsi_91x_deinit is also used in rsi_disconnect, in that code path, the dev field is not
(and thus needs to be) freed.

This bug was found in v4.19, but is also present in the latest version of kernel. Fixes CVE-2019-15504.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/rsi/rsi_91x_usb.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

@@ -643,7 +643,6 @@ fail_rx:
 	kfree(rsi_dev->tx_buffer);
 
 fail_eps:
-	kfree(rsi_dev);
 
 	return status;
 }

From: Jean Delvare <[email protected]>

commit e70d8b287301eb6d7c7761c6171c56af62110ea3 upstream.

The compatibility "eeprom" attribute is currently root-only no matter what the configuration says. The "nvmem" attribute does respect the setting of the root_only configuration bit, so do the same for "eeprom".

---
 drivers/nvmem/core.c |   15 +++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -415,10 +415,17 @@ static int nvmem_setup_compat(struct nvm
 	if (!config->base_dev)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (nvmem->read_only)
-		nvmem->eeprom = bin_attr_ro_root_nvmem;
-	else
-		nvmem->eeprom = bin_attr_rw_root_nvmem;
+	if (nvmem->read_only) {
+		if (config->root_only)
+			nvmem->eeprom = bin_attr_ro_root_nvmem;
+		else
+			nvmem->eeprom = bin_attr_ro_nvmem;
+	} else {
+		if (config->root_only)
+			nvmem->eeprom = bin_attr_rw_root_nvmem;
+		else
+			nvmem->eeprom = bin_attr_rw_nvmem;
+	}
 	nvmem->eeprom.attr.name = "eeprom";
 	nvmem->eeprom.size = nvmem->size;
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC

From: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

commit 42e0e95474fc6076b5cd68cab8fa0340a1797a72 upstream.

One of the very few warnings I have in the current build comes from arch/x86/boot/edd.c, where I get the following with a gcc9 build:

arch/x86/boot/edd.c: In function ‘query_edd’:
arch/x86/boot/edd.c:148:11: warning: taking address of packed member of ‘struct boot_params’ may result in an unaligned pointer value [-Waddress-of-packed-member]

     148 |  mbrptr = boot_params.edd_mbr_sig_buffer;
         |           ^~~~~~~~~~~

This warning triggers because we throw away all the CFLAGS and then make a new set for REALMODE_CFLAGS, so the -Wno-address-of-packed-member we added in the following commit is not present:

6f303d60534c ("gcc-9: silence 'address-of-packed-member' warning")

The simplest solution for now is to adjust the warning for this version of CFLAGS as well, but it would definitely make sense to examine whether REALMODE_CFLAGS could be derived from CFLAGS, so that it picks up changes in the compiler flags environment automatically.

---
 arch/x86/Makefile |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ REALMODE_CFLAGS	:= $(M16_CFLAGS) -g -Os
 
 REALMODE_CFLAGS += $(call __cc-option, $(CC), $(REALMODE_CFLAGS), -ffreestanding)
 REALMODE_CFLAGS += $(call __cc-option, $(CC), $(REALMODE_CFLAGS), -fno-stack-protector)
+REALMODE_CFLAGS += $(call __cc-option, $(CC), $(REALMODE_CFLAGS), -Wno-address-of-packed-member)
 REALMODE_CFLAGS += $(call __cc-option, $(CC), $(REALMODE_CFLAGS), $(cc_stack_align4))
 export REALMODE_CFLAGS
 

I see lots of build failures.

kernel/module.c: In function 'free_module':
kernel/module.c:2187:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'disable_ro_nx'; did you mean 'disable_irq'?

kernel/module.c: In function 'load_module':
kernel/module.c:3828:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'module_disable_nx'; did you mean 'module_disable_ro'?

Reverting

ed510bd0bce3 modules: fix compile error if don't have strict module rwx 22afe9550160 modules: fix BUG when load module with rodata=n

fixes the problem.

Guenter

Ugh, I thought I got these right. Let me see what I got wrong in the backport...

Any hint as to what the .config is here that is causing the problems?

greg k-h

Ok, I think I've fixed this now, I've pushed out an updated queue and a -rc2 with a change that should resolve this. Please let me know if that didn't work.

thanks,

greg k-h

All tests are passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v4.19:

    12 builds:	12 pass, 0 fail
    22 boots:	22 pass, 0 fail
    32 tests:	32 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 4.19.74-rc1-gddb7a3337506
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,

                tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Cheers
Jon

nvpublic

-rc2 looks good.

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.19.74-rc2
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.19.y
git commit: 7290521ed4bdf6c7ec60cab4c19507fd1f53214a
git describe: v4.19.73-51-g7290521ed4bd
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.19-oe/build/v4.19.73-51-g7290521ed4bd

No regressions (compared to build v4.19.73)

No fixes (compared to build v4.19.73)

Ran 22247 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64

Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* network-basic-tests
* perf
* v4l2-compliance
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* kvm-unit-tests
* ssuite
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

For v4.19.73-51-g7290521ed4bd:

Build results:

	total: 156 pass: 156 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 390 pass: 390 fail: 0

Guenter

Great, glad that got fixed up.

Thanks for testing all of these.

greg k-h

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah