KVM: PPC: Driver to manage pages of secure guest
Subsystems (5)
v9 cover KVM: PPC: Driver to manage pages of secure guest
[The main change in this version is the introduction of new locking to prevent concurrent page-in and page-out calls. More details about this are present in patch 2/8]
Hi,
A pseries guest can be run as a secure guest on Ultravisor-enabled POWER platforms. On such platforms, this driver will be used to manage the movement of guest pages between the normal memory managed by hypervisor(HV) and secure memory managed by Ultravisor(UV).
Private ZONE_DEVICE memory equal to the amount of secure memory available in the platform for running secure guests is created. Whenever a page belonging to the guest becomes secure, a page from this private device memory is used to represent and track that secure page on the HV side. The movement of pages between normal and secure memory is done via migrate_vma_pages(). The reverse movement is driven via pagemap_ops.migrate_to_ram().
The page-in or page-out requests from UV will come to HV as hcalls and HV will call back into UV via uvcalls to satisfy these page requests.
These patches are against hmm.git
(https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma.git/log/?h=hmm)
plus
Claudio Carvalho's base ultravisor enablement patches that are present in Michael Ellerman's tree
(https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux.git/log/?h=topic/ppc-kvm)
These patches along with Claudio's above patches are required to run secure pseries guests on KVM. This patchset is based on hmm.git because hmm.git has migrate_vma cleanup and not-device memremap_pages patchsets that are required by this patchset.
Changes in v9
=============
- Prevent concurrent page-in and page-out calls.
- Ensure device PFNs are allocated for zero-pages that are sent to UV.
- Failure to migrate a page during page-in will now return error via hcall.
- Address review comments by Suka
- Misc cleanups
v8: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/T/
Anshuman Khandual (1):
KVM: PPC: Ultravisor: Add PPC_UV config option
Bharata B Rao (6):
KVM: PPC: Move pages between normal and secure memory
KVM: PPC: Shared pages support for secure guests
KVM: PPC: H_SVM_INIT_START and H_SVM_INIT_DONE hcalls
KVM: PPC: Handle memory plug/unplug to secure VM
KVM: PPC: Radix changes for secure guest
KVM: PPC: Support reset of secure guest
Suraj Jitindar Singh (1):
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Define usage types for rmap array in guest
memslot
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.txt | 19 + arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 17 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h | 9 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_uvmem.h | 48 ++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 57 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h | 2 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h | 6 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h | 36 ++ arch/powerpc/kvm/Makefile | 3 + arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_radix.c | 22 + arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 122 ++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rm_mmu.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c | 673 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 12 + include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + 15 files changed, 1024 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_uvmem.h create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v9 1/8 KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Define usage types for rmap array in guest memslot
From: Suraj Jitindar Singh <[email protected]>
The rmap array in the guest memslot is an array of size number of guest pages, allocated at memslot creation time. Each rmap entry in this array is used to store information about the guest page to which it corresponds. For example for a hpt guest it is used to store a lock bit, rc bits, a present bit and the index of a hpt entry in the guest hpt which maps this page. For a radix guest which is running nested guests it is used to store a pointer to a linked list of nested rmap entries which store the nested guest physical address which maps this guest address and for which there is a pte in the shadow page table.
As there are currently two uses for the rmap array, and the potential for this to expand to more in the future, define a type field (being the top 8 bits of the rmap entry) to be used to define the type of the rmap entry which is currently present and define two values for this field for the two current uses of the rmap array.
Since the nested case uses the rmap entry to store a pointer, define this type as having the two high bits set as is expected for a pointer. Define the hpt entry type as having bit 56 set (bit 7 IBM bit ordering).
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rm_mmu.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h +24 -4
@@ -232,11 +232,31 @@ struct revmap_entry { };/* -* We use the top bit of each memslot->arch.rmap entry as a lock bit, -* and bit 32 as a present flag. The bottom 32 bits are the -* index in the guest HPT of a HPTE that points to the page. +* The rmap array of size number of guest pages is allocated for each memslot. +* This array is used to store usage specific information about the guest page. +* Below are the encodings of the various possible usage types. */ -#define KVMPPC_RMAP_LOCK_BIT 63 +/* Free bits which can be used to define a new usage */ +#define KVMPPC_RMAP_TYPE_MASK 0xff00000000000000 +#define KVMPPC_RMAP_NESTED 0xc000000000000000/* Nested rmap array */ +#define KVMPPC_RMAP_HPT 0x0100000000000000/* HPT guest */ +#define KVMPPC_RMAP_UVMEM_PFN 0x0200000000000000/* Secure GPA */ + +static inline unsigned long kvmppc_rmap_type (unsigned long *rmap) +{ +return (*rmap &KVMPPC_RMAP_TYPE_MASK ); +} + +/* +* rmap usage definition for a hash page table (hpt) guest: +* 0x0000080000000000 Lock bit +* 0x0000018000000000 RC bits +* 0x0000000100000000 Present bit +* 0x00000000ffffffff HPT index bits +* The bottom 32 bits are the index in the guest HPT of a HPTE that points to +* the page. +*/ +#define KVMPPC_RMAP_LOCK_BIT 43#define KVMPPC_RMAP_RC_SHIFT 32#define KVMPPC_RMAP_REFERENCED (HPTE_R_R << KVMPPC_RMAP_RC_SHIFT)#define KVMPPC_RMAP_PRESENT 0x100000000ul
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rm_mmu.c +1 -1
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ void kvmppc_add_revmap_chain(struct kvm *kvm, struct revmap_entry *rev, }else { rev->forw = rev->back = pte_index; *rmap = (*rmap & ~KVMPPC_RMAP_INDEX ) | - pte_index |KVMPPC_RMAP_PRESENT ; + pte_index |KVMPPC_RMAP_PRESENT |KVMPPC_RMAP_HPT ; }unlock_rmap (rmap); }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v9 2/8 KVM: PPC: Move pages between normal and secure memory
In reply to Bharata B RaoManage migration of pages betwen normal and secure memory of secure guest by implementing H_SVM_PAGE_IN and H_SVM_PAGE_OUT hcalls.
H_SVM_PAGE_IN: Move the content of a normal page to secure pageH_SVM_PAGE_OUT: Move the content of a secure page to normal page
Private ZONE_DEVICE memory equal to the amount of secure memory available in the platform for running secure guests is created. Whenever a page belonging to the guest becomes secure, a page from this private device memory is used to represent and track that secure page on the HV side. The movement of pages between normal and secure memory is done via migrate_vma_pages() using UV_PAGE_IN and UV_PAGE_OUT ucalls.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h | 4 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_uvmem.h | 29 ++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 13 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h | 2 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h | 14 + arch/powerpc/kvm/Makefile | 3 + arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 20 + arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c | 481 ++++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 566 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_uvmem.h create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c
arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h +4 -0
@@ -342,6 +342,10 @@#define H_TLB_INVALIDATE 0xF808#define H_COPY_TOFROM_GUEST 0xF80C +/* Platform-specific hcalls used by the Ultravisor */ +#define H_SVM_PAGE_IN 0xEF00 +#define H_SVM_PAGE_OUT 0xEF04 +/* Values for 2nd argument to H_SET_MODE */ #define H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_SET_CIABR 1#define H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_SET_DAWR 2
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_uvmem.h new file +29 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __POWERPC_KVM_PPC_HMM_H__ +#define __POWERPC_KVM_PPC_HMM_H__ + +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_UV +unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_page_in (struct kvm *kvm, +unsigned long gra, +unsigned long flags, +unsigned long page_shift); +unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_page_out (struct kvm *kvm, +unsigned long gra, +unsigned long flags, +unsigned long page_shift); +#else +static inline unsigned long +kvmppc_h_svm_page_in (struct kvm *kvm,unsigned long gra, +unsigned long flags,unsigned long page_shift) +{ +return H_UNSUPPORTED ; +} + +static inline unsigned long +kvmppc_h_svm_page_out (struct kvm *kvm,unsigned long gra, +unsigned long flags,unsigned long page_shift) +{ +return H_UNSUPPORTED ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_UV */ +#endif /* __POWERPC_KVM_PPC_HMM_H__ */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h +13 -0
@@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {#endif struct kvmppc_ops *kvm_ops;#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE +struct mutex uvmem_lock;struct mutex mmu_setup_lock;/* nests inside vcpu mutexes */ u64 l1_ptcr;int max_nested_lpid;
@@ -869,4 +870,16 @@ static inline void kvm_arch_vcpu_blocking(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}static inline void kvm_arch_vcpu_unblocking (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}static inline void kvm_arch_vcpu_block_finish (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {} +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_UV +int kvmppc_uvmem_init (void ); +void kvmppc_uvmem_free (void ); +#else +static inline int kvmppc_uvmem_init (void ) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline void kvmppc_uvmem_free (void ) {} +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_UV */ +#endif /* __POWERPC_KVM_HOST_H__ */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h +2 -0
@@ -25,5 +25,7 @@/* opcodes */ #define UV_WRITE_PATE 0xF104#define UV_RETURN 0xF11C +#define UV_PAGE_IN 0xF128 +#define UV_PAGE_OUT 0xF12C#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_ULTRAVISOR_API_H */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h +14 -0
@@ -31,4 +31,18 @@ static inline int uv_register_pate(u64 lpid, u64 dw0, u64 dw1) return ucall_norets(UV_WRITE_PATE, lpid, dw0, dw1); } +static inline int uv_page_in (u64 lpid,u64 src_ra,u64 dst_gpa,u64 flags, +u64 page_shift) +{ +return ucall_norets (UV_PAGE_IN , lpid, src_ra, dst_gpa, flags, + page_shift); +} + +static inline int uv_page_out (u64 lpid,u64 dst_ra,u64 src_gpa,u64 flags, +u64 page_shift) +{ +return ucall_norets (UV_PAGE_OUT , lpid, dst_ra, src_gpa, flags, + page_shift); +} +#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_ULTRAVISOR_H */
arch/powerpc/kvm/Makefile +3 -0
@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ kvm-hv-y += \ book3s_64_mmu_radix.o \ book3s_hv_nested.o +kvm-hv-$(CONFIG_PPC_UV) += \ + book3s_hv_uvmem.o + kvm-hv-$(CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM) += \ book3s_hv_tm.o
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +20 -0
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@#include <asm/xics.h> #include <asm/xive.h> #include <asm/hw_breakpoint.h> +#include <asm/kvm_host.h> +#include <asm/kvm_book3s_uvmem.h> #include "book3s.h"
@@ -1075,6 +1077,18 @@ int kvmppc_pseries_do_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)kvmppc_get_gpr (vcpu,5 ), kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 6));break ; +case H_SVM_PAGE_IN : + ret =kvmppc_h_svm_page_in (vcpu->kvm, +kvmppc_get_gpr (vcpu,4 ), +kvmppc_get_gpr (vcpu,5 ), +kvmppc_get_gpr (vcpu,6 )); +break ; +case H_SVM_PAGE_OUT : + ret =kvmppc_h_svm_page_out (vcpu->kvm, +kvmppc_get_gpr (vcpu,4 ), +kvmppc_get_gpr (vcpu,5 ), +kvmppc_get_gpr (vcpu,6 )); +break ;default :return RESUME_HOST ; }
@@ -4769,6 +4783,7 @@ static int kvmppc_core_init_vm_hv(struct kvm *kvm)char buf[32 ];int ret; +mutex_init (&kvm->arch.uvmem_lock);mutex_init (&kvm->arch.mmu_setup_lock);/* Allocate the guest's logical partition ID */
@@ -5523,11 +5538,16 @@ static int kvmppc_book3s_init_hv(void) no_mixing_hpt_and_radix = true; } + r =kvmppc_uvmem_init (); +if (r <0 ) +pr_err ("KVM-HV: kvmppc_uvmem_init failed %d\n" , r); +return r; }static void kvmppc_book3s_exit_hv (void ) { +kvmppc_uvmem_free ();kvmppc_free_host_rm_ops ();if (kvmppc_radix_possible ())kvmppc_radix_exit ();
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c new file +481 -0
481 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] KVM: PPC: Move pages between normal and secure memory
Quoted 46 lines · Bharata B Rao
Manage migration of pages betwen normal and secure memory of secure guest by implementing
H_SVM_PAGE_INandH_SVM_PAGE_OUThcalls.
H_SVM_PAGE_IN: Move the content of a normal page to secure pageH_SVM_PAGE_OUT: Move the content of a secure page to normal pagePrivate
ZONE_DEVICEmemory equal to the amount of secure memory available in the platform for running secure guests is created. Whenever a page belonging to the guest becomes secure, a page from this private device memory is used to represent and track that secure page on the HV side. The movement of pages between normal and secure memory is done viamigrate_vma_pages()usingUV_PAGE_INandUV_PAGE_OUTucalls.Signed-off-by Bharata B Rao <[email protected]>arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h | 4 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_uvmem.h | 29 ++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 13 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h | 2 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h | 14 + arch/powerpc/kvm/Makefile | 3 + arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 20 + arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c | 481 ++++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 566 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_uvmem.h create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.carch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h +5
-0+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h@@ -342,6 +342,10 @@#define H_TLB_INVALIDATE 0xF808#define H_COPY_TOFROM_GUEST 0xF80C +/* Platform-specific hcalls used by the Ultravisor */ +#define H_SVM_PAGE_IN 0xEF00 +#define H_SVM_PAGE_OUT 0xEF04 +/* Values for 2nd argument to H_SET_MODE */ #define H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_SET_CIABR 1#define H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_SET_DAWR 2arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_uvmem.h new file +1
-0+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_uvmem.h
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_uvmem.h line 3
Quoted 3 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_uvmem.h new file +3
-0@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __POWERPC_KVM_PPC_HMM_H__ +#define __POWERPC_KVM_PPC_HMM_H__
This is a strange sentinal for a header called kvm_book3s_uvmem.h
Jason
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] KVM: PPC: Move pages between normal and secure memory
In reply to Bharata B RaoQuoted 6 lines · Bharata B Rao
Manage migration of pages betwen normal and secure memory of secure guest by implementing
H_SVM_PAGE_INandH_SVM_PAGE_OUThcalls.
H_SVM_PAGE_IN: Move the content of a normal page to secure pageH_SVM_PAGE_OUT: Move the content of a secure page to normal page
Quoted 7 lines
Private
ZONE_DEVICEmemory equal to the amount of secure memory available in the platform for running secure guests is created. Whenever a page belonging to the guest becomes secure, a page from this private device memory is used to represent and track that secure page on the HV side. The movement of pages between normal and secure memory is done viamigrate_vma_pages()usingUV_PAGE_INandUV_PAGE_OUTucalls.
As we discussed privately, but mentioning it here so there is a
record: I am concerned about this structure
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c line 83
Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c new file +5
-0+struct kvmppc_uvmem_page_pvt { +unsigned long *rmap; +struct kvm *kvm; +unsigned long gpa; +};
which keeps a reference to the rmap. The reference could become stale if the memslot is deleted or moved, and nothing in the patch series ensures that the stale references are cleaned up.
If it is possible to do without the long-term rmap reference, and instead find the rmap via the memslots (with the srcu lock held) each time we need the rmap, that would be safer, I think, provided that we can sort out the lock ordering issues.
Paul.
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] KVM: PPC: Move pages between normal and secure memory
Quoted 19 lines · Paul Mackerras
Quoted 6 lines · Bharata B Rao
Manage migration of pages betwen normal and secure memory of secure guest by implementing
H_SVM_PAGE_INandH_SVM_PAGE_OUThcalls.
H_SVM_PAGE_IN: Move the content of a normal page to secure pageH_SVM_PAGE_OUT: Move the content of a secure page to normal pageQuoted 7 lines
Private
ZONE_DEVICEmemory equal to the amount of secure memory available in the platform for running secure guests is created. Whenever a page belonging to the guest becomes secure, a page from this private device memory is used to represent and track that secure page on the HV side. The movement of pages between normal and secure memory is done viamigrate_vma_pages()usingUV_PAGE_INandUV_PAGE_OUTucalls.As we discussed privately, but mentioning it here so there is a
record: I am concerned about this structure
Quoted 9 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c line 83
Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c new file +5
-0+struct kvmppc_uvmem_page_pvt { +unsigned long *rmap; +struct kvm *kvm; +unsigned long gpa; +};which keeps a reference to the rmap. The reference could become stale if the memslot is deleted or moved, and nothing in the patch series ensures that the stale references are cleaned up.
I will add code to release the device PFNs when memslot goes away. In fact the early versions of the patchset had this, but it subsequently got removed.
Quoted 5 lines
If it is possible to do without the long-term rmap reference, and instead find the rmap via the memslots (with the srcu lock held) each time we need the rmap, that would be safer, I think, provided that we can sort out the lock ordering issues.
All paths except fault handler access rmap[] under srcu lock. Even in case of fault handler, for those faults induced by us (shared page handling, releasing device pfns), we do hold srcu lock. The difficult case is when we fault due to HV accessing a device page. In this case we come to fault hanler with mmap_sem already held and are not in a position to take kvm srcu lock as that would lead to lock order reversal. Given that we have pages mapped in still, I assume memslot can't go away while we access rmap[], so think we should be ok here.
However if that sounds fragile, may be I can go back to my initial design where we weren't using rmap[] to store device PFNs. That will increase the memory usage but we give us an easy option to have per-guest mutex to protect concurrent page-ins/outs/faults.
Regards,
Bharata.
Signature · 1 line
http://raobharata.wordpress.com/
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] KVM: PPC: Move pages between normal and secure memory
Quoted 40 lines · Bharata B Rao
Quoted 19 lines · Paul Mackerras
Quoted 6 lines · Bharata B Rao
Manage migration of pages betwen normal and secure memory of secure guest by implementing
H_SVM_PAGE_INandH_SVM_PAGE_OUThcalls.
H_SVM_PAGE_IN: Move the content of a normal page to secure pageH_SVM_PAGE_OUT: Move the content of a secure page to normal pageQuoted 7 lines
Private
ZONE_DEVICEmemory equal to the amount of secure memory available in the platform for running secure guests is created. Whenever a page belonging to the guest becomes secure, a page from this private device memory is used to represent and track that secure page on the HV side. The movement of pages between normal and secure memory is done viamigrate_vma_pages()usingUV_PAGE_INandUV_PAGE_OUTucalls.As we discussed privately, but mentioning it here so there is a
record: I am concerned about this structureQuoted 9 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c line 83
Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c new file +5
-0+struct kvmppc_uvmem_page_pvt { +unsigned long *rmap; +struct kvm *kvm; +unsigned long gpa; +};which keeps a reference to the rmap. The reference could become stale if the memslot is deleted or moved, and nothing in the patch series ensures that the stale references are cleaned up.
I will add code to release the device PFNs when memslot goes away. In fact the early versions of the patchset had this, but it subsequently got removed.
Quoted 5 lines
If it is possible to do without the long-term rmap reference, and instead find the rmap via the memslots (with the srcu lock held) each time we need the rmap, that would be safer, I think, provided that we can sort out the lock ordering issues.
Quoted 8 lines
All paths except fault handler access rmap[] under srcu lock. Even in case of fault handler, for those faults induced by us (shared page handling, releasing device pfns), we do hold srcu lock. The difficult case is when we fault due to HV accessing a device page. In this case we come to fault hanler with
mmap_semalready held and are not in a position to take kvm srcu lock as that would lead to lock order reversal. Given that we have pages mapped in still, I assume memslot can't go away while we access rmap[], so think we should be ok here.
The mapping of pages in userspace memory, and the mapping of userspace memory to guest physical space, are two distinct things. The memslots describe the mapping of userspace addresses to guest physical addresses, but don't say anything about what is mapped at those userspace addresses. So you can indeed get a page fault on a userspace address at the same time that a memslot is being deleted (even a memslot that maps that particular userspace address), because removing the memslot does not unmap anything from userspace memory, it just breaks the association between that userspace memory and guest physical memory. Deleting the memslot does unmap the pages from the guest but doesn't unmap them from the userspace process (e.g. QEMU).
It is an interesting question what the semantics should be when a memslot is deleted and there are pages of userspace currently paged out to the device (i.e. the ultravisor). One approach might be to say that all those pages have to come back to the host before we finish the memslot deletion, but that is probably not necessary; I think we could just say that those pages are gone and can be replaced by zero pages if they get accessed on the host side. If userspace then unmaps the corresponding region of the userspace memory map, we can then just forget all those pages with very little work.
Quoted 4 lines
However if that sounds fragile, may be I can go back to my initial design where we weren't using rmap[] to store device PFNs. That will increase the memory usage but we give us an easy option to have per-guest mutex to protect concurrent page-ins/outs/faults.
That sounds like it would be the best option, even if only in the short term. At least it would give us a working solution, even if it's not the best performing solution.
Paul.
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] KVM: PPC: Move pages between normal and secure memory
Quoted 13 lines · Paul Mackerras
On Tue, Oct 22, 2019 at 11:59:35AM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote:
The mapping of pages in userspace memory, and the mapping of userspace memory to guest physical space, are two distinct things. The memslots describe the mapping of userspace addresses to guest physical addresses, but don't say anything about what is mapped at those userspace addresses. So you can indeed get a page fault on a userspace address at the same time that a memslot is being deleted (even a memslot that maps that particular userspace address), because removing the memslot does not unmap anything from userspace memory, it just breaks the association between that userspace memory and guest physical memory. Deleting the memslot does unmap the pages from the guest but doesn't unmap them from the userspace process (e.g. QEMU).
Quoted 9 lines
It is an interesting question what the semantics should be when a memslot is deleted and there are pages of userspace currently paged out to the device (i.e. the ultravisor). One approach might be to say that all those pages have to come back to the host before we finish the memslot deletion, but that is probably not necessary; I think we could just say that those pages are gone and can be replaced by zero pages if they get accessed on the host side. If userspace then unmaps the corresponding region of the userspace memory map, we can then just forget all those pages with very little work.
There are 5 scenarios currently where we are replacing the device mappings:
1. Guest reset
2. Memslot free (Memory unplug) (Not present in this version though)
3. Converting secure page to shared page
4. HV touching the secure page
5. H_SVM_INIT_ABORT hcall to abort SVM due to errors when transitioning to secure mode (Not present in this version)
In the first 3 cases, we don't need to get the page to HV from the secure side and hence skip the page out. However currently we do allocate fresh page and replace the mapping with the new one.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
However if that sounds fragile, may be I can go back to my initial design where we weren't using rmap[] to store device PFNs. That will increase the memory usage but we give us an easy option to have per-guest mutex to protect concurrent page-ins/outs/faults.
That sounds like it would be the best option, even if only in the short term. At least it would give us a working solution, even if it's not the best performing solution.
Sure, will avoid using rmap[] in the next version.
Regards,
Bharata.
PATCH v9 3/8 KVM: PPC: Shared pages support for secure guests
In reply to Bharata B RaoA secure guest will share some of its pages with hypervisor (Eg. virtio bounce buffers etc). Support sharing of pages between hypervisor and ultravisor.
Shared page is reachable via both HV and UV side page tables. Once a secure page is converted to shared page, the device page that represents the secure page is unmapped from the HV side page tables.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h | 3 ++ arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h +3 -0
@@ -342,6 +342,9 @@#define H_TLB_INVALIDATE 0xF808#define H_COPY_TOFROM_GUEST 0xF80C +/* Flags for H_SVM_PAGE_IN */ +#define H_PAGE_IN_SHARED 0x1 +/* Platform-specific hcalls used by the Ultravisor */ #define H_SVM_PAGE_IN 0xEF00#define H_SVM_PAGE_OUT 0xEF04
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c +82 -4
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Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v9 4/8 KVM: PPC: H_SVM_INIT_START and H_SVM_INIT_DONE hcalls
In reply to Bharata B RaoH_SVM_INIT_START: Initiate securing a VMH_SVM_INIT_DONE: Conclude securing a VM
As part of H_SVM_INIT_START, register all existing memslots with the UV. H_SVM_INIT_DONE call by UV informs HV that transition of the guest to secure mode is complete.
These two states (transition to secure mode STARTED and transition to secure mode COMPLETED) are recorded in kvm->arch.secure_guest. Setting these states will cause the assembly code that enters the guest to call the UV_RETURN ucall instead of trying to enter the guest directly.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h | 2 ++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_uvmem.h | 12 ++++++++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 4 +++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h | 7 +++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 7 +++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 67 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h +2 -0
@@ -348,6 +348,8 @@/* Platform-specific hcalls used by the Ultravisor */ #define H_SVM_PAGE_IN 0xEF00#define H_SVM_PAGE_OUT 0xEF04 +#define H_SVM_INIT_START 0xEF08 +#define H_SVM_INIT_DONE 0xEF0C/* Values for 2nd argument to H_SET_MODE */ #define H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_SET_CIABR 1
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_uvmem.h +12 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_page_out(struct kvm *kvm,unsigned long gra, unsigned long flags, unsigned long page_shift); +unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start (struct kvm *kvm); +unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_done (struct kvm *kvm);#else static inline unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_page_in(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gra,
@@ -25,5 +27,15 @@ kvmppc_h_svm_page_out(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gra, {return H_UNSUPPORTED ; } + +static inline unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +return H_UNSUPPORTED ; +} + +static inline unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_done (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +return H_UNSUPPORTED ; +}#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_UV */ #endif /* __POWERPC_KVM_PPC_HMM_H__ */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h +4 -0
@@ -281,6 +281,10 @@ struct kvm_hpt_info {struct kvm_resize_hpt ; +/* Flag values for kvm_arch.secure_guest */ +#define KVMPPC_SECURE_INIT_START 0x1/* H_SVM_INIT_START has been called */ +#define KVMPPC_SECURE_INIT_DONE 0x2/* H_SVM_INIT_DONE completed */ +struct kvm_arch {unsigned int lpid;unsigned int smt_mode;/* # vcpus per virtual core */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h +1 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@/* opcodes */ #define UV_WRITE_PATE 0xF104#define UV_RETURN 0xF11C +#define UV_REGISTER_MEM_SLOT 0xF120#define UV_PAGE_IN 0xF128#define UV_PAGE_OUT 0xF12C
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h +7 -0
@@ -45,4 +45,11 @@ static inline int uv_page_out(u64 lpid, u64 dst_ra, u64 src_gpa, u64 flags, page_shift); } +static inline int uv_register_mem_slot (u64 lpid,u64 start_gpa,u64 size, +u64 flags,u64 slotid) +{ +return ucall_norets (UV_REGISTER_MEM_SLOT , lpid, start_gpa, + size, flags, slotid); +} +#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_ULTRAVISOR_H */
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +7 -0
@@ -1089,6 +1089,13 @@ int kvmppc_pseries_do_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)kvmppc_get_gpr (vcpu,5 ), kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 6));break ; +case H_SVM_INIT_START : + ret =kvmppc_h_svm_init_start (vcpu->kvm); +break ; +case H_SVM_INIT_DONE : + ret =kvmppc_h_svm_init_done (vcpu->kvm); +break ; +default :return RESUME_HOST ; }
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c +34 -0
@@ -86,6 +86,40 @@ struct kvmppc_uvmem_page_pvt {bool skip_page_out; }; +unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +struct kvm_memslots *slots; +struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot; +int ret =H_SUCCESS ; +int srcu_idx; + + srcu_idx =srcu_read_lock (&kvm->srcu); + slots =kvm_memslots (kvm); +kvm_for_each_memslot (memslot, slots) { + ret =uv_register_mem_slot (kvm->arch.lpid, + memslot->base_gfn <<PAGE_SHIFT , + memslot->npages *PAGE_SIZE , +0 , memslot->id); +if (ret <0 ) { + ret =H_PARAMETER ; + goto out; + } + } + kvm->arch.secure_guest |=KVMPPC_SECURE_INIT_START ; +out: +srcu_read_unlock (&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx); +return ret; +} + +unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_done (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +if (!(kvm->arch.secure_guest &KVMPPC_SECURE_INIT_START )) +return H_UNSUPPORTED ; + + kvm->arch.secure_guest |=KVMPPC_SECURE_INIT_DONE ; +return H_SUCCESS ; +} +/* * Get a free device PFN from the pool *
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v9 5/8 KVM: PPC: Handle memory plug/unplug to secure VM
In reply to Bharata B RaoRegister the new memslot with UV during plug and unregister the memslot during unplug.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h | 5 +++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h +1 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@#define UV_WRITE_PATE 0xF104#define UV_RETURN 0xF11C#define UV_REGISTER_MEM_SLOT 0xF120 +#define UV_UNREGISTER_MEM_SLOT 0xF124#define UV_PAGE_IN 0xF128#define UV_PAGE_OUT 0xF12C
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h +5 -0
@@ -52,4 +52,9 @@ static inline int uv_register_mem_slot(u64 lpid, u64 start_gpa, u64 size, size, flags, slotid); } +static inline int uv_unregister_mem_slot (u64 lpid,u64 slotid) +{ +return ucall_norets (UV_UNREGISTER_MEM_SLOT , lpid, slotid); +} +#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_ULTRAVISOR_H */
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +21 -0
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@#include <asm/hw_breakpoint.h> #include <asm/kvm_host.h> #include <asm/kvm_book3s_uvmem.h> +#include <asm/ultravisor.h> #include "book3s.h"
@@ -4517,6 +4518,26 @@ static void kvmppc_core_commit_memory_region_hv(struct kvm *kvm,if (change ==KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY &&kvm_is_radix (kvm) && ((new->flags ^ old->flags) &KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES ))kvmppc_radix_flush_memslot (kvm, old); +/* +* If UV hasn't yet called H_SVM_INIT_START, don't register memslots. +*/ +if (!kvm->arch.secure_guest) +return ; + +switch (change) { +case KVM_MR_CREATE : +uv_register_mem_slot (kvm->arch.lpid, + new->base_gfn <<PAGE_SHIFT , + new->npages *PAGE_SIZE , +0 , new->id); +break ; +case KVM_MR_DELETE : +uv_unregister_mem_slot (kvm->arch.lpid, old->id); +break ; +default : +/* TODO: Handle KVM_MR_MOVE */ +break ; + } }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v9 6/8 KVM: PPC: Radix changes for secure guest
In reply to Bharata B Rao- After the guest becomes secure, when we handle a page fault of a page belonging to SVM in HV, send that page to UV via UV_PAGE_IN.
- Whenever a page is unmapped on the HV side, inform UV via UV_PAGE_INVAL.
- Ensure all those routines that walk the secondary page tables of the guest don't do so in case of secure VM. For secure guest, the active secondary page tables are in secure memory and the secondary page tables in HV are freed when guest becomes secure.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 12 ++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h | 5 +++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_radix.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 60 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h +12 -0
@@ -877,6 +877,8 @@ static inline void kvm_arch_vcpu_block_finish(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_UV int kvmppc_uvmem_init (void );void kvmppc_uvmem_free (void ); +bool kvmppc_is_guest_secure (struct kvm *kvm); +int kvmppc_send_page_to_uv (struct kvm *kvm,unsigned long gpa);#else static inline int kvmppc_uvmem_init (void ) {
@@ -884,6 +886,16 @@ static inline int kvmppc_uvmem_init(void) }static inline void kvmppc_uvmem_free (void ) {} + +static inline bool kvmppc_is_guest_secure (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +return false; +} + +static inline int kvmppc_send_page_to_uv (struct kvm *kvm,unsigned long gpa) +{ +return -EFAULT ; +}#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_UV */ #endif /* __POWERPC_KVM_HOST_H__ */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h +1 -0
@@ -29,5 +29,6 @@#define UV_UNREGISTER_MEM_SLOT 0xF124#define UV_PAGE_IN 0xF128#define UV_PAGE_OUT 0xF12C +#define UV_PAGE_INVAL 0xF138#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_ULTRAVISOR_API_H */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h +5 -0
@@ -57,4 +57,9 @@ static inline int uv_unregister_mem_slot(u64 lpid, u64 slotid) return ucall_norets(UV_UNREGISTER_MEM_SLOT, lpid, slotid); } +static inline int uv_page_inval (u64 lpid,u64 gpa,u64 page_shift) +{ +return ucall_norets (UV_PAGE_INVAL , lpid, gpa, page_shift); +} +#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_ULTRAVISOR_H */
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_radix.c +22 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@#include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/pgalloc.h> #include <asm/pte-walk.h> +#include <asm/ultravisor.h> +#include <asm/kvm_host.h> /* * Supported radix tree geometry.
@@ -915,6 +917,9 @@ int kvmppc_book3s_radix_page_fault(struct kvm_run *run, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,if (!(dsisr &DSISR_PRTABLE_FAULT )) gpa |= ea &0xfff ; +if (kvmppc_is_guest_secure (kvm)) +return kvmppc_send_page_to_uv (kvm, gpa &PAGE_MASK ); +/* Get the corresponding memslot */ memslot =gfn_to_memslot (kvm, gfn);
@@ -972,6 +977,11 @@ int kvm_unmap_radix(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,unsigned long gpa = gfn <<PAGE_SHIFT ;unsigned int shift; +if (kvmppc_is_guest_secure (kvm)) { +uv_page_inval (kvm->arch.lpid, gpa,PAGE_SIZE ); +return 0 ; + } + ptep =__find_linux_pte (kvm->arch.pgtable, gpa,NULL , &shift);if (ptep &&pte_present (*ptep)) kvmppc_unmap_pte(kvm, ptep, gpa, shift, memslot,
@@ -989,6 +999,9 @@ int kvm_age_radix(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,int ref =0 ;unsigned long old, *rmapp; +if (kvmppc_is_guest_secure (kvm)) +return ref; + ptep =__find_linux_pte (kvm->arch.pgtable, gpa,NULL , &shift);if (ptep &&pte_present (*ptep) &&pte_young (*ptep)) { old = kvmppc_radix_update_pte(kvm, ptep, _PAGE_ACCESSED, 0,
@@ -1013,6 +1026,9 @@ int kvm_test_age_radix(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,unsigned int shift;int ref =0 ; +if (kvmppc_is_guest_secure (kvm)) +return ref; + ptep =__find_linux_pte (kvm->arch.pgtable, gpa,NULL , &shift);if (ptep &&pte_present (*ptep) &&pte_young (*ptep)) ref =1 ;
@@ -1030,6 +1046,9 @@ static int kvm_radix_test_clear_dirty(struct kvm *kvm,int ret =0 ;unsigned long old, *rmapp; +if (kvmppc_is_guest_secure (kvm)) +return ret; + ptep =__find_linux_pte (kvm->arch.pgtable, gpa,NULL , &shift);if (ptep &&pte_present (*ptep) &&pte_dirty (*ptep)) { ret =1 ;
@@ -1082,6 +1101,9 @@ void kvmppc_radix_flush_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,unsigned long gpa;unsigned int shift; +if (kvmppc_is_guest_secure (kvm)) +return ; + gpa = memslot->base_gfn <<PAGE_SHIFT ;spin_lock (&kvm->mmu_lock);for (n = memslot->npages; n; --n) {
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c +20 -0
@@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ struct kvmppc_uvmem_page_pvt {bool skip_page_out; }; +bool kvmppc_is_guest_secure (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +return (kvm->arch.secure_guest &KVMPPC_SECURE_INIT_DONE ); +} +unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start (struct kvm *kvm) {struct kvm_memslots *slots;
@@ -512,6 +517,21 @@ kvmppc_h_svm_page_out(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,return ret; } +int kvmppc_send_page_to_uv (struct kvm *kvm,unsigned long gpa) +{ +unsigned long pfn; +int ret; + + pfn =gfn_to_pfn (kvm, gpa >>PAGE_SHIFT ); +if (is_error_noslot_pfn (pfn)) +return -EFAULT ; + + ret =uv_page_in (kvm->arch.lpid, pfn <<PAGE_SHIFT , gpa,0 ,PAGE_SHIFT ); +kvm_release_pfn_clean (pfn); + +return (ret ==U_SUCCESS ) ?RESUME_GUEST : -EFAULT ; +} +static u64 kvmppc_get_secmem_size (void ) {struct device_node *np;
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v9 7/8 KVM: PPC: Support reset of secure guest
In reply to Bharata B RaoAdd support for reset of secure guest via a new ioctl KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF. This ioctl will be issued by QEMU during reset and includes the the following steps:
- Ask UV to terminate the guest via UV_SVM_TERMINATE ucall
- Unpin the VPA pages so that they can be migrated back to secure side when guest becomes secure again. This is required because pinned pages can't be migrated.
- Reinitialize guest's partitioned scoped page tables. These are freed when guest becomes secure (H_SVM_INIT_DONE)
- Release all device pages of the secure guest.
After these steps, guest is ready to issue UV_ESM call once again to switch to secure mode.
[Implementation of uv_svm_terminate() and its call from guest shutdown path]
--- Documentation/virt/kvm/api.txt | 19 ++++++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_uvmem.h | 7 ++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h | 2 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h | 5 ++ arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 12 ++++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 + 9 files changed, 181 insertions(+)
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.txt +19 -0
@@ -4111,6 +4111,25 @@ Valid values for 'action': #define KVM_PMU_EVENT_ALLOW 0 #define KVM_PMU_EVENT_DENY 1 +4.121 KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF + +Capability: basic +Architectures: powerpc +Type: vm ioctl +Parameters: none +Returns: 0 on successful completion, +Errors: + EINVAL: if ultravisor failed to terminate the secure guest + ENOMEM: if hypervisor failed to allocate new radix page tables for guest + +This ioctl is used to turn off the secure mode of the guest or transition +the guest from secure mode to normal mode. This is invoked when the guest +is reset. This has no effect if called for a normal guest. + +This ioctl issues an ultravisor call to terminate the secure guest, +unpins the VPA pages, reinitializes guest's partition scoped page +tables and releases all the device pages that are used to track the +secure pages by hypervisor. 5. The kvm_run structure ------------------------
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_uvmem.h +7 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_page_out(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long page_shift);unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start (struct kvm *kvm);unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_done (struct kvm *kvm); +void kvmppc_uvmem_free_memslot_pfns (struct kvm *kvm, +struct kvm_memslots *slots);#else static inline unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_page_in(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gra,
@@ -37,5 +39,10 @@ static inline unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_done(struct kvm *kvm) {return H_UNSUPPORTED ; } + +static inline void kvmppc_uvmem_free_memslot_pfns (struct kvm *kvm, +struct kvm_memslots *slots) +{ +}#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_UV */ #endif /* __POWERPC_KVM_PPC_HMM_H__ */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h +2 -0
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ extern void kvm_spapr_tce_release_iommu_group(struct kvm *kvm,extern int kvmppc_switch_mmu_to_hpt (struct kvm *kvm);extern int kvmppc_switch_mmu_to_radix (struct kvm *kvm);extern void kvmppc_setup_partition_table (struct kvm *kvm); +extern int kvmppc_reinit_partition_table (struct kvm *kvm);extern long kvm_vm_ioctl_create_spapr_tce (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_create_spapr_tce_64 *args);
@@ -321,6 +322,7 @@ struct kvmppc_ops { int size);int (*store_to_eaddr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,ulong *eaddr,void *ptr,int size); +int (*svm_off)(struct kvm *kvm); };extern struct kvmppc_ops *kvmppc_hv_ops;
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h +1 -0
@@ -30,5 +30,6 @@#define UV_PAGE_IN 0xF128#define UV_PAGE_OUT 0xF12C#define UV_PAGE_INVAL 0xF138 +#define UV_SVM_TERMINATE 0xF13C#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_ULTRAVISOR_API_H */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h +5 -0
@@ -62,4 +62,9 @@ static inline int uv_page_inval(u64 lpid, u64 gpa, u64 page_shift) return ucall_norets(UV_PAGE_INVAL, lpid, gpa, page_shift); } +static inline int uv_svm_terminate (u64 lpid) +{ +return ucall_norets (UV_SVM_TERMINATE , lpid); +} +#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_ULTRAVISOR_H */
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +74 -0
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arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c +60 -0
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arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c +12 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@#include <asm/hvcall.h> #include <asm/plpar_wrappers.h> #endif +#include <asm/ultravisor.h> +#include <asm/kvm_host.h> #include "timing.h" #include "irq.h"
@@ -2410,6 +2412,16 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, r = -EFAULT ;break ; } +case KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF : { +struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data; + + r =0 ; +if (!kvm->arch.kvm_ops->svm_off) + goto out; + + r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->svm_off (kvm); +break ; + }default : {struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data; r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->arch_vm_ioctl (filp, ioctl, arg);
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +1 -0
@@ -1332,6 +1332,7 @@ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping {#define KVM_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR _IOR(KVMIO, 0xb1, struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char)/* Available with KVM_CAP_PMU_EVENT_FILTER */ #define KVM_SET_PMU_EVENT_FILTER _IOW(KVMIO, 0xb2, struct kvm_pmu_event_filter) +#define KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF _IO(KVMIO, 0xb3)/* ioctl for vm fd */ #define KVM_CREATE_DEVICE _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xe0, struct kvm_create_device)
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v9 8/8 KVM: PPC: Ultravisor: Add PPC_UV config option
In reply to Bharata B RaoFrom: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>
CONFIG_PPC_UV adds support for ultravisor.
--- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +17 -0
@@ -448,6 +448,23 @@ config PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM help Support user-mode Transactional Memory on POWERPC. +config PPC_UV + bool "Ultravisor support" + depends on KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE + select ZONE_DEVICE + select DEV_PAGEMAP_OPS + select DEVICE_PRIVATE + select MEMORY_HOTPLUG + select MEMORY_HOTREMOVE + default n + help + This option paravirtualizes the kernel to run in POWER platforms that + supports the Protected Execution Facility (PEF). On such platforms, + the ultravisor firmware runs at a privilege level above the + hypervisor. + + If unsure, say "N". + config LD_HEAD_STUB_CATCH bool "Reserve 256 bytes to cope with linker stubs in HEAD text" if EXPERT depends on PPC64
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Quoted 27 lines · Bharata B Rao
[The main change in this version is the introduction of new locking to prevent concurrent page-in and page-out calls. More details about this are present in patch 2/8]
Hi,
A pseries guest can be run as a secure guest on Ultravisor-enabled POWER platforms. On such platforms, this driver will be used to manage the movement of guest pages between the normal memory managed by hypervisor(HV) and secure memory managed by Ultravisor(UV).
Private
ZONE_DEVICEmemory equal to the amount of secure memory available in the platform for running secure guests is created. Whenever a page belonging to the guest becomes secure, a page from this private device memory is used to represent and track that secure page on the HV side. The movement of pages between normal and secure memory is done viamigrate_vma_pages(). The reverse movement is driven viapagemap_ops.migrate_to_ram().The page-in or page-out requests from UV will come to HV as hcalls and HV will call back into UV via uvcalls to satisfy these page requests.
These patches are against hmm.git
(https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma.git/log/?h=hmm)plus
Quoted 8 lines
Claudio Carvalho's base ultravisor enablement patches that are present in Michael Ellerman's tree
(https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux.git/log/?h=topic/ppc-kvm)These patches along with Claudio's above patches are required to run secure pseries guests on KVM. This patchset is based on hmm.git because hmm.git has
migrate_vmacleanup and not-devicememremap_pagespatchsets that are required by this patchset.
FWIW this is all merged to Linus now and will be in rc1
Jason