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random: UEFI RNG input is bootloader randomness

RFC In review Dominik Brodowski 4 participants 4 messages Sep 28, 2019 – Sep 30, 2019 EFI

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#0 lore raw

RFC 1/1 random: UEFI RNG input is bootloader randomness

Depending on RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER, bootloader-provided randomness is credited as entropy. As the UEFI seeding entropy pool is seeded by the UEFI firmware/bootloader, add its content as bootloader randomness.

Note that this UEFI (v2.4 or newer) feature is currently only implemented for EFI stub booting on ARM, and further note that RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER must only be enabled if there indeed is sufficient trust in the bootloader _and_ its source of randomness.

Cc Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc Hsin-Yi Wang <[email protected]>
Cc Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Cc Rob Herring <[email protected]>
Cc Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc Lee, Chun-Yi <[email protected]>

---

Untested patch, as efi_random_get_seed() is only hooked up on ARM, and the firmware on my old x86 laptop only has UEFI v2.31 anyway.

Thanks,
Dominik

drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +1 -1
index 8f1ab04f6743..db0bffce754e 100644
@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz,
 					      sizeof(*seed) + size);
 			if (seed != NULL) {
 				pr_notice("seeding entropy pool\n");
-				add_device_randomness(seed->bits, seed->size);
+				add_bootloader_randomness(seed->bits, seed->size);
 				early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed) + size);
 			} else {
 				pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n");
Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Dominik Brodowski

Depending on RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER, bootloader-provided randomness is credited as entropy. As the UEFI seeding entropy pool is seeded by the UEFI firmware/bootloader, add its content as bootloader randomness.

Note that this UEFI (v2.4 or newer) feature is currently only implemented for EFI stub booting on ARM, and further note that RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER must only be enabled if there indeed is sufficient trust in the bootloader _and_ its source of randomness.

Quoted 7 lines
Cc Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc Hsin-Yi Wang <[email protected]>
Cc Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Cc Rob Herring <[email protected]>
Cc Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc Lee, Chun-Yi <[email protected]>

-Kees

Quoted 22 lines

---

Untested patch, as efi_random_get_seed() is only hooked up on ARM, and the firmware on my old x86 laptop only has UEFI v2.31 anyway.

Thanks,
Dominik

drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +1 -1
index 8f1ab04f6743..db0bffce754e 100644
@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz,
 					      sizeof(*seed) + size);
 			if (seed != NULL) {
 				pr_notice("seeding entropy pool\n");
-				add_device_randomness(seed->bits, seed->size);
+				add_bootloader_randomness(seed->bits, seed->size);
 				early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed) + size);
 			} else {
 				pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n");
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Tested-by on v1 1/1
#2 lore raw
In reply to Dominik Brodowski
Quoted 31 lines · Dominik Brodowski

Depending on RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER, bootloader-provided randomness is credited as entropy. As the UEFI seeding entropy pool is seeded by the UEFI firmware/bootloader, add its content as bootloader randomness.

Note that this UEFI (v2.4 or newer) feature is currently only implemented for EFI stub booting on ARM, and further note that RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER must only be enabled if there indeed is sufficient trust in the bootloader _and_ its source of randomness.

Cc Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc Hsin-Yi Wang <[email protected]>
Cc Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Cc Rob Herring <[email protected]>
Cc Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc Lee, Chun-Yi <[email protected]>

---

Untested patch, as efi_random_get_seed() is only hooked up on ARM, and the firmware on my old x86 laptop only has UEFI v2.31 anyway.

Thanks,
Dominik

drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +0 -0
index 8f1ab04f6743..db0bffce754e 100644

drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz, · line 551

Quoted 8 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +1 -1
@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz,
                                              sizeof(*seed) + size);
                        if (seed != NULL) {
                                pr_notice("seeding entropy pool\n");
-                               add_device_randomness(seed->bits, seed->size);
+                               add_bootloader_randomness(seed->bits, seed->size);
                                early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed) + size);
                        } else {
                                pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n");

Tested the patch on my arm64 board which support EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL (i.e. EFI firmware acts as the entropy source) and has 'CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER=y', so:

Thanks.

#3 lore raw
In reply to Dominik Brodowski
Quoted 31 lines · Dominik Brodowski

Depending on RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER, bootloader-provided randomness is credited as entropy. As the UEFI seeding entropy pool is seeded by the UEFI firmware/bootloader, add its content as bootloader randomness.

Note that this UEFI (v2.4 or newer) feature is currently only implemented for EFI stub booting on ARM, and further note that RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER must only be enabled if there indeed is sufficient trust in the bootloader _and_ its source of randomness.

Cc Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc Hsin-Yi Wang <[email protected]>
Cc Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Cc Rob Herring <[email protected]>
Cc Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc Lee, Chun-Yi <[email protected]>

---

Untested patch, as efi_random_get_seed() is only hooked up on ARM, and the firmware on my old x86 laptop only has UEFI v2.31 anyway.

Thanks,
Dominik

drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +0 -0
index 8f1ab04f6743..db0bffce754e 100644

drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz, · line 551

Quoted 8 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +1 -1
@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz,
                                              sizeof(*seed) + size);
                        if (seed != NULL) {
                                pr_notice("seeding entropy pool\n");
-                               add_device_randomness(seed->bits, seed->size);
+                               add_bootloader_randomness(seed->bits, seed->size);
                                early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed) + size);
                        } else {
                                pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n");

Thanks, I like this change. I'll get it queued up in efi/next.