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ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped source address

PATCH In review Eric Dumazet 4 participants 6 messages Oct 2, 2019 – Mar 5, 2021

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped source address

This began with a syzbot report. syzkaller was injecting IPv6 TCP SYN packets having a v4mapped source address.

After an unsuccessful 4-tuple lookup, TCP creates a request socket (SYN_RECV) and calls reqsk_queue_hash_req()

reqsk_queue_hash_req() calls sk_ehashfn(sk)

At this point we have AF_INET6 sockets, and the heuristic used by sk_ehashfn() to either hash the IPv4 or IPv6 addresses is to use ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr)

For the particular spoofed packet, we end up hashing V4 addresses which were not initialized by the TCP IPv6 stack, so KMSAN fired a warning.

I first fixed sk_ehashfn() to test both source and destination addresses, but then faced various problems, including user-space programs like packetdrill that had similar assumptions.

Instead of trying to fix the whole ecosystem, it is better to admit that we have a dual stack behavior, and that we can not build linux kernels without V4 stack anyway.

The dual stack API automatically forces the traffic to be IPv4 if v4mapped addresses are used at bind() or connect(), so it makes no sense to allow IPv6 traffic to use the same v4mapped class.

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Cc Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
net/ipv6/ip6_input.c +10 -0
index d432d0011c160f41aec09640e95179dd7b364cfc..2bb0b66181a741c7fb73cacbdf34c5160f52d186 100644
@@ -223,6 +223,16 @@ static struct sk_buff *ip6_rcv_core(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 	if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&hdr->saddr))
 		goto err;
 
+	/* While RFC4291 is not explicit about v4mapped addresses
+	 * in IPv6 headers, it seems clear linux dual-stack
+	 * model can not deal properly with these.
+	 * Security models could be fooled by ::ffff:127.0.0.1 for example.
+	 *
+	 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02
+	 */
+	if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&hdr->saddr))
+		goto err;
+
 	skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + sizeof(*hdr);
 	IP6CB(skb)->nhoff = offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, nexthdr);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0.581.g78d2f28ef7-goog
#1 lore raw
Quoted 21 lines · Eric Dumazet

The dual stack API automatically forces the traffic to be IPv4 if v4mapped addresses are used at bind() or connect(), so it makes no sense to allow IPv6 traffic to use the same v4mapped class.

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Cc Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
net/ipv6/ip6_input.c +0 -0
index d432d0011c160f41aec09640e95179dd7b364cfc..2bb0b66181a741c7fb73cacbdf34c5160f52d186 100644
@@ -223,6 +223,16 @@ static struct sk_buff *ip6_rcv_core(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 	if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&hdr->saddr))
 		goto err;
 

net/ipv6/ip6_input.c static struct sk_buff *ip6_rcv_core(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, · line 235

Quoted 10 lines
net/ipv6/ip6_input.c +10 -0
+	/* While RFC4291 is not explicit about v4mapped addresses
+	 * in IPv6 headers, it seems clear linux dual-stack
+	 * model can not deal properly with these.
+	 * Security models could be fooled by ::ffff:127.0.0.1 for example.
+	 *
+	 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02
+	 */
+	if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&hdr->saddr))
+		goto err;
+

Any reason to only consider ->saddr instead of checking daddr as well?

#2 lore raw
Quoted 23 lines · Florian Westphal
Quoted 21 lines · Eric Dumazet

The dual stack API automatically forces the traffic to be IPv4 if v4mapped addresses are used at bind() or connect(), so it makes no sense to allow IPv6 traffic to use the same v4mapped class.

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Cc Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
net/ipv6/ip6_input.c +0 -0
index d432d0011c160f41aec09640e95179dd7b364cfc..2bb0b66181a741c7fb73cacbdf34c5160f52d186 100644
@@ -223,6 +223,16 @@ static struct sk_buff *ip6_rcv_core(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
      if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&hdr->saddr))
              goto err;
 
Quoted 12 lines

net/ipv6/ip6_input.c static struct sk_buff *ip6_rcv_core(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, · line 235

Quoted 10 lines
net/ipv6/ip6_input.c +10 -0
+     /* While RFC4291 is not explicit about v4mapped addresses
+      * in IPv6 headers, it seems clear linux dual-stack
+      * model can not deal properly with these.
+      * Security models could be fooled by ::ffff:127.0.0.1 for example.
+      *
+      * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02
+      */
+     if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&hdr->saddr))
+             goto err;
+

Any reason to only consider ->saddr instead of checking daddr as well?

I do not see reasons the packet should be accepted for sane configurations ?

I would rather have a separate patch for daddr if someone needs it.

(This also comes at a cpu cost for all received packets :/ )

#3 lore raw
Quoted 17 lines · Eric Dumazet
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
net/ipv6/ip6_input.c +0 -0
@@ -223,6 +223,16 @@ static struct sk_buff *ip6_rcv_core(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
      if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&hdr->saddr))
              goto err;
 
Quoted 12 lines

net/ipv6/ip6_input.c static struct sk_buff *ip6_rcv_core(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, · line 235

Quoted 10 lines
net/ipv6/ip6_input.c +10 -0
+     /* While RFC4291 is not explicit about v4mapped addresses
+      * in IPv6 headers, it seems clear linux dual-stack
+      * model can not deal properly with these.
+      * Security models could be fooled by ::ffff:127.0.0.1 for example.
+      *
+      * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02
+      */
+     if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&hdr->saddr))
+             goto err;
+

Any reason to only consider ->saddr instead of checking daddr as well?

Quoted 1 line

I do not see reasons the packet should be accepted for sane configurations ?

Fair enough, thanks for explaining.

maintainer
#4 lore raw
In reply to Eric Dumazet

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2019 09:38:55 -0700

Quoted 28 lines

This began with a syzbot report. syzkaller was injecting IPv6 TCP SYN packets having a v4mapped source address.

After an unsuccessful 4-tuple lookup, TCP creates a request socket (SYN_RECV) and calls reqsk_queue_hash_req()

reqsk_queue_hash_req() calls sk_ehashfn(sk)

At this point we have AF_INET6 sockets, and the heuristic used by sk_ehashfn() to either hash the IPv4 or IPv6 addresses is to use ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr)

For the particular spoofed packet, we end up hashing V4 addresses which were not initialized by the TCP IPv6 stack, so KMSAN fired a warning.

I first fixed sk_ehashfn() to test both source and destination addresses, but then faced various problems, including user-space programs like packetdrill that had similar assumptions.

Instead of trying to fix the whole ecosystem, it is better to admit that we have a dual stack behavior, and that we can not build linux kernels without V4 stack anyway.

The dual stack API automatically forces the traffic to be IPv4 if v4mapped addresses are used at bind() or connect(), so it makes no sense to allow IPv6 traffic to use the same v4mapped class.

Quoted 5 lines
Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Cc Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>

Applied and queued up for -stable, thanks Eric.

maintainer
#5 lore raw
In reply to Eric Dumazet
Quoted 28 lines · On Wed, 2 Oct 2019 09:38:55 -0700 Eric Dumazet wrote:

This began with a syzbot report. syzkaller was injecting IPv6 TCP SYN packets having a v4mapped source address.

After an unsuccessful 4-tuple lookup, TCP creates a request socket (SYN_RECV) and calls reqsk_queue_hash_req()

reqsk_queue_hash_req() calls sk_ehashfn(sk)

At this point we have AF_INET6 sockets, and the heuristic used by sk_ehashfn() to either hash the IPv4 or IPv6 addresses is to use ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr)

For the particular spoofed packet, we end up hashing V4 addresses which were not initialized by the TCP IPv6 stack, so KMSAN fired a warning.

I first fixed sk_ehashfn() to test both source and destination addresses, but then faced various problems, including user-space programs like packetdrill that had similar assumptions.

Instead of trying to fix the whole ecosystem, it is better to admit that we have a dual stack behavior, and that we can not build linux kernels without V4 stack anyway.

The dual stack API automatically forces the traffic to be IPv4 if v4mapped addresses are used at bind() or connect(), so it makes no sense to allow IPv6 traffic to use the same v4mapped class.

Quoted 5 lines
Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Cc Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>

FTR this appears to break an UDP/sFlow application which used to work fine with mapped addresses. Given the IETF memo perhaps a sysctl would be appropriate, but even with that we're back to problems in TCP if the sysctl is flipped :S

Quoted 21 lines
net/ipv6/ip6_input.c +10 -0
index d432d0011c160f41aec09640e95179dd7b364cfc..2bb0b66181a741c7fb73cacbdf34c5160f52d186 100644
@@ -223,6 +223,16 @@ static struct sk_buff *ip6_rcv_core(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 	if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&hdr->saddr))
 		goto err;
 
+	/* While RFC4291 is not explicit about v4mapped addresses
+	 * in IPv6 headers, it seems clear linux dual-stack
+	 * model can not deal properly with these.
+	 * Security models could be fooled by ::ffff:127.0.0.1 for example.
+	 *
+	 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02
+	 */
+	if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&hdr->saddr))
+		goto err;
+
 	skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + sizeof(*hdr);
 	IP6CB(skb)->nhoff = offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, nexthdr);