4.4.196-stable review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.196 release. There are 36 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Tue 08 Oct 2019 05:07:10 PM UTC. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.196-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 4.4.196-rc1

Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
NFC: fix attrs checks in netlink interface

Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lock

Jann Horn <[email protected]>

    Smack: Don't ignore other bprm->unsafe flags if LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
sch_cbq: validate TCA_CBQ_WRROPT to avoid crash

Dotan Barak <[email protected]>
net/rds: Fix error handling in rds_ib_add_one()

Dongli Zhang <[email protected]>
xen-netfront: do not use ~0U as error return value for xennet_fill_frags()

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
sch_dsmark: fix potential NULL deref in dsmark_init()

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
nfc: fix memory leak in llcp_sock_bind()

Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
net: qlogic: Fix memory leak in ql_alloc_large_buffers

Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
net: ipv4: avoid mixed n_redirects and rate_tokens usage

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped source address

Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
hso: fix NULL-deref on tty open

Martijn Coenen <[email protected]>
ANDROID: binder: synchronize_rcu() when using POLLFREE.

Martijn Coenen <[email protected]>
ANDROID: binder: remove waitqueue when thread exits.

Nicolas Boichat <[email protected]>
kmemleak: increase DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_EARLY_LOG_SIZE default to 16K

Changwei Ge <[email protected]>
ocfs2: wait for recovering done after direct unlock request

David Howells <[email protected]>
hypfs: Fix error number left in struct pointer member

OGAWA Hirofumi <[email protected]>
fat: work around race with userspace's read via blockdev while mounting

Jia-Ju Bai <[email protected]>
security: smack: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb()

Joao Moreno <[email protected]>
HID: apple: Fix stuck function keys when using FN

Will Deacon <[email protected]>
ARM: 8898/1: mm: Don't treat faults reported from cache maintenance as writes

Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]>
mfd: intel-lpss: Remove D3cold delay

Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
scsi: core: Reduce memory required for SCSI logging

Nathan Lynch <[email protected]>
powerpc/pseries: correctly track irq state in default idle

Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
powerpc/64s/exception: machine check use correct cfar for late handler

hexin <[email protected]>
vfio_pci: Restore original state on release

Sam Bobroff <[email protected]>
powerpc/eeh: Clear stale EEH_DEV_NO_HANDLER flag

Sowjanya Komatineni <[email protected]>
pinctrl: tegra: Fix write barrier placement in pmx_writel

Nathan Lynch <[email protected]>
powerpc/pseries/mobility: use cond_resched when updating device tree

Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
powerpc/futex: Fix warning: 'oldval' may be used uninitialized in this function

Nathan Lynch <[email protected]>
powerpc/rtas: use device model APIs and serialization during LPM

Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
clk: sirf: Don't reference clk_init_data after registration

Nathan Huckleberry <[email protected]>
clk: qoriq: Fix -Wunused-const-variable

Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
ipmi_si: Only schedule continuously in the thread in maintenance mode

Jia-Ju Bai <[email protected]>
gpu: drm: radeon: Fix a possible null-pointer dereference in radeon_connector_set_property()

Marko Kohtala <[email protected]>
video: ssd1307fb: Start page range at page_offset

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                   |  4 +--
 arch/arm/mm/fault.c                        |  4 +--
 arch/arm/mm/fault.h                        |  1 +
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/futex.h           |  3 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_driver.c           | 11 ++++++-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S       |  4 +++
 arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c                 | 11 +++++--
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/mobility.c  |  9 ++++++
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c     |  3 ++
 arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c                    |  9 +++---
 drivers/android/binder.c                   | 26 +++++++++++++++-
 drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c           | 24 ++++++++++++---
 drivers/clk/clk-qoriq.c                    |  2 +-
 drivers/clk/sirf/clk-common.c              | 12 +++++---
 drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_connectors.c |  2 +-
 drivers/hid/hid-apple.c                    | 49 +++++++++++++++++-------------
 drivers/mfd/intel-lpss-pci.c               |  2 ++
 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qla3xxx.c      |  1 +
 drivers/net/usb/hso.c                      | 12 +++++---
 drivers/net/xen-netfront.c                 | 17 ++++++-----
 drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-tegra.c            |  4 ++-
 drivers/scsi/scsi_logging.c                | 48 ++---------------------------
 drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c                | 17 ++++++++---
 drivers/video/fbdev/ssd1307fb.c            |  2 +-
 fs/fat/dir.c                               | 13 ++++++--
 fs/fat/fatent.c                            |  3 ++
 fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmunlock.c                   | 23 +++++++++++---
 include/scsi/scsi_dbg.h                    |  2 --
 lib/Kconfig.debug                          |  2 +-
 net/ipv4/route.c                           |  5 ++-
 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c                       | 10 ++++++
 net/nfc/llcp_sock.c                        |  7 ++++-
 net/nfc/netlink.c                          |  6 ++--
 net/rds/ib.c                               |  6 ++--
 net/sched/sch_cbq.c                        | 27 +++++++++++++---
 net/sched/sch_dsmark.c                     |  2 ++
 security/smack/smack_access.c              |  4 +--
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c                 |  7 +++--
 38 files changed, 257 insertions(+), 137 deletions(-)

From: Marko Kohtala <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dd9782834dd9dde3624ff1acea8859f3d3e792d4 ]

The page_offset was only applied to the end of the page range. This caused the display updates to cause a scrolling effect on the display because the amount of data written to the display did not match the range display expected.

---
 drivers/video/fbdev/ssd1307fb.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index fa3480815cdb6..88e0763edcc72 100644
@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ static int ssd1307fb_init(struct ssd1307fb_par *par)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
-	ret = ssd1307fb_write_cmd(par->client, 0x0);
+	ret = ssd1307fb_write_cmd(par->client, par->page_offset);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 

2.20.1

From: Jia-Ju Bai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f3eb9b8f67bc28783eddc142ad805ebdc53d6339 ]

In radeon_connector_set_property(), there is an if statement on line 743 to check whether connector->encoder is NULL:

    if (connector->encoder)

When connector->encoder is NULL, it is used on line 755:

    if (connector->encoder->crtc)

Thus, a possible null-pointer dereference may occur.

To fix this bug, connector->encoder is checked before being used.

This bug is found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_connectors.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index c6bf378534f83..bebcef2ce6b88 100644
@@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ static int radeon_connector_set_property(struct drm_connector *connector, struct
 
 		radeon_encoder->output_csc = val;
 
-		if (connector->encoder->crtc) {
+		if (connector->encoder && connector->encoder->crtc) {
 			struct drm_crtc *crtc  = connector->encoder->crtc;
 			const struct drm_crtc_helper_funcs *crtc_funcs = crtc->helper_private;
 			struct radeon_crtc *radeon_crtc = to_radeon_crtc(crtc);

2.20.1

From: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 340ff31ab00bca5c15915e70ad9ada3030c98cf8 ]

ipmi_thread() uses back-to-back schedule() to poll for command completion which, on some machines, can push up CPU consumption and heavily tax the scheduler locks leading to noticeable overall performance degradation.

This was originally added so firmware updates through IPMI would complete in a timely manner. But we can't kill the scheduler locks for that one use case.

Instead, only run schedule() continuously in maintenance mode, where firmware updates should run.

---
 drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

index 2f9abe0d04dcb..2f8ff63bbbe43 100644
@@ -281,6 +281,9 @@ struct smi_info {
 	 */
 	bool irq_enable_broken;
 
+	/* Is the driver in maintenance mode? */
+	bool in_maintenance_mode;
+
 	/*
 	 * Did we get an attention that we did not handle?
 	 */

@@ -1091,11 +1094,20 @@ static int ipmi_thread(void *data)
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&(smi_info->si_lock), flags);
 		busy_wait = ipmi_thread_busy_wait(smi_result, smi_info,
 						  &busy_until);
-		if (smi_result == SI_SM_CALL_WITHOUT_DELAY)
+		if (smi_result == SI_SM_CALL_WITHOUT_DELAY) {
 			; /* do nothing */
-		else if (smi_result == SI_SM_CALL_WITH_DELAY && busy_wait)
-			schedule();
-		else if (smi_result == SI_SM_IDLE) {
+		} else if (smi_result == SI_SM_CALL_WITH_DELAY && busy_wait) {
+			/*
+			 * In maintenance mode we run as fast as
+			 * possible to allow firmware updates to
+			 * complete as fast as possible, but normally
+			 * don't bang on the scheduler.
+			 */
+			if (smi_info->in_maintenance_mode)
+				schedule();
+			else
+				usleep_range(100, 200);
+		} else if (smi_result == SI_SM_IDLE) {
 			if (atomic_read(&smi_info->need_watch)) {
 				schedule_timeout_interruptible(100);
 			} else {

@@ -1103,8 +1115,9 @@ static int ipmi_thread(void *data)
 				__set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
 				schedule();
 			}
-		} else
+		} else {
 			schedule_timeout_interruptible(1);
+		}
 	}
 	return 0;
 }

@@ -1283,6 +1296,7 @@ static void set_maintenance_mode(void *send_info, bool enable)
 
 	if (!enable)
 		atomic_set(&smi_info->req_events, 0);
+	smi_info->in_maintenance_mode = enable;
 }
 
 static const struct ipmi_smi_handlers handlers = {

2.20.1

From: Nathan Huckleberry <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a95fb581b144b5e73da382eaedb2e32027610597 ]

drivers/clk/clk-qoriq.c:138:38: warning: unused variable 'p5020_cmux_grp1' [-Wunused-const-variable] static const struct clockgen_muxinfo p5020_cmux_grp1

drivers/clk/clk-qoriq.c:146:38: warning: unused variable 'p5020_cmux_grp2' [-Wunused-const-variable] static const struct clockgen_muxinfo p5020_cmux_grp2

In the definition of the p5020 chip, the p2041 chip's info was used instead. The p5020 and p2041 chips have different info. This is most likely a typo.

---
 drivers/clk/clk-qoriq.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index a5070f9cb0d4a..7244a621c61b9 100644
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ static const struct clockgen_chipinfo chipinfo[] = {
 		.guts_compat = "fsl,qoriq-device-config-1.0",
 		.init_periph = p5020_init_periph,
 		.cmux_groups = {
-			&p2041_cmux_grp1, &p2041_cmux_grp2
+			&p5020_cmux_grp1, &p5020_cmux_grp2
 		},
 		.cmux_to_group = {
 			0, 1, -1

2.20.1

From: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit af55dadfbce35b4f4c6247244ce3e44b2e242b84 ]

A future patch is going to change semantics of clk_register() so that clk_hw::init is guaranteed to be NULL after a clk is registered. Avoid referencing this member here so that we don't run into NULL pointer exceptions.

---
 drivers/clk/sirf/clk-common.c | 12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

index 77e1e2491689b..edb7197cc4b4d 100644
@@ -298,9 +298,10 @@ static u8 dmn_clk_get_parent(struct clk_hw *hw)
 {
 	struct clk_dmn *clk = to_dmnclk(hw);
 	u32 cfg = clkc_readl(clk->regofs);
+	const char *name = clk_hw_get_name(hw);
 
 	/* parent of io domain can only be pll3 */
-	if (strcmp(hw->init->name, "io") == 0)
+	if (strcmp(name, "io") == 0)
 		return 4;
 
 	WARN_ON((cfg & (BIT(3) - 1)) > 4);

@@ -312,9 +313,10 @@ static int dmn_clk_set_parent(struct clk_hw *hw, u8 parent)
 {
 	struct clk_dmn *clk = to_dmnclk(hw);
 	u32 cfg = clkc_readl(clk->regofs);
+	const char *name = clk_hw_get_name(hw);
 
 	/* parent of io domain can only be pll3 */
-	if (strcmp(hw->init->name, "io") == 0)
+	if (strcmp(name, "io") == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	cfg &= ~(BIT(3) - 1);

@@ -354,7 +356,8 @@ static long dmn_clk_round_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,
 {
 	unsigned long fin;
 	unsigned ratio, wait, hold;
-	unsigned bits = (strcmp(hw->init->name, "mem") == 0) ? 3 : 4;
+	const char *name = clk_hw_get_name(hw);
+	unsigned bits = (strcmp(name, "mem") == 0) ? 3 : 4;
 
 	fin = *parent_rate;
 	ratio = fin / rate;

@@ -376,7 +379,8 @@ static int dmn_clk_set_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,
 	struct clk_dmn *clk = to_dmnclk(hw);
 	unsigned long fin;
 	unsigned ratio, wait, hold, reg;
-	unsigned bits = (strcmp(hw->init->name, "mem") == 0) ? 3 : 4;
+	const char *name = clk_hw_get_name(hw);
+	unsigned bits = (strcmp(name, "mem") == 0) ? 3 : 4;
 
 	fin = parent_rate;
 	ratio = fin / rate;

2.20.1

From: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a6717c01ddc259f6f73364779df058e2c67309f8 ]

The LPAR migration implementation and userspace-initiated cpu hotplug can interleave their executions like so:

1. Set cpu 7 offline via sysfs.

2. Begin a partition migration, whose implementation requires the OS to ensure all present cpus are online; cpu 7 is onlined:

     rtas_ibm_suspend_me -> rtas_online_cpus_mask -> cpu_up

This sets cpu 7 online in all respects except for the cpu's corresponding struct device; dev->offline remains true.

3. Set cpu 7 online via sysfs. _cpu_up() determines that cpu 7 is already online and returns success. The driver core (device_online) sets dev->offline = false.

4. The migration completes and restores cpu 7 to offline state:

     rtas_ibm_suspend_me -> rtas_offline_cpus_mask -> cpu_down

This leaves cpu7 in a state where the driver core considers the cpu device online, but in all other respects it is offline and unused. Attempts to online the cpu via sysfs appear to succeed but the driver core actually does not pass the request to the lower-level cpuhp support code. This makes the cpu unusable until the cpu device is manually set offline and then online again via sysfs.

Instead of directly calling cpu_up/cpu_down, the migration code should use the higher-level device core APIs to maintain consistent state and serialize operations.

---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

index 5a753fae8265a..0c42e872d548b 100644
@@ -857,15 +857,17 @@ static int rtas_cpu_state_change_mask(enum rtas_cpu_state state,
 		return 0;
 
 	for_each_cpu(cpu, cpus) {
+		struct device *dev = get_cpu_device(cpu);
+
 		switch (state) {
 		case DOWN:
-			cpuret = cpu_down(cpu);
+			cpuret = device_offline(dev);
 			break;
 		case UP:
-			cpuret = cpu_up(cpu);
+			cpuret = device_online(dev);
 			break;
 		}
-		if (cpuret) {
+		if (cpuret < 0) {
 			pr_debug("%s: cpu_%s for cpu#%d returned %d.\n",
 					__func__,
 					((state == UP) ? "up" : "down"),

@@ -954,6 +956,8 @@ int rtas_ibm_suspend_me(u64 handle)
 	data.token = rtas_token("ibm,suspend-me");
 	data.complete = &done;
 
+	lock_device_hotplug();
+
 	/* All present CPUs must be online */
 	cpumask_andnot(offline_mask, cpu_present_mask, cpu_online_mask);
 	cpuret = rtas_online_cpus_mask(offline_mask);

@@ -985,6 +989,7 @@ int rtas_ibm_suspend_me(u64 handle)
 				__func__);
 
 out:
+	unlock_device_hotplug();
 	free_cpumask_var(offline_mask);
 	return atomic_read(&data.error);
 }

2.20.1

From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 38a0d0cdb46d3f91534e5b9839ec2d67be14c59d ]

We see warnings such as:
kernel/futex.c: In function 'do_futex':
kernel/futex.c:1676:17: warning: 'oldval' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]

     return oldval == cmparg;
                   ^
  kernel/futex.c:1651:6: note: 'oldval' was declared here
    int oldval, ret;
        ^

This is because arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser() only sets *oval if ret is 0 and GCC doesn't see that it will only use it when ret is 0.

Anyway, the non-zero ret path is an error path that won't suffer from setting *oval, and as *oval is a local var in futex_atomic_op_inuser() it will have no impact.

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/futex.h | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

index f4c7467f74655..b73ab8a7ebc3f 100644
@@ -60,8 +60,7 @@ static inline int arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser(int op, int oparg, int *oval,
 
 	pagefault_enable();
 
-	if (!ret)
-		*oval = oldval;
+	*oval = oldval;
 
 	return ret;
 }

2.20.1

From: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ccfb5bd71d3d1228090a8633800ae7cdf42a94ac ]

After a partition migration, pseries_devicetree_update() processes changes to the device tree communicated from the platform to Linux. This is a relatively heavyweight operation, with multiple device tree searches, memory allocations, and conversations with partition firmware.

There's a few levels of nested loops which are bounded only by decisions made by the platform, outside of Linux's control, and indeed we have seen RCU stalls on large systems while executing this call graph. Use cond_resched() in these loops so that the cpu is yielded when needed.

---
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/mobility.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

index c773396d0969b..8d30a425a88ab 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/kobject.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/stat.h>
 #include <linux/completion.h>

@@ -206,7 +207,11 @@ static int update_dt_node(__be32 phandle, s32 scope)
 
 				prop_data += vd;
 			}
+
+			cond_resched();
 		}
+
+		cond_resched();
 	} while (rtas_rc == 1);
 
 	of_node_put(dn);

@@ -282,8 +287,12 @@ int pseries_devicetree_update(s32 scope)
 					add_dt_node(phandle, drc_index);
 					break;
 				}
+
+				cond_resched();
 			}
 		}
+
+		cond_resched();
 	} while (rc == 1);
 
 	kfree(rtas_buf);

2.20.1

From: Sowjanya Komatineni <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c2cf351eba2ff6002ce8eb178452219d2521e38e ]

pmx_writel uses writel which inserts write barrier before the register write.

This patch has fix to replace writel with writel_relaxed followed by a readback and memory barrier to ensure write operation is completed for successful pinctrl change.

---
 drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-tegra.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 0fd7fd2b0f72c..a30e967d75c2a 100644
@@ -52,7 +52,9 @@ static inline u32 pmx_readl(struct tegra_pmx *pmx, u32 bank, u32 reg)
 
 static inline void pmx_writel(struct tegra_pmx *pmx, u32 val, u32 bank, u32 reg)
 {
-	writel(val, pmx->regs[bank] + reg);
+	writel_relaxed(val, pmx->regs[bank] + reg);
+	/* make sure pinmux register write completed */
+	pmx_readl(pmx, bank, reg);
 }
 
 static int tegra_pinctrl_get_groups_count(struct pinctrl_dev *pctldev)

2.20.1

From: Sam Bobroff <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit aa06e3d60e245284d1e55497eb3108828092818d ]

The EEH_DEV_NO_HANDLER flag is used by the EEH system to prevent the use of driver callbacks in drivers that have been bound part way through the recovery process. This is necessary to prevent later stage handlers from being called when the earlier stage handlers haven't, which can be confusing for drivers.

However, the flag is set for all devices that are added after boot time and only cleared at the end of the EEH recovery process. This results in hot plugged devices erroneously having the flag set during the first recovery after they are added (causing their driver's handlers to be incorrectly ignored).

To remedy this, clear the flag at the beginning of recovery processing. The flag is still cleared at the end of recovery processing, although it is no longer really necessary.

Also clear the flag during eeh_handle_special_event(), for the same reasons.

---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_driver.c | 11 ++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 9837c98caabe9..045038469295d 100644
@@ -675,6 +675,10 @@ static bool eeh_handle_normal_event(struct eeh_pe *pe)
 	pr_warn("EEH: This PCI device has failed %d times in the last hour\n",
 		pe->freeze_count);
 
+	eeh_for_each_pe(pe, tmp_pe)
+		eeh_pe_for_each_dev(tmp_pe, edev, tmp)
+			edev->mode &= ~EEH_DEV_NO_HANDLER;
+
 	/* Walk the various device drivers attached to this slot through
 	 * a reset sequence, giving each an opportunity to do what it needs
 	 * to accomplish the reset.  Each child gets a report of the

@@ -840,7 +844,8 @@ perm_error:
 
 static void eeh_handle_special_event(void)
 {
-	struct eeh_pe *pe, *phb_pe;
+	struct eeh_pe *pe, *phb_pe, *tmp_pe;
+	struct eeh_dev *edev, *tmp_edev;
 	struct pci_bus *bus;
 	struct pci_controller *hose;
 	unsigned long flags;

@@ -919,6 +924,10 @@ static void eeh_handle_special_event(void)
 				    (phb_pe->state & EEH_PE_RECOVERING))
 					continue;
 
+				eeh_for_each_pe(pe, tmp_pe)
+					eeh_pe_for_each_dev(tmp_pe, edev, tmp_edev)
+						edev->mode &= ~EEH_DEV_NO_HANDLER;
+
 				/* Notify all devices to be down */
 				eeh_pe_state_clear(pe, EEH_PE_PRI_BUS);
 				bus = eeh_pe_bus_get(phb_pe);

2.20.1

From: hexin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 92c8026854c25093946e0d7fe536fd9eac440f06 ]

vfio_pci_enable() saves the device's initial configuration information with the intent that it is restored in vfio_pci_disable(). However, the commit referenced in Fixes: below replaced the call to __pci_reset_function_locked(), which is not wrapped in a state save and restore, with pci_try_reset_function(), which overwrites the restored device state with the current state before applying it to the device. Reinstate use of __pci_reset_function_locked() to return to the desired behavior.

---
 drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

index 47b229fa5e8ec..4b62eb3b59233 100644
@@ -221,11 +221,20 @@ static void vfio_pci_disable(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev)
 	pci_write_config_word(pdev, PCI_COMMAND, PCI_COMMAND_INTX_DISABLE);
 
 	/*
-	 * Try to reset the device.  The success of this is dependent on
-	 * being able to lock the device, which is not always possible.
+	 * Try to get the locks ourselves to prevent a deadlock. The
+	 * success of this is dependent on being able to lock the device,
+	 * which is not always possible.
+	 * We can not use the "try" reset interface here, which will
+	 * overwrite the previously restored configuration information.
 	 */
-	if (vdev->reset_works && !pci_try_reset_function(pdev))
-		vdev->needs_reset = false;
+	if (vdev->reset_works && pci_cfg_access_trylock(pdev)) {
+		if (device_trylock(&pdev->dev)) {
+			if (!__pci_reset_function_locked(pdev))
+				vdev->needs_reset = false;
+			device_unlock(&pdev->dev);
+		}
+		pci_cfg_access_unlock(pdev);
+	}
 
 	pci_restore_state(pdev);
 out:

2.20.1

From: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0b66370c61fcf5fcc1d6901013e110284da6e2bb ]

Bare metal machine checks run an "early" handler in real mode before running the main handler which reports the event.

The main handler runs exactly as a normal interrupt handler, after the "windup" which sets registers back as they were at interrupt entry. CFAR does not get restored by the windup code, so that will be wrong when the handler is run.

Restore the CFAR to the saved value before running the late handler.

---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

index a44f1755dc4bf..536718ed033fc 100644
@@ -1465,6 +1465,10 @@ machine_check_handle_early:
 	RFI_TO_USER_OR_KERNEL
 9:
 	/* Deliver the machine check to host kernel in V mode. */
+BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
+	ld	r10,ORIG_GPR3(r1)
+	mtspr	SPRN_CFAR,r10
+END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_CFAR)
 	MACHINE_CHECK_HANDLER_WINDUP
 	b	machine_check_pSeries
 

2.20.1

From: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 92c94dfb69e350471473fd3075c74bc68150879e ]

prep_irq_for_idle() is intended to be called before entering H_CEDE (and it is used by the pseries cpuidle driver). However the default pseries idle routine does not call it, leading to mismanaged lazy irq state when the cpuidle driver isn't in use. Manifestations of this include:

* Dropped IPIs in the time immediately after a cpu comes online (before it has installed the cpuidle handler), making the online operation block indefinitely waiting for the new cpu to respond.

* Hitting this WARN_ON in arch_local_irq_restore():

	/*
	 * We should already be hard disabled here. We had bugs
	 * where that wasn't the case so let's dbl check it and
	 * warn if we are wrong. Only do that when IRQ tracing
	 * is enabled as mfmsr() can be costly.
	 */
	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(mfmsr() & MSR_EE))
		__hard_irq_disable();

Call prep_irq_for_idle() from pseries_lpar_idle() and honor its result.

---
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

index 9cc976ff7fecc..88fcf6a95fa67 100644
@@ -369,6 +369,9 @@ static void pseries_lpar_idle(void)
 	 * low power mode by cedeing processor to hypervisor
 	 */
 
+	if (!prep_irq_for_idle())
+		return;
+
 	/* Indicate to hypervisor that we are idle. */
 	get_lppaca()->idle = 1;
 

2.20.1

From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dccc96abfb21dc19d69e707c38c8ba439bba7160 ]

The data structure used for log messages is so large that it can cause a boot failure. Since allocations from that data structure can fail anyway, use kmalloc() / kfree() instead of that data structure.

See also https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204119.
See also commit ded85c193a39 ("scsi: Implement per-cpu logging buffer") # v4.0.

---
 drivers/scsi/scsi_logging.c | 48 +++----------------------------------
 include/scsi/scsi_dbg.h     |  2 --
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)

index bd70339c1242e..03d9855a6afd7 100644
@@ -16,57 +16,15 @@
 #include <scsi/scsi_eh.h>
 #include <scsi/scsi_dbg.h>
 
-#define SCSI_LOG_SPOOLSIZE 4096
-
-#if (SCSI_LOG_SPOOLSIZE / SCSI_LOG_BUFSIZE) > BITS_PER_LONG
-#warning SCSI logging bitmask too large
-#endif
-
-struct scsi_log_buf {
-	char buffer[SCSI_LOG_SPOOLSIZE];
-	unsigned long map;
-};
-
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct scsi_log_buf, scsi_format_log);
-
 static char *scsi_log_reserve_buffer(size_t *len)
 {
-	struct scsi_log_buf *buf;
-	unsigned long map_bits = sizeof(buf->buffer) / SCSI_LOG_BUFSIZE;
-	unsigned long idx = 0;
-
-	preempt_disable();
-	buf = this_cpu_ptr(&scsi_format_log);
-	idx = find_first_zero_bit(&buf->map, map_bits);
-	if (likely(idx < map_bits)) {
-		while (test_and_set_bit(idx, &buf->map)) {
-			idx = find_next_zero_bit(&buf->map, map_bits, idx);
-			if (idx >= map_bits)
-				break;
-		}
-	}
-	if (WARN_ON(idx >= map_bits)) {
-		preempt_enable();
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	*len = SCSI_LOG_BUFSIZE;
-	return buf->buffer + idx * SCSI_LOG_BUFSIZE;
+	*len = 128;
+	return kmalloc(*len, GFP_ATOMIC);
 }
 
 static void scsi_log_release_buffer(char *bufptr)
 {
-	struct scsi_log_buf *buf;
-	unsigned long idx;
-	int ret;
-
-	buf = this_cpu_ptr(&scsi_format_log);
-	if (bufptr >= buf->buffer &&
-	    bufptr < buf->buffer + SCSI_LOG_SPOOLSIZE) {
-		idx = (bufptr - buf->buffer) / SCSI_LOG_BUFSIZE;
-		ret = test_and_clear_bit(idx, &buf->map);
-		WARN_ON(!ret);
-	}
-	preempt_enable();
+	kfree(bufptr);
 }
 
 static inline const char *scmd_name(const struct scsi_cmnd *scmd)

index f8170e90b49d2..bbe71a6361db9 100644
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ struct scsi_cmnd;
 struct scsi_device;
 struct scsi_sense_hdr;
 
-#define SCSI_LOG_BUFSIZE 128
-
 extern void scsi_print_command(struct scsi_cmnd *);
 extern size_t __scsi_format_command(char *, size_t,
 				   const unsigned char *, size_t);

2.20.1

From: Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 76380a607ba0b28627c9b4b55cd47a079a59624b ]

Goodix touchpad may drop its first couple input events when i2c-designware-platdrv and intel-lpss it connects to took too long to runtime resume from runtime suspended state.

This issue happens becuase the touchpad has a rather small buffer to store up to 13 input events, so if the host doesn't read those events in time (i.e. runtime resume takes too long), events are dropped from the touchpad's buffer.

The bottleneck is D3cold delay it waits when transitioning from D3cold to D0, hence remove the delay to make the resume faster. I've tested some systems with intel-lpss and haven't seen any regression.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202683

---
 drivers/mfd/intel-lpss-pci.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

index 5bfdfccbb9a1a..032c95157497f 100644
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ static int intel_lpss_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,
 	info->mem = &pdev->resource[0];
 	info->irq = pdev->irq;
 
+	pdev->d3cold_delay = 0;
+
 	/* Probably it is enough to set this for iDMA capable devices only */
 	pci_set_master(pdev);
 

2.20.1

From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 834020366da9ab3fb87d1eb9a3160eb22dbed63a ]

Translation faults arising from cache maintenance instructions are rather unhelpfully reported with an FSR value where the WnR field is set to 1, indicating that the faulting access was a write. Since cache maintenance instructions on 32-bit ARM do not require any particular permissions, this can cause our private 'cacheflush' system call to fail spuriously if a translation fault is generated due to page aging when targetting a read-only VMA.

In this situation, we will return -EFAULT to userspace, although this is unfortunately suppressed by the popular '__builtin___clear_cache()' intrinsic provided by GCC, which returns void.

Although it's tempting to write this off as a userspace issue, we can actually do a little bit better on CPUs that support LPAE, even if the short-descriptor format is in use. On these CPUs, cache maintenance faults additionally set the CM field in the FSR, which we can use to suppress the write permission checks in the page fault handler and succeed in performing cache maintenance to read-only areas even in the presence of a translation fault.

---
 arch/arm/mm/fault.c | 4 ++--
 arch/arm/mm/fault.h | 1 +
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index 0d20cd5940171..702a5542b11a8 100644
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static inline bool access_error(unsigned int fsr, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	unsigned int mask = VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC;
 
-	if (fsr & FSR_WRITE)
+	if ((fsr & FSR_WRITE) && !(fsr & FSR_CM))
 		mask = VM_WRITE;
 	if (fsr & FSR_LNX_PF)
 		mask = VM_EXEC;

@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
 
 	if (user_mode(regs))
 		flags |= FAULT_FLAG_USER;
-	if (fsr & FSR_WRITE)
+	if ((fsr & FSR_WRITE) && !(fsr & FSR_CM))
 		flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
 
 	/*

index 78830657cab3a..b014e57248044 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
  * Fault status register encodings.  We steal bit 31 for our own purposes.
  */
 #define FSR_LNX_PF		(1 << 31)
+#define FSR_CM			(1 << 13)
 #define FSR_WRITE		(1 << 11)
 #define FSR_FS4			(1 << 10)
 #define FSR_FS3_0		(15)

2.20.1

From: Joao Moreno <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit aec256d0ecd561036f188dbc8fa7924c47a9edfd ]

This fixes an issue in which key down events for function keys would be repeatedly emitted even after the user has raised the physical key. For example, the driver fails to emit the F5 key up event when going through the following steps:
- fnmode=1: hold FN, hold F5, release FN, release F5
- fnmode=2: hold F5, hold FN, release F5, release FN

The repeated F5 key down events can be easily verified using xev.

---
 drivers/hid/hid-apple.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

index 884d82f9190e2..8af87dc05f2a5 100644
@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(swap_opt_cmd, "Swap the Option (\"Alt\") and Command (\"Flag\")
 struct apple_sc {
 	unsigned long quirks;
 	unsigned int fn_on;
-	DECLARE_BITMAP(pressed_fn, KEY_CNT);
 	DECLARE_BITMAP(pressed_numlock, KEY_CNT);
 };
 

@@ -182,6 +181,8 @@ static int hidinput_apple_event(struct hid_device *hid, struct input_dev *input,
 {
 	struct apple_sc *asc = hid_get_drvdata(hid);
 	const struct apple_key_translation *trans, *table;
+	bool do_translate;
+	u16 code = 0;
 
 	if (usage->code == KEY_FN) {
 		asc->fn_on = !!value;

@@ -190,8 +191,6 @@ static int hidinput_apple_event(struct hid_device *hid, struct input_dev *input,
 	}
 
 	if (fnmode) {
-		int do_translate;
-
 		if (hid->product >= USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_WELLSPRING4_ANSI &&
 				hid->product <= USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_WELLSPRING4A_JIS)
 			table = macbookair_fn_keys;

@@ -203,25 +202,33 @@ static int hidinput_apple_event(struct hid_device *hid, struct input_dev *input,
 		trans = apple_find_translation (table, usage->code);
 
 		if (trans) {
-			if (test_bit(usage->code, asc->pressed_fn))
-				do_translate = 1;
-			else if (trans->flags & APPLE_FLAG_FKEY)
-				do_translate = (fnmode == 2 && asc->fn_on) ||
-					(fnmode == 1 && !asc->fn_on);
-			else
-				do_translate = asc->fn_on;
-
-			if (do_translate) {
-				if (value)
-					set_bit(usage->code, asc->pressed_fn);
-				else
-					clear_bit(usage->code, asc->pressed_fn);
-
-				input_event(input, usage->type, trans->to,
-						value);
-
-				return 1;
+			if (test_bit(trans->from, input->key))
+				code = trans->from;
+			else if (test_bit(trans->to, input->key))
+				code = trans->to;
+
+			if (!code) {
+				if (trans->flags & APPLE_FLAG_FKEY) {
+					switch (fnmode) {
+					case 1:
+						do_translate = !asc->fn_on;
+						break;
+					case 2:
+						do_translate = asc->fn_on;
+						break;
+					default:
+						/* should never happen */
+						do_translate = false;
+					}
+				} else {
+					do_translate = asc->fn_on;
+				}
+
+				code = do_translate ? trans->to : trans->from;
 			}
+
+			input_event(input, usage->type, code, value);
+			return 1;
 		}
 
 		if (asc->quirks & APPLE_NUMLOCK_EMULATION &&

2.20.1

From: Jia-Ju Bai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3f4287e7d98a2954f20bf96c567fdffcd2b63eb9 ]

In smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(), there is an if statement on line 3920 to check whether skb is NULL:

    if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)

This check indicates skb can be NULL in some cases.

But on lines 3931 and 3932, skb is used:

    ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
    ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);

Thus, possible null-pointer dereferences may occur when skb is NULL.

To fix these possible bugs, an if statement is added to check skb.

These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.

---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

index 9db7c80a74aa5..b76075dbd6fc8 100644
@@ -3986,6 +3986,8 @@ access_check:
 			skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
 		if (skp == NULL)
 			skp = smack_net_ambient;
+		if (skb == NULL)
+			break;
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 		smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
 		ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;

2.20.1

From: OGAWA Hirofumi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 07bfa4415ab607e459b69bd86aa7e7602ce10b4f ]

If userspace reads the buffer via blockdev while mounting, sb_getblk()+modify can race with buffer read via blockdev.

For example,

            FS                               userspace
    bh = sb_getblk()
    modify bh->b_data
                                  read
				    ll_rw_block(bh)
				      fill bh->b_data by on-disk data
				      /* lost modified data by FS */
				      set_buffer_uptodate(bh)
    set_buffer_uptodate(bh)

Userspace should not use the blockdev while mounting though, the udev seems to be already doing this. Although I think the udev should try to avoid this, workaround the race by small overhead.

---
 fs/fat/dir.c    | 13 +++++++++++--
 fs/fat/fatent.c |  3 +++
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index 8b2127ffb226c..9b77e2ad2b597 100644
@@ -1097,8 +1097,11 @@ static int fat_zeroed_cluster(struct inode *dir, sector_t blknr, int nr_used,
 			err = -ENOMEM;
 			goto error;
 		}
+		/* Avoid race with userspace read via bdev */
+		lock_buffer(bhs[n]);
 		memset(bhs[n]->b_data, 0, sb->s_blocksize);
 		set_buffer_uptodate(bhs[n]);
+		unlock_buffer(bhs[n]);
 		mark_buffer_dirty_inode(bhs[n], dir);
 
 		n++;

@@ -1155,6 +1158,8 @@ int fat_alloc_new_dir(struct inode *dir, struct timespec *ts)
 	fat_time_unix2fat(sbi, ts, &time, &date, &time_cs);
 
 	de = (struct msdos_dir_entry *)bhs[0]->b_data;
+	/* Avoid race with userspace read via bdev */
+	lock_buffer(bhs[0]);
 	/* filling the new directory slots ("." and ".." entries) */
 	memcpy(de[0].name, MSDOS_DOT, MSDOS_NAME);
 	memcpy(de[1].name, MSDOS_DOTDOT, MSDOS_NAME);

@@ -1177,6 +1182,7 @@ int fat_alloc_new_dir(struct inode *dir, struct timespec *ts)
 	de[0].size = de[1].size = 0;
 	memset(de + 2, 0, sb->s_blocksize - 2 * sizeof(*de));
 	set_buffer_uptodate(bhs[0]);
+	unlock_buffer(bhs[0]);
 	mark_buffer_dirty_inode(bhs[0], dir);
 
 	err = fat_zeroed_cluster(dir, blknr, 1, bhs, MAX_BUF_PER_PAGE);

@@ -1234,11 +1240,14 @@ static int fat_add_new_entries(struct inode *dir, void *slots, int nr_slots,
 
 			/* fill the directory entry */
 			copy = min(size, sb->s_blocksize);
+			/* Avoid race with userspace read via bdev */
+			lock_buffer(bhs[n]);
 			memcpy(bhs[n]->b_data, slots, copy);
-			slots += copy;
-			size -= copy;
 			set_buffer_uptodate(bhs[n]);
+			unlock_buffer(bhs[n]);
 			mark_buffer_dirty_inode(bhs[n], dir);
+			slots += copy;
+			size -= copy;
 			if (!size)
 				break;
 			n++;

index e3fc477728b32..be8529739d23e 100644
@@ -389,8 +389,11 @@ static int fat_mirror_bhs(struct super_block *sb, struct buffer_head **bhs,
 				err = -ENOMEM;
 				goto error;
 			}
+			/* Avoid race with userspace read via bdev */
+			lock_buffer(c_bh);
 			memcpy(c_bh->b_data, bhs[n]->b_data, sb->s_blocksize);
 			set_buffer_uptodate(c_bh);
+			unlock_buffer(c_bh);
 			mark_buffer_dirty_inode(c_bh, sbi->fat_inode);
 			if (sb->s_flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
 				err = sync_dirty_buffer(c_bh);

2.20.1

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b54c64f7adeb241423cd46598f458b5486b0375e ]

In hypfs_fill_super(), if hypfs_create_update_file() fails, sbi->update_file is left holding an error number. This is passed to hypfs_kill_super() which doesn't check for this.

Fix this by not setting sbi->update_value until after we've checked for error.

---
 arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

index c670279b33f0c..1de3fdfc35378 100644
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ static int hypfs_show_options(struct seq_file *s, struct dentry *root)
 static int hypfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 {
 	struct inode *root_inode;
-	struct dentry *root_dentry;
+	struct dentry *root_dentry, *update_file;
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct hypfs_sb_info *sbi;
 

@@ -298,9 +298,10 @@ static int hypfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 		rc = hypfs_diag_create_files(root_dentry);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
-	sbi->update_file = hypfs_create_update_file(root_dentry);
-	if (IS_ERR(sbi->update_file))
-		return PTR_ERR(sbi->update_file);
+	update_file = hypfs_create_update_file(root_dentry);
+	if (IS_ERR(update_file))
+		return PTR_ERR(update_file);
+	sbi->update_file = update_file;
 	hypfs_update_update(sb);
 	pr_info("Hypervisor filesystem mounted\n");
 	return 0;

2.20.1

From: Changwei Ge <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0a3775e4f883912944481cf2ef36eb6383a9cc74 ]

There is a scenario causing ocfs2 umount hang when multiple hosts are rebooting at the same time.

NODE1 NODE2 NODE3
send unlock requset to NODE2
dies
become recovery master recover NODE2
find NODE2 dead
mark resource RECOVERING
directly remove lock from grant list
calculate usage but RECOVERING marked
**miss the window of purging
clear RECOVERING

To reproduce this issue, crash a host and then umount ocfs2 from another node.

To solve this, just let unlock progress wait for recovery done.

---
 fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmunlock.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

index 2e3c9dbab68c9..d137d4692b918 100644
@@ -105,7 +105,8 @@ static enum dlm_status dlmunlock_common(struct dlm_ctxt *dlm,
 	enum dlm_status status;
 	int actions = 0;
 	int in_use;
-        u8 owner;
+	u8 owner;
+	int recovery_wait = 0;
 
 	mlog(0, "master_node = %d, valblk = %d\n", master_node,
 	     flags & LKM_VALBLK);

@@ -208,9 +209,12 @@ static enum dlm_status dlmunlock_common(struct dlm_ctxt *dlm,
 		}
 		if (flags & LKM_CANCEL)
 			lock->cancel_pending = 0;
-		else
-			lock->unlock_pending = 0;
-
+		else {
+			if (!lock->unlock_pending)
+				recovery_wait = 1;
+			else
+				lock->unlock_pending = 0;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/* get an extra ref on lock.  if we are just switching

@@ -244,6 +248,17 @@ leave:
 	spin_unlock(&res->spinlock);
 	wake_up(&res->wq);
 
+	if (recovery_wait) {
+		spin_lock(&res->spinlock);
+		/* Unlock request will directly succeed after owner dies,
+		 * and the lock is already removed from grant list. We have to
+		 * wait for RECOVERING done or we miss the chance to purge it
+		 * since the removement is much faster than RECOVERING proc.
+		 */
+		__dlm_wait_on_lockres_flags(res, DLM_LOCK_RES_RECOVERING);
+		spin_unlock(&res->spinlock);
+	}
+
 	/* let the caller's final dlm_lock_put handle the actual kfree */
 	if (actions & DLM_UNLOCK_FREE_LOCK) {
 		/* this should always be coupled with list removal */

2.20.1

From: Nicolas Boichat <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b751c52bb587ae66f773b15204ef7a147467f4c7 ]

The current default value (400) is too low on many systems (e.g. some ARM64 platform takes up 1000+ entries).

syzbot uses 16000 as default value, and has proved to be enough on beefy configurations, so let's pick that value.

This consumes more RAM on boot (each entry is 160 bytes, so in total ~2.5MB of RAM), but the memory would later be freed (early_log is __initdata).

---
 lib/Kconfig.debug | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index fd1205a3dbdbc..7b9d7328f189e 100644
@@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ config DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_EARLY_LOG_SIZE
 	int "Maximum kmemleak early log entries"
 	depends on DEBUG_KMEMLEAK
 	range 200 40000
-	default 400
+	default 16000
 	help
 	  Kmemleak must track all the memory allocations to avoid
 	  reporting false positives. Since memory may be allocated or

2.20.1

From: Martijn Coenen <[email protected]>

commit f5cb779ba16334b45ba8946d6bfa6d9834d1527f upstream.

binder_poll() passes the thread->wait waitqueue that can be slept on for work. When a thread that uses epoll explicitly exits using BINDER_THREAD_EXIT, the waitqueue is freed, but it is never removed from the corresponding epoll data structure. When the process subsequently exits, the epoll cleanup code tries to access the waitlist, which results in a use-after-free.

Prevent this by using POLLFREE when the thread exits.

---
 drivers/android/binder.c |   17 ++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -334,7 +334,8 @@ enum {
 	BINDER_LOOPER_STATE_EXITED      = 0x04,
 	BINDER_LOOPER_STATE_INVALID     = 0x08,
 	BINDER_LOOPER_STATE_WAITING     = 0x10,
-	BINDER_LOOPER_STATE_NEED_RETURN = 0x20
+	BINDER_LOOPER_STATE_NEED_RETURN = 0x20,
+	BINDER_LOOPER_STATE_POLL	= 0x40,
 };
 
 struct binder_thread {

@@ -2610,6 +2611,18 @@ static int binder_free_thread(struct bin
 		} else
 			BUG();
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If this thread used poll, make sure we remove the waitqueue
+	 * from any epoll data structures holding it with POLLFREE.
+	 * waitqueue_active() is safe to use here because we're holding
+	 * the inner lock.
+	 */
+	if ((thread->looper & BINDER_LOOPER_STATE_POLL) &&
+	    waitqueue_active(&thread->wait)) {
+		wake_up_poll(&thread->wait, POLLHUP | POLLFREE);
+	}
+
 	if (send_reply)
 		binder_send_failed_reply(send_reply, BR_DEAD_REPLY);
 	binder_release_work(&thread->todo);

@@ -2633,6 +2646,8 @@ static unsigned int binder_poll(struct f
 		return POLLERR;
 	}
 
+	thread->looper |= BINDER_LOOPER_STATE_POLL;
+
 	wait_for_proc_work = thread->transaction_stack == NULL &&
 		list_empty(&thread->todo) && thread->return_error == BR_OK;
 

From: Martijn Coenen <[email protected]>

commit 5eeb2ca02a2f6084fc57ae5c244a38baab07033a upstream.

To prevent races with ep_remove_waitqueue() removing the waitqueue at the same time.

---
 drivers/android/binder.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

@@ -2623,6 +2623,15 @@ static int binder_free_thread(struct bin
 		wake_up_poll(&thread->wait, POLLHUP | POLLFREE);
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * This is needed to avoid races between wake_up_poll() above and
+	 * and ep_remove_waitqueue() called for other reasons (eg the epoll file
+	 * descriptor being closed); ep_remove_waitqueue() holds an RCU read
+	 * lock, so we can be sure it's done after calling synchronize_rcu().
+	 */
+	if (thread->looper & BINDER_LOOPER_STATE_POLL)
+		synchronize_rcu();
+
 	if (send_reply)
 		binder_send_failed_reply(send_reply, BR_DEAD_REPLY);
 	binder_release_work(&thread->todo);

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8353da9fa69722b54cba82b2ec740afd3d438748 ]

Fix NULL-pointer dereference on tty open due to a failure to handle a missing interrupt-in endpoint when probing modem ports:

	BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000006
	...
	RIP: 0010:tiocmget_submit_urb+0x1c/0xe0 [hso]
	...
	Call Trace:
	hso_start_serial_device+0xdc/0x140 [hso]
	hso_serial_open+0x118/0x1b0 [hso]
	tty_open+0xf1/0x490

---
 drivers/net/usb/hso.c |   12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -2650,14 +2650,18 @@ static struct hso_device *hso_create_bul
 		 */
 		if (serial->tiocmget) {
 			tiocmget = serial->tiocmget;
+			tiocmget->endp = hso_get_ep(interface,
+						    USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_INT,
+						    USB_DIR_IN);
+			if (!tiocmget->endp) {
+				dev_err(&interface->dev, "Failed to find INT IN ep\n");
+				goto exit;
+			}
+
 			tiocmget->urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
 			if (tiocmget->urb) {
 				mutex_init(&tiocmget->mutex);
 				init_waitqueue_head(&tiocmget->waitq);
-				tiocmget->endp = hso_get_ep(
-					interface,
-					USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_INT,
-					USB_DIR_IN);
 			} else
 				hso_free_tiomget(serial);
 		}

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6af1799aaf3f1bc8defedddfa00df3192445bbf3 ]

This began with a syzbot report. syzkaller was injecting IPv6 TCP SYN packets having a v4mapped source address.

After an unsuccessful 4-tuple lookup, TCP creates a request socket (SYN_RECV) and calls reqsk_queue_hash_req()

reqsk_queue_hash_req() calls sk_ehashfn(sk)

At this point we have AF_INET6 sockets, and the heuristic used by sk_ehashfn() to either hash the IPv4 or IPv6 addresses is to use ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr)

For the particular spoofed packet, we end up hashing V4 addresses which were not initialized by the TCP IPv6 stack, so KMSAN fired a warning.

I first fixed sk_ehashfn() to test both source and destination addresses, but then faced various problems, including user-space programs like packetdrill that had similar assumptions.

Instead of trying to fix the whole ecosystem, it is better to admit that we have a dual stack behavior, and that we can not build linux kernels without V4 stack anyway.

The dual stack API automatically forces the traffic to be IPv4 if v4mapped addresses are used at bind() or connect(), so it makes no sense to allow IPv6 traffic to use the same v4mapped class.

---
 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c |   10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

@@ -151,6 +151,16 @@ int ipv6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct
 	if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&hdr->saddr))
 		goto err;
 
+	/* While RFC4291 is not explicit about v4mapped addresses
+	 * in IPv6 headers, it seems clear linux dual-stack
+	 * model can not deal properly with these.
+	 * Security models could be fooled by ::ffff:127.0.0.1 for example.
+	 *
+	 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02
+	 */
+	if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&hdr->saddr))
+		goto err;
+
 	skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + sizeof(*hdr);
 	IP6CB(skb)->nhoff = offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, nexthdr);
 

From: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b406472b5ad79ede8d10077f0c8f05505ace8b6d ]

Since commit c09551c6ff7f ("net: ipv4: use a dedicated counter for icmp_v4 redirect packets") we use 'n_redirects' to account for redirect packets, but we still use 'rate_tokens' to compute the redirect packets exponential backoff.

If the device sent to the relevant peer any ICMP error packet after sending a redirect, it will also update 'rate_token' according to the leaking bucket schema; typically 'rate_token' will raise above BITS_PER_LONG and the redirect packets backoff algorithm will produce undefined behavior.

Fix the issue using 'n_redirects' to compute the exponential backoff in ip_rt_send_redirect().

Note that we still clear rate_tokens after a redirect silence period, to avoid changing an established behaviour.

The root cause predates git history; before the mentioned commit in the critical scenario, the kernel stopped sending redirects, after the mentioned commit the behavior more randomic.

---
 net/ipv4/route.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -897,16 +897,15 @@ void ip_rt_send_redirect(struct sk_buff
 	if (peer->rate_tokens == 0 ||
 	    time_after(jiffies,
 		       (peer->rate_last +
-			(ip_rt_redirect_load << peer->rate_tokens)))) {
+			(ip_rt_redirect_load << peer->n_redirects)))) {
 		__be32 gw = rt_nexthop(rt, ip_hdr(skb)->daddr);
 
 		icmp_send(skb, ICMP_REDIRECT, ICMP_REDIR_HOST, gw);
 		peer->rate_last = jiffies;
-		++peer->rate_tokens;
 		++peer->n_redirects;
 #ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_VERBOSE
 		if (log_martians &&
-		    peer->rate_tokens == ip_rt_redirect_number)
+		    peer->n_redirects == ip_rt_redirect_number)
 			net_warn_ratelimited("host %pI4/if%d ignores redirects for %pI4 to %pI4\n",
 					     &ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, inet_iif(skb),
 					     &ip_hdr(skb)->daddr, &gw);

From: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1acb8f2a7a9f10543868ddd737e37424d5c36cf4 ]

In ql_alloc_large_buffers, a new skb is allocated via netdev_alloc_skb. This skb should be released if pci_dma_mapping_error fails.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qla3xxx.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -2783,6 +2783,7 @@ static int ql_alloc_large_buffers(struct
 				netdev_err(qdev->ndev,
 					   "PCI mapping failed with error: %d\n",
 					   err);
+				dev_kfree_skb_irq(skb);
 				ql_free_large_buffers(qdev);
 				return -ENOMEM;
 			}

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a0c2dc1fe63e2869b74c1c7f6a81d1745c8a695d ]

sysbot reported a memory leak after a bind() has failed.

While we are at it, abort the operation if kmemdup() has failed.

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888105d83ec0 (size 32):
  comm "syz-executor067", pid 7207, jiffies 4294956228 (age 19.430s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 69 6c 65 20 72 65 61 64 00 6e 65 74 3a 5b 34  .ile read.net:[4
    30 32 36 35 33 33 30 39 37 5d 00 00 00 00 00 00  026533097]......
  backtrace:
    [<0000000036bac473>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive /./include/linux/kmemleak.h:43 [inline]
    [<0000000036bac473>] slab_post_alloc_hook /mm/slab.h:522 [inline]
    [<0000000036bac473>] slab_alloc /mm/slab.c:3319 [inline]
    [<0000000036bac473>] __do_kmalloc /mm/slab.c:3653 [inline]
    [<0000000036bac473>] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x169/0x2d0 /mm/slab.c:3670
    [<000000000cd39d07>] kmemdup+0x27/0x60 /mm/util.c:120
    [<000000008e57e5fc>] kmemdup /./include/linux/string.h:432 [inline]
    [<000000008e57e5fc>] llcp_sock_bind+0x1b3/0x230 /net/nfc/llcp_sock.c:107
    [<000000009cb0b5d3>] __sys_bind+0x11c/0x140 /net/socket.c:1647
    [<00000000492c3bbc>] __do_sys_bind /net/socket.c:1658 [inline]
    [<00000000492c3bbc>] __se_sys_bind /net/socket.c:1656 [inline]
    [<00000000492c3bbc>] __x64_sys_bind+0x1e/0x30 /net/socket.c:1656
    [<0000000008704b2a>] do_syscall_64+0x76/0x1a0 /arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
    [<000000009f4c57a4>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

---
 net/nfc/llcp_sock.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -118,9 +118,14 @@ static int llcp_sock_bind(struct socket
 	llcp_sock->service_name = kmemdup(llcp_addr.service_name,
 					  llcp_sock->service_name_len,
 					  GFP_KERNEL);
-
+	if (!llcp_sock->service_name) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto put_dev;
+	}
 	llcp_sock->ssap = nfc_llcp_get_sdp_ssap(local, llcp_sock);
 	if (llcp_sock->ssap == LLCP_SAP_MAX) {
+		kfree(llcp_sock->service_name);
+		llcp_sock->service_name = NULL;
 		ret = -EADDRINUSE;
 		goto put_dev;
 	}

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 474f0813a3002cb299bb73a5a93aa1f537a80ca8 ]

Make sure TCA_DSMARK_INDICES was provided by the user.

syzbot reported :

kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access

general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 8799 Comm: syz-executor235 Not tainted 5.3.0+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:nla_get_u16 include/net/netlink.h:1501 [inline]
RIP: 0010:dsmark_init net/sched/sch_dsmark.c:364 [inline]
RIP: 0010:dsmark_init+0x193/0x640 net/sched/sch_dsmark.c:339
Code: 85 db 58 0f 88 7d 03 00 00 e8 e9 1a ac fb 48 8b 9d 70 ff ff ff 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 7b 04 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 01 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 ca
RSP: 0018:ffff88809426f3b8 EFLAGS: 00010247
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff85c6eb09
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff85c6eb17 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: ffff88809426f4b0 R08: ffff88808c4085c0 R09: ffffed1015d26159
R10: ffffed1015d26158 R11: ffff8880ae930ac7 R12: ffff8880a7e96940
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88809426f8c0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  0000000001292880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000080 CR3: 000000008ca1b000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 qdisc_create+0x4ee/0x1210 net/sched/sch_api.c:1237
 tc_modify_qdisc+0x524/0x1c50 net/sched/sch_api.c:1653
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x463/0xb00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5223
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5241
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x531/0x710 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
 netlink_sendmsg+0x8a5/0xd60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:657
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x803/0x920 net/socket.c:2311
 __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2356
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2365 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2363 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2363
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x760 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x440369

---
 net/sched/sch_dsmark.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -362,6 +362,8 @@ static int dsmark_init(struct Qdisc *sch
 		goto errout;
 
 	err = -EINVAL;
+	if (!tb[TCA_DSMARK_INDICES])
+		goto errout;
 	indices = nla_get_u16(tb[TCA_DSMARK_INDICES]);
 
 	if (hweight32(indices) != 1)

From: Dongli Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a761129e3625688310aecf26e1be9e98e85f8eb5 ]

xennet_fill_frags() uses ~0U as return value when the sk_buff is not able to cache extra fragments. This is incorrect because the return type of xennet_fill_frags() is RING_IDX and 0xffffffff is an expected value for ring buffer index.

In the situation when the rsp_cons is approaching 0xffffffff, the return value of xennet_fill_frags() may become 0xffffffff which xennet_poll() (the caller) would regard as error. As a result, queue->rx.rsp_cons is set incorrectly because it is updated only when there is error. If there is no error, xennet_poll() would be responsible to update queue->rx.rsp_cons. Finally, queue->rx.rsp_cons would point to the rx ring buffer entries whose queue->rx_skbs[i] and queue->grant_rx_ref[i] are already cleared to NULL. This leads to NULL pointer access in the next iteration to process rx ring buffer entries.

The symptom is similar to the one fixed in
commit 00b368502d18 ("xen-netfront: do not assume sk_buff_head list is empty in error handling").

This patch changes the return type of xennet_fill_frags() to indicate whether it is successful or failed. The queue->rx.rsp_cons will be always updated inside this function.

---
 drivers/net/xen-netfront.c |   17 +++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -874,9 +874,9 @@ static int xennet_set_skb_gso(struct sk_
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue,
-				  struct sk_buff *skb,
-				  struct sk_buff_head *list)
+static int xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue,
+			     struct sk_buff *skb,
+			     struct sk_buff_head *list)
 {
 	RING_IDX cons = queue->rx.rsp_cons;
 	struct sk_buff *nskb;

@@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct
 		if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS)) {
 			queue->rx.rsp_cons = ++cons + skb_queue_len(list);
 			kfree_skb(nskb);
-			return ~0U;
+			return -ENOENT;
 		}
 
 		skb_add_rx_frag(skb, skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags,

@@ -906,7 +906,9 @@ static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct
 		kfree_skb(nskb);
 	}
 
-	return cons;
+	queue->rx.rsp_cons = cons;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int checksum_setup(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)

@@ -1032,8 +1034,7 @@ err:
 		skb->data_len = rx->status;
 		skb->len += rx->status;
 
-		i = xennet_fill_frags(queue, skb, &tmpq);
-		if (unlikely(i == ~0U))
+		if (unlikely(xennet_fill_frags(queue, skb, &tmpq)))
 			goto err;
 
 		if (rx->flags & XEN_NETRXF_csum_blank)

@@ -1043,7 +1044,7 @@ err:
 
 		__skb_queue_tail(&rxq, skb);
 
-		queue->rx.rsp_cons = ++i;
+		i = ++queue->rx.rsp_cons;
 		work_done++;
 	}
 

From: Dotan Barak <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d64bf89a75b65f83f06be9fb8f978e60d53752db ]

rds_ibdev:ipaddr_list and rds_ibdev:conn_list are initialized after allocation some resources such as protection domain. If allocation of such resources fail, then these uninitialized variables are accessed in rds_ib_dev_free() in failure path. This can potentially crash the system. The code has been updated to initialize these variables very early in the function.

---
 net/rds/ib.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -146,6 +146,9 @@ static void rds_ib_add_one(struct ib_dev
 	atomic_set(&rds_ibdev->refcount, 1);
 	INIT_WORK(&rds_ibdev->free_work, rds_ib_dev_free);
 
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rds_ibdev->ipaddr_list);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rds_ibdev->conn_list);
+
 	rds_ibdev->max_wrs = dev_attr->max_qp_wr;
 	rds_ibdev->max_sge = min(dev_attr->max_sge, RDS_IB_MAX_SGE);
 

@@ -187,9 +190,6 @@ static void rds_ib_add_one(struct ib_dev
 		 rds_ibdev->fmr_max_remaps, rds_ibdev->max_1m_fmrs,
 		 rds_ibdev->max_8k_fmrs);
 
-	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rds_ibdev->ipaddr_list);
-	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rds_ibdev->conn_list);
-
 	down_write(&rds_ib_devices_lock);
 	list_add_tail_rcu(&rds_ibdev->list, &rds_ib_devices);
 	up_write(&rds_ib_devices_lock);

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e9789c7cc182484fc031fd88097eb14cb26c4596 ]

syzbot reported a crash in cbq_normalize_quanta() caused by an out of range cl->priority.

iproute2 enforces this check, but malicious users do not.

kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access

general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 26447 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.3+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:cbq_normalize_quanta.part.0+0x1fd/0x430 net/sched/sch_cbq.c:902
RSP: 0018:ffff8801a5c333b0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000020000003 RBX: 00000000fffffff8 RCX: ffffc9000712f000
RDX: 00000000000043bf RSI: ffffffff83be8962 RDI: 0000000100000018
RBP: ffff8801a5c33420 R08: 000000000000003a R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000002ef
R13: ffff88018da95188 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000015
FS:  00007f37d26b1700(0000) GS:ffff8801dad00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004c7cec CR3: 00000001bcd0a006 CR4: 00000000001626f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff83be9d57>] cbq_normalize_quanta include/net/pkt_sched.h:27 [inline]
 [<ffffffff83be9d57>] cbq_addprio net/sched/sch_cbq.c:1097 [inline]
 [<ffffffff83be9d57>] cbq_set_wrr+0x2d7/0x450 net/sched/sch_cbq.c:1115
 [<ffffffff83bee8a7>] cbq_change_class+0x987/0x225b net/sched/sch_cbq.c:1537
 [<ffffffff83b96985>] tc_ctl_tclass+0x555/0xcd0 net/sched/sch_api.c:2329
 [<ffffffff83a84655>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x485/0xc10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5248
 [<ffffffff83cadf0a>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2510
 [<ffffffff83a7db6d>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5266
 [<ffffffff83cac2c6>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1324 [inline]
 [<ffffffff83cac2c6>] netlink_unicast+0x536/0x720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1350
 [<ffffffff83cacd4a>] netlink_sendmsg+0x89a/0xd50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1939
 [<ffffffff8399d46e>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:673 [inline]
 [<ffffffff8399d46e>] sock_sendmsg+0x12e/0x170 net/socket.c:684
 [<ffffffff8399f1fd>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x81d/0x960 net/socket.c:2359
 [<ffffffff839a2d05>] __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2397
 [<ffffffff839a2df9>] SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2406 [inline]
 [<ffffffff839a2df9>] SyS_sendmsg+0x29/0x30 net/socket.c:2404
 [<ffffffff8101ccc8>] do_syscall_64+0x528/0x770 arch/x86/entry/common.c:305
 [<ffffffff84400091>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

---
 net/sched/sch_cbq.c |   27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -1340,6 +1340,26 @@ static const struct nla_policy cbq_polic
 	[TCA_CBQ_POLICE]	= { .len = sizeof(struct tc_cbq_police) },
 };
 
+static int cbq_opt_parse(struct nlattr *tb[TCA_CBQ_MAX + 1], struct nlattr *opt)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	if (!opt)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	err = nla_parse_nested(tb, TCA_CBQ_MAX, opt, cbq_policy);
+	if (err < 0)
+		return err;
+
+	if (tb[TCA_CBQ_WRROPT]) {
+		const struct tc_cbq_wrropt *wrr = nla_data(tb[TCA_CBQ_WRROPT]);
+
+		if (wrr->priority > TC_CBQ_MAXPRIO)
+			err = -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return err;
+}
+
 static int cbq_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt)
 {
 	struct cbq_sched_data *q = qdisc_priv(sch);

@@ -1347,7 +1367,7 @@ static int cbq_init(struct Qdisc *sch, s
 	struct tc_ratespec *r;
 	int err;
 
-	err = nla_parse_nested(tb, TCA_CBQ_MAX, opt, cbq_policy);
+	err = cbq_opt_parse(tb, opt);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 

@@ -1728,10 +1748,7 @@ cbq_change_class(struct Qdisc *sch, u32
 	struct cbq_class *parent;
 	struct qdisc_rate_table *rtab = NULL;
 
-	if (opt == NULL)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	err = nla_parse_nested(tb, TCA_CBQ_MAX, opt, cbq_policy);
+	err = cbq_opt_parse(tb, opt);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 

From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>

commit 3675f052b43ba51b99b85b073c7070e083f3e6fb upstream.

There is a logic bug in the current smack_bprm_set_creds():
If LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set, but the ptrace state is deemed to be acceptable (e.g. because the ptracer detached in the meantime), the other ->unsafe flags aren't checked. As far as I can tell, this means that something like the following could work (but I haven't tested it):

- task A: create task B with fork()
- task B: set NO_NEW_PRIVS
- task B: install a seccomp filter that makes open() return 0 under some conditions
- task B: replace fd 0 with a malicious library
- task A: attach to task B with PTRACE_ATTACH
- task B: execve() a file with an SMACK64EXEC extended attribute
- task A: while task B is still in the middle of execve(), exit (which destroys the ptrace relationship)

Make sure that if any flags other than LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE are set in bprm->unsafe, we reject the execve().

---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -932,7 +932,8 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct l
 
 		if (rc != 0)
 			return rc;
-	} else if (bprm->unsafe)
+	}
+	if (bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

commit e5bfad3d7acc5702f32aafeb388362994f4d7bd0 upstream.

inode_smack::smk_lock is taken during smack_d_instantiate(), which is called during a filesystem transaction when creating a file on ext4. Therefore to avoid a deadlock, all code that takes this lock must use GFP_NOFS, to prevent memory reclaim from waiting for the filesystem transaction to complete.

---
 security/smack/smack_access.c |    4 ++--
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c    |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string
 	if (i == 0 || i >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
-	smack = kzalloc(i + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	smack = kzalloc(i + 1, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (smack == NULL)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 

@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(con
 	if (skp != NULL)
 		goto freeout;
 
-	skp = kzalloc(sizeof(*skp), GFP_KERNEL);
+	skp = kzalloc(sizeof(*skp), GFP_NOFS);
 	if (skp == NULL) {
 		skp = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 		goto freeout;

@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(con
 	if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
 
-	buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_KERNEL);
+	buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (buffer == NULL)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 

From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>

commit 18917d51472fe3b126a3a8f756c6b18085eb8130 upstream.

nfc_genl_deactivate_target() relies on the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attribute being present, but doesn't check whether it is actually provided by the user. Same goes for nfc_genl_fw_download() and NFC_ATTR_FIRMWARE_NAME.

This patch adds appropriate checks.

Found with syzkaller.

---
 net/nfc/netlink.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -936,7 +936,8 @@ static int nfc_genl_dep_link_down(struct
 	int rc;
 	u32 idx;
 
-	if (!info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX])
+	if (!info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX] ||
+	    !info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX])
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX]);

@@ -985,7 +986,8 @@ static int nfc_genl_llc_get_params(struc
 	struct sk_buff *msg = NULL;
 	u32 idx;
 
-	if (!info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX])
+	if (!info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX] ||
+	    !info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_FIRMWARE_NAME])
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX]);

All tests are passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v4.4:

    6 builds:	6 pass, 0 fail
    12 boots:	12 pass, 0 fail
    19 tests:	19 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 4.4.196-rc1-g2082eedffaaa
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,

                tegra30-cardhu-a04

Cheers
Jon

nvpublic

powerpc:defconfig fails to build.

arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_driver.c: In function ‘eeh_handle_normal_event’:
arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_driver.c:678:2: error: implicit declaration of function ‘eeh_for_each_pe’; did you mean ‘bus_for_each_dev’?

It has a point:

... HEAD is now at 13cac61d31df Linux 4.4.196-rc1

$ git grep eeh_for_each_pe
arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_driver.c:       eeh_for_each_pe(pe, tmp_pe)
arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_driver.c:                               eeh_for_each_pe(pe, tmp_pe)

Caused by commit 3fb431be8de3a ("powerpc/eeh: Clear stale EEH_DEV_NO_HANDLER flag"). Full report will follow later.

Guenter

Thanks for letting me know, I've dropped this from the queue now and pushed out a -rc2 with that removed.

Sasha, I thought your builder would have caught stuff like this?

thanks,

greg k-h

For v4.4.195-36-g898f6e5cf82f:

Build results:

	total: 170 pass: 170 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 324 pass: 324 fail: 0

Guenter

Wonderful, thanks for letting me know!

greg k-h

Interesting, the 4.4 build fails for me with vanilla 4.4 LTS kernel (which is why this was missed):

AS arch/powerpc/kernel/systbl.o
arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S: Assembler messages:
arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S:1599: Warning: invalid register expression arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S:1640: Warning: invalid register expression arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S:839: Error: attempt to move .org backwards arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S:840: Error: attempt to move .org backwards arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S:864: Error: attempt to move .org backwards arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S:865: Error: attempt to move .org backwards scripts/Makefile.build:375: recipe for target 'arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.o' failed

I'll look into it.

--
Thanks,
Sasha

Is this allmodconfig ? That is correct - it won't build in 4.4.y, and it would not be easy to fix.

Guenter

Oh, interesting, so no allmodconfig? I've disabled everything but allmodconfig on a few architectures in an attempt to save to build time.

--
Thanks,
Sasha

If I recall correctly, it stopped working quite some time ago for v4.4.y, and the powerpc maintainers didn't want to spend the time fixing it. It works with v4.9.y and later.

Guenter

Build results:

	total: 170 pass: 169 fail: 1
Failed builds:
	powerpc:defconfig
Qemu test results:
	total: 324 pass: 313 fail: 11
Failed tests:
	ppc64:mac99:ppc64_book3s_defconfig:nosmp:initrd
	ppc64:mac99:ppc64_book3s_defconfig:smp:initrd
	ppc64:mac99:ppc64_book3s_defconfig:smp:ide:rootfs
	ppc64:mac99:ppc64_book3s_defconfig:smp:sdhci:mmc:rootfs
	ppc64:mac99:ppc64_book3s_defconfig:smp:nvme:rootfs
	ppc64:mac99:ppc64_book3s_defconfig:smp:scsi[DC395]:rootfs
	ppc64:pseries:pseries_defconfig:initrd
	ppc64:pseries:pseries_defconfig:scsi:rootfs
	ppc64:pseries:pseries_defconfig:usb:rootfs
	ppc64:pseries:pseries_defconfig:sdhci:mmc:rootfs
	ppc64:pseries:pseries_defconfig:nvme:rootfs

Failure as already reported.

arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_driver.c: In function ‘eeh_handle_normal_event’:
arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_driver.c:678:2: error: implicit declaration of function ‘eeh_for_each_pe’

Guenter

Hello!

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.4.196-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.4.y
git commit: 13cac61d31df3572c7a2c88f2f40c59e0a92baf2
git describe: v4.4.195-37-g13cac61d31df
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.4-oe/build/v4.4.195-37-g13cac61d31df

No regressions (compared to build v4.4.195)

No fixes (compared to build v4.4.195)

Ran 18597 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64

Test Suites
-----------
* build
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* network-basic-tests
* prep-tmp-disk
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* kvm-unit-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* perf
* v4l2-compliance
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* ssuite

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.4.196-rc1
git repo: https://git.linaro.org/lkft/arm64-stable-rc.git
git branch: 4.4.196-rc1-hikey-20191006-575
git commit: 49d2751d5f3cdb81b162d5c1f7ffb0fe210f005c
git describe: 4.4.196-rc1-hikey-20191006-575
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linaro-hikey-stable-rc-4.4-oe/build/4.4.196-rc1-hikey-20191006-575

No regressions (compared to build 4.4.195-rc1-hikey-20191003-572)

No fixes (compared to build 4.4.195-rc1-hikey-20191003-572)

Ran 1520 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- hi6220-hikey - arm64

Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* perf
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* v4l2-compliance

Greetings!

Daniel Díaz
[email protected]

Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org