Allow the systemd dbus-daemon to talk to systemd
PATCH 1/10 Allow the systemd dbus-daemon to talk to systemd
From: Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>
Recent versions of dbus are started as Type=notify
type=AVC msg=audit(03/10/19 15:32:40.347:64) : avc: denied { write } for pid=809 comm=dbus-daemon name=notify dev="tmpfs" ino=1751 scontext=system_u:system_r:system_dbusd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:object_r:init_runtime_t:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=1
--- policy/modules/services/dbus.te | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
policy/modules/services/dbus.te +3 -0
@@ -159,6 +159,9 @@ ifdef(`init_systemd', ` # for /run/systemd/dynamic-uid/ init_list_pids(system_dbusd_t) init_read_runtime_symlinks(system_dbusd_t) + + # Recent versions of dbus are started as Type=notify + init_write_runtime_socket(system_dbusd_t) ') optional_policy(`
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
PATCH 2/10 Allow geoclue to log in syslog
From: Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>
----time->Thu Oct 3 17:16:40 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570115800.136:513): avc: denied { create } for pid=1384 comm="geoclue" scontext=system_u:system_r:geoclue_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:geoclue_t:s0 tclass=unix_dgram_socket permissive=1
----time->Thu Oct 3 17:16:40 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570115800.136:514): avc: denied { sendto } for pid=1384 comm="geoclue" path="/run/systemd/journal/socket" scontext=system_u:system_r:geoclue_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:syslogd_t:s0 tc lass=unix_dgram_socket permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(1570115800.136:514): avc: denied { write } for pid=1384 comm="geoclue" name="socket" dev="tmpfs" ino=1781 scontext=system_u:system_r:geoclue_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:devlog_t:s0 tcla ss=sock_file permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(1570115800.136:514): avc: denied { search } for pid=1384 comm="geoclue" name="journal" dev="tmpfs" ino=1777 scontext=system_u:system_r:geoclue_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:syslogd_runtim e_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(1570115800.136:514): avc: denied { search } for pid=1384 comm="geoclue" name="systemd" dev="tmpfs" ino=11001 scontext=system_u:system_r:geoclue_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:init_runtime_ t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(1570115800.136:514): avc: denied { write } for pid=1384 comm="geoclue" scontext=system_u:system_r:geoclue_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:geoclue_t:s0 tclass=unix_dgram_socket permissive=1
----
--- policy/modules/services/geoclue.te | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
policy/modules/services/geoclue.te +2 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ dev_read_urand(geoclue_t) auth_use_nsswitch(geoclue_t) +logging_send_syslog_msg(geoclue_t) + miscfiles_read_generic_certs(geoclue_t) miscfiles_read_localization(geoclue_t)
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
PATCH 3/10 Allow colord_t to exec colord_exec_t type
In reply to Laurent BigonvilleFrom: Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>
The main colord daemon can exec other daemon like colord-sane
type=AVC msg=audit(04/10/19 10:12:46.339:1676) : avc: denied { execute_no_trans } for pid=16983 comm=colord path=/usr/lib/colord/colord-sane dev="dm-1" ino=1049183 scontext=system_u:system_r:colord_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:colord_exec_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
--- policy/modules/services/colord.te | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
policy/modules/services/colord.te +2 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(colord_t, colord_var_lib_t, colord_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(colord_t, colord_var_lib_t, colord_var_lib_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(colord_t, colord_var_lib_t, dir) +can_exec(colord_t, colord_exec_t) + kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(colord_t) kernel_read_device_sysctls(colord_t) kernel_read_network_state(colord_t)
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
PATCH 4/10 Allow realmd_t to read localization files
In reply to Laurent BigonvilleFrom: Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>
----time->Sat Oct 5 13:11:40 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570273900.483:148): avc: denied { open } for pid=1382 comm="realmd" path="/etc/locale.alias" dev="dm-1" ino=1047048 scontext=system_u:system_r:realmd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:locale_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(1570273900.483:148): avc: denied { read } for pid=1382 comm="realmd" name="locale.alias" dev="dm-1" ino=1047048 scontext=system_u:system_r:realmd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:locale_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(1570273900.483:148): avc: denied { read } for pid=1382 comm="realmd" name="locale.alias" dev="dm-1" ino=262415 scontext=system_u:system_r:realmd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:locale_t:s0 tclass=lnk_file permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(1570273900.483:148): avc: denied { search } for pid=1382 comm="realmd" name="locale" dev="dm-1" ino=262056 scontext=system_u:system_r:realmd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:locale_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1----time->Sat Oct 5 13:11:40 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570273900.483:149): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=1382 comm="realmd" path="/etc/locale.alias" dev="dm-1" ino=1047048 scontext=system_u:system_r:realmd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:locale_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
----
--- policy/modules/services/realmd.te | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
policy/modules/services/realmd.te +3 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(realmd_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(realmd_t) +# Read /etc/locale.alias +miscfiles_read_localization(realmd_t) + optional_policy(` dbus_system_domain(realmd_t, realmd_exec_t)
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
PATCH 5/10 Allow colord_t to read the color profile stored in ~/.local/share/icc/
In reply to Laurent BigonvilleFrom: Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>
colord reads the color profiles files that are stored in ~/.local/share/icc/, The file descriptor to that file is passed over D-Bus so it needs to be inherited
----time->Sat Oct 5 11:35:54 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570268154.991:223): avc: denied { read } for pid=852 comm="gdbus" path="/home/bigon/.local/share/icc/edid-fcd2cc06dec015794261e6b7756cbcec.icc" dev="dm-3" ino=413402 scontext=system_u:system_r:colord_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:xdg_data_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(1570268154.991:223): avc: denied { use } for pid=852 comm="gdbus" path="/home/bigon/.local/share/icc/edid-fcd2cc06dec015794261e6b7756cbcec.icc" dev="dm-3" ino=413402 scontext=system_u:system_r:colord_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=fd permissive=1----time->Sat Oct 5 11:35:55 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570268155.007:225): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=852 comm="colord" path="/home/bigon/.local/share/icc/edid-fcd2cc06dec015794261e6b7756cbcec.icc" dev="dm-3" ino=413402 scontext=system_u:system_r:colord_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:xdg_data_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
----time->Sat Oct 5 11:35:55 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570268155.007:226): avc: denied { map } for pid=852 comm="colord" path="/home/bigon/.local/share/icc/edid-fcd2cc06dec015794261e6b7756cbcec.icc" dev="dm-3" ino=413402 scontext=system_u:system_r:colord_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:xdg_data_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
----
--- policy/modules/services/colord.te | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
policy/modules/services/colord.te +7 -0
@@ -141,6 +141,13 @@ optional_policy(` udev_read_pid_files(colord_t) ') +# colord reads the color profiles files that are stored in ~/.local/share/icc/, +# The file descriptor to that file is passed over D-Bus so it needs to be inherited +optional_policy(` + unconfined_use_fds(colord_t) + xdg_read_data_files(colord_t) +') + optional_policy(` xserver_read_xdm_lib_files(colord_t) xserver_use_xdm_fds(colord_t)
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
Re: [PATCH 05/10] Allow colord_t to read the color profile stored in ~/.local/share/icc/
Quoted 5 lines · Laurent Bigonville
From: Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>
colord reads the color profiles files that are stored in ~/.local/share/icc/, The file descriptor to that file is passed over D-Bus so it needs to be inherited
This patch is cutting corners a little. It only takes unconfined_t into account and not the confined users (an alternative would be to call "userdom_use_all_users_fds(colord_t)" instead. Which is arguable too broad as well but closest you can get to "common users" without surgery. Secondly xdg_read_data_files() is a little broad.
Also if this patch implies that whatever maintains XDG_DATA_DIR/icc is able to maintain generic xdg data files, which is arguable broad as well.
The second and third argument are subject to how far you want to take things, and so I won't object if that is not addressed. The fd use issue, in my view, should be addressed for all login (common) users with colord access.
Quoted 39 lines
----
time->SatOct 5 11:35:54 2019type=AVC msg=audit(1570268154.991:223): avc: denied { read } for pid=852 comm="gdbus" path="/home/bigon/.local/share/icc/edid-fcd2cc06dec015794261e6b7756cbcec.icc" dev="dm-3" ino=413402 scontext=system_u:system_r:colord_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:xdg_data_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 type=AVC msg=audit(1570268154.991:223): avc: denied { use } for pid=852 comm="gdbus" path="/home/bigon/.local/share/icc/edid-fcd2cc06dec015794261e6b7756cbcec.icc" dev="dm-3" ino=413402 scontext=system_u:system_r:colord_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=fd permissive=1----
time->SatOct 5 11:35:55 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570268155.007:225): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=852 comm="colord" path="/home/bigon/.local/share/icc/edid-fcd2cc06dec015794261e6b7756cbcec.icc" dev="dm-3" ino=413402 scontext=system_u:system_r:colord_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:xdg_data_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
----time->SatOct 5 11:35:55 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570268155.007:226): avc: denied { map } for pid=852 comm="colord" path="/home/bigon/.local/share/icc/edid-fcd2cc06dec015794261e6b7756cbcec.icc" dev="dm-3" ino=413402 scontext=system_u:system_r:colord_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:xdg_data_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
----Signed-off-by Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>--- policy/modules/services/colord.te | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)policy/modules/services/colord.te +7
-0@@ -141,6 +141,13 @@ optional_policy(` udev_read_pid_files(colord_t) ') +# colord reads the color profiles files that are stored in ~/.local/share/icc/, +# The file descriptor to that file is passed over D-Bus so it needs to be inherited +optional_policy(` + unconfined_use_fds(colord_t) + xdg_read_data_files(colord_t) +') + optional_policy(` xserver_read_xdm_lib_files(colord_t) xserver_use_xdm_fds(colord_t)Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
Signature · 3 lines
Key fingerprint = 5F4D 3CDB D3F8 3652 FBD8 02D5 3B6C 5F1D 2C7B 6B02 https://sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x3B6C5F1D2C7B6B02 Dominick Grift
Re: [PATCH 05/10] Allow colord_t to read the color profile stored in ~/.local/share/icc/
Quoted 7 lines · Dominick Grift
Quoted 5 lines · Laurent Bigonville
From: Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>
colord reads the color profiles files that are stored in ~/.local/share/icc/, The file descriptor to that file is passed over D-Bus so it needs to be inherited
Quoted 6 lines
This patch is cutting corners a little. It only takes
unconfined_tinto account and not the confined users (an alternative would be to call "userdom_use_all_users_fds(colord_t)" instead. Which is arguable too broad as well but closest you can get to "common users" without surgery. Secondlyxdg_read_data_files()is a little broad.
Also if this patch implies that whatever maintains XDG_DATA_DIR/icc is able to maintain generic xdg data files, which is arguable broad as well.The second and third argument are subject to how far you want to take things, and so I won't object if that is not addressed. The fd use issue, in my view, should be addressed for all login (common) users with colord access.
Actually, I take this review back. I am not sure how to best deal with this fd.
Quoted 45 lines
Quoted 40 lines
----
time->SatOct 5 11:35:54 2019type=AVC msg=audit(1570268154.991:223): avc: denied { read } for pid=852 comm="gdbus" path="/home/bigon/.local/share/icc/edid-fcd2cc06dec015794261e6b7756cbcec.icc" dev="dm-3" ino=413402 scontext=system_u:system_r:colord_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:xdg_data_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 type=AVC msg=audit(1570268154.991:223): avc: denied { use } for pid=852 comm="gdbus" path="/home/bigon/.local/share/icc/edid-fcd2cc06dec015794261e6b7756cbcec.icc" dev="dm-3" ino=413402 scontext=system_u:system_r:colord_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=fd permissive=1----
time->SatOct 5 11:35:55 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570268155.007:225): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=852 comm="colord" path="/home/bigon/.local/share/icc/edid-fcd2cc06dec015794261e6b7756cbcec.icc" dev="dm-3" ino=413402 scontext=system_u:system_r:colord_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:xdg_data_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
----time->SatOct 5 11:35:55 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570268155.007:226): avc: denied { map } for pid=852 comm="colord" path="/home/bigon/.local/share/icc/edid-fcd2cc06dec015794261e6b7756cbcec.icc" dev="dm-3" ino=413402 scontext=system_u:system_r:colord_t:s0 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:xdg_data_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
----Signed-off-by Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>--- policy/modules/services/colord.te | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)policy/modules/services/colord.te +7
-0@@ -141,6 +141,13 @@ optional_policy(` udev_read_pid_files(colord_t) ') +# colord reads the color profiles files that are stored in ~/.local/share/icc/, +# The file descriptor to that file is passed over D-Bus so it needs to be inherited +optional_policy(` + unconfined_use_fds(colord_t) + xdg_read_data_files(colord_t) +') + optional_policy(` xserver_read_xdm_lib_files(colord_t) xserver_use_xdm_fds(colord_t)Signature · 1 line
2.23.0Signature · 3 lines
Key fingerprint = 5F4D 3CDB D3F8 3652 FBD8 02D5 3B6C 5F1D 2C7B 6B02 https://sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x3B6C5F1D2C7B6B02 Dominick Grift
Signature · 3 lines
Key fingerprint = 5F4D 3CDB D3F8 3652 FBD8 02D5 3B6C 5F1D 2C7B 6B02 https://sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x3B6C5F1D2C7B6B02 Dominick Grift
Re: [PATCH 05/10] Allow colord_t to read the color profile stored in ~/.local/share/icc/
Quoted 8 lines · Dominick Grift
Quoted 7 lines · Dominick Grift
Quoted 5 lines · Laurent Bigonville
From: Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>
colord reads the color profiles files that are stored in ~/.local/share/icc/, The file descriptor to that file is passed over D-Bus so it needs to be inherited
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
This patch is cutting corners a little. It only takes
unconfined_tinto account and not the confined users (an alternative would be to call "userdom_use_all_users_fds(colord_t)" instead. Which is arguable too broad as well but closest you can get to "common users" without surgery. Secondlyxdg_read_data_files()is a little broad.
Also if this patch implies that whatever maintains XDG_DATA_DIR/icc is able to maintain generic xdg data files, which is arguable broad as well.The second and third argument are subject to how far you want to take things, and so I won't object if that is not addressed. The fd use issue, in my view, should be addressed for all login (common) users with colord access.
Actually, I take this review back. I am not sure how to best deal with this fd.
It seems that going to a colord_role() would be the way to go. There already is a colord_dbus_chat($1_t) in userdomain.if, so you could put those dbus rules plus the rules to address the fds together.
I agree the xdg_read_data_files() is somewhat broad, but it seems like xdg_data_t files aren't sensitive. Maybe that's just how it is on system? I don't feel strongly on this.
Signature · 1 line
Chris PeBenito
Re: [PATCH 05/10] Allow colord_t to read the color profile stored in ~/.local/share/icc/
Quoted 18 lines · Chris PeBenito
Quoted 8 lines · Dominick Grift
Quoted 7 lines · Dominick Grift
Quoted 5 lines · Laurent Bigonville
From: Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>
colord reads the color profiles files that are stored in ~/.local/share/icc/, The file descriptor to that file is passed over D-Bus so it needs to be inherited
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
This patch is cutting corners a little. It only takes
unconfined_tinto account and not the confined users (an alternative would be to call "userdom_use_all_users_fds(colord_t)" instead. Which is arguable too broad as well but closest you can get to "common users" without surgery. Secondlyxdg_read_data_files()is a little broad.
Also if this patch implies that whatever maintains XDG_DATA_DIR/icc is able to maintain generic xdg data files, which is arguable broad as well.The second and third argument are subject to how far you want to take things, and so I won't object if that is not addressed. The fd use issue, in my view, should be addressed for all login (common) users with colord access.
Actually, I take this review back. I am not sure how to best deal with this fd.
Quoted 7 lines
It seems that going to a
colord_role()would be the way to go. There already is acolord_dbus_chat($1_t)in userdomain.if, so you could put those dbus rules plus the rules to address the fds together.I agree the
xdg_read_data_files()is somewhat broad, but it seems likexdg_data_tfiles aren't sensitive. Maybe that's just how it is on system? I don't feel strongly on this.
Yes it depends i guess. The thing is that like /usr theres really all kinds of things below ~/.local, like bin, lib, doc etc (pip for example installs to ~/.local/{bin,lib}). So I would surely at least consider that beforehand
ls -aZ ~/.local/
wheel.id:wheel.role:users.generic_home_data.home_data_file:s0 . wheel.id:wheel.role:users.home_libraries.home_file:s0 lib
wheel.id:wheel.role:users.home_dir.file:s0 .. wheel.id:wheel.role:users.generic_home_data.home_data_file:s0 share
wheel.id:wheel.role:users.home_commands.home_file:s0 bin
There's also other gotchas, take for example your personal libvirt pool in ~/.local, this content may potentially also be need to be accessible by the qemu user.
I guess what i am saying is that not everything below /usr is always just "data"
I dont have enough experience with colord to give advice, looking at my policy there's also a colord --user instance, it seems also heavily integrated with gnome-settings-daemon.
I think this patch is probably alright as is for now (maybe its best to just ignore confined users in this stage) as for further partitioning ~/.local, i suppose we can alway's revisit these changes later as this only applies to ~/.local/share/icc anyway.
If this change is one of the few controversial changes that are needed to make gnome work on debian with unconfined, then i think it might be worth it to just accept this and make a note about it to address this properly when someone wants to work on the confined support for this aspect.
Quoted 3 lines
Signature · 2 lines
-- Chris PeBenito
Signature · 3 lines
Key fingerprint = 5F4D 3CDB D3F8 3652 FBD8 02D5 3B6C 5F1D 2C7B 6B02 https://sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x3B6C5F1D2C7B6B02 Dominick Grift
Re: [PATCH 05/10] Allow colord_t to read the color profile stored in ~/.local/share/icc/
Le 12/10/19 à 18:09, Dominick Grift a écrit :
Quoted 33 lines · Chris PeBenito
Quoted 14 lines · Dominick Grift
Quoted 13 lines · Dominick Grift
Quoted 12 lines · Laurent Bigonville
Quoted 5 lines
From: Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>
colord reads the color profiles files that are stored in ~/.local/share/icc/, The file descriptor to that file is passed over D-Bus so it needs to be inherited
This patch is cutting corners a little. It only takes
unconfined_tinto account and not the confined users (an alternative would be to call "userdom_use_all_users_fds(colord_t)" instead. Which is arguable too broad as well but closest you can get to "common users" without surgery. Secondlyxdg_read_data_files()is a little broad.
Also if this patch implies that whatever maintains XDG_DATA_DIR/icc is able to maintain generic xdg data files, which is arguable broad as well.The second and third argument are subject to how far you want to take things, and so I won't object if that is not addressed. The fd use issue, in my view, should be addressed for all login (common) users with colord access.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Actually, I take this review back. I am not sure how to best deal with this fd.
It seems that going to a
colord_role()would be the way to go. There already is acolord_dbus_chat($1_t)in userdomain.if, so you could put those dbus rules plus the rules to address the fds together.I agree the
xdg_read_data_files()is somewhat broad, but it seems likexdg_data_tfiles aren't sensitive. Maybe that's just how it is on system? I don't feel strongly on this.Yes it depends i guess. The thing is that like /usr theres really all kinds of things below ~/.local, like bin, lib, doc etc (pip for example installs to ~/.local/{bin,lib}). So I would surely at least consider that beforehand
ls -aZ ~/.local/
wheel.id:wheel.role:users.generic_home_data.home_data_file:s0 . wheel.id:wheel.role:users.home_libraries.home_file:s0 lib
wheel.id:wheel.role:users.home_dir.file:s0 .. wheel.id:wheel.role:users.generic_home_data.home_data_file:s0 share
wheel.id:wheel.role:users.home_commands.home_file:s0 binThere's also other gotchas, take for example your personal libvirt pool in ~/.local, this content may potentially also be need to be accessible by the qemu user.
Quoted 7 lines
I guess what i am saying is that not everything below /usr is always just "data"
I dont have enough experience with colord to give advice, looking at my policy there's also a colord --user instance, it seems also heavily integrated with gnome-settings-daemon.
I think this patch is probably alright as is for now (maybe its best to just ignore confined users in this stage) as for further partitioning ~/.local, i suppose we can alway's revisit these changes later as this only applies to ~/.local/share/icc anyway.
If this change is one of the few controversial changes that are needed to make gnome work on debian with unconfined, then i think it might be worth it to just accept this and make a note about it to address this properly when someone wants to work on the confined support for this aspect.
This patch is not "the last patch to make GNOME work", there are still other stuff to fix, so we might want to take some time to do that properly.
PATCH 6/10 Allow alsa_t to create alsa_runtime_t file as well
In reply to Laurent BigonvilleFrom: Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>
When alsactl is started as a daemon, it creates a pidfile (/run/alsactl.pid), that needs to be allowed
----time->Sun Oct 6 10:59:09 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570352349.743:45): avc: denied { write open } for pid=804 comm="alsactl" path="/run/alsactl.pid" dev="tmpfs" ino=25882 scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_run_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(1570352349.743:45): avc: denied { create } for pid=804 comm="alsactl" name="alsactl.pid" scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_run_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
----
time->Sun Oct 6 11:54:38 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570355678.226:657): avc: denied { open } for pid=9186 comm="alsactl" path="/run/alsactl.pid" dev="tmpfs" ino=25882 scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_run_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(1570355678.226:657): avc: denied { read } for pid=9186 comm="alsactl" name="alsactl.pid" dev="tmpfs" ino=25882 scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_run_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1----time->Sun Oct 6 11:54:38 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570355678.230:659): avc: denied { unlink } for pid=804 comm="alsactl" name="alsactl.pid" dev="tmpfs" ino=25882 scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_run_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
--- policy/modules/admin/alsa.fc | 1 + policy/modules/admin/alsa.te | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
policy/modules/admin/alsa.fc +1 -0
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ HOME_DIR/\.asoundrc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_home_t,s0) /etc/asound\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_etc_t,s0) /run/alsa(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_runtime_t,s0) +/run/alsactl.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_runtime_t,s0) /usr/bin/ainit -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/alsactl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_exec_t,s0)
policy/modules/admin/alsa.te +2 -1
@@ -58,8 +58,9 @@ allow alsa_t alsa_etc_t:file map; can_exec(alsa_t, alsa_exec_t) allow alsa_t alsa_runtime_t:dir manage_dir_perms; +allow alsa_t alsa_runtime_t:file manage_file_perms; allow alsa_t alsa_runtime_t:lnk_file manage_lnk_file_perms; -files_pid_filetrans(alsa_t, alsa_runtime_t, dir) +files_pid_filetrans(alsa_t, alsa_runtime_t, { dir file }) manage_dirs_pattern(alsa_t, alsa_tmp_t, alsa_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(alsa_t, alsa_tmp_t, alsa_tmp_t)
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
Re: [PATCH 06/10] Allow alsa_t to create alsa_runtime_t file as well
Quoted 28 lines · Laurent Bigonville
From: Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>
When alsactl is started as a daemon, it creates a pidfile (
/run/alsactl.pid), that needs to be allowed----
time->SunOct 6 10:59:09 2019type=AVC msg=audit(1570352349.743:45): avc: denied { write open } for pid=804 comm="alsactl" path="/run/alsactl.pid" dev="tmpfs" ino=25882 scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_run_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 type=AVC msg=audit(1570352349.743:45): avc: denied { create } for pid=804 comm="alsactl" name="alsactl.pid" scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_run_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 ---- time->Sun Oct 6 11:54:38 2019 type=AVC msg=audit(1570355678.226:657): avc: denied { open } for pid=9186 comm="alsactl" path="/run/alsactl.pid" dev="tmpfs" ino=25882 scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_run_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 type=AVC msg=audit(1570355678.226:657): avc: denied { read } for pid=9186 comm="alsactl" name="alsactl.pid" dev="tmpfs" ino=25882 scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_run_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1----
time->SunOct 6 11:54:38 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570355678.230:659): avc: denied { unlink } for pid=804 comm="alsactl" name="alsactl.pid" dev="tmpfs" ino=25882 scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_run_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1Signed-off-by Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>--- policy/modules/admin/alsa.fc | 1 + policy/modules/admin/alsa.te | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)policy/modules/admin/alsa.fc +0
-0
policy/modules/admin/alsa.fc HOME_DIR/\.asoundrc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_home_t,s0) · line 7
Quoted 4 lines
policy/modules/admin/alsa.fc +1
-0@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ HOME_DIR/\.asoundrc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_home_t,s0) /etc/asound\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_etc_t,s0) /run/alsa(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_runtime_t,s0) +/run/alsactl.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_runtime_t,s0)
Needs escaping ( \.pid )
Quoted 19 lines
policy/modules/admin/alsa.fc +0
-0/usr/bin/ainit -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/alsactl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_exec_t,s0)policy/modules/admin/alsa.te +2
-1@@ -58,8 +58,9 @@ allow alsa_t alsa_etc_t:file map; can_exec(alsa_t, alsa_exec_t) allow alsa_t alsa_runtime_t:dir manage_dir_perms; +allow alsa_t alsa_runtime_t:file manage_file_perms; allow alsa_t alsa_runtime_t:lnk_file manage_lnk_file_perms; -files_pid_filetrans(alsa_t, alsa_runtime_t, dir) +files_pid_filetrans(alsa_t, alsa_runtime_t, { dir file }) manage_dirs_pattern(alsa_t, alsa_tmp_t, alsa_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(alsa_t, alsa_tmp_t, alsa_tmp_t)
Signature · 1 line
Chris PeBenito
Re: [PATCH 06/10] Allow alsa_t to create alsa_runtime_t file as well
Le 12/10/19 à 17:52, Chris PeBenito a écrit :
Quoted 24 lines · Laurent Bigonville
Quoted 23 lines
From: Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>
When alsactl is started as a daemon, it creates a pidfile (
/run/alsactl.pid), that needs to be allowed----
time->SunOct 6 10:59:09 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570352349.743:45): avc: denied { write open } for pid=804 comm="alsactl" path="/run/alsactl.pid" dev="tmpfs" ino=25882 scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_run_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 type=AVC msg=audit(1570352349.743:45): avc: denied { create } for pid=804 comm="alsactl" name="alsactl.pid" scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_run_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
----time->SunOct 6 11:54:38 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570355678.226:657): avc: denied { open } for pid=9186 comm="alsactl" path="/run/alsactl.pid" dev="tmpfs" ino=25882 scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_run_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1 type=AVC msg=audit(1570355678.226:657): avc: denied { read } for pid=9186 comm="alsactl" name="alsactl.pid" dev="tmpfs" ino=25882 scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_run_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
----time->SunOct 6 11:54:38 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570355678.230:659): avc: denied { unlink } for pid=804 comm="alsactl" name="alsactl.pid" dev="tmpfs" ino=25882 scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_run_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1Signed-off-by Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>---
policy/modules/admin/alsa.fc | 1 +
policy/modules/admin/alsa.te | 3 ++-2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Quoted 12 lines
policy/modules/admin/alsa.fc HOME_DIR/\.asoundrc -- · line 8
Quoted 10 lines
policy/modules/admin/alsa.fc +1
-0@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ HOME_DIR/\.asoundrc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_home_t,s0) /etc/asound\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_etc_t,s0) /run/alsa(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_runtime_t,s0) +/run/alsactl.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_runtime_t,s0)Needs escaping ( \.pid )
It's fixed in the github merge request
Do you think that you could already merge all the patches of the series except the colord one?
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 18 lines
policy/modules/admin/alsa.fc +0
-0/usr/bin/ainit -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/alsactl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_exec_t,s0)policy/modules/admin/alsa.te +2
-1@@ -58,8 +58,9 @@ allow alsa_t alsa_etc_t:file map; can_exec(alsa_t, alsa_exec_t) allow alsa_t alsa_runtime_t:dir manage_dir_perms; +allow alsa_t alsa_runtime_t:file manage_file_perms; allow alsa_t alsa_runtime_t:lnk_file manage_lnk_file_perms; -files_pid_filetrans(alsa_t, alsa_runtime_t, dir) +files_pid_filetrans(alsa_t, alsa_runtime_t, { dir file }) manage_dirs_pattern(alsa_t, alsa_tmp_t, alsa_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(alsa_t, alsa_tmp_t, alsa_tmp_t)
PATCH 7/10 Allow alsa_t to set scheduling priority and send signal to itself
In reply to Laurent BigonvilleFrom: Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>
When alsactl is running as a daemon with systemd, it sets its process priority to be nice to other processes. When stopping the service, it's signaling to itself that it needs to exit.
----time->Sun Oct 6 11:59:59 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570355999.755:43): avc: denied { setsched } for pid=794 comm="alsactl" scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
----time->Sun Oct 6 11:59:59 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570355999.755:44): avc: denied { getsched } for pid=794 comm="alsactl" scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
----time->Sun Oct 6 12:07:26 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570356446.747:292): avc: denied { signal } for pid=3585 comm="alsactl" scontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:alsa_t:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
--- policy/modules/admin/alsa.te | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
policy/modules/admin/alsa.te +1 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ files_lock_file(alsa_var_lock_t) allow alsa_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search ipc_owner setgid setuid }; # kill : kill pulseaudio dontaudit alsa_t self:capability { kill sys_admin }; +allow alsa_t self:process { getsched setsched signal }; allow alsa_t self:sem create_sem_perms; allow alsa_t self:shm create_shm_perms; allow alsa_t self:unix_stream_socket { accept listen };
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
PATCH 8/10 Allow colord_t to read snmpd_var_lib_t files
In reply to Laurent BigonvilleFrom: Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>
colord-sane daemon indirectly links against libsnmp, the library tries to read files in /var/lib/snmp
----
type=AVC msg=audit(06/10/19 12:58:49.639:83) : avc: denied { getattr } for pid=873 comm=colord-sane path=/var/lib/snmp dev="dm-1" ino=399773 scontext=system_u:system_r:colord_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:snmpd_var_lib_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
----
type=AVC msg=audit(06/10/19 12:58:49.639:84) : avc: denied { search } for pid=873 comm=colord-sane name=snmp dev="dm-1" ino=399773 scontext=system_u:system_r:colord_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:snmpd_var_lib_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
----
type=AVC msg=audit(06/10/19 12:58:49.647:85) : avc: denied { search } for pid=873 comm=colord-sane name=snmp dev="dm-1" ino=399773 scontext=system_u:system_r:colord_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:snmpd_var_lib_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
----
type=AVC msg=audit(06/10/19 12:58:49.647:86) : avc: denied { getattr } for pid=873 comm=colord-sane path=/var/lib/snmp dev="dm-1" ino=399773 scontext=system_u:system_r:colord_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:snmpd_var_lib_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
--- policy/modules/services/colord.te | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
policy/modules/services/colord.te +4 -0
@@ -132,6 +132,10 @@ optional_policy(` policykit_read_reload(colord_t) ') +optional_policy(` + snmp_read_snmp_var_lib_files(colord_t) +') + optional_policy(` sysnet_exec_ifconfig(colord_t) ')
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
PATCH 9/10 Allow systemd_locale_t to talk to systemd notify socket
In reply to Laurent BigonvilleFrom: Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>
----time->Sun Oct 6 15:05:29 2019
type=AVC msg=audit(1570367129.524:673): avc: denied { write } for pid=9609 comm="systemd-localed" name="notify" dev="tmpfs" ino=18551 scontext=system_u:system_r:systemd_locale_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:init_runtime_t:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=1
--- policy/modules/system/systemd.te | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
policy/modules/system/systemd.te +2 -0
@@ -395,6 +395,8 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(systemd_locale_t) files_read_etc_files(systemd_locale_t) +init_write_runtime_socket(systemd_locale_t) + seutil_read_file_contexts(systemd_locale_t) systemd_log_parse_environment(systemd_locale_t)
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
PATCH 10/10 Allow vpnc to create and write its pid file in /run/NetworkManager
In reply to Laurent BigonvilleFrom: Laurent Bigonville <[email protected]>
The pid file is deleted by NetworkManager itself when the vpnc process exits
NetworkManager call vpnc the following way:
system_u:system_r:NetworkManager_t:s0 root 11692 0.0 0.0 166272 9472 ? Sl 12:58 0:00 /usr/lib/NetworkManager/nm-vpnc-service --bus-name org.freedesktop.NetworkManager.vpnc.Connection_21 system_u:system_r:vpnc_t:s0 root 11703 0.1 0.0 9900 4896 ? SL 12:58 0:00 /usr/sbin/vpnc --no-detach --pid-file /var/run/NetworkManager/nm-vpnc-fa482929-93ee-4c64-bfba-4ee31d70f35f.pid -
----
type=AVC msg=audit(07/10/19 10:38:35.131:931) : avc: denied { write } for pid=8653 comm=vpnc path=/run/NetworkManager/nm-vpnc-fa482929-93ee-4c64-bfba-4ee31d70f35f.pid dev="tmpfs" ino=112390 scontext=system_u:system_r:vpnc_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_runtime_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(07/10/19 10:38:35.131:931) : avc: denied { create } for pid=8653 comm=vpnc name=nm-vpnc-fa482929-93ee-4c64-bfba-4ee31d70f35f.pid scontext=system_u:system_r:vpnc_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_runtime_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(07/10/19 10:38:35.131:931) : avc: denied { add_name } for pid=8653 comm=vpnc name=nm-vpnc-fa482929-93ee-4c64-bfba-4ee31d70f35f.pid scontext=system_u:system_r:vpnc_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_runtime_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
type=AVC msg=audit(07/10/19 10:38:35.131:931) : avc: denied { write } for pid=8653 comm=vpnc name=NetworkManager dev="tmpfs" ino=30783 scontext=system_u:system_r:vpnc_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_runtime_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1This commit also adds the needed interfaces
--- policy/modules/admin/vpn.te | 2 ++ policy/modules/services/networkmanager.if | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
policy/modules/admin/vpn.te +2 -0
@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` networkmanager_attach_tun_iface(vpnc_t) + networkmanager_create_pid_files(vpnc_t) + networkmanager_rw_pid_files(vpnc_t) ') optional_policy(`
policy/modules/services/networkmanager.if +38 -0
@@ -253,6 +253,25 @@ interface(`networkmanager_append_log_files',` append_files_pattern($1, NetworkManager_log_t, NetworkManager_log_t) ') +######################################## +## <summary> +## Create networkmanager pid files. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +# +interface(`networkmanager_create_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type NetworkManager_runtime_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + create_files_pattern($1, NetworkManager_runtime_t, NetworkManager_runtime_t) +') + ######################################## ## <summary> ## Read networkmanager pid files.
@@ -273,6 +292,25 @@ interface(`networkmanager_read_pid_files',` allow $1 NetworkManager_runtime_t:file read_file_perms; ') +######################################## +## <summary> +## Read/Write networkmanager pid files. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +# +interface(`networkmanager_rw_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type NetworkManager_runtime_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + rw_files_pattern($1, NetworkManager_runtime_t, NetworkManager_runtime_t) +') + #################################### ## <summary> ## Connect to networkmanager over
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0