proc: fix inode uid/gid writeback race
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 proc: fix inode uid/gid writeback race
(euid, egid) pair is snapshotted correctly from task under RCU, but writeback to inode can be done in any order.
Fix by doing writeback under inode->i_lock where necessary (/proc/* , /proc/*/fd/* , /proc/*/map_files/* revalidate).
---
fs/proc/base.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/proc/fd.c | 2 +- fs/proc/internal.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/proc/base.c +23 -2
@@ -1743,6 +1743,25 @@ void task_dump_owner(struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode, *rgid = gid; } +/* use if inode is live */ +void task_dump_owner_to_inode (struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode, +struct inode *inode) +{ +kuid_t uid; +kgid_t gid; + +task_dump_owner (task, mode, &uid, &gid); +/* +* There is no atomic "change all credentials at once" system call, +* guaranteeing more than _some_ snapshot from "struct cred" ends up +* in inode is not possible. +*/ +spin_lock (&inode->i_lock); + inode->i_uid = uid; + inode->i_gid = gid; +spin_unlock (&inode->i_lock); +} +struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode (struct super_block * sb,struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode) {
@@ -1769,6 +1788,7 @@ struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb,if (!ei->pid) goto out_unlock; +/* fresh inode -- no races */ task_dump_owner (task,0 , &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid);security_task_to_inode (task, inode);
@@ -1802,6 +1822,7 @@ int pid_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,*/ return -ENOENT ; } +/* "struct kstat" is thread local, atomic snapshot is enough */ task_dump_owner (task, inode->i_mode, &stat->uid, &stat->gid); }rcu_read_unlock ();
@@ -1815,7 +1836,7 @@ int pid_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,*/ void pid_update_inode (struct task_struct *task,struct inode *inode) { -task_dump_owner (task, inode->i_mode, &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid); +task_dump_owner_to_inode (task, inode->i_mode, inode); inode->i_mode &= ~(S_ISUID |S_ISGID );security_task_to_inode (task, inode);
@@ -1990,7 +2011,7 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)mmput (mm);if (exact_vma_exists) { -task_dump_owner (task,0 , &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid); +task_dump_owner_to_inode (task,0 , inode);security_task_to_inode (task, inode); status =1 ;
fs/proc/fd.c +1 -1
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static bool tid_fd_mode(struct task_struct *task, unsigned fd, fmode_t *mode)static void tid_fd_update_inode (struct task_struct *task,struct inode *inode,fmode_t f_mode) { -task_dump_owner (task,0 , &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid); +task_dump_owner_to_inode (task,0 , inode);if (S_ISLNK (inode->i_mode)) {unsigned i_mode =S_IFLNK ;
fs/proc/internal.h +2 -0
@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ static inline struct task_struct *get_proc_task(const struct inode *inode)void task_dump_owner (struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode,kuid_t *ruid,kgid_t *rgid); +void task_dump_owner_to_inode (struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode, +struct inode *inode);unsigned name_to_int (const struct qstr *qstr);/*
Quoted 10 lines · Alexey Dobriyan
(euid, egid) pair is snapshotted correctly from task under RCU, but writeback to inode can be done in any order.
Fix by doing writeback under
inode->i_lockwhere necessary (/proc/*,/proc/*/fd/*,/proc/*/map_files/*revalidate).Reported-by [email protected]Signed-off-by Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>---
Thanks!
This certainly fixes the problem of inconsistent uid/gid pair due to racing writebacks, as well as the data-race. If that is the only purpose of this patch, then from what I see this is fine:
However, there is probably still a more fundamental problem as outlined below.
Quoted 18 lines
fs/proc/base.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/proc/fd.c | 2 +- fs/proc/internal.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)fs/proc/base.c +7
-0@@ -1743,6 +1743,25 @@ void task_dump_owner(struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode, *rgid = gid; } +/* use if inode is live */ +void task_dump_owner_to_inode (struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode, +struct inode *inode) +{ +kuid_t uid; +kgid_t gid; +
fs/proc/base.c void task_dump_owner(struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode, · line 1762
Quoted 10 lines
fs/proc/base.c +10
-0+task_dump_owner (task, mode, &uid, &gid); +/* +* There is no atomic "change all credentials at once" system call, +* guaranteeing more than _some_ snapshot from "struct cred" ends up +* in inode is not possible. +*/ +spin_lock (&inode->i_lock); + inode->i_uid = uid; + inode->i_gid = gid; +spin_unlock (&inode->i_lock);
2 tasks can still race here, and the inconsistent scenario I outlined in
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/[email protected]/
could still happen I think (although extremely unlikely). Mainly, causality may still be violated -- but I may be wrong as I don't know the rest of the code (so please be critical of my suggestion).
The problem is that if 2 threads race here, one has snapshotted old uid/gid, and the other the new uid/gid. Then it is still possible for the old uid/gid to be written back after new uid/gid, which would result in this bad scenario:
=== TASK 1 ===
| seteuid(1000);
| seteuid(0);
| stat("/proc/<pid-of-task-1>", &fstat);
| assert(fstat.st_uid == 0); // fails=== TASK 2 ===
| stat("/proc/<pid-of-task-1>", ...);
AFAIK it's not something that can easily be fixed without some timestamp on the uid/gid pair (timestamp updated after setuid/seteuid etc) obtained in the RCU reader critical section. Then in this critical section, uid/gid should only be written if the current pair in inode is older according to snapshot timestamp.
Quoted 61 lines
fs/proc/base.c +6
-2+} +struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode (struct super_block * sb,struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode) {@@ -1769,6 +1788,7 @@ struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb,if (!ei->pid) goto out_unlock; +/* fresh inode -- no races */ task_dump_owner (task,0 , &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid);security_task_to_inode (task, inode);@@ -1802,6 +1822,7 @@ int pid_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,*/ return -ENOENT ; } +/* "struct kstat" is thread local, atomic snapshot is enough */ task_dump_owner (task, inode->i_mode, &stat->uid, &stat->gid); }rcu_read_unlock ();@@ -1815,7 +1836,7 @@ int pid_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,*/ void pid_update_inode (struct task_struct *task,struct inode *inode) { -task_dump_owner (task, inode->i_mode, &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid); +task_dump_owner_to_inode (task, inode->i_mode, inode); inode->i_mode &= ~(S_ISUID |S_ISGID );security_task_to_inode (task, inode);@@ -1990,7 +2011,7 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)mmput (mm);if (exact_vma_exists) { -task_dump_owner (task,0 , &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid); +task_dump_owner_to_inode (task,0 , inode);security_task_to_inode (task, inode); status =1 ;fs/proc/fd.c +1
-1@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static bool tid_fd_mode(struct task_struct *task, unsigned fd, fmode_t *mode)static void tid_fd_update_inode (struct task_struct *task,struct inode *inode,fmode_t f_mode) { -task_dump_owner (task,0 , &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid); +task_dump_owner_to_inode (task,0 , inode);if (S_ISLNK (inode->i_mode)) {unsigned i_mode =S_IFLNK ;fs/proc/internal.h +2
-0@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ static inline struct task_struct *get_proc_task(const struct inode *inode)void task_dump_owner (struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode,kuid_t *ruid,kgid_t *rgid); +void task_dump_owner_to_inode (struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode, +struct inode *inode);unsigned name_to_int (const struct qstr *qstr);/*
Quoted 68 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 10 lines · Alexey Dobriyan
(euid, egid) pair is snapshotted correctly from task under RCU, but writeback to inode can be done in any order.
Fix by doing writeback under
inode->i_lockwhere necessary (/proc/*,/proc/*/fd/*,/proc/*/map_files/*revalidate).Reported-by [email protected]Signed-off-by Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>---
Thanks!
This certainly fixes the problem of inconsistent uid/gid pair due to racing writebacks, as well as the data-race. If that is the only purpose of this patch, then from what I see this is fine:
Acked-by Marco Elver <[email protected]>However, there is probably still a more fundamental problem as outlined below.
Quoted 18 lines
fs/proc/base.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/proc/fd.c | 2 +- fs/proc/internal.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)fs/proc/base.c +7
-0@@ -1743,6 +1743,25 @@ void task_dump_owner(struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode, *rgid = gid; } +/* use if inode is live */ +void task_dump_owner_to_inode (struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode, +struct inode *inode) +{ +kuid_t uid; +kgid_t gid; +fs/proc/base.c void task_dump_owner(struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode, · line 1762
Quoted 10 lines
fs/proc/base.c +10
-0+task_dump_owner (task, mode, &uid, &gid); +/* +* There is no atomic "change all credentials at once" system call, +* guaranteeing more than _some_ snapshot from "struct cred" ends up +* in inode is not possible. +*/ +spin_lock (&inode->i_lock); + inode->i_uid = uid; + inode->i_gid = gid; +spin_unlock (&inode->i_lock);2 tasks can still race here, and the inconsistent scenario I outlined in
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/[email protected]/
could still happen I think (although extremely unlikely). Mainly, causality may still be violated -- but I may be wrong as I don't know the rest of the code (so please be critical of my suggestion).The problem is that if 2 threads race here, one has snapshotted old uid/gid, and the other the new uid/gid. Then it is still possible for the old uid/gid to be written back after new uid/gid, which would result in this bad scenario:
=== TASK 1 ===
| seteuid(1000); | seteuid(0); | stat("/proc/<pid-of-task-1>", &fstat); | assert(fstat.st_uid == 0); // fails
Quoted 8 lines
=== TASK 2 ===
|stat("/proc/<pid-of-task-1>", ...);AFAIK it's not something that can easily be fixed without some timestamp on the uid/gid pair (timestamp updated after setuid/seteuid etc) obtained in the RCU reader critical section. Then in this critical section, uid/gid should only be written if the current pair in inode is older according to snapshot timestamp.
Note that timestamp is probably wrong here, but rather some kind of sequence number would be needed.
Quoted 61 lines
Quoted 61 lines
fs/proc/base.c +6
-2+} +struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode (struct super_block * sb,struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode) {@@ -1769,6 +1788,7 @@ struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb,if (!ei->pid) goto out_unlock; +/* fresh inode -- no races */ task_dump_owner (task,0 , &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid);security_task_to_inode (task, inode);@@ -1802,6 +1822,7 @@ int pid_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,*/ return -ENOENT ; } +/* "struct kstat" is thread local, atomic snapshot is enough */ task_dump_owner (task, inode->i_mode, &stat->uid, &stat->gid); }rcu_read_unlock ();@@ -1815,7 +1836,7 @@ int pid_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,*/ void pid_update_inode (struct task_struct *task,struct inode *inode) { -task_dump_owner (task, inode->i_mode, &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid); +task_dump_owner_to_inode (task, inode->i_mode, inode); inode->i_mode &= ~(S_ISUID |S_ISGID );security_task_to_inode (task, inode);@@ -1990,7 +2011,7 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)mmput (mm);if (exact_vma_exists) { -task_dump_owner (task,0 , &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid); +task_dump_owner_to_inode (task,0 , inode);security_task_to_inode (task, inode); status =1 ;fs/proc/fd.c +1
-1@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static bool tid_fd_mode(struct task_struct *task, unsigned fd, fmode_t *mode)static void tid_fd_update_inode (struct task_struct *task,struct inode *inode,fmode_t f_mode) { -task_dump_owner (task,0 , &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid); +task_dump_owner_to_inode (task,0 , inode);if (S_ISLNK (inode->i_mode)) {unsigned i_mode =S_IFLNK ;fs/proc/internal.h +2
-0@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ static inline struct task_struct *get_proc_task(const struct inode *inode)void task_dump_owner (struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode,kuid_t *ruid,kgid_t *rgid); +void task_dump_owner_to_inode (struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode, +struct inode *inode);unsigned name_to_int (const struct qstr *qstr);/*
Quoted 67 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 10 lines · Alexey Dobriyan
(euid, egid) pair is snapshotted correctly from task under RCU, but writeback to inode can be done in any order.
Fix by doing writeback under
inode->i_lockwhere necessary (/proc/*,/proc/*/fd/*,/proc/*/map_files/*revalidate).Reported-by [email protected]Signed-off-by Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>---
Thanks!
This certainly fixes the problem of inconsistent uid/gid pair due to racing writebacks, as well as the data-race. If that is the only purpose of this patch, then from what I see this is fine:
Acked-by Marco Elver <[email protected]>However, there is probably still a more fundamental problem as outlined below.
Quoted 18 lines
fs/proc/base.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/proc/fd.c | 2 +- fs/proc/internal.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)fs/proc/base.c +7
-0@@ -1743,6 +1743,25 @@ void task_dump_owner(struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode, *rgid = gid; } +/* use if inode is live */ +void task_dump_owner_to_inode (struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode, +struct inode *inode) +{ +kuid_t uid; +kgid_t gid; +fs/proc/base.c void task_dump_owner(struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode, · line 1762
Quoted 10 lines
fs/proc/base.c +10
-0+task_dump_owner (task, mode, &uid, &gid); +/* +* There is no atomic "change all credentials at once" system call, +* guaranteeing more than _some_ snapshot from "struct cred" ends up +* in inode is not possible. +*/ +spin_lock (&inode->i_lock); + inode->i_uid = uid; + inode->i_gid = gid; +spin_unlock (&inode->i_lock);2 tasks can still race here, and the inconsistent scenario I outlined in
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/[email protected]/
could still happen I think (although extremely unlikely). Mainly, causality may still be violated -- but I may be wrong as I don't know the rest of the code (so please be critical of my suggestion).The problem is that if 2 threads race here, one has snapshotted old uid/gid, and the other the new uid/gid. Then it is still possible for the old uid/gid to be written back after new uid/gid, which would result in this bad scenario:
=== TASK 1 ===
| seteuid(1000); | seteuid(0); | stat("/proc/<pid-of-task-1>", &fstat); | assert(fstat.st_uid == 0); // fails
Quoted 8 lines
=== TASK 2 ===
|stat("/proc/<pid-of-task-1>", ...);AFAIK it's not something that can easily be fixed without some timestamp on the uid/gid pair (timestamp updated after setuid/seteuid etc) obtained in the RCU reader critical section. Then in this critical section, uid/gid should only be written if the current pair in inode is older according to snapshot timestamp.
This probably requires bloating "struct cred" with generation number. I'm not sure what to do other than cc our credential overlords.
Quoted 61 lines
Quoted 61 lines
fs/proc/base.c +6
-2+} +struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode (struct super_block * sb,struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode) {@@ -1769,6 +1788,7 @@ struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb,if (!ei->pid) goto out_unlock; +/* fresh inode -- no races */ task_dump_owner (task,0 , &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid);security_task_to_inode (task, inode);@@ -1802,6 +1822,7 @@ int pid_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,*/ return -ENOENT ; } +/* "struct kstat" is thread local, atomic snapshot is enough */ task_dump_owner (task, inode->i_mode, &stat->uid, &stat->gid); }rcu_read_unlock ();@@ -1815,7 +1836,7 @@ int pid_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,*/ void pid_update_inode (struct task_struct *task,struct inode *inode) { -task_dump_owner (task, inode->i_mode, &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid); +task_dump_owner_to_inode (task, inode->i_mode, inode); inode->i_mode &= ~(S_ISUID |S_ISGID );security_task_to_inode (task, inode);@@ -1990,7 +2011,7 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)mmput (mm);if (exact_vma_exists) { -task_dump_owner (task,0 , &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid); +task_dump_owner_to_inode (task,0 , inode);security_task_to_inode (task, inode); status =1 ;fs/proc/fd.c +1
-1@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static bool tid_fd_mode(struct task_struct *task, unsigned fd, fmode_t *mode)static void tid_fd_update_inode (struct task_struct *task,struct inode *inode,fmode_t f_mode) { -task_dump_owner (task,0 , &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid); +task_dump_owner_to_inode (task,0 , inode);if (S_ISLNK (inode->i_mode)) {unsigned i_mode =S_IFLNK ;fs/proc/internal.h +2
-0@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ static inline struct task_struct *get_proc_task(const struct inode *inode)void task_dump_owner (struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode,kuid_t *ruid,kgid_t *rgid); +void task_dump_owner_to_inode (struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode, +struct inode *inode);unsigned name_to_int (const struct qstr *qstr);/*
Quoted 72 lines · Alexey Dobriyan
Quoted 70 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 10 lines · Alexey Dobriyan
(euid, egid) pair is snapshotted correctly from task under RCU, but writeback to inode can be done in any order.
Fix by doing writeback under
inode->i_lockwhere necessary (/proc/*,/proc/*/fd/*,/proc/*/map_files/*revalidate).Reported-by [email protected]Signed-off-by Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>---
Thanks!
This certainly fixes the problem of inconsistent uid/gid pair due to racing writebacks, as well as the data-race. If that is the only purpose of this patch, then from what I see this is fine:
Acked-by Marco Elver <[email protected]>However, there is probably still a more fundamental problem as outlined below.
Quoted 18 lines
fs/proc/base.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/proc/fd.c | 2 +- fs/proc/internal.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)fs/proc/base.c +7
-0@@ -1743,6 +1743,25 @@ void task_dump_owner(struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode, *rgid = gid; } +/* use if inode is live */ +void task_dump_owner_to_inode (struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode, +struct inode *inode) +{ +kuid_t uid; +kgid_t gid; +fs/proc/base.c void task_dump_owner(struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode, · line 1762
Quoted 10 lines
fs/proc/base.c +10
-0+task_dump_owner (task, mode, &uid, &gid); +/* +* There is no atomic "change all credentials at once" system call, +* guaranteeing more than _some_ snapshot from "struct cred" ends up +* in inode is not possible. +*/ +spin_lock (&inode->i_lock); + inode->i_uid = uid; + inode->i_gid = gid; +spin_unlock (&inode->i_lock);2 tasks can still race here, and the inconsistent scenario I outlined in
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/[email protected]/
could still happen I think (although extremely unlikely). Mainly, causality may still be violated -- but I may be wrong as I don't know the rest of the code (so please be critical of my suggestion).The problem is that if 2 threads race here, one has snapshotted old uid/gid, and the other the new uid/gid. Then it is still possible for the old uid/gid to be written back after new uid/gid, which would result in this bad scenario:
=== TASK 1 ===
| seteuid(1000); | seteuid(0); | stat("/proc/<pid-of-task-1>", &fstat); | assert(fstat.st_uid == 0); // fails=== TASK 2 ===
|stat("/proc/<pid-of-task-1>", ...);
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
AFAIK it's not something that can easily be fixed without some timestamp on the uid/gid pair (timestamp updated after setuid/seteuid etc) obtained in the RCU reader critical section. Then in this critical section, uid/gid should only be written if the current pair in inode is older according to snapshot timestamp.
This probably requires bloating "struct cred" with generation number. I'm not sure what to do other than cc our credential overlords.
Just in case, this bug can lead to bad observable behavior, e.g. bypassing LSM checks (apparmor) and this patch does not fix the underlying problem. For details see:
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/syzkaller-bugs/mzwiXt4ml68/GuAUQrWtBQAJ
Quoted 61 lines
Quoted 61 lines
Quoted 61 lines
fs/proc/base.c +6
-2+} +struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode (struct super_block * sb,struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode) {@@ -1769,6 +1788,7 @@ struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode(struct super_block * sb,if (!ei->pid) goto out_unlock; +/* fresh inode -- no races */ task_dump_owner (task,0 , &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid);security_task_to_inode (task, inode);@@ -1802,6 +1822,7 @@ int pid_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,*/ return -ENOENT ; } +/* "struct kstat" is thread local, atomic snapshot is enough */ task_dump_owner (task, inode->i_mode, &stat->uid, &stat->gid); }rcu_read_unlock ();@@ -1815,7 +1836,7 @@ int pid_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,*/ void pid_update_inode (struct task_struct *task,struct inode *inode) { -task_dump_owner (task, inode->i_mode, &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid); +task_dump_owner_to_inode (task, inode->i_mode, inode); inode->i_mode &= ~(S_ISUID |S_ISGID );security_task_to_inode (task, inode);@@ -1990,7 +2011,7 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)mmput (mm);if (exact_vma_exists) { -task_dump_owner (task,0 , &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid); +task_dump_owner_to_inode (task,0 , inode);security_task_to_inode (task, inode); status =1 ;fs/proc/fd.c +1
-1@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static bool tid_fd_mode(struct task_struct *task, unsigned fd, fmode_t *mode)static void tid_fd_update_inode (struct task_struct *task,struct inode *inode,fmode_t f_mode) { -task_dump_owner (task,0 , &inode->i_uid, &inode->i_gid); +task_dump_owner_to_inode (task,0 , inode);if (S_ISLNK (inode->i_mode)) {unsigned i_mode =S_IFLNK ;fs/proc/internal.h +2
-0@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ static inline struct task_struct *get_proc_task(const struct inode *inode)void task_dump_owner (struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode,kuid_t *ruid,kgid_t *rgid); +void task_dump_owner_to_inode (struct task_struct *task,umode_t mode, +struct inode *inode);unsigned name_to_int (const struct qstr *qstr);/*