powerpc: expose secure variables to the kernel and userspace
Subsystems (7)
v5 cover powerpc: expose secure variables to the kernel and userspace
In order to verify the OS kernel on PowerNV systems, secure boot requires X.509 certificates trusted by the platform. These are stored in secure variables controlled by OPAL, called OPAL secure variables. In order to enable users to manage the keys, the secure variables need to be exposed to userspace.
OPAL provides the runtime services for the kernel to be able to access the secure variables[1]. This patchset defines the kernel interface for the OPAL APIs. These APIs are used by the hooks, which load these variables to the keyring and expose them to the userspace for reading/writing.
The previous version[2] of the patchset added support only for the sysfs interface. This patch adds two more patches that involves loading of the firmware trusted keys to the kernel keyring.
Overall, this patchset adds the following support:
* expose secure variables to the kernel via OPAL Runtime API interface
* expose secure variables to the userspace via kernel sysfs interface
* load kernel verification and revocation keys to .platform and .blacklist keyring respectively.
The secure variables can be read/written using simple linux utilities cat/hexdump.
For example:
Path to the secure variables is:/sys/firmware/secvar/vars
Each secure variable is listed as directory.
$ ls -l total 0 drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 0 Aug 20 21:20 db drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 0 Aug 20 21:20 KEK drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 0 Aug 20 21:20 PK
The attributes of each of the secure variables are(for example: PK):
[db]$ ls -l
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root 4096 Oct 1 15:10 data -r--r--r--. 1 root root 65536 Oct 1 15:10 size --w-------. 1 root root 4096 Oct 1 15:12 update
The "data" is used to read the existing variable value using hexdump. The data is stored in ESL format.
The "update" is used to write a new value using cat. The update is to be submitted as AUTH file.
[1] Depends on skiboot OPAL API changes which removes metadata from the API. https://lists.ozlabs.org/pipermail/skiboot/2019-September/015203.html.
[2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/6/13/1644
Changelog:
v5:
* rebased to v5.4-rc3
* includes Oliver's feedbacks
* changed OPAL API as platform driver
* sysfs are made default enabled and dependent on PPC_SECURE_BOOT
* fixed code specific changes in both OPAL API and sysfs
* reading size of the "data" and "update" file from device-tree.
* fixed sysfs documentation to also reflect the data and update file size interpretation
* This patchset is no more dependent on ima-arch/blacklist patchset
v4:
* rebased to v5.4-rc1
* uses __BIN_ATTR_WO macro to create binary attribute as suggested by Greg
* removed email id from the file header
* renamed argument keysize to keybufsize in get_next() function
* updated default binary file sizes to 0, as firmware handles checking against the maximum size
* fixed minor formatting issues in Patch 4/4
* added Greg's and Mimi's Reviewed-by and Ack-by
v3:
* includes Greg's feedbacks:
* fixes in Patch 2/4
* updates the Documentation.
* fixes code feedbacks
* adds SYSFS Kconfig dependency for SECVAR_SYSFS
* fixes mixed tabs and spaces
* removes "name" attribute for each of the variable name based directories
* fixes using __ATTR_RO() and __BIN_ATTR_RO() and statics and const
* fixes the racing issue by using kobj_type default groups. Also, fixes the kobject leakage.
* removes extra print messages
* updates patch description for Patch 3/4
* removes file name from Patch 4/4 file header comment and removed def_bool y from the LOAD_PPC_KEYS Kconfig
* includes Oliver's feedbacks:
* fixes Patch 1/2
* moves OPAL API wrappers after opal_nx_proc_init(), fixed the naming, types and removed extern.
* fixes spaces
* renames get_variable() to get(), get_next_variable() to get_next() and set_variable() to set()
* removed get_secvar_ops() and defined secvar_ops as global
* fixes consts and statics
* removes generic secvar_init() and defined platform specific opal_secar_init()
* updates opal_secvar_supported() to check for secvar support even before checking the OPAL APIs support and also fixed the error codes.
* addes function that converts OPAL return codes to linux errno
* moves secvar check support in the opal_secvar_init() and defined its prototype in opal.h
* fixes Patch 2/2
* fixes static/const
* defines macro for max name size
* replaces OPAL error codes with linux errno and also updated error handling
* moves secvar support check before creating sysfs kobjects in secvar_sysfs_init()
* fixes spaces
v2:
* removes complete efi-sms from the sysfs implementation and is simplified
* includes Greg's and Oliver's feedbacks:
* adds sysfs documentation
* moves sysfs code to arch/powerpc
* other code related feedbacks.
* adds two new patches to load keys to .platform and .blacklist keyring. These patches are added to this series as they are also dependent on OPAL APIs.
Nayna Jain (4):
powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to access secure variable
powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file
powerpc: load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyring
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar | 39 +++ arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 12 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h | 5 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h | 7 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h | 35 +++ arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 3 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c | 16 ++ arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c | 228 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile | 2 +- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c | 3 + arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c | 140 +++++++++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c | 3 + security/integrity/Kconfig | 8 + security/integrity/Makefile | 7 +- .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 80 ++++++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 32 +++ .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 86 +++++++ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 67 +---- 18 files changed, 702 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v5 1/4 powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to access secure variable
The X.509 certificates trusted by the platform and required to secure boot the OS kernel are wrapped in secure variables, which are controlled by OPAL.
This patch adds firmware/kernel interface to read and write OPAL secure variables based on the unique key.
This support can be enabled using CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h | 5 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h | 7 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h | 35 +++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c | 16 +++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile | 2 +- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c | 3 + arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c | 140 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c | 3 + 9 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h +4 -1
@@ -211,7 +211,10 @@#define OPAL_MPIPL_UPDATE 173#define OPAL_MPIPL_REGISTER_TAG 174#define OPAL_MPIPL_QUERY_TAG 175 -#define OPAL_LAST 175 +#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET 176 +#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET_NEXT 177 +#define OPAL_SECVAR_ENQUEUE_UPDATE 178 +#define OPAL_LAST 178#define QUIESCE_HOLD 1/* Spin all calls at entry */ #define QUIESCE_REJECT 2/* Fail all calls with OPAL_BUSY */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h +7 -0
@@ -298,6 +298,13 @@ int opal_sensor_group_clear(u32 group_hndl, int token);int opal_sensor_group_enable (u32 group_hndl,int token,bool enable);int opal_nx_coproc_init (uint32_t chip_id,uint32_t ct); +int opal_secvar_get (const char *key,uint64_t key_len,u8 *data, +uint64_t *data_size); +int opal_secvar_get_next (const char *key,uint64_t *key_len, +uint64_t key_buf_size); +int opal_secvar_enqueue_update (const char *key,uint64_t key_len,u8 *data, +uint64_t data_size); +s64 opal_mpipl_update (enum opal_mpipl_ops op,u64 src,u64 dest,u64 size);s64 opal_mpipl_register_tag (enum opal_mpipl_tags tag,u64 addr);s64 opal_mpipl_query_tag (enum opal_mpipl_tags tag,u64 *addr);
arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h new file +35 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* +* Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation +* Author: Nayna Jain +* +* PowerPC secure variable operations. +*/ +#ifndef SECVAR_OPS_H +#define SECVAR_OPS_H + +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> + +extern const struct secvar_operations *secvar_ops; + +struct secvar_operations { +int (*get)(const char *key,uint64_t key_len,u8 *data, +uint64_t *data_size); +int (*get_next)(const char *key,uint64_t *key_len, +uint64_t keybufsize); +int (*set)(const char *key,uint64_t key_len,u8 *data, +uint64_t data_size); +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT + +extern void set_secvar_ops (const struct secvar_operations *ops); + +#else + +static inline void set_secvar_ops (const struct secvar_operations *ops) { } + +#endif + +#endif
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ ifneq ($(CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV)$(CONFIG_PPC_SVM),) obj-y += ucall.o endif -obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o ima_arch.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o ima_arch.o secvar-ops.o # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c new file +16 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* +* Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation +* Author: Nayna Jain +* +* This file initializes secvar operations for PowerPC Secureboot +*/ + +#include <asm/secvar.h> + +const struct secvar_operations *secvar_ops; + +void set_secvar_ops (const struct secvar_operations *ops) +{ + secvar_ops = ops; +}
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-y += idle.o opal-rtc.o opal-nvram.o opal-lpc.o opal-flash.o obj-y += rng.o opal-elog.o opal-dump.o opal-sysparam.o opal-sensor.o obj-y += opal-msglog.o opal-hmi.o opal-power.o opal-irqchip.o obj-y += opal-kmsg.o opal-powercap.o opal-psr.o opal-sensor-groups.o -obj-y += ultravisor.o +obj-y += ultravisor.o opal-secvar.o obj-$(CONFIG_SMP) += smp.o subcore.o subcore-asm.o obj-$(CONFIG_FA_DUMP) += opal-fadump.o
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c +3 -0
@@ -290,3 +290,6 @@ OPAL_CALL(opal_nx_coproc_init, OPAL_NX_COPROC_INIT);OPAL_CALL (opal_mpipl_update,OPAL_MPIPL_UPDATE );OPAL_CALL (opal_mpipl_register_tag,OPAL_MPIPL_REGISTER_TAG );OPAL_CALL (opal_mpipl_query_tag,OPAL_MPIPL_QUERY_TAG ); +OPAL_CALL (opal_secvar_get,OPAL_SECVAR_GET ); +OPAL_CALL (opal_secvar_get_next,OPAL_SECVAR_GET_NEXT ); +OPAL_CALL (opal_secvar_enqueue_update,OPAL_SECVAR_ENQUEUE_UPDATE );
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c new file +140 -0
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arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c +3 -0
@@ -1002,6 +1002,9 @@ static int __init opal_init(void)/* Initialise OPAL Power control interface */ opal_power_control_init (); +/* Initialize OPAL secure variables */ +opal_pdev_init ("ibm,secvar-v1" ); +return 0 ; }machine_subsys_initcall (powernv, opal_init);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to access secure variable
Quoted 6 lines · Nayna Jain
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h +0
-0
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h line 217
Quoted 8 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h +4
-1@@ -211,7 +211,10 @@#define OPAL_MPIPL_UPDATE 173#define OPAL_MPIPL_REGISTER_TAG 174#define OPAL_MPIPL_QUERY_TAG 175 -#define OPAL_LAST 175 +#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET 176 +#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET_NEXT 177 +#define OPAL_SECVAR_ENQUEUE_UPDATE 178 +#define OPAL_LAST 178
Adjust indentation in the above #defines.
Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h +0
-0
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h int opal_sensor_group_clear(u32 group_hndl, int token); · line 307
Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h +7
-0@@ -298,6 +298,13 @@ int opal_sensor_group_clear(u32 group_hndl, int token);int opal_sensor_group_enable (u32 group_hndl,int token,bool enable);int opal_nx_coproc_init (uint32_t chip_id,uint32_t ct); +int opal_secvar_get (const char *key,uint64_t key_len,u8 *data, +uint64_t *data_size); +int opal_secvar_get_next (const char *key,uint64_t *key_len, +uint64_t key_buf_size); +int opal_secvar_enqueue_update (const char *key,uint64_t key_len,u8 *data, +uint64_t data_size); +
Fix alignment of the parameters in the 2nd line. Same comment in a few other files in this change set.
Quoted 4 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h +4
-0+ +static int opal_get_variable (const char *key,uint64_t ksize, +u8 *data,uint64_t *dsize) +{
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h int opal_sensor_group_clear(u32 group_hndl, int token);
Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h +10
-0+int rc; + +if (!key || !dsize) +return -EINVAL ; + + *dsize =cpu_to_be64 (*dsize); + + rc =opal_secvar_get (key, ksize, data, dsize); + + *dsize =be64_to_cpu (*dsize);
Is it ok to update dsize even if return code (rc) from opal_secvar_get is an error? Just wanted to confirm.
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h
Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h +6
-0+ + *keylen =cpu_to_be64 (*keylen); + + rc =opal_secvar_get_next (key, keylen, keybufsize); + + *keylen =be64_to_cpu (*keylen);
Same comment as above.
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h
Quoted 2 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h +2
-0+ +set_secvar_ops (&opal_secvar_ops);
Does this set function return status?
Quoted 3 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h +3
-0+ +return 0 ; +}
PATCH v5 2/4 powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs
In reply to Nayna JainPowerNV secure variables, which store the keys used for OS kernel verification, are managed by the firmware. These secure variables need to be accessed by the userspace for addition/deletion of the certificates.
This patch adds the sysfs interface to expose secure variables for PowerNV secureboot. The users shall use this interface for manipulating the keys stored in the secure variables.
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar | 39 +++++ arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 11 ++ arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c | 228 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 279 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar new file +39 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +What: /sys/firmware/secvar +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain <[email protected]> +Description: This directory is created if the POWER firmware supports OS + secureboot, thereby secure variables. It exposes interface + for reading/writing the secure variables + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain <[email protected]> +Description: This directory lists all the secure variables that are supported + by the firmware. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable name> +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain <[email protected]> +Description: Each secure variable is represented as a directory named as + <variable_name>. The variable name is unique and is in ASCII + representation. The data and size can be determined by reading + their respective attribute files. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable_name>/size +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain <[email protected]> +Description: An integer representation of the size of the content of the + variable. In other words, it represents the size of the data. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable_name>/data +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain h<[email protected]> +Description: A read-only file containing the value of the variable. The size + of the file represents the maximum size of the variable data. + +What: /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable_name>/update +Date: August 2019 +Contact: Nayna Jain <[email protected]> +Description: A write-only file that is used to submit the new value for the + variable. The size of the file represents the maximum size of + the variable data that can be written.
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +11 -0
@@ -945,6 +945,17 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT to enable OS secure boot on systems that have firmware support for it. If in doubt say N. +config PPC_SECVAR_SYSFS + tristate "Enable sysfs interface for POWER secure variables" + default y + depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT + depends on SYSFS + help + POWER secure variables are managed and controlled by firmware. + These variables are exposed to userspace via sysfs to enable + read/write operations on these variables. Say Y if you have + secure boot enabled and want to expose variables to userspace. + endmenu config ISA_DMA_API
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ obj-y += ucall.o endif obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o ima_arch.o secvar-ops.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECVAR_SYSFS) += secvar-sysfs.o # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +228 -0
228 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v5 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs
Quoted 6 lines · Nayna Jain
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +6
-0+static ssize_t size_show (struct kobject *kobj,struct kobj_attribute *attr, +char *buf) +{ +uint64_t dsize; +int rc; +
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 37
Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +10
-0+ rc = secvar_ops->get (kobj->name,strlen (kobj->name) +1 ,NULL , &dsize); +if (rc) { +pr_err ("Error retrieving variable size %d\n" , rc); +return rc; + } + + rc =sprintf (buf,"%llu\n" , dsize); + +return rc; +}
nit: change it to "return sprintf(buf, "%llu\n", dsize);" instead.
Quoted 7 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +7
-0+ +static ssize_t data_read (struct file *filep,struct kobject *kobj, +struct bin_attribute *attr,char *buf,loff_t off, +size_t count) +{ +uint64_t dsize; +char *data;
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 54
Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +10
-0+int rc; + + rc = secvar_ops->get (kobj->name,strlen (kobj->name) +1 ,NULL , &dsize); +if (rc) { +pr_err ("Error getting variable size %d\n" , rc); +return rc; + } +pr_debug ("dsize is %llu\n" , dsize); + + data =kzalloc (dsize,GFP_KERNEL );
Is there any MAX\MIN limit on dsize that can be returned by secvar_ops? Is it ok to not validate the dsize
Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +6
-0+ +static ssize_t update_write (struct file *filep,struct kobject *kobj, +struct bin_attribute *attr,char *buf,loff_t off, +size_t count) +{ +int rc;
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 85
Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +10
-0+ +pr_debug ("count is %ld\n" , count); + rc = secvar_ops->set (kobj->name,strlen (kobj->name)+1 , buf, count); +if (rc) { +pr_err ("Error setting the variable %s\n" , kobj->name); +return rc; + } + +return count; +}
Return value from this function can be a count (of bytes in buf?) or error code. Could cause confusion.
Quoted 14 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +14
-0+ +static int secvar_sysfs_load (void ) +{ +char *name; +uint64_t namesize =0 ; +struct kobject *kobj; +int rc; + + name =kzalloc (NAME_MAX_SIZE ,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!name) +return -ENOMEM ; + + do { + rc = secvar_ops->get_next(name, &namesize, NAME_MAX_SIZE);
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 163
Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +10
-0+if (rc) { +if (rc != -ENOENT ) +pr_err ("error getting secvar from firmware %d\n" , + rc); +break ; + } + + kobj =kzalloc (sizeof (*kobj),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!kobj) +return -ENOMEM ;
Memory allocated for "name" is leaked in this case.
Quoted 19 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +19
-0+ +kobject_init (kobj, &secvar_ktype); + + rc =kobject_add (kobj, &secvar_kset->kobj,"%s" , name); +if (rc) { +pr_warn ("kobject_add error %d for attribute: %s\n" , rc, + name); +kobject_put (kobj); + kobj =NULL ; + } + +if (kobj) +kobject_uevent (kobj,KOBJ_ADD ); + + }while (!rc); + +kfree (name); +return rc; +}
PATCH v5 3/4 x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file
In reply to Nayna JainThe handlers to add the keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted hashes to the .blacklist keyring is common for both the uefi and powerpc mechanisms of loading the keys/hashes from the firmware.
This patch moves the common code from load_uefi.c to keyring_handler.c
--- security/integrity/Makefile | 3 +- .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 32 ++++++++ security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 67 +--------------- 4 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
security/integrity/Makefile +2 -1
@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) += platform_certs/platform_keyring.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ - platform_certs/load_uefi.o + platform_certs/load_uefi.o \ + platform_certs/keyring_handler.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c new file +80 -0
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security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h new file +32 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#ifndef PLATFORM_CERTS_INTERNAL_H +#define PLATFORM_CERTS_INTERNAL_H + +#include <linux/efi.h> + +void blacklist_hash (const char *source,const void *data, +size_t len,const char *type, +size_t type_len); + +/* +* Blacklist an X509 TBS hash. +*/ +void blacklist_x509_tbs (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len); + +/* +* Blacklist the hash of an executable. +*/ +void blacklist_binary (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len); + +/* +* Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the db. +*/ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); + +/* +* Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx. +*/ +efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx (const efi_guid_t *sig_type); + +#endif
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +1 -66
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Signature · 1 line
2.20.1