arch/x86: efistub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
Subsystems (3)
RFC PATCH 1/1 arch/x86: efistub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
Implement the same mechanism for x86 efistub as introduced by commit 568bc4e87033 ("efi/arm*/libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table") for efi/arm*/libstub, and best described here and there as:
Invoke the EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL protocol in the context of the stub and install the Linux-specific RNG seed UEFI config table. This will be picked up by the EFI routines in the core kernel to seed the kernel entropy pool.
---
As far as I can see, we do not yet make use of the UEFI RNG on x86 at all, but only on arm. Note that this works only when Linux is booted as an EFI stub, and that the EFI-provided randomness is not credited as entropy unless RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set _and_ another patch (on its way upstream; thanks Ard!) is applied, see
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Further note that this patch is untested, as the firmware on my old x86 laptop only has UEFI v2.31. If you want to test it, you may wish to apply
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/#u
first to get a clear indication in dmesg.
Thanks,
Dominik
arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +3 -0
@@ -781,6 +781,9 @@ efi_main(struct efi_config *c, struct boot_params *boot_params)/* Ask the firmware to clear memory on unclean shutdown */ efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation (sys_table); + +efi_random_get_seed (sys_table); +efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog (sys_table);setup_graphics (boot_params);
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +3 -2
@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y # Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in. KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n -lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o +lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o \ + random.o # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64 arm-deps-y := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c
@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ arm-deps-$(CONFIG_ARM64) += sort.c $(obj)/lib-%.o: $(srctree)/lib/%.c FORCE $(call if_changed_rule,cc_o_c) -lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += arm-stub.o fdt.o string.o random.o \ +lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += arm-stub.o fdt.o string.o \ $(patsubst %.c,lib-%.o,$(arm-deps-y)) lib-$(CONFIG_ARM) += arm32-stub.o
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h +0 -2
@@ -63,8 +63,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_alloc(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,efi_status_t check_platform_features (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg); -efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg); -void *get_efi_config_table (efi_system_table_t *sys_table,efi_guid_t guid);/* Helper macros for the usual case of using simple C variables: */
include/linux/efi.h +2 -0
@@ -1631,6 +1631,8 @@ static inline void efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg) { }#endif +efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg); +void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog (efi_system_table_t *sys_table);/*
Quoted 23 lines · Dominik Brodowski
Implement the same mechanism for x86 efistub as introduced by commit
568bc4e87033("efi/arm*/libstub: InvokeEFI_RNG_PROTOCOLto seed the UEFI RNG table") for efi/arm*/libstub, and best described here and there as:Invoke the
EFI_RNG_PROTOCOLprotocol in the context of the stub and install the Linux-specific RNG seed UEFI config table. This will be picked up by the EFI routines in the core kernel to seed the kernel entropy pool.Signed-off-by Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>Cc Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>Cc Hsin-Yi Wang <[email protected]>Cc Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>Cc Rob Herring <[email protected]>Cc Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>Cc <[email protected]>
Quoted 4 lines
---
As far as I can see, we do not yet make use of the UEFI RNG on x86 at all, but only on arm.
If you have a ChaosKey, you may be able to use this driver
http://people.linaro.org/~ard.biesheuvel/ChaosKey/ChaosKeyDxe.efi
to get UEFI to expose the EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL. (Use efibootmgr -r to install it as Driver#### or load it from the UEFI shell using 'load xxx.efi')
Quoted 77 lines
Note that this works only when Linux is booted as an EFI stub, and that the EFI-provided randomness is not credited as entropy unless
RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADERis set _and_ another patch (on its way upstream; thanks Ard!) is applied, seehttps://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/Further note that this patch is untested, as the firmware on my old x86 laptop only has UEFI v2.31. If you want to test it, you may wish to apply
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/#ufirst to get a clear indication in dmesg.
arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +3
-0@@ -781,6 +781,9 @@ efi_main(struct efi_config *c, struct boot_params *boot_params)/* Ask the firmware to clear memory on unclean shutdown */ efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation (sys_table); + +efi_random_get_seed (sys_table); +efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog (sys_table);setup_graphics (boot_params);drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +3
-2@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y # Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in. KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n -lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o +lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o \ + random.o # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64 arm-deps-y := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ arm-deps-$(CONFIG_ARM64) += sort.c $(obj)/lib-%.o: $(srctree)/lib/%.c FORCE $(call if_changed_rule,cc_o_c) -lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += arm-stub.o fdt.o string.o random.o \ +lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += arm-stub.o fdt.o string.o \ $(patsubst %.c,lib-%.o,$(arm-deps-y)) lib-$(CONFIG_ARM) += arm32-stub.odrivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h +0
-2@@ -63,8 +63,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_alloc(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,efi_status_t check_platform_features (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg); -efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg); -void *get_efi_config_table (efi_system_table_t *sys_table,efi_guid_t guid);/* Helper macros for the usual case of using simple C variables: */ include/linux/efi.h +2
-0@@ -1631,6 +1631,8 @@ static inline void efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg) { }#endif +efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg); +void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog (efi_system_table_t *sys_table);/*
efistub: EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL on Dell Inc. Latitude 7390
In reply to Dominik BrodowskiArd, Mario,
in theory, invoking EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL on a Dell Inc. Latitude 7390/09386V, BIOS 1.9.2 04/03/2019, should work fine as the system provides EFI v2.60. Using my patch from a few weeks ago[1], efi_random_get_seed() is called from arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c::efi_main(). In efi_random_get_seed(), the calls to
status = efi_call_early(locate_protocol, &rng_proto, NULL, (void **)&rng);
and
status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
sizeof(*seed) + EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, (void **)&seed);
succeed. However,
status = rng->get_rng(rng, &rng_algo_raw, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);
returns EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER, though I can't see why one of these parameters is invalid. When trying to use the default rng algorithm (by modifying the test to "(status != EFI_SUCCESS)"),
status = rng->get_rng(rng, NULL, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);
the call doesn't seem to return.
Any ideas?
Best,
Dominik
Re: efistub: EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL on Dell Inc. Latitude 7390
Hello Dominik,
Quoted 18 lines · Dominik Brodowski
Ard, Mario,
in theory, invoking
EFI_RNG_PROTOCOLon a Dell Inc. Latitude 7390/09386V, BIOS 1.9.2 04/03/2019, should work fine as the system provides EFI v2.60. Using my patch from a few weeks ago[1],efi_random_get_seed()is called from arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c::efi_main(). Inefi_random_get_seed(), the calls tostatus = efi_call_early(locate_protocol,
&rng_proto, NULL,
(void **)&rng);and
status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool,
EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
sizeof(*seed)+EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, (void **)&seed);
Quoted 7 lines
succeed. However,
status = rng->get_rng(rng, &rng_algo_raw, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);returns
EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER, though I can't see why one of these parameters is invalid.
The UEFI spec defines the conditions under which this function may return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER as
"""
RNGValue is null or RNGValueLength is zero.
"""
Quoted 10 lines
When trying to use the default rng algorithm (by
modifying the test to "(status !=EFI_SUCCESS)"),status = rng->get_rng(rng, NULL, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);the call doesn't seem to return.
Any ideas?
Try running this from the UEFI shell:
Re: efistub: EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL on Dell Inc. Latitude 7390
Hello Ard,
Quoted 45 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Hello Dominik,
Quoted 18 lines · Dominik Brodowski
Ard, Mario,
in theory, invoking
EFI_RNG_PROTOCOLon a Dell Inc. Latitude 7390/09386V, BIOS 1.9.2 04/03/2019, should work fine as the system provides EFI v2.60. Using my patch from a few weeks ago[1],efi_random_get_seed()is called from arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c::efi_main(). Inefi_random_get_seed(), the calls tostatus = efi_call_early(locate_protocol,
&rng_proto, NULL,
(void **)&rng);and
status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool,
EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
sizeof(*seed)+EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, (void **)&seed);Quoted 7 lines
succeed. However,
status = rng->get_rng(rng, &rng_algo_raw, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);returns
EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER, though I can't see why one of these parameters is invalid.The UEFI spec defines the conditions under which this function may return
EFI_INVALID_PARAMETERas"""
RNGValue is null or RNGValueLength is zero."""
Quoted 6 lines
When trying to use the default rng algorithm (by
modifying the test to "(status !=EFI_SUCCESS)"),status = rng->get_rng(rng, NULL, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
the call doesn't seem to return.
Any ideas?
Try running this from the UEFI shell:
Interestingly, this succeeds -- with the default algorithm, SP800-90-CTR-256 and RAW. So I am more confused than before on why the call to ->get_rng() fails in efi_random_get_seed().
Best,
Dominik
Re: efistub: EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL on Dell Inc. Latitude 7390
Quoted 54 lines · Dominik Brodowski
Hello Ard,
Quoted 50 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Hello Dominik,
Quoted 18 lines · Dominik Brodowski
Ard, Mario,
in theory, invoking
EFI_RNG_PROTOCOLon a Dell Inc. Latitude 7390/09386V, BIOS 1.9.2 04/03/2019, should work fine as the system provides EFI v2.60. Using my patch from a few weeks ago[1],efi_random_get_seed()is called from arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c::efi_main(). Inefi_random_get_seed(), the calls tostatus = efi_call_early(locate_protocol,
&rng_proto, NULL,
(void **)&rng);and
status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool,
EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
sizeof(*seed)+EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, (void **)&seed);Quoted 7 lines
succeed. However,
status = rng->get_rng(rng, &rng_algo_raw, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);returns
EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER, though I can't see why one of these parameters is invalid.The UEFI spec defines the conditions under which this function may return
EFI_INVALID_PARAMETERas"""
RNGValue is null or RNGValueLength is zero."""
Quoted 10 lines
When trying to use the default rng algorithm (by
modifying the test to "(status !=EFI_SUCCESS)"),status = rng->get_rng(rng, NULL, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);the call doesn't seem to return.
Any ideas?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Try running this from the UEFI shell:
Interestingly, this succeeds -- with the default algorithm, SP800-90-CTR-256 and RAW. So I am more confused than before on why the call to ->get_rng() fails in
efi_random_get_seed().
It might be an issue with the size of the output.
The original RDRAND based driver in EDK2 contains an apparent misconception that, due to the fact that certain SP800-90-CTR-256 DRBGs require 32 bytes of raw entropy as a seed, it is only valid for the RAW algorithm to be called with an output size of 32.
So in this case, it might be that 32 is treated as a magic number too, and any other size is rejected by the RAW algorithm.
Not sure why the other one fails, though, but the fact that RAW and SP800-90-CTR-256 are the only supported algorithms suggests that your implementation is at least similar to the RDRAND based RngDxe implementation in EDK2.
Re: efistub: EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL on Dell Inc. Latitude 7390
Quoted 73 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 54 lines · Dominik Brodowski
Hello Ard,
Quoted 50 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Hello Dominik,
Quoted 18 lines · Dominik Brodowski
Ard, Mario,
in theory, invoking
EFI_RNG_PROTOCOLon a Dell Inc. Latitude 7390/09386V, BIOS 1.9.2 04/03/2019, should work fine as the system provides EFI v2.60. Using my patch from a few weeks ago[1],efi_random_get_seed()is called from arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c::efi_main(). Inefi_random_get_seed(), the calls tostatus = efi_call_early(locate_protocol,
&rng_proto, NULL,
(void **)&rng);and
status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool,
EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
sizeof(*seed)+EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, (void **)&seed);Quoted 7 lines
succeed. However,
status = rng->get_rng(rng, &rng_algo_raw, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);returns
EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER, though I can't see why one of these parameters is invalid.The UEFI spec defines the conditions under which this function may return
EFI_INVALID_PARAMETERas"""
RNGValue is null or RNGValueLength is zero."""
Quoted 10 lines
When trying to use the default rng algorithm (by
modifying the test to "(status !=EFI_SUCCESS)"),status = rng->get_rng(rng, NULL, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);the call doesn't seem to return.
Any ideas?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Try running this from the UEFI shell:
Interestingly, this succeeds -- with the default algorithm, SP800-90-CTR-256 and RAW. So I am more confused than before on why the call to ->get_rng() fails in
efi_random_get_seed().It might be an issue with the size of the output.
The original RDRAND based driver in EDK2 contains an apparent misconception that, due to the fact that certain SP800-90-CTR-256 DRBGs require 32 bytes of raw entropy as a seed, it is only valid for the RAW algorithm to be called with an output size of 32.
Quoted 7 lines
So in this case, it might be that 32 is treated as a magic number too, and any other size is rejected by the RAW algorithm.
Not sure why the other one fails, though, but the fact that RAW and SP800-90-CTR-256 are the only supported algorithms suggests that your implementation is at least similar to the RDRAND based RngDxe implementation in EDK2.
I've updated the RngTest-X64.efi binary with a version that invokes both the RAW and the default algorithm twice with a request for 64 bytes of entropy, like we do in the kernel. It runs fine on my Thinkpad, can you check whether it works on your Dell system as well?
Re: efistub: EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL on Dell Inc. Latitude 7390
Quoted 15 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 7 lines
It might be an issue with the size of the output.
The original RDRAND based driver in EDK2 contains an apparent misconception that, due to the fact that certain SP800-90-CTR-256 DRBGs require 32 bytes of raw entropy as a seed, it is only valid for the RAW algorithm to be called with an output size of 32.
Quoted 7 lines
So in this case, it might be that 32 is treated as a magic number too, and any other size is rejected by the RAW algorithm.
Not sure why the other one fails, though, but the fact that RAW and SP800-90-CTR-256 are the only supported algorithms suggests that your implementation is at least similar to the RDRAND based RngDxe implementation in EDK2.
Quoted 4 lines
I've updated the RngTest-X64.efi binary with a version that invokes both the RAW and the default algorithm twice with a request for 64 bytes of entropy, like we do in the kernel. It runs fine on my Thinkpad, can you check whether it works on your Dell system as well?
RngTest-X64.efi seems to run through fine.[*] Additionally, if I modify the kernel code to request only 32 bytes, it returns EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER as well. So something else seems to be missing... Just to verify: does efi_random_get_seed() work on your Thinkpad, if called from efi_main()? Have you tested that, by chance?[**]
Thanks,
Dominik
[*] As a sidenote: I say "seems" as the screen is immediately blanked once the RngTest-X64.efi binary has run through, so I have to capture the output with a camera. Maybe add a delay of some sort to the RngTest-X86.efi binary?
[**] patch with additional debug outputs (on top of Linus' tree) here:
arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +3 -0
@@ -781,6 +781,9 @@ efi_main(struct efi_config *c, struct boot_params *boot_params)/* Ask the firmware to clear memory on unclean shutdown */ efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation (sys_table); + +efi_random_get_seed (sys_table); +efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog (sys_table);setup_graphics (boot_params);
drivers/char/random.c +8 -0
@@ -2515,6 +2515,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);*/ void add_bootloader_randomness (const void *buf,unsigned int size) { +unsigned long *data = buf; + +pr_notice ("random: adding %u bits of %sbootloader-provided randomness" , + size *8 , +IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER ) ?"trusted " :"" ); + +pr_notice ("random: is this random? %lx" , *data); +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER ))add_hwgenerator_randomness (buf, size, size *8 );else
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +1 -1
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz, sizeof(*seed) + size);if (seed !=NULL ) {pr_notice ("seeding entropy pool\n" ); -add_device_randomness (seed->bits, seed->size); +add_bootloader_randomness (seed->bits, seed->size);early_memunmap (seed,sizeof (*seed) + size); }else {pr_err ("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n" );
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +3 -2
@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y # Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in. KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n -lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o +lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o \ + random.o # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64 arm-deps-y := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c
@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ arm-deps-$(CONFIG_ARM64) += sort.c $(obj)/lib-%.o: $(srctree)/lib/%.c FORCE $(call if_changed_rule,cc_o_c) -lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += arm-stub.o fdt.o string.o random.o \ +lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += arm-stub.o fdt.o string.o \ $(patsubst %.c,lib-%.o,$(arm-deps-y)) lib-$(CONFIG_ARM) += arm32-stub.o
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h +0 -2
@@ -63,8 +63,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_alloc(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,efi_status_t check_platform_features (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg); -efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg); -void *get_efi_config_table (efi_system_table_t *sys_table,efi_guid_t guid);/* Helper macros for the usual case of using simple C variables: */
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c +21 -5
@@ -152,33 +152,49 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg) status =efi_call_early (locate_protocol, &rng_proto,NULL , (void **)&rng); -if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) +if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) { +pr_efi_err (sys_table_arg,"random: no protocol" );return status; + } status =efi_call_early (allocate_pool,EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA ,sizeof (*seed) +EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE , (void **)&seed); -if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) +if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ){ +pr_efi_err (sys_table_arg,"random: no pool" );return status; + } status = rng->get_rng (rng, &rng_algo_raw,EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE , seed->bits); -if (status ==EFI_UNSUPPORTED ) +if (status ==EFI_DEVICE_ERROR ) +pr_efi_err (sys_table_arg,"random: device error" ); +if (status ==EFI_NOT_READY ) +pr_efi_err (sys_table_arg,"random: not ready" ); +if (status ==EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ) +pr_efi_err (sys_table_arg,"random: invalid parameter" );// that's the reason... +if (status ==EFI_UNSUPPORTED ) {/* * Use whatever algorithm we have available if the raw algorithm * is not implemented. */ + status = rng->get_rng (rng,NULL ,EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE , seed->bits); + } -if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) +if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) { +pr_efi_err (sys_table_arg,"random: no bytes" ); goto err_freepool; + } seed->size =EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE ; status =efi_call_early (install_configuration_table, &rng_table_guid, seed); -if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) +if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) { +pr_efi_err (sys_table_arg,"random: install_configuration_table" ); goto err_freepool; + }return EFI_SUCCESS ;
include/linux/efi.h +2 -0
@@ -1631,6 +1631,8 @@ static inline void efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg) { }#endif +efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg); +void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog (efi_system_table_t *sys_table);/*
Re: efistub: EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL on Dell Inc. Latitude 7390
Quoted 22 lines · Dominik Brodowski
Quoted 15 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 7 lines
It might be an issue with the size of the output.
The original RDRAND based driver in EDK2 contains an apparent misconception that, due to the fact that certain SP800-90-CTR-256 DRBGs require 32 bytes of raw entropy as a seed, it is only valid for the RAW algorithm to be called with an output size of 32.
Quoted 7 lines
So in this case, it might be that 32 is treated as a magic number too, and any other size is rejected by the RAW algorithm.
Not sure why the other one fails, though, but the fact that RAW and SP800-90-CTR-256 are the only supported algorithms suggests that your implementation is at least similar to the RDRAND based RngDxe implementation in EDK2.
Quoted 4 lines
I've updated the RngTest-X64.efi binary with a version that invokes both the RAW and the default algorithm twice with a request for 64 bytes of entropy, like we do in the kernel. It runs fine on my Thinkpad, can you check whether it works on your Dell system as well?
Quoted 6 lines
RngTest-X64.efi seems to run through fine.[*] Additionally, if I modify the kernel code to request only 32 bytes, it returns
EFI_INVALID_PARAMETERas well. So something else seems to be missing... Just to verify: doesefi_random_get_seed()work on your Thinkpad, if called fromefi_main()? Have you tested that, by chance?[**]
I have just tried a v5.4-rc5 kernel built with your patch applied, and it does not boot at all in EFI mode, without any output whatsoever.
Unfortunately, I don't have the bandwidth currently to dig into this, but I should be able to help out a bit more next week.
Quoted 6 lines
[*] As a sidenote: I say "seems" as the screen is immediately blanked once the RngTest-X64.efi binary has run through, so I have to capture the output with a camera. Maybe add a delay of some sort to the RngTest-X86.efi binary?
Are you running it from the UEFI shell?
Quoted 157 lines
[**] patch with additional debug outputs (on top of Linus' tree) here:
arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +3
-0@@ -781,6 +781,9 @@ efi_main(struct efi_config *c, struct boot_params *boot_params)/* Ask the firmware to clear memory on unclean shutdown */ efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation (sys_table); + +efi_random_get_seed (sys_table); +efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog (sys_table);setup_graphics (boot_params);drivers/char/random.c +8
-0@@ -2515,6 +2515,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);*/ void add_bootloader_randomness (const void *buf,unsigned int size) { +unsigned long *data = buf; + +pr_notice ("random: adding %u bits of %sbootloader-provided randomness" , + size *8 , +IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER ) ?"trusted " :"" ); + +pr_notice ("random: is this random? %lx" , *data); +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER ))add_hwgenerator_randomness (buf, size, size *8 );else drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +1
-1@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz, sizeof(*seed) + size);if (seed !=NULL ) {pr_notice ("seeding entropy pool\n" ); -add_device_randomness (seed->bits, seed->size); +add_bootloader_randomness (seed->bits, seed->size);early_memunmap (seed,sizeof (*seed) + size); }else {pr_err ("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n" );drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile +3
-2@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y # Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in. KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n -lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o +lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o \ + random.o # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64 arm-deps-y := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ arm-deps-$(CONFIG_ARM64) += sort.c $(obj)/lib-%.o: $(srctree)/lib/%.c FORCE $(call if_changed_rule,cc_o_c) -lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += arm-stub.o fdt.o string.o random.o \ +lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += arm-stub.o fdt.o string.o \ $(patsubst %.c,lib-%.o,$(arm-deps-y)) lib-$(CONFIG_ARM) += arm32-stub.odrivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h +0
-2@@ -63,8 +63,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_alloc(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,efi_status_t check_platform_features (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg); -efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg); -void *get_efi_config_table (efi_system_table_t *sys_table,efi_guid_t guid);/* Helper macros for the usual case of using simple C variables: */ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c +21
-5@@ -152,33 +152,49 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg) status =efi_call_early (locate_protocol, &rng_proto,NULL , (void **)&rng); -if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) +if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) { +pr_efi_err (sys_table_arg,"random: no protocol" );return status; + } status =efi_call_early (allocate_pool,EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA ,sizeof (*seed) +EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE , (void **)&seed); -if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) +if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ){ +pr_efi_err (sys_table_arg,"random: no pool" );return status; + } status = rng->get_rng (rng, &rng_algo_raw,EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE , seed->bits); -if (status ==EFI_UNSUPPORTED ) +if (status ==EFI_DEVICE_ERROR ) +pr_efi_err (sys_table_arg,"random: device error" ); +if (status ==EFI_NOT_READY ) +pr_efi_err (sys_table_arg,"random: not ready" ); +if (status ==EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ) +pr_efi_err (sys_table_arg,"random: invalid parameter" );// that's the reason... +if (status ==EFI_UNSUPPORTED ) {/* * Use whatever algorithm we have available if the raw algorithm * is not implemented. */ + status = rng->get_rng (rng,NULL ,EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE , seed->bits); + } -if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) +if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) { +pr_efi_err (sys_table_arg,"random: no bytes" ); goto err_freepool; + } seed->size =EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE ; status =efi_call_early (install_configuration_table, &rng_table_guid, seed); -if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) +if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) { +pr_efi_err (sys_table_arg,"random: install_configuration_table" ); goto err_freepool; + }return EFI_SUCCESS ;include/linux/efi.h +2
-0@@ -1631,6 +1631,8 @@ static inline void efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg) { }#endif +efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed (efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg); +void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog (efi_system_table_t *sys_table);/*
RE: efistub: EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL on Dell Inc. Latitude 7390
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelQuoted 84 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, October 28, 2019 3:57 AM
To: Dominik Brodowski
Cc: Limonciello, Mario; linux-efi
Subject: Re: efistub:EFI_RNG_PROTOCOLon Dell Inc. Latitude 7390[EXTERNAL EMAIL]
Quoted 14 lines · Dominik Brodowski
Hello Ard,
Quoted 10 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Hello Dominik,
Quoted 6 lines · Dominik Brodowski
Ard, Mario,
in theory, invoking
EFI_RNG_PROTOCOLon a Dell Inc. Latitude 7390/09386V, BIOS 1.9.2 04/03/2019, should work fine as the system provides EFI v2.60. Using my patch from a few weeks ago[1],efi_random_get_seed()is calledfrom
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c::efi_main(). In
efi_random_get_seed(), theQuoted 39 lines
Quoted 39 lines
Quoted 11 lines
calls to
status = efi_call_early(locate_protocol,
&rng_proto, NULL,
(void **)&rng);and
status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool,
EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
sizeof(*seed)+EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, (void **)&seed);Quoted 7 lines
succeed. However,
status = rng->get_rng(rng, &rng_algo_raw, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);returns
EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER, though I can't see why one of these parameters is invalid.The UEFI spec defines the conditions under which this function may return
EFI_INVALID_PARAMETERas"""
RNGValue is null or RNGValueLength is zero."""
Quoted 10 lines
When trying to use the default rng algorithm (by
modifying the test to "(status !=EFI_SUCCESS)"),status = rng->get_rng(rng, NULL, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);the call doesn't seem to return.
Any ideas?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Try running this from the UEFI shell:
Interestingly, this succeeds -- with the default algorithm, SP800-90-CTR-256 and RAW. So I am more confused than before on why the call to ->get_rng() fails in
efi_random_get_seed().It might be an issue with the size of the output.
The original RDRAND based driver in EDK2 contains an apparent misconception that, due to the fact that certain SP800-90-CTR-256 DRBGs require 32 bytes of raw entropy as a seed, it is only valid for the RAW algorithm to be called with an output size of 32.
Quoted 7 lines
So in this case, it might be that 32 is treated as a magic number too, and any other size is rejected by the RAW algorithm.
Not sure why the other one fails, though, but the fact that RAW and SP800-90-CTR-256 are the only supported algorithms suggests that your implementation is at least similar to the RDRAND based RngDxe implementation in EDK2.
I confirmed with our BIOS team for this platform that the implementation of
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/blob/master/SecurityPkg/RandomNumberGenerator/RngDxe/RngDxe.c
matches EDK2 implementation as of commit https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/289b714b77008aa4200c0be25c4b4e25df04955a
Thanks,
RE: efistub: EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL on Dell Inc. Latitude 7390
In reply to Dominik BrodowskiDominik,
Quoted 11 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, October 28, 2019 2:21 AM
To: Ard Biesheuvel; Limonciello, Mario
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: efistub:EFI_RNG_PROTOCOLon Dell Inc. Latitude 7390[EXTERNAL EMAIL]
Ard, Mario,
I had some discussion to one of our BIOS guys and wanted to point a few things out.
Quoted 6 lines
in theory, invoking
EFI_RNG_PROTOCOLon a Dell Inc. Latitude 7390/09386V, BIOS 1.9.2 04/03/2019, should work fine as the system provides EFI v2.60. Using my patch from a few weeks ago[1],efi_random_get_seed()is called from arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c::efi_main(). Inefi_random_get_seed(), the calls to
Just providing UEFI 2.6 doesn't guarantee an implementation of particular protocols. the protocols are still "optional" but the spec prescribes how they should behave if implemented.
Quoted 20 lines
status = efi_call_early(locate_protocol, &rng_proto, NULL, (void **)&rng);and
status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool,
EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
sizeof(*seed)+EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, (void **)&seed);succeed. However,
status = rng->get_rng(rng, &rng_algo_raw, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);returns
EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER, though I can't see why one of these parameters is invalid. When trying to use the default rng algorithm (by modifying the test to "(status !=EFI_SUCCESS)"),
Quoted 6 lines
status = rng->get_rng(rng, NULL, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);the call doesn't seem to return.
Any ideas?
You should call RngGetInfo() to find the supported protocols instead of making assumptions on which algorithms are supported.
On the particular platform you mentioned above, these are the only two algorithms supported (which you of course also mentioned in a follow up).
o EFI_RNG_ALGORITHM_SP800_90_CTR_256_GUID
o EFI_RNG_ALGORITHM_RAW
Quoted 6 lines
Not sure why the other one fails, though, but the fact that RAW and SP800-90-CTR-256 are the only supported algorithms suggests that your implementation is at least similar to the RDRAND based RngDxe implementation in EDK2.
I would agree it's unlikely to have changed in any significant way.