examples/ipsec-secgw: fix gcm iv length
PATCH 1/1 examples/ipsec-secgw: fix gcm iv length
The example IPsec application does not work properly when using AES-GCM with crypto_openssl.
ESP with AES-GCM uses standard 96bit long algorithm IV ([1]) which later concatenated with be32(1) forms a J0 block. GCM specification ([2], chapter 7.1) states that when length of IV is different than 96b, in order to format a J0 block, GHASH function must be used.
According to specification ([2], chapter 5.1.1) GCM implementations should support standard 96bit IVs, other lengths are optional. Every DPDK cryptodev supports 96bit IV and few of them supports 128bit IV as well (openssl, mrvl, ccp). When passing iv::length=16 to a cryptodev which does support standard IVs only (e.g. qat) it implicitly uses starting 96 bits. On the other hand, openssl follows specification and uses GHASH to compute J0 for that case which results in different than expected J0 values used for encryption/decryption.
Fix an inability to use AES-GCM with crypto_openssl by changing IV length to the standard value of 12.
[1] RFC4106, section "4. Nonce format" and "3.1. Initialization Vector"
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4106 [2] NIST SP800-38D https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38d/final
--- examples/ipsec-secgw/sa.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
examples/ipsec-secgw/sa.c +1 -1
@@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ sa_add_rules(struct sa_ctx *sa_ctx, const struct ipsec_sa entries[], }if (sa->aead_algo ==RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM ) { - iv_length =16 ; + iv_length =12 ; sa_ctx->xf[idx].a.type =RTE_CRYPTO_SYM_XFORM_AEAD ; sa_ctx->xf[idx].a.aead.algo = sa->aead_algo;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Quoted 39 lines
The example IPsec application does not work properly when using AES-GCM with
crypto_openssl.ESP with AES-GCM uses standard 96bit long algorithm IV ([1]) which later concatenated with be32(1) forms a J0 block. GCM specification ([2], chapter 7.1) states that when length of IV is different than 96b, in order to format a J0 block, GHASH function must be used.
According to specification ([2], chapter 5.1.1) GCM implementations should support standard 96bit IVs, other lengths are optional. Every DPDK cryptodev supports 96bit IV and few of them supports 128bit IV as well (openssl, mrvl, ccp). When passing iv::length=16 to a cryptodev which does support standard IVs only (e.g. qat) it implicitly uses starting 96 bits. On the other hand, openssl follows specification and uses GHASH to compute J0 for that case which results in different than expected J0 values used for encryption/decryption.
Fix an inability to use AES-GCM with
crypto_opensslby changing IV length to the standard value of 12.[1] RFC4106, section "4. Nonce format" and "3.1. Initialization Vector"
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftools.ietf
.org%2Fhtml%2Frfc4106&data=02%7C01%7Cakhil.goyal%40nxp.com%7Cd 24096cff31845d1619e08d75e0babaa%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd99c5c301635 %7C0%7C0%7C637081276526121698&sdata=DInvN3miogcG9WqkuRlUQ% 2BzuqMRs2P63CJA%2BojPx6vU%3D&reserved=0
[2] NIST SP800-38Dhttps://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcsrc.nist.
gov%2Fpublications%2Fdetail%2Fsp%2F800- 38d%2Ffinal&data=02%7C01%7Cakhil.goyal%40nxp.com%7Cd24096cff318 45d1619e08d75e0babaa%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd99c5c301635%7C0%7C0% 7C637081276526121698&sdata=EU6tJ9qvzpzh1b8j%2BsPjc18E3CUrXkSZ7c O6xvOmv1U%3D&reserved=0
Quoted 5 lines
Fixes 0fbd75a99f ("cryptodev: move IV parameters to session")Signed-off-by Marcin Smoczynski <[email protected]>---
Applied to dpdk-next-crypto
Thanks.