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open: introduce openat2(2) syscall

PATCH RESEND Superseded Aleksa Sarai 1 participant 14 messages Nov 20, 2019

Subsystems (27)

v17 of 18 Superseded Latest is v18 →

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v17 cover open: introduce openat2(2) syscall

This patchset is being developed here:
<https://github.com/cyphar/linux/tree/openat2/master>

This is a re-send of
<https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/>
but rebased on top of 5.4-rc8 (also my mails got duplicated the first time I sent v17 -- hopefully that doesn't happen this time).

Patch changelog:
v17:
* Add a path_is_under() check for LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED in complete_walk(), as a last line of defence to ensure that namei bugs will not break the contract of LOOKUP_BENEATH or LOOKUP_IN_ROOT.
* Update based on feedback by Al Viro:
* Make nd_jump_link() free the passed path on error, so that callers don't need to worry about it in the error path.
* Remove needless m_retry and r_retry variables in handle_dots().
* Always return -ECHILD from follow_dotdot_rcu().
v16: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/>
v15: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/>
v14: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/>

      <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]>
 v13: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/>
 v12: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/>
 v11: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/>
      <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/>

v10: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/>
v09: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/>
v08: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/>
v07: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/>
v06: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/>
v05: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/>
v04: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/>
v03: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/>
v02: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/>
v01: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/>

For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown flags are present[1].

This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road to being added to openat(2).

Furthermore, the need for some sort of control over VFS's path resolution (to avoid malicious paths resulting in inadvertent breakouts) has been a very long-standing desire of many userspace applications. This patchset is a revival of Al Viro's old AT_NO_JUMPS[3] patchset (which was a variant of David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[4] which was a spin-off of the Capsicum project[5]) with a few additions and changes made based on the previous discussion within [6] as well as others I felt were useful.

In line with the conclusions of the original discussion of AT_NO_JUMPS, the flag has been split up into separate flags. However, instead of being an openat(2) flag it is provided through a new syscall openat2(2) which provides several other improvements to the openat(2) interface (see the patch description for more details). The following new LOOKUP_* flags are added:

* LOOKUP_NO_XDEV blocks all mountpoint crossings (upwards, downwards, or through absolute links). Absolute pathnames alone in openat(2) do not trigger this. Magic-link traversal which implies a vfsmount jump is also blocked (though magic-link jumps on the same vfsmount are permitted).

* LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS blocks resolution through /proc/$pid/fd-style links. This is done by blocking the usage of nd_jump_link() during resolution in a filesystem. The term "magic-links" is used to match with the only reference to these links in Documentation/, but I'm happy to change the name.

It should be noted that this is different to the scope of ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW in that it applies to all path components. However, you can do openat2(NO_FOLLOW|NO_MAGICLINKS) on a magic-link and it will *not* fail (assuming that no parent component was a magic-link), and you will have an fd for the magic-link.

In order to correctly detect magic-links, the introduction of a new LOOKUP_MAGICLINK_JUMPED state flag was required.

* LOOKUP_BENEATH disallows escapes to outside the starting dirfd's tree, using techniques such as ".." or absolute links. Absolute paths in openat(2) are also disallowed. Conceptually this flag is to ensure you "stay below" a certain point in the filesystem tree -- but this requires some additional to protect against various races that would allow escape using "..".

Currently LOOKUP_BENEATH implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, because it can trivially beam you around the filesystem (breaking the protection). In future, there might be similar safety checks done as in LOOKUP_IN_ROOT, but that requires more discussion.

In addition, two new flags are added that expand on the above ideas:

* LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS does what it says on the tin. No symlink resolution is allowed at all, including magic-links. Just as with LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS this can still be used with NOFOLLOW to open an fd for the symlink as long as no parent path had a symlink component.

* LOOKUP_IN_ROOT is an extension of LOOKUP_BENEATH that, rather than blocking attempts to move past the root, forces all such movements to be scoped to the starting point. This provides chroot(2)-like protection but without the cost of a chroot(2) for each filesystem operation, as well as being safe against race attacks that chroot(2) is not.

If a race is detected (as with LOOKUP_BENEATH) then an error is generated, and similar to LOOKUP_BENEATH it is not permitted to cross magic-links with LOOKUP_IN_ROOT.

The primary need for this is from container runtimes, which currently need to do symlink scoping in userspace[7] when opening paths in a potentially malicious container. There is a long list of CVEs that could have bene mitigated by having RESOLVE_THIS_ROOT (such as CVE-2017-1002101, CVE-2017-1002102, CVE-2018-15664, and CVE-2019-5736, just to name a few).

In order to make all of the above more usable, I'm working on libpathrs[8] which is a C-friendly library for safe path resolution. It features a userspace-emulated backend if the kernel doesn't support openat2(2). Hopefully we can get userspace to switch to using it, and thus get openat2(2) support for free once it's ready.

Future work would include implementing things like RESOLVE_NO_AUTOMOUNT and possibly a RESOLVE_NO_REMOTE (to allow programs to be sure they don't hit DoSes though stale NFS handles).

[1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/588444/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFyyxJL1LyXZeBsf2ypriraj5ut1XkNDsunRBqgVjZU_6Q@mail.gmail.com
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
[4]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
[6]: https://lwn.net/Articles/723057/
[7]: https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin
[8]: https://github.com/openSUSE/libpathrs

The current draft of the openat2(2) man-page is included below.

--8<---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPENAT2(2) Linux Programmer's Manual OPENAT2(2)

NAME
openat2 - open and possibly create a file (extended)

SYNOPSIS

       #include <sys/types.h>
       #include <sys/stat.h>
       #include <fcntl.h>

       int openat2(int dirfd, const char *pathname, struct open_how *how, size_t size);

       Note: There is no glibc wrapper for this system call; see NOTES.

DESCRIPTION
The openat2() system call opens the file specified by pathname. If the specified file does not exist, it may optionally (if O_CREAT is specified in how.flags) be created by openat2().

As with openat(2), if pathname is relative, then it is interpreted relative to the direc- tory referred to by the file descriptor dirfd (or the current working directory of the calling process, if dirfd is the special value AT_FDCWD.) If pathname is absolute, then dirfd is ignored (unless how.resolve contains RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, in which case pathname is resolved relative to dirfd.)

The openat2() system call is an extension of openat(2) and provides a superset of its functionality. Rather than taking a single flag argument, an extensible structure (how) is passed instead to allow for future extensions. size must be set to sizeof(struct open_how), to facilitate future extensions (see the "Extensibility" section of the NOTES for more detail on how extensions are handled.)

The open_how structure
The following structure indicates how pathname should be opened, and acts as a superset of the flag and mode arguments to openat(2).

struct open_how {
__aligned_u64 flags; /* O_* flags. */
__u16 mode; /* Mode for O_{CREAT,TMPFILE}. */
__u16 __padding[3]; /* Must be zeroed. */
__aligned_u64 resolve; /* RESOLVE_* flags. */
};

Any future extensions to openat2() will be implemented as new fields appended to the above structure (or through reuse of pre-existing padding space), with the zero value of the new fields acting as though the extension were not present.

The meaning of each field is as follows:

flags
The file creation and status flags to use for this operation. All of the
O_* flags defined for openat(2) are valid openat2() flag values.

Unlike openat(2), it is an error to provide openat2() unknown or conflicting flags in flags.

mode
File mode for the new file, with identical semantics to the mode argument to
openat(2). However, unlike openat(2), it is an error to provide openat2()
with a mode which contains bits other than 0777.

It is an error to provide openat2() a non-zero mode if flags does not con- tain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.

resolve
Change how the components of pathname will be resolved (see path_resolu- tion(7) for background information.) The primary use case for these flags is to allow trusted programs to restrict how untrusted paths (or paths in- side untrusted directories) are resolved. The full list of resolve flags is given below.

RESOLVE_NO_XDEV
Disallow traversal of mount points during path resolution (including all bind mounts).

Users of this flag are encouraged to make its use configurable (un- less it is used for a specific security purpose), as bind mounts are very widely used by end-users. Setting this flag indiscrimnately for all uses of openat2() may result in spurious errors on previously- functional systems.

RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS
Disallow resolution of symbolic links during path resolution. This
option implies RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS.

If the trailing component is a symbolic link, and flags contains both O_PATH and O_NOFOLLOW, then an O_PATH file descriptor referencing the symbolic link will be returned.

Users of this flag are encouraged to make its use configurable (un- less it is used for a specific security purpose), as symbolic links are very widely used by end-users. Setting this flag indiscrimnately for all uses of openat2() may result in spurious errors on previ- ously-functional systems.

RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS
Disallow all magic link resolution during path resolution.

If the trailing component is a magic link, and flags contains both O_PATH and O_NOFOLLOW, then an O_PATH file descriptor referencing the magic link will be returned.

Magic-links are symbolic link-like objects that are most notably
found in proc(5) (examples include /proc/[pid]/exe and
/proc/[pid]/fd/*.) Due to the potential danger of unknowingly open-
ing these magic links, it may be preferable for users to disable their resolution entirely (see symboliclink(7) for more details.)

RESOLVE_BENEATH
Do not permit the path resolution to succeed if any component of the resolution is not a descendant of the directory indicated by dirfd. This results in absolute symbolic links (and absolute values of path- name) to be rejected.

Currently, this flag also disables magic link resolution. However,
this may change in the future. The caller should explicitly specify RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS to ensure that magic links are not resolved.

RESOLVE_IN_ROOT
Treat dirfd as the root directory while resolving pathname (as though the user called chroot(2) with dirfd as the argument.) Absolute sym-
bolic links and ".." path components will be scoped to dirfd. If
pathname is an absolute path, it is also treated relative to dirfd.

However, unlike chroot(2) (which changes the filesystem root perma- nently for a process), RESOLVE_IN_ROOT allows a program to effi- ciently restrict path resolution for only certain operations. It also has several hardening features (such detecting escape attempts during .. resolution) which chroot(2) does not.

Currently, this flag also disables magic link resolution. However, this may change in the future. The caller should explicitly specify RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS to ensure that magic links are not resolved.

It is an error to provide openat2() unknown flags in resolve.

RETURN VALUE
On success, a new file descriptor is returned. On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately.

ERRORS
The set of errors returned by openat2() includes all of the errors returned by openat(2), as well as the following additional errors:

EINVAL An unknown flag or invalid value was specified in how.

EINVAL mode is non-zero, but flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.

EINVAL size was smaller than any known version of struct open_how.

E2BIG An extension was specified in how, which the current kernel does not support (see
the "Extensibility" section of the NOTES for more detail on how extensions are han- dled.)

EAGAIN resolve contains either RESOLVE_IN_ROOT or RESOLVE_BENEATH, and the kernel could
not ensure that a ".." component didn't escape (due to a race condition or poten- tial attack.) Callers may choose to retry the openat2() call.

EXDEV resolve contains either RESOLVE_IN_ROOT or RESOLVE_BENEATH, and an escape from the
root during path resolution was detected.

EXDEV resolve contains RESOLVE_NO_XDEV, and a path component attempted to cross a mount
point.

ELOOP resolve contains RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS, and one of the path components was a symbolic
link (or magic link).

ELOOP resolve contains RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS, and one of the path components was a magic
link.

VERSIONS
openat2() was added to Linux in kernel 5.FOO.

CONFORMING TO
This system call is Linux-specific.

The semantics of RESOLVE_BENEATH were modelled after FreeBSD's O_BENEATH.

NOTES
Glibc does not provide a wrapper for this system call; call it using systemcall(2).

Extensibility
In order to allow for struct open_how to be extended in future kernel revisions, openat2()
requires userspace to specify the size of struct open_how structure they are passing. By
providing this information, it is possible for openat2() to provide both forwards- and backwards-compatibility — with size acting as an implicit version number (because new ex- tension fields will always be appended, the size will always increase.) This extensibil-
ity design is very similar to other system calls such as perf_setattr(2),
perf_event_open(2), and clone(3).

If we let usize be the size of the structure according to userspace and ksize be the size of the structure which the kernel supports, then there are only three cases to consider:

* If ksize equals usize, then there is no version mismatch and how can be used verbatim.

* If ksize is larger than usize, then there are some extensions the kernel sup- ports which the userspace program is unaware of. Because all extensions must have their zero values be a no-op, the kernel treats all of the extension fields not set by userspace to have zero values. This provides backwards-compatibil- ity.

* If ksize is smaller than usize, then there are some extensions which the userspace program is aware of but the kernel does not support. Because all ex- tensions must have their zero values be a no-op, the kernel can safely ignore the unsupported extension fields if they are all-zero. If any unsupported ex- tension fields are non-zero, then -1 is returned and errno is set to E2BIG. This provides forwards-compatibility.

Therefore, most userspace programs will not need to have any special handling of exten-
sions. However, if a userspace program wishes to determine what extensions the running
kernel supports, they may conduct a binary search on size (to find the largest value which doesn't produce an error of E2BIG.)

SEE ALSO

       openat(2), path_resolution(7), symlink(7)

Linux 2019-11-05 OPENAT2(2)
--8<---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Aleksa Sarai (13):
namei: only return -ECHILD from follow_dotdot_rcu()
nsfs: clean-up ns_get_path() signature to return int
namei: allow nd_jump_link() to produce errors
namei: allow set_root() to produce errors
namei: LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS: block symlink resolution
namei: LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS: block magic-link resolution
namei: LOOKUP_NO_XDEV: block mountpoint crossing
namei: LOOKUP_BENEATH: O_BENEATH-like scoped resolution
namei: LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: chroot-like scoped resolution
namei: LOOKUP_{IN_ROOT,BENEATH}: permit limited ".." resolution
open: introduce openat2(2) syscall
selftests: add openat2(2) selftests
Documentation: path-lookup: include new LOOKUP flags

 CREDITS                                       |   4 +-
 Documentation/filesystems/path-lookup.rst     |  68 ++-
 arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl        |   1 +
 arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl                    |   1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h               |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h             |   2 +
 arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl         |   1 +
 arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl         |   1 +
 arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl   |   1 +
 arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl     |   1 +
 arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl     |   1 +
 arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl     |   1 +
 arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl       |   1 +
 arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl      |   1 +
 arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl         |   1 +
 arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl           |   1 +
 arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl        |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl        |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl        |   1 +
 arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl       |   1 +
 fs/namei.c                                    | 185 +++++--
 fs/nsfs.c                                     |  29 +-
 fs/open.c                                     | 149 +++--
 fs/proc/base.c                                |   3 +-
 fs/proc/namespaces.c                          |  20 +-
 include/linux/fcntl.h                         |  12 +-
 include/linux/namei.h                         |  12 +-
 include/linux/proc_ns.h                       |   4 +-
 include/linux/syscalls.h                      |   3 +
 include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h             |   5 +-
 include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h                    |  40 ++
 kernel/bpf/offload.c                          |  12 +-
 kernel/events/core.c                          |   2 +-
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c                |   6 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/Makefile              |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore    |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile      |   8 +
 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c     | 109 ++++
 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h     | 107 ++++
 .../testing/selftests/openat2/openat2_test.c  | 316 +++++++++++
 .../selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c    | 160 ++++++
 .../testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c  | 523 ++++++++++++++++++
 42 files changed, 1686 insertions(+), 113 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/openat2_test.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c

base-commit: af42d3466bdc8f39806b26f593604fdc54140bcb

Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH RESEND v17 1/13 namei: only return -ECHILD from follow_dotdot_rcu()

It's over-zealous to return hard errors under RCU-walk here, given that a REF-walk will be triggered for all other cases handling ".." under RCU.

The original purpose of this check was to ensure that if a rename occurs such that a directory is moved outside of the bind-mount which the resolution started in, it would be detected and blocked to avoid being able to mess with paths outside of the bind-mount. However, triggering a new REF-walk is just as effective a solution.

Cc "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Fixes 397d425dc26d ("vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root")
---
 fs/namei.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/namei.c +1 -1
index 671c3c1a3425..5a47d9c09581 100644
@@ -1359,7 +1359,7 @@ static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
 			nd->path.dentry = parent;
 			nd->seq = seq;
 			if (unlikely(!path_connected(&nd->path)))
-				return -ENOENT;
+				return -ECHILD;
 			break;
 		} else {
 			struct mount *mnt = real_mount(nd->path.mnt);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
#2 lore raw

PATCH RESEND v17 2/13 nsfs: clean-up ns_get_path() signature to return int

In reply to Aleksa Sarai

ns_get_path() and ns_get_path_cb() only ever return either NULL or an ERR_PTR. It is far more idiomatic to simply return an integer, and it makes all of the callers of ns_get_path() more straightforward to read.

Fixes e149ed2b805f ("take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fs")
---
 fs/nsfs.c               | 29 ++++++++++++++---------------
 fs/proc/namespaces.c    |  6 +++---
 include/linux/proc_ns.h |  4 ++--
 kernel/bpf/offload.c    | 12 ++++++------
 kernel/events/core.c    |  2 +-
 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
fs/nsfs.c +14 -15
index a0431642c6b5..f3d2833c5781 100644
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static void nsfs_evict(struct inode *inode)
 	ns->ops->put(ns);
 }
 
-static void *__ns_get_path(struct path *path, struct ns_common *ns)
+static int __ns_get_path(struct path *path, struct ns_common *ns)
 {
 	struct vfsmount *mnt = nsfs_mnt;
 	struct dentry *dentry;
@@ -71,13 +71,13 @@ static void *__ns_get_path(struct path *path, struct ns_common *ns)
 got_it:
 	path->mnt = mntget(mnt);
 	path->dentry = dentry;
-	return NULL;
+	return 0;
 slow:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	inode = new_inode_pseudo(mnt->mnt_sb);
 	if (!inode) {
 		ns->ops->put(ns);
-		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 	inode->i_ino = ns->inum;
 	inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static void *__ns_get_path(struct path *path, struct ns_common *ns)
 	dentry = d_alloc_anon(mnt->mnt_sb);
 	if (!dentry) {
 		iput(inode);
-		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 	d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
 	dentry->d_fsdata = (void *)ns->ops;
@@ -98,23 +98,22 @@ static void *__ns_get_path(struct path *path, struct ns_common *ns)
 		d_delete(dentry);	/* make sure ->d_prune() does nothing */
 		dput(dentry);
 		cpu_relax();
-		return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
+		return -EAGAIN;
 	}
 	goto got_it;
 }
 
-void *ns_get_path_cb(struct path *path, ns_get_path_helper_t *ns_get_cb,
+int ns_get_path_cb(struct path *path, ns_get_path_helper_t *ns_get_cb,
 		     void *private_data)
 {
-	void *ret;
+	int ret;
 
 	do {
 		struct ns_common *ns = ns_get_cb(private_data);
 		if (!ns)
-			return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
-
+			return -ENOENT;
 		ret = __ns_get_path(path, ns);
-	} while (ret == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN));
+	} while (ret == -EAGAIN);
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -131,7 +130,7 @@ static struct ns_common *ns_get_path_task(void *private_data)
 	return args->ns_ops->get(args->task);
 }
 
-void *ns_get_path(struct path *path, struct task_struct *task,
+int ns_get_path(struct path *path, struct task_struct *task,
 		  const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_ops)
 {
 	struct ns_get_path_task_args args = {
@@ -147,7 +146,7 @@ int open_related_ns(struct ns_common *ns,
 {
 	struct path path = {};
 	struct file *f;
-	void *err;
+	int err;
 	int fd;
 
 	fd = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC);
@@ -164,11 +163,11 @@ int open_related_ns(struct ns_common *ns,
 		}
 
 		err = __ns_get_path(&path, relative);
-	} while (err == ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN));
+	} while (err == -EAGAIN);
 
-	if (IS_ERR(err)) {
+	if (err) {
 		put_unused_fd(fd);
-		return PTR_ERR(err);
+		return err;
 	}
 
 	f = dentry_open(&path, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
fs/proc/namespaces.c +3 -3
index dd2b35f78b09..08dd94df1a66 100644
@@ -42,14 +42,14 @@ static const char *proc_ns_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
 	const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_ops = PROC_I(inode)->ns_ops;
 	struct task_struct *task;
 	struct path ns_path;
-	void *error = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+	int error = -EACCES;
 
 	if (!dentry)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
 
 	task = get_proc_task(inode);
 	if (!task)
-		return error;
+		return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
 
 	if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) {
 		error = ns_get_path(&ns_path, task, ns_ops);
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static const char *proc_ns_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
 			nd_jump_link(&ns_path);
 	}
 	put_task_struct(task);
-	return error;
+	return ERR_PTR(error);
 }
 
 static int proc_ns_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer, int buflen)
include/linux/proc_ns.h +2 -2
index d31cb6215905..aed366b4795c 100644
@@ -76,10 +76,10 @@ static inline int ns_alloc_inum(struct ns_common *ns)
 
 extern struct file *proc_ns_fget(int fd);
 #define get_proc_ns(inode) ((struct ns_common *)(inode)->i_private)
-extern void *ns_get_path(struct path *path, struct task_struct *task,
+extern int ns_get_path(struct path *path, struct task_struct *task,
 			const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_ops);
 typedef struct ns_common *ns_get_path_helper_t(void *);
-extern void *ns_get_path_cb(struct path *path, ns_get_path_helper_t ns_get_cb,
+extern int ns_get_path_cb(struct path *path, ns_get_path_helper_t ns_get_cb,
 			    void *private_data);
 
 extern int ns_get_name(char *buf, size_t size, struct task_struct *task,
kernel/bpf/offload.c +6 -6
index ba635209ae9a..a2253a044f90 100644
@@ -302,14 +302,14 @@ int bpf_prog_offload_info_fill(struct bpf_prog_info *info,
 	struct inode *ns_inode;
 	struct path ns_path;
 	char __user *uinsns;
-	void *res;
+	int res;
 	u32 ulen;
 
 	res = ns_get_path_cb(&ns_path, bpf_prog_offload_info_fill_ns, &args);
-	if (IS_ERR(res)) {
+	if (res) {
 		if (!info->ifindex)
 			return -ENODEV;
-		return PTR_ERR(res);
+		return res;
 	}
 
 	down_read(&bpf_devs_lock);
@@ -526,13 +526,13 @@ int bpf_map_offload_info_fill(struct bpf_map_info *info, struct bpf_map *map)
 	};
 	struct inode *ns_inode;
 	struct path ns_path;
-	void *res;
+	int res;
 
 	res = ns_get_path_cb(&ns_path, bpf_map_offload_info_fill_ns, &args);
-	if (IS_ERR(res)) {
+	if (res) {
 		if (!info->ifindex)
 			return -ENODEV;
-		return PTR_ERR(res);
+		return res;
 	}
 
 	ns_inode = ns_path.dentry->d_inode;
kernel/events/core.c +1 -1
index 00a014670ed0..3772a04ca802 100644
@@ -7258,7 +7258,7 @@ static void perf_fill_ns_link_info(struct perf_ns_link_info *ns_link_info,
 {
 	struct path ns_path;
 	struct inode *ns_inode;
-	void *error;
+	int error;
 
 	error = ns_get_path(&ns_path, task, ns_ops);
 	if (!error) {
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
#3 lore raw

PATCH RESEND v17 3/13 namei: allow nd_jump_link() to produce errors

In reply to Aleksa Sarai

In preparation for LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, it's necessary to add the ability for nd_jump_link() to return an error which the corresponding get_link() caller must propogate back up to the VFS.

---
 fs/namei.c                     |  3 ++-
 fs/proc/base.c                 |  3 +--
 fs/proc/namespaces.c           | 14 +++++++++-----
 include/linux/namei.h          |  2 +-
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c |  6 ++++--
 5 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +2 -1
index 5a47d9c09581..1024a641f075 100644
@@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ static int nd_jump_root(struct nameidata *nd)
  * Helper to directly jump to a known parsed path from ->get_link,
  * caller must have taken a reference to path beforehand.
  */
-void nd_jump_link(struct path *path)
+int nd_jump_link(struct path *path)
 {
 	struct nameidata *nd = current->nameidata;
 	path_put(&nd->path);
@@ -867,6 +867,7 @@ void nd_jump_link(struct path *path)
 	nd->path = *path;
 	nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
 	nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd)
fs/proc/base.c +1 -2
index ebea9501afb8..ee97dd322f3e 100644
@@ -1626,8 +1626,7 @@ static const char *proc_pid_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
 
-	nd_jump_link(&path);
-	return NULL;
+	error = nd_jump_link(&path);
 out:
 	return ERR_PTR(error);
 }
fs/proc/namespaces.c +9 -5
index 08dd94df1a66..a8cca516f1a9 100644
@@ -51,11 +51,15 @@ static const char *proc_ns_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (!task)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
 
-	if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) {
-		error = ns_get_path(&ns_path, task, ns_ops);
-		if (!error)
-			nd_jump_link(&ns_path);
-	}
+	if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS))
+		goto out;
+
+	error = ns_get_path(&ns_path, task, ns_ops);
+	if (error)
+		goto out;
+
+	error = nd_jump_link(&ns_path);
+out:
 	put_task_struct(task);
 	return ERR_PTR(error);
 }
include/linux/namei.h +1 -1
index 397a08ade6a2..758e9b47db6f 100644
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ extern int follow_up(struct path *);
 extern struct dentry *lock_rename(struct dentry *, struct dentry *);
 extern void unlock_rename(struct dentry *, struct dentry *);
 
-extern void nd_jump_link(struct path *path);
+extern int __must_check nd_jump_link(struct path *path);
 
 static inline void nd_terminate_link(void *name, size_t len, size_t maxlen)
 {
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +4 -2
index 45d13b6462aa..0b7d6dce6291 100644
@@ -2455,16 +2455,18 @@ static const char *policy_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	struct aa_ns *ns;
 	struct path path;
+	int error;
 
 	if (!dentry)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+
 	ns = aa_get_current_ns();
 	path.mnt = mntget(aafs_mnt);
 	path.dentry = dget(ns_dir(ns));
-	nd_jump_link(&path);
+	error = nd_jump_link(&path);
 	aa_put_ns(ns);
 
-	return NULL;
+	return ERR_PTR(error);
 }
 
 static int policy_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer,
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
#4 lore raw

PATCH RESEND v17 4/13 namei: allow set_root() to produce errors

In reply to Aleksa Sarai

For LOOKUP_BENEATH and LOOKUP_IN_ROOT it is necessary to ensure that set_root() is never called, and thus (for hardening purposes) it should return an error rather than permit a breakout from the root. In addition, move all of the repetitive set_root() calls to nd_jump_root().

---
 fs/namei.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +24 -11
index 1024a641f075..74574a69a614 100644
@@ -798,7 +798,7 @@ static int complete_walk(struct nameidata *nd)
 	return status;
 }
 
-static void set_root(struct nameidata *nd)
+static int set_root(struct nameidata *nd)
 {
 	struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
 
@@ -814,6 +814,7 @@ static void set_root(struct nameidata *nd)
 		get_fs_root(fs, &nd->root);
 		nd->flags |= LOOKUP_ROOT_GRABBED;
 	}
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void path_put_conditional(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd)
@@ -837,6 +838,11 @@ static inline void path_to_nameidata(const struct path *path,
 
 static int nd_jump_root(struct nameidata *nd)
 {
+	if (!nd->root.mnt) {
+		int error = set_root(nd);
+		if (error)
+			return error;
+	}
 	if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
 		struct dentry *d;
 		nd->path = nd->root;
@@ -1080,10 +1086,9 @@ const char *get_link(struct nameidata *nd)
 			return res;
 	}
 	if (*res == '/') {
-		if (!nd->root.mnt)
-			set_root(nd);
-		if (unlikely(nd_jump_root(nd)))
-			return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+		error = nd_jump_root(nd);
+		if (unlikely(error))
+			return ERR_PTR(error);
 		while (unlikely(*++res == '/'))
 			;
 	}
@@ -1698,8 +1703,13 @@ static inline int may_lookup(struct nameidata *nd)
 static inline int handle_dots(struct nameidata *nd, int type)
 {
 	if (type == LAST_DOTDOT) {
-		if (!nd->root.mnt)
-			set_root(nd);
+		int error = 0;
+
+		if (!nd->root.mnt) {
+			error = set_root(nd);
+			if (error)
+				return error;
+		}
 		if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
 			return follow_dotdot_rcu(nd);
 		} else
@@ -2162,6 +2172,7 @@ static int link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd)
 /* must be paired with terminate_walk() */
 static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
 {
+	int error;
 	const char *s = nd->name->name;
 
 	if (!*s)
@@ -2194,11 +2205,13 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
 	nd->path.dentry = NULL;
 
 	nd->m_seq = read_seqbegin(&mount_lock);
+
+	/* Figure out the starting path and root (if needed). */
 	if (*s == '/') {
-		set_root(nd);
-		if (likely(!nd_jump_root(nd)))
-			return s;
-		return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+		error = nd_jump_root(nd);
+		if (unlikely(error))
+			return ERR_PTR(error);
+		return s;
 	} else if (nd->dfd == AT_FDCWD) {
 		if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
 			struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
#5 lore raw

PATCH RESEND v17 5/13 namei: LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS: block symlink resolution

In reply to Aleksa Sarai

/* Background. */
Userspace cannot easily resolve a path without resolving symlinks, and would have to manually resolve each path component with O_PATH and O_NOFOLLOW. This is clearly inefficient, and can be fairly easy to screw up (resulting in possible security bugs). Linus has mentioned that Git has a particular need for this kind of flag[1]. It also resolves a fairly long-standing perceived deficiency in O_NOFOLLOw -- that it only blocks the opening of trailing symlinks.

This is part of a refresh of Al's AT_NO_JUMPS patchset[2] (which was a variation on David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[3], which in turn was based on the Capsicum project[4]).

/* Userspace API. */
LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS will be exposed to userspace through openat2(2).

/* Semantics. */
Unlike most other LOOKUP flags (most notably LOOKUP_FOLLOW), LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS applies to all components of the path.

With LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS, any symlink path component encountered during path resolution will yield -ELOOP. If the trailing component is a symlink (and no other components were symlinks), then O_PATH|O_NOFOLLOW will not error out and will instead provide a handle to the trailing symlink -- without resolving it.

/* Testing. */
LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS is tested as part of the openat2(2) selftests.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFyOKM7DW7+0sdDFKdZFXgptb5r1id9=Wvhd8AgSP7qjwQ@mail.gmail.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[4]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

---
 fs/namei.c            | 3 +++
 include/linux/namei.h | 3 +++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
fs/namei.c +3 -0
index 74574a69a614..303731935eb2 100644
@@ -1052,6 +1052,9 @@ const char *get_link(struct nameidata *nd)
 	int error;
 	const char *res;
 
+	if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS))
+		return ERR_PTR(-ELOOP);
+
 	if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)) {
 		touch_atime(&last->link);
 		cond_resched();
include/linux/namei.h +3 -0
index 758e9b47db6f..0d86e75c04a7 100644
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ enum {LAST_NORM, LAST_ROOT, LAST_DOT, LAST_DOTDOT, LAST_BIND};
 #define LOOKUP_ROOT		0x2000
 #define LOOKUP_ROOT_GRABBED	0x0008
 
+/* Scoping flags for lookup. */
+#define LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS	0x010000 /* No symlink crossing. */
+
 extern int path_pts(struct path *path);
 
 extern int user_path_at_empty(int, const char __user *, unsigned, struct path *, int *empty);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
#6 lore raw

PATCH RESEND v17 6/13 namei: LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS: block magic-link resolution

In reply to Aleksa Sarai

/* Background. */
There has always been a special class of symlink-like objects in procfs (and a few other pseudo-filesystems) which allow for non-lexical resolution of paths using nd_jump_link(). These "magic-links" do not follow traditional mount namespace boundaries, and have been used consistently in container escape attacks because they can be used to trick unsuspecting privileged processes into resolving unexpected paths.

It is also non-trivial for userspace to unambiguously avoid resolving magic-links, because they do not have a reliable indication that they are a magic-link (in order to verify them you'd have to manually open the path given by readlink(2) and then verify that the two file descriptors reference the same underlying file, which is plagued with possible race conditions or supplementary attack scenarios).

It would therefore be very helpful for userspace to be able to avoid these symlinks easily, thus hopefully removing a tool from attackers' toolboxes.

This is part of a refresh of Al's AT_NO_JUMPS patchset[1] (which was a variation on David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[2], which in turn was based on the Capsicum project[3]).

/* Userspace API. */
LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS will be exposed to userspace through openat2(2).

/* Semantics. */
Unlike most other LOOKUP flags (most notably LOOKUP_FOLLOW), LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS applies to all components of the path.

With LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, any magic-link path component encountered during path resolution will yield -ELOOP. The handling of ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW for a trailing magic-link is identical to LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS.

LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS.

/* Testing. */
LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS is tested as part of the openat2(2) selftests.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

---
 fs/namei.c            | 10 +++++++++-
 include/linux/namei.h |  1 +
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/namei.c +9 -1
index 303731935eb2..415a897729c8 100644
@@ -867,13 +867,21 @@ static int nd_jump_root(struct nameidata *nd)
  */
 int nd_jump_link(struct path *path)
 {
+	int error = -ELOOP;
 	struct nameidata *nd = current->nameidata;
-	path_put(&nd->path);
 
+	if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS))
+		goto err;
+
+	path_put(&nd->path);
 	nd->path = *path;
 	nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
 	nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
 	return 0;
+
+err:
+	path_put(path);
+	return error;
 }
 
 static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd)
include/linux/namei.h +1 -0
index 0d86e75c04a7..1573b8493d98 100644
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ enum {LAST_NORM, LAST_ROOT, LAST_DOT, LAST_DOTDOT, LAST_BIND};
 
 /* Scoping flags for lookup. */
 #define LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS	0x010000 /* No symlink crossing. */
+#define LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS	0x020000 /* No nd_jump_link() crossing. */
 
 extern int path_pts(struct path *path);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
#7 lore raw

PATCH RESEND v17 7/13 namei: LOOKUP_NO_XDEV: block mountpoint crossing

In reply to Aleksa Sarai

/* Background. */
The need to contain path operations within a mountpoint has been a long-standing usecase that userspace has historically implemented manually with liberal usage of stat(). find, rsync, tar and many other programs implement these semantics -- but it'd be much simpler to have a fool-proof way of refusing to open a path if it crosses a mountpoint.

This is part of a refresh of Al's AT_NO_JUMPS patchset[1] (which was a variation on David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[2], which in turn was based on the Capsicum project[3]).

/* Userspace API. */
LOOKUP_NO_XDEV will be exposed to userspace through openat2(2).

/* Semantics. */
Unlike most other LOOKUP flags (most notably LOOKUP_FOLLOW), LOOKUP_NO_XDEV applies to all components of the path.

With LOOKUP_NO_XDEV, any path component which crosses a mount-point during path resolution (including "..") will yield an -EXDEV. Absolute paths, absolute symlinks, and magic-links will only yield an -EXDEV if the jump involved changing mount-points.

/* Testing. */
LOOKUP_NO_XDEV is tested as part of the openat2(2) selftests.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

---
 fs/namei.c            | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 include/linux/namei.h |  1 +
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +27 -4
index 415a897729c8..321c8ad5d6b3 100644
@@ -838,6 +838,11 @@ static inline void path_to_nameidata(const struct path *path,
 
 static int nd_jump_root(struct nameidata *nd)
 {
+	if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_XDEV)) {
+		/* Absolute path arguments to path_init() are allowed. */
+		if (nd->path.mnt != NULL && nd->path.mnt != nd->root.mnt)
+			return -EXDEV;
+	}
 	if (!nd->root.mnt) {
 		int error = set_root(nd);
 		if (error)
@@ -873,6 +878,12 @@ int nd_jump_link(struct path *path)
 	if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS))
 		goto err;
 
+	error = -EXDEV;
+	if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_XDEV)) {
+		if (nd->path.mnt != path->mnt)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
 	path_put(&nd->path);
 	nd->path = *path;
 	nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
@@ -1280,12 +1291,16 @@ static int follow_managed(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd)
 		break;
 	}
 
-	if (need_mntput && path->mnt == mnt)
-		mntput(path->mnt);
+	if (need_mntput) {
+		if (path->mnt == mnt)
+			mntput(path->mnt);
+		if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_XDEV))
+			ret = -EXDEV;
+		else
+			nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
+	}
 	if (ret == -EISDIR || !ret)
 		ret = 1;
-	if (need_mntput)
-		nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
 	if (unlikely(ret < 0))
 		path_put_conditional(path, nd);
 	return ret;
@@ -1342,6 +1357,8 @@ static bool __follow_mount_rcu(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
 		mounted = __lookup_mnt(path->mnt, path->dentry);
 		if (!mounted)
 			break;
+		if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_XDEV))
+			return false;
 		path->mnt = &mounted->mnt;
 		path->dentry = mounted->mnt.mnt_root;
 		nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
@@ -1388,6 +1405,8 @@ static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
 				return -ECHILD;
 			if (&mparent->mnt == nd->path.mnt)
 				break;
+			if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_XDEV))
+				return -ECHILD;
 			/* we know that mountpoint was pinned */
 			nd->path.dentry = mountpoint;
 			nd->path.mnt = &mparent->mnt;
@@ -1402,6 +1421,8 @@ static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
 			return -ECHILD;
 		if (!mounted)
 			break;
+		if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_XDEV))
+			return -ECHILD;
 		nd->path.mnt = &mounted->mnt;
 		nd->path.dentry = mounted->mnt.mnt_root;
 		inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
@@ -1500,6 +1521,8 @@ static int follow_dotdot(struct nameidata *nd)
 		}
 		if (!follow_up(&nd->path))
 			break;
+		if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_XDEV))
+			return -EXDEV;
 	}
 	follow_mount(&nd->path);
 	nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
include/linux/namei.h +1 -0
index 1573b8493d98..25ee88c4acb1 100644
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ enum {LAST_NORM, LAST_ROOT, LAST_DOT, LAST_DOTDOT, LAST_BIND};
 /* Scoping flags for lookup. */
 #define LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS	0x010000 /* No symlink crossing. */
 #define LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS	0x020000 /* No nd_jump_link() crossing. */
+#define LOOKUP_NO_XDEV		0x040000 /* No mountpoint crossing. */
 
 extern int path_pts(struct path *path);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
#8 lore raw

PATCH RESEND v17 8/13 namei: LOOKUP_BENEATH: O_BENEATH-like scoped resolution

In reply to Aleksa Sarai

/* Background. */
There are many circumstances when userspace wants to resolve a path and ensure that it doesn't go outside of a particular root directory during resolution. Obvious examples include archive extraction tools, as well as other security-conscious userspace programs. FreeBSD spun out O_BENEATH from their Capsicum project[1,2], so it also seems reasonable to implement similar functionality for Linux.

This is part of a refresh of Al's AT_NO_JUMPS patchset[3] (which was a variation on David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[4], which in turn was based on the Capsicum project[5]).

/* Userspace API. */
LOOKUP_BENEATH will be exposed to userspace through openat2(2).

/* Semantics. */
Unlike most other LOOKUP flags (most notably LOOKUP_FOLLOW), LOOKUP_BENEATH applies to all components of the path.

With LOOKUP_BENEATH, any path component which attempts to "escape" the starting point of the filesystem lookup (the dirfd passed to openat) will yield -EXDEV. Thus, all absolute paths and symlinks are disallowed.

Due to a security concern brought up by Jann[6], any ".." path components are also blocked. This restriction will be lifted in a future patch, but requires more work to ensure that permitting ".." is done safely.

Magic-link jumps are also blocked, because they can beam the path lookup across the starting point. It would be possible to detect and block only the "bad" crossings with path_is_under() checks, but it's unclear whether it makes sense to permit magic-links at all. However, userspace is recommended to pass LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS if they want to ensure that magic-link crossing is entirely disabled.

/* Testing. */
LOOKUP_BENEATH is tested as part of the openat2(2) selftests.

[1]: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D2808
[2]: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17547
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[4]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[6]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1jzNvxB+bfOBnERFGp=oMM0vHWuLD6EULmne3R6xa53w@mail.gmail.com/

---
 fs/namei.c            | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 include/linux/namei.h |  4 +++
 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +64 -6
index 321c8ad5d6b3..3f7bb22c375d 100644
@@ -641,6 +641,14 @@ static bool legitimize_links(struct nameidata *nd)
 
 static bool legitimize_root(struct nameidata *nd)
 {
+	/*
+	 * For scoped-lookups (where nd->root has been zeroed), we need to
+	 * restart the whole lookup from scratch -- because set_root() is wrong
+	 * for these lookups (nd->dfd is the root, not the filesystem root).
+	 */
+	if (!nd->root.mnt && (nd->flags & LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED))
+		return false;
+	/* Nothing to do if nd->root is zero or is managed by the VFS user. */
 	if (!nd->root.mnt || (nd->flags & LOOKUP_ROOT))
 		return true;
 	nd->flags |= LOOKUP_ROOT_GRABBED;
@@ -776,12 +784,27 @@ static int complete_walk(struct nameidata *nd)
 	int status;
 
 	if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
-		if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_ROOT))
+		/*
+		 * We don't want to zero nd->root for scoped-lookups or
+		 * externally-managed nd->root.
+		 */
+		if (!(nd->flags & (LOOKUP_ROOT | LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED)))
 			nd->root.mnt = NULL;
 		if (unlikely(unlazy_walk(nd)))
 			return -ECHILD;
 	}
 
+	if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED)) {
+		/*
+		 * Do a final check to ensure that the path didn't escape. Note
+		 * that this should already be guaranteed by all of the other
+		 * LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED checks (and delaying this check this late
+		 * does open the door to some possible timing-based attacks).
+		 */
+		if (WARN_ON(!path_is_under(&nd->path, &nd->root)))
+			return -EXDEV;
+	}
+
 	if (likely(!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_JUMPED)))
 		return 0;
 
@@ -802,6 +825,14 @@ static int set_root(struct nameidata *nd)
 {
 	struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
 
+	/*
+	 * Jumping to the real root in a scoped-lookup is a BUG in namei, but we
+	 * still have to ensure it doesn't happen because it will cause a breakout
+	 * from the dirfd.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON(nd->flags & LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED))
+		return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
+
 	if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
 		unsigned seq;
 
@@ -838,6 +869,8 @@ static inline void path_to_nameidata(const struct path *path,
 
 static int nd_jump_root(struct nameidata *nd)
 {
+	if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH))
+		return -EXDEV;
 	if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_XDEV)) {
 		/* Absolute path arguments to path_init() are allowed. */
 		if (nd->path.mnt != NULL && nd->path.mnt != nd->root.mnt)
@@ -883,6 +916,9 @@ int nd_jump_link(struct path *path)
 		if (nd->path.mnt != path->mnt)
 			goto err;
 	}
+	/* Not currently safe for scoped-lookups. */
+	if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED))
+		goto err;
 
 	path_put(&nd->path);
 	nd->path = *path;
@@ -1379,8 +1415,11 @@ static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
 	struct inode *inode = nd->inode;
 
 	while (1) {
-		if (path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root))
+		if (path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root)) {
+			if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH))
+				return -ECHILD;
 			break;
+		}
 		if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
 			struct dentry *old = nd->path.dentry;
 			struct dentry *parent = old->d_parent;
@@ -1510,9 +1549,12 @@ static int path_parent_directory(struct path *path)
 
 static int follow_dotdot(struct nameidata *nd)
 {
-	while(1) {
-		if (path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root))
+	while (1) {
+		if (path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root)) {
+			if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH))
+				return -EXDEV;
 			break;
+		}
 		if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
 			int ret = path_parent_directory(&nd->path);
 			if (ret)
@@ -1739,6 +1781,13 @@ static inline int handle_dots(struct nameidata *nd, int type)
 	if (type == LAST_DOTDOT) {
 		int error = 0;
 
+		/*
+		 * Scoped-lookup flags resolving ".." is not currently safe --
+		 * races can cause our parent to have moved outside of the root
+		 * and us to skip over it.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED))
+			return -EXDEV;
 		if (!nd->root.mnt) {
 			error = set_root(nd);
 			if (error)
@@ -2261,7 +2310,6 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
 			get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &nd->path);
 			nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
 		}
-		return s;
 	} else {
 		/* Caller must check execute permissions on the starting path component */
 		struct fd f = fdget_raw(nd->dfd);
@@ -2286,8 +2334,18 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
 			nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
 		}
 		fdput(f);
-		return s;
 	}
+	/* For scoped-lookups we need to set the root to the dirfd as well. */
+	if (flags & LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED) {
+		nd->root = nd->path;
+		if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
+			nd->root_seq = nd->seq;
+		} else {
+			path_get(&nd->root);
+			nd->flags |= LOOKUP_ROOT_GRABBED;
+		}
+	}
+	return s;
 }
 
 static const char *trailing_symlink(struct nameidata *nd)
include/linux/namei.h +4 -0
index 25ee88c4acb1..93dad378f1e8 100644
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_NAMEI_H
 #define _LINUX_NAMEI_H
 
+#include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/path.h>
 #include <linux/fcntl.h>
@@ -43,6 +44,9 @@ enum {LAST_NORM, LAST_ROOT, LAST_DOT, LAST_DOTDOT, LAST_BIND};
 #define LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS	0x010000 /* No symlink crossing. */
 #define LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS	0x020000 /* No nd_jump_link() crossing. */
 #define LOOKUP_NO_XDEV		0x040000 /* No mountpoint crossing. */
+#define LOOKUP_BENEATH		0x080000 /* No escaping from starting point. */
+/* LOOKUP_* flags which do scope-related checks based on the dirfd. */
+#define LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED LOOKUP_BENEATH
 
 extern int path_pts(struct path *path);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
#9 lore raw

PATCH RESEND v17 9/13 namei: LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: chroot-like scoped resolution

In reply to Aleksa Sarai

/* Background. */
Container runtimes or other administrative management processes will often interact with root filesystems while in the host mount namespace, because the cost of doing a chroot(2) on every operation is too prohibitive (especially in Go, which cannot safely use vfork). However, a malicious program can trick the management process into doing operations on files outside of the root filesystem through careful crafting of symlinks.

Most programs that need this feature have attempted to make this process safe, by doing all of the path resolution in userspace (with symlinks being scoped to the root of the malicious root filesystem). Unfortunately, this method is prone to foot-guns and usually such implementations have subtle security bugs.

Thus, what userspace needs is a way to resolve a path as though it were in a chroot(2) -- with all absolute symlinks being resolved relative to the dirfd root (and ".." components being stuck under the dirfd root). It is much simpler and more straight-forward to provide this functionality in-kernel (because it can be done far more cheaply and correctly).

More classical applications that also have this problem (which have their own potentially buggy userspace path sanitisation code) include web servers, archive extraction tools, network file servers, and so on.

/* Userspace API. */
LOOKUP_IN_ROOT will be exposed to userspace through openat2(2).

/* Semantics. */
Unlike most other LOOKUP flags (most notably LOOKUP_FOLLOW), LOOKUP_IN_ROOT applies to all components of the path.

With LOOKUP_IN_ROOT, any path component which attempts to cross the starting point of the pathname lookup (the dirfd passed to openat) will remain at the starting point. Thus, all absolute paths and symlinks will be scoped within the starting point.

There is a slight change in behaviour regarding pathnames -- if the pathname is absolute then the dirfd is still used as the root of resolution of LOOKUP_IN_ROOT is specified (this is to avoid obvious foot-guns, at the cost of a minor API inconsistency).

As with LOOKUP_BENEATH, Jann's security concern about ".."[1] applies to LOOKUP_IN_ROOT -- therefore ".." resolution is blocked. This restriction will be lifted in a future patch, but requires more work to ensure that permitting ".." is done safely.

Magic-link jumps are also blocked, because they can beam the path lookup across the starting point. It would be possible to detect and block only the "bad" crossings with path_is_under() checks, but it's unclear whether it makes sense to permit magic-links at all. However, userspace is recommended to pass LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS if they want to ensure that magic-link crossing is entirely disabled.

/* Testing. */
LOOKUP_IN_ROOT is tested as part of the openat2(2) selftests.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1jzNvxB+bfOBnERFGp=oMM0vHWuLD6EULmne3R6xa53w@mail.gmail.com/

Cc Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
---
 fs/namei.c            | 10 +++++++---
 include/linux/namei.h |  3 ++-
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +7 -3
index 3f7bb22c375d..a6196786db13 100644
@@ -2289,13 +2289,16 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
 
 	nd->m_seq = read_seqbegin(&mount_lock);
 
-	/* Figure out the starting path and root (if needed). */
-	if (*s == '/') {
+	/* Absolute pathname -- fetch the root (LOOKUP_IN_ROOT uses nd->dfd). */
+	if (*s == '/' && !(flags & LOOKUP_IN_ROOT)) {
 		error = nd_jump_root(nd);
 		if (unlikely(error))
 			return ERR_PTR(error);
 		return s;
-	} else if (nd->dfd == AT_FDCWD) {
+	}
+
+	/* Relative pathname -- get the starting-point it is relative to. */
+	if (nd->dfd == AT_FDCWD) {
 		if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
 			struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
 			unsigned seq;
@@ -2335,6 +2338,7 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
 		}
 		fdput(f);
 	}
+
 	/* For scoped-lookups we need to set the root to the dirfd as well. */
 	if (flags & LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED) {
 		nd->root = nd->path;
include/linux/namei.h +2 -1
index 93dad378f1e8..93151e47ec47 100644
@@ -45,8 +45,9 @@ enum {LAST_NORM, LAST_ROOT, LAST_DOT, LAST_DOTDOT, LAST_BIND};
 #define LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS	0x020000 /* No nd_jump_link() crossing. */
 #define LOOKUP_NO_XDEV		0x040000 /* No mountpoint crossing. */
 #define LOOKUP_BENEATH		0x080000 /* No escaping from starting point. */
+#define LOOKUP_IN_ROOT		0x100000 /* Treat dirfd as fs root. */
 /* LOOKUP_* flags which do scope-related checks based on the dirfd. */
-#define LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED LOOKUP_BENEATH
+#define LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED (LOOKUP_BENEATH | LOOKUP_IN_ROOT)
 
 extern int path_pts(struct path *path);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
#10 lore raw

PATCH RESEND v17 10/13 namei: LOOKUP_{IN_ROOT,BENEATH}: permit limited ".." resolution

In reply to Aleksa Sarai

Allow LOOKUP_BENEATH and LOOKUP_IN_ROOT to safely permit ".." resolution (in the case of LOOKUP_BENEATH the resolution will still fail if ".." resolution would resolve a path outside of the root -- while LOOKUP_IN_ROOT will chroot(2)-style scope it). Magic-link jumps are still disallowed entirely[*].

As Jann explains[1,2], the need for this patch (and the original no-".." restriction) is explained by observing there is a fairly easy-to-exploit race condition with chroot(2) (and thus by extension LOOKUP_IN_ROOT and LOOKUP_BENEATH if ".." is allowed) where a rename(2) of a path can be used to "skip over" nd->root and thus escape to the filesystem above nd->root.

  thread1 [attacker]:
    for (;;)
      renameat2(AT_FDCWD, "/a/b/c", AT_FDCWD, "/a/d", RENAME_EXCHANGE);
  thread2 [victim]:
    for (;;)
      openat2(dirb, "b/c/../../etc/shadow",
              { .flags = O_PATH, .resolve = RESOLVE_IN_ROOT } );

With fairly significant regularity, thread2 will resolve to "/etc/shadow" rather than "/a/b/etc/shadow". There is also a similar (though somewhat more privileged) attack using MS_MOVE.

With this patch, such cases will be detected *during* ".." resolution and will return -EAGAIN for userspace to decide to either retry or abort the lookup. It should be noted that ".." is the weak point of chroot(2) -- walking *into* a subdirectory tautologically cannot result in you walking *outside* nd->root (except through a bind-mount or magic-link). There is also no other way for a directory's parent to change (which is the primary worry with ".." resolution here) other than a rename or MS_MOVE.

The primary reason for deferring to userspace with -EAGAIN is that an in-kernel retry loop (or doing a path_is_under() check after re-taking the relevant seqlocks) can become unreasonably expensive on machines with lots of VFS activity (nfsd can cause lots of rename_lock updates). Thus it should be up to userspace how many times they wish to retry the lookup -- the selftests for this attack indicate that there is a ~35% chance of the lookup succeeding on the first try even with an attacker thrashing rename_lock.

A variant of the above attack is included in the selftests for openat2(2) later in this patch series. I've run this test on several machines for several days and no instances of a breakout were detected. While this is not concrete proof that this is safe, when combined with the above argument it should lend some trustworthiness to this construction.

[*] It may be acceptable in the future to do a path_is_under() check for
magic-links after they are resolved. However this seems unlikely to be a feature that people *really* need -- it can be added later if it turns out a lot of people want it.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1jzNvxB+bfOBnERFGp=oMM0vHWuLD6EULmne3R6xa53w@mail.gmail.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez30WJhbsro2HOc_DR7V91M+hNFzBP5ogRMZaxbAORvqzg@mail.gmail.com/

---
 fs/namei.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +24 -13
index a6196786db13..88c706e459f6 100644
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ struct nameidata {
 	struct path	root;
 	struct inode	*inode; /* path.dentry.d_inode */
 	unsigned int	flags;
-	unsigned	seq, m_seq;
+	unsigned	seq, m_seq, r_seq;
 	int		last_type;
 	unsigned	depth;
 	int		total_link_count;
@@ -1781,22 +1781,30 @@ static inline int handle_dots(struct nameidata *nd, int type)
 	if (type == LAST_DOTDOT) {
 		int error = 0;
 
-		/*
-		 * Scoped-lookup flags resolving ".." is not currently safe --
-		 * races can cause our parent to have moved outside of the root
-		 * and us to skip over it.
-		 */
-		if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED))
-			return -EXDEV;
 		if (!nd->root.mnt) {
 			error = set_root(nd);
 			if (error)
 				return error;
 		}
-		if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
-			return follow_dotdot_rcu(nd);
-		} else
-			return follow_dotdot(nd);
+		if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
+			error = follow_dotdot_rcu(nd);
+		else
+			error = follow_dotdot(nd);
+		if (error)
+			return error;
+
+		if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_IS_SCOPED)) {
+			/*
+			 * If there was a racing rename or mount along our
+			 * path, then we can't be sure that ".." hasn't jumped
+			 * above nd->root (and so userspace should retry or use
+			 * some fallback).
+			 */
+			if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&mount_lock, nd->m_seq)))
+				return -EAGAIN;
+			if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, nd->r_seq)))
+				return -EAGAIN;
+		}
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -2266,6 +2274,10 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
 	nd->last_type = LAST_ROOT; /* if there are only slashes... */
 	nd->flags = flags | LOOKUP_JUMPED | LOOKUP_PARENT;
 	nd->depth = 0;
+
+	nd->m_seq = read_seqbegin(&mount_lock);
+	nd->r_seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
+
 	if (flags & LOOKUP_ROOT) {
 		struct dentry *root = nd->root.dentry;
 		struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
@@ -2287,7 +2299,6 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
 	nd->path.mnt = NULL;
 	nd->path.dentry = NULL;
 
-	nd->m_seq = read_seqbegin(&mount_lock);
 
 	/* Absolute pathname -- fetch the root (LOOKUP_IN_ROOT uses nd->dfd). */
 	if (*s == '/' && !(flags & LOOKUP_IN_ROOT)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
#11 lore raw

PATCH RESEND v17 11/13 open: introduce openat2(2) syscall

In reply to Aleksa Sarai

/* Background. */
For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown flags are present[1].

This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road to being added to openat(2).

Userspace also has a hard time figuring out whether a particular flag is supported on a particular kernel. While it is now possible with contemporary kernels (thanks to [3]), older kernels will expose unknown flag bits through fcntl(F_GETFL). Giving a clear -EINVAL during openat(2) time matches modern syscall designs and is far more fool-proof.

In addition, the newly-added path resolution restriction LOOKUP flags (which we would like to expose to user-space) don't feel related to the pre-existing O_* flag set -- they affect all components of path lookup. We'd therefore like to add a new flag argument.

Adding a new syscall allows us to finally fix the flag-ignoring problem, and we can make it extensible enough so that we will hopefully never need an openat3(2).

/* Syscall Prototype. */
/*
* open_how is an extensible structure (similar in interface to
* clone3(2) or sched_setattr(2)). The size parameter must be set to
* sizeof(struct open_how), to allow for future extensions. All future
* extensions will be appended to open_how, with their zero value
* acting as a no-op default.
*/
struct open_how { /* ... */ };

int openat2(int dfd, const char *pathname,

              struct open_how *how, size_t size);

/* Description. */
The initial version of 'struct open_how' contains the following fields:

flags
Used to specify openat(2)-style flags. However, any unknown flag bits or otherwise incorrect flag combinations (like O_PATH|O_RDWR) will result in -EINVAL. In addition, this field is 64-bits wide to allow for more O_ flags than currently permitted with openat(2).

mode
The file mode for O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.

Must be set to zero if flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.

__padding
Must be set to all zeroes.

resolve
Restrict path resolution (in contrast to O_* flags they affect all path components). The current set of flags are as follows (at the moment, all of the RESOLVE_ flags are implemented as just passing the corresponding LOOKUP_ flag).

RESOLVE_NO_XDEV => LOOKUP_NO_XDEV
RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS
RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS
RESOLVE_BENEATH => LOOKUP_BENEATH
RESOLVE_IN_ROOT => LOOKUP_IN_ROOT

open_how does not contain an embedded size field, because it is of little benefit (userspace can figure out the kernel open_how size at runtime fairly easily without it).

Note that as a result of the new how->flags handling, O_PATH|O_TMPFILE is no longer permitted for openat(2). As far as I can tell, this has always been a bug and appears to not be used by userspace (and I've not seen any problems on my machines by disallowing it). If it turns out this breaks something, we can special-case it and only permit it for openat(2) but not openat2(2).

/* Testing. */
In a follow-up patch there are over 200 selftests which ensure that this syscall has the correct semantics and will correctly handle several attack scenarios.

In addition, I've written a userspace library[4] which provides convenient wrappers around openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) (this is necessary because no other syscalls support RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, and thus lots of care must be taken when using RESOLVE_IN_ROOT'd file descriptors with other syscalls). During the development of this patch, I've run numerous verification tests using libpathrs (showing that the API is reasonably usable by userspace).

/* Future Work. */
Additional RESOLVE_ flags have been suggested during the review period. These can be easily implemented separately (such as blocking auto-mount during resolution).

Furthermore, there are some other proposed changes to the openat(2) interface (the most obvious example is magic-link hardening[5]) which would be a good opportunity to add a way for userspace to restrict how O_PATH file descriptors can be re-opened.

[1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/588444/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFyyxJL1LyXZeBsf2ypriraj5ut1XkNDsunRBqgVjZU_6Q@mail.gmail.com
[3]: commit 629e014bb834 ("fs: completely ignore unknown open flags")
[4]: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17523
[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

---
 CREDITS                                     |   4 +-
 arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl      |   1 +
 arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl                  |   1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h             |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h           |   2 +
 arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl       |   1 +
 arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl       |   1 +
 arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl |   1 +
 arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl   |   1 +
 arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl   |   1 +
 arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl   |   1 +
 arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl     |   1 +
 arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl    |   1 +
 arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl       |   1 +
 arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl         |   1 +
 arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl      |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl      |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl      |   1 +
 arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl     |   1 +
 fs/open.c                                   | 149 +++++++++++++++-----
 include/linux/fcntl.h                       |  12 +-
 include/linux/syscalls.h                    |   3 +
 include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h           |   5 +-
 include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h                  |  40 ++++++
 24 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
CREDITS +3 -1
index 031605d46b4d..a048e001d726 100644
@@ -3301,7 +3301,9 @@ S: France
 N: Aleksa Sarai
 E: [email protected]
 W: https://www.cyphar.com/
-D: `pids` cgroup subsystem
+D: /sys/fs/cgroup/pids
+D: openat2(2)
+S: Sydney, Australia
 
 N: Dipankar Sarma
 E: [email protected]
arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 728fe028c02c..9f374f7d9514 100644
@@ -475,3 +475,4 @@
 543	common	fspick				sys_fspick
 544	common	pidfd_open			sys_pidfd_open
 # 545 reserved for clone3
+547	common	openat2				sys_openat2
arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 6da7dc4d79cc..4ba54bc7e19a 100644
@@ -449,3 +449,4 @@
 433	common	fspick				sys_fspick
 434	common	pidfd_open			sys_pidfd_open
 435	common	clone3				sys_clone3
+437	common	openat2				sys_openat2
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h +1 -1
index 2629a68b8724..8aa00ccb0b96 100644
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 #define __ARM_NR_compat_set_tls		(__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 5)
 #define __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END		(__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 0x800)
 
-#define __NR_compat_syscalls		436
+#define __NR_compat_syscalls		438
 #endif
 
 #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h +2 -0
index 94ab29cf4f00..57f6f592d460 100644
@@ -879,6 +879,8 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_fspick, sys_fspick)
 __SYSCALL(__NR_pidfd_open, sys_pidfd_open)
 #define __NR_clone3 435
 __SYSCALL(__NR_clone3, sys_clone3)
+#define __NR_openat2 437
+__SYSCALL(__NR_openat2, sys_openat2)
 
 /*
  * Please add new compat syscalls above this comment and update
arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 36d5faf4c86c..8d36f2e2dc89 100644
@@ -356,3 +356,4 @@
 433	common	fspick				sys_fspick
 434	common	pidfd_open			sys_pidfd_open
 # 435 reserved for clone3
+437	common	openat2				sys_openat2
arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index a88a285a0e5f..2559925f1924 100644
@@ -435,3 +435,4 @@
 433	common	fspick				sys_fspick
 434	common	pidfd_open			sys_pidfd_open
 # 435 reserved for clone3
+437	common	openat2				sys_openat2
arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 09b0cd7dab0a..c04385e60833 100644
@@ -441,3 +441,4 @@
 433	common	fspick				sys_fspick
 434	common	pidfd_open			sys_pidfd_open
 435	common	clone3				sys_clone3
+437	common	openat2				sys_openat2
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl +1 -0
index e7c5ab38e403..68c9ec06851f 100644
@@ -374,3 +374,4 @@
 433	n32	fspick				sys_fspick
 434	n32	pidfd_open			sys_pidfd_open
 435	n32	clone3				__sys_clone3
+437	n32	openat2				sys_openat2
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl +1 -0
index 13cd66581f3b..42a72d010050 100644
@@ -350,3 +350,4 @@
 433	n64	fspick				sys_fspick
 434	n64	pidfd_open			sys_pidfd_open
 435	n64	clone3				__sys_clone3
+437	n64	openat2				sys_openat2
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl +1 -0
index 353539ea4140..f114c4aed0ed 100644
@@ -423,3 +423,4 @@
 433	o32	fspick				sys_fspick
 434	o32	pidfd_open			sys_pidfd_open
 435	o32	clone3				__sys_clone3
+437	o32	openat2				sys_openat2
arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 285ff516150c..b550ae9a7fea 100644
@@ -433,3 +433,4 @@
 433	common	fspick				sys_fspick
 434	common	pidfd_open			sys_pidfd_open
 435	common	clone3				sys_clone3_wrapper
+437	common	openat2				sys_openat2
arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 43f736ed47f2..a8b5ecb5b602 100644
@@ -517,3 +517,4 @@
 433	common	fspick				sys_fspick
 434	common	pidfd_open			sys_pidfd_open
 435	nospu	clone3				ppc_clone3
+437	common	openat2				sys_openat2
arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 3054e9c035a3..16b571c06161 100644
@@ -438,3 +438,4 @@
 433  common	fspick			sys_fspick			sys_fspick
 434  common	pidfd_open		sys_pidfd_open			sys_pidfd_open
 435  common	clone3			sys_clone3			sys_clone3
+437  common	openat2			sys_openat2			sys_openat2
arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index b5ed26c4c005..a7185cc18626 100644
@@ -438,3 +438,4 @@
 433	common	fspick				sys_fspick
 434	common	pidfd_open			sys_pidfd_open
 # 435 reserved for clone3
+437	common	openat2				sys_openat2
arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 8c8cc7537fb2..b11c19552022 100644
@@ -481,3 +481,4 @@
 433	common	fspick				sys_fspick
 434	common	pidfd_open			sys_pidfd_open
 # 435 reserved for clone3
+437	common	openat2			sys_openat2
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +1 -0
index 3fe02546aed3..e5c022e9a5c4 100644
@@ -440,3 +440,4 @@
 433	i386	fspick			sys_fspick			__ia32_sys_fspick
 434	i386	pidfd_open		sys_pidfd_open			__ia32_sys_pidfd_open
 435	i386	clone3			sys_clone3			__ia32_sys_clone3
+437	i386	openat2			sys_openat2			__ia32_sys_openat2
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
index c29976eca4a8..9035647ef236 100644
@@ -357,6 +357,7 @@
 433	common	fspick			__x64_sys_fspick
 434	common	pidfd_open		__x64_sys_pidfd_open
 435	common	clone3			__x64_sys_clone3/ptregs
+437	common	openat2			__x64_sys_openat2
 
 #
 # x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 25f4de729a6d..f0a68013c038 100644
@@ -406,3 +406,4 @@
 433	common	fspick				sys_fspick
 434	common	pidfd_open			sys_pidfd_open
 435	common	clone3				sys_clone3
+437	common	openat2				sys_openat2
fs/open.c +115 -34

223 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/fcntl.h +11 -1
index d019df946cb2..f2eb05bd3af3 100644
@@ -2,15 +2,25 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_FCNTL_H
 #define _LINUX_FCNTL_H
 
+#include <linux/stat.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/fcntl.h>
 
-/* list of all valid flags for the open/openat flags argument: */
+/* List of all valid flags for the open/openat flags argument: */
 #define VALID_OPEN_FLAGS \
 	(O_RDONLY | O_WRONLY | O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOCTTY | O_TRUNC | \
 	 O_APPEND | O_NDELAY | O_NONBLOCK | O_NDELAY | __O_SYNC | O_DSYNC | \
 	 FASYNC	| O_DIRECT | O_LARGEFILE | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | \
 	 O_NOATIME | O_CLOEXEC | O_PATH | __O_TMPFILE)
 
+/* List of all valid flags for the how->upgrade_mask argument: */
+#define VALID_UPGRADE_FLAGS \
+	(UPGRADE_NOWRITE | UPGRADE_NOREAD)
+
+/* List of all valid flags for the how->resolve argument: */
+#define VALID_RESOLVE_FLAGS \
+	(RESOLVE_NO_XDEV | RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS | RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS | \
+	 RESOLVE_BENEATH | RESOLVE_IN_ROOT)
+
 #ifndef force_o_largefile
 #define force_o_largefile() (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T))
 #endif
include/linux/syscalls.h +3 -0
index f7c561c4dcdd..808f103b7a62 100644
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ struct rseq;
 union bpf_attr;
 struct io_uring_params;
 struct clone_args;
+struct open_how;
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/aio_abi.h>
@@ -439,6 +440,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchownat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, uid_t user,
 asmlinkage long sys_fchown(unsigned int fd, uid_t user, gid_t group);
 asmlinkage long sys_openat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags,
 			   umode_t mode);
+asmlinkage long sys_openat2(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
+			    struct open_how *how, size_t size);
 asmlinkage long sys_close(unsigned int fd);
 asmlinkage long sys_vhangup(void);
 
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +4 -1
index 1fc8faa6e973..d4122c091472 100644
@@ -851,8 +851,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_pidfd_open, sys_pidfd_open)
 __SYSCALL(__NR_clone3, sys_clone3)
 #endif
 
+#define __NR_openat2 437
+__SYSCALL(__NR_openat2, sys_openat2)
+
 #undef __NR_syscalls
-#define __NR_syscalls 436
+#define __NR_syscalls 438
 
 /*
  * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h +40 -0
index 1d338357df8a..6b00ad378fb7 100644
@@ -93,5 +93,45 @@
 
 #define AT_RECURSIVE		0x8000	/* Apply to the entire subtree */
 
+/*
+ * Arguments for how openat2(2) should open the target path. If @resolve is
+ * zero, then openat2(2) operates very similarly to openat(2).
+ *
+ * However, unlike openat(2), unknown bits in @flags result in -EINVAL rather
+ * than being silently ignored. @mode must be zero unless one of {O_CREAT,
+ * O_TMPFILE} are set.
+ *
+ * @flags: O_* flags.
+ * @mode: O_CREAT/O_TMPFILE file mode.
+ * @resolve: RESOLVE_* flags.
+ */
+struct open_how {
+	__aligned_u64 flags;
+	__u16 mode;
+	__u16 __padding[3]; /* must be zeroed */
+	__aligned_u64 resolve;
+};
+
+#define OPEN_HOW_SIZE_VER0	24 /* sizeof first published struct */
+#define OPEN_HOW_SIZE_LATEST	OPEN_HOW_SIZE_VER0
+
+/* how->resolve flags for openat2(2). */
+#define RESOLVE_NO_XDEV		0x01 /* Block mount-point crossings
+					(includes bind-mounts). */
+#define RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS	0x02 /* Block traversal through procfs-style
+					"magic-links". */
+#define RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS	0x04 /* Block traversal through all symlinks
+					(implies OEXT_NO_MAGICLINKS) */
+#define RESOLVE_BENEATH		0x08 /* Block "lexical" trickery like
+					"..", symlinks, and absolute
+					paths which escape the dirfd. */
+#define RESOLVE_IN_ROOT		0x10 /* Make all jumps to "/" and ".."
+					be scoped inside the dirfd
+					(similar to chroot(2)). */
+
+/* how->upgrade flags for openat2(2). */
+/* First bit is reserved for a future UPGRADE_NOEXEC flag. */
+#define UPGRADE_NOREAD		0x02 /* Block re-opening with MAY_READ. */
+#define UPGRADE_NOWRITE		0x04 /* Block re-opening with MAY_WRITE. */
 
 #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_FCNTL_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
#12 lore raw

PATCH RESEND v17 12/13 selftests: add openat2(2) selftests

In reply to Aleksa Sarai

Test all of the various openat2(2) flags. A small stress-test of a symlink-rename attack is included to show that the protections against ".."-based attacks are sufficient.

The main things these self-tests are enforcing are:

* The struct+usize ABI for openat2(2) and copy_struct_from_user() to ensure that upgrades will be handled gracefully (in addition, ensuring that misaligned structures are also handled correctly).

* The -EINVAL checks for openat2(2) are all correctly handled to avoid userspace passing unknown or conflicting flag sets (most importantly, ensuring that invalid flag combinations are checked).

* All of the RESOLVE_* semantics (including errno values) are correctly handled with various combinations of paths and flags.

* RESOLVE_IN_ROOT correctly protects against the symlink rename(2) attack that has been responsible for several CVEs (and likely will be responsible for several more).

---
 tools/testing/selftests/Makefile              |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore    |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile      |   8 +
 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c     | 109 ++++
 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h     | 107 ++++
 .../testing/selftests/openat2/openat2_test.c  | 316 +++++++++++
 .../selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c    | 160 ++++++
 .../testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c  | 523 ++++++++++++++++++
 8 files changed, 1225 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/openat2_test.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c
tools/testing/selftests/Makefile +1 -0
index 4cdbae6f4e61..28996856ed5e 100644
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ TARGETS += powerpc
 TARGETS += proc
 TARGETS += pstore
 TARGETS += ptrace
+TARGETS += openat2
 TARGETS += rseq
 TARGETS += rtc
 TARGETS += seccomp
tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore new file +1 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bd68f6c3fd07
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+/*_test
tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile new file +8 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4b93b1417b86
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+
+CFLAGS += -Wall -O2 -g -fsanitize=address -fsanitize=undefined
+TEST_GEN_PROGS := openat2_test resolve_test rename_attack_test
+
+include ../lib.mk
+
+$(TEST_GEN_PROGS): helpers.c
tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c new file +109 -0

109 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h new file +107 -0

107 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/openat2/openat2_test.c new file +316 -0

316 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c new file +160 -0

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tools/testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c new file +523 -0

523 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.24.0
#13 lore raw

PATCH RESEND v17 13/13 Documentation: path-lookup: include new LOOKUP flags

In reply to Aleksa Sarai

Now that we have new LOOKUP flags, we should document them in the relevant path-walking documentation. And now that we've settled on a common name for nd_jump_link() style symlinks ("magic links"), use that term where magic-link semantics are described.

---
 Documentation/filesystems/path-lookup.rst | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Documentation/filesystems/path-lookup.rst +62 -6
index 434a07b0002b..a3216979298b 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ It has subsequently been updated to reflect changes in the kernel
 including:
 
 - per-directory parallel name lookup.
+- ``openat2()`` resolution restriction flags.
 
 Introduction to pathname lookup
 ===============================
@@ -235,6 +236,13 @@ renamed.  If ``d_lookup`` finds that a rename happened while it
 unsuccessfully scanned a chain in the hash table, it simply tries
 again.
 
+``rename_lock`` is also used to detect and defend against potential attacks
+against ``LOOKUP_BENEATH`` and ``LOOKUP_IN_ROOT`` when resolving ".." (where
+the parent directory is moved outside the root, bypassing the ``path_equal()``
+check). If ``rename_lock`` is updated during the lookup and the path encounters
+a "..", a potential attack occurred and ``handle_dots()`` will bail out with
+``-EAGAIN``.
+
 inode->i_rwsem
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
@@ -348,6 +356,13 @@ any changes to any mount points while stepping up.  This locking is
 needed to stabilize the link to the mounted-on dentry, which the
 refcount on the mount itself doesn't ensure.
 
+``mount_lock`` is also used to detect and defend against potential attacks
+against ``LOOKUP_BENEATH`` and ``LOOKUP_IN_ROOT`` when resolving ".." (where
+the parent directory is moved outside the root, bypassing the ``path_equal()``
+check). If ``mount_lock`` is updated during the lookup and the path encounters
+a "..", a potential attack occurred and ``handle_dots()`` will bail out with
+``-EAGAIN``.
+
 RCU
 ~~~
 
@@ -405,6 +420,10 @@ is requested.  Keeping a reference in the ``nameidata`` ensures that
 only one root is in effect for the entire path walk, even if it races
 with a ``chroot()`` system call.
 
+It should be noted that in the case of ``LOOKUP_IN_ROOT`` or
+``LOOKUP_BENEATH``, the effective root becomes the directory file descriptor
+passed to ``openat2()`` (which exposes these ``LOOKUP_`` flags).
+
 The root is needed when either of two conditions holds: (1) either the
 pathname or a symbolic link starts with a "'/'", or (2) a "``..``"
 component is being handled, since "``..``" from the root must always stay
@@ -1149,7 +1168,7 @@ so ``NULL`` is returned to indicate that the symlink can be released and
 the stack frame discarded.
 
 The other case involves things in ``/proc`` that look like symlinks but
-aren't really::
+aren't really (and are therefore commonly referred to as "magic-links")::
 
      $ ls -l /proc/self/fd/1
      lrwx------ 1 neilb neilb 64 Jun 13 10:19 /proc/self/fd/1 -> /dev/pts/4
@@ -1286,7 +1305,9 @@ A few flags
 A suitable way to wrap up this tour of pathname walking is to list
 the various flags that can be stored in the ``nameidata`` to guide the
 lookup process.  Many of these are only meaningful on the final
-component, others reflect the current state of the pathname lookup.
+component, others reflect the current state of the pathname lookup, and some
+apply restrictions to all path components encountered in the path lookup.
+
 And then there is ``LOOKUP_EMPTY``, which doesn't fit conceptually with
 the others.  If this is not set, an empty pathname causes an error
 very early on.  If it is set, empty pathnames are not considered to be
@@ -1310,13 +1331,48 @@ longer needed.
 ``LOOKUP_JUMPED`` means that the current dentry was chosen not because
 it had the right name but for some other reason.  This happens when
 following "``..``", following a symlink to ``/``, crossing a mount point
-or accessing a "``/proc/$PID/fd/$FD``" symlink.  In this case the
-filesystem has not been asked to revalidate the name (with
-``d_revalidate()``).  In such cases the inode may still need to be
-revalidated, so ``d_op->d_weak_revalidate()`` is called if
+or accessing a "``/proc/$PID/fd/$FD``" symlink (also known as a "magic
+link"). In this case the filesystem has not been asked to revalidate the
+name (with ``d_revalidate()``).  In such cases the inode may still need
+to be revalidated, so ``d_op->d_weak_revalidate()`` is called if
 ``LOOKUP_JUMPED`` is set when the look completes - which may be at the
 final component or, when creating, unlinking, or renaming, at the penultimate component.
 
+Resolution-restriction flags
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+In order to allow userspace to protect itself against certain race conditions
+and attack scenarios involving changing path components, a series of flags are
+available which apply restrictions to all path components encountered during
+path lookup. These flags are exposed through ``openat2()``'s ``resolve`` field.
+
+``LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS`` blocks all symlink traversals (including magic-links).
+This is distinctly different from ``LOOKUP_FOLLOW``, because the latter only
+relates to restricting the following of trailing symlinks.
+
+``LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS`` blocks all magic-link traversals. Filesystems must
+ensure that they return errors from ``nd_jump_link()``, because that is how
+``LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS`` and other magic-link restrictions are implemented.
+
+``LOOKUP_NO_XDEV`` blocks all ``vfsmount`` traversals (this includes both
+bind-mounts and ordinary mounts). Note that the ``vfsmount`` which contains the
+lookup is determined by the first mountpoint the path lookup reaches --
+absolute paths start with the ``vfsmount`` of ``/``, and relative paths start
+with the ``dfd``'s ``vfsmount``. Magic-links are only permitted if the
+``vfsmount`` of the path is unchanged.
+
+``LOOKUP_BENEATH`` blocks any path components which resolve outside the
+starting point of the resolution. This is done by blocking ``nd_jump_root()``
+as well as blocking ".." if it would jump outside the starting point.
+``rename_lock`` and ``mount_lock`` are used to detect attacks against the
+resolution of "..". Magic-links are also blocked.
+
+``LOOKUP_IN_ROOT`` resolves all path components as though the starting point
+were the filesystem root. ``nd_jump_root()`` brings the resolution back to to
+the starting point, and ".." at the starting point will act as a no-op. As with
+``LOOKUP_BENEATH``, ``rename_lock`` and ``mount_lock`` are used to detect
+attacks against ".." resolution. Magic-links are also blocked.
+
 Final-component flags
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0