x86/insn-eval: Add support for 64-bit kernel mode
Subsystems (6)
PATCH v3 1/4 x86/insn-eval: Add support for 64-bit kernel mode
To support evaluating 64-bit kernel mode instructions:
Replace existing checks for user_64bit_mode() with a new helper that checks whether code is being executed in either 64-bit kernel mode or 64-bit user mode.
Select the GS base depending on whether the instruction is being evaluated in kernel mode.
---
Notes:
v2:
no changes
v3:
no changesarch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h +13 -0
@@ -159,6 +159,19 @@ static inline bool user_64bit_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)#endif } +/* +* Determine whether the register set came from any context that is running in +* 64-bit mode. +*/ +static inline bool any_64bit_mode (struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +return !user_mode (regs) ||user_64bit_mode (regs); +#else +return false; +#endif +} +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 #define current_user_stack_pointer () current_pt_regs()->sp#define compat_user_stack_pointer () current_pt_regs()->sp
arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c +15 -11
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ static bool check_seg_overrides(struct insn *insn, int regoff)*/ static int resolve_default_seg (struct insn *insn,struct pt_regs *regs,int off) { -if (user_64bit_mode (regs)) +if (any_64bit_mode (regs))return INAT_SEG_REG_IGNORE ;/* * Resolve the default segment register as described in Section 3.7.4
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ static int resolve_seg_reg(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs, int regoff)* which may be invalid at this point. */ if (regoff == offsetof(struct pt_regs , ip)) { -if (user_64bit_mode (regs)) +if (any_64bit_mode (regs))return INAT_SEG_REG_IGNORE ;else return INAT_SEG_REG_CS ;
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ static int resolve_seg_reg(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs, int regoff)* In long mode, segment override prefixes are ignored, except for * overrides for FS and GS. */ -if (user_64bit_mode (regs)) { +if (any_64bit_mode (regs)) {if (idx !=INAT_SEG_REG_FS && idx !=INAT_SEG_REG_GS ) idx =INAT_SEG_REG_IGNORE ;
@@ -646,23 +646,27 @@ unsigned long insn_get_seg_base(struct pt_regs *regs, int seg_reg_idx)*/ return (unsigned long )(sel <<4 ); -if (user_64bit_mode (regs)) { +if (any_64bit_mode (regs)) {/* * Only FS or GS will have a base address, the rest of * the segments' bases are forced to 0. */ unsigned long base; -if (seg_reg_idx ==INAT_SEG_REG_FS ) +if (seg_reg_idx ==INAT_SEG_REG_FS ) {rdmsrl (MSR_FS_BASE , base); -else if (seg_reg_idx ==INAT_SEG_REG_GS ) + }else if (seg_reg_idx ==INAT_SEG_REG_GS ) {/* * swapgs was called at the kernel entry point. Thus, * MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE will have the user-space GS base. */ -rdmsrl (MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE , base); -else +if (user_mode (regs)) +rdmsrl (MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE , base); +else +rdmsrl (MSR_GS_BASE , base); + }else { base =0 ; + }return base; }
@@ -703,7 +707,7 @@ static unsigned long get_seg_limit(struct pt_regs *regs, int seg_reg_idx)if (sel <0 )return 0 ; -if (user_64bit_mode (regs) ||v8086_mode (regs)) +if (any_64bit_mode (regs) ||v8086_mode (regs))return -1L ;if (!sel)
@@ -948,7 +952,7 @@ static int get_eff_addr_modrm(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs,* following instruction. */ if (*regoff == -EDOM ) { -if (user_64bit_mode (regs)) +if (any_64bit_mode (regs)) tmp = regs->ip + insn->length;else tmp =0 ;
@@ -1250,7 +1254,7 @@ static void __user *get_addr_ref_32(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs)* After computed, the effective address is treated as an unsigned * quantity. */ -if (!user_64bit_mode (regs) && ((unsigned int )eff_addr > seg_limit)) +if (!any_64bit_mode (regs) && ((unsigned int )eff_addr > seg_limit)) goto out;/*
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0.432.g9d3f5f5b63-goog
PATCH v3 2/4 x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP
A frequent cause of #GP exceptions are memory accesses to non-canonical addresses. Unlike #PF, #GP doesn't come with a fault address in CR2, so the kernel doesn't currently print the fault address for #GP. Luckily, we already have the necessary infrastructure for decoding X86 instructions and computing the memory address that is being accessed; hook it up to the #GP handler so that we can figure out whether the #GP looks like it was caused by a non-canonical address, and if so, print that address.
While it is already possible to compute the faulting address manually by disassembling the opcode dump and evaluating the instruction against the register dump, this should make it slightly easier to identify crashes at a glance.
---
Notes:
v2:
- print different message for segment-related GP (Borislav)
- rewrite check for non-canonical address (Sean)
- make it clear we don't know for sure why the GP happened (Andy)
v3:
- change message format to one line (Borislav)
I have already sent a patch to syzkaller that relaxes their parsing of GPF messages (https://github.com/google/syzkaller/commit/432c7650) such that changes like the one in this patch don't break it.
That patch has already made its way into syzbot's syzkaller instances according to <https://syzkaller.appspot.com/upstream>.
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +53 -3
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@#include <asm/mpx.h> #include <asm/vm86.h> #include <asm/umip.h> +#include <asm/insn.h> +#include <asm/insn-eval.h> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 #include <asm/x86_init.h>
@@ -509,11 +511,45 @@ dotraplinkage void do_bounds(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)do_trap (X86_TRAP_BR ,SIGSEGV ,"bounds" , regs, error_code,0 ,NULL ); } +/* +* On 64-bit, if an uncaught #GP occurs while dereferencing a non-canonical +* address, return that address. +*/ +static unsigned long get_kernel_gp_address (struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +u8 insn_bytes[MAX_INSN_SIZE ]; +struct insn insn; +unsigned long addr_ref; + +if (probe_kernel_read (insn_bytes, (void *)regs->ip,MAX_INSN_SIZE )) +return 0 ; + +kernel_insn_init (&insn, insn_bytes,MAX_INSN_SIZE ); +insn_get_modrm (&insn); +insn_get_sib (&insn); + addr_ref = (unsigned long )insn_get_addr_ref (&insn, regs); + +/* Bail out if insn_get_addr_ref() failed or we got a kernel address. */ +if (addr_ref >= ~__VIRTUAL_MASK) +return 0 ; + +/* Bail out if the entire operand is in the canonical user half. */ +if (addr_ref + insn.opnd_bytes -1 <= __VIRTUAL_MASK) +return 0 ; + +return addr_ref; +#else +return 0 ; +#endif +} + +#define GPFSTR "general protection fault" dotraplinkage voiddo_general_protection (struct pt_regs *regs,long error_code) { -const char *desc ="general protection fault" ;struct task_struct *tsk; +char desc[90 ] =GPFSTR ;RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN (!rcu_is_watching (),"entry code didn't wake RCU" );cond_local_irq_enable (regs);
@@ -531,6 +567,8 @@ do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) tsk = current;if (!user_mode (regs)) { +unsigned long non_canonical_addr =0 ; +if (fixup_exception (regs,X86_TRAP_GP , error_code,0 ))return ;
@@ -547,8 +585,20 @@ do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)return ;if (notify_die (DIE_GPF , desc, regs, error_code, -X86_TRAP_GP ,SIGSEGV ) !=NOTIFY_STOP ) -die (desc, regs, error_code); +X86_TRAP_GP ,SIGSEGV ) ==NOTIFY_STOP ) +return ; + +if (error_code) +snprintf (desc,sizeof (desc),"segment-related " GPFSTR ); +else + non_canonical_addr =get_kernel_gp_address (regs); + +if (non_canonical_addr) +snprintf (desc,sizeof (desc), +GPFSTR " probably for non-canonical address 0x%lx" , + non_canonical_addr); + +die (desc, regs, error_code);return ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0.432.g9d3f5f5b63-goog
Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP
Quoted 59 lines · Jann Horn
A frequent cause of #GP exceptions are memory accesses to non-canonical addresses. Unlike #PF, #GP doesn't come with a fault address in CR2, so the kernel doesn't currently print the fault address for #GP. Luckily, we already have the necessary infrastructure for decoding X86 instructions and computing the memory address that is being accessed; hook it up to the #GP handler so that we can figure out whether the #GP looks like it was caused by a non-canonical address, and if so, print that address.
While it is already possible to compute the faulting address manually by disassembling the opcode dump and evaluating the instruction against the register dump, this should make it slightly easier to identify crashes at a glance.
Signed-off-by Jann Horn <[email protected]>---
Notes:
v2:
- print different message for segment-related GP (Borislav)
- rewrite check for non-canonical address (Sean)
- make it clear we don't know for sure why the GP happened (Andy)
v3:
- change message format to one line (Borislav)I have already sent a patch to syzkaller that relaxes their parsing of GPF messages (https://github.com/google/syzkaller/commit/432c7650) such that changes like the one in this patch don't break it.
That patch has already made its way into syzbot's syzkaller instances according to <https://syzkaller.appspot.com/upstream>.arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +10
-0@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@#include <asm/mpx.h> #include <asm/vm86.h> #include <asm/umip.h> +#include <asm/insn.h> +#include <asm/insn-eval.h> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 #include <asm/x86_init.h> @@ -509,11 +511,45 @@ dotraplinkage void do_bounds(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)do_trap (X86_TRAP_BR ,SIGSEGV ,"bounds" , regs, error_code,0 ,NULL ); } +/* +* On 64-bit, if an uncaught #GP occurs while dereferencing a non-canonical +* address, return that address. +*/ +static unsigned long get_kernel_gp_address (struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +u8 insn_bytes[MAX_INSN_SIZE ];
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c dotraplinkage void do_bounds(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) · line 531
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +10
-0+struct insn insn; +unsigned long addr_ref; + +if (probe_kernel_read (insn_bytes, (void *)regs->ip,MAX_INSN_SIZE )) +return 0 ; + +kernel_insn_init (&insn, insn_bytes,MAX_INSN_SIZE ); +insn_get_modrm (&insn); +insn_get_sib (&insn); + addr_ref = (unsigned long )insn_get_addr_ref (&insn, regs);
I had to look twice to realize that the 'insn_bytes' isn't an integer that shows the number of bytes in the instruction, but the instruction buffer itself.
Could we please do s/insn_bytes/insn_buf or such?
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c dotraplinkage void do_bounds(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) · line 539
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +8
-0+ +/* Bail out if insn_get_addr_ref() failed or we got a kernel address. */ +if (addr_ref >= ~__VIRTUAL_MASK) +return 0 ; + +/* Bail out if the entire operand is in the canonical user half. */ +if (addr_ref + insn.opnd_bytes -1 <= __VIRTUAL_MASK) +return 0 ;
BTW., it would be nice to split this logic in two: return the faulting address to do_general_protection(), and print it out both for non-canonical and canonical addresses as well -and use the canonical check to *additionally* print out a short note when the operand is non-canonical?
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c dotraplinkage void do_bounds(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) · line 548
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +1
-0+#define GPFSTR "general protection fault"dotraplinkage void
Please separate macro and function definitions by an additional newline.
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c dotraplinkage void do_bounds(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) · line 552
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +1
-1do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) { -const char *desc ="general protection fault" ;struct task_struct *tsk; +char desc[90 ] =GPFSTR ;
How was this maximum string length of '90' derived? In what way will that have to change if someone changes the message?
Thanks,
Ingo
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP
Quoted 2 lines · Ingo Molnar
How was this maximum string length of '90' derived? In what way will that have to change if someone changes the message?
That was me counting the string length in a dirty patch in a previous thread. We probably should say why we decided for a certain length and maybe have a define for it.
Also, I could use your opinion on this here:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
and the following mail.
I think that marking the splat with its number would *immensely* help us with the question: was this the first splat or wasn't? A question we've been asking since I got involved in kernel development. :)
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Ingo Molnar
How was this maximum string length of '90' derived? In what way will that have to change if someone changes the message?
That was me counting the string length in a dirty patch in a previous thread. We probably should say why we decided for a certain length and maybe have a define for it.
Do you think something like this would be better?
char desc[sizeof(GPFSTR) + 50 + 2*sizeof(unsigned long) + 1] = GPFSTR;
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP
Quoted 5 lines · Jann Horn
Quoted 4 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Ingo Molnar
How was this maximum string length of '90' derived? In what way will that have to change if someone changes the message?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
That was me counting the string length in a dirty patch in a previous thread. We probably should say why we decided for a certain length and maybe have a define for it.
Do you think something like this would be better?
char desc[sizeof(GPFSTR) + 50 + 2*sizeof(unsigned long) + 1] = GPFSTR;
Yap, and the 50 is a sufficiently large number so that all possible string combinations in this case can fit in the resulting string array.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP
In reply to Jann HornQuoted 5 lines · Jann Horn
Quoted 4 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Ingo Molnar
How was this maximum string length of '90' derived? In what way will that have to change if someone changes the message?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
That was me counting the string length in a dirty patch in a previous thread. We probably should say why we decided for a certain length and maybe have a define for it.
Do you think something like this would be better?
char desc[sizeof(GPFSTR) + 50 + 2*sizeof(unsigned long) + 1] = GPFSTR;
I'd much prefer this for, because it's a big honking warning for people to not just assume things but double check the limits.
I.e. this mild obfuscation of the array size *helps* code quality in the long run :-)
Thanks,
Ingo
Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP
Quoted 11 lines · Ingo Molnar
Quoted 9 lines · Jann Horn
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Ingo Molnar
How was this maximum string length of '90' derived? In what way will that have to change if someone changes the message?
That was me counting the string length in a dirty patch in a previous thread. We probably should say why we decided for a certain length and maybe have a define for it.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Do you think something like this would be better?
char desc[sizeof(GPFSTR) + 50 + 2*sizeof(unsigned long) + 1] = GPFSTR;
I'd much prefer this for, because it's a big honking warning for people to not just assume things but double check the limits.
Sorry, I can't parse the start of this sentence. I _think_ you're saying you want me to make the change to "char desc[sizeof(GPFSTR) + 50 + 2*sizeof(unsigned long) + 1]"?
Quoted 2 lines
I.e. this mild obfuscation of the array size *helps* code quality in the long run :-)
Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP
Quoted 14 lines · Jann Horn
Quoted 13 lines · Ingo Molnar
Quoted 11 lines · Jann Horn
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Ingo Molnar
How was this maximum string length of '90' derived? In what way will that have to change if someone changes the message?
That was me counting the string length in a dirty patch in a previous thread. We probably should say why we decided for a certain length and maybe have a define for it.
Do you think something like this would be better?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
char desc[sizeof(GPFSTR) + 50 + 2*sizeof(unsigned long) + 1] = GPFSTR;
I'd much prefer this for, because it's a big honking warning for people to not just assume things but double check the limits.
Sorry, I can't parse the start of this sentence. I _think_ you're saying you want me to make the change to "char desc[sizeof(GPFSTR) + 50 + 2*sizeof(unsigned long) + 1]"?
Yeah, correct. There was an extra 'for' in my first sentence:
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I'd much prefer this, because it's a big honking warning for people to not just assume things but double check the limits.
Thanks,
Ingo
Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP
In reply to Ingo MolnarQuoted 10 lines · Ingo Molnar
Quoted 8 lines · Jann Horn
A frequent cause of #GP exceptions are memory accesses to non-canonical addresses. Unlike #PF, #GP doesn't come with a fault address in CR2, so the kernel doesn't currently print the fault address for #GP. Luckily, we already have the necessary infrastructure for decoding X86 instructions and computing the memory address that is being accessed; hook it up to the #GP handler so that we can figure out whether the #GP looks like it was caused by a non-canonical address, and if so, print that address.
[...]
Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 8 lines
(quoted diff) +8
-0+/* + * On 64-bit, if an uncaught #GP occurs while dereferencing a non-canonical + * address, return that address. + */ +static unsigned long get_kernel_gp_address(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + u8 insn_bytes[MAX_INSN_SIZE];Review
Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +10
-0+ struct insn insn; + unsigned long addr_ref; + + if (probe_kernel_read(insn_bytes, (void *)regs->ip, MAX_INSN_SIZE)) + return 0; + + kernel_insn_init(&insn, insn_bytes, MAX_INSN_SIZE); + insn_get_modrm(&insn); + insn_get_sib(&insn); + addr_ref = (unsigned long)insn_get_addr_ref(&insn, regs);I had to look twice to realize that the '
insn_bytes' isn't an integer that shows the number of bytes in the instruction, but the instruction buffer itself.
Quoted 1 line
Could we please do s/insn_bytes/insn_buf or such?
Will change it.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +6
-0+ + /* Bail out if insn_get_addr_ref() failed or we got a kernel address. */ + if (addr_ref >= ~__VIRTUAL_MASK) + return 0; + + /* Bail out if the entire operand is in the canonical user half. */
Quoted 8 lines
Review
Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+ if (addr_ref + insn.opnd_bytes - 1 <= __VIRTUAL_MASK) + return 0;BTW., it would be nice to split this logic in two: return the faulting address to
do_general_protection(), and print it out both for non-canonical and canonical addresses as well -and use the canonical check to *additionally* print out a short note when the operand is non-canonical?
You mean something like this?
========================
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +0 -0
@@ -516,32 +516,36 @@ dotraplinkage void do_bounds(struct pt_regs
*regs, long error_code)
* On 64-bit, if an uncaught #GP occurs while dereferencing a non-canonical
* address, return that address.
*/
-static unsigned long get_kernel_gp_address(struct pt_regs *regs) +static bool get_kernel_gp_address(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long *addr,
+ bool *non_canonical)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
u8 insn_buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE];
struct insn insn;- unsigned long addr_ref;
if (probe_kernel_read(insn_buf, (void *)regs->ip, MAX_INSN_SIZE))
- return 0;
+ return false;
kernel_insn_init(&insn, insn_buf, MAX_INSN_SIZE);
insn_get_modrm(&insn);
insn_get_sib(&insn);- addr_ref = (unsigned long)insn_get_addr_ref(&insn, regs);
+ *addr = (unsigned long)insn_get_addr_ref(&insn, regs);
- /* Bail out if insn_get_addr_ref() failed or we got a kernel address. */
- if (addr_ref >= ~__VIRTUAL_MASK)
- return 0;
+ if (*addr == (unsigned long)-1L)
+ return false;
- /* Bail out if the entire operand is in the canonical user half. */
- if (addr_ref + insn.opnd_bytes - 1 <= __VIRTUAL_MASK)
- return 0;
+ /*
+ * Check that: + * - the address is not in the kernel half or -1 (which means the + * decoder failed to decode it) + * - the last byte of the address is not in the user canonical half + */
+ *non_canonical = *addr < ~__VIRTUAL_MASK &&
+ *addr + insn.opnd_bytes - 1 > __VIRTUAL_MASK;
- return addr_ref;
+ return true;
#else
- return 0;
+ return false;
#endif
}
@@ -569,8 +573,10 @@ do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
tsk = current;
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
- unsigned long non_canonical_addr = 0;
+ bool addr_resolved = false;
+ unsigned long gp_addr;
unsigned long flags;
+ bool non_canonical;
int sig;
if (fixup_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_GP, error_code, 0))
@@ -595,18 +601,19 @@ do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long
error_code)
if (error_code)
snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc), "segment-related " GPFSTR);
else- non_canonical_addr = get_kernel_gp_address(regs);
+ addr_resolved = get_kernel_gp_address(regs, &gp_addr,
+ &non_canonical);
- if (non_canonical_addr)
+ if (addr_resolved)
snprintf(desc, sizeof(desc),
- GPFSTR " probably for non-canonical address 0x%lx", - non_canonical_addr); + GPFSTR " probably for %saddress 0x%lx", + non_canonical ? "non-canonical " : "", gp_addr);
flags = oops_begin();
sig = SIGSEGV;
__die_header(desc, regs, error_code);
- if (non_canonical_addr)
- kasan_non_canonical_hook(non_canonical_addr);
+ if (addr_resolved && non_canonical)
+ kasan_non_canonical_hook(gp_addr);
if (__die_body(desc, regs, error_code))
sig = 0;
oops_end(flags, regs, sig);========================
I guess that could potentially be useful if a #GP is triggered by something like an SSE alignment error? I'll add it in unless someone else complains.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
+#define GPFSTR "general protection fault"
dotraplinkage voidPlease separate macro and function definitions by an additional newline.
Will change it.
Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP
Quoted 8 lines · Jann Horn
You mean something like this?
========================
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c dotraplinkage void do_bounds(struct pt_regs · line 521
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +2
-1@@ -516,32 +516,36 @@ dotraplinkage void do_bounds(struct pt_regs*regs, long error_code) * On 64-bit, if an uncaught #GP occurs while dereferencing a non-canonical * address, return that address. */ -static unsigned long get_kernel_gp_address (struct pt_regs *regs) +static bool get_kernel_gp_address (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long *addr, +bool *non_canonical)
Yeah, that's pretty much the perfect end result!
Quoted 3 lines
I guess that could potentially be useful if a #GP is triggered by something like an SSE alignment error? I'll add it in unless someone else complains.
Yeah - also it's correct information about the context of the fault, so it probably cannot *hurt*, and will allow us to debug/validate everything in this area faster.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
+#define GPFSTR "general protection fault"
dotraplinkage voidPlease separate macro and function definitions by an additional newline.
Will change it.
Thanks!
Ingo
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP
Quoted 5 lines · Ingo Molnar
Quoted 2 lines · Jann Horn
You mean something like this?
Quoted 15 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c dotraplinkage void do_bounds(struct pt_regs · line 521
Quoted 13 lines
========================
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +2
-1@@ -516,32 +516,36 @@ dotraplinkage void do_bounds(struct pt_regs*regs, long error_code) * On 64-bit, if an uncaught #GP occurs while dereferencing a non-canonical * address, return that address. */ -static unsigned long get_kernel_gp_address (struct pt_regs *regs) +static bool get_kernel_gp_address (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long *addr, +bool *non_canonical)Yeah, that's pretty much the perfect end result!
Why do we need the bool thing? Can't we rely on the assumption that an address of 0 is the error case and use that to determine whether the resolving succeeded or not?
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP
Quoted 21 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 4 lines · Ingo Molnar
Quoted 2 lines · Jann Horn
You mean something like this?
Quoted 15 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c dotraplinkage void do_bounds(struct pt_regs · line 521
Quoted 13 lines
========================
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +2
-1@@ -516,32 +516,36 @@ dotraplinkage void do_bounds(struct pt_regs*regs, long error_code) * On 64-bit, if an uncaught #GP occurs while dereferencing a non-canonical * address, return that address. */ -static unsigned long get_kernel_gp_address (struct pt_regs *regs) +static bool get_kernel_gp_address (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long *addr, +bool *non_canonical)Yeah, that's pretty much the perfect end result!
Quoted 3 lines
Why do we need the bool thing? Can't we rely on the assumption that an address of 0 is the error case and use that to determine whether the resolving succeeded or not?
True, that'd work, too. I didn't really want to special-case an integer here - especially one that has the same value as NULL - but I guess it's fine.
Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP
In reply to Borislav PetkovQuoted 22 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 5 lines · Ingo Molnar
Quoted 2 lines · Jann Horn
You mean something like this?
Quoted 15 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c dotraplinkage void do_bounds(struct pt_regs · line 521
Quoted 13 lines
========================
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +2
-1@@ -516,32 +516,36 @@ dotraplinkage void do_bounds(struct pt_regs*regs, long error_code) * On 64-bit, if an uncaught #GP occurs while dereferencing a non-canonical * address, return that address. */ -static unsigned long get_kernel_gp_address (struct pt_regs *regs) +static bool get_kernel_gp_address (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long *addr, +bool *non_canonical)Yeah, that's pretty much the perfect end result!
Quoted 3 lines
Why do we need the bool thing? Can't we rely on the assumption that an address of 0 is the error case and use that to determine whether the resolving succeeded or not?
I'd rather we not trust the decoder and the execution environment so much that it never produces a 0 linear address in a #GP:
in get_addr_ref_32() we could get zero:
linear_addr = (unsigned long)(eff_addr & 0xffffffff) + seg_base;
in get_addr_ref_16() we could get zero too:
linear_addr = (unsigned long)(eff_addr & 0xffff) + seg_base;
Or in particularly exotic crashes we could get zero in get_addr_ref_64() as well:
linear_addr = (unsigned long)eff_addr + seg_base;
although it's unlikely I suspect.
But the 32-bit case should be plausible enough?
It's also the simplest, most straightforward printout of the decoder
state: we either see an error, or an (address,canonical) pair of values.
Thanks,
Ingo
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP
Quoted 2 lines · Ingo Molnar
I'd rather we not trust the decoder and the execution environment so much that it never produces a 0 linear address in a #GP:
I was just scratching my head whether I could trigger a #GP with address of 0. But yeah, I agree, let's be really cautious here. I wouldn't want to debug a #GP with a wrong address reported.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Ingo Molnar
I'd rather we not trust the decoder and the execution environment so much that it never produces a 0 linear address in a #GP:
I was just scratching my head whether I could trigger a #GP with address of 0. But yeah, I agree, let's be really cautious here. I wouldn't want to debug a #GP with a wrong address reported.
It's definitely possible, there are a handful of non-SIMD instructions that generate #GP(0) it CPL=0 in 64-bit mode *and* have a memory operand. Some of them might even be legitimately encountered in the wild.
- CMPXCHG16B if it's not supported by the CPU.
- VMXON if CR4 is misconfigured or VMX isn't enabled in FEATURE_CONTROL.
- MONITOR if ECX has an invalid hint (although MONITOR hardcodes the address in DS:RAX and so doesn't have a ModR/M byte).
Undoudbtedly there are other instructions with similar sources of #GP.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/traps: Print non-canonical address on #GP
Quoted 13 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Ingo Molnar
I'd rather we not trust the decoder and the execution environment so much that it never produces a 0 linear address in a #GP:
I was just scratching my head whether I could trigger a #GP with address of 0. But yeah, I agree, let's be really cautious here. I wouldn't want to debug a #GP with a wrong address reported.
It's definitely possible, there are a handful of non-SIMD instructions that generate #GP(0) it CPL=0 in 64-bit mode *and* have a memory operand. Some of them might even be legitimately encountered in the wild.
Quoted 6 lines
- CMPXCHG16B if it's not supported by the CPU.
- VMXON if CR4 is misconfigured or VMX isn't enabled inFEATURE_CONTROL.
- MONITOR if ECX has an invalid hint (although MONITOR hardcodes the address in DS:RAX and so doesn't have a ModR/M byte).Undoudbtedly there are other instructions with similar sources of #GP.
Right, we currently put our trust in the insn decoder to handle those correctly too.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquettePATCH v3 3/4 x86/dumpstack: Split out header line printing from __die()
In reply to Jann HornSplit __die() into __die_header() and __die_body(). This allows callers to insert extra information below the header line that initiates the bug report.
This can e.g. be used by __die() callers to allow KASAN to print additional information below the header line of the bug report.
---
Notes:
I think that it's nicer to have KASAN's notes about the bug below the first oops line from the kernel. This also means that tools that work with kernel oops reports can just trigger on the "general protection fault" line with the die counter and so on, and just include the text from on there, and the KASAN message will automatically be included.
But if you think that the code looks too ugly, I'd be happy to change that back and drop this patch from the series.
v3:
new patch
arch/x86/include/asm/kdebug.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kdebug.h +3 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ enum show_regs_mode { };extern void die (const char *,struct pt_regs *,long ); +extern void __die_header (const char *str,struct pt_regs *regs,long err); +extern int __must_check __die_body (const char *str,struct pt_regs *regs, +long err);extern int __must_check __die (const char *,struct pt_regs *,long );extern void show_stack_regs (struct pt_regs *regs);extern void __show_regs (struct pt_regs *regs,enum show_regs_mode );
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c +12 -1
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr) }NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (oops_end); -int __die (const char *str,struct pt_regs *regs,long err) +void __die_header (const char *str,struct pt_regs *regs,long err) {const char *pr ="" ;
@@ -384,7 +384,11 @@ int __die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KASAN ) ?" KASAN" :"" ,IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION ) ? (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) ? " PTI" : " NOPTI") : ""); +} +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (__die_header); +int __die_body (const char *str,struct pt_regs *regs,long err) +{show_regs (regs);print_modules ();
@@ -394,6 +398,13 @@ int __die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)return 0 ; } +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (__die_body); + +int __die (const char *str,struct pt_regs *regs,long err) +{ +__die_header (str, regs, err); +return __die_body (str, regs, err); +}NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (__die);/*
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0.432.g9d3f5f5b63-goog
PATCH v3 4/4 x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP
In reply to Jann HornMake #GP exceptions caused by out-of-bounds KASAN shadow accesses easier to understand by computing the address of the original access and printing that. More details are in the comments in the patch.
This turns an error like this:
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault probably for non-canonical address
0xe017577ddf75b7dd: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
into this:
general protection fault probably for non-canonical address
0xe017577ddf75b7dd: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range
[0x00badbeefbadbee8-0x00badbeefbadbeef]The hook is placed in architecture-independent code, but is currently only wired up to the X86 exception handler because I'm not sufficiently familiar with the address space layout and exception handling mechanisms on other architectures.
---
Notes:
v2:
- move to mm/kasan/report.c (Dmitry)
- change hook name to be more generic
- use TASK_SIZE instead of TASK_SIZE_MAX for compiling on non-x86
- don't open-code KASAN_SHADOW_MASK (Dmitry)
- add "KASAN: " prefix, but not "BUG: " (Andrey, Dmitry)
- use same naming scheme as get_wild_bug_type (Andrey)
- this version was "Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>"
v3:
- adjusted example output in commit message based on changes in preceding patch
- ensure that KASAN output happens after bust_spinlocks(1)
- moved hook in arch/x86/kernel/traps.c such that output appears after the first line of KASAN-independent error report
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 11 ++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c | 21 ------------------- include/linux/kasan.h | 6 ++++++ mm/kasan/report.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +11 -0
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@#include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/smp.h> #include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/kasan.h> #include <asm/stacktrace.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/debugreg.h>
@@ -568,6 +569,8 @@ do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) tsk = current;if (!user_mode (regs)) {unsigned long non_canonical_addr =0 ; +unsigned long flags; +int sig;if (fixup_exception (regs,X86_TRAP_GP , error_code,0 ))return ;
@@ -598,6 +601,14 @@ do_general_protection(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)GPFSTR " probably for non-canonical address 0x%lx" , non_canonical_addr); + flags =oops_begin (); + sig =SIGSEGV ; +__die_header (desc, regs, error_code); +if (non_canonical_addr) +kasan_non_canonical_hook (non_canonical_addr); +if (__die_body (desc, regs, error_code)) + sig =0 ; +oops_end (flags, regs, sig);die (desc, regs, error_code);return ; }
arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c +0 -21
@@ -245,23 +245,6 @@ static void __init kasan_map_early_shadow(pgd_t *pgd) }while (pgd++, addr = next, addr != end); } -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE -static int kasan_die_handler (struct notifier_block *self, -unsigned long val, -void *data) -{ -if (val ==DIE_GPF ) { -pr_emerg ("CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled\n" ); -pr_emerg ("GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access\n" ); - } -return NOTIFY_OK ; -} - -static struct notifier_block kasan_die_notifier = { - .notifier_call = kasan_die_handler, -}; -#endif -void __init kasan_early_init (void ) {int i;
@@ -298,10 +281,6 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)int i;void *shadow_cpu_entry_begin, *shadow_cpu_entry_end; -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE -register_die_notifier (&kasan_die_notifier); -#endif -memcpy (early_top_pgt, init_top_pgt,sizeof (early_top_pgt));/*
include/linux/kasan.h +6 -0
@@ -194,4 +194,10 @@ static inline void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr)#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */ +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE +void kasan_non_canonical_hook (unsigned long addr); +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE */ +static inline void kasan_non_canonical_hook (unsigned long addr) { } +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE */ +#endif /* LINUX_KASAN_H */
mm/kasan/report.c +40 -0
@@ -512,3 +512,43 @@ void __kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool is_write, unsigned lonend_report (&flags); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE +/* +* With CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE, accesses to bogus pointers (outside the high +* canonical half of the address space) cause out-of-bounds shadow memory reads +* before the actual access. For addresses in the low canonical half of the +* address space, as well as most non-canonical addresses, that out-of-bounds +* shadow memory access lands in the non-canonical part of the address space. +* Help the user figure out what the original bogus pointer was. +*/ +void kasan_non_canonical_hook (unsigned long addr) +{ +unsigned long orig_addr; +const char *bug_type; + +if (addr <KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET ) +return ; + + orig_addr = (addr -KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET ) <<KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT ; +/* +* For faults near the shadow address for NULL, we can be fairly certain +* that this is a KASAN shadow memory access. +* For faults that correspond to shadow for low canonical addresses, we +* can still be pretty sure - that shadow region is a fairly narrow +* chunk of the non-canonical address space. +* But faults that look like shadow for non-canonical addresses are a +* really large chunk of the address space. In that case, we still +* print the decoded address, but make it clear that this is not +* necessarily what's actually going on. +*/ +if (orig_addr <PAGE_SIZE ) + bug_type ="null-ptr-deref" ; +else if (orig_addr <TASK_SIZE ) + bug_type ="probably user-memory-access" ; +else + bug_type ="maybe wild-memory-access" ; +pr_alert ("KASAN: %s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n" , bug_type, + orig_addr, orig_addr +KASAN_SHADOW_MASK ); +} +#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.24.0.432.g9d3f5f5b63-goog