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powerpc/pseries/svm: Don't access some SPRs

PATCH In review Sukadev Bhattiprolu 3 participants 5 messages Dec 18, 2019 – Dec 19, 2019

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/2 powerpc/pseries/svm: Don't access some SPRs

Ultravisor disables some CPU features like EBB and BHRB in the HFSCR for secure virtual machines (SVMs). If the SVMs attempt to access related registers, they will get a Program Interrupt.

Use macros/wrappers to skip accessing EBB and BHRB registers in secure VMs.

---

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h          | 35 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c           | 12 +++----
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c            | 24 ++++++-------
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S | 48 ++++++++++++++++++-------
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_tm_builtin.c |  6 ++--
 arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c         |  5 +--
 arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c                |  2 +-
 7 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h +35 -0
index b3cbb1136bce..026eb20f6d13 100644
@@ -1379,6 +1379,41 @@ static inline void msr_check_and_clear(unsigned long bits)
 		__msr_check_and_clear(bits);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_SVM
+/*
+ * Move from some "restricted" sprs.
+ * Secure VMs should not access some registers as the related features
+ * are disabled in the CPU. If an SVM is attempting read from the given
+ * SPR, return 0. Otherwise behave like a normal mfspr.
+ */
+#define mfspr_r(rn)						\
+({								\
+	unsigned long rval = 0ULL;				\
+								\
+	if (!(mfmsr() & MSR_S))					\
+		asm volatile("mfspr %0," __stringify(rn)	\
+				: "=r" (rval));			\
+	rval;							\
+})
+
+/*
+ * Move to some "restricted" sprs.
+ * Secure VMs should not access some registers as the related features
+ * are disabled in the CPU. If an SVM is attempting write to the given
+ * SPR, ignore the write. Otherwise behave like a normal mtspr.
+ */
+#define mtspr_r(rn, v)					\
+({								\
+	if (!(mfmsr() & MSR_S))					\
+		asm volatile("mtspr " __stringify(rn) ",%0" :	\
+				     : "r" ((unsigned long)(v)) \
+				     : "memory");		\
+})
+#else
+#define mfspr_r		mfspr
+#define mtspr_r		mtspr
+#endif
+
 #ifdef __powerpc64__
 #if defined(CONFIG_PPC_CELL) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E)
 #define mftb()		({unsigned long rval;				\
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +6 -6
index 639ceae7da9d..9a691452ea3b 100644
@@ -1059,9 +1059,9 @@ static inline void save_sprs(struct thread_struct *t)
 		t->dscr = mfspr(SPRN_DSCR);
 
 	if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S)) {
-		t->bescr = mfspr(SPRN_BESCR);
-		t->ebbhr = mfspr(SPRN_EBBHR);
-		t->ebbrr = mfspr(SPRN_EBBRR);
+		t->bescr = mfspr_r(SPRN_BESCR);
+		t->ebbhr = mfspr_r(SPRN_EBBHR);
+		t->ebbrr = mfspr_r(SPRN_EBBRR);
 
 		t->fscr = mfspr(SPRN_FSCR);
 
@@ -1098,11 +1098,11 @@ static inline void restore_sprs(struct thread_struct *old_thread,
 
 	if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S)) {
 		if (old_thread->bescr != new_thread->bescr)
-			mtspr(SPRN_BESCR, new_thread->bescr);
+			mtspr_r(SPRN_BESCR, new_thread->bescr);
 		if (old_thread->ebbhr != new_thread->ebbhr)
-			mtspr(SPRN_EBBHR, new_thread->ebbhr);
+			mtspr_r(SPRN_EBBHR, new_thread->ebbhr);
 		if (old_thread->ebbrr != new_thread->ebbrr)
-			mtspr(SPRN_EBBRR, new_thread->ebbrr);
+			mtspr_r(SPRN_EBBRR, new_thread->ebbrr);
 
 		if (old_thread->fscr != new_thread->fscr)
 			mtspr(SPRN_FSCR, new_thread->fscr);
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +12 -12
index 709cf1fd4cf4..dba21b0e1d22 100644
@@ -3568,9 +3568,9 @@ int kvmhv_p9_guest_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 time_limit,
 	mtspr(SPRN_PSPB, vcpu->arch.pspb);
 	mtspr(SPRN_FSCR, vcpu->arch.fscr);
 	mtspr(SPRN_TAR, vcpu->arch.tar);
-	mtspr(SPRN_EBBHR, vcpu->arch.ebbhr);
-	mtspr(SPRN_EBBRR, vcpu->arch.ebbrr);
-	mtspr(SPRN_BESCR, vcpu->arch.bescr);
+	mtspr_r(SPRN_EBBHR, vcpu->arch.ebbhr);
+	mtspr_r(SPRN_EBBRR, vcpu->arch.ebbrr);
+	mtspr_r(SPRN_BESCR, vcpu->arch.bescr);
 	mtspr(SPRN_WORT, vcpu->arch.wort);
 	mtspr(SPRN_TIDR, vcpu->arch.tid);
 	mtspr(SPRN_DAR, vcpu->arch.shregs.dar);
@@ -3641,9 +3641,9 @@ int kvmhv_p9_guest_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 time_limit,
 	vcpu->arch.pspb = mfspr(SPRN_PSPB);
 	vcpu->arch.fscr = mfspr(SPRN_FSCR);
 	vcpu->arch.tar = mfspr(SPRN_TAR);
-	vcpu->arch.ebbhr = mfspr(SPRN_EBBHR);
-	vcpu->arch.ebbrr = mfspr(SPRN_EBBRR);
-	vcpu->arch.bescr = mfspr(SPRN_BESCR);
+	vcpu->arch.ebbhr = mfspr_r(SPRN_EBBHR);
+	vcpu->arch.ebbrr = mfspr_r(SPRN_EBBRR);
+	vcpu->arch.bescr = mfspr_r(SPRN_BESCR);
 	vcpu->arch.wort = mfspr(SPRN_WORT);
 	vcpu->arch.tid = mfspr(SPRN_TIDR);
 	vcpu->arch.amr = mfspr(SPRN_AMR);
@@ -4272,9 +4272,9 @@ static int kvmppc_vcpu_run_hv(struct kvm_run *run, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	/* Save userspace EBB and other register values */
 	if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S)) {
-		ebb_regs[0] = mfspr(SPRN_EBBHR);
-		ebb_regs[1] = mfspr(SPRN_EBBRR);
-		ebb_regs[2] = mfspr(SPRN_BESCR);
+		ebb_regs[0] = mfspr_r(SPRN_EBBHR);
+		ebb_regs[1] = mfspr_r(SPRN_EBBRR);
+		ebb_regs[2] = mfspr_r(SPRN_BESCR);
 		user_tar = mfspr(SPRN_TAR);
 	}
 	user_vrsave = mfspr(SPRN_VRSAVE);
@@ -4320,9 +4320,9 @@ static int kvmppc_vcpu_run_hv(struct kvm_run *run, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	/* Restore userspace EBB and other register values */
 	if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S)) {
-		mtspr(SPRN_EBBHR, ebb_regs[0]);
-		mtspr(SPRN_EBBRR, ebb_regs[1]);
-		mtspr(SPRN_BESCR, ebb_regs[2]);
+		mtspr_r(SPRN_EBBHR, ebb_regs[0]);
+		mtspr_r(SPRN_EBBRR, ebb_regs[1]);
+		mtspr_r(SPRN_BESCR, ebb_regs[2]);
 		mtspr(SPRN_TAR, user_tar);
 		mtspr(SPRN_FSCR, current->thread.fscr);
 	}
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S +36 -12

65 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_tm_builtin.c +3 -3
index 217246279dfa..bc3071c0a436 100644
@@ -45,18 +45,18 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation_early(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		if (!(vcpu->arch.hfscr & HFSCR_EBB) ||
 		    ((msr & MSR_PR) && !(mfspr(SPRN_FSCR) & FSCR_EBB)))
 			return 0;
-		bescr = mfspr(SPRN_BESCR);
+		bescr = mfspr_r(SPRN_BESCR);
 		/* expect to see a S->T transition requested */
 		if (((bescr >> 30) & 3) != 2)
 			return 0;
 		bescr &= ~BESCR_GE;
 		if (instr & (1 << 11))
 			bescr |= BESCR_GE;
-		mtspr(SPRN_BESCR, bescr);
+		mtspr_r(SPRN_BESCR, bescr);
 		msr = (msr & ~MSR_TS_MASK) | MSR_TS_T;
 		vcpu->arch.shregs.msr = msr;
 		vcpu->arch.cfar = vcpu->arch.regs.nip - 4;
-		vcpu->arch.regs.nip = mfspr(SPRN_EBBRR);
+		vcpu->arch.regs.nip = mfspr_r(SPRN_EBBRR);
 		return 1;
 
 	case PPC_INST_MTMSRD:
arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c +3 -2
index ca92e01d0bd1..4e76b2251801 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <asm/machdep.h>
 #include <asm/firmware.h>
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
+#include <asm/svm.h>
 #include <asm/code-patching.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
@@ -846,9 +847,9 @@ void perf_event_print_debug(void)
 
 	if (ppmu->flags & PPMU_ARCH_207S) {
 		pr_info("MMCR2: %016lx EBBHR: %016lx\n",
-			mfspr(SPRN_MMCR2), mfspr(SPRN_EBBHR));
+			mfspr(SPRN_MMCR2), mfspr_r(SPRN_EBBHR));
 		pr_info("EBBRR: %016lx BESCR: %016lx\n",
-			mfspr(SPRN_EBBRR), mfspr(SPRN_BESCR));
+			mfspr_r(SPRN_EBBRR), mfspr_r(SPRN_BESCR));
 	}
 #endif
 	pr_info("SIAR:  %016lx SDAR:  %016lx SIER:  %016lx\n",
arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c +1 -1
index d83364ebc5c5..4dae0537f85a 100644
@@ -1871,7 +1871,7 @@ static void dump_207_sprs(void)
 	printf("sdar   = %.16lx   sier = %.16lx pmc6   = %.8lx\n",
 		mfspr(SPRN_SDAR), mfspr(SPRN_SIER), mfspr(SPRN_PMC6));
 	printf("ebbhr  = %.16lx  ebbrr = %.16lx bescr  = %.16lx\n",
-		mfspr(SPRN_EBBHR), mfspr(SPRN_EBBRR), mfspr(SPRN_BESCR));
+		mfspr_r(SPRN_EBBHR), mfspr_r(SPRN_EBBRR), mfspr_r(SPRN_BESCR));
 	printf("iamr   = %.16lx\n", mfspr(SPRN_IAMR));
 
 	if (!(msr & MSR_HV))
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 powerpc/pseries/svm: Disable PMUs in SVMs

For now, disable hardware PMU facilities in secure virtual machines (SVMs) to prevent any information leak between SVMs and the (untrusted) HV.

With this, a simple 'myperf' program that uses the perf_event_open() fails for SVMs (with the corresponding fix to UV). In normal VMs and on the bare-metal HV the syscall and performance counters work

---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/cpu_setup_power.S | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c       |  6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/kernel/cpu_setup_power.S +22 -0
index a460298c7ddb..d5eb06e20b5a 100644
@@ -206,14 +206,36 @@ __init_PMU_HV_ISA207:
 	blr
 
 __init_PMU:
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_SVM
+	/*
+	 * For now, SVM's are restricted from accessing PMU
+	 * features, so skip accordingly.
+	 */
+	mfmsr	r5
+	rldicl	r5, r5, 64-MSR_S_LG, 62
+	cmpwi	r5,1
+	beq	skip1
+#endif
 	li	r5,0
 	mtspr	SPRN_MMCRA,r5
 	mtspr	SPRN_MMCR0,r5
 	mtspr	SPRN_MMCR1,r5
 	mtspr	SPRN_MMCR2,r5
+skip1:
 	blr
 
 __init_PMU_ISA207:
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_SVM
+	/*
+	 * For now, SVM's are restricted from accessing PMU
+	 * features, so skip accordingly.
+	 */
+	mfmsr	r5
+	rldicl	r5, r5, 64-MSR_S_LG, 62
+	cmpwi	r5,1
+	beq	skip2
+#endif
 	li	r5,0
 	mtspr	SPRN_MMCRS,r5
+skip2:
 	blr
arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c +6 -0
index 4e76b2251801..9e6a9f1803f6 100644
@@ -2275,6 +2275,12 @@ static int power_pmu_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
 
 int register_power_pmu(struct power_pmu *pmu)
 {
+	/*
+	 * PMU events are not currently supported in SVMs
+	 */
+	if (is_secure_guest())
+		return -ENOSYS;
+
 	if (ppmu)
 		return -EBUSY;		/* something's already registered */
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
#2 lore raw
In reply to Sukadev Bhattiprolu
Quoted 6 lines · Sukadev Bhattiprolu

Ultravisor disables some CPU features like EBB and BHRB in the HFSCR for secure virtual machines (SVMs). If the SVMs attempt to access related registers, they will get a Program Interrupt.

Use macros/wrappers to skip accessing EBB and BHRB registers in secure VMs.

I continue to dislike this approach.

The result is code that at a glance looks like it's doing one thing, ie. reading or writing an SPR, but is in fact doing nothing.

It's confusing for readers.

It also slows down all these already slow register accesses further, by inserting an mfmsr() in front of every single one.

Quoted 51 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h +35 -0
index b3cbb1136bce..026eb20f6d13 100644
@@ -1379,6 +1379,41 @@ static inline void msr_check_and_clear(unsigned long bits)
 		__msr_check_and_clear(bits);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_SVM
+/*
+ * Move from some "restricted" sprs.
+ * Secure VMs should not access some registers as the related features
+ * are disabled in the CPU. If an SVM is attempting read from the given
+ * SPR, return 0. Otherwise behave like a normal mfspr.
+ */
+#define mfspr_r(rn)						\
+({								\
+	unsigned long rval = 0ULL;				\
+								\
+	if (!(mfmsr() & MSR_S))					\
+		asm volatile("mfspr %0," __stringify(rn)	\
+				: "=r" (rval));			\
+	rval;							\
+})
+
+/*
+ * Move to some "restricted" sprs.
+ * Secure VMs should not access some registers as the related features
+ * are disabled in the CPU. If an SVM is attempting write to the given
+ * SPR, ignore the write. Otherwise behave like a normal mtspr.
+ */
+#define mtspr_r(rn, v)					\
+({								\
+	if (!(mfmsr() & MSR_S))					\
+		asm volatile("mtspr " __stringify(rn) ",%0" :	\
+				     : "r" ((unsigned long)(v)) \
+				     : "memory");		\
+})
+#else
+#define mfspr_r		mfspr
+#define mtspr_r		mtspr
+#endif
+
 #ifdef __powerpc64__
 #if defined(CONFIG_PPC_CELL) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E)
 #define mftb()		({unsigned long rval;				\
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +0 -0
index 639ceae7da9d..9a691452ea3b 100644

arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c static inline void save_sprs(struct thread_struct *t) · line 1064

Quoted 9 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +3 -3
@@ -1059,9 +1059,9 @@ static inline void save_sprs(struct thread_struct *t)
 		t->dscr = mfspr(SPRN_DSCR);
 
 	if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S)) {
-		t->bescr = mfspr(SPRN_BESCR);
-		t->ebbhr = mfspr(SPRN_EBBHR);
-		t->ebbrr = mfspr(SPRN_EBBRR);
+		t->bescr = mfspr_r(SPRN_BESCR);
+		t->ebbhr = mfspr_r(SPRN_EBBHR);
+		t->ebbrr = mfspr_r(SPRN_EBBRR);

eg. here.

This is the fast path of context switch.

That expands to:

	if (!(mfmsr() & MSR_S))
		asm volatile("mfspr %0, SPRN_BESCR" : "=r" (rval));
	if (!(mfmsr() & MSR_S))
		asm volatile("mfspr %0, SPRN_EBBHR" : "=r" (rval));
	if (!(mfmsr() & MSR_S))
		asm volatile("mfspr %0, SPRN_EBBRR" : "=r" (rval));

If the Ultravisor is going to disable EBB and BHRB then we need new CPU_FTR bits for those, and the code that accesses those registers needs to be put behind cpu_has_feature(EBB) etc.

cheers

#3 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Michael Ellerman [[email protected]] wrote:

eg. here.

This is the fast path of context switch.

Quoted 9 lines

That expands to:

	if (!(mfmsr() & MSR_S))
		asm volatile("mfspr %0, SPRN_BESCR" : "=r" (rval));
	if (!(mfmsr() & MSR_S))
		asm volatile("mfspr %0, SPRN_EBBHR" : "=r" (rval));
	if (!(mfmsr() & MSR_S))
		asm volatile("mfspr %0, SPRN_EBBRR" : "=r" (rval));

Yes, should have optimized this at least :-)

Quoted 4 lines

If the Ultravisor is going to disable EBB and BHRB then we need new CPU_FTR bits for those, and the code that accesses those registers needs to be put behind cpu_has_feature(EBB) etc.

Will try the cpu_has_feature(). Would it be ok to use a single feature bit, like UV or make it per-register group as that could need more feature bits?

Thanks,

Sukadev

#4 lore raw
Quoted 18 lines · Sukadev Bhattiprolu
Quoted 5 lines · Michael Ellerman [[email protected]] wrote:

eg. here.

This is the fast path of context switch.

Quoted 9 lines

That expands to:

	if (!(mfmsr() & MSR_S))
		asm volatile("mfspr %0, SPRN_BESCR" : "=r" (rval));
	if (!(mfmsr() & MSR_S))
		asm volatile("mfspr %0, SPRN_EBBHR" : "=r" (rval));
	if (!(mfmsr() & MSR_S))
		asm volatile("mfspr %0, SPRN_EBBRR" : "=r" (rval));

Yes, should have optimized this at least :-)

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

If the Ultravisor is going to disable EBB and BHRB then we need new CPU_FTR bits for those, and the code that accesses those registers needs to be put behind cpu_has_feature(EBB) etc.

Will try the cpu_has_feature(). Would it be ok to use a single feature bit, like UV or make it per-register group as that could need more feature bits?

We already have a number of places using is_secure_guest():

  arch/powerpc/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h: return is_secure_guest();
  arch/powerpc/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h: return is_secure_guest();
  arch/powerpc/include/asm/svm.h:#define get_dtl_cache_ctor()     (is_secure_guest() ? dtl_cache_ctor : NULL)
  arch/powerpc/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c: if (is_secure_guest() && !(image->preserve_context ||
  arch/powerpc/kernel/paca.c:     if (is_secure_guest())
  arch/powerpc/kernel/sysfs.c:    return sprintf(buf, "%u\n", is_secure_guest());
  arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c: if (!is_secure_guest())
  arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/smp.c:   if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_DBELL) && !is_secure_guest())
  arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/svm.c:   if (!is_secure_guest())

Which could all (or mostly) be converted to use a cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_SVM).

So yeah I guess it makes sense to do that, create a CPU_FTR_SVM and set it early in boot based on MSR_S.

You could argue it's a firmware feature, so should be FW_FEATURE_SVM, but we don't use jump_labels for firmware features so they're not as nice for hot-path code like register switching. Also the distinction between CPU and firmware features is a bit arbitrary.

cheers