systemd: improve SELinux support
cover systemd: improve SELinux support
Improve the SELinux support in systemd, especially re-adding checks for unit file operations, like enable, mask...
The original pull request can be found at https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/10023
Patch 1 and 2 improve logging on failures in permissive mode.
Patch 3 adds the ability to obtain the context for a masked unit.
Patch 4 and 5 change several system und service checks. For better distinction two new permissions are introduced: modify and listdynusers.
Patch 6 and 7 re-introduce checking unit file install operations. They were dropped in 8faae625dc9b6322db452937f54176e56e65265a . For consistency in the unexpected case while perforimg a service access check no path can be gathered, now the check will still be executed on the service security class (currently it switches to the system security class).
Patch 8 adds some notes for adding future D-Bus interfaces.
Christian Göttsche (8):
selinux-util: increase log severity
selinux-access: log warning on context acquisition failure
core: bookkeeping withdrawal path of masked units
core: add missing SELinux checks for dbus methods
core: make SELinux access permissions more distinct
core: add support for MAC checks on unit install operations
core: implement the sd-bus generic callback for SELinux
core: add notes to D-Bus interfaces about adding SELinux checks
src/analyze/analyze.c | 11 ++- src/basic/selinux-util.c | 4 +- src/core/dbus-automount.c | 3 + src/core/dbus-cgroup.c | 3 + src/core/dbus-device.c | 3 + src/core/dbus-execute.c | 3 + src/core/dbus-job.c | 7 ++ src/core/dbus-kill.c | 3 + src/core/dbus-manager.c | 164 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- src/core/dbus-mount.c | 3 + src/core/dbus-path.c | 3 + src/core/dbus-scope.c | 3 + src/core/dbus-service.c | 3 + src/core/dbus-slice.c | 3 + src/core/dbus-socket.c | 3 + src/core/dbus-swap.c | 3 + src/core/dbus-target.c | 3 + src/core/dbus-timer.c | 3 + src/core/dbus-unit.c | 14 ++- src/core/load-fragment.c | 10 +++ src/core/manager.c | 10 ++- src/core/manager.h | 2 + src/core/selinux-access.c | 44 ++++++++-- src/core/selinux-access.h | 28 +++++- src/core/unit.c | 13 ++- src/core/unit.h | 3 +- src/shared/install.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++---- src/shared/install.h | 42 ++++++--- src/shared/unit-file.c | 52 ++++++++--- src/shared/unit-file.h | 1 + src/systemctl/systemctl.c | 28 +++--- src/test/test-install-root.c | 86 +++++++++--------- src/test/test-install.c | 38 ++++---- src/test/test-unit-file.c | 8 +- 34 files changed, 543 insertions(+), 165 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
RFC PATCH 1/8 selinux-util: increase log severity
log_enforcing() and log_enforcing_errno() are only used for important messages, which describe failures in enforced mode. They are guarded either by !mac_selinux_use() or !label_hnd checks, where the latter is itself guarded by the former. Only SELinux enabled systems print these logs.
This helps to configure a system in permissive mode, without getting surprising failures when switching to enforced mode.
--- src/basic/selinux-util.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
src/basic/selinux-util.c +2 -2
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(context_t, context_free);static int cached_use =-1 ;static struct selabel_handle *label_hnd =NULL ; -#define log_enforcing (...) log_full(security_getenforce() == 1 ? LOG_ERR : LOG_DEBUG, __VA_ARGS__) -#define log_enforcing_errno (r, ...) log_full_errno(security_getenforce() == 1 ? LOG_ERR : LOG_DEBUG, r, __VA_ARGS__) +#define log_enforcing (...) log_full(security_getenforce() == 1 ? LOG_ERR : LOG_WARNING, __VA_ARGS__) +#define log_enforcing_errno (r, ...) log_full_errno(security_getenforce() == 1 ? LOG_ERR : LOG_WARNING, r, __VA_ARGS__)#endif bool mac_selinux_use (void ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
RFC PATCH 2/8 selinux-access: log warning on context acquisition failure
In reply to Christian GöttscheRelevant when testing in permissive mode, where the function does not return a failure.
This helps to configure a system in permissive mode, without getting surprising failures when switching to enforced mode.
--- src/core/selinux-access.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
src/core/selinux-access.c +2 -0
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ int mac_selinux_generic_access_check( r =getfilecon_raw (path, &fcon);if (r <0 ) { +log_warning_errno (errno,"SELinux getfilecon_raw on '%s' failed: %m (tclass=%s perm=%s)" , path, tclass, permission); r =sd_bus_error_setf (error,SD_BUS_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED ,"Failed to get file context on %s." , path); goto finish; }
@@ -231,6 +232,7 @@ int mac_selinux_generic_access_check( }else { r =getcon_raw (&fcon);if (r <0 ) { +log_warning_errno (errno,"SELinux getcon_raw failed: %m (tclass=%s perm=%s)" , tclass, permission); r =sd_bus_error_setf (error,SD_BUS_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED ,"Failed to get current context." ); goto finish; }
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
RFC PATCH 3/8 core: bookkeeping withdrawal path of masked units
In reply to Christian GöttscheMake it possible to retrieve the MAC target context for an operation on a masked unit beforehand the execution.
E.g. if unit foo is installed at /lib/systemd/system/foo.service with label foo_unit_t, but masked via a symlink /etc/systemd/system/foo.service -> /dev/null, this storing enables to check the unmask operation on the desired context foo_unit_t.
--- src/analyze/analyze.c | 11 ++++++++- src/core/load-fragment.c | 10 ++++++++ src/core/manager.c | 1 + src/core/manager.h | 1 + src/core/unit.c | 9 +++++-- src/core/unit.h | 1 + src/shared/unit-file.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- src/shared/unit-file.h | 1 + src/systemctl/systemctl.c | 2 +- src/test/test-unit-file.c | 8 ++++-- 10 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
src/analyze/analyze.c +10 -1
@@ -1558,6 +1558,7 @@ static bool strv_fnmatch_strv_or_empty(char* const* patterns, char **strv, int fstatic int do_unit_files (int argc,char *argv[],void *userdata) { _cleanup_(lookup_paths_free) LookupPaths lp = {}; _cleanup_hashmap_free_ Hashmap *unit_ids = NULL; + _cleanup_hashmap_free_ Hashmap *unit_withdrawals = NULL; _cleanup_hashmap_free_ Hashmap *unit_names = NULL;char **patterns =strv_skip (argv,1 );Iterator i;
@@ -1569,7 +1570,7 @@ static int do_unit_files(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {if (r <0 )return log_error_errno (r,"lookup_paths_init() failed: %m" ); - r =unit_file_build_name_map (&lp,NULL , &unit_ids, &unit_names,NULL ); + r =unit_file_build_name_map (&lp,NULL , &unit_ids, &unit_withdrawals, &unit_names,NULL );if (r <0 )return log_error_errno (r,"unit_file_build_name_map() failed: %m" );
@@ -1581,6 +1582,14 @@ static int do_unit_files(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {printf ("ids: %s → %s\n" , k, dst); } + HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(dst, k, unit_withdrawals, i) { +if (!strv_fnmatch_or_empty (patterns, k,FNM_NOESCAPE ) && + !strv_fnmatch_or_empty (patterns, dst,FNM_NOESCAPE )) +continue ; + +printf ("withdrawals: %s → %s\n" , k, dst); + } + HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(v, k, unit_names, i) {if (!strv_fnmatch_or_empty (patterns, k,FNM_NOESCAPE ) && !strv_fnmatch_strv_or_empty (patterns, v,FNM_NOESCAPE ))
src/core/load-fragment.c +10 -0
@@ -4670,6 +4670,7 @@ int unit_load_fragment(Unit *u) { r =unit_file_build_name_map (&u->manager->lookup_paths, &u->manager->unit_cache_mtime, &u->manager->unit_id_map, + &u->manager->unit_withdrawal_map, &u->manager->unit_name_map, &u->manager->unit_path_cache);if (r <0 )
@@ -4702,8 +4703,17 @@ int unit_load_fragment(Unit *u) {return r;if (null_or_empty (&st)) { +const char *wpath; + u->load_state =UNIT_MASKED ; u->fragment_mtime =0 ; + + wpath =hashmap_get (u->manager->unit_withdrawal_map, u->id); +if (wpath) { + r =free_and_strdup (&u->withdrawal_path, wpath); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + } }else { u->load_state =UNIT_LOADED ; u->fragment_mtime =timespec_load (&st.st_mtim);
src/core/manager.c +1 -0
@@ -691,6 +691,7 @@ static int manager_setup_prefix(Manager *m) {static void manager_free_unit_name_maps (Manager *m) { m->unit_id_map =hashmap_free (m->unit_id_map); + m->unit_withdrawal_map =hashmap_free (m->unit_withdrawal_map); m->unit_name_map =hashmap_free (m->unit_name_map); m->unit_path_cache =set_free_free (m->unit_path_cache); m->unit_cache_mtime =0 ;
src/core/manager.h +1 -0
@@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ struct Manager {UnitFileScope unit_file_scope;LookupPaths lookup_paths;Hashmap *unit_id_map; +Hashmap *unit_withdrawal_map;Hashmap *unit_name_map;Set *unit_path_cache;usec_t unit_cache_mtime;
src/core/unit.c +7 -2
@@ -708,6 +708,7 @@ void unit_free(Unit *u) {strv_free (u->documentation);free (u->fragment_path);free (u->source_path); +free (u->withdrawal_path);strv_free (u->dropin_paths);free (u->instance);
@@ -1252,6 +1253,9 @@ void unit_dump(Unit *u, FILE *f, const char *prefix) {if (u->source_path)fprintf (f,"%s\tSource Path: %s\n" , prefix, u->source_path); +if (u->withdrawal_path) +fprintf (f,"%s\tWithdrawal Path: %s\n" , prefix, u->withdrawal_path); + STRV_FOREACH(j, u->dropin_paths)fprintf (f,"%s\tDropIn Path: %s\n" , prefix, *j);
@@ -5709,9 +5713,10 @@ const char *unit_label_path(Unit *u) {if (!p)return NULL ; -/* If a unit is masked, then don't read the SELinux label of /dev/null, as that really makes no sense */ +/* If a unit is masked, then don't read the SELinux label of /dev/null, as that really makes no sense. +* Instead try withdrawal path (which can be NULL) */ if (path_equal (p,"/dev/null" )) -return NULL ; +return u->withdrawal_path;return p; }
src/core/unit.h +1 -0
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ typedef struct Unit {char *fragment_path;/* if loaded from a config file this is the primary path to it */ char *source_path;/* if converted, the source file */ +char *withdrawal_path;/* if masked, path to withdrawal unit file (if existent) */ char **dropin_paths;usec_t fragment_mtime;
src/shared/unit-file.c +39 -13
95 lines not on this page · raw message
src/shared/unit-file.h +1 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ int unit_file_build_name_map(const LookupPaths *lp, usec_t *ret_time, Hashmap **ret_unit_ids_map, + Hashmap **ret_unit_withdrawal_map, Hashmap **ret_unit_names_map, Set **ret_path_cache);
src/systemctl/systemctl.c +1 -1
@@ -2660,7 +2660,7 @@ static int unit_find_paths( _cleanup_set_free_free_ Set *names = NULL;if (!cached_name_map) { - r =unit_file_build_name_map (lp,NULL , &cached_id_map, &cached_name_map,NULL ); + r =unit_file_build_name_map (lp,NULL , &cached_id_map,NULL , &cached_name_map,NULL );if (r <0 )return r; }
src/test/test-unit-file.c +6 -2
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ static void test_unit_validate_alias_symlink_and_warn(void) {static void test_unit_file_build_name_map (char **ids) { _cleanup_(lookup_paths_free) LookupPaths lp = {}; _cleanup_hashmap_free_ Hashmap *unit_ids = NULL; + _cleanup_hashmap_free_ Hashmap *unit_withdrawals = NULL; _cleanup_hashmap_free_ Hashmap *unit_names = NULL;Iterator i;const char *k, *dst;
@@ -38,11 +39,14 @@ static void test_unit_file_build_name_map(char **ids) {assert_se (lookup_paths_init (&lp,UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL ) >=0 ); -assert_se (unit_file_build_name_map (&lp, &mtime, &unit_ids, &unit_names,NULL ) ==1 ); +assert_se (unit_file_build_name_map (&lp, &mtime, &unit_ids, &unit_withdrawals, &unit_names,NULL ) ==1 ); HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(dst, k, unit_ids, i)log_info ("ids: %s → %s" , k, dst); + HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(dst, k, unit_withdrawals, i) +log_info ("withdrawals: %s → %s" , k, dst); + HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(v, k, unit_names, i) { _cleanup_free_ char *j = strv_join(v, ", ");log_info ("aliases: %s ← %s" , k, j);
@@ -51,7 +55,7 @@ static void test_unit_file_build_name_map(char **ids) {char buf[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX ];log_debug ("Last modification time: %s" ,format_timestamp (buf,sizeof buf, mtime)); - r =unit_file_build_name_map (&lp, &mtime, &unit_ids, &unit_names,NULL ); + r =unit_file_build_name_map (&lp, &mtime, &unit_ids, &unit_withdrawals, &unit_names,NULL );assert_se (IN_SET (r,0 ,1 ));if (r ==0 )log_debug ("Cache rebuild skipped based on mtime." );
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
RFC PATCH 4/8 core: add missing SELinux checks for dbus methods
In reply to Christian GöttscheAdd new SELinux permissions modify and listdynusers to the class service.
- modfiy checks altering operations, like systemctl log-level debug or systemctl add-wants foo bar.
- listdynusers checks obtaining dynamic users, which is very common on systems using nss-systemd. Add a new permission to avoid undermining the status permission.
Perform SELinux access checks for the following D-Bus exposed methods:
D-Bus interface | c function name | SELinux permission verb
GetAfter / GetBefore | bus_job_method_get_waiting_jobs | status LogTarget | property_set_log_target | modify LogLevel | property_set_log_level | modify RuntimeWatchdocUSec | property_set_runtime_watchdog | modify ServiceWatchdogs | bus_property_set_bool_wrapper | modify GetUnit | method_get_unit | status GetUnitByPID | method_get_unit_by_pid | status GetUnitByControlGroup | method_get_unit_by_control_group | status LoadUnit | method_load_unit | status ListUnitsByNames | method_list_units_by_names | status LookupDynamicUserByName | method_lookup_dynamic_user_by_name | listdynusers LookupDynamicUserByUID | method_lookup_dynamic_user_by_uid | listdynusers GetDynamicUsers | method_get_dynamic_users | listdynusers AddDependencyUnitFiles | method_add_dependency_unit_files | modify GetUnitFileLinks | method_get_unit_file_links | status Unref | bus_unit_method_unref | modify --- src/core/dbus-job.c | 4 ++ src/core/dbus-manager.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- src/core/dbus-unit.c | 4 ++ 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
src/core/dbus-job.c +4 -0
@@ -71,6 +71,10 @@ int bus_job_method_get_waiting_jobs(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_Job *j = userdata;int r, i, n; + r =mac_selinux_unit_access_check (j->unit, message,"status" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; +if (strstr (sd_bus_message_get_member (message),"After" )) n =job_get_after (j, &list);else
src/core/dbus-manager.c +80 -9
215 lines not on this page · raw message
src/core/dbus-unit.c +4 -0
@@ -645,6 +645,10 @@ int bus_unit_method_unref(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_errorassert (message);assert (u); + r =mac_selinux_unit_access_check (u, message,"modify" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + r =bus_unit_track_remove_sender (u, message);if (r == -EUNATCH )return sd_bus_error_setf (error,BUS_ERROR_NOT_REFERENCED ,"Unit has not been referenced yet." );
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/8] core: add missing SELinux checks for dbus methods
Quoted 9 lines · Christian Göttsche
Add new SELinux permissions
modifyandlistdynusersto the classservice.
- modfiy checks altering operations, likesystemctl log-level debugorsystemctl add-wants foo bar.
- listdynusers checks obtaining dynamic users, which is very common on systems using nss-systemd. Add a new permission to avoid undermining thestatuspermission.Perform SELinux access checks for the following D-Bus exposed methods:
D-Bus interface | c function name | SELinux permission verb
Quoted 16 lines
GetAfter / GetBefore | bus_job_method_get_waiting_jobs | status LogTarget | property_set_log_target | modify LogLevel | property_set_log_level | modify RuntimeWatchdocUSec | property_set_runtime_watchdog | modify ServiceWatchdogs | bus_property_set_bool_wrapper | modify GetUnit | method_get_unit | status GetUnitByPID | method_get_unit_by_pid | status GetUnitByControlGroup | method_get_unit_by_control_group | status LoadUnit | method_load_unit | status ListUnitsByNames | method_list_units_by_names | status LookupDynamicUserByName | method_lookup_dynamic_user_by_name | listdynusers LookupDynamicUserByUID | method_lookup_dynamic_user_by_uid | listdynusers GetDynamicUsers | method_get_dynamic_users | listdynusers AddDependencyUnitFiles | method_add_dependency_unit_files | modify GetUnitFileLinks | method_get_unit_file_links | status Unref | bus_unit_method_unref | modify
If we are going to introduce new permissions or change existing ones, we may want to consider just defining a separate permission for every logical interface. Then we can let the policy writer decide what matters to them and at what granularity they want to distinguish things, using macros/interfaces as appropriate to avoid needing to specify them all individually.
Also, you may want to leverage the policy capability mechanism in userspace to permit compatible evolution of permission checks in the same manner it is presently used in the kernel for extended_socket_class, network_peer_controls, open_perms, nnp_nosuid_transition, etc.
Quoted 276 lines
--- src/core/dbus-job.c | 4 ++ src/core/dbus-manager.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- src/core/dbus-unit.c | 4 ++ 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)src/core/dbus-job.c +4
-0@@ -71,6 +71,10 @@ int bus_job_method_get_waiting_jobs(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_Job *j = userdata;int r, i, n; + r =mac_selinux_unit_access_check (j->unit, message,"status" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; +if (strstr (sd_bus_message_get_member (message),"After" )) n =job_get_after (j, &list);else src/core/dbus-manager.c +80
-9@@ -121,6 +121,10 @@ static int property_set_log_target(assert (bus);assert (value); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (value,"modify" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + r =sd_bus_message_read (value,"s" , &t);if (r <0 )return r;@@ -178,6 +182,10 @@ static int property_set_log_level(assert (bus);assert (value); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (value,"modify" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + r =sd_bus_message_read (value,"s" , &t);if (r <0 )return r;@@ -282,6 +290,10 @@ static int property_set_runtime_watchdog(assert_cc (sizeof (usec_t) ==sizeof (uint64_t )); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (value,"modify" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + r =sd_bus_message_read (value,"t" , t);if (r <0 )return r;@@ -289,6 +301,24 @@ static int property_set_runtime_watchdog(return watchdog_set_timeout (t); } +static int bus_property_set_bool_wrapper ( +sd_bus *bus, +const char *path, +const char *interface, +const char *property, +sd_bus_message *value, +void *userdata, +sd_bus_error *error) { + +int r; + + r =mac_selinux_access_check (value,"modify" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + +return bus_property_set_bool (bus, path, interface, property, value, userdata, error); +} +static int bus_get_unit_by_name (Manager *m,sd_bus_message *message,const char *name,Unit **ret_unit,sd_bus_error *error) {Unit *u;int r;@@ -375,6 +405,10 @@ static int method_get_unit(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_errorif (r <0 )return r; + r =mac_selinux_unit_access_check (u, message,"status" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; +return reply_unit_path (u, message, error); }@@ -413,6 +447,10 @@ static int method_get_unit_by_pid(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_buif (!u)return sd_bus_error_setf (error,BUS_ERROR_NO_UNIT_FOR_PID ,"PID " PID_FMT " does not belong to any loaded unit." , pid); + r =mac_selinux_unit_access_check (u, message,"status" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; +return reply_unit_path (u, message, error); }@@ -488,6 +526,10 @@ static int method_get_unit_by_control_group(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdif (!u)return sd_bus_error_setf (error,BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_UNIT ,"Control group '%s' is not valid or not managed by this instance" , cgroup); + r =mac_selinux_unit_access_check (u, message,"status" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; +return reply_unit_path (u, message, error); }@@ -510,6 +552,10 @@ static int method_load_unit(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_erroif (r <0 )return r; + r =mac_selinux_unit_access_check (u, message,"status" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; +return reply_unit_path (u, message, error); }@@ -529,6 +575,7 @@ static int method_start_unit_generic(sd_bus_message *message, Manager *m, JobTypif (r <0 )return r; +/* bus_unit_method_start_generic() includes a mac_selinux check */ return bus_unit_method_start_generic (message, u, job_type, reload_if_possible, error); }@@ -703,6 +750,10 @@ static int method_list_units_by_names(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sassert (message);assert (m); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"status" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + r =sd_bus_message_read_strv (message, &units);if (r <0 )return r;@@ -1263,11 +1314,11 @@ static int method_reload(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_error *assert (message);assert (m); - r =verify_run_space ("Refusing to reload" , error); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"reload" , error);if (r <0 )return r; - r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"reload" , error); + r =verify_run_space ("Refusing to reload" , error);if (r <0 )return r;@@ -1299,11 +1350,11 @@ static int method_reexecute(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_erroassert (message);assert (m); - r =verify_run_space ("Refusing to reexecute" , error); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"reload" , error);if (r <0 )return r; - r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"reload" , error); + r =verify_run_space ("Refusing to reexecute" , error);if (r <0 )return r;@@ -1428,6 +1479,10 @@ static int method_switch_root(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_erassert (message);assert (m); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"reboot" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; +if (statvfs ("/run/systemd" , &svfs) <0 )return sd_bus_error_set_errnof (error, errno,"Failed to statvfs(/run/systemd): %m" );@@ -1441,10 +1496,6 @@ static int method_switch_root(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_er format_bytes(fb_need, sizeof(fb_need), RELOAD_DISK_SPACE_MIN)); } - r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"reboot" , error); -if (r <0 ) -return r; -if (!MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM (m))return sd_bus_error_setf (error,SD_BUS_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ,"Root switching is only supported by system manager." );@@ -1636,6 +1687,10 @@ static int method_lookup_dynamic_user_by_name(sd_bus_message *message, void *useassert (message);assert (m); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"listdynusers" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + r =sd_bus_message_read_basic (message,'s' , &name);if (r <0 )return r;@@ -1663,6 +1718,10 @@ static int method_lookup_dynamic_user_by_uid(sd_bus_message *message, void *userassert (message);assert (m); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"listdynusers" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; +assert_cc (sizeof (uid) ==sizeof (uint32_t )); r =sd_bus_message_read_basic (message,'u' , &uid);if (r <0 )@@ -1692,6 +1751,10 @@ static int method_get_dynamic_users(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_assert (message);assert (m); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"listdynusers" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; +assert_cc (sizeof (uid_t) ==sizeof (uint32_t ));if (!MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM (m))@@ -2264,6 +2327,10 @@ static int method_add_dependency_unit_files(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdassert (message);assert (m); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"modify" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + r =bus_verify_manage_unit_files_async (m, message, error);if (r <0 )return r;@@ -2300,6 +2367,10 @@ static int method_get_unit_file_links(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, schar **p;int runtime, r; + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"status" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + r =sd_bus_message_read (message,"sb" , &name, &runtime);if (r <0 )return r;@@ -2422,7 +2493,7 @@ const sd_bus_vtable bus_manager_vtable[] = {/* The following item is an obsolete alias */ SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY ("ShutdownWatchdogUSec" ,"t" , bus_property_get_usec, bus_property_set_usec, offsetof(Manager , reboot_watchdog),SD_BUS_VTABLE_HIDDEN ),SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY ("KExecWatchdogUSec" ,"t" , bus_property_get_usec, bus_property_set_usec, offsetof(Manager , kexec_watchdog),0 ), -SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY ("ServiceWatchdogs" ,"b" , bus_property_get_bool, bus_property_set_bool, offsetof(Manager , service_watchdogs),0 ), +SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY ("ServiceWatchdogs" ,"b" , bus_property_get_bool, bus_property_set_bool_wrapper, offsetof(Manager , service_watchdogs),0 ),SD_BUS_PROPERTY ("ControlGroup" ,"s" ,NULL , offsetof(Manager , cgroup_root),0 ),SD_BUS_PROPERTY ("SystemState" ,"s" , property_get_system_state,0 ,0 ), SD_BUS_PROPERTY("ExitCode", "y", bus_property_get_unsigned, offsetof(Manager, return_value), 0),src/core/dbus-unit.c +4
-0@@ -645,6 +645,10 @@ int bus_unit_method_unref(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_errorassert (message);assert (u); + r =mac_selinux_unit_access_check (u, message,"modify" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + r =bus_unit_track_remove_sender (u, message);if (r == -EUNATCH )return sd_bus_error_setf (error,BUS_ERROR_NOT_REFERENCED ,"Unit has not been referenced yet." );
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/8] core: add missing SELinux checks for dbus methods
Am Mi., 18. Dez. 2019 um 21:05 Uhr schrieb Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>:
Quoted 35 lines · Christian Göttsche
Quoted 9 lines
Add new SELinux permissions
modifyandlistdynusersto the classservice.
- modfiy checks altering operations, likesystemctl log-level debugorsystemctl add-wants foo bar.
- listdynusers checks obtaining dynamic users, which is very common on systems using nss-systemd. Add a new permission to avoid undermining thestatuspermission.Perform SELinux access checks for the following D-Bus exposed methods:
D-Bus interface | c function name | SELinux permission verb
Quoted 16 lines
GetAfter / GetBefore | bus_job_method_get_waiting_jobs | status LogTarget | property_set_log_target | modify LogLevel | property_set_log_level | modify RuntimeWatchdocUSec | property_set_runtime_watchdog | modify ServiceWatchdogs | bus_property_set_bool_wrapper | modify GetUnit | method_get_unit | status GetUnitByPID | method_get_unit_by_pid | status GetUnitByControlGroup | method_get_unit_by_control_group | status LoadUnit | method_load_unit | status ListUnitsByNames | method_list_units_by_names | status LookupDynamicUserByName | method_lookup_dynamic_user_by_name | listdynusers LookupDynamicUserByUID | method_lookup_dynamic_user_by_uid | listdynusers GetDynamicUsers | method_get_dynamic_users | listdynusers AddDependencyUnitFiles | method_add_dependency_unit_files | modify GetUnitFileLinks | method_get_unit_file_links | status Unref | bus_unit_method_unref | modifyIf we are going to introduce new permissions or change existing ones, we may want to consider just defining a separate permission for every logical interface. Then we can let the policy writer decide what matters to them and at what granularity they want to distinguish things, using macros/interfaces as appropriate to avoid needing to specify them all individually.
Quoted 6 lines
Also, you may want to leverage the policy capability mechanism in userspace to permit compatible evolution of permission checks in the same manner it is presently used in the kernel for
extended_socket_class,network_peer_controls,open_perms,nnp_nosuid_transition, etc.
This might be an idea, to preserve full backward compatibility. While on it one could untangle the system security class.
Afaik this would require a SELinux userland and kernel update, to introduce a new policy capability identifier?
Quoted 278 lines
Quoted 277 lines
--- src/core/dbus-job.c | 4 ++ src/core/dbus-manager.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- src/core/dbus-unit.c | 4 ++ 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)src/core/dbus-job.c +4
-0@@ -71,6 +71,10 @@ int bus_job_method_get_waiting_jobs(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_Job *j = userdata;int r, i, n; + r =mac_selinux_unit_access_check (j->unit, message,"status" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; +if (strstr (sd_bus_message_get_member (message),"After" )) n =job_get_after (j, &list);else src/core/dbus-manager.c +80
-9@@ -121,6 +121,10 @@ static int property_set_log_target(assert (bus);assert (value); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (value,"modify" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + r =sd_bus_message_read (value,"s" , &t);if (r <0 )return r;@@ -178,6 +182,10 @@ static int property_set_log_level(assert (bus);assert (value); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (value,"modify" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + r =sd_bus_message_read (value,"s" , &t);if (r <0 )return r;@@ -282,6 +290,10 @@ static int property_set_runtime_watchdog(assert_cc (sizeof (usec_t) ==sizeof (uint64_t )); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (value,"modify" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + r =sd_bus_message_read (value,"t" , t);if (r <0 )return r;@@ -289,6 +301,24 @@ static int property_set_runtime_watchdog(return watchdog_set_timeout (t); } +static int bus_property_set_bool_wrapper ( +sd_bus *bus, +const char *path, +const char *interface, +const char *property, +sd_bus_message *value, +void *userdata, +sd_bus_error *error) { + +int r; + + r =mac_selinux_access_check (value,"modify" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + +return bus_property_set_bool (bus, path, interface, property, value, userdata, error); +} +static int bus_get_unit_by_name (Manager *m,sd_bus_message *message,const char *name,Unit **ret_unit,sd_bus_error *error) {Unit *u;int r;@@ -375,6 +405,10 @@ static int method_get_unit(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_errorif (r <0 )return r; + r =mac_selinux_unit_access_check (u, message,"status" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; +return reply_unit_path (u, message, error); }@@ -413,6 +447,10 @@ static int method_get_unit_by_pid(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_buif (!u)return sd_bus_error_setf (error,BUS_ERROR_NO_UNIT_FOR_PID ,"PID " PID_FMT " does not belong to any loaded unit." , pid); + r =mac_selinux_unit_access_check (u, message,"status" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; +return reply_unit_path (u, message, error); }@@ -488,6 +526,10 @@ static int method_get_unit_by_control_group(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdif (!u)return sd_bus_error_setf (error,BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_UNIT ,"Control group '%s' is not valid or not managed by this instance" , cgroup); + r =mac_selinux_unit_access_check (u, message,"status" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; +return reply_unit_path (u, message, error); }@@ -510,6 +552,10 @@ static int method_load_unit(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_erroif (r <0 )return r; + r =mac_selinux_unit_access_check (u, message,"status" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; +return reply_unit_path (u, message, error); }@@ -529,6 +575,7 @@ static int method_start_unit_generic(sd_bus_message *message, Manager *m, JobTypif (r <0 )return r; +/* bus_unit_method_start_generic() includes a mac_selinux check */ return bus_unit_method_start_generic (message, u, job_type, reload_if_possible, error); }@@ -703,6 +750,10 @@ static int method_list_units_by_names(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sassert (message);assert (m); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"status" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + r =sd_bus_message_read_strv (message, &units);if (r <0 )return r;@@ -1263,11 +1314,11 @@ static int method_reload(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_error *assert (message);assert (m); - r =verify_run_space ("Refusing to reload" , error); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"reload" , error);if (r <0 )return r; - r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"reload" , error); + r =verify_run_space ("Refusing to reload" , error);if (r <0 )return r;@@ -1299,11 +1350,11 @@ static int method_reexecute(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_erroassert (message);assert (m); - r =verify_run_space ("Refusing to reexecute" , error); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"reload" , error);if (r <0 )return r; - r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"reload" , error); + r =verify_run_space ("Refusing to reexecute" , error);if (r <0 )return r;@@ -1428,6 +1479,10 @@ static int method_switch_root(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_erassert (message);assert (m); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"reboot" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; +if (statvfs ("/run/systemd" , &svfs) <0 )return sd_bus_error_set_errnof (error, errno,"Failed to statvfs(/run/systemd): %m" );@@ -1441,10 +1496,6 @@ static int method_switch_root(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_er format_bytes(fb_need, sizeof(fb_need), RELOAD_DISK_SPACE_MIN)); } - r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"reboot" , error); -if (r <0 ) -return r; -if (!MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM (m))return sd_bus_error_setf (error,SD_BUS_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ,"Root switching is only supported by system manager." );@@ -1636,6 +1687,10 @@ static int method_lookup_dynamic_user_by_name(sd_bus_message *message, void *useassert (message);assert (m); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"listdynusers" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + r =sd_bus_message_read_basic (message,'s' , &name);if (r <0 )return r;@@ -1663,6 +1718,10 @@ static int method_lookup_dynamic_user_by_uid(sd_bus_message *message, void *userassert (message);assert (m); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"listdynusers" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; +assert_cc (sizeof (uid) ==sizeof (uint32_t )); r =sd_bus_message_read_basic (message,'u' , &uid);if (r <0 )@@ -1692,6 +1751,10 @@ static int method_get_dynamic_users(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_assert (message);assert (m); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"listdynusers" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; +assert_cc (sizeof (uid_t) ==sizeof (uint32_t ));if (!MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM (m))@@ -2264,6 +2327,10 @@ static int method_add_dependency_unit_files(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdassert (message);assert (m); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"modify" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + r =bus_verify_manage_unit_files_async (m, message, error);if (r <0 )return r;@@ -2300,6 +2367,10 @@ static int method_get_unit_file_links(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, schar **p;int runtime, r; + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"status" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + r =sd_bus_message_read (message,"sb" , &name, &runtime);if (r <0 )return r;@@ -2422,7 +2493,7 @@ const sd_bus_vtable bus_manager_vtable[] = {/* The following item is an obsolete alias */ SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY ("ShutdownWatchdogUSec" ,"t" , bus_property_get_usec, bus_property_set_usec, offsetof(Manager , reboot_watchdog),SD_BUS_VTABLE_HIDDEN ),SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY ("KExecWatchdogUSec" ,"t" , bus_property_get_usec, bus_property_set_usec, offsetof(Manager , kexec_watchdog),0 ), -SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY ("ServiceWatchdogs" ,"b" , bus_property_get_bool, bus_property_set_bool, offsetof(Manager , service_watchdogs),0 ), +SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY ("ServiceWatchdogs" ,"b" , bus_property_get_bool, bus_property_set_bool_wrapper, offsetof(Manager , service_watchdogs),0 ),SD_BUS_PROPERTY ("ControlGroup" ,"s" ,NULL , offsetof(Manager , cgroup_root),0 ),SD_BUS_PROPERTY ("SystemState" ,"s" , property_get_system_state,0 ,0 ), SD_BUS_PROPERTY("ExitCode", "y", bus_property_get_unsigned, offsetof(Manager, return_value), 0),src/core/dbus-unit.c +4
-0@@ -645,6 +645,10 @@ int bus_unit_method_unref(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_errorassert (message);assert (u); + r =mac_selinux_unit_access_check (u, message,"modify" , error); +if (r <0 ) +return r; + r =bus_unit_track_remove_sender (u, message);if (r == -EUNATCH )return sd_bus_error_setf (error,BUS_ERROR_NOT_REFERENCED ,"Unit has not been referenced yet." );
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/8] core: add missing SELinux checks for dbus methods
Quoted 43 lines · Christian Göttsche
Am Mi., 18. Dez. 2019 um 21:05 Uhr schrieb Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>:
Quoted 35 lines · Christian Göttsche
Quoted 9 lines
Add new SELinux permissions
modifyandlistdynusersto the classservice.
- modfiy checks altering operations, likesystemctl log-level debugorsystemctl add-wants foo bar.
- listdynusers checks obtaining dynamic users, which is very common on systems using nss-systemd. Add a new permission to avoid undermining thestatuspermission.Perform SELinux access checks for the following D-Bus exposed methods:
D-Bus interface | c function name | SELinux permission verb
Quoted 16 lines
GetAfter / GetBefore |
bus_job_method_get_waiting_jobs| status
LogTarget |property_set_log_target| modify
LogLevel |property_set_log_level| modify
RuntimeWatchdocUSec |property_set_runtime_watchdog| modify
ServiceWatchdogs |bus_property_set_bool_wrapper| modify
GetUnit |method_get_unit| status
GetUnitByPID |method_get_unit_by_pid| status
GetUnitByControlGroup |method_get_unit_by_control_group| status
LoadUnit |method_load_unit| status
ListUnitsByNames |method_list_units_by_names| status
LookupDynamicUserByName |method_lookup_dynamic_user_by_name| listdynusers LookupDynamicUserByUID |method_lookup_dynamic_user_by_uid| listdynusers
GetDynamicUsers |method_get_dynamic_users| listdynusers
AddDependencyUnitFiles |method_add_dependency_unit_files| modify
GetUnitFileLinks |method_get_unit_file_links| status
Unref |bus_unit_method_unref| modifyIf we are going to introduce new permissions or change existing ones, we may want to consider just defining a separate permission for every logical interface. Then we can let the policy writer decide what matters to them and at what granularity they want to distinguish things, using macros/interfaces as appropriate to avoid needing to specify them all individually.
Quoted 6 lines
Also, you may want to leverage the policy capability mechanism in userspace to permit compatible evolution of permission checks in the same manner it is presently used in the kernel for
extended_socket_class,network_peer_controls,open_perms,nnp_nosuid_transition, etc.
Quoted 5 lines
This might be an idea, to preserve full backward compatibility. While on it one could untangle the system security class.
Afaik this would require a SELinux userland and kernel update, to introduce a new policy capability identifier?
Correct. I'd like to relax that requirement in the future (see https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/issues/55) but for now you need a patched libsepol and a patched kernel. This would be the first policy capability used by userspace instead of the kernel, so we'd also need/want libselinux functions for testing whether a given policy capability is enabled via selinuxfs. People with existing kernels or policies would continue to operate with the old permission checks; it would require an upgrade of libsepol, kernel, and a policy that explicitly enables the new policy capability to cause the new permission checks to take effect.
RFC PATCH 5/8 core: make SELinux access permissions more distinct
In reply to Christian GöttscheMake access permissions more distinct by using the new introduced permission modify:
- method_set_environment : reload -> modify
- method_unset_environment : reload -> modify
- method_unset_and_set_environment : reload -> modify
- method_set_exit_code : exit -> modify - bus_unit_method_set_properties : start -> modify - bus_unit_method_ref : start -> modify --- src/core/dbus-manager.c | 8 ++++---- src/core/dbus-unit.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
src/core/dbus-manager.c +4 -4
@@ -1561,7 +1561,7 @@ static int method_set_environment(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_buassert (message);assert (m); - r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"reload" , error); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"modify" , error);if (r <0 )return r;
@@ -1592,7 +1592,7 @@ static int method_unset_environment(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_assert (message);assert (m); - r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"reload" , error); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"modify" , error);if (r <0 )return r;
@@ -1624,7 +1624,7 @@ static int method_unset_and_set_environment(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdassert (message);assert (m); - r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"reload" , error); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"modify" , error);if (r <0 )return r;
@@ -1662,7 +1662,7 @@ static int method_set_exit_code(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_assert (message);assert (m); - r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"exit" , error); + r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"modify" , error);if (r <0 )return r;
src/core/dbus-unit.c +2 -2
@@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ int bus_unit_method_set_properties(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bassert (message);assert (u); - r =mac_selinux_unit_access_check (u, message,"start" , error); + r =mac_selinux_unit_access_check (u, message,"modify" , error);if (r <0 )return r;
@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ int bus_unit_method_ref(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_error *eassert (message);assert (u); - r =mac_selinux_unit_access_check (u, message,"start" , error); + r =mac_selinux_unit_access_check (u, message,"modify" , error);if (r <0 )return r;
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
RFC PATCH 6/8 core: add support for MAC checks on unit install operations
In reply to Christian Göttscheshared:
Add a MAC callback call to unit_file_* functions to check unit operations, like enable, disable...
The MAC callback is supplied with the unit name as first argument. The second argument is a blob used by the back-end MAC specific check. If no check should be performed, pass a NULL pointer.
core:
Implement a generic MAC callback for sd-bus and register it for D-Bus exposed methods.
systemctl:
Adopt to the new callback by passing NULL.
No callback check is needed when called on the client side, cause regular MAC checks (like write, unlink...) on the installed unit file (in /lib/systemd/system) or temporary one (in /etc/systemd/system) will be performed.
--- src/core/dbus-manager.c | 41 ++++++++++---- src/core/manager.c | 2 +- src/shared/install.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ src/shared/install.h | 42 +++++++++++---- src/systemctl/systemctl.c | 26 ++++----- src/test/test-install-root.c | 86 ++++++++++++++--------------- src/test/test-install.c | 38 ++++++------- 7 files changed, 224 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)
src/core/dbus-manager.c +30 -11
@@ -2062,10 +2062,22 @@ fail:return r; } +struct mac_callback_userdata { +}; + +static int mac_callback_check (const char *name,void *userdata) { +struct mac_callback_userdata *ud = userdata; + +assert (name); +assert (ud); + +return 0 ; +} +static int method_enable_unit_files_generic (sd_bus_message *message,Manager *m, -int (*call)(UnitFileScope scope,UnitFileFlags flags,const char *root_dir,char *files[],UnitFileChange **changes,size_t *n_changes), +int (*call)(UnitFileScope scope,UnitFileFlags flags,const char *root_dir,char *files[],UnitFileChange **changes,size_t *n_changes,mac_callback_t mac_check,void *userdata),bool carries_install_info,sd_bus_error *error) {
@@ -2074,6 +2086,7 @@ static int method_enable_unit_files_generic(size_t n_changes =0 ;UnitFileFlags flags;int runtime, force, r; +struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = {};assert (message);assert (m);
@@ -2094,7 +2107,7 @@ static int method_enable_unit_files_generic(if (r ==0 )return 1 ;/* No authorization for now, but the async polkit stuff will call us again when it has it */ - r =call (m->unit_file_scope, flags,NULL , l, &changes, &n_changes); + r =call (m->unit_file_scope, flags,NULL , l, &changes, &n_changes, mac_callback_check, &mcud);if (r <0 )return install_error (error, r, changes, n_changes);
@@ -2113,8 +2126,8 @@ static int method_link_unit_files(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bureturn method_enable_unit_files_generic (message, userdata, unit_file_link, false, error); } -static int unit_file_preset_without_mode (UnitFileScope scope,UnitFileFlags flags,const char *root_dir,char **files,UnitFileChange **changes,size_t *n_changes) { -return unit_file_preset (scope, flags, root_dir, files,UNIT_FILE_PRESET_FULL , changes, n_changes); +static int unit_file_preset_without_mode (UnitFileScope scope,UnitFileFlags flags,const char *root_dir,char **files,UnitFileChange **changes,size_t *n_changes,mac_callback_t mac_check,void *userdata) { +return unit_file_preset (scope, flags, root_dir, files,UNIT_FILE_PRESET_FULL , changes, n_changes, mac_check, userdata); }static int method_preset_unit_files (sd_bus_message *message,void *userdata,sd_bus_error *error) {
@@ -2135,6 +2148,7 @@ static int method_preset_unit_files_with_mode(sd_bus_message *message, void *useint runtime, force, r;UnitFileFlags flags;const char *mode; +struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = {};assert (message);assert (m);
@@ -2163,7 +2177,7 @@ static int method_preset_unit_files_with_mode(sd_bus_message *message, void *useif (r ==0 )return 1 ;/* No authorization for now, but the async polkit stuff will call us again when it has it */ - r =unit_file_preset (m->unit_file_scope, flags,NULL , l, mm, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_preset (m->unit_file_scope, flags,NULL , l, mm, &changes, &n_changes, mac_callback_check, &mcud);if (r <0 )return install_error (error, r, changes, n_changes);
@@ -2173,13 +2187,14 @@ static int method_preset_unit_files_with_mode(sd_bus_message *message, void *usestatic int method_disable_unit_files_generic (sd_bus_message *message,Manager *m, -int (*call)(UnitFileScope scope,UnitFileFlags flags,const char *root_dir,char *files[],UnitFileChange **changes,size_t *n_changes), +int (*call)(UnitFileScope scope,UnitFileFlags flags,const char *root_dir,char *files[],UnitFileChange **changes,size_t *n_changes,mac_callback_t mac_check,void *userdata),sd_bus_error *error) { _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;UnitFileChange *changes =NULL ;size_t n_changes =0 ;int r, runtime; +struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = {};assert (message);assert (m);
@@ -2198,7 +2213,7 @@ static int method_disable_unit_files_generic(if (r ==0 )return 1 ;/* No authorization for now, but the async polkit stuff will call us again when it has it */ - r =call (m->unit_file_scope, runtime ?UNIT_FILE_RUNTIME :0 ,NULL , l, &changes, &n_changes); + r =call (m->unit_file_scope, runtime ?UNIT_FILE_RUNTIME :0 ,NULL , l, &changes, &n_changes, mac_callback_check, &mcud);if (r <0 )return install_error (error, r, changes, n_changes);
@@ -2219,6 +2234,7 @@ static int method_revert_unit_files(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_size_t n_changes =0 ;Manager *m = userdata;int r; +struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = {};assert (message);assert (m);
@@ -2233,7 +2249,7 @@ static int method_revert_unit_files(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_if (r ==0 )return 1 ;/* No authorization for now, but the async polkit stuff will call us again when it has it */ - r =unit_file_revert (m->unit_file_scope,NULL , l, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_revert (m->unit_file_scope,NULL , l, &changes, &n_changes, mac_callback_check, &mcud);if (r <0 )return install_error (error, r, changes, n_changes);
@@ -2279,6 +2295,7 @@ static int method_preset_all_unit_files(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata,const char *mode;UnitFileFlags flags;int force, runtime, r; +struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = {};assert (message);assert (m);
@@ -2307,7 +2324,7 @@ static int method_preset_all_unit_files(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata,if (r ==0 )return 1 ;/* No authorization for now, but the async polkit stuff will call us again when it has it */ - r =unit_file_preset_all (m->unit_file_scope, flags,NULL , mm, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_preset_all (m->unit_file_scope, flags,NULL , mm, &changes, &n_changes, mac_callback_check, &mcud);if (r <0 )return install_error (error, r, changes, n_changes);
@@ -2323,6 +2340,7 @@ static int method_add_dependency_unit_files(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdchar *target, *type;UnitDependency dep;UnitFileFlags flags; +struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = {};assert (message);assert (m);
@@ -2351,7 +2369,7 @@ static int method_add_dependency_unit_files(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdif (dep <0 )return -EINVAL ; - r =unit_file_add_dependency (m->unit_file_scope, flags,NULL , l, target, dep, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_add_dependency (m->unit_file_scope, flags,NULL , l, target, dep, &changes, &n_changes, mac_callback_check, &mcud);if (r <0 )return install_error (error, r, changes, n_changes);
@@ -2366,6 +2384,7 @@ static int method_get_unit_file_links(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sconst char *name;char **p;int runtime, r; +struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = {}; r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"status" , error);if (r <0 )
@@ -2387,7 +2406,7 @@ static int method_get_unit_file_links(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, s flags =UNIT_FILE_DRY_RUN | (runtime ?UNIT_FILE_RUNTIME :0 ); - r =unit_file_disable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM , flags,NULL , p, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_disable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM , flags,NULL , p, &changes, &n_changes, mac_callback_check, &mcud);if (r <0 )return log_error_errno (r,"Failed to get file links for %s: %m" , name);
src/core/manager.c +1 -1
@@ -1569,7 +1569,7 @@ static void manager_preset_all(Manager *m) {return ;/* If this is the first boot, and we are in the host system, then preset everything */ - r =unit_file_preset_all (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL ,UNIT_FILE_PRESET_ENABLE_ONLY ,NULL ,0 ); + r =unit_file_preset_all (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL ,UNIT_FILE_PRESET_ENABLE_ONLY ,NULL ,0 ,NULL ,NULL );if (r <0 )log_full_errno (r == -EEXIST ?LOG_NOTICE :LOG_WARNING , r,"Failed to populate /etc with preset unit settings, ignoring: %m" );
src/shared/install.c +86 -15
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src/shared/install.h +32 -10
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src/systemctl/systemctl.c +13 -13
@@ -6899,23 +6899,23 @@ static int enable_unit(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) { flags =args_to_flags ();if (streq (verb,"enable" )) { - r =unit_file_enable (arg_scope, flags, arg_root, names, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_enable (arg_scope, flags, arg_root, names, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL ); carries_install_info = r; }else if (streq (verb,"disable" )) - r =unit_file_disable (arg_scope, flags, arg_root, names, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_disable (arg_scope, flags, arg_root, names, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );else if (streq (verb,"reenable" )) { - r =unit_file_reenable (arg_scope, flags, arg_root, names, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_reenable (arg_scope, flags, arg_root, names, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL ); carries_install_info = r; }else if (streq (verb,"link" )) - r =unit_file_link (arg_scope, flags, arg_root, names, &changes, &n_changes); -else if (streq (verb,"preset" )) { - r =unit_file_preset (arg_scope, flags, arg_root, names, arg_preset_mode, &changes, &n_changes); - }else if (streq (verb,"mask" )) - r =unit_file_mask (arg_scope, flags, arg_root, names, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_link (arg_scope, flags, arg_root, names, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL ); +else if (streq (verb,"preset" )) + r =unit_file_preset (arg_scope, flags, arg_root, names, arg_preset_mode, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL ); +else if (streq (verb,"mask" )) + r =unit_file_mask (arg_scope, flags, arg_root, names, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );else if (streq (verb,"unmask" )) - r =unit_file_unmask (arg_scope, flags, arg_root, names, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_unmask (arg_scope, flags, arg_root, names, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );else if (streq (verb,"revert" )) - r =unit_file_revert (arg_scope, arg_root, names, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_revert (arg_scope, arg_root, names, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );else assert_not_reached ("Unknown verb" );
@@ -7112,7 +7112,7 @@ static int add_dependency(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {assert_not_reached ("Unknown verb" );if (install_client_side ()) { - r =unit_file_add_dependency (arg_scope,args_to_flags (), arg_root, names, target, dep, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_add_dependency (arg_scope,args_to_flags (), arg_root, names, target, dep, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );unit_file_dump_changes (r,"add dependency on" , changes, n_changes, arg_quiet);if (r >0 )
@@ -7174,7 +7174,7 @@ static int preset_all(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {int r;if (install_client_side ()) { - r =unit_file_preset_all (arg_scope,args_to_flags (), arg_root, arg_preset_mode, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_preset_all (arg_scope,args_to_flags (), arg_root, arg_preset_mode, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );unit_file_dump_changes (r,"preset" , changes, n_changes, arg_quiet);if (r >0 )
@@ -7234,7 +7234,7 @@ static int show_installation_targets_client_side(const char *name) { flags =UNIT_FILE_DRY_RUN | (arg_runtime ?UNIT_FILE_RUNTIME :0 ); - r =unit_file_disable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM , flags,NULL , p, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_disable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM , flags,NULL , p, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );if (r <0 )return log_error_errno (r,"Failed to get file links for %s: %m" , name);
src/test/test-install-root.c +43 -43
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src/test/test-install.c +19 -19
@@ -53,12 +53,12 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {log_info ("/*** enable **/" ); - r =unit_file_enable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_enable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );log_info ("/*** enable2 **/" ); - r =unit_file_enable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_enable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );dump_changes (changes, n_changes);
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { changes =NULL ; n_changes =0 ; - r =unit_file_disable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_disable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );dump_changes (changes, n_changes);
@@ -86,10 +86,10 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { changes =NULL ; n_changes =0 ; - r =unit_file_mask (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_mask (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );log_info ("/*** mask2 ***/" ); - r =unit_file_mask (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_mask (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );dump_changes (changes, n_changes);
@@ -103,10 +103,10 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { changes =NULL ; n_changes =0 ; - r =unit_file_unmask (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_unmask (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );log_info ("/*** unmask2 ***/" ); - r =unit_file_unmask (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_unmask (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );dump_changes (changes, n_changes);
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { changes =NULL ; n_changes =0 ; - r =unit_file_mask (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_mask (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );dump_changes (changes, n_changes);
@@ -134,10 +134,10 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { changes =NULL ; n_changes =0 ; - r =unit_file_disable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_disable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );log_info ("/*** disable2 ***/" ); - r =unit_file_disable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_disable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );dump_changes (changes, n_changes);
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { changes =NULL ; n_changes =0 ; - r =unit_file_unmask (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_unmask (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );dump_changes (changes, n_changes);
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { changes =NULL ; n_changes =0 ; - r =unit_file_enable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files2, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_enable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files2, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );dump_changes (changes, n_changes);
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { changes =NULL ; n_changes =0 ; - r =unit_file_disable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL ,STRV_MAKE (basename (files2[0 ])), &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_disable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL ,STRV_MAKE (basename (files2[0 ])), &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );dump_changes (changes, n_changes);
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { changes =NULL ; n_changes =0 ; - r =unit_file_link (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files2, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_link (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files2, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );dump_changes (changes, n_changes);
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { changes =NULL ; n_changes =0 ; - r =unit_file_disable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL ,STRV_MAKE (basename (files2[0 ])), &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_disable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL ,STRV_MAKE (basename (files2[0 ])), &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );dump_changes (changes, n_changes);
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { changes =NULL ; n_changes =0 ; - r =unit_file_link (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files2, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_link (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files2, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );dump_changes (changes, n_changes);
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { changes =NULL ; n_changes =0 ; - r =unit_file_reenable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files2, &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_reenable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files2, &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );dump_changes (changes, n_changes);
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { changes =NULL ; n_changes =0 ; - r =unit_file_disable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL ,STRV_MAKE (basename (files2[0 ])), &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_disable (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL ,STRV_MAKE (basename (files2[0 ])), &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );dump_changes (changes, n_changes);
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { changes =NULL ; n_changes =0 ; - r =unit_file_preset (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files,UNIT_FILE_PRESET_FULL , &changes, &n_changes); + r =unit_file_preset (UNIT_FILE_SYSTEM ,0 ,NULL , (char **) files,UNIT_FILE_PRESET_FULL , &changes, &n_changes,NULL ,NULL );assert_se (r >=0 );dump_changes (changes, n_changes);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
RFC PATCH 7/8 core: implement the sd-bus generic callback for SELinux
In reply to Christian GöttscheAlso keep the SELinux class service in mac_selinux_generic_access_check() in the case no path is given.
Previously this could mainly happen on a mask unit, which is fixed now.
Changing the class, but keeping the permission, is unpleasant as the class system must otherwise define always all permissions of service and a unit operation resulting in a system class-based check is odd. The fallback target context remains the process context of systemd-pid1.
--- src/core/dbus-manager.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++------------- src/core/manager.c | 7 +++++++ src/core/manager.h | 1 + src/core/selinux-access.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- src/core/selinux-access.h | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++--- src/core/unit.c | 4 +++- src/core/unit.h | 2 +- 7 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
src/core/dbus-manager.c +23 -14
@@ -2063,14 +2063,20 @@ fail: }struct mac_callback_userdata { +struct mac_selinux_callback_userdata selinux; };static int mac_callback_check (const char *name,void *userdata) {struct mac_callback_userdata *ud = userdata; +int r;assert (name);assert (ud); + r =mac_selinux_callback_check (name, &(ud->selinux)); +if (r <0 ) +return r; +return 0 ; }
@@ -2079,6 +2085,7 @@ static int method_enable_unit_files_generic(Manager *m, int (*call)(UnitFileScope scope, UnitFileFlags flags, const char *root_dir, char *files[], UnitFileChange **changes, size_t *n_changes, mac_callback_t mac_check, void *userdata), bool carries_install_info, + const char *mac_selinux_verb, sd_bus_error *error) { _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;
@@ -2086,7 +2093,7 @@ static int method_enable_unit_files_generic(size_t n_changes =0 ;UnitFileFlags flags;int runtime, force, r; -struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = {}; +struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = { .selinux = { m, message, error, mac_selinux_verb } };assert (message);assert (m);
@@ -2115,15 +2122,15 @@ static int method_enable_unit_files_generic( }static int method_enable_unit_files (sd_bus_message *message,void *userdata,sd_bus_error *error) { -return method_enable_unit_files_generic (message, userdata, unit_file_enable, true, error); +return method_enable_unit_files_generic (message, userdata, unit_file_enable, true,MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_ENABLE , error); }static int method_reenable_unit_files (sd_bus_message *message,void *userdata,sd_bus_error *error) { -return method_enable_unit_files_generic (message, userdata, unit_file_reenable, true, error); +return method_enable_unit_files_generic (message, userdata, unit_file_reenable, true,MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_REENABLE , error); }static int method_link_unit_files (sd_bus_message *message,void *userdata,sd_bus_error *error) { -return method_enable_unit_files_generic (message, userdata, unit_file_link, false, error); +return method_enable_unit_files_generic (message, userdata, unit_file_link, false,MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_LINK , error); }static int unit_file_preset_without_mode (UnitFileScope scope,UnitFileFlags flags,const char *root_dir,char **files,UnitFileChange **changes,size_t *n_changes,mac_callback_t mac_check,void *userdata) {
@@ -2131,11 +2138,11 @@ static int unit_file_preset_without_mode(UnitFileScope scope, UnitFileFlags flag }static int method_preset_unit_files (sd_bus_message *message,void *userdata,sd_bus_error *error) { -return method_enable_unit_files_generic (message, userdata, unit_file_preset_without_mode, true, error); +return method_enable_unit_files_generic (message, userdata, unit_file_preset_without_mode, true,MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_PRESET , error); }static int method_mask_unit_files (sd_bus_message *message,void *userdata,sd_bus_error *error) { -return method_enable_unit_files_generic (message, userdata, unit_file_mask, false, error); +return method_enable_unit_files_generic (message, userdata, unit_file_mask, false,MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_MASK , error); }static int method_preset_unit_files_with_mode (sd_bus_message *message,void *userdata,sd_bus_error *error) {
@@ -2148,7 +2155,7 @@ static int method_preset_unit_files_with_mode(sd_bus_message *message, void *useint runtime, force, r;UnitFileFlags flags;const char *mode; -struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = {}; +struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = { .selinux = { m, message, error,MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_PRESET } };assert (message);assert (m);
@@ -2188,13 +2195,14 @@ static int method_disable_unit_files_generic(sd_bus_message *message, Manager *m, int (*call)(UnitFileScope scope, UnitFileFlags flags, const char *root_dir, char *files[], UnitFileChange **changes, size_t *n_changes, mac_callback_t mac_check, void *userdata), + const char *mac_selinux_verb, sd_bus_error *error) { _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;UnitFileChange *changes =NULL ;size_t n_changes =0 ;int r, runtime; -struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = {}; +struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = { .selinux = { m, message, error, mac_selinux_verb } };assert (message);assert (m);
@@ -2221,11 +2229,11 @@ static int method_disable_unit_files_generic( }static int method_disable_unit_files (sd_bus_message *message,void *userdata,sd_bus_error *error) { -return method_disable_unit_files_generic (message, userdata, unit_file_disable, error); +return method_disable_unit_files_generic (message, userdata, unit_file_disable,MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_DISABLE , error); }static int method_unmask_unit_files (sd_bus_message *message,void *userdata,sd_bus_error *error) { -return method_disable_unit_files_generic (message, userdata, unit_file_unmask, error); +return method_disable_unit_files_generic (message, userdata, unit_file_unmask,MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_UNMASK , error); }static int method_revert_unit_files (sd_bus_message *message,void *userdata,sd_bus_error *error) {
@@ -2234,7 +2242,7 @@ static int method_revert_unit_files(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_size_t n_changes =0 ;Manager *m = userdata;int r; -struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = {}; +struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = { .selinux = { m, message, error,MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_REVERT } };assert (message);assert (m);
@@ -2295,7 +2303,7 @@ static int method_preset_all_unit_files(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata,const char *mode;UnitFileFlags flags;int force, runtime, r; -struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = {}; +struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = { .selinux = { m, message, error,MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_PRESET } };assert (message);assert (m);
@@ -2340,7 +2348,7 @@ static int method_add_dependency_unit_files(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdchar *target, *type;UnitDependency dep;UnitFileFlags flags; -struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = {}; +struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = { .selinux = { m, message, error,MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_ADDDEPENDENCY } };assert (message);assert (m);
@@ -2377,6 +2385,7 @@ static int method_add_dependency_unit_files(sd_bus_message *message, void *userd }static int method_get_unit_file_links (sd_bus_message *message,void *userdata,sd_bus_error *error) { +Manager *m = userdata; _cleanup_(sd_bus_message_unrefp) sd_bus_message *reply = NULL;UnitFileChange *changes =NULL ;size_t n_changes =0 , i;
@@ -2384,7 +2393,7 @@ static int method_get_unit_file_links(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sconst char *name;char **p;int runtime, r; -struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = {}; +struct mac_callback_userdata mcud = { .selinux = { m, message, error,MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_STATUS } }; r =mac_selinux_access_check (message,"status" , error);if (r <0 )
src/core/manager.c +7 -0
@@ -1868,6 +1868,13 @@ Unit *manager_get_unit(Manager *m, const char *name) {return hashmap_get (m->units, name); } +const char *manager_get_unitpath (Manager *m,const char *name) { +assert (m); +assert (name); + +return hashmap_get (m->unit_id_map, name); +} +static int manager_dispatch_target_deps_queue (Manager *m) {Unit *u;unsigned k;
src/core/manager.h +1 -0
@@ -452,6 +452,7 @@ int manager_startup(Manager *m, FILE *serialization, FDSet *fds);Job *manager_get_job (Manager *m,uint32_t id);Unit *manager_get_unit (Manager *m,const char *name); +const char *manager_get_unitpath (Manager *m,const char *name);int manager_get_job_from_dbus_path (Manager *m,const char *s,Job **_j);
src/core/selinux-access.c +37 -5
80 lines not on this page · raw message
src/core/selinux-access.h +25 -3
@@ -6,15 +6,37 @@#include "bus-util.h" #include "manager.h" -int mac_selinux_generic_access_check (sd_bus_message *message,const char *path,const char *permission,sd_bus_error *error); +#define MAC_SELINUX_CLASS_SYSTEM "system" +#define MAC_SELINUX_CLASS_UNIT "service" + +#define MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_ADDDEPENDENCY "modify" +#define MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_DISABLE "disable" +#define MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_ENABLE "enable" +#define MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_LINK "enable" +#define MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_MASK "disable" +#define MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_PRESET "modify" +#define MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_REENABLE "enable" +#define MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_REVERT "modify" +#define MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_STATUS "status" +#define MAC_SELINUX_UNIT_PERM_UNMASK "enable" + +struct mac_selinux_callback_userdata { +Manager *m; +sd_bus_message *message; +sd_bus_error *error; +const char *permission; +}; +int mac_selinux_callback_check (const char *name,struct mac_selinux_callback_userdata *userdata); + +int mac_selinux_generic_access_check (sd_bus_message *message,const char *path,const char *tclass,const char *permission,sd_bus_error *error);#if HAVE_SELINUX #define mac_selinux_access_check (message, permission, error) \ - mac_selinux_generic_access_check((message), NULL, (permission), (error)) + mac_selinux_generic_access_check((message), NULL, MAC_SELINUX_CLASS_SYSTEM, (permission), (error))#define mac_selinux_unit_access_check (unit, message, permission, error) \ - mac_selinux_generic_access_check((message), unit_label_path(unit), (permission), (error)) + mac_selinux_generic_access_check((message), unit_label_path(unit), MAC_SELINUX_CLASS_UNIT, (permission), (error))#else
src/core/unit.c +3 -1
@@ -5703,9 +5703,11 @@ bool unit_needs_console(Unit *u) {return exec_context_may_touch_console (ec); } -const char *unit_label_path (Unit *u) { +const char *unit_label_path (const Unit *u) {const char *p; +assert (u); +/* Returns the file system path to use for MAC access decisions, i.e. the file to read the SELinux label off * when validating access checks. */
src/core/unit.h +1 -1
@@ -839,7 +839,7 @@ int unit_warn_leftover_processes(Unit *u);bool unit_needs_console (Unit *u); -const char *unit_label_path (Unit *u); +const char *unit_label_path (const Unit *u);int unit_pid_attachable (Unit *unit,pid_t pid,sd_bus_error *error);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
RFC PATCH 8/8 core: add notes to D-Bus interfaces about adding SELinux checks
In reply to Christian Göttsche--- src/core/dbus-automount.c | 3 +++ src/core/dbus-cgroup.c | 3 +++ src/core/dbus-device.c | 3 +++ src/core/dbus-execute.c | 3 +++ src/core/dbus-job.c | 3 +++ src/core/dbus-kill.c | 3 +++ src/core/dbus-manager.c | 3 +++ src/core/dbus-mount.c | 3 +++ src/core/dbus-path.c | 3 +++ src/core/dbus-scope.c | 3 +++ src/core/dbus-service.c | 3 +++ src/core/dbus-slice.c | 3 +++ src/core/dbus-socket.c | 3 +++ src/core/dbus-swap.c | 3 +++ src/core/dbus-target.c | 3 +++ src/core/dbus-timer.c | 3 +++ src/core/dbus-unit.c | 6 ++++++ 17 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
src/core/dbus-automount.c +3 -0
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ static BUS_DEFINE_PROPERTY_GET_ENUM(property_get_result, automount_result, AutomountResult); +/* Note: when adding a SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY or SD_BUS_METHOD add a TODO(selinux), +* so the SELinux people can add a permission check. +*/ const sd_bus_vtable bus_automount_vtable[] = {SD_BUS_VTABLE_START (0 ),SD_BUS_PROPERTY ("Where" ,"s" ,NULL , offsetof(Automount , where),SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST ),
src/core/dbus-cgroup.c +3 -0
@@ -344,6 +344,9 @@ static int property_get_ip_address_access(return sd_bus_message_close_container (reply); } +/* Note: when adding a SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY or SD_BUS_METHOD add a TODO(selinux), +* so the SELinux people can add a permission check. +*/ const sd_bus_vtable bus_cgroup_vtable[] = {SD_BUS_VTABLE_START (0 ),SD_BUS_PROPERTY ("Delegate" ,"b" , bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(CGroupContext , delegate),0 ),
src/core/dbus-device.c +3 -0
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@#include "device.h" #include "unit.h" +/* Note: when adding a SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY or SD_BUS_METHOD add a TODO(selinux), +* so the SELinux people can add a permission check. +*/ const sd_bus_vtable bus_device_vtable[] = {SD_BUS_VTABLE_START (0 ),SD_BUS_PROPERTY ("SysFSPath" ,"s" ,NULL , offsetof(Device , sysfs),SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_EMITS_CHANGE ),
src/core/dbus-execute.c +3 -0
@@ -692,6 +692,9 @@ static int property_get_log_extra_fields(return sd_bus_message_close_container (reply); } +/* Note: when adding a SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY or SD_BUS_METHOD add a TODO(selinux), +* so the SELinux people can add a permission check. +*/ const sd_bus_vtable bus_exec_vtable[] = {SD_BUS_VTABLE_START (0 ),SD_BUS_PROPERTY ("Environment" ,"as" ,NULL , offsetof(ExecContext , environment),SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST ),
src/core/dbus-job.c +3 -0
@@ -119,6 +119,9 @@ int bus_job_method_get_waiting_jobs(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_return sd_bus_send (NULL , reply,NULL ); } +/* Note: when adding a SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY or SD_BUS_METHOD add a TODO(selinux), +* so the SELinux people can add a permission check. +*/ const sd_bus_vtable bus_job_vtable[] = {SD_BUS_VTABLE_START (0 ),SD_BUS_METHOD ("Cancel" ,NULL ,NULL , bus_job_method_cancel,SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED ),
src/core/dbus-kill.c +3 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ static int property_get_restart_kill_signal(return sd_bus_message_append_basic (reply,'i' , &s); } +/* Note: when adding a SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY or SD_BUS_METHOD add a TODO(selinux), +* so the SELinux people can add a permission check. +*/ const sd_bus_vtable bus_kill_vtable[] = {SD_BUS_VTABLE_START (0 ),SD_BUS_PROPERTY ("KillMode" ,"s" , property_get_kill_mode, offsetof(KillContext , kill_mode),SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST ),
src/core/dbus-manager.c +3 -0
@@ -2476,6 +2476,9 @@ static int method_abandon_scope(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_return bus_scope_method_abandon (message, u, error); } +/* Note: when adding a SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY or SD_BUS_METHOD add a TODO(selinux), +* so the SELinux people can add a permission check. +*/ const sd_bus_vtable bus_manager_vtable[] = {SD_BUS_VTABLE_START (0 ),
src/core/dbus-mount.c +3 -0
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ static BUS_DEFINE_PROPERTY_GET(property_get_options, "s", Mount, mount_get_optio static BUS_DEFINE_PROPERTY_GET(property_get_type, "s", Mount, mount_get_fstype); static BUS_DEFINE_PROPERTY_GET_ENUM(property_get_result, mount_result, MountResult); +/* Note: when adding a SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY or SD_BUS_METHOD add a TODO(selinux), +* so the SELinux people can add a permission check. +*/ const sd_bus_vtable bus_mount_vtable[] = {SD_BUS_VTABLE_START (0 ),SD_BUS_PROPERTY ("Where" ,"s" ,NULL , offsetof(Mount , where),SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST ),
src/core/dbus-path.c +3 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ static int property_get_paths(return sd_bus_message_close_container (reply); } +/* Note: when adding a SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY or SD_BUS_METHOD add a TODO(selinux), +* so the SELinux people can add a permission check. +*/ const sd_bus_vtable bus_path_vtable[] = {SD_BUS_VTABLE_START (0 ),SD_BUS_PROPERTY ("Unit" ,"s" , bus_property_get_triggered_unit,0 ,SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST ),
src/core/dbus-scope.c +3 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ int bus_scope_method_abandon(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sd_bus_err static BUS_DEFINE_PROPERTY_GET_ENUM(property_get_result, scope_result, ScopeResult); +/* Note: when adding a SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY or SD_BUS_METHOD add a TODO(selinux), +* so the SELinux people can add a permission check. +*/ const sd_bus_vtable bus_scope_vtable[] = {SD_BUS_VTABLE_START (0 ),SD_BUS_PROPERTY ("Controller" ,"s" ,NULL , offsetof(Scope , controller),SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_EMITS_CHANGE ),
src/core/dbus-service.c +3 -0
@@ -91,6 +91,9 @@ static int property_get_exit_status_set(return sd_bus_message_close_container (reply); } +/* Note: when adding a SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY or SD_BUS_METHOD add a TODO(selinux), +* so the SELinux people can add a permission check. +*/ const sd_bus_vtable bus_service_vtable[] = {SD_BUS_VTABLE_START (0 ),SD_BUS_PROPERTY ("Type" ,"s" , property_get_type, offsetof(Service , type),SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST ),
src/core/dbus-slice.c +3 -0
@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@#include "slice.h" #include "unit.h" +/* Note: when adding a SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY or SD_BUS_METHOD add a TODO(selinux), +* so the SELinux people can add a permission check. +*/ const sd_bus_vtable bus_slice_vtable[] = {SD_BUS_VTABLE_START (0 ),SD_BUS_VTABLE_END
src/core/dbus-socket.c +3 -0
@@ -74,6 +74,9 @@ static int property_get_listen(return sd_bus_message_close_container (reply); } +/* Note: when adding a SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY or SD_BUS_METHOD add a TODO(selinux), +* so the SELinux people can add a permission check. +*/ const sd_bus_vtable bus_socket_vtable[] = {SD_BUS_VTABLE_START (0 ),SD_BUS_PROPERTY ("BindIPv6Only" ,"s" , property_get_bind_ipv6_only, offsetof(Socket , bind_ipv6_only),SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST ),
src/core/dbus-swap.c +3 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static BUS_DEFINE_PROPERTY_GET(property_get_priority, "i", Swap, swap_get_priori static BUS_DEFINE_PROPERTY_GET(property_get_options, "s", Swap, swap_get_options); static BUS_DEFINE_PROPERTY_GET_ENUM(property_get_result, swap_result, SwapResult); +/* Note: when adding a SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY or SD_BUS_METHOD add a TODO(selinux), +* so the SELinux people can add a permission check. +*/ const sd_bus_vtable bus_swap_vtable[] = {SD_BUS_VTABLE_START (0 ),SD_BUS_PROPERTY ("What" ,"s" ,NULL , offsetof(Swap , what),SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_EMITS_CHANGE ),
src/core/dbus-target.c +3 -0
@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@#include "dbus-target.h" #include "unit.h" +/* Note: when adding a SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY or SD_BUS_METHOD add a TODO(selinux), +* so the SELinux people can add a permission check. +*/ const sd_bus_vtable bus_target_vtable[] = {SD_BUS_VTABLE_START (0 ),SD_BUS_VTABLE_END
src/core/dbus-timer.c +3 -0
@@ -118,6 +118,9 @@ static int property_get_next_elapse_monotonic( TIMER_MONOTONIC_CLOCK(t), CLOCK_MONOTONIC)); } +/* Note: when adding a SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY or SD_BUS_METHOD add a TODO(selinux), +* so the SELinux people can add a permission check. +*/ const sd_bus_vtable bus_timer_vtable[] = {SD_BUS_VTABLE_START (0 ),SD_BUS_PROPERTY ("Unit" ,"s" , bus_property_get_triggered_unit,0 ,SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST ),
src/core/dbus-unit.c +6 -0
@@ -764,6 +764,9 @@ static int property_get_refs(return sd_bus_message_close_container (reply); } +/* Note: when adding a SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY or SD_BUS_METHOD add a TODO(selinux), +* so the SELinux people can add a permission check. +*/ const sd_bus_vtable bus_unit_vtable[] = {SD_BUS_VTABLE_START (0 ),
@@ -1350,6 +1353,9 @@ int bus_unit_method_attach_processes(sd_bus_message *message, void *userdata, sdreturn sd_bus_reply_method_return (message,NULL ); } +/* Note: when adding a SD_BUS_WRITABLE_PROPERTY or SD_BUS_METHOD add a TODO(selinux), +* so the SELinux people can add a permission check. +*/ const sd_bus_vtable bus_unit_cgroup_vtable[] = {SD_BUS_VTABLE_START (0 ),SD_BUS_PROPERTY ("Slice" ,"s" , property_get_slice,0 ,0 ),
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Quoted 12 lines · Christian Göttsche
Improve the SELinux support in systemd, especially re-adding checks for unit file operations, like enable, mask...
The original pull request can be found at https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/10023
Patch 1 and 2 improve logging on failures in permissive mode.
Patch 3 adds the ability to obtain the context for a masked unit.
Patch 4 and 5 change several system und service checks. For better distinction two new permissions are introduced: modify and listdynusers.
Quoted 8 lines
Patch 6 and 7 re-introduce checking unit file install operations. They were dropped in
8faae625dc9b6322db452937f54176e56e65265a. For consistency in the unexpected case while perforimg a service access check no path can be gathered, now the check will still be executed on the service security class (currently it switches to the system security class).Patch 8 adds some notes for adding future D-Bus interfaces.
Thanks for working on this. Just to make sure I didn't miss anything while reading the patches, there are no new permissions being added to the system class, correct?
Signature · 1 line
Chris PeBenito
Quoted 20 lines · Chris PeBenito
Quoted 19 lines · Christian Göttsche
Improve the SELinux support in systemd, especially re-adding checks for unit file operations, like enable, mask...
The original pull request can be found at https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/10023
Patch 1 and 2 improve logging on failures in permissive mode.
Patch 3 adds the ability to obtain the context for a masked unit.
Patch 4 and 5 change several system und service checks. For better distinction two new permissions are introduced: modify and listdynusers.
Patch 6 and 7 re-introduce checking unit file install operations. They were dropped in
8faae625dc9b6322db452937f54176e56e65265a. For consistency in the unexpected case while perforimg a service access check no path can be gathered, now the check will still be executed on the service security class (currently it switches to the system security class).
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
Patch 8 adds some notes for adding future D-Bus interfaces.
Thanks for working on this. Just to make sure I didn't miss anything while reading the patches, there are no new permissions being added to the system class, correct?
This is what i understand:
Systemd first wants the regression fixed (re-add enable disable permission checks)
This phase should not add anything to the system class. It merely addresses a previous regression.
When that is done, then either the whole thing can be redone properly using policy capabilities, or we can add new permissions and in that scenario i guess the new permissions would be added to the existing system class (?). If we redo the whole thing without interfering with the existing implementation then we can get rid of the system class usage for systemd.
One can opt in for the proper implementation by enabling the policy capability or otherwise one can stick with the current implementation.
Quoted 3 lines
Signature · 2 lines
-- Chris PeBenito
Signature · 3 lines
Key fingerprint = 5F4D 3CDB D3F8 3652 FBD8 02D5 3B6C 5F1D 2C7B 6B02 https://sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x3B6C5F1D2C7B6B02 Dominick Grift
Quoted 23 lines · Dominick Grift
Quoted 22 lines · Chris PeBenito
Quoted 20 lines · Christian Göttsche
Improve the SELinux support in systemd, especially re-adding checks for unit file operations, like enable, mask...
The original pull request can be found at https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/10023
Patch 1 and 2 improve logging on failures in permissive mode.
Patch 3 adds the ability to obtain the context for a masked unit.
Patch 4 and 5 change several system und service checks. For better distinction two new permissions are introduced: modify and listdynusers.
Patch 6 and 7 re-introduce checking unit file install operations. They were dropped in
8faae625dc9b6322db452937f54176e56e65265a. For consistency in the unexpected case while perforimg a service access check no path can be gathered, now the check will still be executed on the service security class (currently it switches to the system security class).Patch 8 adds some notes for adding future D-Bus interfaces.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks for working on this. Just to make sure I didn't miss anything while reading the patches, there are no new permissions being added to the system class, correct?
This is what i understand:
Systemd first wants the regression fixed (re-add enable disable permission checks) This phase should not add anything to the system class. It merely addresses a previous regression.
I didn't look at all of the implementation details, but as long as there are no new permissions in the system class, I'm ok with the changes.
Quoted 3 lines
When that is done, then either the whole thing can be redone properly using policy capabilities, or we can add new permissions and in that scenario i guess the new permissions would be added to the existing system class (?). If we redo the whole thing without interfering with the existing implementation then we can get rid of the system class usage for systemd.
One can opt in for the proper implementation by enabling the policy capability or otherwise one can stick with the current implementation.
The correct thing to do with future changes is to remove the userspace permissions and put them in a new userspace object class (with appropriate compat, etc). If you're adding new permissions at the same time, a disabled policy capability would mean not checking the new permission; it wouldn't mean adding the new permission to the system class.
Signature · 1 line
Chris PeBenito
Quoted 28 lines · Chris PeBenito
Quoted 27 lines · Dominick Grift
Quoted 25 lines · Chris PeBenito
Quoted 12 lines · Christian Göttsche
Improve the SELinux support in systemd, especially re-adding checks for unit file operations, like enable, mask...
The original pull request can be found at https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/10023
Patch 1 and 2 improve logging on failures in permissive mode.
Patch 3 adds the ability to obtain the context for a masked unit.
Patch 4 and 5 change several system und service checks. For better distinction two new permissions are introduced: modify and listdynusers.
Quoted 8 lines
Patch 6 and 7 re-introduce checking unit file install operations. They were dropped in
8faae625dc9b6322db452937f54176e56e65265a. For consistency in the unexpected case while perforimg a service access check no path can be gathered, now the check will still be executed on the service security class (currently it switches to the system security class).Patch 8 adds some notes for adding future D-Bus interfaces.
Thanks for working on this. Just to make sure I didn't miss anything while reading the patches, there are no new permissions being added to the system class, correct?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
This is what i understand:
Systemd first wants the regression fixed (re-add enable disable permission checks) This phase should not add anything to the system class. It merely addresses a previous regression.
I didn't look at all of the implementation details, but as long as there are no new permissions in the system class, I'm ok with the changes.
This patch series has already been rejected by systemd in the mean time, the reason being that they first want to only address the existing regression. Addding anything new requires a blessing from the various (distribution) maintainers (good luck with that).
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 5 lines
When that is done, then either the whole thing can be redone properly using policy capabilities, or we can add new permissions and in that scenario i guess the new permissions would be added to the existing system class (?). If we redo the whole thing without interfering with the existing implementation then we can get rid of the system class usage for systemd.
One can opt in for the proper implementation by enabling the policy capability or otherwise one can stick with the current implementation.The correct thing to do with future changes is to remove the userspace permissions and put them in a new userspace object class (with appropriate compat, etc). If you're adding new permissions at the same time, a disabled policy capability would mean not checking the new permission; it wouldn't mean adding the new permission to the system class.
Signature · 1 line
Chris PeBenito
Signature · 3 lines
Key fingerprint = 5F4D 3CDB D3F8 3652 FBD8 02D5 3B6C 5F1D 2C7B 6B02 https://sks-keyservers.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x3B6C5F1D2C7B6B02 Dominick Grift