powerpc/pseries/svm: Use FW_FEATURE to detect SVM
Subsystems (2)
PATCH v3 1/2 powerpc/pseries/svm: Use FW_FEATURE to detect SVM
Use FW_FEATURE_SVM to detect a secure guest (SVM). This would be more efficient than calling mfmsr() frequently.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/firmware.h | 3 ++- arch/powerpc/include/asm/svm.h | 6 +++++- arch/powerpc/kernel/paca.c | 6 +++++- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/firmware.c | 3 +++ 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/firmware.h +2 -1
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@#define FW_FEATURE_BLOCK_REMOVE ASM_CONST(0x0000001000000000)#define FW_FEATURE_PAPR_SCM ASM_CONST(0x0000002000000000)#define FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR ASM_CONST(0x0000004000000000) +#define FW_FEATURE_SVM ASM_CONST(0x0000008000000000)#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
@@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ enum {FW_FEATURE_TYPE1_AFFINITY |FW_FEATURE_PRRN |FW_FEATURE_HPT_RESIZE |FW_FEATURE_DRMEM_V2 |FW_FEATURE_DRC_INFO |FW_FEATURE_BLOCK_REMOVE | -FW_FEATURE_PAPR_SCM |FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR , +FW_FEATURE_PAPR_SCM |FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR |FW_FEATURE_SVM ,FW_FEATURE_PSERIES_ALWAYS =0 ,FW_FEATURE_POWERNV_POSSIBLE =FW_FEATURE_OPAL |FW_FEATURE_ULTRAVISOR , FW_FEATURE_POWERNV_ALWAYS = 0,
arch/powerpc/include/asm/svm.h +5 -1
@@ -10,9 +10,13 @@#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_SVM +/* +* Note that this is not usable in early boot - before FW +* features were probed +*/ static inline bool is_secure_guest (void ) { -return mfmsr () &MSR_S ; +return firmware_has_feature (FW_FEATURE_SVM ); }void dtl_cache_ctor (void *addr);
arch/powerpc/kernel/paca.c +5 -1
@@ -120,7 +120,11 @@ static struct lppaca * __init new_lppaca(int cpu, unsigned long limit)if (early_cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_HVMODE ))return NULL ; -if (is_secure_guest ()) +/* +* Firmware features may not have been probed yet, so check +* MSR rather than FW_FEATURE_SVM in is_secure_guest(). +*/ +if (mfmsr () &MSR_S ) lp =alloc_shared_lppaca (LPPACA_SIZE ,0x400 , limit, cpu);else lp =alloc_paca_data (LPPACA_SIZE ,0x400 , limit, cpu);
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/firmware.c +3 -0
@@ -175,4 +175,7 @@ static int __init probe_fw_features(unsigned long node, const char *uname, intvoid __init pseries_probe_fw_features (void ) {of_scan_flat_dt (probe_fw_features,NULL ); + +if (mfmsr () &MSR_S ) + powerpc_firmware_features |=FW_FEATURE_SVM ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
PATCH v3 2/2 powerpc/pseries/svm: Disable BHRB/EBB/PMU access
Ultravisor disables some CPU features like BHRB, EBB and PMU in secure virtual machines (SVMs). Skip accessing those registers in SVMs to avoid getting a Program Interrupt.
---
Changelog[v2]
- [Michael Ellerman] Optimize the code using FW_FEATURE_SVM
- Merged EBB/BHRB and PMU patches into one and reorganized code.
- Fix some build errors reported by <[email protected]>
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/cpu_setup_power.S | 21 ++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 23 ++++++++++------- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++--------- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S | 32 +++++++++++++++--------- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_tm_builtin.c | 21 ++++++++++------ arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c | 6 +++++ arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c | 30 +++++++++++++--------- 7 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/cpu_setup_power.S +21 -0
@@ -206,14 +206,35 @@ __init_PMU_HV_ISA207: blr __init_PMU: +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_SVM + /* + * SVM's are restricted from accessing PMU, so skip. + */ + mfmsr r5 + rldicl r5, r5, 64-MSR_S_LG, 62 + cmpwi r5,1 + beq skip1 +#endif li r5,0 mtspr SPRN_MMCRA,r5 mtspr SPRN_MMCR0,r5 mtspr SPRN_MMCR1,r5 mtspr SPRN_MMCR2,r5 +skip1: blr __init_PMU_ISA207: + +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_SVM + /* + * SVM's are restricted from accessing PMU, so skip. + */ + mfmsr r5 + rldicl r5, r5, 64-MSR_S_LG, 62 + cmpwi r5,1 + beq skip2 +#endif li r5,0 mtspr SPRN_MMCRS,r5 +skip2: blr
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +14 -9
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@#include <asm/asm-prototypes.h> #include <asm/stacktrace.h> #include <asm/hw_breakpoint.h> +#include <asm/svm.h> #include <linux/kprobes.h> #include <linux/kdebug.h>
@@ -1059,9 +1060,11 @@ static inline void save_sprs(struct thread_struct *t) t->dscr =mfspr (SPRN_DSCR );if (cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S )) { - t->bescr =mfspr (SPRN_BESCR ); - t->ebbhr =mfspr (SPRN_EBBHR ); - t->ebbrr =mfspr (SPRN_EBBRR ); +if (!is_secure_guest ()) { + t->bescr =mfspr (SPRN_BESCR ); + t->ebbhr =mfspr (SPRN_EBBHR ); + t->ebbrr =mfspr (SPRN_EBBRR ); + } t->fscr =mfspr (SPRN_FSCR );
@@ -1097,12 +1100,14 @@ static inline void restore_sprs(struct thread_struct *old_thread, }if (cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S )) { -if (old_thread->bescr != new_thread->bescr) -mtspr (SPRN_BESCR , new_thread->bescr); -if (old_thread->ebbhr != new_thread->ebbhr) -mtspr (SPRN_EBBHR , new_thread->ebbhr); -if (old_thread->ebbrr != new_thread->ebbrr) -mtspr (SPRN_EBBRR , new_thread->ebbrr); +if (!is_secure_guest ()) { +if (old_thread->bescr != new_thread->bescr) +mtspr (SPRN_BESCR , new_thread->bescr); +if (old_thread->ebbhr != new_thread->ebbhr) +mtspr (SPRN_EBBHR , new_thread->ebbhr); +if (old_thread->ebbrr != new_thread->ebbrr) +mtspr (SPRN_EBBRR , new_thread->ebbrr); + }if (old_thread->fscr != new_thread->fscr)mtspr (SPRN_FSCR , new_thread->fscr);
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +21 -12
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/of.h> +#include <asm/svm.h> #include <asm/ftrace.h> #include <asm/reg.h>
@@ -3568,9 +3569,11 @@ int kvmhv_p9_guest_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 time_limit,mtspr (SPRN_PSPB , vcpu->arch.pspb);mtspr (SPRN_FSCR , vcpu->arch.fscr);mtspr (SPRN_TAR , vcpu->arch.tar); -mtspr (SPRN_EBBHR , vcpu->arch.ebbhr); -mtspr (SPRN_EBBRR , vcpu->arch.ebbrr); -mtspr (SPRN_BESCR , vcpu->arch.bescr); +if (!is_secure_guest ()) { +mtspr (SPRN_EBBHR , vcpu->arch.ebbhr); +mtspr (SPRN_EBBRR , vcpu->arch.ebbrr); +mtspr (SPRN_BESCR , vcpu->arch.bescr); + }mtspr (SPRN_WORT , vcpu->arch.wort);mtspr (SPRN_TIDR , vcpu->arch.tid);mtspr (SPRN_DAR , vcpu->arch.shregs.dar);
@@ -3641,9 +3644,11 @@ int kvmhv_p9_guest_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 time_limit, vcpu->arch.pspb =mfspr (SPRN_PSPB ); vcpu->arch.fscr =mfspr (SPRN_FSCR ); vcpu->arch.tar =mfspr (SPRN_TAR ); - vcpu->arch.ebbhr =mfspr (SPRN_EBBHR ); - vcpu->arch.ebbrr =mfspr (SPRN_EBBRR ); - vcpu->arch.bescr =mfspr (SPRN_BESCR ); +if (!is_secure_guest ()) { + vcpu->arch.ebbhr =mfspr (SPRN_EBBHR ); + vcpu->arch.ebbrr =mfspr (SPRN_EBBRR ); + vcpu->arch.bescr =mfspr (SPRN_BESCR ); + } vcpu->arch.wort =mfspr (SPRN_WORT ); vcpu->arch.tid =mfspr (SPRN_TIDR ); vcpu->arch.amr =mfspr (SPRN_AMR );
@@ -4272,9 +4277,11 @@ static int kvmppc_vcpu_run_hv(struct kvm_run *run, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)/* Save userspace EBB and other register values */ if (cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S )) { - ebb_regs[0 ] =mfspr (SPRN_EBBHR ); - ebb_regs[1 ] =mfspr (SPRN_EBBRR ); - ebb_regs[2 ] =mfspr (SPRN_BESCR ); +if (!is_secure_guest ()) { + ebb_regs[0 ] =mfspr (SPRN_EBBHR ); + ebb_regs[1 ] =mfspr (SPRN_EBBRR ); + ebb_regs[2 ] =mfspr (SPRN_BESCR ); + } user_tar =mfspr (SPRN_TAR ); } user_vrsave =mfspr (SPRN_VRSAVE );
@@ -4320,9 +4327,11 @@ static int kvmppc_vcpu_run_hv(struct kvm_run *run, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)/* Restore userspace EBB and other register values */ if (cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S )) { -mtspr (SPRN_EBBHR , ebb_regs[0 ]); -mtspr (SPRN_EBBRR , ebb_regs[1 ]); -mtspr (SPRN_BESCR , ebb_regs[2 ]); +if (!is_secure_guest ()) { +mtspr (SPRN_EBBHR , ebb_regs[0 ]); +mtspr (SPRN_EBBRR , ebb_regs[1 ]); +mtspr (SPRN_BESCR , ebb_regs[2 ]); + }mtspr (SPRN_TAR , user_tar);mtspr (SPRN_FSCR , current->thread.fscr); }
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S +20 -12
@@ -810,15 +810,19 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S) mtspr SPRN_CIABR, r7 mtspr SPRN_TAR, r8 ld r5, VCPU_IC(r4) - ld r8, VCPU_EBBHR(r4) mtspr SPRN_IC, r5 - mtspr SPRN_EBBHR, r8 - ld r5, VCPU_EBBRR(r4) - ld r6, VCPU_BESCR(r4) + +BEGIN_FTR_SECTION + ld r5, VCPU_EBBHR(r4) + ld r6, VCPU_EBBRR(r4) + ld r7, VCPU_BESCR(r4) + mtspr SPRN_EBBHR, r5 + mtspr SPRN_EBBRR, r6 + mtspr SPRN_BESCR, r7 +END_FW_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(FW_FEATURE_SVM) + lwz r7, VCPU_GUEST_PID(r4) ld r8, VCPU_WORT(r4) - mtspr SPRN_EBBRR, r5 - mtspr SPRN_BESCR, r6 mtspr SPRN_PID, r7 mtspr SPRN_WORT, r8 BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
@@ -1615,14 +1619,18 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S) mfspr r7, SPRN_TAR std r5, VCPU_IC(r9) std r7, VCPU_TAR(r9) - mfspr r8, SPRN_EBBHR - std r8, VCPU_EBBHR(r9) - mfspr r5, SPRN_EBBRR - mfspr r6, SPRN_BESCR + +BEGIN_FTR_SECTION + mfspr r5, SPRN_EBBHR + mfspr r6, SPRN_EBBRR + mfspr r7, SPRN_BESCR + std r5, VCPU_EBBHR(r9) + std r6, VCPU_EBBRR(r9) + std r7, VCPU_BESCR(r9) +END_FW_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(FW_FEATURE_SVM) + mfspr r7, SPRN_PID mfspr r8, SPRN_WORT - std r5, VCPU_EBBRR(r9) - std r6, VCPU_BESCR(r9) stw r7, VCPU_GUEST_PID(r9) std r8, VCPU_WORT(r9) BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_tm_builtin.c +13 -8
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@#include <asm/kvm_book3s_64.h> #include <asm/reg.h> #include <asm/ppc-opcode.h> +#include <asm/svm.h> /* * This handles the cases where the guest is in real suspend mode
@@ -45,14 +46,18 @@ int kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation_early(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)if (!(vcpu->arch.hfscr &HFSCR_EBB ) || ((msr &MSR_PR ) && !(mfspr (SPRN_FSCR ) &FSCR_EBB )))return 0 ; - bescr =mfspr (SPRN_BESCR ); -/* expect to see a S->T transition requested */ -if (((bescr >>30 ) &3 ) !=2 ) -return 0 ; - bescr &= ~BESCR_GE ; -if (instr & (1 <<11 )) - bescr |=BESCR_GE ; -mtspr (SPRN_BESCR , bescr); + +if (!is_secure_guest ()) { + bescr =mfspr (SPRN_BESCR ); +/* expect to see a S->T transition requested */ +if (((bescr >>30 ) &3 ) !=2 ) +return 0 ; + bescr &= ~BESCR_GE ; +if (instr & (1 <<11 )) + bescr |=BESCR_GE ; +mtspr (SPRN_BESCR , bescr); + } + msr = (msr & ~MSR_TS_MASK ) |MSR_TS_T ; vcpu->arch.shregs.msr = msr; vcpu->arch.cfar = vcpu->arch.regs.nip -4 ;
arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c +6 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@#include <asm/firmware.h> #include <asm/ptrace.h> #include <asm/code-patching.h> +#include <asm/svm.h> #ifdef CONFIG_PPC64 #include "internal.h"
@@ -813,6 +814,11 @@ void perf_event_print_debug(void)return ; } +if (is_secure_guest ()) { +pr_info ("Performance monitor access disabled in SVM.\n" ); +return ; + } +if (!ppmu->n_counter)return ;
arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c +19 -11
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@#include <asm/firmware.h> #include <asm/code-patching.h> #include <asm/sections.h> +#include <asm/svm.h> #ifdef CONFIG_PPC64 #include <asm/hvcall.h>
@@ -1861,17 +1862,24 @@ static void dump_207_sprs(void) mfspr(SPRN_TEXASR)); } -printf ("mmcr0 = %.16lx mmcr1 = %.16lx mmcr2 = %.16lx\n" , -mfspr (SPRN_MMCR0 ),mfspr (SPRN_MMCR1 ),mfspr (SPRN_MMCR2 )); -printf ("pmc1 = %.8lx pmc2 = %.8lx pmc3 = %.8lx pmc4 = %.8lx\n" , -mfspr (SPRN_PMC1 ),mfspr (SPRN_PMC2 ), -mfspr (SPRN_PMC3 ),mfspr (SPRN_PMC4 )); -printf ("mmcra = %.16lx siar = %.16lx pmc5 = %.8lx\n" , -mfspr (SPRN_MMCRA ),mfspr (SPRN_SIAR ),mfspr (SPRN_PMC5 )); -printf ("sdar = %.16lx sier = %.16lx pmc6 = %.8lx\n" , -mfspr (SPRN_SDAR ),mfspr (SPRN_SIER ),mfspr (SPRN_PMC6 )); -printf ("ebbhr = %.16lx ebbrr = %.16lx bescr = %.16lx\n" , -mfspr (SPRN_EBBHR ),mfspr (SPRN_EBBRR ),mfspr (SPRN_BESCR )); +if (!is_secure_guest ()) { +printf ("mmcr0 = %.16lx mmcr1 = %.16lx mmcr2 = %.16lx\n" , +mfspr (SPRN_MMCR0 ),mfspr (SPRN_MMCR1 ), +mfspr (SPRN_MMCR2 )); +printf ("pmc1 = %.8lx pmc2 = %.8lx pmc3 = %.8lx pmc4 = %.8lx\n" , +mfspr (SPRN_PMC1 ),mfspr (SPRN_PMC2 ), +mfspr (SPRN_PMC3 ),mfspr (SPRN_PMC4 )); +printf ("mmcra = %.16lx siar = %.16lx pmc5 = %.8lx\n" , +mfspr (SPRN_MMCRA ),mfspr (SPRN_SIAR ),mfspr (SPRN_PMC5 )); +printf ("sdar = %.16lx sier = %.16lx pmc6 = %.8lx\n" , +mfspr (SPRN_SDAR ),mfspr (SPRN_SIER ),mfspr (SPRN_PMC6 )); + +printf ("ebbhr = %.16lx ebbrr = %.16lx bescr = %.16lx\n" , +mfspr (SPRN_EBBHR ),mfspr (SPRN_EBBRR ), +mfspr (SPRN_BESCR )); + } + +printf ("iamr = %.16lx\n" ,mfspr (SPRN_IAMR ));if (!(msr &MSR_HV ))
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] powerpc/pseries/svm: Disable BHRB/EBB/PMU access
Quoted 3 lines · Sukadev Bhattiprolu
Ultravisor disables some CPU features like BHRB, EBB and PMU in secure virtual machines (SVMs). Skip accessing those registers in SVMs to avoid getting a Program Interrupt.
It would be useful to have more explanation of the rationale for the ultravisor disabling access to those features, and indicate whether this is a temporary restriction or a permanent one. If SVMs are never going to be able to use the PMU then that is a bad thing in my opinion. In other words, the commit message should tell us whether the restriction is just because the ultravisor doesn't yet have code for managing and context-switching the PMU, or if there is there some reason why using the PMU in a SVM will always be prohibited for some security-related reason.
Also, the only way that a SVM would be getting into the KVM code that you are patching is if it is trying to do nested virtualization. However, the SVM should already know that it is not able to do nested virtualization because the ultravisor should be intercepting and failing the H_SET_PARTITION_TABLE hypercall. So I think there is no good reason for patching the KVM code like you are doing unless the PMU restriction is permanent and we are intending someday to enable SVMs to have nested guests.
Paul.