Add policy capability for systemd overhaul
cover Add policy capability for systemd overhaul
Support a SELinux overhaul of systemd by adding a policy capability and adding a library method to obtain a current state of a policy capability.
The systemd patch can be found at
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/10023
and has NOT yet been accepted.
This is just a rfc to test the water.
Christian Göttsche (3):
libsepol: add policy capability for systemd overhaul
libselinux: add security_is_policy_capabilty_enabled()
libselinux: add policy capability test binary
libselinux/include/selinux/selinux.h | 3 + .../security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 | 27 ++++++++ libselinux/src/polcap.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++ libselinux/src/selinux_internal.h | 1 + libselinux/src/selinuxswig_python_exception.i | 9 +++ libselinux/utils/.gitignore | 1 + libselinux/utils/polcap_enabled.c | 30 +++++++++ libsepol/include/sepol/policydb/polcaps.h | 1 + libsepol/src/polcaps.c | 1 + 9 files changed, 137 insertions(+) create mode 100644 libselinux/man/man3/security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 create mode 100644 libselinux/src/polcap.c create mode 100644 libselinux/utils/polcap_enabled.c
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0.rc2
RFC PATCH 1/3 libsepol: add policy capability for systemd overhaul
--- libsepol/include/sepol/policydb/polcaps.h | 1 + libsepol/src/polcaps.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
libsepol/include/sepol/policydb/polcaps.h +1 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ enum {POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK ,POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL ,POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION , +POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_SYSTEMD_OVERHAUL , __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX };#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)
libsepol/src/polcaps.c +1 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ static const char *polcap_names[] = {"always_check_network" ,/* POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK */ "cgroup_seclabel" ,/* POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_SECLABEL */ "nnp_nosuid_transition" ,/* POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION */ +"systemd_overhaul" ,/* POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_SYSTEMD_OVERHAUL */ NULL };
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0.rc2
RFC PATCH 2/3 libselinux: add security_is_policy_capabilty_enabled()
In reply to Christian GöttscheAllow userspace (e.g. object managers like systemd) to obtain the state of a policy capability via a library call.
--- libselinux/include/selinux/selinux.h | 3 + .../security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 | 27 ++++++++ libselinux/src/polcap.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++ libselinux/src/selinux_internal.h | 1 + libselinux/src/selinuxswig_python_exception.i | 9 +++ 5 files changed, 104 insertions(+) create mode 100644 libselinux/man/man3/security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 create mode 100644 libselinux/src/polcap.c
libselinux/include/selinux/selinux.h +3 -0
@@ -354,6 +354,9 @@ extern int security_disable(void);/* Get the policy version number. */ extern int security_policyvers (void ); +/* Get the state of a policy capability. */ +extern int security_is_policy_capability_enabled (const char *name); +/* Get the boolean names */ extern int security_get_boolean_names (char ***names,int *len);
libselinux/man/man3/security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 new file +27 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +.TH "security_is_policy_capability_enabled" "3" "9 January 2020" "[email protected]" "SELinux API documentation" +.SH "NAME" +security_is_policy_capability_enabled \- get the state of a SELinux policy +capability +. +.SH "SYNOPSIS" +.B #include <selinux/selinux.h> +.sp +.BI "int security_is_policy_capability_enabled(const char *" name ");" +. +.SH "DESCRIPTION" +.BR security_is_policy_capability_enabled () +returns 1 if the SELinux policy capability with the given name is enabled, +0 if it is disabled, and \-1 on error. +.SH "NOTES" +The parameter +.IR name +is case insensitive. + +If the the current kernel does not support the given policy capability \-1 is returned and +.BR errno +is set to +.BR ENOTSUP +\&. +. +.SH "SEE ALSO" +.BR selinux "(8)"
libselinux/src/polcap.c new file +64 -0
64 lines not on this page · raw message
libselinux/src/selinux_internal.h +1 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ hidden_proto(selinux_mkload_policy) hidden_proto(security_disable) hidden_proto(security_policyvers) hidden_proto(security_load_policy) + hidden_proto(security_is_policy_capability_enabled) hidden_proto(security_get_boolean_active) hidden_proto(security_get_boolean_names) hidden_proto(security_set_boolean)
libselinux/src/selinuxswig_python_exception.i +9 -0
@@ -665,6 +665,15 @@ } +%exception security_is_policy_capability_enabled { + $action + if (result < 0) { + PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); + SWIG_fail; + } +} + + %exception security_get_boolean_names { $action if (result < 0) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0.rc2
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/3] libselinux: add security_is_policy_capabilty_enabled()
Quoted 16 lines · Christian Göttsche
Allow userspace (e.g. object managers like systemd) to obtain the state of a policy capability via a library call.
--- libselinux/include/selinux/selinux.h | 3 + .../security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 | 27 ++++++++ libselinux/src/polcap.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++ libselinux/src/selinux_internal.h | 1 + libselinux/src/selinuxswig_python_exception.i | 9 +++ 5 files changed, 104 insertions(+)create mode 100644 libselinux/man/man3/security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 create mode 100644
libselinux/src/polcap.clibselinux/include/selinux/selinux.h +0
-0
libselinux/include/selinux/selinux.h extern int security_disable(void); · line 358
Quoted 5 lines
libselinux/include/selinux/selinux.h +2
-0@@ -354,6 +354,9 @@ extern int security_disable(void);/* Get the policy version number. */ extern int security_policyvers (void ); +/* Get the state of a policy capability. */ +extern int security_is_policy_capability_enabled (const char *name);
Not sure if this should be security_ or selinux_. Historically, we originally used security_ as the prefix for security server interfaces (e.g. security_compute_av), avc_ as the prefix for AVC interfaces, and no prefix at all for various other interfaces (e.g. getcon, getfilecon).
Then people pointed out the potential for name collisions (even more
so in a multi-LSM world) and we started using selinux_ prefixes (but not consistently). I'm ok either way but thought I'd mention it.
Quoted 18 lines
libselinux/include/selinux/selinux.h +1
-0+/* Get the boolean names */ extern int security_get_boolean_names (char ***names,int *len);libselinux/man/man3/security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 new file +8
-0@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +.TH "security_is_policy_capability_enabled" "3" "9 January 2020" "[email protected]" "SELinux API documentation" +.SH "NAME" +security_is_policy_capability_enabled \- get the state of a SELinux policy +capability +. +.SH "SYNOPSIS" +.B #include <selinux/selinux.h> +.sp
libselinux/man/man3/security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 line 18
Quoted 10 lines
libselinux/man/man3/security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 new file +10
-0+.BI "int security_is_policy_capability_enabled(const char *" name ");" +. +.SH "DESCRIPTION" +.BR security_is_policy_capability_enabled () +returns 1 if the SELinux policy capability with the given name is enabled, +0 if it is disabled, and \-1 on error. +.SH "NOTES" +The parameter +.IR name +is case insensitive.
Why support case-insensitivity? It complicates the implementation and seems unnecessary.
Quoted 47 lines
libselinux/man/man3/security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 new file +9
-0+ +If the the current kernel does not support the given policy capability \-1 is returned and +.BR errno +is set to +.BR ENOTSUP +\&. +. +.SH "SEE ALSO" +.BR selinux "(8)"libselinux/src/polcap.c new file +32
-0@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +#include <dirent.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#include "policy.h" +#include "selinux_internal.h" + +int security_is_policy_capability_enabled (const char *name) +{ +int fd, enabled; +ssize_t ret; +char path[PATH_MAX ]; +char buf[20 ]; +DIR *polcapdir; +struct dirent *dentry; + +if (!selinux_mnt) { + errno =ENOENT ; +return -1 ; + } + +snprintf (path,sizeof path,"%s/policy_capabilities" , selinux_mnt); + polcapdir =opendir (path); +if (!polcapdir) +return -1 ; + +while ((dentry =readdir (polcapdir)) !=NULL ) {
libselinux/src/polcap.c line 42
Quoted 10 lines
libselinux/src/polcap.c new file +10
-0+if (strcmp (dentry->d_name,"." ) ==0 ||strcmp (dentry->d_name,".." ) ==0 ) +continue ; + +if (strcasecmp (name, dentry->d_name) !=0 ) +continue ; + +snprintf (path,sizeof path,"%s/policy_capabilities/%s" , selinux_mnt, dentry->d_name); + fd =open (path,O_RDONLY |O_CLOEXEC ); +if (fd <0 ) + goto err;
If you weren't trying to support case-insensitivity, you could just directly open() the capability file and be done with it.
Quoted 12 lines
libselinux/src/polcap.c new file +12
-0+ +memset (buf,0 ,sizeof buf); + ret =read (fd, buf,sizeof buf -1 ); +close (fd); +if (ret <0 ) + goto err; + +if (sscanf (buf,"%d" , &enabled) !=1 ) + goto err; + +closedir (polcapdir); +return !!enabled;
libselinux/src/polcap.c line 64
Quoted 10 lines
libselinux/src/polcap.c new file +10
-0+ } + +if (errno ==0 ) + errno =ENOTSUP ; +err: +closedir (polcapdir); +return -1 ; +} + +hidden_def (security_is_policy_capability_enabled)
The hidden_proto/hidden_def declarations are for libselinux functions that are called by libselinux itself, to provide an internal symbol for it and thereby avoid the cost and confusion of supporting libselinux using some other .so's definition of it. So unless you put a call to it somewhere inside libselinux, you don't need this.
libselinux/src/selinux_internal.h hidden_proto(selinux_mkload_policy) · line 12
Quoted 9 lines
libselinux/src/selinux_internal.h +1
-0@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ hidden_proto(selinux_mkload_policy) hidden_proto(security_disable) hidden_proto(security_policyvers) hidden_proto(security_load_policy) + hidden_proto(security_is_policy_capability_enabled)
Ditto
Quoted 24 lines
libselinux/src/selinux_internal.h +0
-0hidden_proto(security_get_boolean_active) hidden_proto(security_get_boolean_names) hidden_proto(security_set_boolean)libselinux/src/selinuxswig_python_exception.i +9
-0@@ -665,6 +665,15 @@ } +%exception security_is_policy_capability_enabled { + $action + if (result < 0) { + PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); + SWIG_fail; + } +} + + %exception security_get_boolean_names { $action if (result < 0) {
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/3] libselinux: add security_is_policy_capabilty_enabled()
Am Fr., 10. Jan. 2020 um 15:29 Uhr schrieb Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>:
Quoted 21 lines · Christian Göttsche
Quoted 19 lines
Allow userspace (e.g. object managers like systemd) to obtain the state of a policy capability via a library call.
--- libselinux/include/selinux/selinux.h | 3 + .../security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 | 27 ++++++++ libselinux/src/polcap.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++ libselinux/src/selinux_internal.h | 1 + libselinux/src/selinuxswig_python_exception.i | 9 +++ 5 files changed, 104 insertions(+)create mode 100644 libselinux/man/man3/security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 create mode 100644
libselinux/src/polcap.clibselinux/include/selinux/selinux.h +0
-0@@ -354,6 +354,9 @@ extern int security_disable(void);/* Get the policy version number. */ extern int security_policyvers (void );
Quoted 11 lines
libselinux/include/selinux/selinux.h extern int security_disable(void); · line 358
Quoted 2 lines
libselinux/include/selinux/selinux.h +2
-0+/* Get the state of a policy capability. */ +extern int security_is_policy_capability_enabled (const char *name);Not sure if this should be
security_orselinux_. Historically, we originally usedsecurity_as the prefix for security server interfaces (e.g.security_compute_av),avc_as the prefix for AVC interfaces, and no prefix at all for various other interfaces (e.g. getcon, getfilecon).
Then people pointed out the potential for name collisions (even more
so in a multi-LSM world) and we started usingselinux_prefixes (but not consistently). I'm ok either way but thought I'd mention it.
I'll think about it..
Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 23 lines
libselinux/include/selinux/selinux.h +1
-0+/* Get the boolean names */ extern int security_get_boolean_names (char ***names,int *len);libselinux/man/man3/security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 new file +13
-0@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +.TH "security_is_policy_capability_enabled" "3" "9 January 2020" "[email protected]" "SELinux API documentation" +.SH "NAME" +security_is_policy_capability_enabled \- get the state of a SELinux policy +capability +. +.SH "SYNOPSIS" +.B #include <selinux/selinux.h> +.sp +.BI "int security_is_policy_capability_enabled(const char *" name ");" +. +.SH "DESCRIPTION" +.BR security_is_policy_capability_enabled () +returns 1 if the SELinux policy capability with the given name is enabled,
Quoted 9 lines
libselinux/man/man3/security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 line 18
Quoted 5 lines
libselinux/man/man3/security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 new file +5
-0+0 if it is disabled, and \-1 on error. +.SH "NOTES" +The parameter +.IR name +is case insensitive.Why support case-insensitivity? It complicates the implementation and seems unnecessary.
sepol_polcap_getnum() does it:
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/blob/5bbe32a7e585dcd403739ea55a2fb25cbd184383/libsepol/src/polcaps.c#L25
Quoted 53 lines
Quoted 53 lines
libselinux/man/man3/security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 new file +9
-0+ +If the the current kernel does not support the given policy capability \-1 is returned and +.BR errno +is set to +.BR ENOTSUP +\&. +. +.SH "SEE ALSO" +.BR selinux "(8)"libselinux/src/polcap.c new file +37
-0@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +#include <dirent.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#include "policy.h" +#include "selinux_internal.h" + +int security_is_policy_capability_enabled (const char *name) +{ +int fd, enabled; +ssize_t ret; +char path[PATH_MAX ]; +char buf[20 ]; +DIR *polcapdir; +struct dirent *dentry; + +if (!selinux_mnt) { + errno =ENOENT ; +return -1 ; + } + +snprintf (path,sizeof path,"%s/policy_capabilities" , selinux_mnt); + polcapdir =opendir (path); +if (!polcapdir) +return -1 ; + +while ((dentry =readdir (polcapdir)) !=NULL ) { +if (strcmp (dentry->d_name,"." ) ==0 ||strcmp (dentry->d_name,".." ) ==0 ) +continue ; + +if (strcasecmp (name, dentry->d_name) !=0 ) +continue ;
Quoted 9 lines
libselinux/src/polcap.c line 42
Quoted 5 lines
libselinux/src/polcap.c new file +5
-0+ +snprintf (path,sizeof path,"%s/policy_capabilities/%s" , selinux_mnt, dentry->d_name); + fd =open (path,O_RDONLY |O_CLOEXEC ); +if (fd <0 ) + goto err;If you weren't trying to support case-insensitivity, you could just directly
open()the capability file and be done with it.
Would we need to check for directory traversals in that case? char *tainted_userdata = "../../../../etc/passwd" security_is_policy_capability_enabled(tainted_userdata)
Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 21 lines
libselinux/src/polcap.c new file +20
-0+ +memset (buf,0 ,sizeof buf); + ret =read (fd, buf,sizeof buf -1 ); +close (fd); +if (ret <0 ) + goto err; + +if (sscanf (buf,"%d" , &enabled) !=1 ) + goto err; + +closedir (polcapdir); +return !!enabled; + } + +if (errno ==0 ) + errno =ENOTSUP ; +err: +closedir (polcapdir); +return -1 ; +}
Quoted 9 lines
libselinux/src/polcap.c line 64
Quoted 2 lines
libselinux/src/polcap.c new file +2
-0+ +hidden_def (security_is_policy_capability_enabled)The hidden_proto/hidden_def declarations are for libselinux functions that are called by libselinux itself, to provide an internal symbol for it and thereby avoid the cost and confusion of supporting libselinux using some other .so's definition of it. So unless you put a call to it somewhere inside libselinux, you don't need this.
Ok, I'll drop it.
Quoted 37 lines
libselinux/src/selinux_internal.h hidden_proto(selinux_mkload_policy) · line 12
Quoted 9 lines
libselinux/src/selinux_internal.h +1
-0@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ hidden_proto(selinux_mkload_policy) hidden_proto(security_disable) hidden_proto(security_policyvers) hidden_proto(security_load_policy) + hidden_proto(security_is_policy_capability_enabled)Ditto
Quoted 24 lines
libselinux/src/selinux_internal.h +0
-0hidden_proto(security_get_boolean_active) hidden_proto(security_get_boolean_names) hidden_proto(security_set_boolean)libselinux/src/selinuxswig_python_exception.i +9
-0@@ -665,6 +665,15 @@ } +%exception security_is_policy_capability_enabled { + $action + if (result < 0) { + PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError); + SWIG_fail; + } +} + + %exception security_get_boolean_names { $action if (result < 0) {
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/3] libselinux: add security_is_policy_capabilty_enabled()
Quoted 35 lines · Christian Göttsche
Am Fr., 10. Jan. 2020 um 15:29 Uhr schrieb Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>:
Quoted 24 lines · Christian Göttsche
Quoted 22 lines
Allow userspace (e.g. object managers like systemd) to obtain the state of a policy capability via a library call.
---libselinux/man/man3/security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 new file +13
-0@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +.TH "security_is_policy_capability_enabled" "3" "9 January 2020" "[email protected]" "SELinux API documentation" +.SH "NAME" +security_is_policy_capability_enabled \- get the state of a SELinux policy +capability +. +.SH "SYNOPSIS" +.B #include <selinux/selinux.h> +.sp +.BI "int security_is_policy_capability_enabled(const char *" name ");" +. +.SH "DESCRIPTION" +.BR security_is_policy_capability_enabled () +returns 1 if the SELinux policy capability with the given name is enabled,Quoted 9 lines
libselinux/man/man3/security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 line 18
Quoted 5 lines
libselinux/man/man3/security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 new file +5
-0+0 if it is disabled, and \-1 on error. +.SH "NOTES" +The parameter +.IR name +is case insensitive.Why support case-insensitivity? It complicates the implementation and seems unnecessary.
Quoted 2 lines
sepol_polcap_getnum()does it:
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/blob/5bbe32a7e585dcd403739ea55a2fb25cbd184383/libsepol/src/polcaps.c#L25
Not sure why though. One difference is that sepol_polcap_getnum() is only used for capability names specified in policies, while security_is_policy_capability_enabled() will be used in application code. It seems reasonable to require application writers to use the right case for the capability name?
Quoted 64 lines
Quoted 54 lines
Quoted 54 lines
libselinux/man/man3/security_is_policy_capability_enabled.3 new file +9
-0+ +If the the current kernel does not support the given policy capability \-1 is returned and +.BR errno +is set to +.BR ENOTSUP +\&. +. +.SH "SEE ALSO" +.BR selinux "(8)"libselinux/src/polcap.c new file +37
-0@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +#include <dirent.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#include "policy.h" +#include "selinux_internal.h" + +int security_is_policy_capability_enabled (const char *name) +{ +int fd, enabled; +ssize_t ret; +char path[PATH_MAX ]; +char buf[20 ]; +DIR *polcapdir; +struct dirent *dentry; + +if (!selinux_mnt) { + errno =ENOENT ; +return -1 ; + } + +snprintf (path,sizeof path,"%s/policy_capabilities" , selinux_mnt); + polcapdir =opendir (path); +if (!polcapdir) +return -1 ; + +while ((dentry =readdir (polcapdir)) !=NULL ) { +if (strcmp (dentry->d_name,"." ) ==0 ||strcmp (dentry->d_name,".." ) ==0 ) +continue ; + +if (strcasecmp (name, dentry->d_name) !=0 ) +continue ;Quoted 9 lines
libselinux/src/polcap.c line 42
Quoted 5 lines
libselinux/src/polcap.c new file +5
-0+ +snprintf (path,sizeof path,"%s/policy_capabilities/%s" , selinux_mnt, dentry->d_name); + fd =open (path,O_RDONLY |O_CLOEXEC ); +if (fd <0 ) + goto err;If you weren't trying to support case-insensitivity, you could just directly
open()the capability file and be done with it.
Quoted 3 lines
Would we need to check for directory traversals in that case? char
*tainted_userdata= "../../../../etc/passwd"security_is_policy_capability_enabled(tainted_userdata)
No, we aren't crossing a trust boundary here and any sane application is going to hardcode the policy capability name, not take it from an untrusted source.
RFC PATCH 3/3 libselinux: add policy capability test binary
In reply to Christian Göttsche--- libselinux/utils/.gitignore | 1 + libselinux/utils/polcap_enabled.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+) create mode 100644 libselinux/utils/polcap_enabled.c
libselinux/utils/.gitignore +1 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ getpidcon getsebool getseuser matchpathcon +polcap_enabled policyvers sefcontext_compile selabel_digest
libselinux/utils/polcap_enabled.c new file +30 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <selinux/selinux.h> + +int main (int argc,char **argv) +{ +int ret; + +if (argc !=2 ) { +printf ("usage: %s polcap_name\n" , argv[0 ]); +return 1 ; + } + + ret =security_is_policy_capability_enabled (argv[1 ]); + +if (ret ==1 ) +printf ("enabled\n" ); +else if (ret ==0 ) +printf ("disabled\n" ); +else if (errno ==ENOTSUP ) +printf ("not supported\n" ); +else { +printf ("error (%d): %s\n" , errno,strerror (errno)); +return 1 ; + } + +return 0 ; +}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0.rc2
Re: [RFC PATCH 3/3] libselinux: add policy capability test binary
Quoted 44 lines · Christian Göttsche
--- libselinux/utils/.gitignore | 1 + libselinux/utils/polcap_enabled.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)create mode 100644
libselinux/utils/polcap_enabled.clibselinux/utils/.gitignore +1
-0@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ getpidcon getsebool getseuser matchpathcon +polcap_enabled policyvers sefcontext_compile selabel_digestlibselinux/utils/polcap_enabled.c new file +20
-0@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <selinux/selinux.h> + +int main (int argc,char **argv) +{ +int ret; + +if (argc !=2 ) { +printf ("usage: %s polcap_name\n" , argv[0 ]); +return 1 ; + } + + ret =security_is_policy_capability_enabled (argv[1 ]); + +if (ret ==1 ) +printf ("enabled\n" ); +else if (ret ==0 )
libselinux/utils/polcap_enabled.c line 30
Quoted 10 lines
libselinux/utils/polcap_enabled.c new file +10
-0+printf ("disabled\n" ); + else if (errno == ENOTSUP) + printf("not supported\n"); + else { +printf ("error (%d): %s\n" , errno,strerror (errno)); +return 1 ; + } + +return 0 ; +}
For new libselinux utilities, let's try to use some kind of unique prefix to help avoid collisions for distros that install these programs.
selinux_ should be fine.