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rxrpc: Unlock new call in rxrpc_new_incoming_call() rather than the caller

PATCH New Sasha Levin 1 participant 21 messages Jan 10, 2020

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Sasha Levin

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 6/26 rxrpc: Unlock new call in rxrpc_new_incoming_call() rather than the caller

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f33121cbe91973a08e68e4bde8c3f7e6e4e351c1 ]

Move the unlock and the ping transmission for a new incoming call into rxrpc_new_incoming_call() rather than doing it in the caller. This makes it clearer to see what's going on.

---
 net/rxrpc/call_accept.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 net/rxrpc/input.c       | 18 ------------------
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
net/rxrpc/call_accept.c +28 -8
index 135bf5cd8dd5..3685b1732f65 100644
@@ -239,6 +239,22 @@ void rxrpc_discard_prealloc(struct rxrpc_sock *rx)
 	kfree(b);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Ping the other end to fill our RTT cache and to retrieve the rwind
+ * and MTU parameters.
+ */
+static void rxrpc_send_ping(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
+	ktime_t now = skb->tstamp;
+
+	if (call->peer->rtt_usage < 3 ||
+	    ktime_before(ktime_add_ms(call->peer->rtt_last_req, 1000), now))
+		rxrpc_propose_ACK(call, RXRPC_ACK_PING, sp->hdr.serial,
+				  true, true,
+				  rxrpc_propose_ack_ping_for_params);
+}
+
 /*
  * Allocate a new incoming call from the prealloc pool, along with a connection
  * and a peer as necessary.
@@ -346,9 +362,7 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_new_incoming_call(struct rxrpc_local *local,
 				  sp->hdr.seq, RX_INVALID_OPERATION, ESHUTDOWN);
 		skb->mark = RXRPC_SKB_MARK_REJECT_ABORT;
 		skb->priority = RX_INVALID_OPERATION;
-		_leave(" = NULL [close]");
-		call = NULL;
-		goto out;
+		goto no_call;
 	}
 
 	/* The peer, connection and call may all have sprung into existence due
@@ -361,9 +375,7 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_new_incoming_call(struct rxrpc_local *local,
 	call = rxrpc_alloc_incoming_call(rx, local, peer, conn, skb);
 	if (!call) {
 		skb->mark = RXRPC_SKB_MARK_REJECT_BUSY;
-		_leave(" = NULL [busy]");
-		call = NULL;
-		goto out;
+		goto no_call;
 	}
 
 	trace_rxrpc_receive(call, rxrpc_receive_incoming,
@@ -432,10 +444,18 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_new_incoming_call(struct rxrpc_local *local,
 	 */
 	rxrpc_put_call(call, rxrpc_call_put);
 
-	_leave(" = %p{%d}", call, call->debug_id);
-out:
 	spin_unlock(&rx->incoming_lock);
+
+	rxrpc_send_ping(call, skb);
+	mutex_unlock(&call->user_mutex);
+
+	_leave(" = %p{%d}", call, call->debug_id);
 	return call;
+
+no_call:
+	spin_unlock(&rx->incoming_lock);
+	_leave(" = NULL [%u]", skb->mark);
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 /*
net/rxrpc/input.c +0 -18
index 157be1ff8697..86bd133b4fa0 100644
@@ -192,22 +192,6 @@ static void rxrpc_congestion_management(struct rxrpc_call *call,
 	goto out_no_clear_ca;
 }
 
-/*
- * Ping the other end to fill our RTT cache and to retrieve the rwind
- * and MTU parameters.
- */
-static void rxrpc_send_ping(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-	struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
-	ktime_t now = skb->tstamp;
-
-	if (call->peer->rtt_usage < 3 ||
-	    ktime_before(ktime_add_ms(call->peer->rtt_last_req, 1000), now))
-		rxrpc_propose_ACK(call, RXRPC_ACK_PING, sp->hdr.serial,
-				  true, true,
-				  rxrpc_propose_ack_ping_for_params);
-}
-
 /*
  * Apply a hard ACK by advancing the Tx window.
  */
@@ -1396,8 +1380,6 @@ int rxrpc_input_packet(struct sock *udp_sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		call = rxrpc_new_incoming_call(local, rx, skb);
 		if (!call)
 			goto reject_packet;
-		rxrpc_send_ping(call, skb);
-		mutex_unlock(&call->user_mutex);
 	}
 
 	/* Process a call packet; this either discards or passes on the ref
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 7/26 rxrpc: Don't take call->user_mutex in rxrpc_new_incoming_call()

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 13b7955a0252e15265386b229b814152f109b234 ]

Standard kernel mutexes cannot be used in any way from interrupt or softirq context, so the user_mutex which manages access to a call cannot be a mutex since on a new call the mutex must start off locked and be unlocked within the softirq handler to prevent userspace interfering with a call we're setting up.

Commit a0855d24fc22d49cdc25664fb224caee16998683 ("locking/mutex: Complain upon mutex API misuse in IRQ contexts") causes big warnings to be splashed in dmesg for each a new call that comes in from the server. Whilst it *seems* like it should be okay, since the accept path uses trylock, there are issues with PI boosting and marking the wrong task as the owner.

Fix this by not taking the mutex in the softirq path at all. It's not obvious that there should be any need for it as the state is set before the first notification is generated for the new call.

There's also no particular reason why the link-assessing ping should be triggered inside the mutex. It's not actually transmitted there anyway, but rather it has to be deferred to a workqueue.

Further, I don't think that there's any particular reason that the socket notification needs to be done from within rx->incoming_lock, so the amount of time that lock is held can be shortened too and the ping prepared before the new call notification is sent.

Fixes 540b1c48c37a ("rxrpc: Fix deadlock between call creation and sendmsg/recvmsg")
cc Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
cc Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
---
 net/rxrpc/call_accept.c | 20 +++-----------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
net/rxrpc/call_accept.c +3 -17
index 3685b1732f65..44fa22b020ef 100644
@@ -381,18 +381,6 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_new_incoming_call(struct rxrpc_local *local,
 	trace_rxrpc_receive(call, rxrpc_receive_incoming,
 			    sp->hdr.serial, sp->hdr.seq);
 
-	/* Lock the call to prevent rxrpc_kernel_send/recv_data() and
-	 * sendmsg()/recvmsg() inconveniently stealing the mutex once the
-	 * notification is generated.
-	 *
-	 * The BUG should never happen because the kernel should be well
-	 * behaved enough not to access the call before the first notification
-	 * event and userspace is prevented from doing so until the state is
-	 * appropriate.
-	 */
-	if (!mutex_trylock(&call->user_mutex))
-		BUG();
-
 	/* Make the call live. */
 	rxrpc_incoming_call(rx, call, skb);
 	conn = call->conn;
@@ -433,6 +421,9 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_new_incoming_call(struct rxrpc_local *local,
 		BUG();
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&conn->state_lock);
+	spin_unlock(&rx->incoming_lock);
+
+	rxrpc_send_ping(call, skb);
 
 	if (call->state == RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_ACCEPTING)
 		rxrpc_notify_socket(call);
@@ -444,11 +435,6 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_new_incoming_call(struct rxrpc_local *local,
 	 */
 	rxrpc_put_call(call, rxrpc_call_put);
 
-	spin_unlock(&rx->incoming_lock);
-
-	rxrpc_send_ping(call, skb);
-	mutex_unlock(&call->user_mutex);
-
 	_leave(" = %p{%d}", call, call->debug_id);
 	return call;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 8/26 rxrpc: Fix missing security check on incoming calls

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 063c60d39180cec7c9317f5acfc3071f8fecd705 ]

Fix rxrpc_new_incoming_call() to check that we have a suitable service key available for the combination of service ID and security class of a new incoming call - and to reject calls for which we don't.

This causes an assertion like the following to appear:

	rxrpc: Assertion failed - 6(0x6) == 12(0xc) is false
	kernel BUG at net/rxrpc/call_object.c:456!

Where call->state is RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_SECURING (6) rather than RXRPC_CALL_COMPLETE (12).

Fixes 248f219cb8bc ("rxrpc: Rewrite the data and ack handling code")
---
 net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h  | 10 ++++--
 net/rxrpc/call_accept.c  | 14 ++++++--
 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c   | 16 +--------
 net/rxrpc/conn_service.c |  4 +++
 net/rxrpc/rxkad.c        |  5 +--
 net/rxrpc/security.c     | 70 +++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 6 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h +7 -3
index 7c7d10f2e0c1..5e99df80e80a 100644
@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ struct rxrpc_skb_priv {
 struct rxrpc_security {
 	const char		*name;		/* name of this service */
 	u8			security_index;	/* security type provided */
+	u32			no_key_abort;	/* Abort code indicating no key */
 
 	/* Initialise a security service */
 	int (*init)(void);
@@ -977,8 +978,9 @@ static inline void rxrpc_reduce_conn_timer(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
 struct rxrpc_connection *rxrpc_find_service_conn_rcu(struct rxrpc_peer *,
 						     struct sk_buff *);
 struct rxrpc_connection *rxrpc_prealloc_service_connection(struct rxrpc_net *, gfp_t);
-void rxrpc_new_incoming_connection(struct rxrpc_sock *,
-				   struct rxrpc_connection *, struct sk_buff *);
+void rxrpc_new_incoming_connection(struct rxrpc_sock *, struct rxrpc_connection *,
+				   const struct rxrpc_security *, struct key *,
+				   struct sk_buff *);
 void rxrpc_unpublish_service_conn(struct rxrpc_connection *);
 
 /*
@@ -1103,7 +1105,9 @@ extern const struct rxrpc_security rxkad;
 int __init rxrpc_init_security(void);
 void rxrpc_exit_security(void);
 int rxrpc_init_client_conn_security(struct rxrpc_connection *);
-int rxrpc_init_server_conn_security(struct rxrpc_connection *);
+bool rxrpc_look_up_server_security(struct rxrpc_local *, struct rxrpc_sock *,
+				   const struct rxrpc_security **, struct key **,
+				   struct sk_buff *);
 
 /*
  * sendmsg.c
net/rxrpc/call_accept.c +11 -3
index 44fa22b020ef..70e44abf106c 100644
@@ -263,6 +263,8 @@ static struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_alloc_incoming_call(struct rxrpc_sock *rx,
 						    struct rxrpc_local *local,
 						    struct rxrpc_peer *peer,
 						    struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
+						    const struct rxrpc_security *sec,
+						    struct key *key,
 						    struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct rxrpc_backlog *b = rx->backlog;
@@ -310,7 +312,7 @@ static struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_alloc_incoming_call(struct rxrpc_sock *rx,
 		conn->params.local = rxrpc_get_local(local);
 		conn->params.peer = peer;
 		rxrpc_see_connection(conn);
-		rxrpc_new_incoming_connection(rx, conn, skb);
+		rxrpc_new_incoming_connection(rx, conn, sec, key, skb);
 	} else {
 		rxrpc_get_connection(conn);
 	}
@@ -349,9 +351,11 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_new_incoming_call(struct rxrpc_local *local,
 					   struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
+	const struct rxrpc_security *sec = NULL;
 	struct rxrpc_connection *conn;
 	struct rxrpc_peer *peer = NULL;
-	struct rxrpc_call *call;
+	struct rxrpc_call *call = NULL;
+	struct key *key = NULL;
 
 	_enter("");
 
@@ -372,7 +376,11 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_new_incoming_call(struct rxrpc_local *local,
 	 */
 	conn = rxrpc_find_connection_rcu(local, skb, &peer);
 
-	call = rxrpc_alloc_incoming_call(rx, local, peer, conn, skb);
+	if (!conn && !rxrpc_look_up_server_security(local, rx, &sec, &key, skb))
+		goto no_call;
+
+	call = rxrpc_alloc_incoming_call(rx, local, peer, conn, sec, key, skb);
+	key_put(key);
 	if (!call) {
 		skb->mark = RXRPC_SKB_MARK_REJECT_BUSY;
 		goto no_call;
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c +1 -15
index a1ceef4f5cd0..808a4723f868 100644
@@ -376,21 +376,7 @@ static void rxrpc_secure_connection(struct rxrpc_connection *conn)
 	_enter("{%d}", conn->debug_id);
 
 	ASSERT(conn->security_ix != 0);
-
-	if (!conn->params.key) {
-		_debug("set up security");
-		ret = rxrpc_init_server_conn_security(conn);
-		switch (ret) {
-		case 0:
-			break;
-		case -ENOENT:
-			abort_code = RX_CALL_DEAD;
-			goto abort;
-		default:
-			abort_code = RXKADNOAUTH;
-			goto abort;
-		}
-	}
+	ASSERT(conn->server_key);
 
 	if (conn->security->issue_challenge(conn) < 0) {
 		abort_code = RX_CALL_DEAD;
net/rxrpc/conn_service.c +4 -0
index 123d6ceab15c..21da48e3d2e5 100644
@@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ struct rxrpc_connection *rxrpc_prealloc_service_connection(struct rxrpc_net *rxn
  */
 void rxrpc_new_incoming_connection(struct rxrpc_sock *rx,
 				   struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
+				   const struct rxrpc_security *sec,
+				   struct key *key,
 				   struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
@@ -160,6 +162,8 @@ void rxrpc_new_incoming_connection(struct rxrpc_sock *rx,
 	conn->service_id	= sp->hdr.serviceId;
 	conn->security_ix	= sp->hdr.securityIndex;
 	conn->out_clientflag	= 0;
+	conn->security		= sec;
+	conn->server_key	= key_get(key);
 	if (conn->security_ix)
 		conn->state	= RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_UNSECURED;
 	else
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c +3 -2
index 8d8aa3c230b5..098f1f9ec53b 100644
@@ -648,9 +648,9 @@ static int rxkad_issue_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn)
 	u32 serial;
 	int ret;
 
-	_enter("{%d,%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->params.key));
+	_enter("{%d,%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->server_key));
 
-	ret = key_validate(conn->params.key);
+	ret = key_validate(conn->server_key);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -1293,6 +1293,7 @@ static void rxkad_exit(void)
 const struct rxrpc_security rxkad = {
 	.name				= "rxkad",
 	.security_index			= RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD,
+	.no_key_abort			= RXKADUNKNOWNKEY,
 	.init				= rxkad_init,
 	.exit				= rxkad_exit,
 	.init_connection_security	= rxkad_init_connection_security,
net/rxrpc/security.c +33 -37

95 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 9/26 dmaengine: k3dma: Avoid null pointer traversal

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: John Stultz <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2f42e05b942fe2fbfb9bbc6e34e1dd8c3ce4f3a4 ]

In some cases we seem to submit two transactions in a row, which causes us to lose track of the first. If we then cancel the request, we may still get an interrupt, which traverses a null ds_run value.

So try to avoid starting a new transaction if the ds_run value is set.

While this patch avoids the null pointer crash, I've had some reports of the k3dma driver still getting confused, which suggests the ds_run/ds_done value handling still isn't quite right. However, I've not run into an issue recently with it so I think this patch is worth pushing upstream to avoid the crash.

---
 drivers/dma/k3dma.c | 12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/dma/k3dma.c +9 -3
index 4b36c8810517..d05471653224 100644
@@ -229,9 +229,11 @@ static irqreturn_t k3_dma_int_handler(int irq, void *dev_id)
 			c = p->vchan;
 			if (c && (tc1 & BIT(i))) {
 				spin_lock_irqsave(&c->vc.lock, flags);
-				vchan_cookie_complete(&p->ds_run->vd);
-				p->ds_done = p->ds_run;
-				p->ds_run = NULL;
+				if (p->ds_run != NULL) {
+					vchan_cookie_complete(&p->ds_run->vd);
+					p->ds_done = p->ds_run;
+					p->ds_run = NULL;
+				}
 				spin_unlock_irqrestore(&c->vc.lock, flags);
 			}
 			if (c && (tc2 & BIT(i))) {
@@ -271,6 +273,10 @@ static int k3_dma_start_txd(struct k3_dma_chan *c)
 	if (BIT(c->phy->idx) & k3_dma_get_chan_stat(d))
 		return -EAGAIN;
 
+	/* Avoid losing track of  ds_run if a transaction is in flight */
+	if (c->phy->ds_run)
+		return -EAGAIN;
+
 	if (vd) {
 		struct k3_dma_desc_sw *ds =
 			container_of(vd, struct k3_dma_desc_sw, vd);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 10/26 s390/qeth: fix qdio teardown after early init error

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Julian Wiedmann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8b5026bc16938920e4780b9094c3bf20e1e0939d ]

qeth_l?_set_online() goes through a number of initialization steps, and on any error uses qeth_l?_stop_card() to tear down the residual state.

The first initialization step is qeth_core_hardsetup_card(). When this fails after having established a QDIO context on the device (ie. somewhere after qeth_mpc_initialize()), qeth_l?_stop_card() doesn't shut down this QDIO context again (since the card state hasn't progressed from DOWN at this stage).

Even worse, we then call qdio_free() as final teardown step to free the QDIO data structures - while some of them are still hooked into wider QDIO infrastructure such as the IRQ list. This is inevitably followed by use-after-frees and other nastyness.

Fix this by unconditionally calling qeth_qdio_clear_card() to shut down the QDIO context, and also to halt/clear any pending activity on the various IO channels.
Remove the naive attempt at handling the teardown in qeth_mpc_initialize(), it clearly doesn't suffice and we're handling it properly now in the wider teardown code.

Fixes 4a71df50047f ("qeth: new qeth device driver")
---
 drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c | 20 ++++++++------------
 drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c   |  2 +-
 drivers/s390/net/qeth_l3_main.c   |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c +8 -12
index 83794d7494d4..c444210d563b 100644
@@ -2451,50 +2451,46 @@ static int qeth_mpc_initialize(struct qeth_card *card)
 	rc = qeth_cm_enable(card);
 	if (rc) {
 		QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, "2err%d", rc);
-		goto out_qdio;
+		return rc;
 	}
 	rc = qeth_cm_setup(card);
 	if (rc) {
 		QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, "3err%d", rc);
-		goto out_qdio;
+		return rc;
 	}
 	rc = qeth_ulp_enable(card);
 	if (rc) {
 		QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, "4err%d", rc);
-		goto out_qdio;
+		return rc;
 	}
 	rc = qeth_ulp_setup(card);
 	if (rc) {
 		QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, "5err%d", rc);
-		goto out_qdio;
+		return rc;
 	}
 	rc = qeth_alloc_qdio_queues(card);
 	if (rc) {
 		QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, "5err%d", rc);
-		goto out_qdio;
+		return rc;
 	}
 	rc = qeth_qdio_establish(card);
 	if (rc) {
 		QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, "6err%d", rc);
 		qeth_free_qdio_queues(card);
-		goto out_qdio;
+		return rc;
 	}
 	rc = qeth_qdio_activate(card);
 	if (rc) {
 		QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, "7err%d", rc);
-		goto out_qdio;
+		return rc;
 	}
 	rc = qeth_dm_act(card);
 	if (rc) {
 		QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, "8err%d", rc);
-		goto out_qdio;
+		return rc;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
-out_qdio:
-	qeth_qdio_clear_card(card, !IS_IQD(card));
-	qdio_free(CARD_DDEV(card));
-	return rc;
 }
 
 void qeth_print_status_message(struct qeth_card *card)
drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c +1 -1
index 4bccdce19b5a..4224a3b7cd07 100644
@@ -287,12 +287,12 @@ static void qeth_l2_stop_card(struct qeth_card *card)
 		card->state = CARD_STATE_HARDSETUP;
 	}
 	if (card->state == CARD_STATE_HARDSETUP) {
-		qeth_qdio_clear_card(card, 0);
 		qeth_drain_output_queues(card);
 		qeth_clear_working_pool_list(card);
 		card->state = CARD_STATE_DOWN;
 	}
 
+	qeth_qdio_clear_card(card, 0);
 	flush_workqueue(card->event_wq);
 	card->info.mac_bits &= ~QETH_LAYER2_MAC_REGISTERED;
 }
drivers/s390/net/qeth_l3_main.c +1 -1
index d7bfc7a0e4c0..ae5300fef4e3 100644
@@ -1426,12 +1426,12 @@ static void qeth_l3_stop_card(struct qeth_card *card)
 		card->state = CARD_STATE_HARDSETUP;
 	}
 	if (card->state == CARD_STATE_HARDSETUP) {
-		qeth_qdio_clear_card(card, 0);
 		qeth_drain_output_queues(card);
 		qeth_clear_working_pool_list(card);
 		card->state = CARD_STATE_DOWN;
 	}
 
+	qeth_qdio_clear_card(card, 0);
 	flush_workqueue(card->event_wq);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 11/26 s390/qeth: lock the card while changing its hsuid

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Julian Wiedmann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5b6c7b55cfe26224b0f41b1c226d3534c542787f ]

qeth_l3_dev_hsuid_store() initially checks the card state, but doesn't take the conf_mutex to ensure that the card stays in this state while being reconfigured.

Rework the code to take this lock, and drop a redundant state check in a helper function.

Fixes b333293058aa ("qeth: add support for af_iucv HiperSockets transport")
---
 drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c |  5 ----
 drivers/s390/net/qeth_l3_sys.c    | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c +0 -5
index c444210d563b..7320a187d66a 100644
@@ -3378,11 +3378,6 @@ int qeth_configure_cq(struct qeth_card *card, enum qeth_cq cq)
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		if (card->state != CARD_STATE_DOWN) {
-			rc = -1;
-			goto out;
-		}
-
 		qeth_free_qdio_queues(card);
 		card->options.cq = cq;
 		rc = 0;
drivers/s390/net/qeth_l3_sys.c +28 -12
index 2f73b33c9347..333fd4619dc6 100644
@@ -270,24 +270,36 @@ static ssize_t qeth_l3_dev_hsuid_store(struct device *dev,
 		struct device_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t count)
 {
 	struct qeth_card *card = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+	int rc = 0;
 	char *tmp;
-	int rc;
 
 	if (!card)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!IS_IQD(card))
 		return -EPERM;
-	if (card->state != CARD_STATE_DOWN)
-		return -EPERM;
-	if (card->options.sniffer)
-		return -EPERM;
-	if (card->options.cq == QETH_CQ_NOTAVAILABLE)
-		return -EPERM;
+
+	mutex_lock(&card->conf_mutex);
+	if (card->state != CARD_STATE_DOWN) {
+		rc = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (card->options.sniffer) {
+		rc = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (card->options.cq == QETH_CQ_NOTAVAILABLE) {
+		rc = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	tmp = strsep((char **)&buf, "\n");
-	if (strlen(tmp) > 8)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	if (strlen(tmp) > 8) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	if (card->options.hsuid[0])
 		/* delete old ip address */
@@ -298,11 +310,13 @@ static ssize_t qeth_l3_dev_hsuid_store(struct device *dev,
 		card->options.hsuid[0] = '\0';
 		memcpy(card->dev->perm_addr, card->options.hsuid, 9);
 		qeth_configure_cq(card, QETH_CQ_DISABLED);
-		return count;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (qeth_configure_cq(card, QETH_CQ_ENABLED))
-		return -EPERM;
+	if (qeth_configure_cq(card, QETH_CQ_ENABLED)) {
+		rc = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	snprintf(card->options.hsuid, sizeof(card->options.hsuid),
 		 "%-8s", tmp);
@@ -311,6 +325,8 @@ static ssize_t qeth_l3_dev_hsuid_store(struct device *dev,
 
 	rc = qeth_l3_modify_hsuid(card, true);
 
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&card->conf_mutex);
 	return rc ? rc : count;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 12/26 s390/qeth: fix false reporting of VNIC CHAR config failure

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Alexandra Winter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 68c57bfd52836e31bff33e5e1fc64029749d2c35 ]

Symptom: Error message "Configuring the VNIC characteristics failed" in dmesg whenever an OSA interface on z15 is set online.

The VNIC characteristics get re-programmed when setting a L2 device online. This follows the selected 'wanted' characteristics - with the exception that the INVISIBLE characteristic unconditionally gets switched off.

For devices that don't support INVISIBLE (ie. OSA), the resulting IO failure raises a noisy error message
("Configuring the VNIC characteristics failed").
For IQD, INVISIBLE is off by default anyways.

So don't unnecessarily special-case the INVISIBLE characteristic, and thereby suppress the misleading error message on OSA devices.

Fixes caa1f0b10d18 ("s390/qeth: add VNICC enable/disable support")
---
 drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c +0 -1
index 4224a3b7cd07..5272a4c36db8 100644
@@ -2071,7 +2071,6 @@ static void qeth_l2_vnicc_init(struct qeth_card *card)
 	error |= qeth_l2_vnicc_recover_timeout(card, QETH_VNICC_LEARNING,
 					       timeout);
 	chars_tmp = card->options.vnicc.wanted_chars ^ QETH_VNICC_DEFAULT;
-	chars_tmp |= QETH_VNICC_BRIDGE_INVISIBLE;
 	chars_len = sizeof(card->options.vnicc.wanted_chars) * BITS_PER_BYTE;
 	for_each_set_bit(i, &chars_tmp, chars_len) {
 		vnicc = BIT(i);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 13/26 s390/qeth: Fix vnicc_is_in_use if rx_bcast not set

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Alexandra Winter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e8a66d800471e2df7f0b484e2e46898b21d1fa82 ]

Symptom: After vnicc/rx_bcast has been manually set to 0,
bridge_* sysfs parameters can still be set or written.
Only occurs on HiperSockets, as OSA doesn't support changing rx_bcast.

Vnic characteristics and bridgeport settings are mutually exclusive. rx_bcast defaults to 1, so manually setting it to 0 should disable bridge_* parameters.

Instead it makes sense here to check the supported mask. If the card does not support vnicc at all, bridge commands are always allowed.

Fixes caa1f0b10d18 ("s390/qeth: add VNICC enable/disable support")
---
 drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c +1 -2
index 5272a4c36db8..dcbdaa5ce455 100644
@@ -1982,8 +1982,7 @@ int qeth_l2_vnicc_get_timeout(struct qeth_card *card, u32 *timeout)
 /* check if VNICC is currently enabled */
 bool qeth_l2_vnicc_is_in_use(struct qeth_card *card)
 {
-	/* if everything is turned off, VNICC is not active */
-	if (!card->options.vnicc.cur_chars)
+	if (!card->options.vnicc.sup_chars)
 		return false;
 	/* default values are only OK if rx_bcast was not enabled by user
 	 * or the card is offline.
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 14/26 s390/qeth: vnicc Fix init to default

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Alexandra Winter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d1b9ae1864fc3c000e0eb4af8482d78c63e0915a ]

During vnicc_init wanted_char should be compared to cur_char and not to QETH_VNICC_DEFAULT. Without this patch there is no way to enforce the default values as desired values.

Note, that it is expected, that a card comes online with default values. This patch was tested with private card firmware.

Fixes caa1f0b10d18 ("s390/qeth: add VNICC enable/disable support")
---
 drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c +3 -1
index dcbdaa5ce455..b9b47e74d6c2 100644
@@ -2069,7 +2069,9 @@ static void qeth_l2_vnicc_init(struct qeth_card *card)
 	/* enforce assumed default values and recover settings, if changed  */
 	error |= qeth_l2_vnicc_recover_timeout(card, QETH_VNICC_LEARNING,
 					       timeout);
-	chars_tmp = card->options.vnicc.wanted_chars ^ QETH_VNICC_DEFAULT;
+	/* Change chars, if necessary  */
+	chars_tmp = card->options.vnicc.wanted_chars ^
+		    card->options.vnicc.cur_chars;
 	chars_len = sizeof(card->options.vnicc.wanted_chars) * BITS_PER_BYTE;
 	for_each_set_bit(i, &chars_tmp, chars_len) {
 		vnicc = BIT(i);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 15/26 s390/qeth: fix initialization on old HW

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Julian Wiedmann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0b698c838e84149b690c7e979f78cccb6f8aa4b9 ]

I stumbled over an old OSA model that claims to support DIAG_ASSIST, but then rejects the cmd to query its DIAG capabilities.

In the old code this was ok, as the returned raw error code was > 0. Now that we translate the raw codes to errnos, the "rc < 0" causes us to fail the initialization of the device.

The fix is trivial: don't bail out when the DIAG query fails. Such an error is not critical, we can still use the device (with a slightly reduced set of features).

Fixes 742d4d40831d ("s390/qeth: convert remaining legacy cmd callbacks")
---
 drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c | 4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c +1 -3
index 7320a187d66a..b60e6b3046ef 100644
@@ -4963,10 +4963,8 @@ int qeth_core_hardsetup_card(struct qeth_card *card, bool *carrier_ok)
 	}
 	if (qeth_adp_supported(card, IPA_SETADP_SET_DIAG_ASSIST)) {
 		rc = qeth_query_setdiagass(card);
-		if (rc < 0) {
+		if (rc)
 			QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, "8err%d", rc);
-			goto out;
-		}
 	}
 	return 0;
 out:
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 16/26 hsr: add hsr root debugfs directory

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c6c4ccd7f96993e106dfea7ef18127f972f2db5e ]

In current hsr code, when hsr interface is created, it creates debugfs directory /sys/kernel/debug/<interface name>.
If there is same directory or file name in there, it fails. In order to reduce possibility of failure of creation of debugfs, this patch adds root directory.

Test commands:
ip link add dummy0 type dummy
ip link add dummy1 type dummy
ip link add hsr0 type hsr slave1 dummy0 slave2 dummy1

Before this patch:
/sys/kernel/debug/hsr0/node_table

After this patch:
/sys/kernel/debug/hsr/hsr0/node_table

---
 net/hsr/hsr_debugfs.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
 net/hsr/hsr_main.c    |  1 +
 net/hsr/hsr_main.h    |  6 ++++++
 net/hsr/hsr_netlink.c |  1 +
 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/hsr/hsr_debugfs.c +20 -3
index 6618a9d8e58e..a7462a718e7b 100644
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
 #include "hsr_main.h"
 #include "hsr_framereg.h"
 
+static struct dentry *hsr_debugfs_root_dir;
+
 static void print_mac_address(struct seq_file *sfp, unsigned char *mac)
 {
 	seq_printf(sfp, "%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:",
@@ -81,9 +83,9 @@ void hsr_debugfs_init(struct hsr_priv *priv, struct net_device *hsr_dev)
 {
 	struct dentry *de = NULL;
 
-	de = debugfs_create_dir(hsr_dev->name, NULL);
+	de = debugfs_create_dir(hsr_dev->name, hsr_debugfs_root_dir);
 	if (IS_ERR(de)) {
-		pr_err("Cannot create hsr debugfs root\n");
+		pr_err("Cannot create hsr debugfs directory\n");
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -93,7 +95,7 @@ void hsr_debugfs_init(struct hsr_priv *priv, struct net_device *hsr_dev)
 				 priv->node_tbl_root, priv,
 				 &hsr_fops);
 	if (IS_ERR(de)) {
-		pr_err("Cannot create hsr node_table directory\n");
+		pr_err("Cannot create hsr node_table file\n");
 		debugfs_remove(priv->node_tbl_root);
 		priv->node_tbl_root = NULL;
 		return;
@@ -115,3 +117,18 @@ hsr_debugfs_term(struct hsr_priv *priv)
 	debugfs_remove(priv->node_tbl_root);
 	priv->node_tbl_root = NULL;
 }
+
+void hsr_debugfs_create_root(void)
+{
+	hsr_debugfs_root_dir = debugfs_create_dir("hsr", NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(hsr_debugfs_root_dir)) {
+		pr_err("Cannot create hsr debugfs root directory\n");
+		hsr_debugfs_root_dir = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+void hsr_debugfs_remove_root(void)
+{
+	/* debugfs_remove() internally checks NULL and ERROR */
+	debugfs_remove(hsr_debugfs_root_dir);
+}
net/hsr/hsr_main.c +1 -0
index 6deb8fa8d5c8..e28c975520ec 100644
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ static void __exit hsr_exit(void)
 {
 	unregister_netdevice_notifier(&hsr_nb);
 	hsr_netlink_exit();
+	hsr_debugfs_remove_root();
 }
 
 module_init(hsr_init);
net/hsr/hsr_main.h +6 -0
index 9ec38e33b8b1..6696923fd4bd 100644
@@ -187,12 +187,18 @@ static inline u16 hsr_get_skb_sequence_nr(struct sk_buff *skb)
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_FS)
 void hsr_debugfs_init(struct hsr_priv *priv, struct net_device *hsr_dev);
 void hsr_debugfs_term(struct hsr_priv *priv);
+void hsr_debugfs_create_root(void);
+void hsr_debugfs_remove_root(void);
 #else
 static inline void hsr_debugfs_init(struct hsr_priv *priv,
 				    struct net_device *hsr_dev)
 {}
 static inline void hsr_debugfs_term(struct hsr_priv *priv)
 {}
+static inline void hsr_debugfs_create_root(void)
+{}
+static inline void hsr_debugfs_remove_root(void)
+{}
 #endif
 
 #endif /*  __HSR_PRIVATE_H */
net/hsr/hsr_netlink.c +1 -0
index 8f8337f893ba..8dc0547f01d0 100644
@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ int __init hsr_netlink_init(void)
 	if (rc)
 		goto fail_genl_register_family;
 
+	hsr_debugfs_create_root();
 	return 0;
 
 fail_genl_register_family:
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 17/26 hsr: rename debugfs file when interface name is changed

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4c2d5e33dcd3a6333a7895be3b542ff3d373177c ]

hsr interface has own debugfs file, which name is same with interface name. So, interface name is changed, debugfs file name should be changed too.

Fixes fc4ecaeebd26 ("net: hsr: add debugfs support for display node list")
---
 net/hsr/hsr_debugfs.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 net/hsr/hsr_main.c    |  3 +++
 net/hsr/hsr_main.h    |  4 ++++
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
net/hsr/hsr_debugfs.c +13 -0
index a7462a718e7b..d5f709b940ff 100644
@@ -65,6 +65,19 @@ hsr_node_table_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 	return single_open(filp, hsr_node_table_show, inode->i_private);
 }
 
+void hsr_debugfs_rename(struct net_device *dev)
+{
+	struct hsr_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev);
+	struct dentry *d;
+
+	d = debugfs_rename(hsr_debugfs_root_dir, priv->node_tbl_root,
+			   hsr_debugfs_root_dir, dev->name);
+	if (IS_ERR(d))
+		netdev_warn(dev, "failed to rename\n");
+	else
+		priv->node_tbl_root = d;
+}
+
 static const struct file_operations hsr_fops = {
 	.open	= hsr_node_table_open,
 	.read	= seq_read,
net/hsr/hsr_main.c +3 -0
index e28c975520ec..d2ee7125a7f1 100644
@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ static int hsr_netdev_notify(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
 	case NETDEV_CHANGE:	/* Link (carrier) state changes */
 		hsr_check_carrier_and_operstate(hsr);
 		break;
+	case NETDEV_CHANGENAME:
+		hsr_debugfs_rename(dev);
+		break;
 	case NETDEV_CHANGEADDR:
 		if (port->type == HSR_PT_MASTER) {
 			/* This should not happen since there's no
net/hsr/hsr_main.h +4 -0
index 6696923fd4bd..d40de84a637f 100644
@@ -185,11 +185,15 @@ static inline u16 hsr_get_skb_sequence_nr(struct sk_buff *skb)
 }
 
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_FS)
+void hsr_debugfs_rename(struct net_device *dev);
 void hsr_debugfs_init(struct hsr_priv *priv, struct net_device *hsr_dev);
 void hsr_debugfs_term(struct hsr_priv *priv);
 void hsr_debugfs_create_root(void);
 void hsr_debugfs_remove_root(void);
 #else
+static inline void void hsr_debugfs_rename(struct net_device *dev)
+{
+}
 static inline void hsr_debugfs_init(struct hsr_priv *priv,
 				    struct net_device *hsr_dev)
 {}
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 18/26 hsr: reset network header when supervision frame is created

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3ed0a1d563903bdb4b4c36c58c4d9c1bcb23a6e6 ]

The supervision frame is L2 frame.
When supervision frame is created, hsr module doesn't set network header. If tap routine is enabled, dev_queue_xmit_nit() is called and it checks network_header. If network_header pointer wasn't set(or invalid), it resets network_header and warns.
In order to avoid unnecessary warning message, resetting network_header is needed.

Test commands:
ip netns add nst
ip link add veth0 type veth peer name veth1
ip link add veth2 type veth peer name veth3
ip link set veth1 netns nst
ip link set veth3 netns nst
ip link set veth0 up
ip link set veth2 up
ip link add hsr0 type hsr slave1 veth0 slave2 veth2
ip a a 192.168.100.1/24 dev hsr0
ip link set hsr0 up
ip netns exec nst ip link set veth1 up
ip netns exec nst ip link set veth3 up
ip netns exec nst ip link add hsr1 type hsr slave1 veth1 slave2 veth3 ip netns exec nst ip a a 192.168.100.2/24 dev hsr1
ip netns exec nst ip link set hsr1 up
tcpdump -nei veth0

Splat looks like:

[  175.852292][    C3] protocol 88fb is buggy, dev veth0
Fixes f421436a591d ("net/hsr: Add support for the High-availability Seamless Redundancy protocol (HSRv0)")
---
 net/hsr/hsr_device.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/hsr/hsr_device.c +2 -0
index 62c03f0d0079..c7bd6c49fadf 100644
@@ -272,6 +272,8 @@ static void send_hsr_supervision_frame(struct hsr_port *master,
 			    skb->dev->dev_addr, skb->len) <= 0)
 		goto out;
 	skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
+	skb_reset_network_header(skb);
+	skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
 
 	if (hsr_ver > 0) {
 		hsr_tag = skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct hsr_tag));
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 19/26 ioat: ioat_alloc_ring() failure handling.

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b0b5ce1010ffc50015eaec72b0028aaae3f526bb ]

If dma_alloc_coherent() returns NULL in ioat_alloc_ring(), ring allocation must not proceed.

Until now, if the first call to dma_alloc_coherent() in ioat_alloc_ring() returned NULL, the processing could proceed, failing with NULL-pointer dereferencing further down the line.

---
 drivers/dma/ioat/dma.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/dma/ioat/dma.c +2 -1
index 1a422a8b43cf..18c011e57592 100644
@@ -377,10 +377,11 @@ ioat_alloc_ring(struct dma_chan *c, int order, gfp_t flags)
 
 		descs->virt = dma_alloc_coherent(to_dev(ioat_chan),
 						 SZ_2M, &descs->hw, flags);
-		if (!descs->virt && (i > 0)) {
+		if (!descs->virt) {
 			int idx;
 
 			for (idx = 0; idx < i; idx++) {
+				descs = &ioat_chan->descs[idx];
 				dma_free_coherent(to_dev(ioat_chan), SZ_2M,
 						  descs->virt, descs->hw);
 				descs->virt = NULL;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 20/26 drm/amdgpu: enable gfxoff for raven1 refresh

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: changzhu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e0c63812352298efbce2a71483c1dab627d0c288 ]

When smu version is larger than 0x41e2b, it will load raven_kicker_rlc.bin.To enable gfxoff for raven_kicker_rlc.bin,it needs to avoid adev->pm.pp_feature &= ~PP_GFXOFF_MASK when it loads raven_kicker_rlc.bin.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v9_0.c | 15 ++++-----------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v9_0.c +4 -11
index c9ba2ec6d038..ab4a0d8545dc 100644
@@ -1038,17 +1038,10 @@ static void gfx_v9_0_check_if_need_gfxoff(struct amdgpu_device *adev)
 	case CHIP_VEGA20:
 		break;
 	case CHIP_RAVEN:
-		/* Disable GFXOFF on original raven.  There are combinations
-		 * of sbios and platforms that are not stable.
-		 */
-		if (!(adev->rev_id >= 0x8 || adev->pdev->device == 0x15d8))
-			adev->pm.pp_feature &= ~PP_GFXOFF_MASK;
-		else if (!(adev->rev_id >= 0x8 || adev->pdev->device == 0x15d8)
-			 &&((adev->gfx.rlc_fw_version != 106 &&
-			     adev->gfx.rlc_fw_version < 531) ||
-			    (adev->gfx.rlc_fw_version == 53815) ||
-			    (adev->gfx.rlc_feature_version < 1) ||
-			    !adev->gfx.rlc.is_rlc_v2_1))
+		if (!(adev->rev_id >= 0x8 ||
+		      adev->pdev->device == 0x15d8) &&
+		    (adev->pm.fw_version < 0x41e2b || /* not raven1 fresh */
+		     !adev->gfx.rlc.is_rlc_v2_1)) /* without rlc save restore ucodes */
 			adev->pm.pp_feature &= ~PP_GFXOFF_MASK;
 
 		if (adev->pm.pp_feature & PP_GFXOFF_MASK)
Signature · 6 lines
2.20.1

_______________________________________________
amd-gfx mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/amd-gfx
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 21/26 hsr: fix slab-out-of-bounds Read in hsr_debugfs_rename()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 04b69426d846cd04ca9acefff1ea39e1c64d2714 ]

hsr slave interfaces don't have debugfs directory.
So, hsr_debugfs_rename() shouldn't be called when hsr slave interface name is changed.

Test commands:
ip link add dummy0 type dummy
ip link add dummy1 type dummy
ip link add hsr0 type hsr slave1 dummy0 slave2 dummy1 ip link set dummy0 name ap

Splat looks like:

[21071.899367][T22666] ap: renamed from dummy0
[21071.914005][T22666] ==================================================================
[21071.919008][T22666] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hsr_debugfs_rename+0xaa/0xb0 [hsr]
[21071.923640][T22666] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88805febcd98 by task ip/22666
[21071.926941][T22666]
[21071.927750][T22666] CPU: 0 PID: 22666 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.5.0-rc2+ #240
[21071.929919][T22666] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[21071.935094][T22666] Call Trace:
[21071.935867][T22666]  dump_stack+0x96/0xdb
[21071.936687][T22666]  ? hsr_debugfs_rename+0xaa/0xb0 [hsr]
[21071.937774][T22666]  print_address_description.constprop.5+0x1be/0x360
[21071.939019][T22666]  ? hsr_debugfs_rename+0xaa/0xb0 [hsr]
[21071.940081][T22666]  ? hsr_debugfs_rename+0xaa/0xb0 [hsr]
[21071.940949][T22666]  __kasan_report+0x12a/0x16f
[21071.941758][T22666]  ? hsr_debugfs_rename+0xaa/0xb0 [hsr]
[21071.942674][T22666]  kasan_report+0xe/0x20
[21071.943325][T22666]  hsr_debugfs_rename+0xaa/0xb0 [hsr]
[21071.944187][T22666]  hsr_netdev_notify+0x1fe/0x9b0 [hsr]
[21071.945052][T22666]  ? __module_text_address+0x13/0x140
[21071.945897][T22666]  notifier_call_chain+0x90/0x160
[21071.946743][T22666]  dev_change_name+0x419/0x840
[21071.947496][T22666]  ? __read_once_size_nocheck.constprop.6+0x10/0x10
[21071.948600][T22666]  ? netdev_adjacent_rename_links+0x280/0x280
[21071.949577][T22666]  ? __read_once_size_nocheck.constprop.6+0x10/0x10
[21071.950672][T22666]  ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
[21071.951345][T22666]  ? do_setlink+0x811/0x2ef0
[21071.951991][T22666]  do_setlink+0x811/0x2ef0
[21071.952613][T22666]  ? is_bpf_text_address+0x81/0xe0

[ ... ]

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 4c2d5e33dcd3 ("hsr: rename debugfs file when interface name is changed")
---
 net/hsr/hsr_main.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/hsr/hsr_main.c +2 -1
index d2ee7125a7f1..9e389accbfc7 100644
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ static int hsr_netdev_notify(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
 		hsr_check_carrier_and_operstate(hsr);
 		break;
 	case NETDEV_CHANGENAME:
-		hsr_debugfs_rename(dev);
+		if (is_hsr_master(dev))
+			hsr_debugfs_rename(dev);
 		break;
 	case NETDEV_CHANGEADDR:
 		if (port->type == HSR_PT_MASTER) {
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 22/26 media: intel-ipu3: Align struct ipu3_uapi_awb_fr_config_s to 32 bytes

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sakari Ailus <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ce644cf3fa06504c2c71ab1b794160d54aaccbc0 ]

A struct that needs to be aligned to 32 bytes has a size of 28. Increase the size to 32.

This makes elements of arrays of this struct aligned to 32 as well, and other structs where members are aligned to 32 mixing ipu3_uapi_awb_fr_config_s as well as other types.

Fixes commit dca5ef2aa1e6 ("media: staging/intel-ipu3: remove the unnecessary compiler flags")
---
 drivers/staging/media/ipu3/include/intel-ipu3.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/staging/media/ipu3/include/intel-ipu3.h +1 -1
index c7cd27efac8a..0b1cb9f9cbd1 100644
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ struct ipu3_uapi_awb_fr_config_s {
 	__u16 reserved1;
 	__u32 bayer_sign;
 	__u8 bayer_nf;
-	__u8 reserved2[3];
+	__u8 reserved2[7];
 } __attribute__((aligned(32))) __packed;
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH 23/26 kbuild/deb-pkg: annotate libelf-dev dependency as :native

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8ffdc54b6f4cd718a45802e645bb853e3a46a078 ]

Cross compiling the x86 kernel on a non-x86 build machine produces the following error when CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC is enabled, regardless of whether libelf-dev is installed or not.

dpkg-checkbuilddeps: error: Unmet build dependencies: libelf-dev
dpkg-buildpackage: warning: build dependencies/conflicts unsatisfied; aborting
dpkg-buildpackage: warning: (Use -d flag to override.)

Since this is a build time dependency for a build tool, we need to depend on the native version of libelf-dev so add the appropriate annotation.

---
 scripts/package/mkdebian | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
scripts/package/mkdebian +1 -1
index e0750b70453f..786c5ab37d00 100755
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ mkdir -p debian/source/
 echo "1.0" > debian/source/format
 
 echo $debarch > debian/arch
-extra_build_depends=", $(if_enabled_echo CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC libelf-dev)"
+extra_build_depends=", $(if_enabled_echo CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC libelf-dev:native)"
 extra_build_depends="$extra_build_depends, $(if_enabled_echo CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING libssl-dev:native)"
 
 # Generate a simple changelog template
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#18 lore raw

PATCH 24/26 hexagon: parenthesize registers in asm predicates

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Nick Desaulniers <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 780a0cfda9006a9a22d6473c2d4c527f5c68eb2e ]

Hexagon requires that register predicates in assembly be parenthesized.

Cc Lee Jones <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Cc Tuowen Zhao <[email protected]>
Cc Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
Cc Luis Chamberlain <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Alexios Zavras <[email protected]>
Cc Allison Randal <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Fontana <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Boqun Feng <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
---
 arch/hexagon/include/asm/atomic.h   |  8 ++++----
 arch/hexagon/include/asm/bitops.h   |  8 ++++----
 arch/hexagon/include/asm/cmpxchg.h  |  2 +-
 arch/hexagon/include/asm/futex.h    |  6 +++---
 arch/hexagon/include/asm/spinlock.h | 20 ++++++++++----------
 arch/hexagon/kernel/vm_entry.S      |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
arch/hexagon/include/asm/atomic.h +4 -4
index 12cd9231c4b8..0231d69c8bf2 100644
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static inline void atomic_##op(int i, atomic_t *v)			\
 		"1:	%0 = memw_locked(%1);\n"			\
 		"	%0 = "#op "(%0,%2);\n"				\
 		"	memw_locked(%1,P3)=%0;\n"			\
-		"	if !P3 jump 1b;\n"				\
+		"	if (!P3) jump 1b;\n"				\
 		: "=&r" (output)					\
 		: "r" (&v->counter), "r" (i)				\
 		: "memory", "p3"					\
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static inline int atomic_##op##_return(int i, atomic_t *v)		\
 		"1:	%0 = memw_locked(%1);\n"			\
 		"	%0 = "#op "(%0,%2);\n"				\
 		"	memw_locked(%1,P3)=%0;\n"			\
-		"	if !P3 jump 1b;\n"				\
+		"	if (!P3) jump 1b;\n"				\
 		: "=&r" (output)					\
 		: "r" (&v->counter), "r" (i)				\
 		: "memory", "p3"					\
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ static inline int atomic_fetch_##op(int i, atomic_t *v)			\
 		"1:	%0 = memw_locked(%2);\n"			\
 		"	%1 = "#op "(%0,%3);\n"				\
 		"	memw_locked(%2,P3)=%1;\n"			\
-		"	if !P3 jump 1b;\n"				\
+		"	if (!P3) jump 1b;\n"				\
 		: "=&r" (output), "=&r" (val)				\
 		: "r" (&v->counter), "r" (i)				\
 		: "memory", "p3"					\
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static inline int atomic_fetch_add_unless(atomic_t *v, int a, int u)
 		"	}"
 		"	memw_locked(%2, p3) = %1;"
 		"	{"
-		"		if !p3 jump 1b;"
+		"		if (!p3) jump 1b;"
 		"	}"
 		"2:"
 		: "=&r" (__oldval), "=&r" (tmp)
arch/hexagon/include/asm/bitops.h +4 -4
index 47384b094b94..71429f756af0 100644
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static inline int test_and_clear_bit(int nr, volatile void *addr)
 	"1:	R12 = memw_locked(R10);\n"
 	"	{ P0 = tstbit(R12,R11); R12 = clrbit(R12,R11); }\n"
 	"	memw_locked(R10,P1) = R12;\n"
-	"	{if !P1 jump 1b; %0 = mux(P0,#1,#0);}\n"
+	"	{if (!P1) jump 1b; %0 = mux(P0,#1,#0);}\n"
 	: "=&r" (oldval)
 	: "r" (addr), "r" (nr)
 	: "r10", "r11", "r12", "p0", "p1", "memory"
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static inline int test_and_set_bit(int nr, volatile void *addr)
 	"1:	R12 = memw_locked(R10);\n"
 	"	{ P0 = tstbit(R12,R11); R12 = setbit(R12,R11); }\n"
 	"	memw_locked(R10,P1) = R12;\n"
-	"	{if !P1 jump 1b; %0 = mux(P0,#1,#0);}\n"
+	"	{if (!P1) jump 1b; %0 = mux(P0,#1,#0);}\n"
 	: "=&r" (oldval)
 	: "r" (addr), "r" (nr)
 	: "r10", "r11", "r12", "p0", "p1", "memory"
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static inline int test_and_change_bit(int nr, volatile void *addr)
 	"1:	R12 = memw_locked(R10);\n"
 	"	{ P0 = tstbit(R12,R11); R12 = togglebit(R12,R11); }\n"
 	"	memw_locked(R10,P1) = R12;\n"
-	"	{if !P1 jump 1b; %0 = mux(P0,#1,#0);}\n"
+	"	{if (!P1) jump 1b; %0 = mux(P0,#1,#0);}\n"
 	: "=&r" (oldval)
 	: "r" (addr), "r" (nr)
 	: "r10", "r11", "r12", "p0", "p1", "memory"
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static inline int ffs(int x)
 	int r;
 
 	asm("{ P0 = cmp.eq(%1,#0); %0 = ct0(%1);}\n"
-		"{ if P0 %0 = #0; if !P0 %0 = add(%0,#1);}\n"
+		"{ if (P0) %0 = #0; if (!P0) %0 = add(%0,#1);}\n"
 		: "=&r" (r)
 		: "r" (x)
 		: "p0");
arch/hexagon/include/asm/cmpxchg.h +1 -1
index 6091322c3af9..92b8a02e588a 100644
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __xchg(unsigned long x, volatile void *ptr,
 	__asm__ __volatile__ (
 	"1:	%0 = memw_locked(%1);\n"    /*  load into retval */
 	"	memw_locked(%1,P0) = %2;\n" /*  store into memory */
-	"	if !P0 jump 1b;\n"
+	"	if (!P0) jump 1b;\n"
 	: "=&r" (retval)
 	: "r" (ptr), "r" (x)
 	: "memory", "p0"
arch/hexagon/include/asm/futex.h +3 -3
index cb635216a732..0191f7c7193e 100644
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 	    /* For example: %1 = %4 */ \
 	    insn \
 	"2: memw_locked(%3,p2) = %1;\n" \
-	"   if !p2 jump 1b;\n" \
+	"   if (!p2) jump 1b;\n" \
 	"   %1 = #0;\n" \
 	"3:\n" \
 	".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \
@@ -84,10 +84,10 @@ futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(u32 *uval, u32 __user *uaddr, u32 oldval,
 	"1: %1 = memw_locked(%3)\n"
 	"   {\n"
 	"      p2 = cmp.eq(%1,%4)\n"
-	"      if !p2.new jump:NT 3f\n"
+	"      if (!p2.new) jump:NT 3f\n"
 	"   }\n"
 	"2: memw_locked(%3,p2) = %5\n"
-	"   if !p2 jump 1b\n"
+	"   if (!p2) jump 1b\n"
 	"3:\n"
 	".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
 	"4: %0 = #%6\n"
arch/hexagon/include/asm/spinlock.h +10 -10
index bfe07d842ff3..ef103b73bec8 100644
@@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ static inline void arch_read_lock(arch_rwlock_t *lock)
 	__asm__ __volatile__(
 		"1:	R6 = memw_locked(%0);\n"
 		"	{ P3 = cmp.ge(R6,#0); R6 = add(R6,#1);}\n"
-		"	{ if !P3 jump 1b; }\n"
+		"	{ if (!P3) jump 1b; }\n"
 		"	memw_locked(%0,P3) = R6;\n"
-		"	{ if !P3 jump 1b; }\n"
+		"	{ if (!P3) jump 1b; }\n"
 		:
 		: "r" (&lock->lock)
 		: "memory", "r6", "p3"
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static inline void arch_read_unlock(arch_rwlock_t *lock)
 		"1:	R6 = memw_locked(%0);\n"
 		"	R6 = add(R6,#-1);\n"
 		"	memw_locked(%0,P3) = R6\n"
-		"	if !P3 jump 1b;\n"
+		"	if (!P3) jump 1b;\n"
 		:
 		: "r" (&lock->lock)
 		: "memory", "r6", "p3"
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static inline int arch_read_trylock(arch_rwlock_t *lock)
 	__asm__ __volatile__(
 		"	R6 = memw_locked(%1);\n"
 		"	{ %0 = #0; P3 = cmp.ge(R6,#0); R6 = add(R6,#1);}\n"
-		"	{ if !P3 jump 1f; }\n"
+		"	{ if (!P3) jump 1f; }\n"
 		"	memw_locked(%1,P3) = R6;\n"
 		"	{ %0 = P3 }\n"
 		"1:\n"
@@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ static inline void arch_write_lock(arch_rwlock_t *lock)
 	__asm__ __volatile__(
 		"1:	R6 = memw_locked(%0)\n"
 		"	{ P3 = cmp.eq(R6,#0);  R6 = #-1;}\n"
-		"	{ if !P3 jump 1b; }\n"
+		"	{ if (!P3) jump 1b; }\n"
 		"	memw_locked(%0,P3) = R6;\n"
-		"	{ if !P3 jump 1b; }\n"
+		"	{ if (!P3) jump 1b; }\n"
 		:
 		: "r" (&lock->lock)
 		: "memory", "r6", "p3"
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static inline int arch_write_trylock(arch_rwlock_t *lock)
 	__asm__ __volatile__(
 		"	R6 = memw_locked(%1)\n"
 		"	{ %0 = #0; P3 = cmp.eq(R6,#0);  R6 = #-1;}\n"
-		"	{ if !P3 jump 1f; }\n"
+		"	{ if (!P3) jump 1f; }\n"
 		"	memw_locked(%1,P3) = R6;\n"
 		"	%0 = P3;\n"
 		"1:\n"
@@ -117,9 +117,9 @@ static inline void arch_spin_lock(arch_spinlock_t *lock)
 	__asm__ __volatile__(
 		"1:	R6 = memw_locked(%0);\n"
 		"	P3 = cmp.eq(R6,#0);\n"
-		"	{ if !P3 jump 1b; R6 = #1; }\n"
+		"	{ if (!P3) jump 1b; R6 = #1; }\n"
 		"	memw_locked(%0,P3) = R6;\n"
-		"	{ if !P3 jump 1b; }\n"
+		"	{ if (!P3) jump 1b; }\n"
 		:
 		: "r" (&lock->lock)
 		: "memory", "r6", "p3"
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ static inline unsigned int arch_spin_trylock(arch_spinlock_t *lock)
 	__asm__ __volatile__(
 		"	R6 = memw_locked(%1);\n"
 		"	P3 = cmp.eq(R6,#0);\n"
-		"	{ if !P3 jump 1f; R6 = #1; %0 = #0; }\n"
+		"	{ if (!P3) jump 1f; R6 = #1; %0 = #0; }\n"
 		"	memw_locked(%1,P3) = R6;\n"
 		"	%0 = P3;\n"
 		"1:\n"
arch/hexagon/kernel/vm_entry.S +1 -1
index 12242c27e2df..4023fdbea490 100644
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ ret_from_fork:
 		R26.L = #LO(do_work_pending);
 		R0 = #VM_INT_DISABLE;
 	}
-	if P0 jump check_work_pending
+	if (P0) jump check_work_pending
 	{
 		R0 = R25;
 		callr R24
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#19 lore raw

PATCH 25/26 hexagon: work around compiler crash

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Nick Desaulniers <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 63e80314ab7cf4783526d2e44ee57a90514911c9 ]

Clang cannot translate the string "r30" into a valid register yet.

---
 arch/hexagon/kernel/stacktrace.c | 4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/hexagon/kernel/stacktrace.c +1 -3
index 35f29423fda8..5ed02f699479 100644
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 
-register unsigned long current_frame_pointer asm("r30");
-
 struct stackframe {
 	unsigned long fp;
 	unsigned long rets;
@@ -30,7 +28,7 @@ void save_stack_trace(struct stack_trace *trace)
 
 	low = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current);
 	high = low + THREAD_SIZE;
-	fp = current_frame_pointer;
+	fp = (unsigned long)__builtin_frame_address(0);
 
 	while (fp >= low && fp <= (high - sizeof(*frame))) {
 		frame = (struct stackframe *)fp;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author maintainer
#20 lore raw

PATCH 26/26 ocfs2: call journal flush to mark journal as empty after journal recovery when mount

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Kai Li <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 397eac17f86f404f5ba31d8c3e39ec3124b39fd3 ]

If journal is dirty when mount, it will be replayed but jbd2 sb log tail cannot be updated to mark a new start because journal->j_flag has already been set with JBD2_ABORT first in journal_init_common.

When a new transaction is committed, it will be recored in block 1 first(journal->j_tail is set to 1 in journal_reset). If emergency restart happens again before journal super block is updated unfortunately, the new recorded trans will not be replayed in the next mount.

The following steps describe this procedure in detail.
1. mount and touch some files
2. these transactions are committed to journal area but not checkpointed
3. emergency restart
4. mount again and its journals are replayed
5. journal super block's first s_start is 1, but its s_seq is not updated
6. touch a new file and its trans is committed but not checkpointed
7. emergency restart again
8. mount and journal is dirty, but trans committed in 6 will not be replayed.

This exception happens easily when this lun is used by only one node. If it is used by multi-nodes, other node will replay its journal and its journal super block will be updated after recovery like what this patch does.

ocfs2_recover_node->ocfs2_replay_journal.

The following jbd2 journal can be generated by touching a new file after journal is replayed, and seq 15 is the first valid commit, but first seq is 13 in journal super block.

logdump:
Block 0: Journal Superblock
Seq: 0 Type: 4 (JBD2_SUPERBLOCK_V2)
Blocksize: 4096 Total Blocks: 32768 First Block: 1
First Commit ID: 13 Start Log Blknum: 1
Error: 0
Feature Compat: 0
Feature Incompat: 2 block64
Feature RO compat: 0
Journal UUID: 4ED3822C54294467A4F8E87D2BA4BC36
FS Share Cnt: 1 Dynamic Superblk Blknum: 0
Per Txn Block Limit Journal: 0 Data: 0

Block 1: Journal Commit Block
Seq: 14 Type: 2 (JBD2_COMMIT_BLOCK)

Block 2: Journal Descriptor
Seq: 15 Type: 1 (JBD2_DESCRIPTOR_BLOCK)
No. Blocknum Flags
0. 587 none
UUID: 00000000000000000000000000000000

   1. 8257792         JBD2_FLAG_SAME_UUID
   2. 619             JBD2_FLAG_SAME_UUID
   3. 24772864        JBD2_FLAG_SAME_UUID
   4. 8257802         JBD2_FLAG_SAME_UUID
   5. 513             JBD2_FLAG_SAME_UUID JBD2_FLAG_LAST_TAG
  ...
  Block 7: Inode
  Inode: 8257802   Mode: 0640   Generation: 57157641 (0x3682809)
  FS Generation: 2839773110 (0xa9437fb6)
  CRC32: 00000000   ECC: 0000
  Type: Regular   Attr: 0x0   Flags: Valid
  Dynamic Features: (0x1) InlineData
  User: 0 (root)   Group: 0 (root)   Size: 7
  Links: 1   Clusters: 0
  ctime: 0x5de5d870 0x11104c61 -- Tue Dec  3 11:37:20.286280801 2019
  atime: 0x5de5d870 0x113181a1 -- Tue Dec  3 11:37:20.288457121 2019
  mtime: 0x5de5d870 0x11104c61 -- Tue Dec  3 11:37:20.286280801 2019

dtime: 0x0 -- Thu Jan 1 08:00:00 1970
...
Block 9: Journal Commit Block
Seq: 15 Type: 2 (JBD2_COMMIT_BLOCK)

The following is journal recovery log when recovering the upper jbd2 journal when mount again.

syslog:
ocfs2: File system on device (252,1) was not unmounted cleanly, recovering it. fs/jbd2/recovery.c:(do_one_pass, 449): Starting recovery pass 0 fs/jbd2/recovery.c:(do_one_pass, 449): Starting recovery pass 1 fs/jbd2/recovery.c:(do_one_pass, 449): Starting recovery pass 2 fs/jbd2/recovery.c:(jbd2_journal_recover, 278): JBD2: recovery, exit status 0, recovered transactions 13 to 13

Due to first commit seq 13 recorded in journal super is not consistent with the value recorded in block 1(seq is 14), journal recovery will be terminated before seq 15 even though it is an unbroken commit, inode 8257802 is a new file and it will be lost.

---
 fs/ocfs2/journal.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
fs/ocfs2/journal.c +8 -0
index 699a560efbb0..900e4ef686bf 100644
@@ -1066,6 +1066,14 @@ int ocfs2_journal_load(struct ocfs2_journal *journal, int local, int replayed)
 
 	ocfs2_clear_journal_error(osb->sb, journal->j_journal, osb->slot_num);
 
+	if (replayed) {
+		jbd2_journal_lock_updates(journal->j_journal);
+		status = jbd2_journal_flush(journal->j_journal);
+		jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal->j_journal);
+		if (status < 0)
+			mlog_errno(status);
+	}
+
 	status = ocfs2_journal_toggle_dirty(osb, 1, replayed);
 	if (status < 0) {
 		mlog_errno(status);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1