xen-pciback: optionally allow interrupt enable flag writes
PATCH v4 1/1 xen-pciback: optionally allow interrupt enable flag writes
QEMU running in a stubdom needs to be able to set INTX_DISABLE, and the MSI(-X) enable flags in the PCI config space. This adds an attribute 'allow_interrupt_control' which when set for a PCI device allows writes to this flag(s). The toolstack will need to set this for stubdoms. When enabled, guest (stubdomain) will be allowed to set relevant enable flags, but only one at a time - i.e. it refuses to enable more than one of INTx, MSI, MSI-X at a time.
This functionality is needed only for config space access done by device model (stubdomain) serving a HVM with the actual PCI device. It is not necessary and unsafe to enable direct access to those bits for PV domain with the device attached. For PV domains, there are separate protocol messages (XEN_PCI_OP_{enable,disable}_{msi,msix}) for this purpose. Those ops in addition to setting enable bits, also configure MSI(-X) in dom0 kernel - which is undesirable for PCI passthrough to HVM guests.
This should not introduce any new security issues since a malicious guest (or stubdom) can already generate MSIs through other ways, see
[1] page 8. Additionally, when qemu runs in dom0, it already have direct access to those bits.
This is the second iteration of this feature. First was proposed as a direct Xen interface through a new hypercall, but ultimately it was rejected by the maintainer, because of mixing pciback and hypercalls for PCI config space access isn't a good design. Full discussion at [2].
[1]: https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2011/Software%20Attacks%20on%20Intel%20VT-d.pdf
[2]: https://xen.markmail.org/thread/smpgpws4umdzizze
---
Changes in v4:
- fix incorrect variable used
- don't enable INTx when already enabled
Changes in v3:
- return bitmap (or negative error) from xen_pcibk_get_interrupt_type(), to implicitly handle cases when multiple interrupt types are already enabled - disallow enabling in that case
- add documentation
Changes in v2:
- introduce xen_pcibk_get_interrupt_type() to deduplicate current INTx/MSI/MSI-X state check
- fix checking MSI/MSI-X state on devices not supporting it
--- .../ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-pciback | 13 +++ drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.c | 36 ++++++++ drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.h | 7 ++ .../xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_capability.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++ drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_header.c | 19 ++++ drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pci_stub.c | 66 ++++++++++++++ drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 230 insertions(+)
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-pciback +13 -0
@@ -11,3 +11,16 @@ Description: #echo 00:19.0-E0:2:FF > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/quirks will allow the guest to read and write to the configuration register 0x0E. + +What: /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/allow_interrupt_control +Date: Jan 2020 +KernelVersion: 5.5 +Contact: [email protected] +Description: + List of devices which can have interrupt control flag (INTx, + MSI, MSI-X) set by a connected guest. It is meant to be set + only when the guest is a stubdomain hosting device model (qemu) + and the actual device is assigned to a HVM. It is not safe + (similar to permissive attribute) to set for a devices assigned + to a PV guest. The device is automatically removed from this + list when the connected pcifront terminates.
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.c +36 -0
@@ -286,6 +286,42 @@ int xen_pcibk_config_write(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset, int size, u32 value)return xen_pcibios_err_to_errno (err); } +int xen_pcibk_get_interrupt_type (struct pci_dev *dev) +{ +int err; +u16 val; +int ret =0 ; + + err =pci_read_config_word (dev,PCI_COMMAND , &val); +if (err) +return err; +if (!(val &PCI_COMMAND_INTX_DISABLE )) + ret |=INTERRUPT_TYPE_INTX ; + +/* Do not trust dev->msi(x)_enabled here, as enabling could be done +* bypassing the pci_*msi* functions, by the qemu. +*/ +if (dev->msi_cap) { + err =pci_read_config_word (dev, + dev->msi_cap +PCI_MSI_FLAGS , + &val); +if (err) +return err; +if (val &PCI_MSI_FLAGS_ENABLE ) + ret |=INTERRUPT_TYPE_MSI ; + } +if (dev->msix_cap) { + err =pci_read_config_word (dev, + dev->msix_cap +PCI_MSIX_FLAGS , + &val); +if (err) +return err; +if (val &PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_ENABLE ) + ret |=INTERRUPT_TYPE_MSIX ; + } +return ret; +} +void xen_pcibk_config_free_dyn_fields (struct pci_dev *dev) {struct xen_pcibk_dev_data *dev_data =pci_get_drvdata (dev);
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.h +7 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ struct config_field_entry {void *data; }; +#define INTERRUPT_TYPE_NONE 0 +#define INTERRUPT_TYPE_INTX 1 +#define INTERRUPT_TYPE_MSI 2 +#define INTERRUPT_TYPE_MSIX 4 +extern bool xen_pcibk_permissive;#define OFFSET (cfg_entry) ((cfg_entry)->base_offset+(cfg_entry)->field->offset)
@@ -126,4 +131,6 @@ int xen_pcibk_config_capability_init(void);int xen_pcibk_config_header_add_fields (struct pci_dev *dev);int xen_pcibk_config_capability_add_fields (struct pci_dev *dev); +int xen_pcibk_get_interrupt_type (struct pci_dev *dev); +#endif /* __XEN_PCIBACK_CONF_SPACE_H__ */
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_capability.c +88 -0
105 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_header.c +19 -0
@@ -117,6 +117,25 @@ static int command_write(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset, u16 value, void *data)pci_clear_mwi (dev); } +if (dev_data && dev_data->allow_interrupt_control) { +if ((cmd->val ^ value) &PCI_COMMAND_INTX_DISABLE ) { +if (value &PCI_COMMAND_INTX_DISABLE ) { +pci_intx (dev,0 ); + }else { +/* Do not allow enabling INTx together with MSI or MSI-X. */ +switch (xen_pcibk_get_interrupt_type (dev)) { +case INTERRUPT_TYPE_NONE : +pci_intx (dev,1 ); +break ; +case INTERRUPT_TYPE_INTX : +break ; +default : +return PCIBIOS_SET_FAILED ; + } + } + } + } + cmd->val = value;if (!xen_pcibk_permissive && (!dev_data || !dev_data->permissive))
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pci_stub.c +66 -0
90 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback.h +1 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct xen_pcibk_dev_data {struct list_head config_fields;struct pci_saved_state *pci_saved_state; unsigned int permissive:1; + unsigned int allow_interrupt_control:1; unsigned int warned_on_write:1; unsigned int enable_intx:1; unsigned int isr_on:1; /* Whether the IRQ handler is installed. */
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Quoted 26 lines · Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
QEMU running in a stubdom needs to be able to set
INTX_DISABLE, and the MSI(-X) enable flags in the PCI config space. This adds an attribute 'allow_interrupt_control' which when set for a PCI device allows writes to this flag(s). The toolstack will need to set this for stubdoms. When enabled, guest (stubdomain) will be allowed to set relevant enable flags, but only one at a time - i.e. it refuses to enable more than one of INTx, MSI, MSI-X at a time.This functionality is needed only for config space access done by device model (stubdomain) serving a HVM with the actual PCI device. It is not necessary and unsafe to enable direct access to those bits for PV domain with the device attached. For PV domains, there are separate protocol messages (XEN_PCI_OP_{enable,disable}_{msi,msix}) for this purpose. Those ops in addition to setting enable bits, also configure MSI(-X) in dom0 kernel - which is undesirable for PCI passthrough to HVM guests.
This should not introduce any new security issues since a malicious guest (or stubdom) can already generate MSIs through other ways, see
[1] page 8. Additionally, when qemu runs in dom0, it already have direct access to those bits.This is the second iteration of this feature. First was proposed as a direct Xen interface through a new hypercall, but ultimately it was rejected by the maintainer, because of mixing pciback and hypercalls for PCI config space access isn't a good design. Full discussion at [2].
Quoted 7 lines
[1]: https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2011/Software%20Attacks%20on%20Intel%20VT-d.pdf
[2]: https://xen.markmail.org/thread/smpgpws4umdzizze[part of the commit message and sysfs handling]Signed-off-by Simon Gaiser <[email protected]>[the rest]Signed-off-by Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <[email protected]>
Some minor nits below, but LGTM:
Quoted 50 lines
---
Changes in v4:
- fix incorrect variable used
- don't enable INTx when already enabled
Changes in v3:
- return bitmap (or negative error) fromxen_pcibk_get_interrupt_type(), to implicitly handle cases when multiple interrupt types are already enabled - disallow enabling in that case
- add documentation
Changes in v2:
- introducexen_pcibk_get_interrupt_type()to deduplicate current INTx/MSI/MSI-X state check
- fix checking MSI/MSI-X state on devices not supporting it--- .../ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-pciback | 13 +++ drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.c | 36 ++++++++ drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.h | 7 ++ .../xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_capability.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++ drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_header.c | 19 ++++ drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pci_stub.c | 66 ++++++++++++++ drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 230 insertions(+)Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-pciback +13
-0@@ -11,3 +11,16 @@ Description: #echo 00:19.0-E0:2:FF > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/quirks will allow the guest to read and write to the configuration register 0x0E. + +What: /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/allow_interrupt_control +Date: Jan 2020 +KernelVersion: 5.5 +Contact: [email protected] +Description: + List of devices which can have interrupt control flag (INTx, + MSI, MSI-X) set by a connected guest. It is meant to be set + only when the guest is a stubdomain hosting device model (qemu) + and the actual device is assigned to a HVM. It is not safe + (similar to permissive attribute) to set for a devices assigned + to a PV guest. The device is automatically removed from this + list when the connected pcifront terminates.drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.c +0
-0
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.c int xen_pcibk_config_write(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset, int size, u32 value) · line 289
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.c +1
-0@@ -286,6 +286,42 @@ int xen_pcibk_config_write(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset, int size, u32 value)return xen_pcibios_err_to_errno (err); } +int xen_pcibk_get_interrupt_type (struct pci_dev *dev)
const for *dev.
Quoted 43 lines
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.c +35
-0+{ +int err; +u16 val; +int ret =0 ; + + err =pci_read_config_word (dev,PCI_COMMAND , &val); +if (err) +return err; +if (!(val &PCI_COMMAND_INTX_DISABLE )) + ret |=INTERRUPT_TYPE_INTX ; + +/* Do not trust dev->msi(x)_enabled here, as enabling could be done +* bypassing the pci_*msi* functions, by the qemu. +*/ +if (dev->msi_cap) { + err =pci_read_config_word (dev, + dev->msi_cap +PCI_MSI_FLAGS , + &val); +if (err) +return err; +if (val &PCI_MSI_FLAGS_ENABLE ) + ret |=INTERRUPT_TYPE_MSI ; + } +if (dev->msix_cap) { + err =pci_read_config_word (dev, + dev->msix_cap +PCI_MSIX_FLAGS , + &val); +if (err) +return err; +if (val &PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_ENABLE ) + ret |=INTERRUPT_TYPE_MSIX ; + } +return ret; +} +void xen_pcibk_config_free_dyn_fields (struct pci_dev *dev) {struct xen_pcibk_dev_data *dev_data =pci_get_drvdata (dev);drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.h +0
-0
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.h struct config_field_entry { · line 71
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.h +4
-0@@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ struct config_field_entry {void *data; }; +#define INTERRUPT_TYPE_NONE 0 +#define INTERRUPT_TYPE_INTX 1 +#define INTERRUPT_TYPE_MSI 2 +#define INTERRUPT_TYPE_MSIX 4
Nit: those being a bitmap I would write them as:
#define INTERRUPT_TYPE_NONE (1<<0)
#define INTERRUPT_TYPE_INTX (1<<1)
#define INTERRUPT_TYPE_MSI (1<<2)
#define INTERRUPT_TYPE_MSIX (1<<3)
And would place them together with the function prototype below where they are used.
Quoted 16 lines
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space.h +3
-0+extern bool xen_pcibk_permissive;#define OFFSET (cfg_entry) ((cfg_entry)->base_offset+(cfg_entry)->field->offset)@@ -126,4 +131,6 @@ int xen_pcibk_config_capability_init(void);int xen_pcibk_config_header_add_fields (struct pci_dev *dev);int xen_pcibk_config_capability_add_fields (struct pci_dev *dev); +int xen_pcibk_get_interrupt_type (struct pci_dev *dev); +#endif /* __XEN_PCIBACK_CONF_SPACE_H__ */ drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_capability.c +0
-0
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_capability.c static const struct config_field caplist_pm[] = { · line 194
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_capability.c +3
-0@@ -189,6 +189,84 @@ static const struct config_field caplist_pm[] = { {} }; +static struct msi_msix_field_config { + u16 enable_bit; /* bit for enabling MSI/MSI-X */ + int int_type; /* interrupt type for exclusiveness check */
unsigned int would be a better fit here, since you will never store a negative value AFAICT.
Quoted 33 lines
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_capability.c +33
-0+} msi_field_config = { + .enable_bit = PCI_MSI_FLAGS_ENABLE, + .int_type =INTERRUPT_TYPE_MSI , +}, msix_field_config = { + .enable_bit =PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_ENABLE , + .int_type = INTERRUPT_TYPE_MSIX, +}; + +static void *msi_field_init (struct pci_dev *dev,int offset) +{ +return &msi_field_config; +} + +static void *msix_field_init (struct pci_dev *dev,int offset) +{ +return &msix_field_config; +} + +static int msi_msix_flags_write (struct pci_dev *dev,int offset,u16 new_value, +void *data) +{ +int err; +u16 old_value; +const struct msi_msix_field_config *field_config = data; +const struct xen_pcibk_dev_data *dev_data =pci_get_drvdata (dev); + +if (xen_pcibk_permissive || dev_data->permissive) + goto write; + + err =pci_read_config_word (dev, offset, &old_value); +if (err) +return err; +
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_capability.c static const struct config_field caplist_pm[] = { · line 237
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/conf_space_capability.c +10
-0+if (new_value == old_value) +return 0 ; + +if (!dev_data->allow_interrupt_control || + (new_value ^ old_value) & ~field_config->enable_bit) +return PCIBIOS_SET_FAILED ; + +if (new_value & field_config->enable_bit) { +/* don't allow enabling together with other interrupt types */ +int int_type =xen_pcibk_get_interrupt_type (dev);
A newline here would make this easier to read I think.
Thanks, Roger.
Quoted 39 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 26 lines · Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
QEMU running in a stubdom needs to be able to set
INTX_DISABLE, and the MSI(-X) enable flags in the PCI config space. This adds an attribute 'allow_interrupt_control' which when set for a PCI device allows writes to this flag(s). The toolstack will need to set this for stubdoms. When enabled, guest (stubdomain) will be allowed to set relevant enable flags, but only one at a time - i.e. it refuses to enable more than one of INTx, MSI, MSI-X at a time.This functionality is needed only for config space access done by device model (stubdomain) serving a HVM with the actual PCI device. It is not necessary and unsafe to enable direct access to those bits for PV domain with the device attached. For PV domains, there are separate protocol messages (XEN_PCI_OP_{enable,disable}_{msi,msix}) for this purpose. Those ops in addition to setting enable bits, also configure MSI(-X) in dom0 kernel - which is undesirable for PCI passthrough to HVM guests.
This should not introduce any new security issues since a malicious guest (or stubdom) can already generate MSIs through other ways, see
[1] page 8. Additionally, when qemu runs in dom0, it already have direct access to those bits.This is the second iteration of this feature. First was proposed as a direct Xen interface through a new hypercall, but ultimately it was rejected by the maintainer, because of mixing pciback and hypercalls for PCI config space access isn't a good design. Full discussion at [2].
Quoted 7 lines
[1]: https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2011/Software%20Attacks%20on%20Intel%20VT-d.pdf
[2]: https://xen.markmail.org/thread/smpgpws4umdzizze[part of the commit message and sysfs handling]Signed-off-by Simon Gaiser <[email protected]>[the rest]Signed-off-by Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <[email protected]>Some minor nits below, but LGTM:
Reviewed-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>Quoted 1 line
Quoted 12 lines
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-pciback Description: · line 17
Quoted 12 lines
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-pciback +4
-0@@ -11,3 +11,16 @@ Description: #echo 00:19.0-E0:2:FF > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/quirks will allow the guest to read and write to the configuration register 0x0E. + +What: /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/allow_interrupt_control +Date: Jan 2020 +KernelVersion: 5.5
5.6
I can fix this and the things that Roger mentioned while committing if Marek is OK with that.
-boris
Quoted 57 lines · Boris Ostrovsky
Quoted 39 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 26 lines · Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
QEMU running in a stubdom needs to be able to set
INTX_DISABLE, and the MSI(-X) enable flags in the PCI config space. This adds an attribute 'allow_interrupt_control' which when set for a PCI device allows writes to this flag(s). The toolstack will need to set this for stubdoms. When enabled, guest (stubdomain) will be allowed to set relevant enable flags, but only one at a time - i.e. it refuses to enable more than one of INTx, MSI, MSI-X at a time.This functionality is needed only for config space access done by device model (stubdomain) serving a HVM with the actual PCI device. It is not necessary and unsafe to enable direct access to those bits for PV domain with the device attached. For PV domains, there are separate protocol messages (XEN_PCI_OP_{enable,disable}_{msi,msix}) for this purpose. Those ops in addition to setting enable bits, also configure MSI(-X) in dom0 kernel - which is undesirable for PCI passthrough to HVM guests.
This should not introduce any new security issues since a malicious guest (or stubdom) can already generate MSIs through other ways, see
[1] page 8. Additionally, when qemu runs in dom0, it already have direct access to those bits.This is the second iteration of this feature. First was proposed as a direct Xen interface through a new hypercall, but ultimately it was rejected by the maintainer, because of mixing pciback and hypercalls for PCI config space access isn't a good design. Full discussion at [2].
Quoted 7 lines
[1]: https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2011/Software%20Attacks%20on%20Intel%20VT-d.pdf
[2]: https://xen.markmail.org/thread/smpgpws4umdzizze[part of the commit message and sysfs handling]Signed-off-by Simon Gaiser <[email protected]>[the rest]Signed-off-by Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <[email protected]>Some minor nits below, but LGTM:
Reviewed-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>Quoted 1 line
Quoted 12 lines
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-pciback Description: · line 17
Quoted 12 lines
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-pciback +4
-0@@ -11,3 +11,16 @@ Description: #echo 00:19.0-E0:2:FF > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/quirks will allow the guest to read and write to the configuration register 0x0E. + +What: /sys/bus/pci/drivers/pciback/allow_interrupt_control +Date: Jan 2020 +KernelVersion: 5.55.6
Quoted 2 lines
I can fix this and the things that Roger mentioned while committing if Marek is OK with that.
Yes, thanks!
Signature · 5 lines
Best Regards, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Invisible Things Lab A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text. Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing?