docs: qemu-cpu-models: Document '-noTSX' variants and 'mds-no'
PATCH 1/1 docs: qemu-cpu-models: Document '-noTSX' variants and 'mds-no'
- Add the -noTSX variants for CascadeLake and SkyLake.
- Add a note aboute the 'mds-no' MSR. Two confusing things about this:
(1) The 'mds-no' will _not_ show up in the guest's /proc/cpuinfo. Rather it is used to fill in the guest's sysfs:
sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds:Not affected
Paolo confirmed on IRC as such.
(2) There are _three_ variants[+] of CascadeLake CPUs, with different stepping levels: 5, 6, and 7. To quite wikichip.org[*]:
"note that while steppings 6 & 7 are fully mitigated, earlier stepping 5 is not protected against MSBDS, MLPDS, nor MDSUM"
The above is also indicated in the Intel's manual itself[+], as indicated by "No" under the three columns of MFBDS, MSBDS, and MLPDS.
[+] https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/processors-affected-microarchitectural-data-sampling
[*] https://en.wikichip.org/wiki/intel/microarchitectures/cascade_lake#Key_changes_from_Skylake
---
TODO:
- I think I also need to add a note about 'tsx-ctrl' bit. Here too, same question as above -- does it show up in /proc/cpuinfo/?
--- docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi +36 -1
@@ -72,14 +72,30 @@ between machines, if live migration compatibility is required, use the newest CPU model that is compatible across all desired hosts. @table @option + +@item @code{Cascadelake-Server-noTSX} + +Intell Xeon Processor (Cascade Lake, 2019-2020), with "stepping" levels +6 or 7 only. (The Cascade Lake Xeon processor with @b{stepping 5 is +vulnerable to MDS variants}; refer below.) + +@code{/proc/cpuinfo}. + +The @code{mds-no} bit does not show up under @code{/proc/cpuinfo}. +Rather it shows up under the @code{sysfs}, as +@code{/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds:Not affected} + + @item @code{Skylake-Server} @item @code{Skylake-Server-IBRS} +@item @code{Skylake-Server-noTSX-IBRS} Intel Xeon Processor (Skylake, 2016) @item @code{Skylake-Client} @item @code{Skylake-Client-IBRS} +@item @code{Skylake-Client-noTSX-IBRS} Intel Core Processor (Skylake, 2015)
@@ -214,9 +230,28 @@ Must be explicitly turned on for all Intel CPU models. Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it can be used for guest CPUs. + +@item @code{mds-no} + +This is an MSR (Model-Specific Register) used by QEMU to indicate that +the host is @i{not} vulnerable to any of the MDS variants ([MFBDS] +CVE-2018-12130, [MLPDS] CVE-2018-12127, [MSBDS] CVE-2018-12126). + +Note that there are @i{three} versions of Intel's Cascade Lake +processor, as distinguished by their "stepping" levels 5, 6, and 7. The +CPU with stepping "5" is @b{vulnerable to MDS variants}; and the CPUs +with steppings "6" and "7" are @b{not vulnerable} to the above mentioned +MDS variants. The processor "stepping" is reported in +@code{/proc/cpuinfo}. + +Confusingly, the @code{mds-no} bit does not show up under +@code{/proc/cpuinfo} inside the guest. Rather the kernel uses it to +fill in the @code{sysfs}, as +@code{/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds: Not affected}, +assuming the processor is running with stepping 6 or 7. + @end table - @node preferred_cpu_models_amd_x86 @subsubsection Preferred CPU models for AMD x86 hosts
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
On Thu, Jan 16, 2020 at 06:36:38PM +0100, Kashyap Chamarthy wrote:
[...]
Quoted 2 lines
(2) There are _three_ variants[+] of CascadeLake CPUs, with different stepping levels: 5, 6, and 7. To quite wikichip.org[*]:
s/quite/quote/
Quoted 8 lines
"note that while steppings 6 & 7 are fully mitigated, earlier stepping 5 is not protected against MSBDS, MLPDS, nor MDSUM"
The above is also indicated in the Intel's manual itself[+], as indicated by "No" under the three columns of MFBDS, MSBDS, and MLPDS.
Quoted 8 lines
[+] https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/processors-affected-microarchitectural-data-sampling
[*] https://en.wikichip.org/wiki/intel/microarchitectures/cascade_lake#Key_changes_from_SkylakeSigned-off-by Kashyap Chamarthy <[email protected]>---
TODO:
- I think I also need to add a note about 'tsx-ctrl' bit. Here too, same question as above -- does it show up in/proc/cpuinfo/?
While at it ... if I mention 'mds-no', then it would be inconsistent, and inaccurate, if I don't also mention 'taa-no' IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit.
In short, I should mention the following MSR bits, and their use, in context:
- mds-no
- taa-no
- tsx-ctrl
... while bearing in mind that none (?) of these MSR bits will show up under /proc/cpuinfo in the guest, rather they're used to populate the relevant vulnerability file in sysfs (/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/).
[...]
Signature · 1 line
/kashyap
Quoted 38 lines · Kashyap Chamarthy
- Add the -noTSX variants for CascadeLake and SkyLake.
- Add a note aboute the 'mds-no' MSR. Two confusing things about this:
(1) The 'mds-no' will _not_ show up in the guest's
/proc/cpuinfo. Rather it is used to fill in the guest's sysfs:sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds:Not affected
Paolo confirmed on IRC as such.
(2) There are _three_ variants[+] of CascadeLake CPUs, with different stepping levels: 5, 6, and 7. To quite wikichip.org[*]:
"note that while steppings 6 & 7 are fully mitigated, earlier stepping 5 is not protected against MSBDS, MLPDS, nor MDSUM"
The above is also indicated in the Intel's manual itself[+], as indicated by "No" under the three columns of MFBDS, MSBDS, and MLPDS.
[+] https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/processors-affected-microarchitectural-data-sampling
[*] https://en.wikichip.org/wiki/intel/microarchitectures/cascade_lake#Key_changes_from_SkylakeSigned-off-by Kashyap Chamarthy <[email protected]>---
TODO:
- I think I also need to add a note about 'tsx-ctrl' bit. Here too, same question as above -- does it show up in/proc/cpuinfo/?--- docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi +0
-0
docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi between machines, if live migration compatibility is required, use the newest · line 76
Quoted 5 lines
docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi +2
-0@@ -72,14 +72,30 @@ between machines, if live migration compatibility is required, use the newest CPU model that is compatible across all desired hosts. @table @option + +@item @code{Cascadelake-Server-noTSX}
Also needs
@item @code{Cascadelake-Server}
docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi between machines, if live migration compatibility is required, use the newest · line 78
Quoted 2 lines
docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi +2
-0+ +Intell Xeon Processor (Cascade Lake, 2019-2020), with "stepping" levels
s/Intell/Intel/
s/-2020// as we only need the initial year of introduction IMHO.
docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi between machines, if live migration compatibility is required, use the newest · line 86
Quoted 8 lines
docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi +8
-0+6 or 7 only. (The Cascade Lake Xeon processor with @b{stepping 5 is +vulnerable to MDS variants}; refer below.) + +@code{/proc/cpuinfo}. + +The @code{mds-no} bit does not show up under @code{/proc/cpuinfo}. +Rather it shows up under the @code{sysfs}, as +@code{/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds:Not affected}
We already talk about this later on we I thin kwe can trim the /proc/cpinfo bit
Quoted 26 lines
docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi +11
-0@item @code{Skylake-Server} @item @code{Skylake-Server-IBRS} +@item @code{Skylake-Server-noTSX-IBRS} Intel Xeon Processor (Skylake, 2016) @item @code{Skylake-Client} @item @code{Skylake-Client-IBRS} +@item @code{Skylake-Client-noTSX-IBRS} Intel Core Processor (Skylake, 2015)@@ -214,9 +230,28 @@ Must be explicitly turned on for all Intel CPU models. Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it can be used for guest CPUs. + +@item @code{mds-no} + +This is an MSR (Model-Specific Register) used by QEMU to indicate that +the host is @i{not} vulnerable to any of the MDS variants ([MFBDS] +CVE-2018-12130, [MLPDS] CVE-2018-12127, [MSBDS] CVE-2018-12126). + +Note that there are @i{three} versions of Intel's Cascade Lake +processor, as distinguished by their "stepping" levels 5, 6, and 7. The
docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi Must be explicitly turned on for all Intel CPU models. · line 251
Quoted 10 lines
docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi +10
-0+CPU with stepping "5" is @b{vulnerable to MDS variants}; and the CPUs +with steppings "6" and "7" are @b{not vulnerable} to the above mentioned +MDS variants. The processor "stepping" is reported in +@code{/proc/cpuinfo}. + +Confusingly, the @code{mds-no} bit does not show up under +@code{/proc/cpuinfo} inside the guest. Rather the kernel uses it to +fill in the @code{sysfs}, as +@code{/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds: Not affected}, +assuming the processor is running with stepping 6 or 7.
I think we can simplify this a little - we don't need to talk about CPU steppings - the user simply needs to know whether the sysfs file reports vulnerable or not.
So perhaps this text:
Recommended to inform the guest OS that the host is @i{not] vulnerable to any of the MDS variants ([MFBDS] CVE-2018-12130, [MLPDS] CVE-2018-12127, [MSBDS] CVE-2018-12126).
This is a MSR feature rather than a CPUID feature, so will not appear in the Linux @code{/proc/cpuinfo} in the host or guest.
It should only be enabled for VMs if the host reports @code{Not affected} in the @code{/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds} file.
Regards,
Daniel
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Quoted 1 line · Daniel P. Berrangé
On Thu, Jan 16, 2020 at 06:36:38PM +0100, Kashyap Chamarthy wrote:
[...]
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
@table @option
+
+@item @code{Cascadelake-Server-noTSX}Also needs
@item @code{Cascadelake-Server}
Will add.
Quoted 6 lines
Review
Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+ +Intell Xeon Processor (Cascade Lake, 2019-2020), with "stepping" levelss/Intell/Intel/
s/-2020// as we only need the initial year of introduction IMHO.
Will do. (I wasn't sure, hence I put both years :-))
Quoted 11 lines
docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi between machines, if live migration compatibility is required, use the newest · line 86
Quoted 8 lines
+6 or 7 only. (The Cascade Lake Xeon processor with @b{stepping 5 is
docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi +7
-0+vulnerable to MDS variants}; refer below.) + +@code{/proc/cpuinfo}. + +The @code{mds-no} bit does not show up under @code{/proc/cpuinfo}. +Rather it shows up under the @code{sysfs}, as +@code{/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds:Not affected}We already talk about this later on we I thin kwe can trim the
/proc/cpinfobit
True, will remove this redundancy.
[...]
Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 8 lines
+@item @code{mds-no}
docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi +7
-0+ +This is an MSR (Model-Specific Register) used by QEMU to indicate that +the host is @i{not} vulnerable to any of the MDS variants ([MFBDS] +CVE-2018-12130, [MLPDS] CVE-2018-12127, [MSBDS] CVE-2018-12126). + +Note that there are @i{three} versions of Intel's Cascade Lake +processor, as distinguished by their "stepping" levels 5, 6, and 7. Thedocs/qemu-cpu-models.texi Must be explicitly turned on for all Intel CPU models. · line 251
Quoted 10 lines
docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi +10
-0+CPU with stepping "5" is @b{vulnerable to MDS variants}; and the CPUs +with steppings "6" and "7" are @b{not vulnerable} to the above mentioned +MDS variants. The processor "stepping" is reported in +@code{/proc/cpuinfo}. + +Confusingly, the @code{mds-no} bit does not show up under +@code{/proc/cpuinfo} inside the guest. Rather the kernel uses it to +fill in the @code{sysfs}, as +@code{/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds: Not affected}, +assuming the processor is running with stepping 6 or 7.I think we can simplify this a little - we don't need to talk about CPU steppings - the user simply needs to know whether the sysfs file reports vulnerable or not.
So perhaps this text:
Recommended to inform the guest OS that the host is @i{not] vulnerable to any of the MDS variants ([MFBDS] CVE-2018-12130, [MLPDS] CVE-2018-12127, [MSBDS] CVE-2018-12126).
Quoted 6 lines
This is a MSR feature rather than a CPUID feature, so will not appear in the Linux @code{/proc/cpuinfo} in the host or guest.
It should only be enabled for VMs if the host reports @code{Not affected} in the @code{/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds} file.
Your phrasing is indeed simpler and more to-the-point; will incorporate it.
I'll also add similar sections about the other two MSRs: 'taa-no' and 'tsx-ctrl' (as mentioned here:
https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2020-01/msg03685.html).
Thanks for the careful review.
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/kashyap