LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
Subsystems (27)
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Casey Schaufler
maintainerv14 cover LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
This patchset provides the changes required for the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5
Incorporate feedback from v13
- Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002)
- Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002)
- Remove unneeded include (patch 0013)
- Use context.len correctly (patch 0015)
- Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016)
- Drop SO_PEERCONTEXT as it's not needed yet (patch 0023)
v13: Rebase to 5.5-rc2
Incorporate feedback from v12
- Print lsmblob size with %z (Patch 0002)
- Convert lockdown LSM initialization. (Patch 0002)
- Restore error check in nft_secmark_compute_secid (Patch 0006)
- Correct blob scaffolding in ima_must_appraise() (Patch 0009)
- Make security_setprocattr() clearer (Patch 0013)
- Use lsm_task_display more widely (Patch 0013)
- Use passed size in lsmcontext_init() (Patch 0014)
- Don't add a smack_release_secctx() hook (Patch 0014)
- Don't print warning in security_release_secctx() (Patch 0014)
- Don't duplicate the label in nfs4_label_init_security() (Patch 0016)
- Remove reviewed-by as code has significant change (Patch 0016)
- Send the entire lsmblob for Tag 6 (Patch 0019)
- Fix description of socket_getpeersec_stream parameters (Patch 0023)
- Retain LSMBLOB_FIRST. What was I thinking? (Patch 0023)
- Add compound context to LSM documentation (Patch 0023)
v12: Rebase to 5.5-rc1
Fixed a couple of incorrect contractions in the text.
v11: Rebase to 5.4-rc6
Incorporate feedback from v10
- Disambiguate reading /proc/.../attr/display by restricting all use of the interface to the current process.
- Fix a merge error in AppArmor's display attribute check
v10: Ask the security modules if the display can be changed.
v9: There is no version 9
v8: Incorporate feedback from v7
- Minor clean-up in display value management
- refactor "compound" context creation to use a common append_ctx() function.
v7: Incorporate feedback from v6
- Make setting the display a privileged operation. The availability of compound contexts reduces the need for setting the display.
v6: Incorporate feedback from v5
- Add subj_<lsm>= and obj_<lsm>= fields to audit records
- Add /proc/.../attr/context to get the full context in lsmname\0value\0... format as suggested by Simon McVittie
- Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for getsockopt() to get the full context in the same format, also suggested by Simon McVittie.
- Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm_display_default to provide the display default value.
v5: Incorporate feedback from v4
- Initialize the lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx()
- Clear the lsmcontext in all security_release_secctx() cases
- Don't use the "display" on strictly internal context interfaces.
- The SELinux binder hooks check for cases where the context "display" isn't compatible with SELinux.
v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
- Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
- Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the slot value.
- Validate slot values used in security.c
- Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
- fix display value check in dentry_init_security
- Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting the audit log
v3: Incorporate feedback from v2
- Make lsmblob parameter and variable names more meaningful, changing "le" and "l" to "blob".
- Improve consistency of constant naming.
- Do more sanity checking during LSM initialization.
- Be a bit clearer about what is temporary scaffolding.
- Rather than clutter security_getpeersec_dgram with otherwise unnecessary checks remove the apparmor stub, which does nothing useful.
Patch 0001 moves management of the sock security blob from the individual modules to the infrastructure.
Patches 0002-0012 replace system use of a "secid" with a structure "lsmblob" containing information from the security modules to be held and reused later. At this point lsmblob contains an array of u32 secids, one "slot" for each of the security modules compiled into the kernel that used secids. A "slot" is allocated when a security module requests one.
The infrastructure is changed to use the slot number to pass the correct secid to or from the security module hooks.
It is important that the lsmblob be a fixed size entity that does not have to be allocated. Several of the places where it is used would have performance and/or locking issues with dynamic allocation.
Patch 0013 provides a mechanism for a process to identify which security module's hooks should be used when displaying or converting a security context string. A new interface /proc/self/attr/display contains the name of the security module to show. Reading from this file will present the name of the module, while writing to it will set the value. Only names of active security modules are accepted. Internally, the name is translated to the appropriate "slot" number for the module which is then stored in the task security blob. Setting the display requires that all modules using the /proc interfaces allow the transition. The "display" of other processess can be neither read nor written. All suggested cases for reading the display of a different process have race conditions.
Patch 0014 Starts the process of changing how a security context is represented. Since it is possible for a security context to have been generated by more than one security module it is now necessary to note which module created a security context so that the correct "release" hook can be called. There are several places where the module that created a security context cannot be inferred.
This is achieved by introducing a "lsmcontext" structure which contains the context string, its length and the "slot" number of the security module that created it. The security_release_secctx() interface is changed, replacing the (string,len) pointer pair with a lsmcontext pointer.
Patches 0015-0017 convert the security interfaces from (string,len) pointer pairs to a lsmcontext pointer. The slot number identifying the creating module is added by the infrastructure. Where the security context is stored for extended periods the data type is changed.
The Netlabel code is converted to save lsmblob structures instead of secids in Patch 0018.
Patch 0019 adds checks to the binder hooks which verify that if both ends of a transaction use the same "display".
Patches 0020-0021 add addition data to the audit records to identify the LSM specific data for all active modules.
Patch 0022 adds a new interfaces for getting the compound security contexts.
Finally, with all interference on the AppArmor hooks removed, Patch 0023 removes the exclusive bit from AppArmor. An unnecessary stub hook was also removed.
The Ubuntu project is using an earlier version of this patchset in their distribution to enable stacking for containers.
Performance measurements to date have the change within the "noise". The sockperf and dbench results are on the order of 0.2% to 0.8% difference, with better performance being as common as worse. The benchmarks were run with AppArmor and Smack on Ubuntu.
https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.5-rc5-v14
---
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 1/23 LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++----------- security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 78 +++++++++++++++---------------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++ security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++----- security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 64 ++++++++++++------------- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 ++-- 10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +1 -0
@@ -2095,6 +2095,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {int lbs_cred;int lbs_file;int lbs_inode; +int lbs_sock;int lbs_ipc;int lbs_msg_msg;int lbs_task;
security/apparmor/include/net.h +5 -1
@@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {struct aa_label *peer; }; -#define SK_CTX (X ) ((X)->sk_security) +static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock (const struct sock *sk) +{ +return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} +#define SOCK_ctx (X ) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET (NAME ,OP ,SK ,F ,T ,P ) \ struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
security/apparmor/lsm.c +10 -28
@@ -766,33 +766,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginforeturn error; } -/** -* apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field -*/ -static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t flags) -{ -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; - - ctx =kzalloc (sizeof (*ctx), flags); -if (!ctx) -return -ENOMEM ; - -SK_CTX (sk) = ctx; - -return 0 ; -} -/** * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field */ static void apparmor_sk_free_security (struct sock *sk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk); -SK_CTX (sk) =NULL ;aa_put_label (ctx->label);aa_put_label (ctx->peer); -kfree (ctx); }/**
@@ -801,8 +783,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)static void apparmor_sk_clone_security (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); -struct aa_sk_ctx *new =SK_CTX (newsk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *new =aa_sock (newsk); new->label =aa_get_label (ctx->label); new->peer =aa_get_label (ctx->peer);
@@ -853,7 +835,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, label =aa_get_current_label ();if (sock->sk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sock->sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sock->sk);aa_put_label (ctx->label); ctx->label =aa_get_label (label);
@@ -1038,7 +1020,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)*/ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!skb->secmark)return 0 ;
@@ -1051,7 +1033,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label (struct sock *sk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (ctx->peer)return ctx->peer;
@@ -1135,7 +1117,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,*/ static void apparmor_sock_graft (struct sock *sk,struct socket *parent) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!ctx->label) ctx->label =aa_get_current_label ();
@@ -1145,7 +1127,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)static int apparmor_inet_conn_request (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb,struct request_sock *req) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!skb->secmark)return 0 ;
@@ -1162,6 +1144,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *), .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx), .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), + .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx), }; static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1198,7 +1181,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),LSM_HOOK_INIT (setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
@@ -1749,7 +1731,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,if (sk ==NULL )return NF_ACCEPT ; - ctx =SK_CTX (sk); + ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!apparmor_secmark_check (ctx->label,OP_SENDMSG ,AA_MAY_SEND , skb->secmark, sk))return NF_ACCEPT ;
security/security.c +35 -1
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@#include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/msg.h> #include <net/flow.h> +#include <net/sock.h> #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -169,6 +170,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); +lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); }
@@ -304,6 +306,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)init_debug ("inode blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_inode);init_debug ("ipc blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);init_debug ("msg_msg blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); +init_debug ("sock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_sock);init_debug ("task blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_task);/*
@@ -622,6 +625,28 @@ static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)return 0 ; } +/** +* lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob +* @sock: the sock that needs a blob +* @priority: allocation mode +* +* Allocate the sock blob for all the modules +* +* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. +*/ +static int lsm_sock_alloc (struct sock *sock,gfp_t priority) +{ +if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock ==0 ) { + sock->sk_security =NULL ; +return 0 ; + } + + sock->sk_security =kzalloc (blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority); +if (sock->sk_security ==NULL ) +return -ENOMEM ; +return 0 ; +} +/** * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob * @task: the task that needs a blob
@@ -2066,12 +2091,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);int security_sk_alloc (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority) { -return call_int_hook (sk_alloc_security,0 , sk, family, priority); +int rc =lsm_sock_alloc (sk, priority); + +if (unlikely (rc)) +return rc; + rc =call_int_hook (sk_alloc_security,0 , sk, family, priority); +if (unlikely (rc)) +security_sk_free (sk); +return rc; }void security_sk_free (struct sock *sk) {call_void_hook (sk_free_security, sk); +kfree (sk->sk_security); + sk->sk_security =NULL ; }void security_sk_clone (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk)
security/selinux/hooks.c +37 -41
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security/selinux/include/objsec.h +5 -0
@@ -189,4 +189,9 @@ static inline u32 current_sid(void) return tsec->sid; } +static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock (const struct sock *sock) +{ +return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} +#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
security/selinux/netlabel.c +12 -11
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@#include <linux/gfp.h> #include <linux/ip.h> #include <linux/ipv6.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include <net/ip.h>
@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr (struct sock *sk) {int rc; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;if (sksec->nlbl_secattr !=NULL )
@@ -100,7 +101,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr( const struct sock *sk, u32 sid) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;if (secattr ==NULL )
@@ -235,7 +236,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */ sk =skb_to_full_sk (skb);if (sk !=NULL ) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (sksec->nlbl_state !=NLBL_REQSKB )return 0 ;
@@ -273,7 +274,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, {int rc;struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (ep->base.sk);struct sockaddr_in addr4;struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
@@ -352,7 +353,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)*/ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone (struct sock *sk,u16 family) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (family ==PF_INET ) sksec->nlbl_state =NLBL_LABELED ;
@@ -370,8 +371,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)*/ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone (struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; -struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk); +struct sk_security_struct *newsksec =selinux_sock (newsk); newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state; }
@@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create (struct sock *sk,u16 family) {int rc; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;if (family !=PF_INET && family !=PF_INET6 )
@@ -504,7 +505,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, {int rc =0 ;struct sock *sk = sock->sk; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
@@ -542,7 +543,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr) {int rc; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
@@ -581,7 +582,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked (struct sock *sk,struct sockaddr *addr) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (sksec->nlbl_state !=NLBL_REQSKB && sksec->nlbl_state !=NLBL_CONNLABELED )
security/smack/smack.h +5 -0
@@ -372,6 +372,11 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc; } +static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock (const struct sock *sock) +{ +return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} +/* * Is the directory transmuting? */
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +30 -34
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security/smack/smack_netfilter.c +4 -4
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,struct socket_smack *ssp;struct smack_known *skp; -if (sk && sk->sk_security) { - ssp = sk->sk_security; +if (sk &&smack_sock (sk)) { + ssp =smack_sock (sk); skp = ssp->smk_out; skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid; }
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,struct socket_smack *ssp;struct smack_known *skp; -if (sk && sk->sk_security) { - ssp = sk->sk_security; +if (sk &&smack_sock (sk)) { + ssp =smack_sock (sk); skp = ssp->smk_out; skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid; }
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 2/23 LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
In reply to Casey SchauflerWhen more than one security module is exporting data to audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a structure to be used instead.
The lsmblob structure is currently an array of u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the security modules built into the system that would use secids if active. The system assigns the module a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are compiled in but not registered there will be unused slots.
A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of security module data rather than a single instance. Because IMA uses the audit rule functions it is affected as well.
--- include/linux/audit.h | 4 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 ++++- include/linux/security.h | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- kernel/auditfilter.c | 27 ++++++----- kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++--- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++- security/commoncap.c | 7 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 36 ++++++++++----- security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++- security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 ++- security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++- security/security.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++- 16 files changed, 239 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
include/linux/audit.h +3 -1
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <uapi/linux/audit.h> #define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1)
@@ -64,8 +65,9 @@ struct audit_field {kuid_t uid;kgid_t gid;struct { +bool lsm_isset;char *lsm_str; -void *lsm_rule; +void *lsm_rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ]; }; };u32 op;
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +10 -2
@@ -2077,6 +2077,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {#endif } __randomize_layout; +/* +* Information that identifies a security module. +*/ +struct lsm_id { +const char *lsm;/* Name of the LSM */ +int slot;/* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */ +}; +/* * Security module hook list structure. * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
@@ -2085,7 +2093,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {struct hlist_node list;struct hlist_head *head;union security_list_options hook; -char *lsm; +struct lsm_id *lsmid; } __randomize_layout;/*
@@ -2114,7 +2122,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;extern char *lsm_names;extern void security_add_hooks (struct security_hook_list *hooks,int count, -char *lsm); +struct lsm_id *lsmid);#define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)#define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)
include/linux/security.h +62 -4
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kernel/auditfilter.c +15 -12
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW :case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH :kfree (f->lsm_str); -security_audit_rule_free (f->lsm_rule); +security_audit_rule_free (f->lsm_rules); } }
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, entry->rule.buflen += f->val; err =security_audit_rule_init (f->type, f->op, str, - (void **)&f->lsm_rule); + f->lsm_rules);/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (err == -EINVAL ) {
@@ -528,8 +528,10 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,if (err) {kfree (str); goto exit_free; - }else + }else { + f->lsm_isset = true; f->lsm_str = str; + }break ;case AUDIT_WATCH : str =audit_unpack_string (&bufp, &remain, f->val);
@@ -767,7 +769,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)return 0 ; } -/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be +/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rules is opaque, so must be * re-initialized. */ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field (struct audit_field *df,struct audit_field *sf)
@@ -781,9 +783,9 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,return -ENOMEM ; df->lsm_str = lsm_str; -/* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */ +/* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rules */ ret =security_audit_rule_init (df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str, - (void **)&df->lsm_rule); + df->lsm_rules);/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (ret == -EINVAL ) {
@@ -835,7 +837,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old) new->tree = old->tree;memcpy (new->fields, old->fields,sizeof (struct audit_field ) * fcount); -/* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because +/* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rules fields, because * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */ for (i =0 ; i < fcount; i++) {switch (new->fields[i].type) {
@@ -1353,10 +1355,11 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE :case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN :case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR : -if (f->lsm_rule) { +if (f->lsm_isset) {security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, - f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); + f->type, f->op, + f->lsm_rules); }break ;case AUDIT_EXE :
@@ -1383,7 +1386,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)return ret; } -static int update_lsm_rule (struct audit_krule *r) +static int update_lsm_rules (struct audit_krule *r) { struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);struct audit_entry *nentry;
@@ -1415,7 +1418,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)return err; } -/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules. +/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rules field of all applicable rules. * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
@@ -1430,7 +1433,7 @@ int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)for (i =0 ; i <AUDIT_NR_FILTERS ; i++) {list_for_each_entry_safe (r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) { -int res =update_lsm_rule (r); +int res =update_lsm_rules (r);if (!err) err = res; }
kernel/auditsc.c +6 -6
@@ -638,14 +638,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,match for now to avoid losing information that may be wanted. An error message will also be logged upon error */ -if (f->lsm_rule) { +if (f->lsm_isset) {if (need_sid) {security_task_getsecid (tsk, &sid); need_sid =0 ; } result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, f->type, f->op, - f->lsm_rule); + f->lsm_rules); }break ;case AUDIT_OBJ_USER :
@@ -655,21 +655,21 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH :/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR also applies here */ -if (f->lsm_rule) { +if (f->lsm_isset) {/* Find files that match */ if (name) { result =security_audit_rule_match ( name->osid, f->type, f->op, - f->lsm_rule); + f->lsm_rules); }else if (ctx) {list_for_each_entry (n, &ctx->names_list, list) {if (security_audit_rule_match ( n->osid, f->type, f->op, - f->lsm_rule)) { + f->lsm_rules)) { ++result;break ; }
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,break ;if (security_audit_rule_match (ctx->ipc.osid, f->type, f->op, - f->lsm_rule)) + f->lsm_rules)) ++result; }break ;
security/apparmor/lsm.c +6 -1
@@ -1147,6 +1147,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx), }; +static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="apparmor" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -1847,7 +1852,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) goto buffers_out; }security_add_hooks (apparmor_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (apparmor_hooks), -"apparmor" ); + &apparmor_lsmid);/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ apparmor_initialized =1 ;
security/commoncap.c +6 -1
@@ -1339,6 +1339,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="capability" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (capable, cap_capable), LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
@@ -1363,7 +1368,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {static int __init capability_init (void ) {security_add_hooks (capability_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (capability_hooks), -"capability" ); + &capability_lsmid);return 0 ; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +24 -12
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t ,kuid_t );/* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */ int pcr;struct { -void *rule;/* LSM file metadata specific */ +void *rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ];void *args_p;/* audit value */ int type;/* audit type */ } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES ];
@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {struct ima_template_desc *template; }; +static inline bool ima_lsm_isset (void *rules[]) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) +if (rules[i]) +return true; +return false; +} +/* * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
@@ -252,9 +262,11 @@ __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);static void ima_lsm_free_rule (struct ima_rule_entry *entry) {int i; +int r;for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) { -kfree (entry->lsm[i].rule); +for (r =0 ; r <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; r++) +kfree (entry->lsm[i].rules[r]);kfree (entry->lsm[i].args_p); }kfree (entry);
@@ -277,7 +289,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) memset(nentry->lsm, 0, sizeof_field(struct ima_rule_entry, lsm));for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) { -if (!entry->lsm[i].rule) +if (!ima_lsm_isset (entry->lsm[i].rules))continue ; nentry->lsm[i].type = entry->lsm[i].type;
@@ -289,7 +301,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) result =security_filter_rule_init (nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, nentry->lsm[i].args_p, - &nentry->lsm[i].rule); + nentry->lsm[i].rules);if (result == -EINVAL )pr_warn ("ima: rule for LSM \'%d\' is undefined\n" , entry->lsm[i].type);
@@ -329,7 +341,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)list_for_each_entry_safe (entry, e, &ima_policy_rules, list) { needs_update =0 ;for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) { -if (entry->lsm[i].rule) { +if (ima_lsm_isset (entry->lsm[i].rules)) { needs_update =1 ;break ; }
@@ -415,7 +427,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,int rc =0 ;u32 osid; -if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) +if (!ima_lsm_isset (rule->lsm[i].rules))continue ;switch (i) {
@@ -426,7 +438,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, rc =security_filter_rule_match (osid, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, - rule->lsm[i].rule); + rule->lsm[i].rules);break ;case LSM_SUBJ_USER :case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE :
@@ -434,7 +446,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, rc =security_filter_rule_match (secid, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, - rule->lsm[i].rule); + rule->lsm[i].rules);default :break ; }
@@ -810,7 +822,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, {int result; -if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) +if (ima_lsm_isset (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules))return -EINVAL ; entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p =match_strdup (args);
@@ -821,8 +833,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, result =security_filter_rule_init (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); -if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) { + entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules); +if (!ima_lsm_isset (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules)) {kfree (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -1469,7 +1481,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) }for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) { -if (entry->lsm[i].rule) { +if (ima_lsm_isset (entry->lsm[i].rules)) {switch (i) {case LSM_OBJ_USER : seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
security/loadpin/loadpin.c +7 -1
@@ -180,6 +180,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)return loadpin_read_file (NULL , (enum kernel_read_file_id ) id); } +static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="loadpin" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),LSM_HOOK_INIT (kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
@@ -227,7 +232,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)pr_info ("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n" , enforce ?"" :"not " );parse_exclude (); -security_add_hooks (loadpin_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (loadpin_hooks),"loadpin" ); +security_add_hooks (loadpin_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (loadpin_hooks), + &loadpin_lsmid);return 0 ; }
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +6 -1
@@ -102,6 +102,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down), }; +static struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="landlock" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; +static int __init lockdown_lsm_init (void ) {#if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY )
@@ -110,7 +115,7 @@ static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)lock_kernel_down ("Kernel configuration" ,LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX );#endif security_add_hooks (lockdown_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (lockdown_hooks), -"lockdown" ); + &lockdown_lsmid);return 0 ; }
security/safesetid/lsm.c +7 -1
@@ -149,6 +149,11 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,return -EACCES ; } +static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="safesetid" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; +static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),LSM_HOOK_INIT (capable, safesetid_security_capable)
@@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {static int __init safesetid_security_init (void ) {security_add_hooks (safesetid_security_hooks, -ARRAY_SIZE (safesetid_security_hooks),"safesetid" ); +ARRAY_SIZE (safesetid_security_hooks), + &safesetid_lsmid);/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */ safesetid_initialized =1 ;
security/security.c +61 -11
130 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/hooks.c +7 -1
@@ -6860,6 +6860,11 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) }#endif +static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="selinux" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),LSM_HOOK_INIT (binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
@@ -7128,7 +7133,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)hashtab_cache_init (); -security_add_hooks (selinux_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (selinux_hooks),"selinux" ); +security_add_hooks (selinux_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (selinux_hooks), + &selinux_lsmid);if (avc_add_callback (selinux_netcache_avc_callback,AVC_CALLBACK_RESET ))panic ("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n" );
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +6 -1
@@ -4585,6 +4585,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack), }; +static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="smack" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -4783,7 +4788,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)/* * Register with LSM */ -security_add_hooks (smack_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (smack_hooks),"smack" ); +security_add_hooks (smack_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid); smack_enabled =1 ;pr_info ("Smack: Initializing.\n" );
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +7 -1
@@ -529,6 +529,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task) } } +static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="tomoyo" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; +/* * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for * registering TOMOYO.
@@ -581,7 +586,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)struct tomoyo_task *s =tomoyo_task (current);/* register ourselves with the security framework */ -security_add_hooks (tomoyo_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (tomoyo_hooks),"tomoyo" ); +security_add_hooks (tomoyo_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (tomoyo_hooks), + &tomoyo_lsmid);pr_info ("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n" ); s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;atomic_inc (&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
security/yama/yama_lsm.c +6 -1
@@ -421,6 +421,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)return rc; } +static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="yama" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -477,7 +482,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }static int __init yama_init (void ) {pr_info ("Yama: becoming mindful.\n" ); -security_add_hooks (yama_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (yama_hooks),"yama" ); +security_add_hooks (yama_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);yama_init_sysctl ();return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v14 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
Quoted 32 lines · Casey Schaufler
When more than one security module is exporting data to audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a structure to be used instead.
The lsmblob structure is currently an array of u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the security modules built into the system that would use secids if active. The system assigns the module a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are compiled in but not registered there will be unused slots.
A new
lsm_idstructure, which contains the name of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of security module data rather than a single instance. Because IMA uses the audit rule functions it is affected as well.
Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>---
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +0
-0@@ -102,6 +102,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
security/lockdown/lockdown.c static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { · line 112
Quoted 10 lines
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +5
-0}; +static struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="landlock" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; +static int __init lockdown_lsm_init (void ) {#if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY )
You really want landlock merged, don't you?
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 3/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the lsmblob instead of a u32. In some cases this requires a temporary conversion using lsmblob_init() that will go away when other interfaces get converted.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++-- security/security.c | 8 +++++--- 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -1837,7 +1837,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY int security_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **lsmrule);int security_audit_rule_known (struct audit_krule *krule); -int security_audit_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op,void **lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_match (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 field,u32 op, +void **lsmrule);void security_audit_rule_free (void **lsmrule);#else
@@ -1853,8 +1854,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)return 0 ; } -static inline int security_audit_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op, -void **lsmrule) +static inline int security_audit_rule_match (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 field, +u32 op,void **lsmrule) {return 0 ; }
kernel/auditfilter.c +4 -2
@@ -1327,6 +1327,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];pid_t pid;u32 sid; +struct lsmblob blob;switch (f->type) {case AUDIT_PID :
@@ -1357,8 +1358,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR :if (f->lsm_isset) {security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); - result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, - f->type, f->op, +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); + result =security_audit_rule_match ( + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); }break ;
kernel/auditsc.c +10 -4
@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,const struct cred *cred;int i, need_sid =1 ;u32 sid; +struct lsmblob blob;unsigned int sessionid; cred =rcu_dereference_check (tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
@@ -643,7 +644,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,security_task_getsecid (tsk, &sid); need_sid =0 ; } - result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, f->type, +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); + result =security_audit_rule_match (&blob, + f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); }
@@ -658,15 +661,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,if (f->lsm_isset) {/* Find files that match */ if (name) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, name->osid); result =security_audit_rule_match ( - name->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); }else if (ctx) {list_for_each_entry (n, &ctx->names_list, list) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, name->osid);if (security_audit_rule_match ( - n->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules)) {
@@ -678,7 +683,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,/* Find ipc objects that match */ if (!ctx || ctx->type !=AUDIT_IPC )break ; -if (security_audit_rule_match (ctx->ipc.osid, +lsmblob_init (&blob, ctx->ipc.osid); +if (security_audit_rule_match (&blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules)) ++result;
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2 -2
@@ -381,8 +381,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,return -EINVAL ; } -static inline int security_filter_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op, -void *lsmrule) +static inline int security_filter_rule_match (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 field, +u32 op,void *lsmrule) {return -EINVAL ; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +5 -2
@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) {int rc =0 ;u32 osid; +struct lsmblob blob;if (!ima_lsm_isset (rule->lsm[i].rules))continue ;
@@ -435,7 +436,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_OBJ_ROLE :case LSM_OBJ_TYPE :security_inode_getsecid (inode, &osid); - rc =security_filter_rule_match (osid, +lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); + rc =security_filter_rule_match (&blob, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rules);
@@ -443,7 +445,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_SUBJ_USER :case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE :case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE : - rc =security_filter_rule_match (secid, +lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); + rc =security_filter_rule_match (&blob, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rules);
security/security.c +5 -3
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)/* * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list. */ -static int lsm_slot__initdata ; +static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;/** * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
@@ -2435,7 +2435,8 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule) } } -int security_audit_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op,void **lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_match (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 field,u32 op, +void **lsmrule) {struct security_hook_list *hp;int rc;
@@ -2443,7 +2444,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))continue ; - rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match (secid, field, op, + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match (blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], + field, op, &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);if (rc)return rc;
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 4/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_kernel_act_as interface to use a lsmblob structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of module stacking. Change its only caller, set_security_override, to do the same. Change that one's only caller, set_security_override_from_ctx, to call it with the new parameter type.
--- include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- kernel/cred.c | 10 ++++++---- security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
include/linux/cred.h +2 -1
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@struct cred ;struct inode ; +struct lsmblob ;/* * COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);extern void revert_creds (const struct cred *);extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred (struct task_struct *);extern int change_create_files_as (struct cred *,struct inode *); -extern int set_security_override (struct cred *,u32 ); +extern int set_security_override (struct cred *,struct lsmblob *);extern int set_security_override_from_ctx (struct cred *,const char *);extern int set_create_files_as (struct cred *,struct inode *);extern int cred_fscmp (const struct cred *,const struct cred *);
include/linux/security.h +3 -2
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);int security_prepare_creds (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old,gfp_t gfp);void security_transfer_creds (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old);void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,u32 *secid); -int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,u32 secid); +int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_kernel_create_files_as (struct cred *new,struct inode *inode);int security_kernel_module_request (char *kmod_name);int security_kernel_load_data (enum kernel_load_data_id id);
@@ -1043,7 +1043,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, { } -static inline int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *cred,u32 secid) +static inline int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob) {return 0 ; }
kernel/cred.c +6 -4
@@ -732,14 +732,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);/** * set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials * @new: The credentials to alter -* @secid: The LSM security ID to set +* @blob: The LSM security information to set * * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used. */ -int set_security_override (struct cred *new,u32 secid) +int set_security_override (struct cred *new,struct lsmblob *blob) { -return security_kernel_act_as (new, secid); +return security_kernel_act_as (new, blob); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (set_security_override);
@@ -755,6 +755,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);*/ int set_security_override_from_ctx (struct cred *new,const char *secctx) { +struct lsmblob blob;u32 secid;int ret;
@@ -762,7 +763,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)if (ret <0 )return ret; -return set_security_override (new, secid); +lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); +return set_security_override (new, &blob); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (set_security_override_from_ctx);
security/security.c +12 -2
@@ -1615,9 +1615,19 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_cred_getsecid); -int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,u32 secid) +int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,struct lsmblob *blob) { -return call_int_hook (kernel_act_as,0 , new, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc; + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.kernel_act_as (new, blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); +if (rc !=0 ) +return rc; + } +return 0 ; }int security_kernel_create_files_as (struct cred *new,struct inode *inode)
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 5/23 net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the data used in UDS SO_PEERSEC processing from a secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update the security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() interface to use the lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code that will come out when the security_secid_to_secctx() code is brought in line with the lsmblob.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++-- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/scm.h | 8 +++++--- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 +++++--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +++--- security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +5 -2
@@ -1356,7 +1356,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);int security_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_socket_getpeersec_stream (struct socket *sock,char __user *optval,int __user *optlen,unsigned len); -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid); +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsmblob *blob);int security_sk_alloc (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority);void security_sk_free (struct sock *sk);void security_sk_clone (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1494,7 +1495,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __return -ENOPROTOOPT ; } -static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid) +static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock, +struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsmblob *blob) {return -ENOPROTOOPT ; }
include/net/af_unix.h +1 -1
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {kgid_t gid;struct scm_fp_list *fp;/* Passed files */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK -u32 secid;/* Security ID */ +struct lsmblob lsmblob;/* Security LSM data */ #endif u32 consumed; } __randomize_layout;
include/net/scm.h +5 -3
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {struct scm_fp_list *fp;/* Passed files */ struct scm_creds creds;/* Skb credentials */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK -u32 secid;/* Passed security ID */ +struct lsmblob lsmblob;/* Passed LSM data */ #endif };
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK static __inline__void unix_get_peersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct scm_cookie *scm) { -security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (sock,NULL , &scm->secid); +security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (sock,NULL , &scm->lsmblob); }#else static __inline__void unix_get_peersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct scm_cookie *scm)
@@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scint err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen); +/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */ + err =security_secid_to_secctx (scm->lsmblob.secid[0 ], + &secdata, &seclen);if (!err) {put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata);
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +5 -3
@@ -130,15 +130,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,static void ip_cmsg_recv_security (struct msghdr *msg,struct sk_buff *skb) { +struct lsmblob lb;char *secdata; -u32 seclen, secid; +u32 seclen;int err; - err =security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (NULL , skb, &secid); + err =security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (NULL , skb, &lb);if (err)return ; - err =security_secid_to_secctx (secid, &secdata, &seclen); +/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */ + err =security_secid_to_secctx (lb.secid[0 ], &secdata, &seclen);if (err)return ;
net/unix/af_unix.c +3 -3
@@ -138,17 +138,17 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK static void unix_get_secdata (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb) { -UNIXCB (skb).secid = scm->secid; +UNIXCB (skb).lsmblob = scm->lsmblob; }static inline void unix_set_secdata (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb) { - scm->secid =UNIXCB (skb).secid; + scm->lsmblob =UNIXCB (skb).lsmblob; }static inline bool unix_secdata_eq (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb) { -return (scm->secid ==UNIXCB (skb).secid); +return lsmblob_equal (&scm->lsmblob, &(UNIXCB (skb).lsmblob)); }#else static inline void unix_get_secdata (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb)
security/security.c +15 -3
@@ -2108,10 +2108,22 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, optval, optlen, len); } -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid) +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsmblob *blob) { -return call_int_hook (socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT , sock, - skb, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT ; + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram, + list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram (sock, skb, + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); +if (rc !=0 ) +break ; + } +return rc; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 6/23 Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange security_secctx_to_secid() to fill in a lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. Multiple LSMs may be able to interpret the string, and this allows for setting whichever secid is appropriate. In some cases there is scaffolding where other interfaces have yet to be converted.
--- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- kernel/cred.c | 4 +--- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 12 +++++++----- net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 5 ++++- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 14 ++++++++------ security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +3 -2
@@ -496,7 +496,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name);int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); -int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid); +int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen);void security_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode);int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1302,7 +1303,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclestatic inline int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, -u32 *secid) +struct lsmblob *blob) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
kernel/cred.c +1 -3
@@ -756,14 +756,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);int set_security_override_from_ctx (struct cred *new,const char *secctx) {struct lsmblob blob; -u32 secid;int ret; - ret =security_secctx_to_secid (secctx,strlen (secctx), &secid); + ret =security_secctx_to_secid (secctx,strlen (secctx), &blob);if (ret <0 )return ret; -lsmblob_init (&blob, secid);return set_security_override (new, &blob); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (set_security_override_from_ctx);
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c +7 -5
@@ -625,21 +625,23 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {static int nft_secmark_compute_secid (struct nft_secmark *priv) { -u32 tmp_secid =0 ; +struct lsmblob blob;int err; - err =security_secctx_to_secid (priv->ctx,strlen (priv->ctx), &tmp_secid); + err =security_secctx_to_secid (priv->ctx,strlen (priv->ctx), &blob);if (err)return err; -if (!tmp_secid) +if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))return -ENOENT ; - err =security_secmark_relabel_packet (tmp_secid); +/* Using le[0] is scaffolding */ + err =security_secmark_relabel_packet (blob.secid[0 ]);if (err)return err; - priv->secid = tmp_secid; +/* Using le[0] is scaffolding */ + priv->secid = blob.secid[0 ];return 0 ; }
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c +4 -1
@@ -45,13 +45,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)static int checkentry_lsm (struct xt_secmark_target_info *info) { +struct lsmblob blob;int err; info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX -1 ] ='\0' ; info->secid =0 ; err =security_secctx_to_secid (info->secctx,strlen (info->secctx), - &info->secid); + &blob);if (err) {if (err == -EINVAL ) pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
@@ -59,6 +60,8 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)return err; } +/* scaffolding during the transition */ + info->secid = blob.secid[0 ];if (!info->secid) {pr_info_ratelimited ("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n" , info->secctx);
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +8 -6
@@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,void *addr;void *mask;u32 addr_len; -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;struct netlbl_audit audit_info;/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -905,12 +905,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb, ret_val =security_secctx_to_secid (nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]),nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]), - &secid); + &blob);if (ret_val !=0 )return ret_val; +/* scaffolding with the [0] */ return netlbl_unlhsh_add (&init_net, - dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid, + dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0 ], &audit_info); }
@@ -932,7 +933,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,void *addr;void *mask;u32 addr_len; -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;struct netlbl_audit audit_info;/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -954,12 +955,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb, ret_val =security_secctx_to_secid (nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]),nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]), - &secid); + &blob);if (ret_val !=0 )return ret_val; +/* scaffolding with the [0] */ return netlbl_unlhsh_add (&init_net, -NULL , addr, mask, addr_len, secid, +NULL , addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0 ], &audit_info); }
security/security.c +15 -3
@@ -1970,10 +1970,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secid_to_secctx); -int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid) +int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; -return call_int_hook (secctx_to_secid,0 , secdata, seclen, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid (secdata, seclen, + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); +if (rc !=0 ) +return rc; + } +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secctx_to_secid);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v14 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
Quoted 9 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change
security_secctx_to_secid()to fill in a lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. Multiple LSMs may be able to interpret the string, and this allows for setting whichever secid is appropriate. In some cases there is scaffolding where other interfaces have yet to be converted.Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
I acked v13 of this patch and don't see any real change here, so:
Quoted 199 lines
--- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- kernel/cred.c | 4 +--- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 12 +++++++----- net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 5 ++++- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 14 ++++++++------ security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)include/linux/security.h +3
-2@@ -496,7 +496,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name);int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); -int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid); +int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen);void security_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode);int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);@@ -1302,7 +1303,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclestatic inline int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, -u32 *secid) +struct lsmblob *blob) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }kernel/cred.c +1
-3@@ -756,14 +756,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);int set_security_override_from_ctx (struct cred *new,const char *secctx) {struct lsmblob blob; -u32 secid;int ret; - ret =security_secctx_to_secid (secctx,strlen (secctx), &secid); + ret =security_secctx_to_secid (secctx,strlen (secctx), &blob);if (ret <0 )return ret; -lsmblob_init (&blob, secid);return set_security_override (new, &blob); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (set_security_override_from_ctx);net/netfilter/nft_meta.c +7
-5@@ -625,21 +625,23 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {static int nft_secmark_compute_secid (struct nft_secmark *priv) { -u32 tmp_secid =0 ; +struct lsmblob blob;int err; - err =security_secctx_to_secid (priv->ctx,strlen (priv->ctx), &tmp_secid); + err =security_secctx_to_secid (priv->ctx,strlen (priv->ctx), &blob);if (err)return err; -if (!tmp_secid) +if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))return -ENOENT ; - err =security_secmark_relabel_packet (tmp_secid); +/* Using le[0] is scaffolding */ + err =security_secmark_relabel_packet (blob.secid[0 ]);if (err)return err; - priv->secid = tmp_secid; +/* Using le[0] is scaffolding */ + priv->secid = blob.secid[0 ];return 0 ; }net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c +4
-1@@ -45,13 +45,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)static int checkentry_lsm (struct xt_secmark_target_info *info) { +struct lsmblob blob;int err; info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX -1 ] ='\0' ; info->secid =0 ; err =security_secctx_to_secid (info->secctx,strlen (info->secctx), - &info->secid); + &blob);if (err) {if (err == -EINVAL ) pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",@@ -59,6 +60,8 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)return err; } +/* scaffolding during the transition */ + info->secid = blob.secid[0 ];if (!info->secid) {pr_info_ratelimited ("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n" , info->secctx);net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +8
-6@@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,void *addr;void *mask;u32 addr_len; -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;struct netlbl_audit audit_info;/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a @@ -905,12 +905,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb, ret_val =security_secctx_to_secid (nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]),nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]), - &secid); + &blob);if (ret_val !=0 )return ret_val; +/* scaffolding with the [0] */ return netlbl_unlhsh_add (&init_net, - dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid, + dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0 ], &audit_info); }@@ -932,7 +933,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,void *addr;void *mask;u32 addr_len; -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;struct netlbl_audit audit_info;/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a @@ -954,12 +955,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb, ret_val =security_secctx_to_secid (nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]),nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]), - &secid); + &blob);if (ret_val !=0 )return ret_val; +/* scaffolding with the [0] */ return netlbl_unlhsh_add (&init_net, -NULL , addr, mask, addr_len, secid, +NULL , addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0 ], &audit_info); }security/security.c +15
-3@@ -1970,10 +1970,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secid_to_secctx); -int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid) +int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; -return call_int_hook (secctx_to_secid,0 , secdata, seclen, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid (secdata, seclen, + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); +if (rc !=0 ) +return rc; + } +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secctx_to_secid);
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 7/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange security_secid_to_secctx() to take a lsmblob as input instead of a u32 secid. It will then call the LSM hooks using the lsmblob element allocated for that module. The callers have been updated as well. This allows for the possibility that more than one module may be called upon to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the audit code.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 4 +++- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- include/net/scm.h | 5 ++--- kernel/audit.c | 9 +++++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++---- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 8 ++++++-- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 +++- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 8 ++++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 6 +++--- security/security.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 12 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +3 -1
@@ -3105,10 +3105,12 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;size_t added_size;security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &secid); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz); +lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ; return_error_param = ret;
include/linux/security.h +3 -2
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, size_t size);int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name); -int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen);
@@ -1296,7 +1296,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)return 0 ; } -static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob, +char **secdata,u32 *seclen) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
include/net/scm.h +2 -3
@@ -97,9 +97,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scint err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { -/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */ - err =security_secid_to_secctx (scm->lsmblob.secid[0 ], - &secdata, &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &secdata, + &seclen);if (!err) {put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata);
kernel/audit.c +7 -2
@@ -1417,7 +1417,10 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO : len =0 ;if (audit_sig_sid) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len); +struct lsmblob blob; + +lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_sig_sid); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len);if (err)return err; }
@@ -2060,12 +2063,14 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)unsigned len;int error;u32 sid; +struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (current, &sid);if (!sid)return 0 ; - error =security_secid_to_secctx (sid, &ctx, &len); +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); + error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len);if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL ) goto error_path;
kernel/auditsc.c +10 -4
@@ -966,6 +966,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len;int rc =0 ; +struct lsmblob blob; ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_OBJ_PID );if (!ab)
@@ -975,7 +976,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);if (sid) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (sid, &ctx, &len)) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else {
@@ -1218,7 +1220,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)if (osid) {char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len; -if (security_secid_to_secctx (osid, &ctx, &len)) { +struct lsmblob blob; + +lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , osid); *call_panic =1 ; }else {
@@ -1368,9 +1373,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,if (n->osid !=0 ) {char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len; +struct lsmblob blob; -if (security_secid_to_secctx ( - n->osid, &ctx, &len)) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, n->osid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , n->osid);if (call_panic) *call_panic =2 ;
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +1 -2
@@ -139,8 +139,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)if (err)return ; -/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */ - err =security_secid_to_secctx (lb.secid[0 ], &secdata, &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &secdata, &seclen);if (err)return ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +6 -2
@@ -331,8 +331,10 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)struct nlattr *nest_secctx;int len, ret;char *secctx; +struct lsmblob blob; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (ct->secmark, &secctx, &len); +lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len);if (ret)return 0 ;
@@ -643,8 +645,10 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct) {#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK int len, ret; +struct lsmblob blob; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (ct->secmark,NULL , &len); +lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob,NULL , &len);if (ret)return 0 ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +3 -1
@@ -175,8 +175,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)int ret;u32 len;char *secctx; +struct lsmblob blob; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (ct->secmark, &secctx, &len); +lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len);if (ret)return ;
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +6 -2
@@ -305,13 +305,17 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata) {u32 seclen =0 ;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK ) +struct lsmblob blob; +if (!skb || !sk_fullsock (skb->sk))return 0 ;read_lock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); -if (skb->secmark) -security_secid_to_secctx (skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen); +if (skb->secmark) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, skb->secmark); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, secdata, &seclen); + }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);#endif
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +14 -4
@@ -375,6 +375,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf =NULL ;char *secctx =NULL ;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob;if (addr_len !=sizeof (struct in_addr ) && addr_len !=sizeof (struct in6_addr ))
@@ -437,7 +438,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net, unlhsh_add_return:rcu_read_unlock ();if (audit_buf !=NULL ) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (secid, +lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx);
@@ -474,6 +476,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,struct net_device *dev;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock); list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -493,8 +496,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net, addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev); +if (entry !=NULL ) +lsmblob_init (&blob, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (entry->secid, +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx);security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -536,6 +541,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,struct net_device *dev;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock); list_entry =netlbl_af6list_remove (addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -554,8 +560,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net, addr, mask);if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev); +if (entry !=NULL ) +lsmblob_init (&blob, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (entry->secid, +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx);security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1076,6 +1084,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,u32 secid;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob; data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid, cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1130,7 +1139,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd, secid = addr6->secid; } - ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (secid, &secctx, &secctx_len); +lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); + ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +3 -3
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob;if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )return NULL ;
@@ -98,10 +99,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid), audit_info->sessionid); +lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_info->secid);if (audit_info->secid !=0 && -security_secid_to_secctx (audit_info->secid, - &secctx, - &secctx_len) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , secctx);security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); }
security/security.c +13 -3
@@ -1963,10 +1963,20 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_ismaclabel); -int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) { -return call_int_hook (secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , secid, secdata, - seclen); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc; + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx (blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], + secdata, seclen); +if (rc !=0 ) +return rc; + } +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secid_to_secctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 8/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerThere may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The audit data structure containing the secid will be updated later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 5 ++++- security/security.c | 12 +++++++++--- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);void security_task_to_inode (struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode);int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,short flag); -void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,u32 *secid); +void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg *msg);void security_msg_msg_free (struct msg_msg *msg);int security_msg_queue_alloc (struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -1174,9 +1174,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,return 0 ; } -static inline void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,u32 *secid) +static inline void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, +struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); }static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg *msg)
kernel/auditsc.c +4 -1
@@ -2285,11 +2285,14 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)void __audit_ipc_obj (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) {struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); +struct lsmblob blob; context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; context->ipc.has_perm =0 ; -security_ipc_getsecid (ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); +security_ipc_getsecid (ipcp, &blob); +/* scaffolding on the [0] - change "osid" to a lsmblob */ + context->ipc.osid = blob.secid[0 ]; context->type =AUDIT_IPC ; }
security/security.c +9 -3
@@ -1783,10 +1783,16 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)return call_int_hook (ipc_permission,0 , ipcp, flag); } -void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,u32 *secid) +void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; -call_void_hook (ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + hp->hook.ipc_getsecid (ipcp, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } }int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg *msg)
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 9/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_task_getsecid() interface to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all possible secids for possible reporting.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 4 +-- include/linux/security.h | 7 +++-- kernel/audit.c | 11 +++---- kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +-- kernel/auditsc.c | 18 ++++++++---- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 +++- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 9 +++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 42 +++++++++++++++------------ security/security.c | 12 ++++++-- 10 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +1 -3
@@ -3104,12 +3104,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->priority =task_nice (current);if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) { -u32 secid;struct lsmblob blob;size_t added_size; -security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &secid); -lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); +security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &blob); ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ;
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,int security_task_setpgid (struct task_struct *p,pid_t pgid);int security_task_getpgid (struct task_struct *p);int security_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p); -void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid); +void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p,int nice);int security_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p,int ioprio);int security_task_getioprio (struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1101,9 +1101,10 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)return 0 ; } -static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid) +static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p, +struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); }static inline int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p,int nice)
kernel/audit.c +6 -5
@@ -2062,14 +2062,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)char *ctx =NULL ;unsigned len;int error; -u32 sid;struct lsmblob blob; -security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); -if (!sid) +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))return 0 ; -lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len);if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL )
@@ -2277,6 +2275,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)int audit_signal_info (int sig,struct task_struct *t) {kuid_t uid =current_uid (), auid; +struct lsmblob blob; if (auditd_test_task(t) && (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2287,7 +2286,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; -security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_sig_sid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */ + audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0 ]; }return audit_signal_info_syscall (t);
kernel/auditfilter.c +1 -3
@@ -1326,7 +1326,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)for (i =0 ; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];pid_t pid; -u32 sid;struct lsmblob blob;switch (f->type) {
@@ -1357,8 +1356,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN :case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR :if (f->lsm_isset) { -security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); -lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); result =security_audit_rule_match ( &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules);
kernel/auditsc.c +12 -6
@@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, {const struct cred *cred;int i, need_sid =1 ; -u32 sid;struct lsmblob blob;unsigned int sessionid;
@@ -641,10 +640,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,logged upon error */ if (f->lsm_isset) {if (need_sid) { -security_task_getsecid (tsk, &sid); +security_task_getsecid (tsk, &blob); need_sid =0 ; } -lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob, f->type, f->op,
@@ -2382,12 +2380,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)void __audit_ptrace (struct task_struct *t) {struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); +struct lsmblob blob; context->target_pid =task_tgid_nr (t); context->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); context->target_uid =task_uid (t); context->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &context->target_sid); +security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); +/* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */ + context->target_sid = blob.secid[0 ];memcpy (context->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); }
@@ -2403,6 +2404,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;struct audit_context *ctx =audit_context ();kuid_t t_uid =task_uid (t); +struct lsmblob blob;if (!audit_signals ||audit_dummy_context ())return 0 ;
@@ -2414,7 +2416,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &ctx->target_sid); +security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); +/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ + ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0 ];memcpy (ctx->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN );return 0 ; }
@@ -2435,7 +2439,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_loginuid (t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); +security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); +/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ + axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0 ];memcpy (axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); axp->pid_count++;
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +4 -1
@@ -1539,11 +1539,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)int ret_val;struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;struct netlbl_audit audit_info; +struct lsmblob blob;/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */ -security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_info.secid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */ + audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0 ]; audit_info.loginuid =GLOBAL_ROOT_UID ; audit_info.sessionid =0 ;
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h +5 -1
@@ -34,7 +34,11 @@static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo (struct sk_buff *skb,struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { -security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_info->secid); +struct lsmblob blob; + +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding until secid is converted */ + audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0 ]; audit_info->loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current); audit_info->sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (current); }
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +5 -4
@@ -48,14 +48,15 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)*/ int ima_must_appraise (struct inode *inode,int mask,enum ima_hooks func) { -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;if (!ima_appraise)return 0 ; -security_task_getsecid (current, &secid); -return ima_match_policy (inode,current_cred (), secid, func, mask, -IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ,NULL ,NULL ); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding the .secid[0] */ +return ima_match_policy (inode,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], func, + mask,IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ,NULL ,NULL ); } static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +24 -18
88 lines not on this page · raw message
security/security.c +9 -3
@@ -1700,10 +1700,16 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)return call_int_hook (task_getsid,0 , p); } -void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid) +void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; -call_void_hook (task_getsecid, p, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + hp->hook.task_getsecid (p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_task_getsecid);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 10/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided for IMA and audit.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 +--- security/security.c | 11 +++++++++-- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);int security_inode_getsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,void **buffer,bool alloc);int security_inode_setsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size,int flags);int security_inode_listsecurity (struct inode *inode,char *buffer,size_t buffer_size); -void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid); +void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new);int security_inode_copy_up_xattr (const char *name); int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
@@ -924,9 +924,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,return 0 ; } -static inline void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid) +static inline void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode, +struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); }static inline int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new)
kernel/auditsc.c +5 -1
@@ -1931,13 +1931,17 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,const struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags) { + struct lsmblob blob; + name->ino = inode->i_ino; name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; name->mode = inode->i_mode; name->uid = inode->i_uid; name->gid = inode->i_gid; name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; -security_inode_getsecid (inode, &name->osid); +security_inode_getsecid (inode, &blob); +/* scaffolding until osid is updated */ + name->osid = blob.secid[0 ];if (flags &AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL ) { name->fcap_ver =-1 ;return ;
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1 -3
@@ -425,7 +425,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,return false;for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) {int rc =0 ; -u32 osid;struct lsmblob blob;if (!ima_lsm_isset (rule->lsm[i].rules))
@@ -435,8 +434,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_OBJ_USER :case LSM_OBJ_ROLE :case LSM_OBJ_TYPE : -security_inode_getsecid (inode, &osid); -lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); +security_inode_getsecid (inode, &blob); rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
security/security.c +9 -2
@@ -1386,9 +1386,16 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_listsecurity); -void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid) +void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,struct lsmblob *blob) { -call_void_hook (inode_getsecid, inode, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + hp->hook.inode_getsecid (inode, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } }int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new)
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 11/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_cred_getsecid() interface to fill in a lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. The associated data elements in the audit sub-system are changed from a secid to a lsmblob to accommodate multiple possible LSM audit users.
--- include/linux/security.h | 2 +- kernel/audit.c | 19 +++++++----------- kernel/audit.h | 5 +++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 33 +++++++++++-------------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 8 ++++---- security/security.c | 12 ++++++++--- 6 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +1 -1
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);void security_cred_free (struct cred *cred);int security_prepare_creds (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old,gfp_t gfp);void security_transfer_creds (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old); -void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,u32 *secid); +void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_kernel_create_files_as (struct cred *new,struct inode *inode);int security_kernel_module_request (char *kmod_name);
kernel/audit.c +7 -12
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ static u32 audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;/* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */ kuid_t audit_sig_uid =INVALID_UID ;pid_t audit_sig_pid =-1 ; -u32 audit_sig_sid =0 ; +struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;/* Records can be lost in several ways: 0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1416,23 +1416,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) }case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO : len =0 ; -if (audit_sig_sid) { -struct lsmblob blob; - -lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_sig_sid); - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len); +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx, + &len);if (err)return err; } sig_data =kmalloc (sizeof (*sig_data) + len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!sig_data) { -if (audit_sig_sid) +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm))security_release_secctx (ctx, len);return -ENOMEM ; } sig_data->uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid); sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid; -if (audit_sig_sid) { +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) {memcpy (sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);security_release_secctx (ctx, len); }
@@ -2275,7 +2273,6 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)int audit_signal_info (int sig,struct task_struct *t) {kuid_t uid =current_uid (), auid; -struct lsmblob blob; if (auditd_test_task(t) && (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2286,9 +2283,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; -security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */ - audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_sig_lsm); }return audit_signal_info_syscall (t);
kernel/audit.h +3 -2
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h> #include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ struct audit_context {kuid_t target_auid;kuid_t target_uid;unsigned int target_sessionid; -u32 target_sid; +struct lsmblob target_lsm;char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN ];struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
@@ -329,7 +330,7 @@ extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid; -extern u32 audit_sig_sid; +extern struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;extern int audit_filter (int msgtype,unsigned int listtype);
kernel/auditsc.c +12 -21
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ];kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ];unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ]; -u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ]; +struct lsmblob target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ];char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ][TASK_COMM_LEN ];int pid_count; };
@@ -957,14 +957,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) }static int audit_log_pid_context (struct audit_context *context,pid_t pid, -kuid_t auid,kuid_t uid,unsigned int sessionid, -u32 sid,char *comm) +kuid_t auid,kuid_t uid, +unsigned int sessionid, +struct lsmblob *blob,char *comm) {struct audit_buffer *ab;char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len;int rc =0 ; -struct lsmblob blob; ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_OBJ_PID );if (!ab)
@@ -973,9 +973,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,audit_log_format (ab,"opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d" , pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid),from_kuid (&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid); -if (sid) { -lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) { +if (lsmblob_is_set (blob)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else {
@@ -1546,7 +1545,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) axs->target_auid[i], axs->target_uid[i], axs->target_sessionid[i], - axs->target_sid[i], + &axs->target_lsm[i], axs->target_comm[i])) call_panic = 1; }
@@ -1555,7 +1554,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)audit_log_pid_context (context, context->target_pid, context->target_auid, context->target_uid, context->target_sessionid, - context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) + &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm)) call_panic = 1;if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -1733,7 +1732,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) context->aux =NULL ; context->aux_pids =NULL ; context->target_pid =0 ; - context->target_sid =0 ; +lsmblob_init (&context->target_lsm,0 ); context->sockaddr_len =0 ; context->type =0 ; context->fds[0 ] =-1 ;
@@ -2384,15 +2383,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)void __audit_ptrace (struct task_struct *t) {struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); -struct lsmblob blob; context->target_pid =task_tgid_nr (t); context->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); context->target_uid =task_uid (t); context->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); -/* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */ - context->target_sid = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (t, &context->target_lsm);memcpy (context->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); }
@@ -2408,7 +2404,6 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;struct audit_context *ctx =audit_context ();kuid_t t_uid =task_uid (t); -struct lsmblob blob;if (!audit_signals ||audit_dummy_context ())return 0 ;
@@ -2420,9 +2415,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); -/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ - ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (t, &ctx->target_lsm);memcpy (ctx->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN );return 0 ; }
@@ -2443,9 +2436,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_loginuid (t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); -/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ - axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]);memcpy (axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); axp->pid_count++;
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +4 -4
@@ -412,7 +412,6 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)int ima_bprm_check (struct linux_binprm *bprm) {int ret; -u32 secid;struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob);
@@ -422,9 +421,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)if (ret)return ret; -security_cred_getsecid (bprm->cred, &secid); -return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid,NULL ,0 , -MAY_EXEC ,CREDS_CHECK ); +security_cred_getsecid (bprm->cred, &blob); +/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ +return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0 ], +NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,CREDS_CHECK ); }/**
security/security.c +9 -3
@@ -1615,10 +1615,16 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)call_void_hook (cred_transfer, new, old); } -void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,u32 *secid) +void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; -call_void_hook (cred_getsecid, c, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.cred_getsecid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + hp->hook.cred_getsecid (c, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_cred_getsecid);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 12/23 IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
In reply to Casey SchauflerThe IMA interfaces ima_get_action() and ima_match_policy() call LSM functions that use lsmblobs. Change the IMA functions to pass the lsmblob to be compatible with the LSM functions.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 11 ++++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 10 ++++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 5 ++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 32 +++++++++++---------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 +++++----- 5 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +6 -5
@@ -205,9 +205,9 @@ extern const char *const func_tokens[];struct modsig ;/* LIM API function definitions */ -int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -int mask,enum ima_hooks func,int *pcr, -struct ima_template_desc **template_desc); +int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob,int mask,enum ima_hooks func, +int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc);int ima_must_measure (struct inode *inode,int mask,enum ima_hooks func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -232,8 +232,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);const char *ima_d_path (const struct path *path,char **pathbuf,char *filename);/* IMA policy related functions */ -int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -enum ima_hooks func,int mask,int flags,int *pcr, +int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob,enum ima_hooks func,int mask, +int flags,int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc);void ima_init_policy (void );void ima_update_policy (void );
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +5 -5
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy. * @inode: pointer to inode to measure * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate -* @secid: secid of the task being validated +* @blob: LSM data of the task being validated * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC, * MAY_APPEND) * @func: caller identifier
@@ -181,15 +181,15 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask. * */ -int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -int mask,enum ima_hooks func,int *pcr, -struct ima_template_desc **template_desc) +int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob,int mask,enum ima_hooks func, +int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc) {int flags =IMA_MEASURE |IMA_AUDIT |IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ; flags &= ima_policy_flag; -return ima_match_policy (inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr, +return ima_match_policy (inode, cred, blob, func, mask, flags, pcr, template_desc); }
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +2 -3
@@ -54,9 +54,8 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)return 0 ;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding the .secid[0] */ -return ima_match_policy (inode,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], func, - mask,IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ,NULL ,NULL ); +return ima_match_policy (inode,current_cred (), &blob, func, mask, +IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ,NULL ,NULL ); } static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +13 -19
@@ -190,8 +190,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) }static int process_measurement (struct file *file,const struct cred *cred, -u32 secid,char *buf,loff_t size,int mask, -enum ima_hooks func) +struct lsmblob *blob,char *buf,loff_t size, +int mask,enum ima_hooks func) {struct inode *inode =file_inode (file);struct integrity_iint_cache *iint =NULL ;
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. * Included is the appraise submask. */ - action =ima_get_action (inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr, + action =ima_get_action (inode, cred, blob, mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc); violation_check = ((func ==FILE_CHECK || func ==MMAP_CHECK ) && (ima_policy_flag &IMA_MEASURE ));
@@ -388,8 +388,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)if (file && (prot &PROT_EXEC )) {security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */ -return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], +return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), &blob,NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,MMAP_CHECK ); }
@@ -415,16 +414,14 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ - ret =process_measurement (bprm->file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], -NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,BPRM_CHECK ); + ret =process_measurement (bprm->file,current_cred (), &blob,NULL ,0 , +MAY_EXEC ,BPRM_CHECK );if (ret)return ret;security_cred_getsecid (bprm->cred, &blob); -/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ -return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0 ], -NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,CREDS_CHECK ); +return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, &blob,NULL ,0 , +MAY_EXEC ,CREDS_CHECK ); }/**
@@ -442,8 +439,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ -return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ],NULL ,0 , +return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), &blob,NULL ,0 , mask & (MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE |MAY_EXEC |MAY_APPEND ),FILE_CHECK ); }
@@ -575,9 +571,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, func = read_idmap[read_id] ?:FILE_CHECK ;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ -return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], buf, - size,MAY_READ , func); +return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), &blob, buf, size, +MAY_READ , func); }/**
@@ -669,9 +664,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,*/ if (func) {security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding */ - action =ima_get_action (NULL ,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], -0 , func, &pcr, &template); + action =ima_get_action (NULL ,current_cred (), &blob,0 , func, + &pcr, &template);if (!(action &IMA_MEASURE ))return ; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +6 -6
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,* Returns true on rule match, false on failure. */ static bool ima_match_rules (struct ima_rule_entry *rule,struct inode *inode, -const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, +const struct cred *cred,struct lsmblob *blob,enum ima_hooks func,int mask) {int i;
@@ -443,7 +443,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_SUBJ_USER :case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE :case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE : -lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
@@ -487,7 +486,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is * being made -* @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated +* @blob: LSM data of the task to be validated * @func: IMA hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
@@ -500,8 +499,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)* list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. */ -int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -enum ima_hooks func,int mask,int flags,int *pcr, +int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob,enum ima_hooks func,int mask, +int flags,int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc) {struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,if (!(entry->action & actmask))continue ; -if (!ima_match_rules (entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask)) +if (!ima_match_rules (entry, inode, cred, blob, func, mask))continue ; action |= entry->flags &IMA_ACTION_FLAGS ;
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 13/23 LSM: Specify which LSM to display
In reply to Casey SchauflerCreate a new entry "display" in the procfs attr directory for controlling which LSM security information is displayed for a process. A process can only read or write its own display value.
The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for human readable data may be written to "display" to set the value. The name of the LSM currently in use can be read from "display". At this point there can only be one LSM capable of display active. A helper function lsm_task_display() is provided to get the display slot for a task_struct.
Setting the "display" requires that all security modules using setprocattr hooks allow the action. Each security module is responsible for defining its policy.
AppArmor hook provided by John Johansen <[email protected]> SELinux hook provided by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
--- fs/proc/base.c | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 15 +++ security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 32 +++++ security/security.c | 167 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 ++ security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++ 8 files changed, 219 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
fs/proc/base.c +1 -0
@@ -2652,6 +2652,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {ATTR (NULL ,"fscreate" ,0666 ),ATTR (NULL ,"keycreate" ,0666 ),ATTR (NULL ,"sockcreate" ,0666 ), +ATTR (NULL ,"display" ,0666 ), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACKDIR ("smack" ,0555 , proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +15 -0
@@ -2186,4 +2186,19 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,extern int lsm_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode); +/** +* lsm_task_display - the "display" LSM for this task +* @task: The task to report on +* +* Returns the task's display LSM slot. +*/ +static inline int lsm_task_display (struct task_struct *task) +{ +int *display = task->security; + +if (display) +return *display; +return LSMBLOB_INVALID ; +} +#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h +2 -1
@@ -28,8 +28,9 @@#define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10#define AA_CLASS_NET 14#define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16 +#define AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM 17 -#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_LABEL +#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM/* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */ extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
security/apparmor/lsm.c +32 -0
@@ -612,6 +612,25 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,return error; } + +static int profile_display_lsm (struct aa_profile *profile, +struct common_audit_data *sa) +{ +struct aa_perms perms = { }; +unsigned int state; + + state =PROFILE_MEDIATES (profile,AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM ); +if (state) { +aa_compute_perms (profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms); +aa_apply_modes_to_perms (profile, &perms); +aad (sa)->label = &profile->label; + +return aa_check_perms (profile, &perms,AA_MAY_WRITE , sa,NULL ); + } + +return 0 ; +} +static int apparmor_setprocattr (const char *name,void *value,size_t size) {
@@ -623,6 +642,19 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,if (size ==0 )return -EINVAL ; +/* LSM infrastructure does actual setting of display if allowed */ +if (!strcmp (name,"display" )) { +struct aa_profile *profile; +struct aa_label *label; + +aad (&sa)->info ="set display lsm" ; + label =begin_current_label_crit_section (); + error =fn_for_each_confined (label, profile, +profile_display_lsm (profile, &sa)); +end_current_label_crit_section (label); +return error; + } +/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */ if (args[size -1 ] !='\0' ) {/* null terminate */
security/security.c +150 -17
266 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/hooks.c +11 -0
@@ -6323,6 +6323,17 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)/* * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all. */ + +/* +* For setting display, we only perform a permission check; +* the actual update to the display value is handled by the +* LSM framework. +*/ +if (!strcmp (name,"display" )) +return avc_has_perm (&selinux_state, + mysid, mysid,SECCLASS_PROCESS2 , +PROCESS2__SETDISPLAY ,NULL ); +if (!strcmp (name,"exec" )) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
security/selinux/include/classmap.h +1 -1
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {"execmem" ,"execstack" ,"execheap" ,"setkeycreate" , "setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } }, {"process2" , - { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } }, + { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", "setdisplay", NULL } }, {"system" , { "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod", "syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +7 -0
@@ -3518,6 +3518,13 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;int rc; +/* +* Allow the /proc/.../attr/current and SO_PEERSEC "display" +* to be reset at will. +*/ +if (strcmp (name,"display" ) ==0 ) +return 0 ; +if (!smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_ADMIN ) &&list_empty (&tsp->smk_relabel))return -EPERM ;
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 14/23 LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
In reply to Casey SchauflerAdd a new lsmcontext data structure to hold all the information about a "security context", including the string, its size and which LSM allocated the string. The allocation information is necessary because LSMs have different policies regarding the lifecycle of these strings. SELinux allocates and destroys them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer to an entry in a list that never goes away.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 10 ++++--- fs/ceph/xattr.c | 6 ++++- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 8 ++++-- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 7 +++-- include/linux/security.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/net/scm.h | 5 +++- kernel/audit.c | 14 +++++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++++++--- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 ++- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 ++- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 ++- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 13 ++++++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 19 +++++++++++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 4 ++- security/security.c | 11 ++++---- 15 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +7 -3
@@ -2861,6 +2861,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,int t_debug_id =atomic_inc_return (&binder_last_id);char *secctx =NULL ;u32 secctx_sz =0 ; +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ e =binder_transaction_log_add (&binder_transaction_log); e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
@@ -3157,7 +3158,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->security_ctx =0 ;WARN_ON (1 ); } -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_sz); +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); secctx =NULL ; } t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
@@ -3490,8 +3492,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,binder_alloc_free_buf (&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer); err_binder_alloc_buf_failed: err_bad_extra_size: -if (secctx) -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_sz); +if (secctx) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + } err_get_secctx_failed:kfree (tcomplete);binder_stats_deleted (BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE );
fs/ceph/xattr.c +5 -1
@@ -1271,12 +1271,16 @@ int ceph_security_init_secctx(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,void ceph_release_acl_sec_ctx (struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx) { +#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_POSIX_ACL posix_acl_release (as_ctx->acl);posix_acl_release (as_ctx->default_acl);#endif #ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL -security_release_secctx (as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen); +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff);#endif if (as_ctx->pagelist)ceph_pagelist_release (as_ctx->pagelist);
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +6 -2
@@ -130,8 +130,12 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,static inline void nfs4_label_release_security (struct nfs4_label *label) { -if (label) -security_release_secctx (label->label, label->len); +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ + +if (label) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, label->label, label->len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + } }static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask (struct nfs_server *server,struct nfs4_label *label) {
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +5 -2
@@ -2421,6 +2421,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,int err;struct nfs4_acl *acl =NULL ;#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ void *context =NULL ;int contextlen;#endif
@@ -2923,8 +2924,10 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp, out:#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL -if (context) -security_release_secctx (context, contextlen); +if (context) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, context, contextlen,0 );/*scaffolding*/ +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + }#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */ kfree (acl);if (tempfh) {
include/linux/security.h +33 -2
@@ -128,6 +128,37 @@ enum lockdown_reason { LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, }; +/* +* A "security context" is the text representation of +* the information used by LSMs. +* This structure contains the string, its length, and which LSM +* it is useful for. +*/ +struct lsmcontext { +char *context;/* Provided by the module */ +u32 len; +int slot;/* Identifies the module */ +}; + +/** +* lsmcontext_init - initialize an lsmcontext structure. +* @cp: Pointer to the context to initialize +* @context: Initial context, or NULL +* @size: Size of context, or 0 +* @slot: Which LSM provided the context +* +* Fill in the lsmcontext from the provided information. +* This is a scaffolding function that will be removed when +* lsmcontext integration is complete. +*/ +static inline void lsmcontext_init (struct lsmcontext *cp,char *context, +u32 size,int slot) +{ + cp->slot = slot; + cp->context = context; + cp->len = size; +} +/* * Data exported by the security modules *
@@ -498,7 +529,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsmblob *blob); -void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen); +void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp);void security_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode);int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);int security_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1312,7 +1343,7 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } -static inline void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen) +static inline void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp) { }
include/net/scm.h +4 -1
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK static inline void scm_passec (struct socket *sock,struct msghdr *msg,struct scm_cookie *scm) { +struct lsmcontext context;char *secdata;u32 seclen;int err;
@@ -102,7 +103,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scif (!err) {put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata); -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +/*scaffolding*/ +lsmcontext_init (&context, secdata, seclen,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context); } } }
kernel/audit.c +10 -4
@@ -1180,6 +1180,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len; +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ err =audit_netlink_ok (skb, msg_type);if (err)
@@ -1424,15 +1425,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) } sig_data =kmalloc (sizeof (*sig_data) + len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!sig_data) { -if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + }return -ENOMEM ; } sig_data->uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid); sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) {memcpy (sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); }audit_send_reply (skb, seq,AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO ,0 ,0 , sig_data,sizeof (*sig_data) + len);
@@ -2061,6 +2065,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)unsigned len;int error;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ security_task_getsecid (current, &blob);if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))
@@ -2074,7 +2079,8 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) }audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff);return 0 ; error_path:
kernel/auditsc.c +9 -3
@@ -962,6 +962,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm) { struct audit_buffer *ab; +struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len;int rc =0 ;
@@ -979,7 +980,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, rc =1 ; }else {audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 );/*scaffolding*/ +security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); } }audit_log_format (ab," ocomm=" );
@@ -1192,6 +1194,7 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)static void show_special (struct audit_context *context,int *call_panic) { +struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;struct audit_buffer *ab;int i;
@@ -1225,7 +1228,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) *call_panic =1 ; }else {audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); } }if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
@@ -1371,6 +1375,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;lsmblob_init (&blob, n->osid);if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
@@ -1379,7 +1384,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n, *call_panic =2 ; }else {audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ +security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); } }
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +3 -1
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,static void ip_cmsg_recv_security (struct msghdr *msg,struct sk_buff *skb) { +struct lsmcontext context;struct lsmblob lb;char *secdata;u32 seclen;
@@ -144,7 +145,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)return ;put_cmsg (msg,SOL_IP ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata); -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secdata, seclen,0 );/* scaffolding */ +security_release_secctx (&context); }static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr (struct msghdr *msg,struct sk_buff *skb)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +3 -1
@@ -332,6 +332,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)int len, ret;char *secctx;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len);
@@ -349,7 +350,8 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct) ret =0 ; nla_put_failure: -security_release_secctx (secctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ +security_release_secctx (&context); return ret; }#else
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +3 -1
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)u32 len;char *secctx;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len);
@@ -184,7 +185,8 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)seq_printf (s,"secctx=%s " , secctx); - security_release_secctx(secctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ + security_release_secctx(&context); }#else static inline void ct_show_secctx (struct seq_file *s,const struct nf_conn *ct)
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +9 -4
@@ -395,6 +395,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var (ctinfo );struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;bool csum_verify; +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ char *secdata =NULL ;u32 seclen =0 ;
@@ -625,8 +626,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, } nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len; -if (seclen) -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +if (seclen) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secdata, seclen,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + }return skb; nla_put_failure:
@@ -634,8 +637,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,kfree_skb (skb);net_err_ratelimited ("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n" ); nlmsg_failure: -if (seclen) -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +if (seclen) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secdata, seclen,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + }return NULL ; }
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +15 -4
@@ -373,6 +373,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,struct net_device *dev;struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf =NULL ; +struct lsmcontext context;char *secctx =NULL ;u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -443,7 +444,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +/* scaffolding */ +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , ret_val ==0 ?1 :0 );audit_log_end (audit_buf);
@@ -474,6 +477,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev; +struct lsmcontext context;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -502,7 +506,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net, security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +/* scaffolding */ +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , entry !=NULL ?1 :0 );audit_log_end (audit_buf);
@@ -539,6 +545,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev; +struct lsmcontext context;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -566,7 +573,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net, security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , entry !=NULL ?1 :0 );audit_log_end (audit_buf);
@@ -1080,6 +1088,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,int ret_val = -ENOMEM ;struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;struct net_device *dev; +struct lsmcontext context;void *data;u32 secid;char *secctx;
@@ -1147,7 +1156,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX , secctx_len, secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +/* scaffolding */ +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure;
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +3 -1
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) {struct audit_buffer *audit_buf; +struct lsmcontext context;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -103,7 +104,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,if (audit_info->secid !=0 &&security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 );/*scaffolding*/ +security_release_secctx (&context); }return audit_buf;
security/security.c +6 -5
@@ -2143,16 +2143,17 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secctx_to_secid); -void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen) +void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp) {struct security_hook_list *hp; -int display =lsm_task_display (current);hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list) -if (display ==LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) { - hp->hook.release_secctx (secdata, seclen); -return ; +if (cp->slot == hp->lsmid->slot) { + hp->hook.release_secctx (cp->context, cp->len); +break ; } + +memset (cp,0 ,sizeof (*cp)); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_release_secctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 15/23 LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
In reply to Casey SchauflerReplace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier along with the context and context length. This allows security_release_secctx() to know how to release the context. Callers have been modified to use or save the returned data from the new structure.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 26 +++++++--------- include/linux/security.h | 4 +-- include/net/scm.h | 10 ++----- kernel/audit.c | 35 ++++++++-------------- kernel/auditsc.c | 31 +++++++------------ net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 7 ++--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 14 +++++---- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 7 ++--- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 5 +++- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 40 ++++++++----------------- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 7 ++--- security/security.c | 10 +++++-- 12 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +10 -16
@@ -2859,9 +2859,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off =0 ;struct binder_context *context = proc->context;int t_debug_id =atomic_inc_return (&binder_last_id); -char *secctx =NULL ; -u32 secctx_sz =0 ; -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ +struct lsmcontext lsmctx = { }; e =binder_transaction_log_add (&binder_transaction_log); e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
@@ -3109,14 +3107,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,size_t added_size;security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &blob); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx);if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ; return_error_param = ret; return_error_line = __LINE__; goto err_get_secctx_failed; } - added_size =ALIGN (secctx_sz,sizeof (u64)); + added_size =ALIGN (lsmctx.len,sizeof (u64)); extra_buffers_size += added_size;if (extra_buffers_size < added_size) {/* integer overflow of extra_buffers_size */
@@ -3143,24 +3141,22 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->buffer =NULL ; goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed; } -if (secctx) { +if (lsmctx.context) {int err;size_t buf_offset =ALIGN (tr->data_size,sizeof (void *)) +ALIGN (tr->offsets_size,sizeof (void *)) +ALIGN (extra_buffers_size,sizeof (void *)) - -ALIGN (secctx_sz,sizeof (u64)); +ALIGN (lsmctx.len,sizeof (u64)); t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t )t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset; err =binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer (&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer, buf_offset, - secctx, secctx_sz); + lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);if (err) { t->security_ctx =0 ;WARN_ON (1 ); } -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - secctx =NULL ; +security_release_secctx (&lsmctx); } t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id; t->buffer->transaction = t;
@@ -3216,7 +3212,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, off_end_offset = off_start_offset + tr->offsets_size; sg_buf_offset =ALIGN (off_end_offset,sizeof (void *)); sg_buf_end_offset = sg_buf_offset + extra_buffers_size - -ALIGN (secctx_sz,sizeof (u64)); +ALIGN (lsmctx.len,sizeof (u64)); off_min =0 ;for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset; buffer_offset +=sizeof (binder_size_t)) {
@@ -3492,10 +3488,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,binder_alloc_free_buf (&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer); err_binder_alloc_buf_failed: err_bad_extra_size: -if (secctx) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +if (lsmctx.context) +security_release_secctx (&lsmctx); err_get_secctx_failed:kfree (tcomplete);binder_stats_deleted (BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE );
include/linux/security.h +2 -2
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, size_t size);int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name); -int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob, -char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +struct lsmcontext *cp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
include/net/scm.h +3 -7
@@ -93,18 +93,14 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,static inline void scm_passec (struct socket *sock,struct msghdr *msg,struct scm_cookie *scm) {struct lsmcontext context; -char *secdata; -u32 seclen;int err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &secdata, - &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &context);if (!err) { -put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata); -/*scaffolding*/ -lsmcontext_init (&context, secdata, seclen,0 ); +put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , + context.len, context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); } }
kernel/audit.c +13 -22
@@ -1178,9 +1178,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)struct audit_buffer *ab;u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;struct audit_sig_info *sig_data; -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len; -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ +struct lsmcontext context = { }; err =audit_netlink_ok (skb, msg_type);if (err)
@@ -1416,30 +1414,26 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)break ; }case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO : - len =0 ;if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx, - &len); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, + &context);if (err)return err; } - sig_data =kmalloc (sizeof (*sig_data) + len,GFP_KERNEL ); + sig_data =kmalloc (sizeof (*sig_data) + context.len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!sig_data) { -if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) +security_release_secctx (&context);return -ENOMEM ; } sig_data->uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid); sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { -memcpy (sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); +memcpy (sig_data->ctx, context.context, context.len); +security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_send_reply (skb, seq,AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO ,0 ,0 , - sig_data,sizeof (*sig_data) + len); + sig_data,sizeof (*sig_data) + context.len);kfree (sig_data);break ;case AUDIT_TTY_GET : {
@@ -2061,26 +2055,23 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab) { -char *ctx =NULL ; -unsigned len;int error;struct lsmblob blob; -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ +struct lsmcontext context;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob);if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))return 0 ; - error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len); + error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL ) goto error_path;return 0 ; } -audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , ctx); -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); +audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , context.context); +security_release_secctx (&context);return 0 ; error_path:
kernel/auditsc.c +11 -20
@@ -962,9 +962,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm) { struct audit_buffer *ab; -struct lsmcontext lsmcxt; -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len; +struct lsmcontext lsmctx;int rc =0 ; ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_OBJ_PID );
@@ -975,13 +973,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);if (lsmblob_is_set (blob)) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &ctx, &len)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmctx)) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 );/*scaffolding*/ -security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); +audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , lsmctx.context); +security_release_secctx (&lsmctx); } }audit_log_format (ab," ocomm=" );
@@ -1194,7 +1191,6 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)static void show_special (struct audit_context *context,int *call_panic) { -struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;struct audit_buffer *ab;int i;
@@ -1218,17 +1214,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)from_kgid (&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid), context->ipc.mode);if (osid) { -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len; +struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;struct lsmblob blob;lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmcxt)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , osid); *call_panic =1 ; }else { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 ); +audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , lsmcxt.context);security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); } }
@@ -1372,20 +1366,17 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,MAJOR (n->rdev), MINOR(n->rdev));if (n->osid !=0 ) { -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len;struct lsmblob blob; -struct lsmcontext lsmcxt; +struct lsmcontext lsmctx;lsmblob_init (&blob, n->osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , n->osid);if (call_panic) *call_panic =2 ; }else { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ -security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); +audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , lsmctx.context); +security_release_secctx (&lsmctx); } }
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +2 -5
@@ -132,20 +132,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb) {struct lsmcontext context;struct lsmblob lb; -char *secdata; -u32 seclen;int err; err =security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (NULL , skb, &lb);if (err)return ; - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &secdata, &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &context);if (err)return ; -put_cmsg (msg,SOL_IP ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata); -lsmcontext_init (&context, secdata, seclen,0 );/* scaffolding */ +put_cmsg (msg,SOL_IP ,SCM_SECURITY , context.len, context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +8 -6
@@ -329,13 +329,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx (struct sk_buff *skb,const struct nf_conn *ct) {struct nlattr *nest_secctx; -int len, ret; -char *secctx; +int ret;struct lsmblob blob;struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (ret)return 0 ;
@@ -344,13 +343,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)if (!nest_secctx) goto nla_put_failure; -if (nla_put_string (skb,CTA_SECCTX_NAME , secctx)) +if (nla_put_string (skb,CTA_SECCTX_NAME , context.context)) goto nla_put_failure;nla_nest_end (skb, nest_secctx); ret =0 ; nla_put_failure: -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ security_release_secctx (&context);return ret; }
@@ -648,12 +646,16 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK int len, ret;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob,NULL , &len); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (ret)return 0 ; + len = context.len; +security_release_secctx (&context); +return nla_total_size (0 )/* CTA_SECCTX */ +nla_total_size (sizeof (char ) * len);/* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */ #else
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +2 -5
@@ -173,19 +173,16 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)static void ct_show_secctx (struct seq_file *s,const struct nf_conn *ct) {int ret; -u32 len; -char *secctx;struct lsmblob blob;struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (ret)return ; -seq_printf (s,"secctx=%s " , secctx); +seq_printf (s,"secctx=%s " , context.context); -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ security_release_secctx (&context); }#else
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +4 -1
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)u32 seclen =0 ;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK )struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context = { };if (!skb || !sk_fullsock (skb->sk))return 0 ;
@@ -314,10 +315,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)if (skb->secmark) {lsmblob_init (&blob, skb->secmark); -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, secdata, &seclen); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + *secdata = context.context; }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); + seclen = context.len;#endif return seclen; }
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +12 -28
@@ -374,8 +374,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf =NULL ;struct lsmcontext context; -char *secctx =NULL ; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob; if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
@@ -440,12 +438,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,rcu_read_unlock ();if (audit_buf !=NULL ) {lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, - &secctx, - &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -/* scaffolding */ -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , + context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , ret_val ==0 ?1 :0 );
@@ -478,8 +473,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev;struct lsmcontext context; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -503,11 +496,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,if (entry !=NULL )lsmblob_init (&blob, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, - &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -/* scaffolding */ -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , + context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , entry !=NULL ?1 :0 );
@@ -546,8 +537,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev;struct lsmcontext context; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -570,10 +559,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,if (entry !=NULL )lsmblob_init (&blob, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, - &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , + context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , entry !=NULL ?1 :0 );
@@ -1091,8 +1079,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,struct lsmcontext context;void *data;u32 secid; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob; data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
@@ -1149,15 +1135,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd, }lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); - ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len); + ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; ret_val =nla_put (cb_arg->skb,NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX , - secctx_len, - secctx); -/* scaffolding */ -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); + context.len, + context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure;
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +2 -5
@@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type, {struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct lsmcontext context; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )
@@ -102,9 +100,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_info->secid);if (audit_info->secid !=0 && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , secctx); -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 );/*scaffolding*/ +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }
security/security.c +7 -3
@@ -2108,18 +2108,22 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_ismaclabel); -int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp) {struct security_hook_list *hp;int display =lsm_task_display (current); +memset (cp,0 ,sizeof (*cp)); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))continue ; -if (display ==LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) +if (display ==LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) { + cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx ( blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], - secdata, seclen); + &cp->context, &cp->len); + } }return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 16/23 LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill a lsmcontext structure instead of data and length pointers. This provides the information about which LSM created the context so that security_release_secctx() can use the correct hook.
--- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 23 +++++++++-------------- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- security/security.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +9 -14
@@ -2304,11 +2304,11 @@ nfsd4_encode_layout_types(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 layout_types)#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL static inline __be32 nfsd4_encode_security_label (struct xdr_stream *xdr,struct svc_rqst *rqstp, -void *context,int len) +struct lsmcontext *context) {__be32 *p; - p =xdr_reserve_space (xdr, len +4 +4 +4 ); + p =xdr_reserve_space (xdr, context->len +4 +4 +4 );if (!p)return nfserr_resource;
@@ -2318,13 +2318,13 @@ nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,*/ *p++ =cpu_to_be32 (0 );/* lfs */ *p++ =cpu_to_be32 (0 );/* pi */ - p =xdr_encode_opaque (p, context, len); + p =xdr_encode_opaque (p, context->context, context->len); return 0; }#else static inline __be32 nfsd4_encode_security_label (struct xdr_stream *xdr,struct svc_rqst *rqstp, -void *context,int len) +struct lsmcontext *context) {return 0 ; }#endif
@@ -2421,9 +2421,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,int err;struct nfs4_acl *acl =NULL ;#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ -void *context =NULL ; -int contextlen; +struct lsmcontext context = { };#endif bool contextsupport = false;struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
@@ -2481,7 +2479,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp, bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {if (exp->ex_flags &NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL ) err =security_inode_getsecctx (d_inode (dentry), - &context, &contextlen); + &context);else err = -EOPNOTSUPP ; contextsupport = (err ==0 );
@@ -2911,8 +2909,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL if (bmval2 &FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL ) { - status =nfsd4_encode_security_label (xdr, rqstp, context, - contextlen); + status =nfsd4_encode_security_label (xdr, rqstp, &context);if (status) goto out; }
@@ -2924,10 +2921,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp, out:#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL -if (context) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, context, contextlen,0 );/*scaffolding*/ -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +if (context.context) +security_release_secctx (&context);#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */ kfree (acl);if (tempfh) {
include/linux/security.h +3 -2
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);void security_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode);int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);int security_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen); -int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen); +int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsmcontext *cp);int security_locked_down (enum lockdown_reason what);#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
@@ -1359,7 +1359,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } -static inline int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen) +static inline int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode, +struct lsmcontext *cp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
security/security.c +11 -2
@@ -2179,9 +2179,18 @@ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_setsecctx); -int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen) +int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsmcontext *cp) { -return call_int_hook (inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , inode, ctx, ctxlen); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +memset (cp,0 ,sizeof (*cp)); + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list) { + cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot; +return hp->hook.inode_getsecctx (inode, (void **)&cp->context, + &cp->len); + } +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_getsecctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 17/23 LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange netlink netfilter interfaces to use lsmcontext pointers, and remove scaffolding.
--- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 32 +++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +13 -19
@@ -301,12 +301,10 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)return -1 ; } -static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (struct sk_buff *skb,char **secdata) +static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (struct sk_buff *skb,struct lsmcontext *context) { -u32 seclen =0 ;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK )struct lsmblob blob; -struct lsmcontext context = { };if (!skb || !sk_fullsock (skb->sk))return 0 ;
@@ -314,15 +312,16 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)read_lock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);if (skb->secmark) { +/* Any LSM might be looking for the secmark */ lsmblob_init (&blob, skb->secmark); -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); - *secdata = context.context; +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, context); }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); - seclen = context.len; +return context->len; +#else +return 0 ;#endif -return seclen; }static u32 nfqnl_get_bridge_size (struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
@@ -398,8 +397,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var (ctinfo );struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;bool csum_verify; -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ -char *secdata =NULL ; +struct lsmcontext context = { };u32 seclen =0 ; size =nlmsg_total_size (sizeof (struct nfgenmsg ))
@@ -466,7 +464,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, }if ((queue->flags &NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX ) && entskb->sk) { - seclen =nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (entskb, &secdata); + seclen =nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (entskb, &context);if (seclen) size +=nla_total_size (seclen); }
@@ -601,7 +599,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(skb, entskb->sk) < 0) goto nla_put_failure; -if (seclen &&nla_put (skb,NFQA_SECCTX , seclen, secdata)) +if (seclen &&nla_put (skb,NFQA_SECCTX , context.len, context.context)) goto nla_put_failure;if (ct && nfnl_ct->build (skb, ct, ctinfo,NFQA_CT ,NFQA_CT_INFO ) <0 )
@@ -629,10 +627,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, } nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len; -if (seclen) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secdata, seclen,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +if (seclen) +security_release_secctx (&context);return skb; nla_put_failure:
@@ -640,10 +636,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,kfree_skb (skb);net_err_ratelimited ("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n" ); nlmsg_failure: -if (seclen) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secdata, seclen,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +if (seclen) +security_release_secctx (&context);return NULL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 18/23 NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
In reply to Casey SchauflerNetlabel uses LSM interfaces requiring an lsmblob and the internal storage is used to pass information between these interfaces, so change the internal data from a secid to a lsmblob. Update the netlabel interfaces and their callers to accommodate the change. This requires that the modules using netlabel use the lsm_id.slot to access the correct secid when using netlabel.
--- include/net/netlabel.h | 8 ++-- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 23 +++++++----- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 57 +++++++++++------------------ net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +- security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 + security/selinux/netlabel.c | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +- security/smack/smack.h | 1 + security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 ++- security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 +++-- 12 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
include/net/netlabel.h +4 -4
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {* @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label * @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap * @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level -* @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token +* @attr.lsmblob: LSM specific data * * Description: * This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;u32 lvl; } mls; -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob lsmblob; } attr; };
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u16 family, - u32 secid, + struct lsmblob *lsmblob, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info); int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net, const char *dev_name,
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u16 family, - u32 secid, + struct lsmblob *lsmblob, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { return -ENOSYS;
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c +13 -10
@@ -106,15 +106,17 @@ int cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid = 1;/* Base length of the local tag (non-standard tag). * Tag definition (may change between kernel versions) * -* 0 8 16 24 32 -* +----------+----------+----------+----------+ -* | 10000000 | 00000110 | 32-bit secid value | -* +----------+----------+----------+----------+ -* | in (host byte order)| -* +----------+----------+ -* +* 0 8 16 16 + sizeof(struct lsmblob) +* +----------+----------+---------------------+ +* | 10000000 | 00000110 | LSM blob data | +* +----------+----------+---------------------+ +* +* All secid and flag fields are in host byte order. +* The lsmblob structure size varies depending on which +* Linux security modules are built in the kernel. +* The data is opaque. */ -#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN 6 +#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN (2 + sizeof(struct lsmblob))/* * Helper Functions
@@ -1467,7 +1469,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def, buffer[0 ] =CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL ; buffer[1 ] =CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN ; - *(u32 *)&buffer[2 ] = secattr->attr.secid; +memcpy (&buffer[2 ], &secattr->attr.lsmblob, +sizeof (secattr->attr.lsmblob));return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN ; }
@@ -1487,7 +1490,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,const unsigned char *tag, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { - secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2]; + memcpy(&secattr->attr.lsmblob, &tag[2], sizeof(secattr->attr.lsmblob)); secattr->flags |=NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ;return 0 ;
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c +3 -3
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,* @addr: IP address in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr) * @mask: address mask in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr) * @family: address family -* @secid: LSM secid value for the entry +* @lsmblob: LSM data value for the entry * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information * * Description:
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u16 family, - u32 secid, + struct lsmblob *lsmblob, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { u32 addr_len;
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,return netlbl_unlhsh_add (net, dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, - secid, audit_info); + lsmblob, audit_info); }/**
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +22 -35
207 lines not on this page · raw message
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h +1 -1
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u32 addr_len, - u32 secid, + struct lsmblob *lsmblob, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info); int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net, const char *dev_name,
security/selinux/hooks.c +1 -1
@@ -6871,7 +6871,7 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) }#endif -static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { +struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lsm ="selinux" , .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
security/selinux/include/security.h +1 -0
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@struct netlbl_lsm_secattr ;extern int selinux_enabled; +extern struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid;/* Policy capabilities */ enum {
security/selinux/netlabel.c +1 -1
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(return NULL ;if ((secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ) && - (secattr->attr.secid == sid)) + (secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] == sid))return secattr;return NULL ;
security/selinux/ss/services.c +2 -2
@@ -3599,7 +3599,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,if (secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE ) *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;else if (secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ) - *sid = secattr->attr.secid; + *sid = secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot];else if (secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL ) { rc = -EIDRM ; ctx =sidtab_search (sidtab,SECINITSID_NETMSG );
@@ -3672,7 +3672,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,if (secattr->domain ==NULL ) goto out; - secattr->attr.secid = sid; + secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] = sid; secattr->flags |=NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY |NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ;mls_export_netlbl_lvl (policydb, ctx, secattr); rc =mls_export_netlbl_cat (policydb, ctx, secattr);
security/smack/smack.h +1 -0
@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list);* Shared data. */ extern int smack_enabled; +extern struct lsm_id smack_lsmid;extern int smack_cipso_direct;extern int smack_cipso_mapped;extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +3 -2
@@ -3775,7 +3775,8 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,/* * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid. */ -return smack_from_secid (sap->attr.secid); +return smack_from_secid ( + sap->attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot]);/* * Without guidance regarding the smack value * for the packet fall back on the network
@@ -4592,7 +4593,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack), }; -static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { +struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lsm ="smack" , .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
security/smack/smackfs.c +7 -3
@@ -1122,6 +1122,7 @@ static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr (struct file *file,const char __user *buf,size_t count,loff_t *ppos) { +struct lsmblob lsmblob;struct smk_net4addr *snp;struct sockaddr_in newname;char *smack;
@@ -1253,10 +1254,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,* this host so that incoming packets get labeled. * but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option */ -if (rc ==0 && skp !=NULL ) +if (rc ==0 && skp !=NULL ) { +lsmblob_init (&lsmblob,0 ); + lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = snp->smk_label->smk_secid; rc =netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add (&init_net,NULL , - &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask,PF_INET , - snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info); + &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask,PF_INET , &lsmblob, + &audit_info); + }if (rc ==0 ) rc = count;
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v14 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
Netlabel uses LSM interfaces requiring an lsmblob and the internal storage is used to pass information between these interfaces, so change the internal data from a secid to a lsmblob. Update the netlabel interfaces and their callers to accommodate the change. This requires that the modules using netlabel use the lsm_id.slot to access the correct secid when using netlabel.
Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Similarly, I acked v13 of this patch and didn't see any real change here.
Quoted 508 lines
--- include/net/netlabel.h | 8 ++-- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 23 +++++++----- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 57 +++++++++++------------------ net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +- security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 + security/selinux/netlabel.c | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +- security/smack/smack.h | 1 + security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 ++- security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 +++-- 12 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)include/net/netlabel.h +4
-4@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {* @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label * @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap * @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level -* @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token +* @attr.lsmblob: LSM specific data * * Description: * This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;u32 lvl; } mls; -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob lsmblob; } attr; };@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u16 family, - u32 secid, + struct lsmblob *lsmblob, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info); int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net, const char *dev_name,@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u16 family, - u32 secid, + struct lsmblob *lsmblob, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { return -ENOSYS;net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c +13
-10@@ -106,15 +106,17 @@ int cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid = 1;/* Base length of the local tag (non-standard tag). * Tag definition (may change between kernel versions) * -* 0 8 16 24 32 -* +----------+----------+----------+----------+ -* | 10000000 | 00000110 | 32-bit secid value | -* +----------+----------+----------+----------+ -* | in (host byte order)| -* +----------+----------+ -* +* 0 8 16 16 + sizeof(struct lsmblob) +* +----------+----------+---------------------+ +* | 10000000 | 00000110 | LSM blob data | +* +----------+----------+---------------------+ +* +* All secid and flag fields are in host byte order. +* The lsmblob structure size varies depending on which +* Linux security modules are built in the kernel. +* The data is opaque. */ -#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN 6 +#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN (2 + sizeof(struct lsmblob))/* * Helper Functions @@ -1467,7 +1469,8 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def, buffer[0 ] =CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL ; buffer[1 ] =CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN ; - *(u32 *)&buffer[2 ] = secattr->attr.secid; +memcpy (&buffer[2 ], &secattr->attr.lsmblob, +sizeof (secattr->attr.lsmblob));return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN ; }@@ -1487,7 +1490,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,const unsigned char *tag, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { - secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2]; + memcpy(&secattr->attr.lsmblob, &tag[2], sizeof(secattr->attr.lsmblob)); secattr->flags |=NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ;return 0 ;net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c +3
-3@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,* @addr: IP address in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr) * @mask: address mask in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr) * @family: address family -* @secid: LSM secid value for the entry +* @lsmblob: LSM data value for the entry * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information * * Description: @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u16 family, - u32 secid, + struct lsmblob *lsmblob, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { u32 addr_len;@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,return netlbl_unlhsh_add (net, dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, - secid, audit_info); + lsmblob, audit_info); }/** net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +22
-35@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_tbl {#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry (iter) \ container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4, list)struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 { -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob lsmblob;struct netlbl_af4list list;struct rcu_head rcu;@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 {#define netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry (iter) \ container_of(iter, struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6, list)struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 { -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob lsmblob;struct netlbl_af6list list;struct rcu_head rcu;@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)* @iface: the associated interface entry * @addr: IPv4 address in network byte order * @mask: IPv4 address mask in network byte order -* @secid: LSM secid value for entry +* @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry * * Description: * Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *netlbl_unlhsh_search_iface(int ifindex)static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4 (struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,const struct in_addr *addr,const struct in_addr *mask, -u32 secid) +struct lsmblob *lsmblob) {int ret_val;struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface, entry->list.addr = addr->s_addr & mask->s_addr; entry->list.mask = mask->s_addr; entry->list.valid =1 ; - entry->secid = secid; + entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock); ret_val =netlbl_af4list_add (&entry->list, &iface->addr4_list);@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,* @iface: the associated interface entry * @addr: IPv6 address in network byte order * @mask: IPv6 address mask in network byte order -* @secid: LSM secid value for entry +* @lsmblob: LSM data value for entry * * Description: * Add a new address entry into the unlabeled connection hash table using the @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6 (struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface,const struct in6_addr *addr,const struct in6_addr *mask, -u32 secid) +struct lsmblob *lsmblob) {int ret_val;struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6(struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface, entry->list.addr.s6_addr32[3 ] &= mask->s6_addr32[3 ]; entry->list.mask = *mask; entry->list.valid =1 ; - entry->secid = secid; + entry->lsmblob = *lsmblob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock); ret_val =netlbl_af6list_add (&entry->list, &iface->addr6_list);@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u32 addr_len, - u32 secid, + struct lsmblob *lsmblob, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { int ret_val;@@ -374,7 +374,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf =NULL ;struct lsmcontext context; -struct lsmblob blob;if (addr_len !=sizeof (struct in_addr ) && addr_len !=sizeof (struct in6_addr ))@@ -407,7 +406,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,const struct in_addr *addr4 = addr;const struct in_addr *mask4 = mask; - ret_val =netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4 (iface, addr4, mask4, secid); + ret_val =netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr4 (iface, addr4, mask4, lsmblob);if (audit_buf !=NULL ) netlbl_af4list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1, dev_name,@@ -420,7 +419,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,const struct in6_addr *addr6 = addr;const struct in6_addr *mask6 = mask; - ret_val =netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6 (iface, addr6, mask6, secid); + ret_val =netlbl_unlhsh_add_addr6 (iface, addr6, mask6, lsmblob);if (audit_buf !=NULL ) netlbl_af6list_audit_addr(audit_buf, 1, dev_name,@@ -437,8 +436,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net, unlhsh_add_return:rcu_read_unlock ();if (audit_buf !=NULL ) { -lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);@@ -473,7 +471,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev;struct lsmcontext context; -struct lsmblob blob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock); list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,@@ -493,10 +490,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net, addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev); -if (entry !=NULL ) -lsmblob_init (&blob, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);@@ -537,7 +532,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev;struct lsmcontext context; -struct lsmblob blob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock); list_entry =netlbl_af6list_remove (addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);@@ -556,10 +550,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net, addr, mask);if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev); -if (entry !=NULL ) -lsmblob_init (&blob, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);@@ -913,9 +905,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,if (ret_val !=0 )return ret_val; -/* scaffolding with the [0] */ return netlbl_unlhsh_add (&init_net, - dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0 ], + dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, &blob, &audit_info); }@@ -963,10 +954,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,if (ret_val !=0 )return ret_val; -/* scaffolding with the [0] */ return netlbl_unlhsh_add (&init_net, -NULL , addr, mask, addr_len, blob.secid[0 ], - &audit_info); +NULL , addr, mask, addr_len, &blob, &audit_info); }/** @@ -1078,8 +1067,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,struct net_device *dev;struct lsmcontext context;void *data; -u32 secid; -struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmblob *lsmb; data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid, cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,@@ -1117,7 +1105,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; - secid = addr4->secid; + lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr4->lsmblob; }else { ret_val = nla_put_in6_addr(cb_arg->skb, NLBL_UNLABEL_A_IPV6ADDR,@@ -1131,11 +1119,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; - secid = addr6->secid; + lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob; } -lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); - ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmb, &context);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,@@ -1487,7 +1474,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb, &iface->addr4_list);if (addr4 ==NULL ) goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel; - secattr->attr.secid =netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry (addr4)->secid; + secattr->attr.lsmblob =netlbl_unlhsh_addr4_entry (addr4)->lsmblob;break ; }#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IPV6 )@@ -1500,7 +1487,7 @@ int netlbl_unlabel_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb, &iface->addr6_list);if (addr6 ==NULL ) goto unlabel_getattr_nolabel; - secattr->attr.secid =netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry (addr6)->secid; + secattr->attr.lsmblob =netlbl_unlhsh_addr6_entry (addr6)->lsmblob; break; }#endif /* IPv6 */ net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h +1
-1@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u32 addr_len, - u32 secid, + struct lsmblob *lsmblob, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info); int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net, const char *dev_name,security/selinux/hooks.c +1
-1@@ -6871,7 +6871,7 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) }#endif -static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { +struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lsm ="selinux" , .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED };security/selinux/include/security.h +1
-0@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@struct netlbl_lsm_secattr ;extern int selinux_enabled; +extern struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid;/* Policy capabilities */ enum {security/selinux/netlabel.c +1
-1@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(return NULL ;if ((secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ) && - (secattr->attr.secid == sid)) + (secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] == sid))return secattr;return NULL ;security/selinux/ss/services.c +2
-2@@ -3599,7 +3599,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,if (secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE ) *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;else if (secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ) - *sid = secattr->attr.secid; + *sid = secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot];else if (secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL ) { rc = -EIDRM ; ctx =sidtab_search (sidtab,SECINITSID_NETMSG );@@ -3672,7 +3672,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,if (secattr->domain ==NULL ) goto out; - secattr->attr.secid = sid; + secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] = sid; secattr->flags |=NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY |NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ;mls_export_netlbl_lvl (policydb, ctx, secattr); rc =mls_export_netlbl_cat (policydb, ctx, secattr);security/smack/smack.h +1
-0@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list);* Shared data. */ extern int smack_enabled; +extern struct lsm_id smack_lsmid;extern int smack_cipso_direct;extern int smack_cipso_mapped;extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;security/smack/smack_lsm.c +3
-2@@ -3775,7 +3775,8 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,/* * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid. */ -return smack_from_secid (sap->attr.secid); +return smack_from_secid ( + sap->attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot]);/* * Without guidance regarding the smack value * for the packet fall back on the network @@ -4592,7 +4593,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack), }; -static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { +struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lsm ="smack" , .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED };security/smack/smackfs.c +7
-3@@ -1122,6 +1122,7 @@ static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr (struct file *file,const char __user *buf,size_t count,loff_t *ppos) { +struct lsmblob lsmblob;struct smk_net4addr *snp;struct sockaddr_in newname;char *smack;@@ -1253,10 +1254,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,* this host so that incoming packets get labeled. * but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option */ -if (rc ==0 && skp !=NULL ) +if (rc ==0 && skp !=NULL ) { +lsmblob_init (&lsmblob,0 ); + lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = snp->smk_label->smk_secid; rc =netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add (&init_net,NULL , - &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask,PF_INET , - snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info); + &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask,PF_INET , &lsmblob, + &audit_info); + }if (rc ==0 ) rc = count;
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 19/23 LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder
In reply to Casey SchauflerVerify that the tasks on the ends of a binder transaction use the same "display" security module. This prevents confusion of security "contexts".
--- security/security.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
security/security.c +29 -0
@@ -737,9 +737,38 @@ int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)return call_int_hook (binder_set_context_mgr,0 , mgr); } +/** +* security_binder_transaction - Binder driver transaction check +* @from: source of the transaction +* @to: destination of the transaction +* +* Verify that the tasks have the same LSM "display", then +* call the security module hooks. +* +* Returns -EINVAL if the displays don't match, or the +* result of the security module checks. +*/ int security_binder_transaction (struct task_struct *from,struct task_struct *to) { +int from_display =lsm_task_display (from); +int to_display =lsm_task_display (to); + +/* +* If the display is LSMBLOB_INVALID the first module that has +* an entry is used. This will be in the 0 slot. +* +* This is currently only required if the server has requested +* peer contexts, but it would be unwieldly to have too much of +* the binder driver detail here. +*/ +if (from_display ==LSMBLOB_INVALID ) + from_display =0 ; +if (to_display ==LSMBLOB_INVALID ) + to_display =0 ; +if (from_display != to_display) +return -EINVAL ; +return call_int_hook (binder_transaction,0 , from, to); }
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 20/23 Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary
In reply to Casey SchauflerAdd record entries to identify subject data for all of the security modules when there is more than one.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +- include/linux/audit.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 9 ++++- include/net/scm.h | 3 +- kernel/audit.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++- kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 1 + kernel/auditfilter.c | 1 + kernel/auditsc.c | 10 +++-- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 11 ++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 + net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 1 + security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 1 + security/security.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- 19 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +1 -1
@@ -3107,7 +3107,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,size_t added_size;security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &blob); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ; return_error_param = ret;
include/linux/audit.h +1 -0
@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type,extern void audit_log_lost (const char *message);extern int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab); +extern void audit_log_task_lsms (struct audit_buffer *ab);extern void audit_log_task_info (struct audit_buffer *ab);extern int audit_update_lsm_rules (void );
include/linux/security.h +7 -2
@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ struct lsmblob {#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1/* Not a valid LSM slot number */ #define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2/* Slot requested on initialization */ #define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3/* Slot not requested */ +#define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4/* Use the "display" slot */ +#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5/* Use the default "display" slot */ /** * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
@@ -217,6 +219,8 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)return !memcmp (bloba, blobb,sizeof (*bloba)); } +const char *security_lsm_slot_name (int slot); +/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable (const struct cred *cred,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,unsigned int opts);
@@ -526,7 +530,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, size_t size);int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name); -int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp); +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp, +int display);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1331,7 +1336,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob, -struct lsmcontext *cp) +struct lsmcontext *cp,int display) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
include/net/scm.h +2 -1
@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scint err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &context); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (!err) { put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
kernel/audit.c +38 -2
@@ -392,6 +392,7 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, u32 new, u32 old,if (rc) allow_changes =0 ;/* Something weird, deny request */ audit_log_format (ab," res=%d" , allow_changes); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab);return rc; }
@@ -1097,6 +1098,7 @@ static void audit_log_feature_change(int which, u32 old_feature, u32 new_featureaudit_log_format (ab," feature=%s old=%u new=%u old_lock=%u new_lock=%u res=%d" , audit_feature_names[which], !!old_feature, !!new_feature, !!old_lock, !!new_lock, res); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
@@ -1346,6 +1348,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) size--;audit_log_n_untrustedstring (ab, data, size); } +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }break ;
@@ -1360,6 +1363,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) msg_type ==AUDIT_ADD_RULE ?"add_rule" :"remove_rule" , audit_enabled); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab);return -EPERM ; }
@@ -1373,6 +1377,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)audit_log_common_recv_msg (audit_context (), &ab,AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE );audit_log_format (ab," op=trim res=1" ); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab);break ;case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV : {
@@ -1408,6 +1413,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)audit_log_format (ab," new=" );audit_log_untrustedstring (ab, new);audit_log_format (ab," res=%d" , !err); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab);kfree (old);kfree (new);
@@ -1416,7 +1422,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO :if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, - &context); + &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST );if (err)return err; }
@@ -1475,6 +1481,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)" old-log_passwd=%d new-log_passwd=%d res=%d" , old.enabled, s.enabled, old.log_passwd, s.log_passwd, !err); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab);break ; }
@@ -2053,6 +2060,33 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)audit_log_format (ab,"(null)" ); } +void audit_log_task_lsms (struct audit_buffer *ab) +{ +int i; +const char *lsm; +struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context; + +/* +* Don't do anything unless there is more than one LSM +* with a security context to report. +*/ +if (security_lsm_slot_name (1 ) ==NULL ) +return ; + +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) { + lsm =security_lsm_slot_name (i); +if (lsm ==NULL ) +break ; +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context, i)) +continue ; +audit_log_format (ab," subj_%s=%s" , lsm, context.context); +security_release_secctx (&context); + } +} +int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab) {int error;
@@ -2063,7 +2097,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))return 0 ; - error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST );if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL ) goto error_path;
@@ -2171,6 +2205,7 @@ void audit_log_path_denied(int type, const char *operation)audit_log_format (ab,"op=%s" , operation);audit_log_task_info (ab);audit_log_format (ab," res=0" ); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
@@ -2221,6 +2256,7 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid, oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ?tty_name (tty) :"(none)" , oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);audit_put_tty (tty); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
kernel/audit_fsnotify.c +1 -0
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ static void audit_mark_log_rule_change(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark, caudit_log_untrustedstring (ab, audit_mark->path);audit_log_key (ab, rule->filterkey);audit_log_format (ab," list=%d res=1" , rule->listnr); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
kernel/auditfilter.c +1 -0
@@ -1105,6 +1105,7 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int reaudit_log_format (ab," op=%s" , action);audit_log_key (ab, rule->filterkey);audit_log_format (ab," list=%d res=%d" , rule->listnr, res); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
kernel/auditsc.c +7 -3
@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);if (lsmblob_is_set (blob)) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmctx)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmctx,LSMBLOB_FIRST )) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else {
@@ -1218,7 +1218,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)struct lsmblob blob;lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmcxt)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmcxt, +LSMBLOB_FIRST )) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , osid); *call_panic =1 ; }else {
@@ -1370,7 +1371,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,struct lsmcontext lsmctx;lsmblob_init (&blob, n->osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx,LSMBLOB_FIRST )) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , n->osid);if (call_panic) *call_panic =2 ;
@@ -1479,6 +1480,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)audit_log_task_info (ab);audit_log_key (ab, context->filterkey); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab);for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
@@ -2602,6 +2604,7 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)return ;audit_log_task (ab);audit_log_format (ab," sig=%ld res=1" , signr); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
@@ -2628,6 +2631,7 @@ void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)audit_log_format (ab," sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x" , signr,syscall_get_arch (current), syscall,in_compat_syscall (),KSTK_EIP (current), code); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +1 -1
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)if (err)return ; - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &context); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (err)return ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +2 -2
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret)return 0 ;
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret)return 0 ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +1 -1
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret)return ;
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +1 -1
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)if (skb->secmark) {/* Any LSM might be looking for the secmark */ lsmblob_init (&blob, skb->secmark); -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, context); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY ); }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +7 -4
@@ -436,7 +436,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net, unlhsh_add_return:rcu_read_unlock ();if (audit_buf !=NULL ) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);
@@ -491,7 +492,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);
@@ -551,7 +553,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);
@@ -1122,7 +1125,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd, lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob; } - ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmb, &context); + ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmb, &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST );if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +1 -1
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_info->secid);if (audit_info->secid !=0 && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +2 -0
@@ -4206,6 +4206,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_policy_add(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result, bool task_valid)xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo (task_valid, audit_buf);audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , result);xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo (xp, audit_buf); +audit_log_task_lsms (audit_buf);audit_log_end (audit_buf); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xfrm_audit_policy_add);
@@ -4221,6 +4222,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo (task_valid, audit_buf);audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , result);xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo (xp, audit_buf); +audit_log_task_lsms (audit_buf);audit_log_end (audit_buf); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xfrm_audit_policy_delete);
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +2 -0
@@ -2642,6 +2642,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_state_add(struct xfrm_state *x, int result, bool task_valid)xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo (task_valid, audit_buf);xfrm_audit_helper_sainfo (x, audit_buf);audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , result); +audit_log_task_lsms (audit_buf);audit_log_end (audit_buf); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xfrm_audit_state_add);
@@ -2656,6 +2657,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x, int result, bool task_valid)xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo (task_valid, audit_buf);xfrm_audit_helper_sainfo (x, audit_buf);audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , result); +audit_log_task_lsms (audit_buf);audit_log_end (audit_buf); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xfrm_audit_state_delete);
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +1 -0
@@ -363,6 +363,7 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,audit_log_format (ab," hash=\"%s:%s\"" , algo_name, hash);audit_log_task_info (ab); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); iint->flags |=IMA_AUDITED ;
security/integrity/integrity_audit.c +1 -0
@@ -54,5 +54,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,audit_log_format (ab," ino=%lu" , inode->i_ino); }audit_log_format (ab," res=%d" , !result); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
security/security.c +47 -4
74 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 21/23 Audit: Include object data for all security modules
In reply to Casey SchauflerWhen there is more than one context displaying security module extend what goes into the audit record by supplimenting the "obj=" with an "obj_<lsm>=" for each such security module.
--- kernel/audit.h | 4 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
kernel/audit.h +2 -2
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ struct audit_names {kuid_t uid;kgid_t gid;dev_t rdev; -u32 osid; +struct lsmblob oblob;struct audit_cap_data fcap;unsigned int fcap_ver;unsigned char type;/* record type */
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ struct audit_context {kuid_t uid;kgid_t gid;umode_t mode; -u32 osid; +struct lsmblob oblob;int has_perm;uid_t perm_uid;gid_t perm_gid;
kernel/auditsc.c +54 -52
181 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 22/23 LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
In reply to Casey SchauflerAdd an entry /proc/.../attr/context which displays the full process security "context" in compound format:'
lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
This entry is not writable.
--- Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 14 ++++++++ fs/proc/base.c | 1 + security/security.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 78 insertions(+)
Documentation/security/lsm.rst +14 -0
@@ -199,3 +199,17 @@ capability-related fields: - ``fs/nfsd/auth.c``::c:func:`nfsd_setuser()` - ``fs/proc/array.c``::c:func:`task_cap()` + +LSM External Interfaces +======================= + +The LSM infrastructure does not generally provide external interfaces. +The individual security modules provide what external interfaces they +require. The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special +case where multiple security modules provide a process context. This +is provided in compound context format. + +- `lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0` + +The special file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security +context of the identified process.
fs/proc/base.c +1 -0
@@ -2653,6 +2653,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {ATTR (NULL ,"keycreate" ,0666 ),ATTR (NULL ,"sockcreate" ,0666 ),ATTR (NULL ,"display" ,0666 ), +ATTR (NULL ,"context" ,0666 ), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACKDIR ("smack" ,0555 , proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
security/security.c +63 -0
81 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 7 lines · Casey Schaufler
Add an entry
/proc/.../attr/contextwhich displays the full process security "context" in compound format:'lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...This entry is not writable.
Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
As previously discussed, there are issues with AppArmor's implementation of getprocattr() particularly around the trailing newline that dbus-daemon and perhaps others would like to see go away in any new interface. Hence, I don't think we should implement this new API using the existing getprocattr() hook lest it also be locked into the current behavior forever.
Quoted 129 lines
--- Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 14 ++++++++ fs/proc/base.c | 1 + security/security.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 78 insertions(+)Documentation/security/lsm.rst +14
-0@@ -199,3 +199,17 @@ capability-related fields: - ``fs/nfsd/auth.c``::c:func:`nfsd_setuser()` - ``fs/proc/array.c``::c:func:`task_cap()` + +LSM External Interfaces +======================= + +The LSM infrastructure does not generally provide external interfaces. +The individual security modules provide what external interfaces they +require. The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special +case where multiple security modules provide a process context. This +is provided in compound context format. + +- `lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0` + +The special file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security +context of the identified process.fs/proc/base.c +1
-0@@ -2653,6 +2653,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {ATTR (NULL ,"keycreate" ,0666 ),ATTR (NULL ,"sockcreate" ,0666 ),ATTR (NULL ,"display" ,0666 ), +ATTR (NULL ,"context" ,0666 ), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACKDIR ("smack" ,0555 , proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),security/security.c +63
-0@@ -722,6 +722,42 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)panic ("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n" , __func__); } +/** +* append_ctx - append a lsm/context pair to a compound context +* @ctx: the existing compound context +* @ctxlen: size of the old context, including terminating nul byte +* @lsm: new lsm name, nul terminated +* @new: new context, possibly nul terminated +* @newlen: maximum size of @new +* +* replace @ctx with a new compound context, appending @newlsm and @new +* to @ctx. On exit the new data replaces the old, which is freed. +* @ctxlen is set to the new size, which includes a trailing nul byte. +* +* Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM if no memory is available. +*/ +static int append_ctx (char **ctx,int *ctxlen,const char *lsm,char *new, +int newlen) +{ +char *final; +int llen; + + llen =strlen (lsm) +1 ; + newlen =strnlen (new, newlen) +1 ; + + final =kzalloc (*ctxlen + llen + newlen,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (final ==NULL ) +return -ENOMEM ; +if (*ctxlen) +memcpy (final, *ctx, *ctxlen); +memcpy (final + *ctxlen, lsm, llen); +memcpy (final + *ctxlen + llen, new, newlen); +kfree (*ctx); + *ctx = final; + *ctxlen = *ctxlen + llen + newlen; +return 0 ; +} +/* * Hook list operation macros. * @@ -2041,6 +2077,10 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, char **value) {struct security_hook_list *hp; +char *final =NULL ; +char *cp; +int rc =0 ; +int finallen =0 ;int display =lsm_task_display (current);int slot =0 ;@@ -2068,6 +2108,29 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,return -ENOMEM ; } +if (!strcmp (name,"context" )) { +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, + list) { + rc = hp->hook.getprocattr (p,"current" , &cp); +if (rc == -EINVAL || rc == -ENOPROTOOPT ) +continue ; +if (rc <0 ) { +kfree (final); +return rc; + } + rc =append_ctx (&final, &finallen, hp->lsmid->lsm, + cp, rc); +if (rc <0 ) { +kfree (final); +return rc; + } + } +if (final ==NULL ) +return -EINVAL ; + *value = final; +return finallen; + } +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {if (lsm !=NULL &&strcmp (lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))continue ;
Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 10 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 7 lines · Casey Schaufler
Add an entry
/proc/.../attr/contextwhich displays the full process security "context" in compound format:' lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
This entry is not writable.Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>As previously discussed, there are issues with AppArmor's implementation of
getprocattr()particularly around the trailing newline that dbus-daemon and perhaps others would like to see go away in any new interface. Hence, I don't think we should implement this new API using the existinggetprocattr()hook lest it also be locked into the current behavior forever.
Also, it would be good if whatever hook is introduced to support /proc/pid/attr/context could also be leveraged by the SO_PEERCONTEXT implementation in the future so that we are guaranteed a consistent result between the two interfaces, unlike the current situation for /proc/self/attr/current versus SO_PEERSEC.
Quoted 131 lines
Quoted 130 lines
---
Documentation/security/lsm.rst| 14 ++++++++ fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
security/security.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++3 files changed, 78 insertions(+)Documentation/security/lsm.rst +0
-0@@ -199,3 +199,17 @@ capability-related fields:- ``fs/nfsd/auth.c``::c:func:
nfsd_setuser()
- ``fs/proc/array.c``::c:func:task_cap()Documentation/security/lsm.rst +14
-0+ +LSM External Interfaces +======================= + +The LSM infrastructure does not generally provide external interfaces. +The individual security modules provide what external interfaces they +require. The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special +case where multiple security modules provide a process context. This +is provided in compound context format. + +- `lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0` + +The special file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security +context of the identified process.fs/proc/base.c +1
-0@@ -2653,6 +2653,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666), ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666), ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666), + ATTR(NULL, "context", 0666), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK DIR("smack", 0555, proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),security/security.c +36
-0@@ -722,6 +722,42 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__); } +/** +* append_ctx - append a lsm/context pair to a compound context +* @ctx: the existing compound context +* @ctxlen: size of the old context, including terminating nul byte +* @lsm: new lsm name, nul terminated +* @new: new context, possibly nul terminated +* @newlen: maximum size of @new +* +* replace @ctx with a new compound context, appending @newlsm and @new +* to @ctx. On exit the new data replaces the old, which is freed. +* @ctxlen is set to the new size, which includes a trailing nul byte. +* +* Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM if no memory is available. +*/ +static int append_ctx (char **ctx,int *ctxlen,const char *lsm,char *new, + int newlen) +{ + char *final; + int llen; + + llen = strlen(lsm) + 1; + newlen = strnlen(new, newlen) + 1; + + final = kzalloc(*ctxlen + llen + newlen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (final == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + if (*ctxlen) + memcpy(final, *ctx, *ctxlen); + memcpy(final + *ctxlen, lsm, llen); + memcpy(final + *ctxlen + llen, new, newlen); + kfree(*ctx); + *ctx = final; + *ctxlen = *ctxlen + llen + newlen; + return 0; +} + /** Hook list operation macros. *
security/security.c +27
-0@@ -2041,6 +2077,10 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, char **value) { struct security_hook_list *hp; + char *final = NULL; + char *cp; + int rc = 0; + int finallen = 0; int display = lsm_task_display(current); int slot = 0;@@ -2068,6 +2108,29 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, return -ENOMEM; } + if (!strcmp(name, "context")) { + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, + list) { + rc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "current", &cp); + if (rc == -EINVAL || rc == -ENOPROTOOPT) + continue; + if (rc < 0) { + kfree(final); + return rc; + } + rc = append_ctx(&final, &finallen, hp->lsmid->lsm, + cp, rc); + if (rc < 0) { + kfree(final); + return rc; + } + } + if (final == NULL) + return -EINVAL; + *value = final; + return finallen; + } + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm)) continue;
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 7 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines · Casey Schaufler
Add an entry
/proc/.../attr/contextwhich displays the full process security "context" in compound format:' lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
This entry is not writable.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>As previously discussed, there are issues with AppArmor's implementation of
getprocattr()particularly around the trailing newline that dbus-daemon and perhaps others would like to see go away in any new interface. Hence, I don't think we should implement this new API using the existinggetprocattr()hook lest it also be locked into the current behavior forever.Also, it would be good if whatever hook is introduced to support
/proc/pid/attr/contextcould also be leveraged by theSO_PEERCONTEXTimplementation in the future so that we are guaranteed a consistent result between the two interfaces, unlike the current situation for/proc/self/attr/currentversusSO_PEERSEC.
I don't believe that a new hook is necessary, and that introducing one just to deal with a '\n' would be pedantic. We really have two rational options. AppArmor could drop the '\n' from their "context". Or, we can simply document that the /proc/pid/attr/context interface will trim any trailing whitespace. I understand that this would be a break from the notion that the LSM infrastructure does not constrain what a module uses for its own data. On the other hand, we have been saying that "context"s are strings, and ignoring trailing whitespace is usual behavior for strings.
Quoted 129 lines
Quoted 128 lines
Quoted 127 lines
---
Documentation/security/lsm.rst| 14 ++++++++ fs/proc/base.c | 1 +
security/security.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++3 files changed, 78 insertions(+)Documentation/security/lsm.rst +0
-0@@ -199,3 +199,17 @@ capability-related fields:- ``fs/nfsd/auth.c``::c:func:
nfsd_setuser()
- ``fs/proc/array.c``::c:func:task_cap()Documentation/security/lsm.rst +14
-0+ +LSM External Interfaces +======================= + +The LSM infrastructure does not generally provide external interfaces. +The individual security modules provide what external interfaces they +require. The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special +case where multiple security modules provide a process context. This +is provided in compound context format. + +- `lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0` + +The special file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security +context of the identified process.fs/proc/base.c +1
-0@@ -2653,6 +2653,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = { ATTR(NULL, "keycreate", 0666), ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate", 0666), ATTR(NULL, "display", 0666), + ATTR(NULL, "context", 0666), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK DIR("smack", 0555, proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),security/security.c +63
-0@@ -722,6 +722,42 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__); } +/** +* append_ctx - append a lsm/context pair to a compound context +* @ctx: the existing compound context +* @ctxlen: size of the old context, including terminating nul byte +* @lsm: new lsm name, nul terminated +* @new: new context, possibly nul terminated +* @newlen: maximum size of @new +* +* replace @ctx with a new compound context, appending @newlsm and @new +* to @ctx. On exit the new data replaces the old, which is freed. +* @ctxlen is set to the new size, which includes a trailing nul byte. +* +* Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM if no memory is available. +*/ +static int append_ctx (char **ctx,int *ctxlen,const char *lsm,char *new, + int newlen) +{ + char *final; + int llen; + + llen = strlen(lsm) + 1; + newlen = strnlen(new, newlen) + 1; + + final = kzalloc(*ctxlen + llen + newlen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (final == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + if (*ctxlen) + memcpy(final, *ctx, *ctxlen); + memcpy(final + *ctxlen, lsm, llen); + memcpy(final + *ctxlen + llen, new, newlen); + kfree(*ctx); + *ctx = final; + *ctxlen = *ctxlen + llen + newlen; + return 0; +} + /** Hook list operation macros. * @@ -2041,6 +2077,10 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, char **value) { struct security_hook_list *hp; + char *final = NULL; + char *cp; + int rc = 0; + int finallen = 0; int display = lsm_task_display(current); int slot = 0;@@ -2068,6 +2108,29 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name, return -ENOMEM; } + if (!strcmp(name, "context")) { + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, + list) { + rc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "current", &cp); + if (rc == -EINVAL || rc == -ENOPROTOOPT) + continue; + if (rc < 0) { + kfree(final); + return rc; + } + rc = append_ctx(&final, &finallen, hp->lsmid->lsm, + cp, rc); + if (rc < 0) { + kfree(final); + return rc; + } + } + if (final == NULL) + return -EINVAL; + *value = final; + return finallen; + } + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm)) continue;
Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 15 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 7 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines · Casey Schaufler
Add an entry
/proc/.../attr/contextwhich displays the full process security "context" in compound format:'
lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
This entry is not writable.Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>As previously discussed, there are issues with AppArmor's implementation of
getprocattr()particularly around the trailing newline that dbus-daemon and perhaps others would like to see go away in any new interface. Hence, I don't think we should implement this new API using the existinggetprocattr()hook lest it also be locked into the current behavior forever.Also, it would be good if whatever hook is introduced to support
/proc/pid/attr/contextcould also be leveraged by theSO_PEERCONTEXTimplementation in the future so that we are guaranteed a consistent result between the two interfaces, unlike the current situation for/proc/self/attr/currentversusSO_PEERSEC.
Quoted 9 lines
I don't believe that a new hook is necessary, and that introducing one just to deal with a '\n' would be pedantic. We really have two rational options. AppArmor could drop the '\n' from their "context". Or, we can simply document that the
/proc/pid/attr/contextinterface will trim any trailing whitespace. I understand that this would be a break from the notion that the LSM infrastructure does not constrain what a module uses for its own data. On the other hand, we have been saying that "context"s are strings, and ignoring trailing whitespace is usual behavior for strings.
Well, you can either introduce a new common underlying hook for use by /proc/pid/attr/context and SO_PEERCONTEXT to produce the string that is to be returned to userspace (in order to guarantee consistency in format and allowing them to be directly compared, which I think is what the dbus maintainers wanted), or you can modify every security module to provide that guarantee in its existing getprocattr and getpeersec* hook functions (SELinux already provides this guarantee; Smack and AppArmor produce slightly different results with respect to \0 and/or \n), or you can have the framework trim the values it gets from the security modules before composing them. But you need to do one of those things before this interface gets merged upstream.
Aside from the trailing newline and \0 issues, AppArmor also has a whitespace-separated (mode) field that may or may not be present in the contexts it presently returns, ala "/usr/sbin/cupsd (enforce)". Not sure what they want for the new interfaces.
Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 3 lines · Stephen Smalley
Aside from the trailing newline and \0 issues, AppArmor also has a whitespace-separated (mode) field that may or may not be present in the contexts it presently returns, ala "
/usr/sbin/cupsd(enforce)".
My understanding from last time I worked with AppArmor is that this is genuinely part of the context, and whether it is present or absent does not vary according to the kernel API used to access contexts. AppArmor-specific higher-level APIs parse it into a label and an optional mode, but LSM-agnostic user-space APIs (like the one in dbus) pass the whole string through as-is.
(In practice it seems to be present if and only if the context is something other than "unconfined", although I don't know offhand whether that's an API guarantee.)
smcv
John Johansen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 12 lines · Simon McVittie
Quoted 3 lines · Stephen Smalley
Aside from the trailing newline and \0 issues, AppArmor also has a whitespace-separated (mode) field that may or may not be present in the contexts it presently returns, ala "
/usr/sbin/cupsd(enforce)".My understanding from last time I worked with AppArmor is that this is genuinely part of the context, and whether it is present or absent does not vary according to the kernel API used to access contexts. AppArmor-specific higher-level APIs parse it into a label and an optional mode, but LSM-agnostic user-space APIs (like the one in dbus) pass the whole string through as-is.
Quoted 4 lines
(In practice it seems to be present if and only if the context is something other than "unconfined", although I don't know offhand whether that's an API guarantee.)
Correct, currently it is always included unless the context is unconfined. There is no guarantee that I am aware of beyond that is what the code did in the past and so as to not break things we continue to do exactly that.
The mode certainly does not need to be included in a newer interface.
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
In reply to Stephen SmalleyQuoted 26 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 15 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 7 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines · Casey Schaufler
Add an entry
/proc/.../attr/contextwhich displays the full process security "context" in compound format:' lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
This entry is not writable.Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>As previously discussed, there are issues with AppArmor's implementation of
getprocattr()particularly around the trailing newline that dbus-daemon and perhaps others would like to see go away in any new interface. Hence, I don't think we should implement this new API using the existinggetprocattr()hook lest it also be locked into the current behavior forever.Also, it would be good if whatever hook is introduced to support
/proc/pid/attr/contextcould also be leveraged by theSO_PEERCONTEXTimplementation in the future so that we are guaranteed a consistent result between the two interfaces, unlike the current situation for/proc/self/attr/currentversusSO_PEERSEC.Quoted 9 lines
I don't believe that a new hook is necessary, and that introducing one just to deal with a '\n' would be pedantic. We really have two rational options. AppArmor could drop the '\n' from their "context". Or, we can simply document that the
/proc/pid/attr/contextinterface will trim any trailing whitespace. I understand that this would be a break from the notion that the LSM infrastructure does not constrain what a module uses for its own data. On the other hand, we have been saying that "context"s are strings, and ignoring trailing whitespace is usual behavior for strings.
Quoted 1 line
Well, you can either introduce a new common underlying hook for use by
/proc/pid/attr/contextandSO_PEERCONTEXTto produce the string that is to be returned to userspace (in order to guarantee consistency in format and allowing them to be directly compared, which I think is what the dbus maintainers wanted),
The getprocattr() hooks are already required to provide a nul terminated string.
The behavior of /proc/self/attr/current with regard to trailing whitespace or the terminating nul is left to the security module.
The behavior of /proc/self/attr/context is new, and as such it can be defined to be reasonable and consistent.
Quoted 1 line
or you can modify every security module to provide that guarantee in its existing getprocattr and getpeersec* hook functions (SELinux already provides this guarantee; Smack and AppArmor produce slightly different results with respect to \0 and/or \n), or you can have the framework trim the values it gets from the security modules before composing them.
Changing "every security module" turns out to be trivial, really. The security_getprocattr() interface doesn't change, the getprocattr hooks get a bool argument indicating if newlines are allowed, the AppArmor code changes to check the bool and security_getprocattr() sets to bool specially for the "context" case.
The getpeersec() interface use for SO_PEERCONTEXT isn't any more difficult. The security modules are free to include a terminating nul or not in the existing use case, but a bool can tell them what the behavior must be when we get to that interface.
It's not like there are all that many security modules to bring in line at this point. Establishing sane rules of behavior is overdue. With the current set of new modules sniffing at the door it really is time to tighten these up.
Quoted 3 lines
But you need to do one of those things before this interface gets merged upstream.
Aside from the trailing newline and \0 issues, AppArmor also has a whitespace-separated (mode) field that may or may not be present in the contexts it presently returns, ala "
/usr/sbin/cupsd(enforce)". Not sure what they want for the new interfaces.
Using '\0' as a field terminator addresses that issue. That's a primary motivator.
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
In reply to Stephen SmalleyQuoted 26 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 15 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 7 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines · Casey Schaufler
Add an entry
/proc/.../attr/contextwhich displays the full process security "context" in compound format:' lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
This entry is not writable.Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>As previously discussed, there are issues with AppArmor's implementation of
getprocattr()particularly around the trailing newline that dbus-daemon and perhaps others would like to see go away in any new interface. Hence, I don't think we should implement this new API using the existinggetprocattr()hook lest it also be locked into the current behavior forever.Also, it would be good if whatever hook is introduced to support
/proc/pid/attr/contextcould also be leveraged by theSO_PEERCONTEXTimplementation in the future so that we are guaranteed a consistent result between the two interfaces, unlike the current situation for/proc/self/attr/currentversusSO_PEERSEC.Quoted 9 lines
I don't believe that a new hook is necessary, and that introducing one just to deal with a '\n' would be pedantic. We really have two rational options. AppArmor could drop the '\n' from their "context". Or, we can simply document that the
/proc/pid/attr/contextinterface will trim any trailing whitespace. I understand that this would be a break from the notion that the LSM infrastructure does not constrain what a module uses for its own data. On the other hand, we have been saying that "context"s are strings, and ignoring trailing whitespace is usual behavior for strings.
Quoted 4 lines
Well, you can either introduce a new common underlying hook for use by
/proc/pid/attr/contextandSO_PEERCONTEXTto produce the string that is to be returned to userspace (in order to guarantee consistency in format and allowing them to be directly compared, which I think is what the dbus maintainers wanted), or you can modify every security module to provide that guarantee in its existing getprocattr and getpeersec* hook functions (SELinux already provides this guarantee; Smack and AppArmor produce slightly different results with respect to \0 and/or \n), or you can have the framework trim the values it gets from the security modules before composing them. But you need to do one of those things before this interface gets merged upstream.Aside from the trailing newline and \0 issues, AppArmor also has a whitespace-separated (mode) field that may or may not be present in the contexts it presently returns, ala "
/usr/sbin/cupsd(enforce)". Not sure what they want for the new interfaces.
From c4085435215653b7c4d07a35a9df308120441d79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 13:57:23 -0800
Subject: [PATCH v14] LSM: Move "context" format enforcement into security
modules
Document in lsm_hooks.h what is expected of a security module that supplies the "context" attribute. Add handling of the "context" attribute to SELinux, Smack and AppArmor security modules. The AppArmor implementation provides a different string for "context" than it does for other attributes to conform with the "context" format.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++++ security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 ++++++-- security/apparmor/procattr.c | 11 +++++++---- security/security.c | 2 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +- 7 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +6 -0
@@ -1321,6 +1321,12 @@* @pages contains the number of pages. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * +* @getprocattr: +* Provide the named process attribute for display in special files in +* the /proc/.../attr directory. Attribute naming and the data displayed +* is at the discretion of the security modules. The exception is the +* "context" attribute, which will contain the security context of the +* task as a nul terminated text string without trailing whitespace. * @ismaclabel: * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name * represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC
security/apparmor/include/procattr.h +1 -1
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@#ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H#define __AA_PROCATTR_H -int aa_getprocattr (struct aa_label *label,char **string); +int aa_getprocattr (struct aa_label *label,char **string,bool newline);int aa_setprocattr_changehat (char *args,size_t size,int flags);#endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
security/apparmor/lsm.c +6 -2
@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,const struct cred *cred =get_task_cred (task);struct aa_task_ctx *ctx =task_ctx (current);struct aa_label *label =NULL ; +bool newline = true;if (strcmp (name,"current" ) ==0 ) label =aa_get_newest_label (cred_label (cred));
@@ -600,11 +601,14 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, label =aa_get_newest_label (ctx->previous); else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec) label =aa_get_newest_label (ctx->onexec); - else + else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) { + label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred)); + newline = false; + } else error = -EINVAL; if (label) - error =aa_getprocattr (label, value); + error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, newline); aa_put_label(label); put_cred(cred);
security/apparmor/procattr.c +7 -4
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@* aa_getprocattr - Return the profile information for @profile * @profile: the profile to print profile info about (NOT NULL) * @string: Returns - string containing the profile info (NOT NULL) +* @newline: Should a newline be added to @string. * * Returns: length of @string on success else error on failure *
@@ -30,7 +31,7 @@* * Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure */ -int aa_getprocattr (struct aa_label *label,char **string) +int aa_getprocattr (struct aa_label *label,char **string,bool newline) {struct aa_ns *ns =labels_ns (label);struct aa_ns *current_ns =aa_get_current_ns ();
@@ -60,11 +61,13 @@ int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)return len; } - (*string)[len] ='\n' ; - (*string)[len +1 ] =0 ; +if (newline) { + (*string)[len] ='\n' ; + (*string)[++len] =0 ; + }aa_put_ns (current_ns); -return len +1 ; +return len; }/**
security/security.c +1 -1
@@ -2111,7 +2111,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,if (!strcmp (name,"context" )) {hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { - rc = hp->hook.getprocattr (p,"current" , &cp); + rc = hp->hook.getprocattr (p,"context" , &cp);if (rc == -EINVAL || rc == -ENOPROTOOPT )continue ;if (rc <0 ) {
security/selinux/hooks.c +1 -1
@@ -6281,7 +6281,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, goto bad; } -if (!strcmp (name,"current" )) +if (!strcmp (name,"current" ) || !strcmp (name,"context" )) sid = __tsec->sid;else if (!strcmp (name,"prev" )) sid = __tsec->osid;
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1 -1
@@ -3487,7 +3487,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)char *cp;int slen; -if (strcmp (name,"current" ) !=0 ) +if (strcmp (name,"current" ) !=0 &&strcmp (name,"context" ) !=0 )return -EINVAL ; cp =kstrdup (skp->smk_known,GFP_KERNEL );
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 29 lines · Casey Schaufler
From
c4085435215653b7c4d07a35a9df308120441d79Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2020 13:57:23 -0800
Subject: [PATCH v14] LSM: Move "context" format enforcement into security
modulesDocument in
lsm_hooks.hwhat is expected of a security module that supplies the "context" attribute. Add handling of the "context" attribute to SELinux, Smack and AppArmor security modules. The AppArmor implementation provides a different string for "context" than it does for other attributes to conform with the "context" format.Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++++ security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 ++++++-- security/apparmor/procattr.c | 11 +++++++---- security/security.c | 2 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +- 7 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +0
-0
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h line 1329
Quoted 9 lines
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +6
-0@@ -1321,6 +1321,12 @@* @pages contains the number of pages. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * +* @getprocattr: +* Provide the named process attribute for display in special files in +* the /proc/.../attr directory. Attribute naming and the data displayed +* is at the discretion of the security modules. The exception is the +* "context" attribute, which will contain the security context of the +* task as a nul terminated text string without trailing whitespace.
I'd suggest something like the following instead:
* @getprocattr
* Get the value of process attribute @name for task @p into a buffer * allocated by the security module and returned via @value. The * caller will free the returned buffer via kfree. The set of * attribute names is fixed by proc but the format of @value is up * to the security module authors except for the "context" attribute, * whose value is required to be a NUL-terminated printable ASCII * string without trailing whitespace. * @p the task whose attribute is being fetched * @name the name of the process attribute being fetched * @value set to point to the buffer containing the attribute value * Return the length of @value including the NUL on success, or -errno on error.
The printable ASCII bit is based on what the dbus maintainer requested in previous discussions. The question of whether the terminating NUL should be included in the returned length was otherwise left ambiguous and inconsistent in your patch among the different security modules; if you prefer not including it in the length returned by the security modules, you'll need to adjust SELinux at least to not do so for "context".
Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 14 lines · Stephen Smalley
I'd suggest something like the following instead:
* @getprocattr
* Get the value of process attribute @name for task @p into a buffer * allocated by the security module and returned via @value. The
* caller will free the returned buffer via kfree. The set of
* attribute names is fixed by proc but the format of @value is up * to the security module authors except for the "context" attribute, * whose value is required to be a NUL-terminated printable ASCII
* string without trailing whitespace.
* @p the task whose attribute is being fetched
* @name the name of the process attribute being fetched
* @value set to point to the buffer containing the attribute value * Return the length of @value including the NUL on success, or -errno on error.
Quoted 1 line
The printable ASCII bit is based on what the dbus maintainer requested in previous discussions. The question of whether the terminating NUL should be included in the returned length was otherwise left ambiguous and inconsistent in your patch among the different security modules; if you prefer not including it in the length returned by the security modules, you'll need to adjust SELinux at least to not do so for "context".
BTW, I think the above guarantees with the exception of no trailing whitespace and whether the NUL byte is included or excluded from length are in reality also required for "current" (and SO_PEERSEC) or existing userspace will break.
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 14 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines · Stephen Smalley
I'd suggest something like the following instead:
* @getprocattr
* Get the value of process attribute @name for task @p into a buffer * allocated by the security module and returned via @value. The * caller will free the returned buffer via kfree. The set ofQuoted 8 lines
* attribute names is fixed by proc but the format of @value is up * to the security module authors except for the "context" attribute, * whose value is required to be a NUL-terminated printable ASCII
* string without trailing whitespace.
* @p the task whose attribute is being fetched
* @name the name of the process attribute being fetched
* @value set to point to the buffer containing the attribute value * Return the length of @value including the NUL on success, or -errno on error.
I'm fine with either description, so I'll adopt yours.
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The printable ASCII bit is based on what the dbus maintainer requested in previous discussions. The question of whether the terminating NUL should be included in the returned length was otherwise left ambiguous and inconsistent in your patch among the different security modules; if you prefer not including it in the length returned by the security modules, you'll need to adjust SELinux at least to not do so for "context".
append_ctx() is supposed to take the possibility that the module specific context string may or may not include a trailing '\0' into account. Alas, I see a problem in the current version for the "no trailing '\0'" case. On the other hand, with your proposed description the trailing '\0' is required, so it's a matter of verifying that all modules providing a "context" provide one that includes a trailing '\0' and return strlen()+1.
Quoted 2 lines
BTW, I think the above guarantees with the exception of no trailing whitespace and whether the NUL byte is included or excluded from length are in reality also required for "current" (and
SO_PEERSEC) or existing userspace will break.
The behavior of interfaces (e.g. "current", "exec") that are module defined is only of concern with respect to to "display" behavior. If a security module wants to provide a variable size binary blob in "current" I would object on principle, but policy as I understand it has long been that if the authors want to do that, it's their call. The "context" has a defined format, and it would be up to the authors to come up with a printable ASCII representation of the binary blob. If they care. They're not required to provide a "context".
Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 8 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 1 line · Stephen Smalley
BTW, I think the above guarantees with the exception of no trailing whitespace and whether the NUL byte is included or excluded from length are in reality also required for "current" (and
SO_PEERSEC) or existing userspace will break.The behavior of interfaces (e.g. "current", "exec") that are module defined is only of concern with respect to to "display" behavior. If a security module wants to provide a variable size binary blob in "current" I would object on principle, but policy as I understand it has long been that if the authors want to do that, it's their call.
Doing so would break existing userspace (not just LSM-specific userspace), so I think it would be a deal breaker even for new security modules to move away from those guarantees for "current" at least. procps-ng (and I think procps before it) directly reads /proc/pid/attr/current and truncates at the first unprintable character.
systemd's sd-bus reads /proc/pid/attr/current directly and treats \n,
\r, or \0 byte as terminators and truncated on first occurrence. A variety of userspace code uses the value obtained from /proc/pid/attr/current and/or SO_PEERSEC as something that it can pass to printf-like functions using a %s specifier for inclusion in logs and audit messages.
Quoted 3 lines
The "context" has a defined format, and it would
be up to the authors to come up with a printable ASCII representation of the binary blob. If they care. They're not required to provide a "context".
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 11 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 8 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 1 line · Stephen Smalley
BTW, I think the above guarantees with the exception of no trailing whitespace and whether the NUL byte is included or excluded from length are in reality also required for "current" (and
SO_PEERSEC) or existing userspace will break.The behavior of interfaces (e.g. "current", "exec") that are module defined is only of concern with respect to to "display" behavior. If a security module wants to provide a variable size binary blob in "current" I would object on principle, but policy as I understand it has long been that if the authors want to do that, it's their call.
Doing so would break existing userspace (not just LSM-specific userspace), so I think it would be a deal breaker even for new security modules to move away from those guarantees for "current" at least. procps-ng (and I think procps before it) directly reads
/proc/pid/attr/currentand truncates at the first unprintable character.
An user-space that makes invalid assumptions about an interface can't implicitly define the behavior of that interface. You can't declare that "current" is defined to be a string just because a developer looked at how one security module uses it and coded the application accordingly. You can't declare that "current" will always be a SELinux context. That horse left the barn in 2007, and there are still people writing code assuming that is what they're getting.
If the sub-system maintainer, James Morris, is willing to state that "current" must have a particular format that would be different.
Quoted 1 line
systemd's sd-bus reads
/proc/pid/attr/currentdirectly and treats \n, \r, or \0 byte as terminators and truncated on first occurrence. A variety of userspace code uses the value obtained from/proc/pid/attr/currentand/orSO_PEERSECas something that it can pass to printf-like functions using a %s specifier for inclusion in logs and audit messages.
Yup. And so far no security module has been foolish enough to export a binary blob in a /proc/.../attr interface. That doesn't mean that the interface is defined as a string. It's certainly the convention, but nowhere is it documented as a requirement.
That's why I'm putting in the effort to define the format for "context" and SO_PEERCONTEXT. Interfaces at the LSM level need to be defined so as to allow the underlying security modules to provide the information they want in a way that is unambiguous and application non-hostile. The help I've gotten from you and the rest of the reviewers over the life of this effort has been extremely helpful, if not always easy to swallow.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
The "context" has a defined format, and it would
be up to the authors to come up with a printable ASCII representation of the binary blob. If they care. They're not required to provide a "context".
Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
In reply to Stephen SmalleyQuoted 2 lines · Stephen Smalley
The printable ASCII bit is based on what the dbus maintainer requested in previous discussions.
I thought in previous discussions, we had come to the conclusion that I can't assume it's 7-bit ASCII. (If I *can* assume that for this new API, that's even better.)
To be clear, when I say ASCII I mean a sequence of bytes != '\0' with their high bit unset (x & 0x7f == x) and the obvious mapping to/from Unicode (bytes '\1' to '\x7f' represent codepoints U+0001 to U+007F). Is that the same thing you mean?
I thought the conclusion we had come to in previous conversations was that the LSM context is what GLib calls a "bytestring", the same as filenames and environment variables - an opaque sequence of bytes != '\0', with no further guarantees, and no specified encoding or mapping to/from Unicode (most likely some superset of ASCII like UTF-8 or Latin-1, but nobody knows which one, and they could equally well be some binary encoding with no Unicode meaning, as long as it avoids '\0').
If I can safely assume that a new kernel <-> user-space API is constrained to UTF-8 or a UTF-8 subset like ASCII, then I can provide more friendly APIs for user-space features built over it. If that isn't possible, the next best thing is a "bytestring" like filenames, environment variables, and most kernel <-> user-space strings in general.
smcv
Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 4 lines · Simon McVittie
Quoted 2 lines · Stephen Smalley
The printable ASCII bit is based on what the dbus maintainer requested in previous discussions.
Quoted 8 lines
I thought in previous discussions, we had come to the conclusion that I can't assume it's 7-bit ASCII. (If I *can* assume that for this new API, that's even better.)
To be clear, when I say ASCII I mean a sequence of bytes != '\0' with their high bit unset (x &
0x7f== x) and the obvious mapping to/from Unicode (bytes '\1' to '\x7f' represent codepoints U+0001 to U+007F). Is that the same thing you mean?
I mean the subset of 7-bit ASCII that satisfies isprint() using the "C" locale. That is already true for SELinux with the existing interfaces. I can't necessarily speak for the others.
Quoted 16 lines
I thought the conclusion we had come to in previous conversations was that the LSM context is what GLib calls a "bytestring", the same as filenames and environment variables - an opaque sequence of bytes != '\0', with no further guarantees, and no specified encoding or mapping to/from Unicode (most likely some superset of ASCII like UTF-8 or Latin-1, but nobody knows which one, and they could equally well be some binary encoding with no Unicode meaning, as long as it avoids '\0').
If I can safely assume that a new kernel <-> user-space API is constrained to UTF-8 or a UTF-8 subset like ASCII, then I can provide more friendly APIs for user-space features built over it. If that isn't possible, the next best thing is a "bytestring" like filenames, environment variables, and most kernel <-> user-space strings in general.
smcv
Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 9 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 8 lines · Simon McVittie
Quoted 2 lines · Stephen Smalley
The printable ASCII bit is based on what the dbus maintainer requested in previous discussions.
I thought in previous discussions, we had come to the conclusion that I can't assume it's 7-bit ASCII. (If I *can* assume that for this new API, that's even better.)
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
To be clear, when I say ASCII I mean a sequence of bytes != '\0' with their high bit unset (x &
0x7f== x) and the obvious mapping to/from Unicode (bytes '\1' to '\x7f' represent codepoints U+0001 to U+007F). Is that the same thing you mean?I mean the subset of 7-bit ASCII that satisfies
isprint()using the "C" locale. That is already true for SELinux with the existing interfaces. I can't necessarily speak for the others.
Looks like Smack labels are similarly restricted, per Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Smack.rst. So I guess the only one that is perhaps unclear is AppArmor, since its labels are typically derived from pathnames? Can an AppArmor label returned via its getprocattr() hook be any legal pathname?
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 16 lines
I thought the conclusion we had come to in previous conversations was that the LSM context is what GLib calls a "bytestring", the same as filenames and environment variables - an opaque sequence of bytes != '\0', with no further guarantees, and no specified encoding or mapping to/from Unicode (most likely some superset of ASCII like UTF-8 or Latin-1, but nobody knows which one, and they could equally well be some binary encoding with no Unicode meaning, as long as it avoids '\0').
If I can safely assume that a new kernel <-> user-space API is constrained to UTF-8 or a UTF-8 subset like ASCII, then I can provide more friendly APIs for user-space features built over it. If that isn't possible, the next best thing is a "bytestring" like filenames, environment variables, and most kernel <-> user-space strings in general.
smcv
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 10 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 9 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 8 lines · Simon McVittie
Quoted 2 lines · Stephen Smalley
The printable ASCII bit is based on what the dbus maintainer requested in previous discussions.
I thought in previous discussions, we had come to the conclusion that I can't assume it's 7-bit ASCII. (If I *can* assume that for this new API, that's even better.)
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
To be clear, when I say ASCII I mean a sequence of bytes != '\0' with their high bit unset (x &
0x7f== x) and the obvious mapping to/from Unicode (bytes '\1' to '\x7f' represent codepoints U+0001 to U+007F). Is that the same thing you mean?I mean the subset of 7-bit ASCII that satisfies
isprint()using the "C" locale. That is already true for SELinux with the existing interfaces. I can't necessarily speak for the others.Looks like Smack labels are similarly restricted, per Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Smack.rst. So I guess the only one that is perhaps unclear is AppArmor, since its labels are typically derived from pathnames? Can an AppArmor label returned via its
getprocattr()hook be any legal pathname?
Because attr/context (and later, SO_PEERCONTEXT) are new interfaces there is no need to exactly duplicate what is in attr/current (later SO_PEERSEC). I already plan to omit the "mode" component of the AppArmor data in the AppArmor hook, as was discussed earlier. I would prefer ASCII, but if AppArmor needs bytestrings, that's what we'll have to do.
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 17 lines
I thought the conclusion we had come to in previous conversations was that the LSM context is what GLib calls a "bytestring", the same as filenames and environment variables - an opaque sequence of bytes != '\0', with no further guarantees, and no specified encoding or mapping to/from Unicode (most likely some superset of ASCII like UTF-8 or Latin-1, but nobody knows which one, and they coould equally well be some binary encoding with no Unicode meaning, as long as it avoids '\0').
If I can safely assume that a new kernel <-> user-space API is constrained to UTF-8 or a UTF-8 subset like ASCII, then I can provide more friendly APIs for user-space features built over it. If that isn't possible, the next best thing is a "bytestring" like filenames, environment variables, and most kernel <-> user-space strings in general.
smcv
John Johansen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 18 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 17 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 15 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 4 lines · Simon McVittie
Quoted 2 lines · Stephen Smalley
The printable ASCII bit is based on what the dbus maintainer requested in previous discussions.
Quoted 8 lines
I thought in previous discussions, we had come to the conclusion that I can't assume it's 7-bit ASCII. (If I *can* assume that for this new API, that's even better.)
To be clear, when I say ASCII I mean a sequence of bytes != '\0' with their high bit unset (x &
0x7f== x) and the obvious mapping to/from Unicode (bytes '\1' to '\x7f' represent codepoints U+0001 to U+007F). Is that the same thing you mean?I mean the subset of 7-bit ASCII that satisfies
isprint()using the "C" locale. That is already true for SELinux with the existing interfaces. I can't necessarily speak for the others.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Looks like Smack labels are similarly restricted, per Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Smack.rst. So I guess the only one that is perhaps unclear is AppArmor, since its labels are typically derived from pathnames? Can an AppArmor label returned via its
getprocattr()hook be any legal pathname?Because attr/context (and later,
SO_PEERCONTEXT) are new interfaces there is no need to exactly duplicate what is in attr/current (laterSO_PEERSEC). I already plan to omit the "mode" component of the AppArmor data in the AppArmor hook, as was discussed earlier. I would prefer ASCII, but if AppArmor needs bytestrings, that's what we'll have to do.
sadly, to not break userspace its a byte string because that is what the path based profile names are. AppArmor does support a more limited non path based profile name but I can't guarantee that is what userspace is using in policy.
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Quoted 17 lines
I thought the conclusion we had come to in previous conversations was that the LSM context is what GLib calls a "bytestring", the same as filenames and environment variables - an opaque sequence of bytes != '\0', with no further guarantees, and no specified encoding or mapping to/from Unicode (most likely some superset of ASCII like UTF-8 or Latin-1, but nobody knows which one, and they coould equally well be some binary encoding with no Unicode meaning, as long as it avoids '\0').
If I can safely assume that a new kernel <-> user-space API is constrained to UTF-8 or a UTF-8 subset like ASCII, then I can provide more friendly APIs for user-space features built over it. If that isn't possible, the next best thing is a "bytestring" like filenames, environment variables, and most kernel <-> user-space strings in general.
smcv
Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 10 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 7 lines · Casey Schaufler
Because attr/context (and later,
SO_PEERCONTEXT) are new interfaces there is no need to exactly duplicate what is in attr/current (laterSO_PEERSEC). I already plan to omit the "mode" component of the AppArmor data in the AppArmor hook, as was discussed earlier. I would prefer ASCII, but if AppArmor needs bytestrings, that's what we'll have to do.sadly, to not break userspace its a byte string because that is what the path based profile names are. AppArmor does support a more limited non path based profile name but I can't guarantee that is what userspace is using in policy.
Ok, so /proc/pid/attr/context and SO_PEERCONTEXT have to be defined as returning bytestrings.
So far we've talked about having AppArmor drop the trailing newline, be consistent with regard to whether the terminating NUL is included or excluded, and drop the mode field from what it returns for /proc/pid/attr/context and SO_PEERCONTEXT versus the current /proc/pid/attr/current and SO_PEERSEC. Is that correct?
How do we envision a liblsm processing the value returned from /proc/pid/attr/context or SO_PEEERCONTEXT? It can certainly split it up per LSM. But can it then take the apparmor portion of the context and pass that to existing libapparmor interfaces without breakage? Or will the changes to the format described above create issues there?
John Johansen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 10 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 9 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 7 lines · Casey Schaufler
Because attr/context (and later,
SO_PEERCONTEXT) are new interfaces there is no need to exactly duplicate what is in attr/current (laterSO_PEERSEC). I already plan to omit the "mode" component of the AppArmor data in the AppArmor hook, as was discussed earlier. I would prefer ASCII, but if AppArmor needs bytestrings, that's what we'll have to do.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
sadly, to not break userspace its a byte string because that is what the path based profile names are. AppArmor does support a more limited non path based profile name but I can't guarantee that is what userspace is using in policy.
Ok, so
/proc/pid/attr/contextandSO_PEERCONTEXThave to be defined as returning bytestrings.So far we've talked about having AppArmor drop the trailing newline, be consistent with regard to whether the terminating NUL is included or excluded, and drop the mode field from what it returns for
/proc/pid/attr/contextandSO_PEERCONTEXTversus the current/proc/pid/attr/currentand SO_PEERSEC. Is that correct?How do we envision a liblsm processing the value returned from
/proc/pid/attr/contextor SO_PEEERCONTEXT? It can certainly split it up per LSM. But can it then take the apparmor portion of the context and pass that to existing libapparmor interfaces without breakage? Or will the changes to the format described above create issues there?
libapparmor can handle the changes. It does not require the mode string, currently anything unconfined does not include it, and we have already done experiments with dropping it in other cases. The trailing '\n' is handled conditionally so only if its there; this is well tested as the currently out of upstream af_unix socket mediation that is used by dbus does not include a trailing '\n' on the SO_PEERSEC.
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 11 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 10 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 9 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 7 lines · Casey Schaufler
Because attr/context (and later,
SO_PEERCONTEXT) are new interfaces there is no need to exactly duplicate what is in attr/current (laterSO_PEERSEC). I already plan to omit the "mode" component of the AppArmor data in the AppArmor hook, as was discussed earlier. I would prefer ASCII, but if AppArmor needs bytestrings, that's what we'll have to do.
Quoted 7 lines
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sadly, to not break userspace its a byte string because that is what the path based profile names are. AppArmor does support a more limited non path based profile name but I can't guarantee that is what userspace is using in policy.
Ok, so
/proc/pid/attr/contextandSO_PEERCONTEXThave to be defined as returning bytestrings.So far we've talked about having AppArmor drop the trailing newline, be consistent with regard to whether the terminating NUL is included or excluded, and drop the mode field from what it returns for
/proc/pid/attr/contextandSO_PEERCONTEXTversus the current/proc/pid/attr/currentand SO_PEERSEC. Is that correct?How do we envision a liblsm processing the value returned from
/proc/pid/attr/contextorSO_PEEERCONTEXT?
There hasn't been any serious thought put into liblsm. To date there hasn't been an LSM level interface to worry about except for /sys/kernel/security/lsm. My notions of what a liblsm ought provide would seem archaic to most of the people here. I can make proposals if there's a notion that liblsm makes sense.
Quoted 4 lines
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It can certainly split it up per LSM. But can it then take the apparmor portion of the context and pass that to existing libapparmor interfaces without breakage? Or will the changes to the format described above create issues there?
libapparmor can handle the changes. It does not require the mode string, currently anything unconfined does not include it, and we have already done experiments with dropping it in other cases. The trailing '\n' is handled conditionally so only if its there; this is well tested as the currently out of upstream
af_unixsocket mediation that is used by dbus does not include a trailing '\n' on theSO_PEERSEC.
So it doesn't seem that there would be significant difficulties switching from "current" to "context". It won't be transparent, but we're providing "display" to address that.
John Johansen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 27 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 11 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 10 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 9 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 7 lines · Casey Schaufler
Because attr/context (and later,
SO_PEERCONTEXT) are new interfaces there is no need to exactly duplicate what is in attr/current (laterSO_PEERSEC). I already plan to omit the "mode" component of the AppArmor data in the AppArmor hook, as was discussed earlier. I would prefer ASCII, but if AppArmor needs bytestrings, that's what we'll have to do.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
sadly, to not break userspace its a byte string because that is what the path based profile names are. AppArmor does support a more limited non path based profile name but I can't guarantee that is what userspace is using in policy.
Ok, so
/proc/pid/attr/contextandSO_PEERCONTEXThave to be defined as returning bytestrings.So far we've talked about having AppArmor drop the trailing newline, be consistent with regard to whether the terminating NUL is included or excluded, and drop the mode field from what it returns for
/proc/pid/attr/contextandSO_PEERCONTEXTversus the current/proc/pid/attr/currentand SO_PEERSEC. Is that correct?How do we envision a liblsm processing the value returned from
/proc/pid/attr/contextorSO_PEEERCONTEXT?There hasn't been any serious thought put into liblsm. To date there hasn't been an LSM level interface to worry about except for
/sys/kernel/security/lsm. My notions of what a liblsm ought provide would seem archaic to most of the people here. I can make proposals if there's a notion that liblsm makes sense.
Quoted 10 lines
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It can certainly split it up per LSM. But can it then take the apparmor portion of the context and pass that to existing libapparmor interfaces without breakage? Or will the changes to the format described above create issues there?
libapparmor can handle the changes. It does not require the mode string, currently anything unconfined does not include it, and we have already done experiments with dropping it in other cases. The trailing '\n' is handled conditionally so only if its there; this is well tested as the currently out of upstream
af_unixsocket mediation that is used by dbus does not include a trailing '\n' on theSO_PEERSEC.So it doesn't seem that there would be significant difficulties switching from "current" to "context". It won't be transparent, but we're providing "display" to address that.
right
John Johansen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
In reply to Stephen SmalleyQuoted 10 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 9 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 8 lines · Simon McVittie
Quoted 2 lines · Stephen Smalley
The printable ASCII bit is based on what the dbus maintainer requested in previous discussions.
I thought in previous discussions, we had come to the conclusion that I can't assume it's 7-bit ASCII. (If I *can* assume that for this new API, that's even better.)
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
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To be clear, when I say ASCII I mean a sequence of bytes != '\0' with their high bit unset (x &
0x7f== x) and the obvious mapping to/from Unicode (bytes '\1' to '\x7f' represent codepoints U+0001 to U+007F). Is that the same thing you mean?I mean the subset of 7-bit ASCII that satisfies
isprint()using the "C" locale. That is already true for SELinux with the existing interfaces. I can't necessarily speak for the others.Looks like Smack labels are similarly restricted, per Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Smack.rst. So I guess the only one that is perhaps unclear is AppArmor, since its labels are typically derived from pathnames? Can an AppArmor label returned via its
getprocattr()hook be any legal pathname?
yes sadly, as much as I would like to depracate/remove it the pathname based profile names are a byte string. AppArmor supports a more restricted profile name and I have been trying to get people to move to it for 12 years with only limited success.
Quoted 18 lines
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Quoted 16 lines
I thought the conclusion we had come to in previous conversations was that the LSM context is what GLib calls a "bytestring", the same as filenames and environment variables - an opaque sequence of bytes != '\0', with no further guarantees, and no specified encoding or mapping to/from Unicode (most likely some superset of ASCII like UTF-8 or Latin-1, but nobody knows which one, and they could equally well be some binary encoding with no Unicode meaning, as long as it avoids '\0').
If I can safely assume that a new kernel <-> user-space API is constrained to UTF-8 or a UTF-8 subset like ASCII, then I can provide more friendly APIs for user-space features built over it. If that isn't possible, the next best thing is a "bytestring" like filenames, environment variables, and most kernel <-> user-space strings in general.
smcv
John Johansen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
In reply to Stephen SmalleyQuoted 26 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 15 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 7 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines · Casey Schaufler
Add an entry
/proc/.../attr/contextwhich displays the full process security "context" in compound format:' lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
This entry is not writable.Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>As previously discussed, there are issues with AppArmor's implementation of
getprocattr()particularly around the trailing newline that dbus-daemon and perhaps others would like to see go away in any new interface. Hence, I don't think we should implement this new API using the existinggetprocattr()hook lest it also be locked into the current behavior forever.Also, it would be good if whatever hook is introduced to support
/proc/pid/attr/contextcould also be leveraged by theSO_PEERCONTEXTimplementation in the future so that we are guaranteed a consistent result between the two interfaces, unlike the current situation for/proc/self/attr/currentversusSO_PEERSEC.Quoted 9 lines
I don't believe that a new hook is necessary, and that introducing one just to deal with a '\n' would be pedantic. We really have two rational options. AppArmor could drop the '\n' from their "context". Or, we can simply document that the
/proc/pid/attr/contextinterface will trim any trailing whitespace. I understand that this would be a break from the notion that the LSM infrastructure does not constrain what a module uses for its own data. On the other hand, we have been saying that "context"s are strings, and ignoring trailing whitespace is usual behavior for strings.
Quoted 4 lines
Well, you can either introduce a new common underlying hook for use by
/proc/pid/attr/contextandSO_PEERCONTEXTto produce the string that is to be returned to userspace (in order to guarantee consistency in format and allowing them to be directly compared, which I think is what the dbus maintainers wanted), or you can modify every security module to provide that guarantee in its existing getprocattr and getpeersec* hook functions (SELinux already provides this guarantee; Smack and AppArmor produce slightly different results with respect to \0 and/or \n), or you can have the framework trim the values it gets from the security modules before composing them. But you need to do one of those things before this interface gets merged upstream.Aside from the trailing newline and \0 issues, AppArmor also has a whitespace-separated (mode) field that may or may not be present in the contexts it presently returns, ala "
/usr/sbin/cupsd(enforce)". Not sure what they want for the new interfaces.
It is not needed for the new interface. And if I could go back and remove it from the old interface I would.
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 7 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 4 lines · Stephen Smalley
...
Aside from the trailing newline and \0 issues, AppArmor also has a whitespace-separated (mode) field that may or may not be present in the contexts it presently returns, ala "
/usr/sbin/cupsd(enforce)". Not sure what they want for the new interfaces.It is not needed for the new interface. And if I could go back and remove it from the old interface I would.
So, what would the "context" for this case be? "/usr/sbin/cupsd" or "enforce"?
John Johansen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 7 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 4 lines · Stephen Smalley
...
Aside from the trailing newline and \0 issues, AppArmor also has a whitespace-separated (mode) field that may or may not be present in the contexts it presently returns, ala "
/usr/sbin/cupsd(enforce)". Not sure what they want for the new interfaces.It is not needed for the new interface. And if I could go back and remove it from the old interface I would.
So, what would the "context" for this case be? "
/usr/sbin/cupsd" or "enforce"?
"/usr/sbin/cupsd"
"enforce" is the profile mode which can be looked up separately using "/usr/sbin/cupsd" if it is really needed.
John Johansen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
In reply to Casey SchauflerQuoted 15 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 7 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 6 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 5 lines · Casey Schaufler
Add an entry
/proc/.../attr/contextwhich displays the full process security "context" in compound format:'
lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
This entry is not writable.Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>As previously discussed, there are issues with AppArmor's implementation of
getprocattr()particularly around the trailing newline that dbus-daemon and perhaps others would like to see go away in any new interface. Hence, I don't think we should implement this new API using the existinggetprocattr()hook lest it also be locked into the current behavior forever.Also, it would be good if whatever hook is introduced to support
/proc/pid/attr/contextcould also be leveraged by theSO_PEERCONTEXTimplementation in the future so that we are guaranteed a consistent result between the two interfaces, unlike the current situation for/proc/self/attr/currentversusSO_PEERSEC.
Quoted 11 lines
I don't believe that a new hook is necessary, and that introducing one just to deal with a '\n' would be pedantic. We really have two rational options. AppArmor could drop the '\n' from their "context". Or, we can simply document that the
/proc/pid/attr/contextinterface will trim any trailing whitespace. I understand that this would be a break from the notion that the LSM infrastructure does not constrain what a module uses for its own data. On the other hand, we have been saying that "context"s are strings, and ignoring trailing whitespace is usual behavior for strings.
AppArmor can drop the trailing '\n' it is not required. I would say it could be dropped from /proc/pid/attr/current except there may be some third party code that requires it.
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v14 23/23 AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
In reply to Casey SchauflerWith the inclusion of the "display" process attribute mechanism AppArmor no longer needs to be treated as an "exclusive" security module. Remove the flag that indicates it is exclusive. Remove the stub getpeersec_dgram AppArmor hook as it has no effect in the single LSM case and interferes in the multiple LSM case.
--- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 20 +------------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)
security/apparmor/lsm.c +1 -19
@@ -1120,22 +1120,6 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,return error; } -/** -* apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet -* @sock: the peer socket -* @skb: packet data -* @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet -* -* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent -*/ -static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock, -struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid) - -{ -/* TODO: requires secid support */ -return -ENOPROTOOPT ; -} -/** * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket * @sk: child sock
@@ -1239,8 +1223,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {#endif LSM_HOOK_INIT (socket_getpeersec_stream, apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (socket_getpeersec_dgram, - apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft), #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
@@ -1909,7 +1891,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)DEFINE_LSM (apparmor) = { .name ="apparmor" , - .flags =LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR |LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE , + .flags =LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR , .enabled = &apparmor_enabled, .blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes, .init = apparmor_init,
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
This patchset provides the changes required for the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5
Incorporate feedback from v13
- Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002)
- Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002)
- Remove unneeded include (patch 0013)
- Use context.len correctly (patch 0015)
- Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016)
- DropSO_PEERCONTEXTas it's not needed yet (patch 0023)
Looks like you also dropped "LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security" entirely (was patch 16 in v13).
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
This patchset provides the changes required for the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5
Incorporate feedback from v13
- Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002)
- Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002)
- Remove unneeded include (patch 0013)
- Use context.len correctly (patch 0015)
- Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016)
- DropSO_PEERCONTEXTas it's not needed yet (patch 0023)
I don't know for sure if this is your bug, but it happens every time I boot with your patches applied and not at all on stock v5.5-rc5 so here it is. Will try to bisect as time permits but not until next week. Trigger seems to be loading the tun driver.
[ 67.726834] tun: Universal TUN/TAP device driver, 1.6 [ 67.736657] ================================================================== [ 67.741335] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sock_init_data+0x14a/0x5a0 [ 67.745037] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88870afe8928 by task libvirtd/1238
[ 67.751861] CPU: 4 PID: 1238 Comm: libvirtd Tainted: G T 5.5.0-rc5+ #54 [ 67.756250] Call Trace: [ 67.759510] dump_stack+0xb8/0x110 [ 67.761604] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x280 [ 67.763768] __kasan_report.cold+0x75/0x8f [ 67.765895] ? sock_init_data+0x14a/0x5a0 [ 67.768282] kasan_report+0xe/0x20 [ 67.770397] sock_init_data+0x14a/0x5a0 [ 67.772511] tun_chr_open+0x1de/0x280 [tun] [ 67.774644] misc_open+0x1cb/0x210 [ 67.776820] chrdev_open+0x15b/0x350 [ 67.778917] ? cdev_put.part.0+0x30/0x30 [ 67.781030] do_dentry_open+0x2cb/0x800 [ 67.783135] ? cdev_put.part.0+0x30/0x30 [ 67.785225] ? devcgroup_check_permission+0x11a/0x260 [ 67.787321] ? __x64_sys_fchdir+0xf0/0xf0 [ 67.789418] ? security_inode_permission+0x5b/0x70 [ 67.791513] path_openat+0x858/0x14a0 [ 67.793589] ? path_mountpoint+0x5e0/0x5e0 [ 67.795719] ? mark_lock+0xb8/0xb00 [ 67.797786] do_filp_open+0x11e/0x1b0 [ 67.799840] ? may_open_dev+0x60/0x60 [ 67.801871] ? match_held_lock+0x1b/0x240 [ 67.803968] ? lock_downgrade+0x360/0x360 [ 67.805997] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x119/0x1d0 [ 67.808041] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x60/0x60 [ 67.810099] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa3/0x130 [ 67.812244] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x30 [ 67.814287] ? __alloc_fd+0x143/0x2f0 [ 67.816324] do_sys_open+0x1f0/0x2d0 [ 67.818358] ? filp_open+0x50/0x50 [ 67.820404] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [ 67.822447] ? lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xbe/0x100 [ 67.824473] ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90 [ 67.826484] do_syscall_64+0x74/0xd0 [ 67.828480] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 67.830478] RIP: 0033:0x7f1a2cce6074 [ 67.832495] Code: 24 20 eb 8f 66 90 44 89 54 24 0c e8 86 f4 ff ff 44 8b 54 24 0c 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 41 89 c0 bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 32 44 89 c7 89 44 24 0c e8 b8 f4 ff ff 8b 44 [ 67.834760] RSP: 002b:00007f19e4af46d0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 [ 67.837032] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1a2cce6074 [ 67.839318] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007f1a2d0bfb67 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c [ 67.841598] RBP: 00007f1a2d0bfb67 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f19e4af4914 [ 67.843941] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000002 [ 67.846283] R13: 000000000000000d R14: 00007f19e4af4920 R15: 00007f1a2d0bfb67
[ 67.850936] Allocated by task 1238: [ 67.853241] save_stack+0x1b/0x80 [ 67.855533] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0 [ 67.857935] sk_prot_alloc+0x115/0x170 [ 67.860235] sk_alloc+0x2f/0xa10 [ 67.862541] tun_chr_open+0x4d/0x280 [tun] [ 67.864894] misc_open+0x1cb/0x210 [ 67.867164] chrdev_open+0x15b/0x350 [ 67.869448] do_dentry_open+0x2cb/0x800 [ 67.871768] path_openat+0x858/0x14a0 [ 67.874041] do_filp_open+0x11e/0x1b0 [ 67.876328] do_sys_open+0x1f0/0x2d0 [ 67.878592] do_syscall_64+0x74/0xd0 [ 67.880899] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 67.885431] Freed by task 726: [ 67.887689] save_stack+0x1b/0x80 [ 67.889967] __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x170 [ 67.892197] kfree+0xff/0x430 [ 67.894444] uevent_show+0x176/0x1b0 [ 67.896709] dev_attr_show+0x37/0x70 [ 67.898940] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x119/0x210 [ 67.901159] seq_read+0x29d/0x720 [ 67.903367] vfs_read+0xf9/0x1f0 [ 67.905538] ksys_read+0xc9/0x160 [ 67.907736] do_syscall_64+0x74/0xd0 [ 67.909889] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 67.914100] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88870afe8000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
[ 67.918357] The buggy address is located 2344 bytes inside of
4096-byte region [ffff88870afe8000, ffff88870afe9000)
[ 67.922562] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 67.924725] page:ffffea001c2bfa00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88881f00de00 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 67.926926] raw: 0017ffe000010200 ffffea001c167a00 0000000200000002 ffff88881f00de00
[ 67.929144] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080040004 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 67.931362] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected[ 67.936192] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 67.938438] ffff88870afe8800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 67.941078] ffff88870afe8880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 67.943393] >ffff88870afe8900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 67.945709] ^ [ 67.948000] ffff88870afe8980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 67.950311] ffff88870afe8a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 67.952629] ==================================================================
Casey Schaufler
maintainerQuoted 13 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
This patchset provides the changes required for the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5
Incorporate feedback from v13
- Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002)
- Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002)
- Remove unneeded include (patch 0013)
- Use context.len correctly (patch 0015)
- Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016)
- DropSO_PEERCONTEXTas it's not needed yet (patch 0023)
Quoted 1 line
I don't know for sure if this is your bug, but it happens every time I boot with your patches applied and not at all on stock v5.5-rc5 so here it is. Will try to bisect as time permits but not until next week. Trigger seems to be loading the tun driver.
Thanks. I will have a look as well.
Quoted 97 lines
[ 67.726834] tun: Universal TUN/TAP device driver, 1.6
[ 67.736657] ================================================================== [ 67.741335] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds insock_init_data+0x14a/0x5a0[ 67.745037] Read of size 4 at addrffff88870afe8928by task libvirtd/1238[ 67.751861] CPU: 4 PID: 1238 Comm: libvirtd Tainted: G T 5.5.0-rc5+ #54
[ 67.756250] Call Trace:
[ 67.759510]dump_stack+0xb8/0x110
[ 67.761604] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x280
[ 67.763768]__kasan_report.cold+0x75/0x8f
[ 67.765895] ?sock_init_data+0x14a/0x5a0
[ 67.768282]kasan_report+0xe/0x20
[ 67.770397]sock_init_data+0x14a/0x5a0
[ 67.772511]tun_chr_open+0x1de/0x280[tun]
[ 67.774644]misc_open+0x1cb/0x210
[ 67.776820]chrdev_open+0x15b/0x350
[ 67.778917] ? cdev_put.part.0+0x30/0x30
[ 67.781030]do_dentry_open+0x2cb/0x800
[ 67.783135] ? cdev_put.part.0+0x30/0x30
[ 67.785225] ?devcgroup_check_permission+0x11a/0x260
[ 67.787321] ?__x64_sys_fchdir+0xf0/0xf0
[ 67.789418] ?security_inode_permission+0x5b/0x70
[ 67.791513]path_openat+0x858/0x14a0
[ 67.793589] ?path_mountpoint+0x5e0/0x5e0
[ 67.795719] ?mark_lock+0xb8/0xb00
[ 67.797786]do_filp_open+0x11e/0x1b0
[ 67.799840] ?may_open_dev+0x60/0x60
[ 67.801871] ?match_held_lock+0x1b/0x240
[ 67.803968] ?lock_downgrade+0x360/0x360
[ 67.805997] ?do_raw_spin_lock+0x119/0x1d0
[ 67.808041] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x60/0x60
[ 67.810099] ?do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa3/0x130
[ 67.812244] ?_raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x30
[ 67.814287] ?__alloc_fd+0x143/0x2f0
[ 67.816324]do_sys_open+0x1f0/0x2d0
[ 67.818358] ?filp_open+0x50/0x50
[ 67.820404] ?trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
[ 67.822447] ?lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xbe/0x100
[ 67.824473] ?mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90
[ 67.826484]do_syscall_64+0x74/0xd0
[ 67.828480]entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 67.830478] RIP: 0033:0x7f1a2cce6074
[ 67.832495] Code: 24 20 eb 8f 66 90 44 89 54 24 0c e8 86 f4 ff ff 44 8b 54 24 0c 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 41 89 c0 bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 32 44 89 c7 89 44 24 0c e8 b8 f4 ff ff 8b 44 [ 67.834760] RSP: 002b:00007f19e4af46d0 EFLAGS: 00000293ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
[ 67.837032] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX:00007f1a2cce6074
[ 67.839318] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI:00007f1a2d0bfb67RDI:00000000ffffff9c
[ 67.841598] RBP:00007f1a2d0bfb67R08: 0000000000000000 R09:00007f19e4af4914
[ 67.843941] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000002
[ 67.846283] R13:000000000000000dR14:00007f19e4af4920R15:00007f1a2d0bfb67[ 67.850936] Allocated by task 1238:
[ 67.853241]save_stack+0x1b/0x80
[ 67.855533] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0 [ 67.857935]sk_prot_alloc+0x115/0x170
[ 67.860235]sk_alloc+0x2f/0xa10
[ 67.862541]tun_chr_open+0x4d/0x280[tun]
[ 67.864894]misc_open+0x1cb/0x210
[ 67.867164]chrdev_open+0x15b/0x350
[ 67.869448]do_dentry_open+0x2cb/0x800
[ 67.871768]path_openat+0x858/0x14a0
[ 67.874041]do_filp_open+0x11e/0x1b0
[ 67.876328]do_sys_open+0x1f0/0x2d0
[ 67.878592]do_syscall_64+0x74/0xd0
[ 67.880899]entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe[ 67.885431] Freed by task 726:
[ 67.887689]save_stack+0x1b/0x80
[ 67.889967]__kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x170
[ 67.892197]kfree+0xff/0x430
[ 67.894444]uevent_show+0x176/0x1b0
[ 67.896709]dev_attr_show+0x37/0x70
[ 67.898940]sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x119/0x210
[ 67.901159]seq_read+0x29d/0x720
[ 67.903367]vfs_read+0xf9/0x1f0
[ 67.905538]ksys_read+0xc9/0x160
[ 67.907736]do_syscall_64+0x74/0xd0
[ 67.909889]entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe[ 67.914100] The buggy address belongs to the object at
ffff88870afe8000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
[ 67.918357] The buggy address is located 2344 bytes inside of
4096-byte region [ffff88870afe8000,ffff88870afe9000)
[ 67.922562] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 67.924725] page:ffffea001c2bfa00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88881f00de00 index:0x0compound_mapcount: 0 [ 67.926926] raw:0017ffe000010200ffffea001c167a000000000200000002ffff88881f00de00
[ 67.929144] raw: 0000000000000000 000000008004000400000001ffffffff0000000000000000
[ 67.931362] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected[ 67.936192] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 67.938438]ffff88870afe8800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 67.941078]ffff88870afe8880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 67.943393] >ffff88870afe8900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 67.945709] ^
[ 67.948000]ffff88870afe8980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 67.950311]ffff88870afe8a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 67.952629] ==================================================================
Quoted 14 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 13 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
This patchset provides the changes required for the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5
Incorporate feedback from v13
- Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002)
- Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002)
- Remove unneeded include (patch 0013)
- Use context.len correctly (patch 0015)
- Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016)
- DropSO_PEERCONTEXTas it's not needed yet (patch 0023)
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
I don't know for sure if this is your bug, but it happens every time I boot with your patches applied and not at all on stock v5.5-rc5 so here it is. Will try to bisect as time permits but not until next week. Trigger seems to be loading the tun driver.
Thanks. I will have a look as well.
Bisection led to the first patch in the series, "LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security". Still not sure if the bug is in the patch itself or just being surfaced by it.
Quoted 97 lines
Quoted 97 lines
[ 67.726834] tun: Universal TUN/TAP device driver, 1.6
[ 67.736657] ================================================================== [ 67.741335] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds insock_init_data+0x14a/0x5a0[ 67.745037] Read of size 4 at addrffff88870afe8928by task libvirtd/1238[ 67.751861] CPU: 4 PID: 1238 Comm: libvirtd Tainted: G T 5.5.0-rc5+ #54
[ 67.756250] Call Trace:
[ 67.759510]dump_stack+0xb8/0x110
[ 67.761604] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x280
[ 67.763768]__kasan_report.cold+0x75/0x8f
[ 67.765895] ?sock_init_data+0x14a/0x5a0
[ 67.768282]kasan_report+0xe/0x20
[ 67.770397]sock_init_data+0x14a/0x5a0
[ 67.772511]tun_chr_open+0x1de/0x280[tun]
[ 67.774644]misc_open+0x1cb/0x210
[ 67.776820]chrdev_open+0x15b/0x350
[ 67.778917] ? cdev_put.part.0+0x30/0x30
[ 67.781030]do_dentry_open+0x2cb/0x800
[ 67.783135] ? cdev_put.part.0+0x30/0x30
[ 67.785225] ?devcgroup_check_permission+0x11a/0x260
[ 67.787321] ?__x64_sys_fchdir+0xf0/0xf0
[ 67.789418] ?security_inode_permission+0x5b/0x70
[ 67.791513]path_openat+0x858/0x14a0
[ 67.793589] ?path_mountpoint+0x5e0/0x5e0
[ 67.795719] ?mark_lock+0xb8/0xb00
[ 67.797786]do_filp_open+0x11e/0x1b0
[ 67.799840] ?may_open_dev+0x60/0x60
[ 67.801871] ?match_held_lock+0x1b/0x240
[ 67.803968] ?lock_downgrade+0x360/0x360
[ 67.805997] ?do_raw_spin_lock+0x119/0x1d0
[ 67.808041] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x60/0x60
[ 67.810099] ?do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa3/0x130
[ 67.812244] ?_raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x30
[ 67.814287] ?__alloc_fd+0x143/0x2f0
[ 67.816324]do_sys_open+0x1f0/0x2d0
[ 67.818358] ?filp_open+0x50/0x50
[ 67.820404] ?trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
[ 67.822447] ?lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xbe/0x100
[ 67.824473] ?mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90
[ 67.826484]do_syscall_64+0x74/0xd0
[ 67.828480]entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 67.830478] RIP: 0033:0x7f1a2cce6074
[ 67.832495] Code: 24 20 eb 8f 66 90 44 89 54 24 0c e8 86 f4 ff ff 44 8b 54 24 0c 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 41 89 c0 bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 32 44 89 c7 89 44 24 0c e8 b8 f4 ff ff 8b 44 [ 67.834760] RSP: 002b:00007f19e4af46d0 EFLAGS: 00000293ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
[ 67.837032] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX:00007f1a2cce6074
[ 67.839318] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI:00007f1a2d0bfb67RDI:00000000ffffff9c
[ 67.841598] RBP:00007f1a2d0bfb67R08: 0000000000000000 R09:00007f19e4af4914
[ 67.843941] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000002
[ 67.846283] R13:000000000000000dR14:00007f19e4af4920R15:00007f1a2d0bfb67[ 67.850936] Allocated by task 1238:
[ 67.853241]save_stack+0x1b/0x80
[ 67.855533] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0 [ 67.857935]sk_prot_alloc+0x115/0x170
[ 67.860235]sk_alloc+0x2f/0xa10
[ 67.862541]tun_chr_open+0x4d/0x280[tun]
[ 67.864894]misc_open+0x1cb/0x210
[ 67.867164]chrdev_open+0x15b/0x350
[ 67.869448]do_dentry_open+0x2cb/0x800
[ 67.871768]path_openat+0x858/0x14a0
[ 67.874041]do_filp_open+0x11e/0x1b0
[ 67.876328]do_sys_open+0x1f0/0x2d0
[ 67.878592]do_syscall_64+0x74/0xd0
[ 67.880899]entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe[ 67.885431] Freed by task 726:
[ 67.887689]save_stack+0x1b/0x80
[ 67.889967]__kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x170
[ 67.892197]kfree+0xff/0x430
[ 67.894444]uevent_show+0x176/0x1b0
[ 67.896709]dev_attr_show+0x37/0x70
[ 67.898940]sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x119/0x210
[ 67.901159]seq_read+0x29d/0x720
[ 67.903367]vfs_read+0xf9/0x1f0
[ 67.905538]ksys_read+0xc9/0x160
[ 67.907736]do_syscall_64+0x74/0xd0
[ 67.909889]entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe[ 67.914100] The buggy address belongs to the object at
ffff88870afe8000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
[ 67.918357] The buggy address is located 2344 bytes inside of
4096-byte region [ffff88870afe8000,ffff88870afe9000)
[ 67.922562] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 67.924725] page:ffffea001c2bfa00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88881f00de00 index:0x0compound_mapcount: 0 [ 67.926926] raw:0017ffe000010200ffffea001c167a000000000200000002ffff88881f00de00
[ 67.929144] raw: 0000000000000000 000000008004000400000001ffffffff0000000000000000
[ 67.931362] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected[ 67.936192] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 67.938438]ffff88870afe8800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 67.941078]ffff88870afe8880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 67.943393] >ffff88870afe8900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 67.945709] ^
[ 67.948000]ffff88870afe8980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 67.950311]ffff88870afe8a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 67.952629] ==================================================================
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in tun_chr_open/sock_init_data (Was: Re: [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor)
Quoted 15 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 14 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 13 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
This patchset provides the changes required for the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5
Incorporate feedback from v13
- Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002)
- Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002)
- Remove unneeded include (patch 0013)
- Use context.len correctly (patch 0015)
- Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016)
- DropSO_PEERCONTEXTas it's not needed yet (patch 0023)
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
I don't know for sure if this is your bug, but it happens every time I boot with your patches applied and not at all on stock v5.5-rc5 so here it is. Will try to bisect as time permits but not until next week. Trigger seems to be loading the tun driver.
Thanks. I will have a look as well.
Bisection led to the first patch in the series, "LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security". Still not sure if the bug is in the patch itself or just being surfaced by it.
Looks like the bug is pre-existing to me and just exposed by your patch. tun_chr_open() is creating a struct tun_file via sk_alloc() with its own tun_proto with a custom .obj_size. It then passes the tun_file->socket and ->sk fields to sock_init_data(). sock_init_data() assumes it can safely use SOCK_INODE(sock) if sock is non-NULL, which means that it presumes all such sockets were wrapped in a struct socket_alloc. But this one wasn't. I don't know if that's a bug in the tun driver for not wrapping its socket in a socket_alloc or in sock_init_data() for assuming that all sockets it is passed have been so wrapped. KASAN is tripping on this assignment in sock_init_data():
net/core/sock.c:
2871 sk->sk_uid = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_uid;
This appears to have been broken since commit 86741ec25462e4c8cdce6df2f41ead05568c7d5e ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.").
Previously reported here by someone else with RFC patches:
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/
Quoted 99 lines
Quoted 98 lines
Quoted 98 lines
[ 67.726834] tun: Universal TUN/TAP device driver, 1.6
[ 67.736657] ================================================================== [ 67.741335] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds insock_init_data+0x14a/0x5a0[ 67.745037] Read of size 4 at addrffff88870afe8928by task libvirtd/1238[ 67.751861] CPU: 4 PID: 1238 Comm: libvirtd Tainted: G T 5.5.0-rc5+ #54
[ 67.756250] Call Trace:
[ 67.759510]dump_stack+0xb8/0x110
[ 67.761604] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x280
[ 67.763768]__kasan_report.cold+0x75/0x8f
[ 67.765895] ?sock_init_data+0x14a/0x5a0
[ 67.768282]kasan_report+0xe/0x20
[ 67.770397]sock_init_data+0x14a/0x5a0
[ 67.772511]tun_chr_open+0x1de/0x280[tun]
[ 67.774644]misc_open+0x1cb/0x210
[ 67.776820]chrdev_open+0x15b/0x350
[ 67.778917] ? cdev_put.part.0+0x30/0x30
[ 67.781030]do_dentry_open+0x2cb/0x800
[ 67.783135] ? cdev_put.part.0+0x30/0x30
[ 67.785225] ?devcgroup_check_permission+0x11a/0x260
[ 67.787321] ?__x64_sys_fchdir+0xf0/0xf0
[ 67.789418] ?security_inode_permission+0x5b/0x70
[ 67.791513]path_openat+0x858/0x14a0
[ 67.793589] ?path_mountpoint+0x5e0/0x5e0
[ 67.795719] ?mark_lock+0xb8/0xb00
[ 67.797786]do_filp_open+0x11e/0x1b0
[ 67.799840] ?may_open_dev+0x60/0x60
[ 67.801871] ?match_held_lock+0x1b/0x240
[ 67.803968] ?lock_downgrade+0x360/0x360
[ 67.805997] ?do_raw_spin_lock+0x119/0x1d0
[ 67.808041] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x60/0x60
[ 67.810099] ?do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa3/0x130
[ 67.812244] ?_raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x30
[ 67.814287] ?__alloc_fd+0x143/0x2f0
[ 67.816324]do_sys_open+0x1f0/0x2d0
[ 67.818358] ?filp_open+0x50/0x50
[ 67.820404] ?trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
[ 67.822447] ?lockdep_hardirqs_off+0xbe/0x100
[ 67.824473] ?mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90
[ 67.826484]do_syscall_64+0x74/0xd0
[ 67.828480]entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 67.830478] RIP: 0033:0x7f1a2cce6074
[ 67.832495] Code: 24 20 eb 8f 66 90 44 89 54 24 0c e8 86 f4 ff ff 44 8b 54 24 0c 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 41 89 c0 bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 32 44 89 c7 89 44 24 0c e8 b8 f4 ff ff 8b 44 [ 67.834760] RSP: 002b:00007f19e4af46d0 EFLAGS: 00000293ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
[ 67.837032] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX:00007f1a2cce6074
[ 67.839318] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI:00007f1a2d0bfb67RDI:00000000ffffff9c
[ 67.841598] RBP:00007f1a2d0bfb67R08: 0000000000000000 R09:00007f19e4af4914
[ 67.843941] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000002
[ 67.846283] R13:000000000000000dR14:00007f19e4af4920R15:00007f1a2d0bfb67[ 67.850936] Allocated by task 1238:
[ 67.853241]save_stack+0x1b/0x80
[ 67.855533] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0 [ 67.857935]sk_prot_alloc+0x115/0x170
[ 67.860235]sk_alloc+0x2f/0xa10
[ 67.862541]tun_chr_open+0x4d/0x280[tun]
[ 67.864894]misc_open+0x1cb/0x210
[ 67.867164]chrdev_open+0x15b/0x350
[ 67.869448]do_dentry_open+0x2cb/0x800
[ 67.871768]path_openat+0x858/0x14a0
[ 67.874041]do_filp_open+0x11e/0x1b0
[ 67.876328]do_sys_open+0x1f0/0x2d0
[ 67.878592]do_syscall_64+0x74/0xd0
[ 67.880899]entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe[ 67.885431] Freed by task 726:
[ 67.887689]save_stack+0x1b/0x80
[ 67.889967]__kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x170
[ 67.892197]kfree+0xff/0x430
[ 67.894444]uevent_show+0x176/0x1b0
[ 67.896709]dev_attr_show+0x37/0x70
[ 67.898940]sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x119/0x210
[ 67.901159]seq_read+0x29d/0x720
[ 67.903367]vfs_read+0xf9/0x1f0
[ 67.905538]ksys_read+0xc9/0x160
[ 67.907736]do_syscall_64+0x74/0xd0
[ 67.909889]entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe[ 67.914100] The buggy address belongs to the object at
ffff88870afe8000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
[ 67.918357] The buggy address is located 2344 bytes inside of
4096-byte region [ffff88870afe8000,ffff88870afe9000)
[ 67.922562] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 67.924725] page:ffffea001c2bfa00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88881f00de00 index:0x0compound_mapcount: 0 [ 67.926926] raw:0017ffe000010200ffffea001c167a000000000200000002ffff88881f00de00
[ 67.929144] raw: 0000000000000000 000000008004000400000001ffffffff0000000000000000
[ 67.931362] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected[ 67.936192] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 67.938438]ffff88870afe8800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 67.941078]ffff88870afe8880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 67.943393] >ffff88870afe8900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 67.945709] ^
[ 67.948000]ffff88870afe8980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 67.950311]ffff88870afe8a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 67.952629] ==================================================================
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in tun_chr_open/sock_init_data (Was: Re: [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor)
Quoted 16 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 15 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 14 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 13 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
This patchset provides the changes required for the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5
Incorporate feedback from v13
- Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002)
- Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002)
- Remove unneeded include (patch 0013)
- Use context.len correctly (patch 0015)
- Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016)
- DropSO_PEERCONTEXTas it's not needed yet (patch 0023)
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
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I don't know for sure if this is your bug, but it happens every time I boot with your patches applied and not at all on stock v5.5-rc5 so here it is. Will try to bisect as time permits but not until next week. Trigger seems to be loading the tun driver.
Thanks. I will have a look as well.
Bisection led to the first patch in the series, "LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security". Still not sure if the bug is in the patch itself or just being surfaced by it.
Looks like the bug is pre-existing to me and just exposed by your patch.
OK, thanks. I don't see how moving the allocation ought to have perturbed that, but it's good to know what happened.
BUG: sock_init_data() assumes socket is embedded in socket_alloc, tun/tap does not
In reply to Stephen SmalleySince commit 86741ec25462e4c8cdce6df2f41ead05568c7d5e ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.") circa v4.10, sock_init_data() dereferences SOCK_INODE(sock) whenever sock is non-NULL, thereby requiring all callers that provide a socket to have embedded it within a struct socket_alloc. However, the tun and tap drivers embed a struct socket within their own data structures (tun_file and tap_queue), call sock_init_data() on these sockets, and were not updated to wrap these sockets within socket_alloc. I haven't checked whether there may be other cases beyond tun/tap. A bug report with RFC patches was posted by [email protected] back in September to address the tun/tap case here:
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ seemingly without any response or follow-up that I could see in the archives.
Is sock_init_data() wrong to make this assumption, and if so, how should it be fixed? Or should tun/tap and any other callers be updated to embed their sockets within socket_alloc structures? Or should they not call sock_init_data() on their sockets?
Sorry if this has been discussed elsewhere but I couldn't find anything beyond what I cited above.
Casey Schaufler
maintainerQuoted 15 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 14 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 13 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
This patchset provides the changes required for the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5
Incorporate feedback from v13
- Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002)
- Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002)
- Remove unneeded include (patch 0013)
- Use context.len correctly (patch 0015)
- Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016)
- DropSO_PEERCONTEXTas it's not needed yet (patch 0023)
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
I don't know for sure if this is your bug, but it happens every time I boot with your patches applied and not at all on stock v5.5-rc5 so here it is. Will try to bisect as time permits but not until next week. Trigger seems to be loading the tun driver.
Thanks. I will have a look as well.
Bisection led to the first patch in the series, "LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security". Still not sure if the bug is in the patch itself or just being surfaced by it.
It looks like the tun code is making a private socket in tun_chr_open() without initializing the sk_security member. It's possible that this used to work implicitly, but I don't see how the change should have broken that. Investigation continues.