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mm/util: fix a data race in __vm_enough_memory()

PATCH In review Qian Cai 4 participants 6 messages Jan 30, 2020 – Jan 31, 2020

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Qian Cai

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 mm/util: fix a data race in __vm_enough_memory()

"vm_committed_as.count" could be accessed concurrently as reported by KCSAN,

read to 0xffffffff923164f8 of 8 bytes by task 1268 on cpu 38:

  __vm_enough_memory+0x43/0x280 mm/util.c:801
  mmap_region+0x1b2/0xb90 mm/mmap.c:1726
  do_mmap+0x45c/0x700
  vm_mmap_pgoff+0xc0/0x130
  vm_mmap+0x71/0x90
  elf_map+0xa1/0x1b0
  load_elf_binary+0x9de/0x2180
  search_binary_handler+0xd8/0x2b0
  __do_execve_file+0xb61/0x1080
  __x64_sys_execve+0x5f/0x70
  do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb47
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

write to 0xffffffff923164f8 of 8 bytes by task 1265 on cpu 41:

  percpu_counter_add_batch+0x83/0xd0 lib/percpu_counter.c:91
  exit_mmap+0x178/0x220 include/linux/mman.h:68
  mmput+0x10e/0x270
  flush_old_exec+0x572/0xfe0
  load_elf_binary+0x467/0x2180
  search_binary_handler+0xd8/0x2b0
  __do_execve_file+0xb61/0x1080
  __x64_sys_execve+0x5f/0x70
  do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb47
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Since only the read is operating as lockless, fix it by using READ_ONLY() for it to avoid any possible false warning due to load tearing.

---
 mm/util.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/util.c +1 -1
index 988d11e6c17c..58cd8f28651c 100644
@@ -798,7 +798,7 @@ int __vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages, int cap_sys_admin)
 {
 	long allowed;
 
-	VM_WARN_ONCE(percpu_counter_read(&vm_committed_as) <
+	VM_WARN_ONCE(READ_ONCE(vm_committed_as.count) <
 			-(s64)vm_committed_as_batch * num_online_cpus(),
 			"memory commitment underflow");
 
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0 (Apple Git-122.2)
#1 lore raw
Quoted 29 lines · Qian Cai

"vm_committed_as.count" could be accessed concurrently as reported by KCSAN,

read to 0xffffffff923164f8 of 8 bytes by task 1268 on cpu 38:

  __vm_enough_memory+0x43/0x280 mm/util.c:801
  mmap_region+0x1b2/0xb90 mm/mmap.c:1726
  do_mmap+0x45c/0x700
  vm_mmap_pgoff+0xc0/0x130
  vm_mmap+0x71/0x90
  elf_map+0xa1/0x1b0
  load_elf_binary+0x9de/0x2180
  search_binary_handler+0xd8/0x2b0
  __do_execve_file+0xb61/0x1080
  __x64_sys_execve+0x5f/0x70
  do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb47
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

write to 0xffffffff923164f8 of 8 bytes by task 1265 on cpu 41:

  percpu_counter_add_batch+0x83/0xd0 lib/percpu_counter.c:91
  exit_mmap+0x178/0x220 include/linux/mman.h:68
  mmput+0x10e/0x270
  flush_old_exec+0x572/0xfe0
  load_elf_binary+0x467/0x2180
  search_binary_handler+0xd8/0x2b0
  __do_execve_file+0xb61/0x1080
  __x64_sys_execve+0x5f/0x70
  do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb47
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Quoted 2 lines

Since only the read is operating as lockless, fix it by using READ_ONLY() for it to avoid any possible false warning due to load

You mean READ_ONCE ...

mm/util.c int __vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages, int cap_sys_admin) · line 802

Quoted 6 lines

{

mm/util.c +1 -1
 	long allowed;
 
-	VM_WARN_ONCE(percpu_counter_read(&vm_committed_as) <
+	VM_WARN_ONCE(READ_ONCE(vm_committed_as.count) <
 			-(s64)vm_committed_as_batch * num_online_cpus(),

I'm really not a fan of exposing the internals of a percpu_counter outside the percpu_counter.h file. Why shouldn't this be fixed by putting the READ_ONCE() inside percpu_counter_read()?

author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Matthew Wilcox

I'm really not a fan of exposing the internals of a percpu_counter outside the percpu_counter.h file. Why shouldn't this be fixed by putting the READ_ONCE() inside percpu_counter_read()?

It is because not all places suffer from a data race. For example, in __wb_update_bandwidth(), it was protected by a lock. I was a bit worry about blindly adding READ_ONCE() inside percpu_counter_read() might has unexpected side-effect. For example, it is unnecessary to have READ_ONCE() for a volatile variable. So, I thought just to keep the change minimal with a trade off by exposing a bit internal details as you mentioned.

However, I had also copied the percpu maintainers to see if they have any preferences?

#3 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Qian Cai
Quoted 6 lines · Matthew Wilcox

I'm really not a fan of exposing the internals of a percpu_counter outside the percpu_counter.h file. Why shouldn't this be fixed by putting the READ_ONCE() inside percpu_counter_read()?

It is because not all places suffer from a data race. For example, in __wb_update_bandwidth(), it was protected by a lock. I was a bit worry about blindly adding READ_ONCE() inside percpu_counter_read() might has unexpected side-effect. For example, it is unnecessary to have READ_ONCE() for a volatile variable. So, I thought just to keep the change minimal with a trade off by exposing a bit internal details as you mentioned.

However, I had also copied the percpu maintainers to see if they have any preferences?

I would not add READ_ONCE to percpu_counter_read(), given the writes (increments) are not atomic either, so not much is gained.

Notice that this is inside a WARN_ONCE, so you may argue that a data race here doesn't matter to the correct behaviour of the system (except if you have panic_on_warn on).

For the warning to trigger, vm_committed_as must decrease. Assume that a data race (assuming bad compiler optimizations) can somehow accomplish this, then the load or write must cause a transient value to somehow be less than a stable value. My hypothesis is this is very unlikely.

Given the fact this is a WARN_ONCE, and the fact that a transient decrease in the value is unlikely, you may consider 'VM_WARN_ONCE(data_race(percpu_counter_read(&vm_committed_as)) < ...)'. That way you won't modify percpu_counter_read and still catch unintended races elsewhere.

[ Note that the 'data_race()' macro is still only in -next, -tip, and -rcu. ]

Thanks,
-- Marco

maintainer
#4 lore raw
Quoted 25 lines · On Thu, 30 Jan 2020 13:35:18 +0100 Marco Elver <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 10 lines · Qian Cai
Quoted 6 lines · Matthew Wilcox

I'm really not a fan of exposing the internals of a percpu_counter outside the percpu_counter.h file. Why shouldn't this be fixed by putting the READ_ONCE() inside percpu_counter_read()?

It is because not all places suffer from a data race. For example, in __wb_update_bandwidth(), it was protected by a lock. I was a bit worry about blindly adding READ_ONCE() inside percpu_counter_read() might has unexpected side-effect. For example, it is unnecessary to have READ_ONCE() for a volatile variable. So, I thought just to keep the change minimal with a trade off by exposing a bit internal details as you mentioned.

However, I had also copied the percpu maintainers to see if they have any preferences?

I would not add READ_ONCE to percpu_counter_read(), given the writes (increments) are not atomic either, so not much is gained.

Notice that this is inside a WARN_ONCE, so you may argue that a data race here doesn't matter to the correct behaviour of the system (except if you have panic_on_warn on).

For the warning to trigger, vm_committed_as must decrease. Assume that a data race (assuming bad compiler optimizations) can somehow accomplish this, then the load or write must cause a transient value to somehow be less than a stable value. My hypothesis is this is very unlikely.

Quoted 6 lines

Given the fact this is a WARN_ONCE, and the fact that a transient decrease in the value is unlikely, you may consider 'VM_WARN_ONCE(data_race(percpu_counter_read(&vm_committed_as)) < ...)'. That way you won't modify percpu_counter_read and still catch unintended races elsewhere.

That, or add an alternative version of per_cpu_counter_read() to the percpu API. A very carefully commented version!

author
#5 lore raw
Quoted 38 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 25 lines · On Thu, 30 Jan 2020 13:35:18 +0100 Marco Elver <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 10 lines · Qian Cai
Quoted 6 lines · Matthew Wilcox

I'm really not a fan of exposing the internals of a percpu_counter outside the percpu_counter.h file. Why shouldn't this be fixed by putting the READ_ONCE() inside percpu_counter_read()?

It is because not all places suffer from a data race. For example, in __wb_update_bandwidth(), it was protected by a lock. I was a bit worry about blindly adding READ_ONCE() inside percpu_counter_read() might has unexpected side-effect. For example, it is unnecessary to have READ_ONCE() for a volatile variable. So, I thought just to keep the change minimal with a trade off by exposing a bit internal details as you mentioned.

However, I had also copied the percpu maintainers to see if they have any preferences?

I would not add READ_ONCE to percpu_counter_read(), given the writes (increments) are not atomic either, so not much is gained.

Notice that this is inside a WARN_ONCE, so you may argue that a data race here doesn't matter to the correct behaviour of the system (except if you have panic_on_warn on).

For the warning to trigger, vm_committed_as must decrease. Assume that a data race (assuming bad compiler optimizations) can somehow accomplish this, then the load or write must cause a transient value to somehow be less than a stable value. My hypothesis is this is very unlikely.

Quoted 6 lines

Given the fact this is a WARN_ONCE, and the fact that a transient decrease in the value is unlikely, you may consider 'VM_WARN_ONCE(data_race(percpu_counter_read(&vm_committed_as)) < ...)'. That way you won't modify percpu_counter_read and still catch unintended races elsewhere.

Quoted 2 lines

That, or add an alternative version of per_cpu_counter_read() to the percpu API. A very carefully commented version!

I send a patch to use data_race() which should be sufficient,

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/