4.14.171-stable review
Subsystems (3)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 132/173 KVM: VMX: Add non-canonical check on writes to RTIT address MSRs
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fe6ed369fca98e99df55c932b85782a5687526b5 ]
Reject writes to RTIT address MSRs if the data being written is a non-canonical address as the MSRs are subject to canonical checks, e.g. KVM will trigger an unchecked #GP when loading the values to hardware during pt_guest_enter().
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 8033 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 8033 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c new file +8033 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,8033 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* +* Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux +* +* This module enables machines with Intel VT-x extensions to run virtual +* machines without emulation or binary translation. +* +* Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc. +* Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates. +* +* Authors: +* Avi Kivity <[email protected]> +* Yaniv Kamay <[email protected]> +*/ + +#include <linux/frame.h> +#include <linux/highmem.h> +#include <linux/hrtimer.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/kvm_host.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/moduleparam.h> +#include <linux/mod_devicetable.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/sched/smt.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/tboot.h> +#include <linux/trace_events.h> + +#include <asm/apic.h> +#include <asm/asm.h> +#include <asm/cpu.h> +#include <asm/debugreg.h> +#include <asm/desc.h> +#include <asm/fpu/internal.h> +#include <asm/io.h> +#include <asm/irq_remapping.h> +#include <asm/kexec.h> +#include <asm/perf_event.h> +#include <asm/mce.h> +#include <asm/mmu_context.h> +#include <asm/mshyperv.h> +#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h> +#include <asm/virtext.h> +#include <asm/vmx.h> + +#include "capabilities.h" +#include "cpuid.h" +#include "evmcs.h" +#include "irq.h" +#include "kvm_cache_regs.h" +#include "lapic.h" +#include "mmu.h" +#include "nested.h" +#include "ops.h" +#include "pmu.h" +#include "trace.h" +#include "vmcs.h" +#include "vmcs12.h" +#include "vmx.h" +#include "x86.h" + +MODULE_AUTHOR ("Qumranet" ); +MODULE_LICENSE ("GPL" ); + +static const struct x86_cpu_id vmx_cpu_id[] = { +X86_FEATURE_MATCH (X86_FEATURE_VMX ), + {} +}; +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE (x86cpu, vmx_cpu_id); + +bool __read_mostly enable_vpid =1 ; +module_param_named (vpid, enable_vpid, bool,0444 ); + +static bool __read_mostly enable_vnmi =1 ; +module_param_named (vnmi, enable_vnmi, bool,S_IRUGO ); + +bool __read_mostly flexpriority_enabled =1 ; +module_param_named (flexpriority, flexpriority_enabled, bool,S_IRUGO ); + +bool __read_mostly enable_ept =1 ; +module_param_named (ept, enable_ept, bool,S_IRUGO ); + +bool __read_mostly enable_unrestricted_guest =1 ; +module_param_named (unrestricted_guest, + enable_unrestricted_guest, bool,S_IRUGO ); + +bool __read_mostly enable_ept_ad_bits =1 ; +module_param_named (eptad, enable_ept_ad_bits, bool,S_IRUGO ); + +static bool __read_mostly emulate_invalid_guest_state = true; +module_param (emulate_invalid_guest_state, bool,S_IRUGO ); + +static bool __read_mostly fasteoi =1 ; +module_param (fasteoi, bool,S_IRUGO ); + +static bool __read_mostly enable_apicv =1 ; +module_param (enable_apicv, bool,S_IRUGO ); + +/* +* If nested=1, nested virtualization is supported, i.e., guests may use +* VMX and be a hypervisor for its own guests. If nested=0, guests may not +* use VMX instructions. +*/ +static bool __read_mostly nested =1 ; +module_param (nested, bool,S_IRUGO ); + +bool __read_mostly enable_pml =1 ; +module_param_named (pml, enable_pml, bool,S_IRUGO ); + +static bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcs =0 ; +module_param (dump_invalid_vmcs, bool,0644 ); + +#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC 1 +#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV 2 + +#define KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX 0xffffffffffffffffULL + +/* Guest_tsc -> host_tsc conversion requires 64-bit division. */ +static int __read_mostly cpu_preemption_timer_multi; +static bool __read_mostly enable_preemption_timer =1 ; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +module_param_named (preemption_timer, enable_preemption_timer, bool,S_IRUGO ); +#endif + +#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_OFF (X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD) +#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST X86_CR0_NE +#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON \ + (KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST | \ + X86_CR0_WP | X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE) +#define KVM_CR4_GUEST_OWNED_BITS \ + (X86_CR4_PVI | X86_CR4_DE | X86_CR4_PCE | X86_CR4_OSFXSR \ + | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | X86_CR4_LA57 | X86_CR4_TSD) + +#define KVM_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST X86_CR4_VMXE +#define KVM_PMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON (X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_VMXE) +#define KVM_RMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON (X86_CR4_VME | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_VMXE) + +#define RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS (~(X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM)) + +#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS_MASK (~(RTIT_STATUS_FILTEREN | \ + RTIT_STATUS_CONTEXTEN | RTIT_STATUS_TRIGGEREN | \ + RTIT_STATUS_ERROR | RTIT_STATUS_STOPPED | \ + RTIT_STATUS_BYTECNT)) + +#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE_MASK \ + (~((1UL << cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(vcpu)) - 1) | 0x7f) + +/* +* These 2 parameters are used to config the controls for Pause-Loop Exiting: +* ple_gap: upper bound on the amount of time between two successive +* executions of PAUSE in a loop. Also indicate if ple enabled. +* According to test, this time is usually smaller than 128 cycles. +* ple_window: upper bound on the amount of time a guest is allowed to execute +* in a PAUSE loop. Tests indicate that most spinlocks are held for +* less than 2^12 cycles +* Time is measured based on a counter that runs at the same rate as the TSC, +* refer SDM volume 3b section 21.6.13 & 22.1.3. +*/ +static unsigned int ple_gap =KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_GAP ; +module_param (ple_gap, uint,0444 ); + +static unsigned int ple_window =KVM_VMX_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW ; +module_param (ple_window, uint,0444 ); + +/* Default doubles per-vcpu window every exit. */ +static unsigned int ple_window_grow =KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_GROW ; +module_param (ple_window_grow, uint,0444 ); + +/* Default resets per-vcpu window every exit to ple_window. */ +static unsigned int ple_window_shrink =KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_SHRINK ; +module_param (ple_window_shrink, uint,0444 ); + +/* Default is to compute the maximum so we can never overflow. */ +static unsigned int ple_window_max =KVM_VMX_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_MAX ; +module_param (ple_window_max, uint,0444 ); + +/* Default is SYSTEM mode, 1 for host-guest mode */ +int __read_mostly pt_mode =PT_MODE_SYSTEM ; +module_param (pt_mode, int,S_IRUGO ); + +static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (vmx_l1d_should_flush); +static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (vmx_l1d_flush_cond); +static DEFINE_MUTEX (vmx_l1d_flush_mutex); + +/* Storage for pre module init parameter parsing */ +static enum vmx_l1d_flush_state __read_mostly vmentry_l1d_flush_param =VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO ; + +static const struct { +const char *option; +bool for_parse; +} vmentry_l1d_param[] = { + [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO ] = {"auto" , true}, + [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER ] = {"never" , true}, + [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND ] = {"cond" , true}, + [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS ] = {"always" , true}, + [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED ] = {"EPT disabled" , false}, + [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED ] = {"not required" , false}, +}; + +#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4 +static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages; + +static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush (enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf) +{ +struct page *page; +unsigned int i; + +if (!boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_L1TF )) { + l1tf_vmx_mitigation =VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED ; +return 0 ; + } + +if (!enable_ept) { + l1tf_vmx_mitigation =VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED ; +return 0 ; + } + +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES )) { +u64 msr; + +rdmsrl (MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES , msr); +if (msr &ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH ) { + l1tf_vmx_mitigation =VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED ; +return 0 ; + } + } + +/* If set to auto use the default l1tf mitigation method */ +if (l1tf ==VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO ) { +switch (l1tf_mitigation) { +case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF : + l1tf =VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER ; +break ; +case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN : +case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH : +case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT : + l1tf =VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND ; +break ; +case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL : +case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE : + l1tf =VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS ; +break ; + } + }else if (l1tf_mitigation ==L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE ) { + l1tf =VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS ; + } + +if (l1tf !=VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER && !vmx_l1d_flush_pages && + !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D )) { +/* +* This allocation for vmx_l1d_flush_pages is not tied to a VM +* lifetime and so should not be charged to a memcg. +*/ + page =alloc_pages (GFP_KERNEL ,L1D_CACHE_ORDER ); +if (!page) +return -ENOMEM ; + vmx_l1d_flush_pages =page_address (page); + +/* +* Initialize each page with a different pattern in +* order to protect against KSM in the nested +* virtualization case. +*/ +for (i =0 ; i <1u <<L1D_CACHE_ORDER ; ++i) { +memset (vmx_l1d_flush_pages + i *PAGE_SIZE , i +1 , +PAGE_SIZE ); + } + } + + l1tf_vmx_mitigation = l1tf; + +if (l1tf !=VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER ) +static_branch_enable (&vmx_l1d_should_flush); +else +static_branch_disable (&vmx_l1d_should_flush); + +if (l1tf ==VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND ) +static_branch_enable (&vmx_l1d_flush_cond); +else +static_branch_disable (&vmx_l1d_flush_cond); +return 0 ; +} + +static int vmentry_l1d_flush_parse (const char *s) +{ +unsigned int i; + +if (s) { +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (vmentry_l1d_param); i++) { +if (vmentry_l1d_param[i].for_parse && +sysfs_streq (s, vmentry_l1d_param[i].option)) +return i; + } + } +return -EINVAL ; +} + +static int vmentry_l1d_flush_set (const char *s,const struct kernel_param *kp) +{ +int l1tf, ret; + + l1tf =vmentry_l1d_flush_parse (s); +if (l1tf <0 ) +return l1tf; + +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_BUG_L1TF )) +return 0 ; + +/* +* Has vmx_init() run already? If not then this is the pre init +* parameter parsing. In that case just store the value and let +* vmx_init() do the proper setup after enable_ept has been +* established. +*/ +if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation ==VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO ) { + vmentry_l1d_flush_param = l1tf; +return 0 ; + } + +mutex_lock (&vmx_l1d_flush_mutex); + ret =vmx_setup_l1d_flush (l1tf); +mutex_unlock (&vmx_l1d_flush_mutex); +return ret; +} + +static int vmentry_l1d_flush_get (char *s,const struct kernel_param *kp) +{ +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (l1tf_vmx_mitigation >=ARRAY_SIZE (vmentry_l1d_param))) +return sprintf (s,"???\n" ); + +return sprintf (s,"%s\n" , vmentry_l1d_param[l1tf_vmx_mitigation].option); +} + +static const struct kernel_param_ops vmentry_l1d_flush_ops = { + .set = vmentry_l1d_flush_set, + .get = vmentry_l1d_flush_get, +}; +module_param_cb (vmentry_l1d_flush, &vmentry_l1d_flush_ops,NULL ,0644 ); + +static bool guest_state_valid (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +static u32 vmx_segment_access_rights (struct kvm_segment *var); +static __always_inline void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, +u32 msr,int type); + +void vmx_vmexit (void ); + +#define vmx_insn_failed(fmt...) \ +do { \ + WARN_ONCE(1, fmt); \ + pr_warn_ratelimited(fmt); \ +} while (0) + +asmlinkage void vmread_error(unsigned long field, bool fault) +{ +if (fault) +kvm_spurious_fault (); +else +vmx_insn_failed ("kvm: vmread failed: field=%lx\n" , field); +} + +noinline void vmwrite_error(unsigned long field, unsigned long value) +{ +vmx_insn_failed ("kvm: vmwrite failed: field=%lx val=%lx err=%d\n" , + field, value,vmcs_read32 (VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR )); +} + +noinline void vmclear_error(struct vmcs *vmcs, u64 phys_addr) +{ +vmx_insn_failed ("kvm: vmclear failed: %p/%llx\n" , vmcs, phys_addr); +} + +noinline void vmptrld_error(struct vmcs *vmcs, u64 phys_addr) +{ +vmx_insn_failed ("kvm: vmptrld failed: %p/%llx\n" , vmcs, phys_addr); +} + +noinline void invvpid_error(unsigned long ext, u16 vpid, gva_t gva) +{ +vmx_insn_failed ("kvm: invvpid failed: ext=0x%lx vpid=%u gva=0x%lx\n" , + ext, vpid, gva); +} + +noinline void invept_error(unsigned long ext, u64 eptp, gpa_t gpa) +{ +vmx_insn_failed ("kvm: invept failed: ext=0x%lx eptp=%llx gpa=0x%llx\n" , + ext, eptp, gpa); +} + +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea); +DEFINE_PER_CPU (struct vmcs *, current_vmcs); +/* +* We maintain a per-CPU linked-list of VMCS loaded on that CPU. This is needed +* when a CPU is brought down, and we need to VMCLEAR all VMCSs loaded on it. +*/ +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, loaded_vmcss_on_cpu); + +/* +* We maintian a per-CPU linked-list of vCPU, so in wakeup_handler() we +* can find which vCPU should be waken up. +*/ +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, blocked_vcpu_on_cpu); +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(spinlock_t, blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock); + +static DECLARE_BITMAP(vmx_vpid_bitmap, VMX_NR_VPIDS); +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK (vmx_vpid_lock); + +struct vmcs_config vmcs_config; +struct vmx_capability vmx_capability; + +#define VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD (seg) \ + [VCPU_SREG_##seg] = { \ + .selector = GUEST_##seg##_SELECTOR, \ + .base = GUEST_##seg##_BASE, \ + .limit = GUEST_##seg##_LIMIT, \ + .ar_bytes = GUEST_##seg##_AR_BYTES, \ + } + +static const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field { +unsigned selector; +unsigned base; +unsigned limit; +unsigned ar_bytes; +} kvm_vmx_segment_fields[] = { +VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD (CS ), +VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD (DS ), +VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD (ES ), +VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD (FS ), +VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD (GS ), +VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD (SS ), +VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD (TR ), +VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD (LDTR ), +}; + +u64 host_efer; +static unsigned long host_idt_base; + +/* +* Though SYSCALL is only supported in 64-bit mode on Intel CPUs, kvm +* will emulate SYSCALL in legacy mode if the vendor string in guest +* CPUID.0:{EBX,ECX,EDX} is "AuthenticAMD" or "AMDisbetter!" To +* support this emulation, IA32_STAR must always be included in +* vmx_msr_index[], even in i386 builds. +*/ +const u32 vmx_msr_index[] = { +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, MSR_LSTAR, MSR_CSTAR, +#endif + MSR_EFER, MSR_TSC_AUX, MSR_STAR, + MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, +}; + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) +static bool __read_mostly enlightened_vmcs = true; +module_param(enlightened_vmcs, bool, 0444); + +/* check_ept_pointer() should be under protection of ept_pointer_lock. */ +static void check_ept_pointer_match(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; + u64 tmp_eptp = INVALID_PAGE; + int i; + + kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) { + if (!VALID_PAGE(tmp_eptp)) { + tmp_eptp = to_vmx(vcpu)->ept_pointer; + } else if (tmp_eptp != to_vmx(vcpu)->ept_pointer) { + to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointers_match + = EPT_POINTERS_MISMATCH; + return; + } + } + + to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointers_match = EPT_POINTERS_MATCH; +} + +static int kvm_fill_hv_flush_list_func(struct hv_guest_mapping_flush_list *flush, + void *data) +{ + struct kvm_tlb_range *range = data; + + return hyperv_fill_flush_guest_mapping_list(flush, range->start_gfn, + range->pages); +} + +static inline int __hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range(struct kvm *kvm, + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_tlb_range *range) +{ + u64 ept_pointer = to_vmx(vcpu)->ept_pointer; + + /* + * FLUSH_GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_SPACE hypercall needs address + * of the base of EPT PML4 table, strip off EPT configuration + * information. + */ + if (range) + return hyperv_flush_guest_mapping_range(ept_pointer & PAGE_MASK, + kvm_fill_hv_flush_list_func, (void *)range); + else + return hyperv_flush_guest_mapping(ept_pointer & PAGE_MASK); +} + +static int hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range(struct kvm *kvm, + struct kvm_tlb_range *range) +{ + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; + int ret = 0, i; + + spin_lock(&to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointer_lock); + + if (to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointers_match == EPT_POINTERS_CHECK) + check_ept_pointer_match(kvm); + + if (to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointers_match != EPT_POINTERS_MATCH) { + kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) { + /* If ept_pointer is invalid pointer, bypass flush request. */ + if (VALID_PAGE(to_vmx(vcpu)->ept_pointer)) + ret |= __hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range( + kvm, vcpu, range); + } + } else { + ret = __hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range(kvm, + kvm_get_vcpu(kvm, 0), range); + } + + spin_unlock(&to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointer_lock); + return ret; +} +static int hv_remote_flush_tlb(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + return hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range(kvm, NULL); +} + +static int hv_enable_direct_tlbflush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs; + struct hv_partition_assist_pg **p_hv_pa_pg = + &vcpu->kvm->arch.hyperv.hv_pa_pg; + /* + * Synthetic VM-Exit is not enabled in current code and so All + * evmcs in singe VM shares same assist page. + */ + if (!*p_hv_pa_pg) + *p_hv_pa_pg = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + + if (!*p_hv_pa_pg) + return -ENOMEM; + + evmcs = (struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *)to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->vmcs; + + evmcs->partition_assist_page = + __pa(*p_hv_pa_pg); + evmcs->hv_vm_id = (unsigned long)vcpu->kvm; + evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.nested_flush_hypercall = 1; + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) */ + +/* + * Comment's format: document - errata name - stepping - processor name. + * Refer from + * https://www.virtualbox.org/svn/vbox/trunk/src/VBox/VMM/VMMR0/HMR0.cpp + */ +static u32 vmx_preemption_cpu_tfms[] = { +/* 323344.pdf - BA86 - D0 - Xeon 7500 Series */ +0x000206E6, +/* 323056.pdf - AAX65 - C2 - Xeon L3406 */ +/* 322814.pdf - AAT59 - C2 - i7-600, i5-500, i5-400 and i3-300 Mobile */ +/* 322911.pdf - AAU65 - C2 - i5-600, i3-500 Desktop and Pentium G6950 */ +0x00020652, +/* 322911.pdf - AAU65 - K0 - i5-600, i3-500 Desktop and Pentium G6950 */ +0x00020655, +/* 322373.pdf - AAO95 - B1 - Xeon 3400 Series */ +/* 322166.pdf - AAN92 - B1 - i7-800 and i5-700 Desktop */ +/* + * 320767.pdf - AAP86 - B1 - + * i7-900 Mobile Extreme, i7-800 and i7-700 Mobile + */ +0x000106E5, +/* 321333.pdf - AAM126 - C0 - Xeon 3500 */ +0x000106A0, +/* 321333.pdf - AAM126 - C1 - Xeon 3500 */ +0x000106A1, +/* 320836.pdf - AAJ124 - C0 - i7-900 Desktop Extreme and i7-900 Desktop */ +0x000106A4, + /* 321333.pdf - AAM126 - D0 - Xeon 3500 */ + /* 321324.pdf - AAK139 - D0 - Xeon 5500 */ + /* 320836.pdf - AAJ124 - D0 - i7-900 Extreme and i7-900 Desktop */ +0x000106A5, + /* Xeon E3-1220 V2 */ +0x000306A8, +}; + +static inline bool cpu_has_broken_vmx_preemption_timer(void) +{ + u32 eax = cpuid_eax(0x00000001), i; + + /* Clear the reserved bits */ + eax &= ~(0x3U << 14 | 0xfU << 28); + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_preemption_cpu_tfms); i++) + if (eax == vmx_preemption_cpu_tfms[i]) + return true; + + return false; +} + +static inline bool cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + return flexpriority_enabled && lapic_in_kernel(vcpu); +} + +static inline bool report_flexpriority(void) +{ + return flexpriority_enabled; +} + +static inline int __find_msr_index(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < vmx->nmsrs; ++i) + if (vmx_msr_index[vmx->guest_msrs[i].index] == msr) + return i; + return -1; +} + +struct shared_msr_entry *find_msr_entry(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr) +{ + int i; + + i = __find_msr_index(vmx, msr); + if (i >= 0) + return &vmx->guest_msrs[i]; + return NULL; +} + +static int vmx_set_guest_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct shared_msr_entry *msr, u64 data) +{ + int ret = 0; + + u64 old_msr_data = msr->data; + msr->data = data; + if (msr - vmx->guest_msrs < vmx->save_nmsrs) { + preempt_disable(); + ret = kvm_set_shared_msr(msr->index, msr->data, + msr->mask); + preempt_enable(); + if (ret) + msr->data = old_msr_data; + } + return ret; +} + +void loaded_vmcs_init(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs) +{ + vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->vmcs); + if (loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs && loaded_vmcs->launched) + vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs); + loaded_vmcs->cpu = -1; + loaded_vmcs->launched = 0; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE +/* + * This bitmap is used to indicate whether the vmclear + * operation is enabled on all cpus. All disabled by + * default. + */ +static cpumask_t crash_vmclear_enabled_bitmap = CPU_MASK_NONE; + +static inline void crash_enable_local_vmclear(int cpu) +{ + cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &crash_vmclear_enabled_bitmap); +} + +static inline void crash_disable_local_vmclear(int cpu) +{ + cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, &crash_vmclear_enabled_bitmap); +} + +static inline int crash_local_vmclear_enabled(int cpu) +{ + return cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, &crash_vmclear_enabled_bitmap); +} + +static void crash_vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss(void) +{ + int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); + struct loaded_vmcs *v; + + if (!crash_local_vmclear_enabled(cpu)) + return; + + list_for_each_entry(v, &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu), + loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link) + vmcs_clear(v->vmcs); +} +#else +static inline void crash_enable_local_vmclear(int cpu) { } +static inline void crash_disable_local_vmclear(int cpu) { } +#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE */ + +static void __loaded_vmcs_clear(void *arg) +{ + struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs = arg; + int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); + + if (loaded_vmcs->cpu != cpu) + return; /* vcpu migration can race with cpu offline */ + if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) == loaded_vmcs->vmcs) + per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = NULL; + crash_disable_local_vmclear(cpu); + list_del(&loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link); + + /* + * we should ensure updating loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link + * is before setting loaded_vmcs->vcpu to -1 which is done in + * loaded_vmcs_init. Otherwise, other cpu can see vcpu = -1 fist + * then adds the vmcs into percpu list before it is deleted. + */ + smp_wmb(); + + loaded_vmcs_init(loaded_vmcs); + crash_enable_local_vmclear(cpu); +} + +void loaded_vmcs_clear(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs) +{ + int cpu = loaded_vmcs->cpu; + + if (cpu != -1) + smp_call_function_single(cpu, + __loaded_vmcs_clear, loaded_vmcs, 1); +} + +static bool vmx_segment_cache_test_set(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg, + unsigned field) +{ + bool ret; + u32 mask = 1 << (seg * SEG_FIELD_NR + field); + + if (!kvm_register_is_available(&vmx->vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS)) { + kvm_register_mark_available(&vmx->vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS); + vmx->segment_cache.bitmask = 0; + } + ret = vmx->segment_cache.bitmask & mask; + vmx->segment_cache.bitmask |= mask; + return ret; +} + +static u16 vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg) +{ + u16 *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].selector; + + if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_SEL)) + *p = vmcs_read16(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].selector); + return *p; +} + +static ulong vmx_read_guest_seg_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg) +{ + ulong *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].base; + + if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_BASE)) + *p = vmcs_readl(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].base); + return *p; +} + +static u32 vmx_read_guest_seg_limit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg) +{ + u32 *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].limit; + + if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_LIMIT)) + *p = vmcs_read32(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].limit); + return *p; +} + +static u32 vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg) +{ + u32 *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].ar; + + if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_AR)) + *p = vmcs_read32(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].ar_bytes); + return *p; +} + +void update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + u32 eb; + + eb = (1u << PF_VECTOR) | (1u << UD_VECTOR) | (1u << MC_VECTOR) | + (1u << DB_VECTOR) | (1u << AC_VECTOR); + /* + * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately + * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap. + * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway + * as VMware does. + */ + if (enable_vmware_backdoor) + eb |= (1u << GP_VECTOR); + if ((vcpu->guest_debug & + (KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)) == + (KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)) + eb |= 1u << BP_VECTOR; + if (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active) + eb = ~0; + if (enable_ept) + eb &= ~(1u << PF_VECTOR); /* bypass_guest_pf = 0 */ + + /* When we are running a nested L2 guest and L1 specified for it a + * certain exception bitmap, we must trap the same exceptions and pass + * them to L1. When running L2, we will only handle the exceptions + * specified above if L1 did not want them. + */ + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) + eb |= get_vmcs12(vcpu)->exception_bitmap; + + vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb); +} + +/* + * Check if MSR is intercepted for currently loaded MSR bitmap. + */ +static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr) +{ + unsigned long *msr_bitmap; + int f = sizeof(unsigned long); + + if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) + return true; + + msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap; + + if (msr <= 0x1fff) { + return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f); + } else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) { + msr &= 0x1fff; + return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f); + } + + return true; +} + +static void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, + unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit) +{ + vm_entry_controls_clearbit(vmx, entry); + vm_exit_controls_clearbit(vmx, exit); +} + +int vmx_find_msr_index(struct vmx_msrs *m, u32 msr) +{ + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < m->nr; ++i) { + if (m->val[i].index == msr) + return i; + } + return -ENOENT; +} + +static void clear_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr) +{ + int i; + struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload; + + switch (msr) { + case MSR_EFER: + if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer()) { + clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx, + VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER, + VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER); + return; + } + break; + case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL: + if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl()) { + clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx, + VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, + VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL); + return; + } + break; + } + i = vmx_find_msr_index(&m->guest, msr); + if (i < 0) + goto skip_guest; + --m->guest.nr; + m->guest.val[i] = m->guest.val[m->guest.nr]; + vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->guest.nr); + +skip_guest: + i = vmx_find_msr_index(&m->host, msr); + if (i < 0) + return; + + --m->host.nr; + m->host.val[i] = m->host.val[m->host.nr]; + vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->host.nr); +} + +static void add_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, + unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit, + unsigned long guest_val_vmcs, unsigned long host_val_vmcs, + u64 guest_val, u64 host_val) +{ + vmcs_write64(guest_val_vmcs, guest_val); + if (host_val_vmcs != HOST_IA32_EFER) + vmcs_write64(host_val_vmcs, host_val); + vm_entry_controls_setbit(vmx, entry); + vm_exit_controls_setbit(vmx, exit); +} + +static void add_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr, + u64 guest_val, u64 host_val, bool entry_only) +{ + int i, j = 0; + struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload; + + switch (msr) { + case MSR_EFER: + if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer()) { + add_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx, + VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER, + VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER, + GUEST_IA32_EFER, + HOST_IA32_EFER, + guest_val, host_val); + return; + } + break; + case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL: + if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl()) { + add_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx, + VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, + VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, + GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, + HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, + guest_val, host_val); + return; + } + break; + case MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE: + /* PEBS needs a quiescent period after being disabled (to write + * a record). Disabling PEBS through VMX MSR swapping doesn't + * provide that period, so a CPU could write host's record into + * guest's memory. + */ + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE, 0); + } + + i = vmx_find_msr_index(&m->guest, msr); + if (!entry_only) + j = vmx_find_msr_index(&m->host, msr); + + if ((i < 0 && m->guest.nr == NR_LOADSTORE_MSRS) || + (j < 0 && m->host.nr == NR_LOADSTORE_MSRS)) { + printk_once(KERN_WARNING "Not enough msr switch entries. " + "Can't add msr %x\n", msr); + return; + } + if (i < 0) { + i = m->guest.nr++; + vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->guest.nr); + } + m->guest.val[i].index = msr; + m->guest.val[i].value = guest_val; + + if (entry_only) + return; + + if (j < 0) { + j = m->host.nr++; + vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->host.nr); + } + m->host.val[j].index = msr; + m->host.val[j].value = host_val; +} + +static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int efer_offset) +{ + u64 guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer; + u64 ignore_bits = 0; + + /* Shadow paging assumes NX to be available. */ + if (!enable_ept) + guest_efer |= EFER_NX; + + /* + * LMA and LME handled by hardware; SCE meaningless outside long mode. + */ + ignore_bits |= EFER_SCE; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + ignore_bits |= EFER_LMA | EFER_LME; + /* SCE is meaningful only in long mode on Intel */ + if (guest_efer & EFER_LMA) + ignore_bits &= ~(u64)EFER_SCE; +#endif + + /* + * On EPT, we can't emulate NX, so we must switch EFER atomically. + * On CPUs that support "load IA32_EFER", always switch EFER + * atomically, since it's faster than switching it manually. + */ + if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer() || + (enable_ept && ((vmx->vcpu.arch.efer ^ host_efer) & EFER_NX))) { + if (!(guest_efer & EFER_LMA)) + guest_efer &= ~EFER_LME; + if (guest_efer != host_efer) + add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER, + guest_efer, host_efer, false); + else + clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER); + return false; + } else { + clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER); + + guest_efer &= ~ignore_bits; + guest_efer |= host_efer & ignore_bits; + + vmx->guest_msrs[efer_offset].data = guest_efer; + vmx->guest_msrs[efer_offset].mask = ~ignore_bits; + + return true; + } +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 +/* + * On 32-bit kernels, VM exits still load the FS and GS bases from the + * VMCS rather than the segment table. KVM uses this helper to figure + * out the current bases to poke them into the VMCS before entry. + */ +static unsigned long segment_base(u16 selector) +{ + struct desc_struct *table; + unsigned long v; + + if (!(selector & ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK)) + return 0; + + table = get_current_gdt_ro(); + + if ((selector & SEGMENT_TI_MASK) == SEGMENT_LDT) { + u16 ldt_selector = kvm_read_ldt(); + + if (!(ldt_selector & ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK)) + return 0; + + table = (struct desc_struct *)segment_base(ldt_selector); + } + v = get_desc_base(&table[selector >> 3]); + return v; +} +#endif + +static inline void pt_load_msr(struct pt_ctx *ctx, u32 addr_range) +{ + u32 i; + + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, ctx->status); + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, ctx->output_base); + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK, ctx->output_mask); + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH, ctx->cr3_match); + for (i = 0; i < addr_range; i++) { + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, ctx->addr_a[i]); + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, ctx->addr_b[i]); + } +} + +static inline void pt_save_msr(struct pt_ctx *ctx, u32 addr_range) +{ + u32 i; + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, ctx->status); + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, ctx->output_base); + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK, ctx->output_mask); + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH, ctx->cr3_match); + for (i = 0; i < addr_range; i++) { + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, ctx->addr_a[i]); + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, ctx->addr_b[i]); + } +} + +static void pt_guest_enter(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_SYSTEM) + return; + + /* + * GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL is already set in the VMCS. + * Save host state before VM entry. + */ + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl); + if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) { + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0); + pt_save_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.host, vmx->pt_desc.addr_range); + pt_load_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.guest, vmx->pt_desc.addr_range); + } +} + +static void pt_guest_exit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_SYSTEM) + return; + + if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) { + pt_save_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.guest, vmx->pt_desc.addr_range); + pt_load_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.host, vmx->pt_desc.addr_range); + } + + /* Reload host state (IA32_RTIT_CTL will be cleared on VM exit). */ + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl); +} + +void vmx_set_host_fs_gs(struct vmcs_host_state *host, u16 fs_sel, u16 gs_sel, + unsigned long fs_base, unsigned long gs_base) +{ + if (unlikely(fs_sel != host->fs_sel)) { + if (!(fs_sel & 7)) + vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, fs_sel); + else + vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, 0); + host->fs_sel = fs_sel; + } + if (unlikely(gs_sel != host->gs_sel)) { + if (!(gs_sel & 7)) + vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, gs_sel); + else + vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, 0); + host->gs_sel = gs_sel; + } + if (unlikely(fs_base != host->fs_base)) { + vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, fs_base); + host->fs_base = fs_base; + } + if (unlikely(gs_base != host->gs_base)) { + vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, gs_base); + host->gs_base = gs_base; + } +} + +void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + struct vmcs_host_state *host_state; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); +#endif + unsigned long fs_base, gs_base; + u16 fs_sel, gs_sel; + int i; + + vmx->req_immediate_exit = false; + + /* + * Note that guest MSRs to be saved/restored can also be changed + * when guest state is loaded. This happens when guest transitions + * to/from long-mode by setting MSR_EFER.LMA. + */ + if (!vmx->guest_msrs_ready) { + vmx->guest_msrs_ready = true; + for (i = 0; i < vmx->save_nmsrs; ++i) + kvm_set_shared_msr(vmx->guest_msrs[i].index, + vmx->guest_msrs[i].data, + vmx->guest_msrs[i].mask); + + } + if (vmx->guest_state_loaded) + return; + + host_state = &vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state; + + /* + * Set host fs and gs selectors. Unfortunately, 22.2.3 does not + * allow segment selectors with cpl > 0 or ti == 1. + */ + host_state->ldt_sel = kvm_read_ldt(); + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + savesegment(ds, host_state->ds_sel); + savesegment(es, host_state->es_sel); + + gs_base = cpu_kernelmode_gs_base(cpu); + if (likely(is_64bit_mm(current->mm))) { + save_fsgs_for_kvm(); + fs_sel = current->thread.fsindex; + gs_sel = current->thread.gsindex; + fs_base = current->thread.fsbase; + vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = current->thread.gsbase; + } else { + savesegment(fs, fs_sel); + savesegment(gs, gs_sel); + fs_base = read_msr(MSR_FS_BASE); + vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = read_msr(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE); + } + + wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base); +#else + savesegment(fs, fs_sel); + savesegment(gs, gs_sel); + fs_base = segment_base(fs_sel); + gs_base = segment_base(gs_sel); +#endif + + vmx_set_host_fs_gs(host_state, fs_sel, gs_sel, fs_base, gs_base); + vmx->guest_state_loaded = true; +} + +static void vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + struct vmcs_host_state *host_state; + + if (!vmx->guest_state_loaded) + return; + + host_state = &vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state; + + ++vmx->vcpu.stat.host_state_reload; + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base); +#endif + if (host_state->ldt_sel || (host_state->gs_sel & 7)) { + kvm_load_ldt(host_state->ldt_sel); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + load_gs_index(host_state->gs_sel); +#else + loadsegment(gs, host_state->gs_sel); +#endif + } + if (host_state->fs_sel & 7) + loadsegment(fs, host_state->fs_sel); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + if (unlikely(host_state->ds_sel | host_state->es_sel)) { + loadsegment(ds, host_state->ds_sel); + loadsegment(es, host_state->es_sel); + } +#endif + invalidate_tss_limit(); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base); +#endif + load_fixmap_gdt(raw_smp_processor_id()); + vmx->guest_state_loaded = false; + vmx->guest_msrs_ready = false; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +static u64 vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + preempt_disable(); + if (vmx->guest_state_loaded) + rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base); + preempt_enable(); + return vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base; +} + +static void vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data) +{ + preempt_disable(); + if (vmx->guest_state_loaded) + wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, data); + preempt_enable(); + vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base = data; +} +#endif + +static void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) +{ + struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu); + struct pi_desc old, new; + unsigned int dest; + + /* + * In case of hot-plug or hot-unplug, we may have to undo + * vmx_vcpu_pi_put even if there is no assigned device. And we + * always keep PI.NDST up to date for simplicity: it makes the + * code easier, and CPU migration is not a fast path. + */ + if (!pi_test_sn(pi_desc) && vcpu->cpu == cpu) + return; + + /* + * If the 'nv' field is POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR, do not change + * PI.NDST: pi_post_block is the one expected to change PID.NDST and the + * wakeup handler expects the vCPU to be on the blocked_vcpu_list that + * matches PI.NDST. Otherwise, a vcpu may not be able to be woken up + * correctly. + */ + if (pi_desc->nv == POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR || vcpu->cpu == cpu) { + pi_clear_sn(pi_desc); + goto after_clear_sn; + } + + /* The full case. */ + do { + old.control = new.control = pi_desc->control; + + dest = cpu_physical_id(cpu); + + if (x2apic_enabled()) + new.ndst = dest; + else + new.ndst = (dest << 8) & 0xFF00; + + new.sn = 0; + } while (cmpxchg64(&pi_desc->control, old.control, + new.control) != old.control); + +after_clear_sn: + + /* + * Clear SN before reading the bitmap. The VT-d firmware + * writes the bitmap and reads SN atomically (5.2.3 in the + * spec), so it doesn't really have a memory barrier that + * pairs with this, but we cannot do that and we need one. + */ + smp_mb__after_atomic(); + + if (!pi_is_pir_empty(pi_desc)) + pi_set_on(pi_desc); +} + +void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) +{ + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + bool already_loaded = vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu == cpu; + + if (!already_loaded) { + loaded_vmcs_clear(vmx->loaded_vmcs); + local_irq_disable(); + crash_disable_local_vmclear(cpu); + + /* + * Read loaded_vmcs->cpu should be before fetching + * loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link. + * See the comments in __loaded_vmcs_clear(). + */ + smp_rmb(); + + list_add(&vmx->loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link, + &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu)); + crash_enable_local_vmclear(cpu); + local_irq_enable(); + } + + if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) { + per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs; + vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs); + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); + } + + if (!already_loaded) { + void *gdt = get_current_gdt_ro(); + unsigned long sysenter_esp; + + kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu); + + /* + * Linux uses per-cpu TSS and GDT, so set these when switching + * processors. See 22.2.4. + */ + vmcs_writel(HOST_TR_BASE, + (unsigned long)&get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->tss.x86_tss); + vmcs_writel(HOST_GDTR_BASE, (unsigned long)gdt); /* 22.2.4 */ + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, sysenter_esp); + vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, sysenter_esp); /* 22.2.3 */ + + vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu = cpu; + } + + /* Setup TSC multiplier */ + if (kvm_has_tsc_control && + vmx->current_tsc_ratio != vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio) + decache_tsc_multiplier(vmx); +} + +/* + * Switches to specified vcpu, until a matching vcpu_put(), but assumes + * vcpu mutex is already taken. + */ +void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) +{ + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + + vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(vcpu, cpu); + + vmx_vcpu_pi_load(vcpu, cpu); + + vmx->host_pkru = read_pkru(); + vmx->host_debugctlmsr = get_debugctlmsr(); +} + +static void vmx_vcpu_pi_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu); + + if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm) || + !irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP) || + !kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu)) + return; + + /* Set SN when the vCPU is preempted */ + if (vcpu->preempted) + pi_set_sn(pi_desc); +} + +static void vmx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + vmx_vcpu_pi_put(vcpu); + + vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(to_vmx(vcpu)); +} + +static bool emulation_required(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + return emulate_invalid_guest_state && !guest_state_valid(vcpu); +} + +static void vmx_decache_cr0_guest_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + +unsigned long vmx_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + unsigned long rflags, save_rflags; + + if (!kvm_register_is_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS)) { + kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS); + rflags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS); + if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) { + rflags &= RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS; + save_rflags = vmx->rmode.save_rflags; + rflags |= save_rflags & ~RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS; + } + vmx->rflags = rflags; + } + return vmx->rflags; +} + +void vmx_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags) +{ + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + unsigned long old_rflags; + + if (enable_unrestricted_guest) { + kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS); + vmx->rflags = rflags; + vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, rflags); + return; + } + + old_rflags = vmx_get_rflags(vcpu); + vmx->rflags = rflags; + if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) { + vmx->rmode.save_rflags = rflags; + rflags |= X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM; + } + vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, rflags); + + if ((old_rflags ^ vmx->rflags) & X86_EFLAGS_VM) + vmx->emulation_required = emulation_required(vcpu); +} + +u32 vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + u32 interruptibility = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO); + int ret = 0; + + if (interruptibility & GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI) + ret |= KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI; + if (interruptibility & GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS) + ret |= KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS; + + return ret; +} + +void vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask) +{ + u32 interruptibility_old = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO); + u32 interruptibility = interruptibility_old; + + interruptibility &= ~(GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS); + + if (mask & KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS) + interruptibility |= GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS; + else if (mask & KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI) + interruptibility |= GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI; + + if ((interruptibility != interruptibility_old)) + vmcs_write32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, interruptibility); +} + +static int vmx_rtit_ctl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data) +{ + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + unsigned long value; + + /* + * Any MSR write that attempts to change bits marked reserved will + * case a #GP fault. + */ + if (data & vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask) + return 1; + + /* + * Any attempt to modify IA32_RTIT_CTL while TraceEn is set will + * result in a #GP unless the same write also clears TraceEn. + */ + if ((vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) && + ((vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl ^ data) & ~RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN)) + return 1; + + /* + * WRMSR to IA32_RTIT_CTL that sets TraceEn but clears this bit + * and FabricEn would cause #GP, if + * CPUID.(EAX=14H, ECX=0):ECX.SNGLRGNOUT[bit 2] = 0 + */ + if ((data & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) && !(data & RTIT_CTL_TOPA) && + !(data & RTIT_CTL_FABRIC_EN) && + !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, + PT_CAP_single_range_output)) + return 1; + + /* + * MTCFreq, CycThresh and PSBFreq encodings check, any MSR write that + * utilize encodings marked reserved will casue a #GP fault. + */ + value = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_mtc_periods); + if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_mtc) && + !test_bit((data & RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE) >> + RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE_OFFSET, &value)) + return 1; + value = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, + PT_CAP_cycle_thresholds); + if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_cyc) && + !test_bit((data & RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH) >> + RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH_OFFSET, &value)) + return 1; + value = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_periods); + if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_cyc) && + !test_bit((data & RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ) >> + RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ_OFFSET, &value)) + return 1; + + /* + * If ADDRx_CFG is reserved or the encodings is >2 will + * cause a #GP fault. + */ + value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR0) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR0_OFFSET; + if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.addr_range < 1)) || (value > 2)) + return 1; + value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR1) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR1_OFFSET; + if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.addr_range < 2)) || (value > 2)) + return 1; + value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR2) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR2_OFFSET; + if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.addr_range < 3)) || (value > 2)) + return 1; + value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR3) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR3_OFFSET; + if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.addr_range < 4)) || (value > 2)) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + unsigned long rip; + + /* + * Using VMCS.VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN on EPT misconfig depends on + * undefined behavior: Intel's SDM doesn't mandate the VMCS field be + * set when EPT misconfig occurs. In practice, real hardware updates + * VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN on EPT misconfig, but other hypervisors + * (namely Hyper-V) don't set it due to it being undefined behavior, + * i.e. we end up advancing IP with some random value. + */ + if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) || + to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) { + rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu); + rip += vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN); + kvm_rip_write(vcpu, rip); + } else { + if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP)) + return 0; + } + + /* skipping an emulated instruction also counts */ + vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0); + + return 1; +} + +static void vmx_clear_hlt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + /* + * Ensure that we clear the HLT state in the VMCS. We don't need to + * explicitly skip the instruction because if the HLT state is set, + * then the instruction is already executing and RIP has already been + * advanced. + */ + if (kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu->kvm) && + vmcs_read32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE) == GUEST_ACTIVITY_HLT) + vmcs_write32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE, GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE); +} + +static void vmx_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + unsigned nr = vcpu->arch.exception.nr; + bool has_error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code; + u32 error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.error_code; + u32 intr_info = nr | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK; + + kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu); + + if (has_error_code) { + vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE, error_code); + intr_info |= INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK; + } + + if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) { + int inc_eip = 0; + if (kvm_exception_is_soft(nr)) + inc_eip = vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len; + kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, nr, inc_eip); + return; + } + + WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->emulation_required); + + if (kvm_exception_is_soft(nr)) { + vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN, + vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len); + intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION; + } else + intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION; + + vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, intr_info); + + vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu); +} + +static bool vmx_rdtscp_supported(void) +{ + return cpu_has_vmx_rdtscp(); +} + +static bool vmx_invpcid_supported(void) +{ + return cpu_has_vmx_invpcid(); +} + +/* + * Swap MSR entry in host/guest MSR entry array. + */ +static void move_msr_up(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int from, int to) +{ + struct shared_msr_entry tmp; + + tmp = vmx->guest_msrs[to]; + vmx->guest_msrs[to] = vmx->guest_msrs[from]; + vmx->guest_msrs[from] = tmp; +} + +/* + * Set up the vmcs to automatically save and restore system + * msrs. Don't touch the 64-bit msrs if the guest is in legacy + * mode, as fiddling with msrs is very expensive. + */ +static void setup_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +{ + int save_nmsrs, index; + + save_nmsrs = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + /* + * The SYSCALL MSRs are only needed on long mode guests, and only + * when EFER.SCE is set. + */ + if (is_long_mode(&vmx->vcpu) && (vmx->vcpu.arch.efer & EFER_SCE)) { + index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_STAR); + if (index >= 0) + move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++); + index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_LSTAR); + if (index >= 0) + move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++); + index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK); + if (index >= 0) + move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++); + } +#endif + index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_EFER); + if (index >= 0 && update_transition_efer(vmx, index)) + move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++); + index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_TSC_AUX); + if (index >= 0 && guest_cpuid_has(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP)) + move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++); + index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL); + if (index >= 0) + move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++); + + vmx->save_nmsrs = save_nmsrs; + vmx->guest_msrs_ready = false; + + if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) + vmx_update_msr_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu); +} + +static u64 vmx_read_l1_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu); + + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && + (vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control & CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING)) + return vcpu->arch.tsc_offset - vmcs12->tsc_offset; + + return vcpu->arch.tsc_offset; +} + +static u64 vmx_write_l1_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset) +{ + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu); + u64 g_tsc_offset = 0; + + /* + * We're here if L1 chose not to trap WRMSR to TSC. According + * to the spec, this should set L1's TSC; The offset that L1 + * set for L2 remains unchanged, and still needs to be added + * to the newly set TSC to get L2's TSC. + */ + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && + (vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control & CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING)) + g_tsc_offset = vmcs12->tsc_offset; + + trace_kvm_write_tsc_offset(vcpu->vcpu_id, + vcpu->arch.tsc_offset - g_tsc_offset, + offset); + vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, offset + g_tsc_offset); + return offset + g_tsc_offset; +} + +/* + * nested_vmx_allowed() checks whether a guest should be allowed to use VMX + * instructions and MSRs (i.e., nested VMX). Nested VMX is disabled for + * all guests if the "nested" module option is off, and can also be disabled + * for a single guest by disabling its VMX cpuid bit. + */ +bool nested_vmx_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + return nested && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX); +} + +static inline bool vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + uint64_t val) +{ + uint64_t valid_bits = to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits; + + return !(val & ~valid_bits); +} + +static int vmx_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr) +{ + switch (msr->index) { + case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC: + if (!nested) + return 1; + return vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmcs_config.nested, msr->index, &msr->data); + default: + return 1; + } +} + +/* + * Reads an msr value (of 'msr_index') into 'pdata'. + * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise. + * Assumes vcpu_load() was already called. + */ +static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) +{ + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + struct shared_msr_entry *msr; + u32 index; + + switch (msr_info->index) { +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + case MSR_FS_BASE: + msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_FS_BASE); + break; + case MSR_GS_BASE: + msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GS_BASE); + break; + case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE: + msr_info->data = vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(vmx); + break; +#endif + case MSR_EFER: + return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info); + case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !(vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)) + return 1; + goto find_shared_msr; + case MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !vmx_has_waitpkg(vmx)) + return 1; + + msr_info->data = vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control; + break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) + return 1; + + msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl; + break; + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS: + msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS); + break; + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP: + msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP); + break; + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP: + msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP); + break; + case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS: + if (!kvm_mpx_supported() || + (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX))) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS); + break; + case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !(vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & + FEATURE_CONTROL_LMCE)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.mcg_ext_ctl; + break; + case MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL: + msr_info->data = vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control; + break; + case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC: + if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu)) + return 1; + return vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmx->nested.msrs, msr_info->index, + &msr_info->data); + case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL: + if (pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl; + break; + case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS: + if (pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.status; + break; + case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH: + if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) || + !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, + PT_CAP_cr3_filtering)) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.cr3_match; + break; + case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE: + if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) || + (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, + PT_CAP_topa_output) && + !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, + PT_CAP_single_range_output))) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_base; + break; + case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK: + if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) || + (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, + PT_CAP_topa_output) && + !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, + PT_CAP_single_range_output))) + return 1; + msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask; + break; + case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B: + index = msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A; + if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) || + (index >= 2 * intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, + PT_CAP_num_address_ranges))) + return 1; + if (is_noncanonical_address(data, vcpu)) + return 1; + if (index % 2) + msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_b[index / 2]; + else + msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2]; + break; + case MSR_TSC_AUX: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP)) + return 1; + goto find_shared_msr; + default: + find_shared_msr: + msr = find_msr_entry(vmx, msr_info->index); + if (msr) { + msr_info->data = msr->data; + break; + } + return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Writes msr value into the appropriate "register". + * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise. + * Assumes vcpu_load() was already called. + */ +static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) +{ + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + struct shared_msr_entry *msr; + int ret = 0; + u32 msr_index = msr_info->index; + u64 data = msr_info->data; + u32 index; + + switch (msr_index) { + case MSR_EFER: + ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info); + break; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + case MSR_FS_BASE: + vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx); + vmcs_writel(GUEST_FS_BASE, data); + break; + case MSR_GS_BASE: + vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx); + vmcs_writel(GUEST_GS_BASE, data); + break; + case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE: + vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(vmx, data); + break; +#endif + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS: + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) + get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_sysenter_cs = data; + vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, data); + break; + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP: + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) + get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_sysenter_eip = data; + vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, data); + break; + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP: + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) + get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_sysenter_esp = data; + vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, data); + break; + case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR: + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vm_exit_controls & + VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS) + get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_ia32_debugctl = data; + + ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info); + break; + + case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS: + if (!kvm_mpx_supported() || + (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX))) + return 1; + if (is_noncanonical_address(data & PAGE_MASK, vcpu) || + (data & MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS_RSVD)) + return 1; + vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, data); + break; + case MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !vmx_has_waitpkg(vmx)) + return 1; + + /* The reserved bit 1 and non-32 bit [63:32] should be zero */ + if (data & (BIT_ULL(1) | GENMASK_ULL(63, 32))) + return 1; + + vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control = data; + break; + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) + return 1; + + /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */ + if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD)) + return 1; + + vmx->spec_ctrl = data; + + if (!data) + break; + + /* + * For non-nested: + * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass + * it through. + * + * For nested: + * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in + * nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the + * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten + * in the merging. We update the vmcs01 here for L1 as well + * since it will end up touching the MSR anyway now. + */ + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, + MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, + MSR_TYPE_RW); + break; + case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !(vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)) + return 1; + if (data & ~(TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE | TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR)) + return 1; + goto find_shared_msr; + case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) + return 1; + + if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB) + return 1; + + if (!data) + break; + + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB); + + /* + * For non-nested: + * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass + * it through. + * + * For nested: + * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in + * nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the + * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten + * in the merging. + */ + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, + MSR_TYPE_W); + break; + case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT: + if (!kvm_pat_valid(data)) + return 1; + + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && + get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT) + get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_ia32_pat = data; + + if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) { + vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, data); + vcpu->arch.pat = data; + break; + } + ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info); + break; + case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST: + ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info); + break; + case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL: + if ((!msr_info->host_initiated && + !(to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control & + FEATURE_CONTROL_LMCE)) || + (data & ~MCG_EXT_CTL_LMCE_EN)) + return 1; + vcpu->arch.mcg_ext_ctl = data; + break; + case MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL: + if (!vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(vcpu, data) || + (to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control & + FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED && !msr_info->host_initiated)) + return 1; + vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control = data; + if (msr_info->host_initiated && data == 0) + vmx_leave_nested(vcpu); + break; + case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated) + return 1; /* they are read-only */ + if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu)) + return 1; + return vmx_set_vmx_msr(vcpu, msr_index, data); + case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL: + if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) || + vmx_rtit_ctl_check(vcpu, data) || + vmx->nested.vmxon) + return 1; + vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL, data); + vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl = data; + pt_update_intercept_for_msr(vmx); + break; + case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS: + if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) || + (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) || + (data & MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS_MASK)) + return 1; + vmx->pt_desc.guest.status = data; + break; + case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH: + if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) || + (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) || + !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, + PT_CAP_cr3_filtering)) + return 1; + vmx->pt_desc.guest.cr3_match = data; + break; + case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE: + if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) || + (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) || + (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, + PT_CAP_topa_output) && + !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, + PT_CAP_single_range_output)) || + (data & MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE_MASK)) + return 1; + vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_base = data; + break; + case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK: + if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) || + (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) || + (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, + PT_CAP_topa_output) && + !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, + PT_CAP_single_range_output))) + return 1; + vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask = data; + break; + case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B: + index = msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A; + if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) || + (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) || + (index >= 2 * intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, + PT_CAP_num_address_ranges))) + return 1; + if (is_noncanonical_address(data, vcpu)) + return 1; + if (index % 2) + vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_b[index / 2] = data; + else + vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2] = data; + break; + case MSR_TSC_AUX: + if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP)) + return 1; + /* Check reserved bit, higher 32 bits should be zero */ + if ((data >> 32) != 0) + return 1; + goto find_shared_msr; + + default: + find_shared_msr: + msr = find_msr_entry(vmx, msr_index); + if (msr) + ret = vmx_set_guest_msr(vmx, msr, data); + else + ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info); + } + + return ret; +} + +static void vmx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg) +{ + kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, reg); + + switch (reg) { + case VCPU_REGS_RSP: + vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP] = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RSP); + break; + case VCPU_REGS_RIP: + vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP] = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RIP); + break; + case VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR: + if (enable_ept) + ept_save_pdptrs(vcpu); + break; + case VCPU_EXREG_CR3: + if (enable_unrestricted_guest || (enable_ept && is_paging(vcpu))) + vcpu->arch.cr3 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3); + break; + default: + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + break; + } +} + +static __init int cpu_has_kvm_support(void) +{ + return cpu_has_vmx(); +} + +static __init int vmx_disabled_by_bios(void) +{ + u64 msr; + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, msr); + if (msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED) { + /* launched w/ TXT and VMX disabled */ + if (!(msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX) + && tboot_enabled()) + return 1; + /* launched w/o TXT and VMX only enabled w/ TXT */ + if (!(msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX) + && (msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX) + && !tboot_enabled()) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "kvm: disable TXT in the BIOS or " + "activate TXT before enabling KVM\n"); + return 1; + } + /* launched w/o TXT and VMX disabled */ + if (!(msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX) + && !tboot_enabled()) + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static void kvm_cpu_vmxon(u64 addr) +{ + cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE); + intel_pt_handle_vmx(1); + + asm volatile ("vmxon %0" : : "m"(addr)); +} + +static int hardware_enable(void) +{ + int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); + u64 phys_addr = __pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu)); + u64 old, test_bits; + + if (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_VMXE) + return -EBUSY; + + /* + * This can happen if we hot-added a CPU but failed to allocate + * VP assist page for it. + */ + if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs) && + !hv_get_vp_assist_page(cpu)) + return -EFAULT; + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu)); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu, cpu)); + spin_lock_init(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, cpu)); + + /* + * Now we can enable the vmclear operation in kdump + * since the loaded_vmcss_on_cpu list on this cpu + * has been initialized. + * + * Though the cpu is not in VMX operation now, there + * is no problem to enable the vmclear operation + * for the loaded_vmcss_on_cpu list is empty! + */ + crash_enable_local_vmclear(cpu); + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, old); + + test_bits = FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED; + test_bits |= FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX; + if (tboot_enabled()) + test_bits |= FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX; + + if ((old & test_bits) != test_bits) { + /* enable and lock */ + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, old | test_bits); + } + kvm_cpu_vmxon(phys_addr); + if (enable_ept) + ept_sync_global(); + + return 0; +} + +static void vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss(void) +{ + int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); + struct loaded_vmcs *v, *n; + + list_for_each_entry_safe(v, n, &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu), + loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link) + __loaded_vmcs_clear(v); +} + + +/* Just like cpu_vmxoff(), but with the __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() + * tricks. + */ +static void kvm_cpu_vmxoff(void) +{ + asm volatile (__ex("vmxoff")); + + intel_pt_handle_vmx(0); + cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE); +} + +static void hardware_disable(void) +{ + vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss(); + kvm_cpu_vmxoff(); +} + +static __init int adjust_vmx_controls(u32 ctl_min, u32 ctl_opt, + u32 msr, u32 *result) +{ + u32 vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high; + u32 ctl = ctl_min | ctl_opt; + + rdmsr(msr, vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high); + + ctl &= vmx_msr_high; /* bit == 0 in high word ==> must be zero */ + ctl |= vmx_msr_low; /* bit == 1 in low word ==> must be one */ + + /* Ensure minimum (required) set of control bits are supported. */ + if (ctl_min & ~ctl) + return -EIO; + + *result = ctl; + return 0; +} + +static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, + struct vmx_capability *vmx_cap) +{ + u32 vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high; + u32 min, opt, min2, opt2; + u32 _pin_based_exec_control = 0; + u32 _cpu_based_exec_control = 0; + u32 _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control = 0; + u32 _vmexit_control = 0; + u32 _vmentry_control = 0; + + memset(vmcs_conf, 0, sizeof(*vmcs_conf)); + min = CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING | +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING | + CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING | +#endif + CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING | + CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING | + CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING | + CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING | + CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING | + CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING | + CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING | + CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING | + CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING; + + opt = CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW | + CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS | + CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS; + if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS, + &_cpu_based_exec_control) < 0) + return -EIO; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + if ((_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)) + _cpu_based_exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING & + ~CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING; +#endif + if (_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS) { + min2 = 0; + opt2 = SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES | + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE | + SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING | + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID | + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT | + SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST | + SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING | + SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC | + SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP | + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID | + SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT | + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY | + SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS | + SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES | + SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING | + SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING | + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML | + SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING | + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE | + SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_USE_GPA | + SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX | + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC | + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING; + if (adjust_vmx_controls(min2, opt2, + MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2, + &_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control) < 0) + return -EIO; + } +#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64 + if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)) + _cpu_based_exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW; +#endif + + if (!(_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)) + _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~( + SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT | + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE | + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY); + + rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP, + &vmx_cap->ept, &vmx_cap->vpid); + + if (_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT) { + /* CR3 accesses and invlpg don't need to cause VM Exits when EPT + enabled */ + _cpu_based_exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING | + CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING | + CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING); + } else if (vmx_cap->ept) { + vmx_cap->ept = 0; + pr_warn_once("EPT CAP should not exist if not support " + "1-setting enable EPT VM-execution control\n"); + } + if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID) && + vmx_cap->vpid) { + vmx_cap->vpid = 0; + pr_warn_once("VPID CAP should not exist if not support " + "1-setting enable VPID VM-execution control\n"); + } + + min = VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS | VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + min |= VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE; +#endif + opt = VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL | + VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT | + VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER | + VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS | + VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP | + VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL; + if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS, + &_vmexit_control) < 0) + return -EIO; + + min = PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK | PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING; + opt = PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS | PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR | + PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER; + if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS, + &_pin_based_exec_control) < 0) + return -EIO; + + if (cpu_has_broken_vmx_preemption_timer()) + _pin_based_exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER; + if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY)) + _pin_based_exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR; + + min = VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS; + opt = VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL | + VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT | + VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER | + VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS | + VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP | + VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL; + if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS, + &_vmentry_control) < 0) + return -EIO; + + /* + * Some cpus support VM_{ENTRY,EXIT}_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL but they + * can't be used due to an errata where VM Exit may incorrectly clear + * IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL[34:32]. Workaround the errata by using the + * MSR load mechanism to switch IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL. + */ + if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x6) { + switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) { + case 26: /* AAK155 */ + case 30: /* AAP115 */ + case 37: /* AAT100 */ + case 44: /* BC86,AAY89,BD102 */ + case 46: /* BA97 */ + _vmentry_control &= ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL; + _vmexit_control &= ~VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL; + pr_warn_once("kvm: VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL " + "does not work properly. Using workaround\n"); + break; + default: + break; + } + } + + + rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC, vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high); + + /* IA-32 SDM Vol 3B: VMCS size is never greater than 4kB. */ + if ((vmx_msr_high & 0x1fff) > PAGE_SIZE) + return -EIO; + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + /* IA-32 SDM Vol 3B: 64-bit CPUs always have VMX_BASIC_MSR[48]==0. */ + if (vmx_msr_high & (1u<<16)) + return -EIO; +#endif + + /* Require Write-Back (WB) memory type for VMCS accesses. */ + if (((vmx_msr_high >> 18) & 15) != 6) + return -EIO; + + vmcs_conf->size = vmx_msr_high & 0x1fff; + vmcs_conf->order = get_order(vmcs_conf->size); + vmcs_conf->basic_cap = vmx_msr_high & ~0x1fff; + + vmcs_conf->revision_id = vmx_msr_low; + + vmcs_conf->pin_based_exec_ctrl = _pin_based_exec_control; + vmcs_conf->cpu_based_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_exec_control; + vmcs_conf->cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control; + vmcs_conf->vmexit_ctrl = _vmexit_control; + vmcs_conf->vmentry_ctrl = _vmentry_control; + + if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs)) + evmcs_sanitize_exec_ctrls(vmcs_conf); + + return 0; +} + +struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs_cpu(bool shadow, int cpu, gfp_t flags) +{ + int node = cpu_to_node(cpu); + struct page *pages; + struct vmcs *vmcs; + + pages = __alloc_pages_node(node, flags, vmcs_config.order); + if (!pages) + return NULL; + vmcs = page_address(pages); + memset(vmcs, 0, vmcs_config.size); + + /* KVM supports Enlightened VMCS v1 only */ + if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs)) + vmcs->hdr.revision_id = KVM_EVMCS_VERSION; + else + vmcs->hdr.revision_id = vmcs_config.revision_id; + + if (shadow) + vmcs->hdr.shadow_vmcs = 1; + return vmcs; +} + +void free_vmcs(struct vmcs *vmcs) +{ + free_pages((unsigned long)vmcs, vmcs_config.order); +} + +/* + * Free a VMCS, but before that VMCLEAR it on the CPU where it was last loaded + */ +void free_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs) +{ + if (!loaded_vmcs->vmcs) + return; + loaded_vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs); + free_vmcs(loaded_vmcs->vmcs); + loaded_vmcs->vmcs = NULL; + if (loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap) + free_page((unsigned long)loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap); + WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs != NULL); +} + +int alloc_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs) +{ + loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs(false); + if (!loaded_vmcs->vmcs) + return -ENOMEM; + + loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL; + loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = false; + loaded_vmcs_init(loaded_vmcs); + + if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) { + loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap = (unsigned long *) + __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap) + goto out_vmcs; + memset(loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE); + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) && + static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs) && + (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_MSR_BITMAP)) { + struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs = + (struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *)loaded_vmcs->vmcs; + + evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.msr_bitmap = 1; + } + } + + memset(&loaded_vmcs->host_state, 0, sizeof(struct vmcs_host_state)); + memset(&loaded_vmcs->controls_shadow, 0, + sizeof(struct vmcs_controls_shadow)); + + return 0; + +out_vmcs: + free_loaded_vmcs(loaded_vmcs); + return -ENOMEM; +} + +static void free_kvm_area(void) +{ + int cpu; + + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + free_vmcs(per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu)); + per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu) = NULL; + } +} + +static __init int alloc_kvm_area(void) +{ + int cpu; + + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + struct vmcs *vmcs; + + vmcs = alloc_vmcs_cpu(false, cpu, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!vmcs) { + free_kvm_area(); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + /* + * When eVMCS is enabled, alloc_vmcs_cpu() sets + * vmcs->revision_id to KVM_EVMCS_VERSION instead of + * revision_id reported by MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC. + * + * However, even though not explicitly documented by + * TLFS, VMXArea passed as VMXON argument should + * still be marked with revision_id reported by + * physical CPU. + */ + if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs)) + vmcs->hdr.revision_id = vmcs_config.revision_id; + + per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu) = vmcs; + } + return 0; +} + +static void fix_pmode_seg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg, + struct kvm_segment *save) +{ + if (!emulate_invalid_guest_state) { + /* + * CS and SS RPL should be equal during guest entry according + * to VMX spec, but in reality it is not always so. Since vcpu + * is in the middle of the transition from real mode to + * protected mode it is safe to assume that RPL 0 is a good + * default value. + */ + if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS || seg == VCPU_SREG_SS) + save->selector &= ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK; + save->dpl = save->selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK; + save->s = 1; + } + vmx_set_segment(vcpu, save, seg); +} + +static void enter_pmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + unsigned long flags; + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + + /* + * Update real mode segment cache. It may be not up-to-date if sement + * register was written while vcpu was in a guest mode. + */ + vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES], VCPU_SREG_ES); + vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS], VCPU_SREG_DS); + vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS], VCPU_SREG_FS); + vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS], VCPU_SREG_GS); + vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS], VCPU_SREG_SS); + vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS], VCPU_SREG_CS); + + vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0; + + vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx); + + vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_TR], VCPU_SREG_TR); + + flags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS); + flags &= RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS; + flags |= vmx->rmode.save_rflags & ~RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS; + vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, flags); + + vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, (vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) & ~X86_CR4_VME) | + (vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW) & X86_CR4_VME)); + + update_exception_bitmap(vcpu); + + fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_CS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS]); + fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_SS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS]); + fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_ES, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES]); + fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_DS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS]); + fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_FS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS]); + fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_GS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS]); +} + +static void fix_rmode_seg(int seg, struct kvm_segment *save) +{ + const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field *sf = &kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg]; + struct kvm_segment var = *save; + + var.dpl = 0x3; + if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS) + var.type = 0x3; + + if (!emulate_invalid_guest_state) { + var.selector = var.base >> 4; + var.base = var.base & 0xffff0; + var.limit = 0xffff; + var.g = 0; + var.db = 0; + var.present = 1; + var.s = 1; + var.l = 0; + var.unusable = 0; + var.type = 0x3; + var.avl = 0; + if (save->base & 0xf) + printk_once(KERN_WARNING "kvm: segment base is not " + "paragraph aligned when entering " + "protected mode (seg=%d)", seg); + } + + vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var.selector); + vmcs_writel(sf->base, var.base); + vmcs_write32(sf->limit, var.limit); + vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, vmx_segment_access_rights(&var)); +} + +static void enter_rmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + unsigned long flags; + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(vcpu->kvm); + + vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_TR], VCPU_SREG_TR); + vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES], VCPU_SREG_ES); + vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS], VCPU_SREG_DS); + vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS], VCPU_SREG_FS); + vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS], VCPU_SREG_GS); + vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS], VCPU_SREG_SS); + vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS], VCPU_SREG_CS); + + vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 1; + + /* + * Very old userspace does not call KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR before entering + * vcpu. Warn the user that an update is overdue. + */ + if (!kvm_vmx->tss_addr) + printk_once(KERN_WARNING "kvm: KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR need to be " + "called before entering vcpu\n"); + + vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx); + + vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, kvm_vmx->tss_addr); + vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, RMODE_TSS_SIZE - 1); + vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, 0x008b); + + flags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS); + vmx->rmode.save_rflags = flags; + + flags |= X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM; + + vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, flags); + vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) | X86_CR4_VME); + update_exception_bitmap(vcpu); + + fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_SS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS]); + fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_CS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS]); + fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_ES, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES]); + fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_DS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS]); + fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_GS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS]); + fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_FS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS]); + + kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu); +} + +void vmx_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer) +{ + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + struct shared_msr_entry *msr = find_msr_entry(vmx, MSR_EFER); + + if (!msr) + return; + + vcpu->arch.efer = efer; + if (efer & EFER_LMA) { + vm_entry_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE); + msr->data = efer; + } else { + vm_entry_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE); + + msr->data = efer & ~EFER_LME; + } + setup_msrs(vmx); +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + +static void enter_lmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + u32 guest_tr_ar; + + vmx_segment_cache_clear(to_vmx(vcpu)); + + guest_tr_ar = vmcs_read32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES); + if ((guest_tr_ar & VMX_AR_TYPE_MASK) != VMX_AR_TYPE_BUSY_64_TSS) { + pr_debug_ratelimited("%s: tss fixup for long mode. \n", + __func__); + vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, + (guest_tr_ar & ~VMX_AR_TYPE_MASK) + | VMX_AR_TYPE_BUSY_64_TSS); + } + vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer | EFER_LMA); +} + +static void exit_lmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + vm_entry_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE); + vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer & ~EFER_LMA); +} + +#endif + +static void vmx_flush_tlb_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr) +{ + int vpid = to_vmx(vcpu)->vpid; + + if (!vpid_sync_vcpu_addr(vpid, addr)) + vpid_sync_context(vpid); + + /* + * If VPIDs are not supported or enabled, then the above is a no-op. + * But we don't really need a TLB flush in that case anyway, because + * each VM entry/exit includes an implicit flush when VPID is 0. + */ +} + +static void vmx_decache_cr0_guest_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + ulong cr0_guest_owned_bits = vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits; + + vcpu->arch.cr0 &= ~cr0_guest_owned_bits; + vcpu->arch.cr0 |= vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR0) & cr0_guest_owned_bits; +} + +static void vmx_decache_cr4_guest_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + ulong cr4_guest_owned_bits = vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits; + + vcpu->arch.cr4 &= ~cr4_guest_owned_bits; + vcpu->arch.cr4 |= vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) & cr4_guest_owned_bits; +} + +static void ept_load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu; + + if (!kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR)) + return; + + if (is_pae_paging(vcpu)) { + vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR0, mmu->pdptrs[0]); + vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR1, mmu->pdptrs[1]); + vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR2, mmu->pdptrs[2]); + vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR3, mmu->pdptrs[3]); + } +} + +void ept_save_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu; + + if (is_pae_paging(vcpu)) { + mmu->pdptrs[0] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR0); + mmu->pdptrs[1] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR1); + mmu->pdptrs[2] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR2); + mmu->pdptrs[3] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR3); + } + + kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR); +} + +static void ept_update_paging_mode_cr0(unsigned long *hw_cr0, + unsigned long cr0, + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + + if (!kvm_register_is_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3)) + vmx_cache_reg(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3); + if (!(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) { + /* From paging/starting to nonpaging */ + exec_controls_setbit(vmx, CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING | + CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING); + vcpu->arch.cr0 = cr0; + vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu)); + } else if (!is_paging(vcpu)) { + /* From nonpaging to paging */ + exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING | + CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING); + vcpu->arch.cr0 = cr0; + vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu)); + } + + if (!(cr0 & X86_CR0_WP)) + *hw_cr0 &= ~X86_CR0_WP; +} + +void vmx_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0) +{ + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + unsigned long hw_cr0; + + hw_cr0 = (cr0 & ~KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_OFF); + if (enable_unrestricted_guest) + hw_cr0 |= KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST; + else { + hw_cr0 |= KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON; + + if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PE)) + enter_pmode(vcpu); + + if (!vmx->rmode.vm86_active && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PE)) + enter_rmode(vcpu); + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + if (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME) { + if (!is_paging(vcpu) && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) + enter_lmode(vcpu); + if (is_paging(vcpu) && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) + exit_lmode(vcpu); + } +#endif + + if (enable_ept && !enable_unrestricted_guest) + ept_update_paging_mode_cr0(&hw_cr0, cr0, vcpu); + + vmcs_writel(CR0_READ_SHADOW, cr0); + vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR0, hw_cr0); + vcpu->arch.cr0 = cr0; + + /* depends on vcpu->arch.cr0 to be set to a new value */ + vmx->emulation_required = emulation_required(vcpu); +} + +static int get_ept_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + if (cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels() && (cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu) > 48)) + return 5; + return 4; +} + +u64 construct_eptp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long root_hpa) +{ + u64 eptp = VMX_EPTP_MT_WB; + + eptp |= (get_ept_level(vcpu) == 5) ? VMX_EPTP_PWL_5 : VMX_EPTP_PWL_4; + + if (enable_ept_ad_bits && + (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) || nested_ept_ad_enabled(vcpu))) + eptp |= VMX_EPTP_AD_ENABLE_BIT; + eptp |= (root_hpa & PAGE_MASK); + + return eptp; +} + +void vmx_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3) +{ + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm; + bool update_guest_cr3 = true; + unsigned long guest_cr3; + u64 eptp; + + guest_cr3 = cr3; + if (enable_ept) { + eptp = construct_eptp(vcpu, cr3); + vmcs_write64(EPT_POINTER, eptp);
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2.20.1
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Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 133/173 KVM: nVMX: vmread should not set rflags to specify success in case of #PF
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a4d956b9390418623ae5d07933e2679c68b6f83c ]
In case writing to vmread destination operand result in a #PF, vmread should not call nested_vmx_succeed() to set rflags to specify success. Similar to as done in VMPTRST (See handle_vmptrst()).
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +3 -1
@@ -8014,8 +8014,10 @@ static int handle_vmread(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)/* _system ok, nested_vmx_check_permission has verified cpl=0 */ if (kvm_write_guest_virt_system (vcpu, gva, &field_value, (is_long_mode (vcpu) ?8 :4 ), - &e)) + &e)) {kvm_inject_page_fault (vcpu, &e); +return 1 ; + } }nested_vmx_succeed (vcpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 134/173 KVM: Use vcpu-specific gva->hva translation when querying host page size
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f9b84e19221efc5f493156ee0329df3142085f28 ]
Use kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva() when retrieving the host page size so that the correct set of memslots is used when handling x86 page faults in SMM.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 6 +++--- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c +3 -3
@@ -1165,12 +1165,12 @@ static bool mmu_gfn_lpage_is_disallowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn,return __mmu_gfn_lpage_is_disallowed (gfn, level, slot); } -static int host_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn) +static int host_mapping_level (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gfn_t gfn) {unsigned long page_size;int i, ret =0 ; - page_size =kvm_host_page_size (kvm, gfn); + page_size =kvm_host_page_size (vcpu, gfn);for (i =PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL ; i <=PT_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL ; ++i) {if (page_size >=KVM_HPAGE_SIZE (i))
@@ -1220,7 +1220,7 @@ static int mapping_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t large_gfn,if (unlikely (*force_pt_level))return PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL ; - host_level =host_mapping_level (vcpu->kvm, large_gfn); + host_level =host_mapping_level (vcpu, large_gfn);if (host_level ==PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL )return host_level;
include/linux/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ int kvm_clear_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, int offset, int len);int kvm_clear_guest (struct kvm *kvm,gpa_t gpa,unsigned long len);struct kvm_memory_slot *gfn_to_memslot (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn);bool kvm_is_visible_gfn (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn); -unsigned long kvm_host_page_size (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn); +unsigned long kvm_host_page_size (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gfn_t gfn);void mark_page_dirty (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn);struct kvm_memslots *kvm_vcpu_memslots (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +2 -2
@@ -1277,14 +1277,14 @@ bool kvm_is_visible_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (kvm_is_visible_gfn); -unsigned long kvm_host_page_size (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn) +unsigned long kvm_host_page_size (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gfn_t gfn) {struct vm_area_struct *vma;unsigned long addr, size; size =PAGE_SIZE ; - addr =gfn_to_hva (kvm, gfn); + addr =kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva (vcpu, gfn);if (kvm_is_error_hva (addr))return PAGE_SIZE ;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 135/173 KVM: Play nice with read-only memslots when querying host page size
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 42cde48b2d39772dba47e680781a32a6c4b7dc33 ]
Avoid the "writable" check in __gfn_to_hva_many(), which will always fail on read-only memslots due to gfn_to_hva() assuming writes. Functionally, this allows x86 to create large mappings for read-only memslots that are backed by HugeTLB mappings.
Note, the changelog for commit 05da45583de9 ("KVM: MMU: large page support") states "If the largepage contains write-protected pages, a large pte is not used.", but "write-protected" refers to pages that are temporarily read-only, e.g. read-only memslots didn't even exist at the time.
--- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +1 -1
@@ -1284,7 +1284,7 @@ unsigned long kvm_host_page_size(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn) size =PAGE_SIZE ; - addr =kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva (vcpu, gfn); + addr =kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva_prot (vcpu, gfn,NULL );if (kvm_is_error_hva (addr))return PAGE_SIZE ;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 136/173 KVM: s390: do not clobber registers during guest reset/store status
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 55680890ea78be0df5e1384989f1be835043c084 ]
The initial CPU reset clobbers the userspace fpc and the store status ioctl clobbers the guest acrs + fpr. As these calls are only done via ioctl (and not via vcpu_run), no CPU context is loaded, so we can (and must) act directly on the sync regs, not on the thread context.
--- arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c +2 -4
@@ -2384,9 +2384,7 @@ static void kvm_s390_vcpu_initial_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)memset (vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr,0 ,16 *sizeof (__u64)); vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[0 ] =0xE0UL ; vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[14 ] =0xC2000000UL ; -/* make sure the new fpc will be lazily loaded */ -save_fpu_regs (); - current->thread.fpu.fpc =0 ; + vcpu->run->s.regs.fpc =0 ; vcpu->arch.sie_block->gbea =1 ; vcpu->arch.sie_block->pp =0 ; vcpu->arch.sie_block->fpf &= ~FPF_BPBC ;
@@ -3753,7 +3751,7 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp, }case KVM_S390_STORE_STATUS : idx =srcu_read_lock (&vcpu->kvm->srcu); - r =kvm_s390_vcpu_store_status (vcpu, arg); + r =kvm_s390_store_status_unloaded (vcpu, arg);srcu_read_unlock (&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);break ;case KVM_S390_SET_INITIAL_PSW : {
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 137/173 cifs: fail i/o on soft mounts if sessionsetup errors out
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]>
commit b0dd940e582b6a60296b9847a54012a4b080dc72 upstream.
RHBZ: 1579050
If we have a soft mount we should fail commands for session-setup failures (such as the password having changed/ account being deleted/ ...) and return an error back to the application.
--- fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c +8 -2
@@ -257,9 +257,14 @@ smb2_reconnect(__le16 smb2_command, stru } rc =cifs_negotiate_protocol (0 , tcon->ses); -if (!rc && tcon->ses->need_reconnect) +if (!rc && tcon->ses->need_reconnect) { rc =cifs_setup_session (0 , tcon->ses, nls_codepage); - +if ((rc == -EACCES ) && !tcon->retry) { + rc = -EHOSTDOWN ; +mutex_unlock (&tcon->ses->session_mutex); + goto failed; + } + }if (rc || !tcon->need_reconnect) {mutex_unlock (&tcon->ses->session_mutex); goto out;
@@ -301,6 +306,7 @@ out:case SMB2_SET_INFO : rc = -EAGAIN ; } +failed:unload_nls (nls_codepage);return rc; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 138/173 clocksource: Prevent double add_timer_on() for watchdog_timer
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
commit febac332a819f0e764aa4da62757ba21d18c182b upstream.
Kernel crashes inside QEMU/KVM are observed:
kernel BUG at kernel/time/timer.c:1154! BUG_ON(timer_pending(timer) || !timer->function) in add_timer_on().
At the same time another cpu got:
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI of poinson pointer 0xdead000000000200 in:
__hlist_del at include/linux/list.h:681
(inlined by) detach_timer at kernel/time/timer.c:818 (inlined by) expire_timers at kernel/time/timer.c:1355 (inlined by) __run_timers at kernel/time/timer.c:1686 (inlined by) run_timer_softirq at kernel/time/timer.c:1699
Unfortunately kernel logs are badly scrambled, stacktraces are lost.
Printing the timer->function before the BUG_ON() pointed to clocksource_watchdog().
The execution of clocksource_watchdog() can race with a sequence of clocksource_stop_watchdog() .. clocksource_start_watchdog():
expire_timers()
detach_timer(timer, true);
timer->entry.pprev = NULL;
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&base->lock);
call_timer_fn
clocksource_watchdog()
clocksource_watchdog_kthread() or clocksource_unbind() spin_lock_irqsave(&watchdog_lock, flags); clocksource_stop_watchdog(); del_timer(&watchdog_timer); watchdog_running = 0; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&watchdog_lock, flags); spin_lock_irqsave(&watchdog_lock, flags); clocksource_start_watchdog(); add_timer_on(&watchdog_timer, ...); watchdog_running = 1; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&watchdog_lock, flags);
spin_lock(&watchdog_lock);
add_timer_on(&watchdog_timer, ...);
BUG_ON(timer_pending(timer) || !timer->function);
timer_pending() -> true
BUG()I.e. inside clocksource_watchdog() watchdog_timer could be already armed.
Check timer_pending() before calling add_timer_on(). This is sufficient as all operations are synchronized by watchdog_lock.
--- kernel/time/clocksource.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/time/clocksource.c +9 -2
@@ -280,8 +280,15 @@ static void clocksource_watchdog(unsigne next_cpu =cpumask_next (raw_smp_processor_id (), cpu_online_mask);if (next_cpu >= nr_cpu_ids) next_cpu =cpumask_first (cpu_online_mask); - watchdog_timer.expires +=WATCHDOG_INTERVAL ; -add_timer_on (&watchdog_timer, next_cpu); + +/* +* Arm timer if not already pending: could race with concurrent +* pair clocksource_stop_watchdog() clocksource_start_watchdog(). +*/ +if (!timer_pending (&watchdog_timer)) { + watchdog_timer.expires +=WATCHDOG_INTERVAL ; +add_timer_on (&watchdog_timer, next_cpu); + } out:spin_unlock (&watchdog_lock); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 139/173 perf/core: Fix mlock accounting in perf_mmap()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Song Liu <[email protected]>
commit 003461559ef7a9bd0239bae35a22ad8924d6e9ad upstream.
Decreasing sysctl_perf_event_mlock between two consecutive perf_mmap()s of a perf ring buffer may lead to an integer underflow in locked memory accounting. This may lead to the undesired behaviors, such as failures in BPF map creation.
Address this by adjusting the accounting logic to take into account the possibility that the amount of already locked memory may exceed the current limit.
--- kernel/events/core.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/events/core.c +9 -1
@@ -5441,7 +5441,15 @@ accounting:*/ user_lock_limit *=num_online_cpus (); - user_locked =atomic_long_read (&user->locked_vm) + user_extra; + user_locked =atomic_long_read (&user->locked_vm); + +/* +* sysctl_perf_event_mlock may have changed, so that +* user->locked_vm > user_lock_limit +*/ +if (user_locked > user_lock_limit) + user_locked = user_lock_limit; + user_locked += user_extra;if (user_locked > user_lock_limit) extra = user_locked - user_lock_limit;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 140/173 rxrpc: Fix service call disconnection
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: David Howells <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b39a934ec72fa2b5a74123891f25273a38378b90 ]
The recent patch that substituted a flag on an rxrpc_call for the connection pointer being NULL as an indication that a call was disconnected puts the set_bit in the wrong place for service calls. This is only a problem if a call is implicitly terminated by a new call coming in on the same connection channel instead of a terminating ACK packet.
In such a case, rxrpc_input_implicit_end_call() calls __rxrpc_disconnect_call(), which is now (incorrectly) setting the disconnection bit, meaning that when rxrpc_release_call() is later called, it doesn't call rxrpc_disconnect_call() and so the call isn't removed from the peer's error distribution list and the list gets corrupted.
KASAN finds the issue as an access after release on a call, but the position at which it occurs is confusing as it appears to be related to a different call (the call site is where the latter call is being removed from the error distribution list and either the next or pprev pointer points to a previously released call).
Fix this by moving the setting of the flag from __rxrpc_disconnect_call() to rxrpc_disconnect_call() in the same place that the connection pointer was being cleared.
--- net/rxrpc/conn_object.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/rxrpc/conn_object.c +1 -2
@@ -163,8 +163,6 @@ void __rxrpc_disconnect_call(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,_enter ("%d,%x" , conn->debug_id, call->cid); -set_bit (RXRPC_CALL_DISCONNECTED , &call->flags); -if (rcu_access_pointer (chan->call) == call) {/* Save the result of the call so that we can repeat it if necessary * through the channel, whilst disposing of the actual call record.
@@ -209,6 +207,7 @@ void rxrpc_disconnect_call(struct rxrpc_call *call)__rxrpc_disconnect_call (conn, call);spin_unlock (&conn->channel_lock); +set_bit (RXRPC_CALL_DISCONNECTED , &call->flags); conn->idle_timestamp = jiffies; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 141/173 ASoC: pcm: update FE/BE trigger order based on the command
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ranjani Sridharan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit acbf27746ecfa96b290b54cc7f05273482ea128a ]
Currently, the trigger orders SND_SOC_DPCM_TRIGGER_PRE/POST determine the order in which FE DAI and BE DAI are triggered. In the case of SND_SOC_DPCM_TRIGGER_PRE, the FE DAI is triggered before the BE DAI and in the case of SND_SOC_DPCM_TRIGGER_POST, the BE DAI is triggered before the FE DAI. And this order remains the same irrespective of the trigger command.
In the case of the SOF driver, during playback, the FW expects the BE DAI to be triggered before the FE DAI during the START trigger. The BE DAI trigger handles the starting of Link DMA and so it must be started before the FE DAI is started to prevent xruns during pause/release. This can be addressed by setting the trigger order for the FE dai link to SND_SOC_DPCM_TRIGGER_POST. But during the STOP trigger, the FW expects the FE DAI to be triggered before the BE DAI. Retaining the same order during the START and STOP commands, results in FW error as the DAI component in the FW is still active.
The issue can be fixed by mirroring the trigger order of FE and BE DAI's during the START and STOP trigger. So, with the trigger order set to SND_SOC_DPCM_TRIGGER_PRE, the FE DAI will be trigger first during SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_START/STOP/RESUME and the BE DAI will be triggered first during the STOP/SUSPEND/PAUSE commands. Conversely, with the trigger order set to SND_SOC_DPCM_TRIGGER_POST, the BE DAI will be triggered first during the SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_START/STOP/RESUME commands and the FE DAI will be triggered first during the SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_STOP/SUSPEND/PAUSE commands.
--- sound/soc/soc-pcm.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
sound/soc/soc-pcm.c +68 -27
@@ -2123,42 +2123,81 @@ int dpcm_be_dai_trigger(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, int stream, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (dpcm_be_dai_trigger); +static int dpcm_dai_trigger_fe_be (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, +int cmd,bool fe_first) +{ +struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe = substream->private_data; +int ret; + +/* call trigger on the frontend before the backend. */ +if (fe_first) { +dev_dbg (fe->dev,"ASoC: pre trigger FE %s cmd %d\n" , + fe->dai_link->name, cmd); + + ret =soc_pcm_trigger (substream, cmd); +if (ret <0 ) +return ret; + + ret =dpcm_be_dai_trigger (fe, substream->stream, cmd); +return ret; + } + +/* call trigger on the frontend after the backend. */ + ret =dpcm_be_dai_trigger (fe, substream->stream, cmd); +if (ret <0 ) +return ret; + +dev_dbg (fe->dev,"ASoC: post trigger FE %s cmd %d\n" , + fe->dai_link->name, cmd); + + ret =soc_pcm_trigger (substream, cmd); + +return ret; +} +static int dpcm_fe_dai_do_trigger (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,int cmd) {struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe = substream->private_data; -int stream = substream->stream, ret; +int stream = substream->stream; +int ret =0 ;enum snd_soc_dpcm_trigger trigger = fe->dai_link->trigger[stream]; fe->dpcm[stream].runtime_update =SND_SOC_DPCM_UPDATE_FE ;switch (trigger) {case SND_SOC_DPCM_TRIGGER_PRE : -/* call trigger on the frontend before the backend. */ - -dev_dbg (fe->dev,"ASoC: pre trigger FE %s cmd %d\n" , - fe->dai_link->name, cmd); - - ret =soc_pcm_trigger (substream, cmd); -if (ret <0 ) { -dev_err (fe->dev,"ASoC: trigger FE failed %d\n" , ret); - goto out; +switch (cmd) { +case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_START : +case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_RESUME : +case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_PAUSE_RELEASE : + ret =dpcm_dai_trigger_fe_be (substream, cmd, true); +break ; +case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_STOP : +case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_SUSPEND : +case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_PAUSE_PUSH : + ret =dpcm_dai_trigger_fe_be (substream, cmd, false); +break ; +default : + ret = -EINVAL ; +break ; } - - ret =dpcm_be_dai_trigger (fe, substream->stream, cmd);break ;case SND_SOC_DPCM_TRIGGER_POST : -/* call trigger on the frontend after the backend. */ - - ret =dpcm_be_dai_trigger (fe, substream->stream, cmd); -if (ret <0 ) { -dev_err (fe->dev,"ASoC: trigger FE failed %d\n" , ret); - goto out; +switch (cmd) { +case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_START : +case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_RESUME : +case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_PAUSE_RELEASE : + ret =dpcm_dai_trigger_fe_be (substream, cmd, false); +break ; +case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_STOP : +case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_SUSPEND : +case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_PAUSE_PUSH : + ret =dpcm_dai_trigger_fe_be (substream, cmd, true); +break ; +default : + ret = -EINVAL ; +break ; } - -dev_dbg (fe->dev,"ASoC: post trigger FE %s cmd %d\n" , - fe->dai_link->name, cmd); - - ret =soc_pcm_trigger (substream, cmd);break ;case SND_SOC_DPCM_TRIGGER_BESPOKE :/* bespoke trigger() - handles both FE and BEs */
@@ -2167,10 +2206,6 @@ static int dpcm_fe_dai_do_trigger(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, int cmd) fe->dai_link->name, cmd); ret =soc_pcm_bespoke_trigger (substream, cmd); -if (ret <0 ) { -dev_err (fe->dev,"ASoC: trigger FE failed %d\n" , ret); - goto out; - }break ;default : dev_err(fe->dev, "ASoC: invalid trigger cmd %d for %s\n", cmd,
@@ -2179,6 +2214,12 @@ static int dpcm_fe_dai_do_trigger(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, int cmd) goto out; } +if (ret <0 ) { +dev_err (fe->dev,"ASoC: trigger FE cmd: %d failed: %d\n" , + cmd, ret); + goto out; + } +switch (cmd) {case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_START :case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_RESUME :
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 142/173 hv_sock: Remove the accept port restriction
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sunil Muthuswamy <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c742c59e1fbd022b64d91aa9a0092b3a699d653c ]
Currently, hv_sock restricts the port the guest socket can accept connections on. hv_sock divides the socket port namespace into two parts for server side (listening socket), 0-0x7FFFFFFF & 0x80000000-0xFFFFFFFF (there are no restrictions on client port namespace). The first part (0-0x7FFFFFFF) is reserved for sockets where connections can be accepted. The second part (0x80000000-0xFFFFFFFF) is reserved for allocating ports for the peer (host) socket, once a connection is accepted. This reservation of the port namespace is specific to hv_sock and not known by the generic vsock library (ex: af_vsock). This is problematic because auto-binds/ephemeral ports are handled by the generic vsock library and it has no knowledge of this port reservation and could allocate a port that is not compatible with hv_sock (and legitimately so). The issue hasn't surfaced so far because the auto-bind code of vsock (__vsock_bind_stream) prior to the change 'VSOCK: bind to random port for VMADDR_PORT_ANY' would start walking up from LAST_RESERVED_PORT (1023) and start assigning ports. That will take a large number of iterations to hit 0x7FFFFFFF. But, after the above change to randomize port selection, the issue has started coming up more frequently.
There has really been no good reason to have this port reservation logic in hv_sock from the get go. Reserving a local port for peer ports is not how things are handled generally. Peer ports should reflect the peer port. This fixes the issue by lifting the port reservation, and also returns the right peer port. Since the code converts the GUID to the peer port (by using the first 4 bytes), there is a possibility of conflicts, but that seems like a reasonable risk to take, given this is limited to vsock and that only applies to all local sockets.
--- net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c | 68 +++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c +9 -59
@@ -144,28 +144,15 @@ struct hvsock {**************************************************************************** * The only valid Service GUIDs, from the perspectives of both the host and * * Linux VM, that can be connected by the other end, must conform to this * -* format: <port>-facb-11e6-bd58-64006a7986d3, and the "port" must be in * -* this range [0, 0x7FFFFFFF]. * +* format: <port>-facb-11e6-bd58-64006a7986d3. * **************************************************************************** * * When we write apps on the host to connect(), the GUID ServiceID is used. * When we write apps in Linux VM to connect(), we only need to specify the * port and the driver will form the GUID and use that to request the host. * -* From the perspective of Linux VM: -* 1. the local ephemeral port (i.e. the local auto-bound port when we call -* connect() without explicit bind()) is generated by __vsock_bind_stream(), -* and the range is [1024, 0xFFFFFFFF). -* 2. the remote ephemeral port (i.e. the auto-generated remote port for -* a connect request initiated by the host's connect()) is generated by -* hvs_remote_addr_init() and the range is [0x80000000, 0xFFFFFFFF). */ -#define MAX_LISTEN_PORT ((u32)0x7FFFFFFF) -#define MAX_VM_LISTEN_PORT MAX_LISTEN_PORT -#define MAX_HOST_LISTEN_PORT MAX_LISTEN_PORT -#define MIN_HOST_EPHEMERAL_PORT (MAX_HOST_LISTEN_PORT + 1) -/* 00000000-facb-11e6-bd58-64006a7986d3 */ static const uuid_le srv_id_template = UUID_LE(0x00000000, 0xfacb, 0x11e6, 0xbd, 0x58,
@@ -188,33 +175,6 @@ static void hvs_addr_init(struct sockaddr_vm *addr, const uuid_le *svr_id)vsock_addr_init (addr,VMADDR_CID_ANY , port); } -static void hvs_remote_addr_init (struct sockaddr_vm *remote, -struct sockaddr_vm *local) -{ -static u32 host_ephemeral_port =MIN_HOST_EPHEMERAL_PORT ; -struct sock *sk; - -vsock_addr_init (remote,VMADDR_CID_ANY ,VMADDR_PORT_ANY ); - -while (1 ) { -/* Wrap around ? */ -if (host_ephemeral_port <MIN_HOST_EPHEMERAL_PORT || - host_ephemeral_port ==VMADDR_PORT_ANY ) - host_ephemeral_port =MIN_HOST_EPHEMERAL_PORT ; - - remote->svm_port = host_ephemeral_port++; - - sk =vsock_find_connected_socket (remote, local); -if (!sk) { -/* Found an available ephemeral port */ -return ; - } - -/* Release refcnt got in vsock_find_connected_socket */ -sock_put (sk); - } -} -static void hvs_set_channel_pending_send_size (struct vmbus_channel *chan) { set_channel_pending_send_size(chan,
@@ -342,12 +302,7 @@ static void hvs_open_connection(struct vmbus_channel *chan) if_type = &chan->offermsg.offer.if_type; if_instance = &chan->offermsg.offer.if_instance; conn_from_host = chan->offermsg.offer.u.pipe.user_def[0 ]; - -/* The host or the VM should only listen on a port in -* [0, MAX_LISTEN_PORT] -*/ -if (!is_valid_srv_id (if_type) || -get_port_by_srv_id (if_type) >MAX_LISTEN_PORT ) +if (!is_valid_srv_id (if_type))return ;hvs_addr_init (&addr, conn_from_host ? if_type : if_instance);
@@ -372,6 +327,13 @@ static void hvs_open_connection(struct vmbus_channel *chan) new->sk_state =TCP_SYN_SENT ; vnew =vsock_sk (new); + +hvs_addr_init (&vnew->local_addr, if_type); + +/* Remote peer is always the host */ +vsock_addr_init (&vnew->remote_addr, +VMADDR_CID_HOST ,VMADDR_PORT_ANY ); + vnew->remote_addr.svm_port =get_port_by_srv_id (if_instance); hvs_new = vnew->trans; hvs_new->chan = chan; }else {
@@ -411,8 +373,6 @@ static void hvs_open_connection(struct vmbus_channel *chan) sk->sk_ack_backlog++;hvs_addr_init (&vnew->local_addr, if_type); -hvs_remote_addr_init (&vnew->remote_addr, &vnew->local_addr); - hvs_new->vm_srv_id = *if_type; hvs_new->host_srv_id = *if_instance;
@@ -717,16 +677,6 @@ static bool hvs_stream_is_active(struct vsock_sock *vsk)static bool hvs_stream_allow (u32 cid,u32 port) { -/* The host's port range [MIN_HOST_EPHEMERAL_PORT, 0xFFFFFFFF) is -* reserved as ephemeral ports, which are used as the host's ports -* when the host initiates connections. -* -* Perform this check in the guest so an immediate error is produced -* instead of a timeout. -*/ -if (port >MAX_HOST_LISTEN_PORT ) -return false; -if (cid ==VMADDR_CID_HOST )return true;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 143/173 RDMA/netlink: Do not always generate an ACK for some netlink operations
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Håkon Bugge <[email protected]>
commit a242c36951ecd24bc16086940dbe6b522205c461 upstream.
In rdma_nl_rcv_skb(), the local variable err is assigned the return value of the supplied callback function, which could be one of ib_nl_handle_resolve_resp(), ib_nl_handle_set_timeout(), or ib_nl_handle_ip_res_resp(). These three functions all return skb->len on success.
rdma_nl_rcv_skb() is merely a copy of netlink_rcv_skb(). The callback functions used by the latter have the convention: "Returns 0 on success or a negative error code".
In particular, the statement (equal for both functions):
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_ACK || err)
implies that rdma_nl_rcv_skb() always will ack a message, independent of the NLM_F_ACK being set in nlmsg_flags or not.
The fix could be to change the above statement, but it is better to keep the two *_rcv_skb() functions equal in this respect and instead change the three callback functions in the rdma subsystem to the correct convention.
--- drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c +1 -1
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int ib_nl_handle_ip_res_resp(struct sk_bif (ib_nl_is_good_ip_resp (nlh))ib_nl_process_good_ip_rsep (nlh); -return skb->len; +return 0 ; } static int ib_nl_ip_send_msg(struct rdma_dev_addr *dev_addr,
drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c +2 -2
@@ -1078,7 +1078,7 @@ int ib_nl_handle_set_timeout(struct sk_b } settimeout_out: -return skb->len; +return 0 ; }static inline int ib_nl_is_good_resolve_resp (const struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
@@ -1149,7 +1149,7 @@ int ib_nl_handle_resolve_resp(struct sk_ } resp_out: -return skb->len; +return 0 ; }static void free_sm_ah (struct kref *kref)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 144/173 scsi: ufs: Fix ufshcd_probe_hba() reture value in case ufshcd_scsi_add_wlus() fails
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Bean Huo <[email protected]>
commit b9fc5320212efdfb4e08b825aaa007815fd11d16 upstream.
A non-zero error value likely being returned by ufshcd_scsi_add_wlus() in case of failure of adding the WLs, but ufshcd_probe_hba() doesn't use this value, and doesn't report this failure to upper caller. This patch is to fix this issue.
--- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +2 -1
@@ -6415,7 +6415,8 @@ static int ufshcd_probe_hba(struct ufs_hufshcd_init_icc_levels (hba);/* Add required well known logical units to scsi mid layer */ -if (ufshcd_scsi_add_wlus (hba)) + ret =ufshcd_scsi_add_wlus (hba); +if (ret) goto out;/* Initialize devfreq after UFS device is detected */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 145/173 PCI/switchtec: Fix vep_vector_number ioread width
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Logan Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
commit 9375646b4cf03aee81bc6c305aa18cc80b682796 upstream.
vep_vector_number is actually a 16 bit register which should be read with ioread16() instead of ioread32().
--- drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c +1 -1
@@ -1399,7 +1399,7 @@ static int switchtec_init_isr(struct swiif (nvecs <0 )return nvecs; - event_irq =ioread32 (&stdev->mmio_part_cfg->vep_vector_number); + event_irq =ioread16 (&stdev->mmio_part_cfg->vep_vector_number);if (event_irq <0 || event_irq >= nvecs)return -EFAULT ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 146/173 PCI: Dont disable bridge BARs when assigning bus resources
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Logan Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
commit 9db8dc6d0785225c42a37be7b44d1b07b31b8957 upstream.
Some PCI bridges implement BARs in addition to bridge windows. For example, here's a PLX switch:
04:00.0 PCI bridge: PLX Technology, Inc. PEX 8724 24-Lane, 6-Port PCI
Express Gen 3 (8 GT/s) Switch, 19 x 19mm FCBGA (rev ca) (prog-if 00 [Normal decode])
Flags: bus master, fast devsel, latency 0, IRQ 30, NUMA node 0 Memory at 90a00000 (32-bit, non-prefetchable) [size=256K]
Bus: primary=04, secondary=05, subordinate=0a, sec-latency=0 I/O behind bridge: 00002000-00003fff
Memory behind bridge: 90000000-909fffff
Prefetchable memory behind bridge: 0000380000800000-0000380000bfffff
Previously, when the kernel assigned resource addresses (with the pci=realloc command line parameter, for example) it could clear the struct resource corresponding to the BAR. When this happened, lspci would report this BAR as "ignored":
Region 0: Memory at <ignored> (32-bit, non-prefetchable) [size=256K]
This is because the kernel reports a zero start address and zero flags in the corresponding sysfs resource file and in /proc/bus/pci/devices. Investigation with 'lspci -x', however, shows the BIOS-assigned address will still be programmed in the device's BAR registers.
It's clearly a bug that the kernel lost track of the BAR value, but in most cases, this still won't result in a visible issue because nothing uses the memory, so nothing is affected. However, when an IOMMU is in use, it will not reserve this space in the IOVA because the kernel no longer thinks the range is valid. (See dmar_init_reserved_ranges() for the Intel implementation of this.)
Without the proper reserved range, a DMA mapping may allocate an IOVA that matches a bridge BAR, which results in DMA accesses going to the BAR instead of the intended RAM.
The problem was in pci_assign_unassigned_root_bus_resources(). When any resource from a bridge device fails to get assigned, the code set the resource's flags to zero. This makes sense for bridge windows, as they will be re-enabled later, but for regular BARs, it makes the kernel permanently lose track of the fact that they decode address space.
Change pci_assign_unassigned_root_bus_resources() and pci_assign_unassigned_bridge_resources() so they only clear "res->flags" for bridge *windows*, not bridge BARs.
--- drivers/pci/setup-bus.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/setup-bus.c +16 -4
@@ -1824,12 +1824,18 @@ again:/* restore size and flags */ list_for_each_entry (fail_res, &fail_head, list) {struct resource *res = fail_res->res; +int idx; res->start = fail_res->start; res->end = fail_res->end; res->flags = fail_res->flags; -if (fail_res->dev->subordinate) - res->flags =0 ; + +if (pci_is_bridge (fail_res->dev)) { + idx = res - &fail_res->dev->resource[0 ]; +if (idx >=PCI_BRIDGE_RESOURCES && + idx <=PCI_BRIDGE_RESOURCE_END ) + res->flags =0 ; + } }free_list (&fail_head);
@@ -1895,12 +1901,18 @@ again:/* restore size and flags */ list_for_each_entry (fail_res, &fail_head, list) {struct resource *res = fail_res->res; +int idx; res->start = fail_res->start; res->end = fail_res->end; res->flags = fail_res->flags; -if (fail_res->dev->subordinate) - res->flags =0 ; + +if (pci_is_bridge (fail_res->dev)) { + idx = res - &fail_res->dev->resource[0 ]; +if (idx >=PCI_BRIDGE_RESOURCES && + idx <=PCI_BRIDGE_RESOURCE_END ) + res->flags =0 ; + } }free_list (&fail_head);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 147/173 nfs: NFS_SWAP should depend on SWAP
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
commit 474c4f306eefbb21b67ebd1de802d005c7d7ecdc upstream.
If CONFIG_SWAP=n, it does not make much sense to offer the user the option to enable support for swapping over NFS, as that will still fail at run time:
# swapon /swap
swapon: /swap: swapon failed: Function not implementedFix this by adding a dependency on CONFIG_SWAP.
--- fs/nfs/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/nfs/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ config NFS_V4 config NFS_SWAP bool "Provide swap over NFS support" default n - depends on NFS_FS + depends on NFS_FS && SWAP select SUNRPC_SWAP help This option enables swapon to work on files located on NFS mounts.
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 148/173 NFS/pnfs: Fix pnfs_generic_prepare_to_resend_writes()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
commit 221203ce6406273cf00e5c6397257d986c003ee6 upstream.
Instead of making assumptions about the commit verifier contents, change the commit code to ensure we always check that the verifier was set by the XDR code.
--- fs/nfs/direct.c | 4 ++-- fs/nfs/nfs3xdr.c | 5 ++++- fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c | 5 ++++- fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c | 7 +++---- fs/nfs/write.c | 4 +++- 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/direct.c +2 -2
@@ -261,10 +261,10 @@ static int nfs_direct_cmp_commit_data_ve data->ds_commit_index);/* verifier not set so always fail */ -if (verfp->committed <0 ) +if (verfp->committed <0 || data->res.verf->committed <=NFS_UNSTABLE )return 1 ; -return nfs_direct_cmp_verf (verfp, &data->verf); +return nfs_direct_cmp_verf (verfp, data->res.verf); }/**
fs/nfs/nfs3xdr.c +4 -1
@@ -2373,6 +2373,7 @@ static int nfs3_xdr_dec_commit3res(struc void *data) {struct nfs_commitres *result = data; +struct nfs_writeverf *verf = result->verf;enum nfs_stat status;int error;
@@ -2385,7 +2386,9 @@ static int nfs3_xdr_dec_commit3res(struc result->op_status = status;if (status !=NFS3_OK ) goto out_status; - error =decode_writeverf3 (xdr, &result->verf->verifier); + error =decode_writeverf3 (xdr, &verf->verifier); +if (!error) + verf->committed =NFS_FILE_SYNC ; out:return error; out_status:
fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c +4 -1
@@ -4409,11 +4409,14 @@ static int decode_write_verifier(structstatic int decode_commit (struct xdr_stream *xdr,struct nfs_commitres *res) { +struct nfs_writeverf *verf = res->verf;int status; status =decode_op_hdr (xdr,OP_COMMIT );if (!status) - status =decode_write_verifier (xdr, &res->verf->verifier); + status =decode_write_verifier (xdr, &verf->verifier); +if (!status) + verf->committed =NFS_FILE_SYNC ;return status; }
fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c +3 -4
@@ -30,12 +30,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pnfs_generic_rw_releas/* Fake up some data that will cause nfs_commit_release to retry the writes. */ void pnfs_generic_prepare_to_resend_writes (struct nfs_commit_data *data) { -struct nfs_page *first =nfs_list_entry (data->pages.next); +struct nfs_writeverf *verf = data->res.verf; data->task.tk_status =0 ; -memcpy (&data->verf.verifier, &first->wb_verf, -sizeof (data->verf.verifier)); - data->verf.verifier.data[0 ]++;/* ensure verifier mismatch */ +memset (&verf->verifier,0 ,sizeof (verf->verifier)); + verf->committed =NFS_UNSTABLE ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (pnfs_generic_prepare_to_resend_writes);
fs/nfs/write.c +3 -1
@@ -1807,6 +1807,7 @@ static void nfs_commit_done(struct rpc_tstatic void nfs_commit_release_pages (struct nfs_commit_data *data) { +const struct nfs_writeverf *verf = data->res.verf;struct nfs_page *req;int status = data->task.tk_status;struct nfs_commit_info cinfo;
@@ -1833,7 +1834,8 @@ static void nfs_commit_release_pages(str/* Okay, COMMIT succeeded, apparently. Check the verifier * returned by the server against all stored verfs. */ -if (!nfs_write_verifier_cmp (&req->wb_verf, &data->verf.verifier)) { +if (verf->committed >NFS_UNSTABLE && + !nfs_write_verifier_cmp (&req->wb_verf, &verf->verifier)) {/* We have a match */ if (req->wb_page)nfs_inode_remove_request (req);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 149/173 NFSv4: try lease recovery on NFS4ERR_EXPIRED
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Robert Milkowski <[email protected]>
commit 924491f2e476f7234d722b24171a4daff61bbe13 upstream.
Currently, if an nfs server returns NFS4ERR_EXPIRED to open(), we return EIO to applications without even trying to recover.
--- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +5 -0
@@ -2923,6 +2923,11 @@ static struct nfs4_state *nfs4_do_open(s exception.retry =1 ;continue ; } +if (status == -NFS4ERR_EXPIRED ) { +nfs4_schedule_lease_recovery (server->nfs_client); + exception.retry =1 ; +continue ; + }if (status == -EAGAIN ) {/* We must have found a delegation */ exception.retry =1 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 150/173 serial: uartps: Add a timeout to the tx empty wait
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Shubhrajyoti Datta <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 277375b864e8147975b064b513f491e2a910e66a ]
In case the cable is not connected then the target gets into an infinite wait for tx empty.
Add a timeout to the tx empty wait.
--- drivers/tty/serial/xilinx_uartps.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/xilinx_uartps.c +10 -4
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@#include <linux/of.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/pm_runtime.h> +#include <linux/iopoll.h> #define CDNS_UART_TTY_NAME "ttyPS"#define CDNS_UART_NAME "xuartps"
@@ -39,6 +40,7 @@#define CDNS_UART_NR_PORTS 2#define CDNS_UART_FIFO_SIZE 64/* FIFO size */ #define CDNS_UART_REGISTER_SPACE 0x1000 +#define TX_TIMEOUT 500000/* Rx Trigger level */ static int rx_trigger_level =56 ;
@@ -685,16 +687,20 @@ static void cdns_uart_set_termios(structunsigned int cval =0 ;unsigned int baud, minbaud, maxbaud;unsigned long flags; -unsigned int ctrl_reg, mode_reg; +unsigned int ctrl_reg, mode_reg, val; +int err;spin_lock_irqsave (&port->lock, flags);/* Wait for the transmit FIFO to empty before making changes */ if (!(readl (port->membase +CDNS_UART_CR ) &CDNS_UART_CR_TX_DIS )) { -while (!(readl (port->membase +CDNS_UART_SR ) & -CDNS_UART_SR_TXEMPTY )) { -cpu_relax (); + err =readl_poll_timeout (port->membase +CDNS_UART_SR , + val, (val &CDNS_UART_SR_TXEMPTY ), +1000 ,TX_TIMEOUT ); +if (err) { +dev_err (port->dev,"timed out waiting for tx empty" ); +return ; } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 151/173 rtc: hym8563: Return -EINVAL if the time is known to be invalid
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Paul Kocialkowski <[email protected]>
commit f236a2a2ebabad0848ad0995af7ad1dc7029e895 upstream.
The current code returns -EPERM when the voltage loss bit is set. Since the bit indicates that the time value is not valid, return -EINVAL instead, which is the appropriate error code for this situation.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-hym8563.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-hym8563.c +1 -1
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static int hym8563_rtc_read_time(structif (!hym8563->valid) {dev_warn (&client->dev,"no valid clock/calendar values available\n" ); -return -EPERM ; +return -EINVAL ; } ret =i2c_smbus_read_i2c_block_data (client,HYM8563_SEC ,7 , buf);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 152/173 rtc: cmos: Stop using shared IRQ
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
commit b6da197a2e9670df6f07e6698629e9ce95ab614e upstream.
As reported by Guilherme G. Piccoli:
---8<---8<---8<---
The rtc-cmos interrupt setting was changed in the commit 079062b28fb4 ("rtc: cmos: prevent kernel warning on IRQ flags mismatch") in order to allow shared interrupts; according to that commit's description, some machine got kernel warnings due to the interrupt line being shared between rtc-cmos and other hardware, and rtc-cmos didn't allow IRQ sharing that time.
After the aforementioned commit though it was observed a huge increase in lost HPET interrupts in some systems, observed through the following kernel message:
[...] hpet1: lost 35 rtc interrupts
After investigation, it was narrowed down to the shared interrupts usage when having the kernel option "irqpoll" enabled. In this case, all IRQ handlers are called for non-timer interrupts, if such handlers are setup in shared IRQ lines. The rtc-cmos IRQ handler could be set to hpet_rtc_interrupt(), which will produce the kernel "lost interrupts" message after doing work - lots of readl/writel to HPET registers, which are known to be slow.
Although "irqpoll" is not a default kernel option, it's used in some contexts, one being the kdump kernel (which is an already "impaired" kernel usually running with 1 CPU available), so the performance burden could be considerable. Also, the same issue would happen (in a shorter extent though) when using "irqfixup" kernel option.
In a quick experiment, a virtual machine with uptime of 2 minutes produced
Quoted 1 line
300 calls to
hpet_rtc_interrupt()when "irqpoll" was set, whereas without
sharing interrupts this number reduced to 1 interrupt. Machines with more hardware than a VM should generate even more unnecessary HPET interrupts in this scenario.
---8<---8<---8<---
After looking into the rtc-cmos driver history and DSDT table from the Microsoft Surface 3, we may notice that Hans de Goede submitted a correct fix (see dependency below). Thus, we simply revert the culprit commit.
Depends-on: a1e23a42f1bd ("rtc: cmos: Do not assume irq 8 for rtc when there are no legacy irqs")
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-cmos.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-cmos.c +1 -1
@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ cmos_do_probe(struct device *dev, struct rtc_cmos_int_handler = cmos_interrupt; retval =request_irq (rtc_irq, rtc_cmos_int_handler, -IRQF_SHARED ,dev_name (&cmos_rtc.rtc->dev), +0 ,dev_name (&cmos_rtc.rtc->dev), cmos_rtc.rtc);if (retval <0 ) {dev_dbg (dev,"IRQ %d is already in use\n" , rtc_irq);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 153/173 ARC: [plat-axs10x]: Add missing multicast filter number to GMAC node
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jose Abreu <[email protected]>
commit 7980dff398f86a618f502378fa27cf7e77449afa upstream.
Add a missing property to GMAC node so that multicast filtering works correctly.
--- arch/arc/boot/dts/axs10x_mb.dtsi | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arc/boot/dts/axs10x_mb.dtsi +1 -0
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ interrupt-names = "macirq"; phy-mode = "rgmii"; snps,pbl = < 32 >; + snps,multicast-filter-bins = <256>; clocks = <&apbclk>; clock-names = "stmmaceth"; max-speed = <100>;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 154/173 platform/x86: intel_mid_powerbtn: Take a copy of ddata
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Mika Westerberg <[email protected]>
commit 5e0c94d3aeeecc68c573033f08d9678fecf253bd upstream.
The driver gets driver_data from memory that is marked as const (which is probably put to read-only memory) and it then modifies it. This likely causes some sort of fault to happen.
Fix this by taking a copy of the structure.
--- drivers/platform/x86/intel_mid_powerbtn.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/platform/x86/intel_mid_powerbtn.c +3 -2
@@ -158,9 +158,10 @@ static int mid_pb_probe(struct platform_input_set_capability (input,EV_KEY ,KEY_POWER ); - ddata = (struct mid_pb_ddata *)id->driver_data; + ddata =devm_kmemdup (&pdev->dev, (void *)id->driver_data, +sizeof (*ddata),GFP_KERNEL );if (!ddata) -return -ENODATA ; +return -ENOMEM ; ddata->dev = &pdev->dev; ddata->irq = irq;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 155/173 ARM: dts: at91: sama5d3: fix maximum peripheral clock rates
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Alexandre Belloni <[email protected]>
commit ee0aa926ddb0bd8ba59e33e3803b3b5804e3f5da upstream.
Currently the maximum rate for peripheral clock is calculated based on a typical 133MHz MCK. The maximum frequency is defined in the datasheet as a ratio to MCK. Some sama5d3 platforms are using a 166MHz MCK. Update the device trees to match the maximum rate based on 166MHz.
--- arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3.dtsi | 28 ++++++++++++++-------------- arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_can.dtsi | 4 ++-- arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_uart.dtsi | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3.dtsi +14 -14
@@ -1185,49 +1185,49 @@ usart0_clk: usart0_clk { #clock-cells = <0>; reg = <12>; - atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>; }; usart1_clk: usart1_clk { #clock-cells = <0>; reg = <13>; - atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>; }; usart2_clk: usart2_clk { #clock-cells = <0>; reg = <14>; - atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>; }; usart3_clk: usart3_clk { #clock-cells = <0>; reg = <15>; - atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>; }; uart0_clk: uart0_clk { #clock-cells = <0>; reg = <16>; - atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>; }; twi0_clk: twi0_clk { reg = <18>; #clock-cells = <0>; - atmel,clk-output-range = <0 16625000>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 41500000>; }; twi1_clk: twi1_clk { #clock-cells = <0>; reg = <19>; - atmel,clk-output-range = <0 16625000>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 41500000>; }; twi2_clk: twi2_clk { #clock-cells = <0>; reg = <20>; - atmel,clk-output-range = <0 16625000>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 41500000>; }; mci0_clk: mci0_clk {
@@ -1243,19 +1243,19 @@ spi0_clk: spi0_clk { #clock-cells = <0>; reg = <24>; - atmel,clk-output-range = <0 133000000>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 166000000>; }; spi1_clk: spi1_clk { #clock-cells = <0>; reg = <25>; - atmel,clk-output-range = <0 133000000>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 166000000>; }; tcb0_clk: tcb0_clk { #clock-cells = <0>; reg = <26>; - atmel,clk-output-range = <0 133000000>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 166000000>; }; pwm_clk: pwm_clk {
@@ -1266,7 +1266,7 @@ adc_clk: adc_clk { #clock-cells = <0>; reg = <29>; - atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>; }; dma0_clk: dma0_clk {
@@ -1297,13 +1297,13 @@ ssc0_clk: ssc0_clk { #clock-cells = <0>; reg = <38>; - atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>; }; ssc1_clk: ssc1_clk { #clock-cells = <0>; reg = <39>; - atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>; }; sha_clk: sha_clk {
arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_can.dtsi +2 -2
@@ -37,13 +37,13 @@ can0_clk: can0_clk { #clock-cells = <0>; reg = <40>; - atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>; }; can1_clk: can1_clk { #clock-cells = <0>; reg = <41>; - atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>; }; }; };
arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_uart.dtsi +2 -2
@@ -42,13 +42,13 @@ uart0_clk: uart0_clk { #clock-cells = <0>; reg = <16>; - atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>; }; uart1_clk: uart1_clk { #clock-cells = <0>; reg = <17>; - atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>; }; }; };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 156/173 ARM: dts: at91: sama5d3: define clock rate range for tcb1
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Alexandre Belloni <[email protected]>
commit a7e0f3fc01df4b1b7077df777c37feae8c9e8b6d upstream.
The clock rate range for the TCB1 clock is missing. define it in the device tree.
--- arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_tcb1.dtsi | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_tcb1.dtsi +1 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ tcb1_clk: tcb1_clk { #clock-cells = <0>; reg = <27>; + atmel,clk-output-range = <0 166000000>; }; }; };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 157/173 tools/power/acpi: fix compilation error
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Zhengyuan Liu <[email protected]>
commit 1985f8c7f9a42a651a9750d6fcadc74336d182df upstream.
If we compile tools/acpi target in the top source directory, we'd get a compilation error showing as bellow:
# make tools/acpi DESCEND power/acpi DESCEND tools/acpidbg CC tools/acpidbg/acpidbg.o Assembler messages: Fatal error: can't create /home/lzy/kernel-upstream/power/acpi/\ tools/acpidbg/acpidbg.o: No such file or directory ../../Makefile.rules:26: recipe for target '/home/lzy/kernel-upstream/\ power/acpi/tools/acpidbg/acpidbg.o' failed make[3]: *** [/home/lzy/kernel-upstream//power/acpi/tools/acpidbg/\ acpidbg.o] Error 1 Makefile:19: recipe for target 'acpidbg' failed make[2]: *** [acpidbg] Error 2 Makefile:54: recipe for target 'acpi' failed make[1]: *** [acpi] Error 2 Makefile:1607: recipe for target 'tools/acpi' failed make: *** [tools/acpi] Error 2
--- tools/power/acpi/Makefile.config | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/power/acpi/Makefile.config +1 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ include $(srctree)/../../scripts/Makefil OUTPUT=$(srctree)/ ifeq ("$(origin O)", "command line") - OUTPUT := $(O)/power/acpi/ + OUTPUT := $(O)/tools/power/acpi/ endif #$(info Determined 'OUTPUT' to be $(OUTPUT))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 158/173 powerpc/pseries/vio: Fix iommu_table use-after-free refcount warning
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Tyrel Datwyler <[email protected]>
commit aff8c8242bc638ba57247ae1ec5f272ac3ed3b92 upstream.
Commit e5afdf9dd515 ("powerpc/vfio_spapr_tce: Add reference counting to iommu_table") missed an iommu_table allocation in the pseries vio code. The iommu_table is allocated with kzalloc and as a result the associated kref gets a value of zero. This has the side effect that during a DLPAR remove of the associated virtual IOA the iommu_tce_table_put() triggers a use-after-free underflow warning.
Call Trace: [c0000002879e39f0] [c00000000071ecb4] refcount_warn_saturate+0x184/0x190
(unreliable)
[c0000002879e3a50] [c0000000000500ac] iommu_tce_table_put+0x9c/0xb0 [c0000002879e3a70] [c0000000000f54e4] vio_dev_release+0x34/0x70 [c0000002879e3aa0] [c00000000087cfa4] device_release+0x54/0xf0 [c0000002879e3b10] [c000000000d64c84] kobject_cleanup+0xa4/0x240 [c0000002879e3b90] [c00000000087d358] put_device+0x28/0x40 [c0000002879e3bb0] [c0000000007a328c] dlpar_remove_slot+0x15c/0x250 [c0000002879e3c50] [c0000000007a348c] remove_slot_store+0xac/0xf0 [c0000002879e3cd0] [c000000000d64220] kobj_attr_store+0x30/0x60 [c0000002879e3cf0] [c0000000004ff13c] sysfs_kf_write+0x6c/0xa0 [c0000002879e3d10] [c0000000004fde4c] kernfs_fop_write+0x18c/0x260 [c0000002879e3d60] [c000000000410f3c] __vfs_write+0x3c/0x70 [c0000002879e3d80] [c000000000415408] vfs_write+0xc8/0x250 [c0000002879e3dd0] [c0000000004157dc] ksys_write+0x7c/0x120 [c0000002879e3e20] [c00000000000b278] system_call+0x5c/0x68
Further, since the refcount was always zero the iommu_tce_table_put() fails to call the iommu_table release function resulting in a leak.
Fix this issue be initilizing the iommu_table kref immediately after allocation.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vio.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vio.c +2 -0
@@ -1195,6 +1195,8 @@ static struct iommu_table *vio_build_iomif (tbl ==NULL )return NULL ; +kref_init (&tbl->it_kref); +of_parse_dma_window (dev->dev.of_node, dma_window, &tbl->it_index, &offset, &size);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 159/173 powerpc/pseries: Allow not having ibm, hypertas-functions::hcall-multi-tce for DDW
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Alexey Kardashevskiy <[email protected]>
commit 7559d3d295f3365ea7ac0c0274c05e633fe4f594 upstream.
By default a pseries guest supports a H_PUT_TCE hypercall which maps a single IOMMU page in a DMA window. Additionally the hypervisor may support H_PUT_TCE_INDIRECT/H_STUFF_TCE which update multiple TCEs at once; this is advertised via the device tree /rtas/ibm,hypertas-functions property which Linux converts to FW_FEATURE_MULTITCE.
FW_FEATURE_MULTITCE is checked when dma_iommu_ops is used; however the code managing the huge DMA window (DDW) ignores it and calls H_PUT_TCE_INDIRECT even if it is explicitly disabled via the "multitce=off" kernel command line parameter.
This adds FW_FEATURE_MULTITCE checking to the DDW code path.
This changes tce_build_pSeriesLP to take liobn and page size as the huge window does not have iommu_table descriptor which usually the place to store these numbers.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c +29 -14
@@ -168,10 +168,10 @@ static unsigned long tce_get_pseries(strreturn be64_to_cpu (*tcep); } -static void tce_free_pSeriesLP (struct iommu_table *,long ,long ); +static void tce_free_pSeriesLP (unsigned long liobn,long ,long );static void tce_freemulti_pSeriesLP (struct iommu_table *,long ,long ); -static int tce_build_pSeriesLP (struct iommu_table *tbl,long tcenum, +static int tce_build_pSeriesLP (unsigned long liobn,long tcenum,long tceshift,long npages,unsigned long uaddr,enum dma_data_direction direction,unsigned long attrs)
@@ -182,25 +182,25 @@ static int tce_build_pSeriesLP(struct ioint ret =0 ;long tcenum_start = tcenum, npages_start = npages; - rpn =__pa (uaddr) >>TCE_SHIFT ; + rpn =__pa (uaddr) >> tceshift; proto_tce =TCE_PCI_READ ;if (direction !=DMA_TO_DEVICE ) proto_tce |=TCE_PCI_WRITE ;while (npages--) { - tce = proto_tce | (rpn &TCE_RPN_MASK ) <<TCE_RPN_SHIFT ; - rc =plpar_tce_put ((u64 )tbl->it_index, (u64 )tcenum <<12 , tce); + tce = proto_tce | (rpn &TCE_RPN_MASK ) << tceshift; + rc =plpar_tce_put ((u64 )liobn, (u64 )tcenum << tceshift, tce);if (unlikely (rc ==H_NOT_ENOUGH_RESOURCES )) { ret = (int )rc; -tce_free_pSeriesLP (tbl, tcenum_start, +tce_free_pSeriesLP (liobn, tcenum_start, (npages_start - (npages +1 )));break ; }if (rc &&printk_ratelimit ()) {printk ("tce_build_pSeriesLP: plpar_tce_put failed. rc=%lld\n" , rc); -printk ("\tindex = 0x%llx\n" , (u64 )tbl->it_index); +printk ("\tindex = 0x%llx\n" , (u64 )liobn);printk ("\ttcenum = 0x%llx\n" , (u64 )tcenum);printk ("\ttce val = 0x%llx\n" , tce );dump_stack ();
@@ -229,7 +229,8 @@ static int tce_buildmulti_pSeriesLP(struunsigned long flags;if ((npages ==1 ) || !firmware_has_feature (FW_FEATURE_MULTITCE )) { -return tce_build_pSeriesLP (tbl, tcenum, npages, uaddr, +return tce_build_pSeriesLP (tbl->it_index, tcenum, + tbl->it_page_shift, npages, uaddr, direction, attrs); }
@@ -245,8 +246,9 @@ static int tce_buildmulti_pSeriesLP(stru/* If allocation fails, fall back to the loop implementation */ if (!tcep) {local_irq_restore (flags); -return tce_build_pSeriesLP (tbl, tcenum, npages, uaddr, - direction, attrs); +return tce_build_pSeriesLP (tbl->it_index, tcenum, + tbl->it_page_shift, + npages, uaddr, direction, attrs); }__this_cpu_write (tce_page, tcep); }
@@ -297,16 +299,16 @@ static int tce_buildmulti_pSeriesLP(strureturn ret; } -static void tce_free_pSeriesLP (struct iommu_table *tbl,long tcenum,long npages) +static void tce_free_pSeriesLP (unsigned long liobn,long tcenum,long npages) {u64 rc;while (npages--) { - rc =plpar_tce_put ((u64 )tbl->it_index, (u64 )tcenum <<12 ,0 ); + rc =plpar_tce_put ((u64 )liobn, (u64 )tcenum <<12 ,0 );if (rc &&printk_ratelimit ()) {printk ("tce_free_pSeriesLP: plpar_tce_put failed. rc=%lld\n" , rc); -printk ("\tindex = 0x%llx\n" , (u64 )tbl->it_index); +printk ("\tindex = 0x%llx\n" , (u64 )liobn);printk ("\ttcenum = 0x%llx\n" , (u64 )tcenum);dump_stack (); }
@@ -321,7 +323,7 @@ static void tce_freemulti_pSeriesLP(struu64 rc;if (!firmware_has_feature (FW_FEATURE_MULTITCE )) -return tce_free_pSeriesLP (tbl, tcenum, npages); +return tce_free_pSeriesLP (tbl->it_index, tcenum, npages); rc =plpar_tce_stuff ((u64 )tbl->it_index, (u64 )tcenum <<12 ,0 , npages);
@@ -436,6 +438,19 @@ static int tce_setrange_multi_pSeriesLP(u64 rc =0 ;long l, limit; +if (!firmware_has_feature (FW_FEATURE_MULTITCE )) { +unsigned long tceshift =be32_to_cpu (maprange->tce_shift); +unsigned long dmastart = (start_pfn <<PAGE_SHIFT ) + +be64_to_cpu (maprange->dma_base); +unsigned long tcenum = dmastart >> tceshift; +unsigned long npages = num_pfn <<PAGE_SHIFT >> tceshift; +void *uaddr =__va (start_pfn <<PAGE_SHIFT ); + +return tce_build_pSeriesLP (be32_to_cpu (maprange->liobn), + tcenum, tceshift, npages, (unsigned long ) uaddr, +DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL ,0 ); + } +local_irq_disable ();/* to protect tcep and the page behind it */ tcep =__this_cpu_read (tce_page);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 160/173 KVM: arm/arm64: vgic-its: Fix restoration of unmapped collections
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Auger <[email protected]>
commit 8c58be34494b7f1b2adb446e2d8beeb90e5de65b upstream.
Saving/restoring an unmapped collection is a valid scenario. For example this happens if a MAPTI command was sent, featuring an unmapped collection. At the moment the CTE fails to be restored. Only compare against the number of online vcpus if the rdist base is set.
--- virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c +2 -1
@@ -2210,7 +2210,8 @@ static int vgic_its_restore_cte(struct v target_addr = (u32)(val >>KVM_ITS_CTE_RDBASE_SHIFT ); coll_id = val &KVM_ITS_CTE_ICID_MASK ; -if (target_addr >=atomic_read (&kvm->online_vcpus)) +if (target_addr !=COLLECTION_NOT_MAPPED && + target_addr >=atomic_read (&kvm->online_vcpus))return -EINVAL ; collection =find_collection (its, coll_id);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 161/173 ARM: 8949/1: mm: mark free_memmap as __init
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Olof Johansson <[email protected]>
commit 31f3010e60522ede237fb145a63b4af5a41718c2 upstream.
As of commit ac7c3e4ff401 ("compiler: enable CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING forcibly"), free_memmap() might not always be inlined, and thus is triggering a section warning:
WARNING: vmlinux.o(.text.unlikely+0x904): Section mismatch in reference from the function free_memmap() to the function .meminit.text:memblock_free()
Mark it as __init, since the faller (free_unused_memmap) already is.
--- arch/arm/mm/init.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/mm/init.c +1 -1
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ static inline void poison_init_mem(void *p++ =0xe7fddef0 ; } -static inline void +static inline void __init free_memmap (unsigned long start_pfn,unsigned long end_pfn) {struct page *start_pg, *end_pg;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 162/173 arm64: cpufeature: Fix the type of no FP/SIMD capability
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
commit 449443c03d8cfdacf7313e17779a2594ebf87e6d upstream.
The NO_FPSIMD capability is defined with scope SYSTEM, which implies that the "absence" of FP/SIMD on at least one CPU is detected only after all the SMP CPUs are brought up. However, we use the status of this capability for every context switch. So, let us change the scope to LOCAL_CPU to allow the detection of this capability as and when the first CPU without FP is brought up.
Also, the current type allows hotplugged CPU to be brought up without FP/SIMD when all the current CPUs have FP/SIMD and we have the userspace up. Fix both of these issues by changing the capability to BOOT_RESTRICTED_LOCAL_CPU_FEATURE.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +1 -1
@@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabiliti {/* FP/SIMD is not implemented */ .capability = ARM64_HAS_NO_FPSIMD, - .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_RESTRICTED_CPU_LOCAL_FEATURE, .min_field_value = 0, .matches = has_no_fpsimd, },
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 163/173 KVM: arm/arm64: Fix young bit from mmu notifier
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Gavin Shan <[email protected]>
commit cf2d23e0bac9f6b5cd1cba8898f5f05ead40e530 upstream.
kvm_test_age_hva() is called upon mmu_notifier_test_young(), but wrong address range has been passed to handle_hva_to_gpa(). With the wrong address range, no young bits will be checked in handle_hva_to_gpa(). It means zero is always returned from mmu_notifier_test_young().
This fixes the issue by passing correct address range to the underly function handle_hva_to_gpa(), so that the hardware young (access) bit will be visited.
--- virt/kvm/arm/mmu.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
virt/kvm/arm/mmu.c +2 -1
@@ -1736,7 +1736,8 @@ int kvm_test_age_hva(struct kvm *kvm, unif (!kvm->arch.pgd)return 0 ;trace_kvm_test_age_hva (hva); -return handle_hva_to_gpa (kvm, hva, hva, kvm_test_age_hva_handler,NULL ); +return handle_hva_to_gpa (kvm, hva, hva +PAGE_SIZE , + kvm_test_age_hva_handler,NULL ); }void kvm_mmu_free_memory_caches (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 164/173 crypto: artpec6 - return correct error code for failed setkey()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit b828f905904cd76424230c69741a4cabb0174168 upstream.
->setkey() is supposed to retun -EINVAL for invalid key lengths, not -1.
--- drivers/crypto/axis/artpec6_crypto.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/axis/artpec6_crypto.c +1 -1
@@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@ static int artpec6_crypto_aead_set_key(sif (len !=16 && len !=24 && len !=32 ) {crypto_aead_set_flags (tfm,CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN ); -return -1 ; +return -EINVAL ; } ctx->key_length = len;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 165/173 crypto: atmel-sha - fix error handling when setting hmac key
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit b529f1983b2dcc46354f311feda92e07b6e9e2da upstream.
HMAC keys can be of any length, and atmel_sha_hmac_key_set() can only fail due to -ENOMEM. But atmel_sha_hmac_setkey() incorrectly treated any error as a "bad key length" error. Fix it to correctly propagate the -ENOMEM error code and not set any tfm result flags.
--- drivers/crypto/atmel-sha.c | 7 +------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/atmel-sha.c +1 -6
@@ -1921,12 +1921,7 @@ static int atmel_sha_hmac_setkey(struct {struct atmel_sha_hmac_ctx *hmac =crypto_ahash_ctx (tfm); -if (atmel_sha_hmac_key_set (&hmac->hkey, key, keylen)) { -crypto_ahash_set_flags (tfm,CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN ); -return -EINVAL ; - } - -return 0 ; +return atmel_sha_hmac_key_set (&hmac->hkey, key, keylen); }static int atmel_sha_hmac_init (struct ahash_request *req)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 166/173 media: i2c: adv748x: Fix unsafe macros
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
commit 0d962e061abcf1b9105f88fb850158b5887fbca3 upstream.
Enclose multiple macro parameters in parentheses in order to make such macros safer and fix the Clang warning below:
drivers/media/i2c/adv748x/adv748x-afe.c:452:12: warning: operator '?:' has lower precedence than '|'; '|' will be evaluated first [-Wbitwise-conditional-parentheses]
ret = sdp_clrset(state, ADV748X_SDP_FRP, ADV748X_SDP_FRP_MASK, enable ? ctrl->val - 1 : 0);
--- drivers/media/i2c/adv748x/adv748x.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/media/i2c/adv748x/adv748x.h +4 -4
@@ -372,10 +372,10 @@ int adv748x_write_block(struct adv748x_s#define io_read (s, r) adv748x_read(s, ADV748X_PAGE_IO, r)#define io_write (s, r, v) adv748x_write(s, ADV748X_PAGE_IO, r, v) -#define io_clrset (s, r, m, v) io_write(s, r, (io_read(s, r) & ~m) | v) +#define io_clrset (s, r, m, v) io_write(s, r, (io_read(s, r) & ~(m)) | (v))#define hdmi_read (s, r) adv748x_read(s, ADV748X_PAGE_HDMI, r) -#define hdmi_read16 (s, r, m) (((hdmi_read(s, r) << 8) | hdmi_read(s, r+1)) & m) +#define hdmi_read16 (s, r, m) (((hdmi_read(s, r) << 8) | hdmi_read(s, (r)+1)) & (m))#define hdmi_write (s, r, v) adv748x_write(s, ADV748X_PAGE_HDMI, r, v)#define repeater_read (s, r) adv748x_read(s, ADV748X_PAGE_REPEATER, r)
@@ -383,11 +383,11 @@ int adv748x_write_block(struct adv748x_s#define sdp_read (s, r) adv748x_read(s, ADV748X_PAGE_SDP, r)#define sdp_write (s, r, v) adv748x_write(s, ADV748X_PAGE_SDP, r, v) -#define sdp_clrset (s, r, m, v) sdp_write(s, r, (sdp_read(s, r) & ~m) | v) +#define sdp_clrset (s, r, m, v) sdp_write(s, r, (sdp_read(s, r) & ~(m)) | (v))#define cp_read (s, r) adv748x_read(s, ADV748X_PAGE_CP, r)#define cp_write (s, r, v) adv748x_write(s, ADV748X_PAGE_CP, r, v) -#define cp_clrset (s, r, m, v) cp_write(s, r, (cp_read(s, r) & ~m) | v) +#define cp_clrset (s, r, m, v) cp_write(s, r, (cp_read(s, r) & ~(m)) | (v))#define txa_read (s, r) adv748x_read(s, ADV748X_PAGE_TXA, r)#define txb_read (s, r) adv748x_read(s, ADV748X_PAGE_TXB, r)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 167/173 pinctrl: sh-pfc: r8a7778: Fix duplicate SDSELF_B and SD1_CLK_B
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
commit 805f635703b2562b5ddd822c62fc9124087e5dd5 upstream.
The FN_SDSELF_B and FN_SD1_CLK_B enum IDs are used twice, which means one set of users must be wrong. Replace them by the correct enum IDs.
--- drivers/pinctrl/sh-pfc/pfc-r8a7778.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/pinctrl/sh-pfc/pfc-r8a7778.c +2 -2
@@ -2325,7 +2325,7 @@ static const struct pinmux_cfg_reg pinmuFN_ATAG0_A ,0 ,FN_REMOCON_B ,0 ,/* IP0_11_8 [4] */ FN_SD1_DAT2_A ,FN_MMC_D2 ,0 ,FN_BS , -FN_ATADIR0_A ,0 ,FN_SDSELF_B ,0 , +FN_ATADIR0_A ,0 ,FN_SDSELF_A ,0 ,FN_PWM4_B ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 , /* IP0_7_5 [3] */
@@ -2367,7 +2367,7 @@ static const struct pinmux_cfg_reg pinmuFN_TS_SDAT0_A ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,/* IP1_10_8 [3] */ -FN_SD1_CLK_B ,FN_MMC_D6 ,0 ,FN_A24 , +FN_SD1_CD_A ,FN_MMC_D6 ,0 ,FN_A24 ,FN_DREQ1_A ,0 ,FN_HRX0_B ,FN_TS_SPSYNC0_A ,/* IP1_7_5 [3] */ FN_A23, FN_HTX0_B, FN_TX2_B, FN_DACK2_A,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 168/173 scsi: megaraid_sas: Do not initiate OCR if controller is not in ready state
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Anand Lodnoor <[email protected]>
commit 6d7537270e3283b92f9b327da9d58a4de40fe8d0 upstream.
Driver initiates OCR if a DCMD command times out. But there is a deadlock if the driver attempts to invoke another OCR before the mutex lock (reset_mutex) is released from the previous session of OCR.
This patch takes care of the above scenario using new flag MEGASAS_FUSION_OCR_NOT_POSSIBLE to indicate if OCR is possible.
--- drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c | 3 ++- drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c | 3 ++- drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c +2 -1
@@ -4109,7 +4109,8 @@ dcmd_timeout_ocr_possible(struct megasasif (instance->adapter_type ==MFI_SERIES )return KILL_ADAPTER ;else if (instance->unload || -test_bit (MEGASAS_FUSION_IN_RESET , &instance->reset_flags)) +test_bit (MEGASAS_FUSION_OCR_NOT_POSSIBLE , + &instance->reset_flags))return IGNORE_TIMEOUT ;else return INITIATE_OCR ;
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c +2 -1
@@ -4212,6 +4212,7 @@ int megasas_reset_fusion(struct Scsi_Hosif (instance->requestorId && !instance->skip_heartbeat_timer_del)del_timer_sync (&instance->sriov_heartbeat_timer);set_bit (MEGASAS_FUSION_IN_RESET , &instance->reset_flags); +set_bit (MEGASAS_FUSION_OCR_NOT_POSSIBLE , &instance->reset_flags);atomic_set (&instance->adprecovery,MEGASAS_ADPRESET_SM_POLLING ); instance->instancet->disable_intr (instance);megasas_sync_irqs ((unsigned long )instance);
@@ -4399,7 +4400,7 @@ fail_kill_adapter:atomic_set (&instance->adprecovery,MEGASAS_HBA_OPERATIONAL ); } out: -clear_bit (MEGASAS_FUSION_IN_RESET , &instance->reset_flags); +clear_bit (MEGASAS_FUSION_OCR_NOT_POSSIBLE , &instance->reset_flags);mutex_unlock (&instance->reset_mutex);return retval; }
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.h +1 -0
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ enum MR_RAID_FLAGS_IO_SUB_TYPE {#define MEGASAS_FP_CMD_LEN 16#define MEGASAS_FUSION_IN_RESET 0 +#define MEGASAS_FUSION_OCR_NOT_POSSIBLE 1#define THRESHOLD_REPLY_COUNT 50#define RAID_1_PEER_CMDS 2#define JBOD_MAPS_COUNT 2
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 169/173 dm: fix potential for q->make_request_fn NULL pointer
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
commit 47ace7e012b9f7ad71d43ac9063d335ea3d6820b upstream.
Move blk_queue_make_request() to dm.c:alloc_dev() so that q->make_request_fn is never NULL during the lifetime of a DM device (even one that is created without a DM table).
Otherwise generic_make_request() will crash simply by doing:
dmsetup create -n test
mount /dev/dm-N /mnt
While at it, move ->congested_data initialization out of dm.c:alloc_dev() and into the bio-based specific init method.
Depends-on: c12c9a3c3860c ("dm: various cleanups to md->queue initialization code")
[smb: adjusted for context and dm_init_md_queue() exitsting in older
kernels]
--- drivers/md/dm.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm.c +7 -2
@@ -1647,7 +1647,6 @@ void dm_init_md_queue(struct mapped_devi* - must do so here (in alloc_dev callchain) before queue is used */ md->queue->queuedata = md; - md->queue->backing_dev_info->congested_data = md; }void dm_init_normal_md_queue (struct mapped_device *md)
@@ -1658,6 +1657,7 @@ void dm_init_normal_md_queue(struct mapp/* * Initialize aspects of queue that aren't relevant for blk-mq */ + md->queue->backing_dev_info->congested_data = md; md->queue->backing_dev_info->congested_fn = dm_any_congested; }
@@ -1750,6 +1750,12 @@ static struct mapped_device *alloc_dev(i goto bad;dm_init_md_queue (md); +/* +* default to bio-based required ->make_request_fn until DM +* table is loaded and md->type established. If request-based +* table is loaded: blk-mq will override accordingly. +*/ +blk_queue_make_request (md->queue, dm_make_request); md->disk =alloc_disk_node (1 , numa_node_id);if (!md->disk)
@@ -2055,7 +2061,6 @@ int dm_setup_md_queue(struct mapped_devicase DM_TYPE_BIO_BASED :case DM_TYPE_DAX_BIO_BASED :dm_init_normal_md_queue (md); -blk_queue_make_request (md->queue, dm_make_request);/* * DM handles splitting bios as needed. Free the bio_split bioset * since it won't be used (saves 1 process per bio-based DM device).
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 170/173 mwifiex: Fix possible buffer overflows in mwifiex_ret_wmm_get_status()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Qing Xu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3a9b153c5591548612c3955c9600a98150c81875 ]
mwifiex_ret_wmm_get_status() calls memcpy() without checking the destination size.Since the source is given from remote AP which contains illegal wmm elements , this may trigger a heap buffer overflow.
Fix it by putting the length check before calling memcpy().
--- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c +4 -0
@@ -976,6 +976,10 @@ int mwifiex_ret_wmm_get_status(struct mwifiex_private *priv,"WMM Parameter Set Count: %d\n" , wmm_param_ie->qos_info_bitmap & mask); +if (wmm_param_ie->vend_hdr.len +2 > +sizeof (struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter )) +break ; +memcpy ((u8 *) &priv->curr_bss_params.bss_descriptor. wmm_ie, wmm_param_ie, wmm_param_ie->vend_hdr.len +2 );
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 171/173 mwifiex: Fix possible buffer overflows in mwifiex_cmd_append_vsie_tlv()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Qing Xu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b70261a288ea4d2f4ac7cd04be08a9f0f2de4f4d ]
mwifiex_cmd_append_vsie_tlv() calls memcpy() without checking the destination size may trigger a buffer overflower, which a local user could use to cause denial of service or the execution of arbitrary code.
Fix it by putting the length check before calling memcpy().
--- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c +7 -0
@@ -2890,6 +2890,13 @@ mwifiex_cmd_append_vsie_tlv(struct mwifiex_private *priv, vs_param_set->header.len =cpu_to_le16 ((((u16 ) priv->vs_ie[id].ie[1 ]) &0x00FF ) +2 ); +if (le16_to_cpu (vs_param_set->header.len) > +MWIFIEX_MAX_VSIE_LEN ) { +mwifiex_dbg (priv->adapter,ERROR , +"Invalid param length!\n" ); +break ; + } +memcpy (vs_param_set->ie, priv->vs_ie[id].ie,le16_to_cpu (vs_param_set->header.len)); *buffer += le16_to_cpu(vs_param_set->header.len) +
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 172/173 libertas: dont exit from lbs_ibss_join_existing() with RCU read lock held
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nicolai Stange <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c7bf1fb7ddca331780b9a733ae308737b39f1ad4 ]
Commit e5e884b42639 ("libertas: Fix two buffer overflows at parsing bss descriptor") introduced a bounds check on the number of supplied rates to lbs_ibss_join_existing().
Unfortunately, it introduced a return path from within a RCU read side critical section without a corresponding rcu_read_unlock(). Fix this.
--- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/cfg.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/cfg.c +1 -0
@@ -1788,6 +1788,7 @@ static int lbs_ibss_join_existing(struct lbs_private *priv, rates_max = rates_eid[1 ];if (rates_max >MAX_RATES ) {lbs_deb_join ("invalid rates" ); +rcu_read_unlock (); goto out; } rates = cmd.bss.rates;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 173/173 libertas: make lbs_ibss_join_existing() return error code on rates overflow
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nicolai Stange <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1754c4f60aaf1e17d886afefee97e94d7f27b4cb ]
Commit e5e884b42639 ("libertas: Fix two buffer overflows at parsing bss descriptor") introduced a bounds check on the number of supplied rates to lbs_ibss_join_existing() and made it to return on overflow.
However, the aforementioned commit doesn't set the return value accordingly and thus, lbs_ibss_join_existing() would return with zero even though it failed.
Make lbs_ibss_join_existing return -EINVAL in case the bounds check on the number of supplied rates fails.
--- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/cfg.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/cfg.c +1 -0
@@ -1789,6 +1789,7 @@ static int lbs_ibss_join_existing(struct lbs_private *priv,if (rates_max >MAX_RATES ) {lbs_deb_join ("invalid rates" );rcu_read_unlock (); + ret = -EINVAL ; goto out; } rates = cmd.bss.rates;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.171 release. There are 173 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Feb 2020 15:16:41 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 9 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.171-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.171 release. There are 173 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Feb 2020 15:16:41 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Commit 833e09807c49 ("serial: uartps: Add a timeout to the tx empty wait") breaks all xilinx boot tests, here and in v4.19.y. Reverting it fixes the problem. that is maybe not entirely surprising, given that there were some 40 other commits into the same file since v4.14.
FWIW, I still think that way too many patches are being backported.
Guenter
---
# bad: [2874fe09799571ffc1e2e075c38a1c128fc11cae] Linux 4.14.171-rc1
# good: [e0f8b8a65a473a8baa439cf865a694bbeb83fe90] Linux 4.14.170
git bisect start 'HEAD' 'v4.14.170'
# good: [31fbe06af2d73712ecc3e24a8bfd45ba9654d6f9] KVM: x86: Protect x86_decode_insn from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks git bisect good 31fbe06af2d73712ecc3e24a8bfd45ba9654d6f9
# good: [a7a7caf5064e71b5572e0e0615b253957faaab44] KVM: x86: Fix potential put_fpu() w/o load_fpu() on MPX platform git bisect good a7a7caf5064e71b5572e0e0615b253957faaab44
# bad: [47819f61a70e6e82decb834f9619fceef3129c21] rtc: cmos: Stop using shared IRQ
git bisect bad 47819f61a70e6e82decb834f9619fceef3129c21
# good: [4e85572492f971378c791e3d2175622ff85f9e75] ASoC: pcm: update FE/BE trigger order based on the command git bisect good 4e85572492f971378c791e3d2175622ff85f9e75
# good: [ba63da54934347cd4b208ac1e87d8b91c6c69379] PCI: Don't disable bridge BARs when assigning bus resources git bisect good ba63da54934347cd4b208ac1e87d8b91c6c69379
# good: [dad1bc453beefd1d281e02d90243edd65e2b6d4b] NFSv4: try lease recovery on NFS4ERR_EXPIRED git bisect good dad1bc453beefd1d281e02d90243edd65e2b6d4b
# bad: [e0fda976e9af9b5d26696c9e4d225d1c7757c22f] rtc: hym8563: Return -EINVAL if the time is known to be invalid git bisect bad e0fda976e9af9b5d26696c9e4d225d1c7757c22f
# bad: [833e09807c499ee1449ddcd190a557d912f31e1b] serial: uartps: Add a timeout to the tx empty wait git bisect bad 833e09807c499ee1449ddcd190a557d912f31e1b
# first bad commit: [833e09807c499ee1449ddcd190a557d912f31e1b] serial: uartps: Add a timeout to the tx empty wait
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 6 lines · Guenter Roeck
Quoted 5 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.171 release. There are 173 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Feb 2020 15:16:41 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Commit
833e09807c49("serial: uartps: Add a timeout to the tx empty wait") breaks all xilinx boot tests, here and in v4.19.y. Reverting it fixes the problem. that is maybe not entirely surprising, given that there were some 40 other commits into the same file since v4.14.
Ah, I added the fixup patch (Pavel pointed it out), but didn't push out a -rc2 with it in it. I'll go do that now.
Quoted 1 line
FWIW, I still think that way too many patches are being backported.
All of the patches I have been added are there either because they were asked to be there due to the cc: stable tag, or a developer asked, or there was a "Fixes:" tag that referenced a commit in that tree.
Yes, it looks like a lot, but people are finally getting better at tagging their stuff, which is why we are finally getting more fixes in the tree. We were riding for the past 15 years before now with way too little fixes being applied.
And this is also what testing is for, be it 1 or 200 patches a release, they should all be able to pass testing to make us feel better that they are "safe". The quantity does not matter for that.
thanks,
greg k-h
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.171 release. There are 173 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Feb 2020 15:16:41 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Build results:
total: 172 pass: 172 fail: 0 Qemu test results: total: 379 pass: 365 fail: 14 Failed tests: arm:xilinx-zynq-a9:multi_v7_defconfig:mem128:zynq-zc702:initrd arm:xilinx-zynq-a9:multi_v7_defconfig:sd:mem128:zynq-zc702:rootfs arm:xilinx-zynq-a9:multi_v7_defconfig:sd:mem128:zynq-zc706:rootfs arm:xilinx-zynq-a9:multi_v7_defconfig:sd:mem128:zynq-zed:rootfs arm64:xlnx-zcu102:defconfig:smp:mem2G:initrd:xilinx/zynqmp-ep108 arm64:xlnx-zcu102:defconfig:smp:mem2G:sd:rootfs:xilinx/zynqmp-ep108 arm64:xlnx-zcu102:defconfig:smp:mem2G:sata:rootfs:xilinx/zynqmp-ep108 arm64:xlnx-zcu102:defconfig:nosmp:mem2G:initrd:xilinx/zynqmp-ep108 arm64:xlnx-zcu102:defconfig:nosmp:mem2G:sd:rootfs:xilinx/zynqmp-ep108 arm64be:xlnx-zcu102:defconfig:smp:mem2G:initrd:xilinx/zynqmp-ep108 arm64be:xlnx-zcu102:defconfig:smp:mem2G:sd:rootfs:xilinx/zynqmp-ep108 arm64be:xlnx-zcu102:defconfig:smp:mem2G:sata:rootfs:xilinx/zynqmp-ep108 arm64be:xlnx-zcu102:defconfig:nosmp:mem2G:initrd:xilinx/zynqmp-ep108 arm64be:xlnx-zcu102:defconfig:nosmp:mem2G:sd:rootfs:xilinx/zynqmp-ep108
Failures as reported separately.
Guenter
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.171 release. There are 173 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Feb 2020 15:16:41 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.171-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.14.171-rc2
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.14.y
git commit: fc30e3f7ed49e3e207a81a7945cd2524bc6a9cb7
git describe: v4.14.170-175-gfc30e3f7ed49
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.14-oe/build/v4.14.170-175-gfc30e3f7ed49
No regressions (compared to build v4.14.170)
No fixes (compared to build v4.14.170)
Ran 24192 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64
Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* linux-log-parser
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* perf
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* v4l2-compliance
* network-basic-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* kvm-unit-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none
* ssuite
Signature · 2 lines
Linaro LKFT https://lkft.linaro.org
Jon Hunter
maintainerQuoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.171 release. There are 173 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Feb 2020 15:16:41 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.171-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
All tests are passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v4.14:
8 builds: 8 pass, 0 fail
16 boots: 16 pass, 0 fail
24 tests: 24 pass, 0 failLinux version: 4.14.171-rc1-g2874fe097995
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,
tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04
Cheers
Jon
Signature · 1 line
nvpublic
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.171 release. There are 173 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Feb 2020 15:16:41 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
For v4.14.170-175-gfc30e3f7ed49:
Build results:
total: 172 pass: 172 fail: 0 Qemu test results: total: 378 pass: 378 fail: 0
Guenter