qemu-cpu-models: Document -noTSX, mds-no, taa-no, and tsx-ctrl
PATCH v3 1/1 qemu-cpu-models: Document -noTSX, mds-no, taa-no, and tsx-ctrl
- Add the '-noTSX' variants for CascadeLake and SkyLake.
- Document the three MSR bits: 'mds-no', 'taa-no', and 'tsx-ctrl'
Two confusing about 'mds-no' (and the first point applies to the other two MSRs too):
(1) The 'mds-no' will _not_ show up in the guest's /proc/cpuinfo. Rather it is used to fill in the guest's sysfs:
sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds:Not affected
Paolo confirmed on IRC as such.
(2) There are _three_ variants[+] of CascadeLake CPUs, with different stepping levels: 5, 6, and 7. To quote wikichip.org[*]:
"note that while steppings 6 & 7 are fully mitigated, earlier stepping 5 is not protected against MSBDS, MLPDS, nor MDSUM"
The above is also indicated in the Intel's document[+], as indicated by "No" under the three columns of MFBDS, MSBDS, and MLPDS.
[+] https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/processors-affected-microarchitectural-data-sampling
[*] https://en.wikichip.org/wiki/intel/microarchitectures/cascade_lake#Key_changes_from_Skylake
---
v3:
- Address feedback from Paolo
- Add URL to the deep-dive on Intel's MDS
v2:
- Address feedback from DanPB
- Add sections on 'taa-no' and 'tsx-ctrl'
--- docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi +64 -1
@@ -72,14 +72,25 @@ between machines, if live migration compatibility is required, use the newest CPU model that is compatible across all desired hosts. @table @option + +@item @code{Cascadelake-Server} +@item @code{Cascadelake-Server-noTSX} + +Intel Xeon Processor (Cascade Lake, 2019), with "stepping" levels +6 or 7 only. (The Cascade Lake Xeon processor with @b{stepping 5 is +vulnerable to MDS variants}.) + + @item @code{Skylake-Server} @item @code{Skylake-Server-IBRS} +@item @code{Skylake-Server-noTSX-IBRS} Intel Xeon Processor (Skylake, 2016) @item @code{Skylake-Client} @item @code{Skylake-Client-IBRS} +@item @code{Skylake-Client-noTSX-IBRS} Intel Core Processor (Skylake, 2015)
@@ -214,9 +225,61 @@ Must be explicitly turned on for all Intel CPU models. Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it can be used for guest CPUs. + +@item @code{mds-no} + +Recommended to inform the guest OS that the host is @i{not} vulnerable +to any of the MDS variants ([MFBDS] CVE-2018-12130, [MLPDS] +CVE-2018-12127, [MSBDS] CVE-2018-12126). + +This is an MSR (Model-Specific Register) feature rather than a CPUID +feature, so it will not appear in the Linux @code{/proc/cpuinfo} in the +host or guest. Instead, the host kernel uses it to populate the MDS +vulnerability file in @code{sysfs}. + +So it should only be enabled for VMs if the host reports @code{Not +affected} in the @code{/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds} +file. + +@item @code{taa-no} + +Recommended to inform that the guest that the host is @i{not} vulnerable +to CVE-2019-11135, TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA). + +This too is an MSR feature, so it does not show up in the Linux +@code{/proc/cpuinfo} in the host or guest. + +It should only be enabled for VMs if the host reports @code{Not +affected} in the +@code{/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort} file. + +@item @code{tsx-ctrl} + +Recommended to inform the guest that it can disable the Intel TSX +(Transactional Synchronization Extensions) feature; or, if the processor +is vulnerable, use the Intel VERW instruction (a processor-level +instruction that performs checks on memory access) as a mitigation for +the TAA vulnerability. (For details, refer to +@url{https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-intel-analysis-microarchitectural-data-sampling, +this Intel's deep-dive into MDS}. + +Expose this to the guest OS if and only if: (a) the host has TSX +enabled; and (b) the guest has @code{rtm} CPU flag enabled. + +By disabling TSX, KVM-based guests can avoid paying the price of +mitigting TSX-based attacks. + +Note that @code{tasx-ctrl} too is an MSR feature, so it does not show up +in the Linux @code{/proc/cpuinfo} in the host or guest. + +To validate that Intel TSX is indeed disabled for the guest, there are +two ways: (a) check for the @i{absence} of @code{rtm} in the guest's +@code{/proc/cpuinfo}; or (b) the +@code{/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort} file in +the guest should report @code{Mitigation: TSX disabled}. + @end table - @node preferred_cpu_models_amd_x86 @subsubsection Preferred CPU models for AMD x86 hosts
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Ping.
Quoted 136 lines · Kashyap Chamarthy
- Add the '-noTSX' variants for CascadeLake and SkyLake.
- Document the three MSR bits: 'mds-no', 'taa-no', and 'tsx-ctrl'
Two confusing about 'mds-no' (and the first point applies to the other two MSRs too):
(1) The 'mds-no' will _not_ show up in the guest's
/proc/cpuinfo. Rather it is used to fill in the guest's sysfs:sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds:Not affected
Paolo confirmed on IRC as such.
(2) There are _three_ variants[+] of CascadeLake CPUs, with different stepping levels: 5, 6, and 7. To quote wikichip.org[*]:
"note that while steppings 6 & 7 are fully mitigated, earlier stepping 5 is not protected against MSBDS, MLPDS, nor MDSUM"
The above is also indicated in the Intel's document[+], as indicated by "No" under the three columns of MFBDS, MSBDS, and MLPDS.
[+] https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/processors-affected-microarchitectural-data-sampling
[*] https://en.wikichip.org/wiki/intel/microarchitectures/cascade_lake#Key_changes_from_SkylakeSigned-off-by Kashyap Chamarthy <[email protected]>---
v3:
- Address feedback from Paolo
- Add URL to the deep-dive on Intel's MDS
v2:
- Address feedback from DanPB
- Add sections on 'taa-no' and 'tsx-ctrl'--- docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)docs/qemu-cpu-models.texi +64
-1@@ -72,14 +72,25 @@ between machines, if live migration compatibility is required, use the newest CPU model that is compatible across all desired hosts. @table @option + +@item @code{Cascadelake-Server} +@item @code{Cascadelake-Server-noTSX} + +Intel Xeon Processor (Cascade Lake, 2019), with "stepping" levels +6 or 7 only. (The Cascade Lake Xeon processor with @b{stepping 5 is +vulnerable to MDS variants}.) + + @item @code{Skylake-Server} @item @code{Skylake-Server-IBRS} +@item @code{Skylake-Server-noTSX-IBRS} Intel Xeon Processor (Skylake, 2016) @item @code{Skylake-Client} @item @code{Skylake-Client-IBRS} +@item @code{Skylake-Client-noTSX-IBRS} Intel Core Processor (Skylake, 2015)@@ -214,9 +225,61 @@ Must be explicitly turned on for all Intel CPU models. Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it can be used for guest CPUs. + +@item @code{mds-no} + +Recommended to inform the guest OS that the host is @i{not} vulnerable +to any of the MDS variants ([MFBDS] CVE-2018-12130, [MLPDS] +CVE-2018-12127, [MSBDS] CVE-2018-12126). + +This is an MSR (Model-Specific Register) feature rather than a CPUID +feature, so it will not appear in the Linux @code{/proc/cpuinfo} in the +host or guest. Instead, the host kernel uses it to populate the MDS +vulnerability file in @code{sysfs}. + +So it should only be enabled for VMs if the host reports @code{Not +affected} in the @code{/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds} +file. + +@item @code{taa-no} + +Recommended to inform that the guest that the host is @i{not} vulnerable +to CVE-2019-11135, TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA). + +This too is an MSR feature, so it does not show up in the Linux +@code{/proc/cpuinfo} in the host or guest. + +It should only be enabled for VMs if the host reports @code{Not +affected} in the +@code{/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort} file. + +@item @code{tsx-ctrl} + +Recommended to inform the guest that it can disable the Intel TSX +(Transactional Synchronization Extensions) feature; or, if the processor +is vulnerable, use the Intel VERW instruction (a processor-level +instruction that performs checks on memory access) as a mitigation for +the TAA vulnerability. (For details, refer to +@url{https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-intel-analysis-microarchitectural-data-sampling, +this Intel's deep-dive into MDS}. + +Expose this to the guest OS if and only if: (a) the host has TSX +enabled; and (b) the guest has @code{rtm} CPU flag enabled. + +By disabling TSX, KVM-based guests can avoid paying the price of +mitigting TSX-based attacks. + +Note that @code{tasx-ctrl} too is an MSR feature, so it does not show up +in the Linux @code{/proc/cpuinfo} in the host or guest. + +To validate that Intel TSX is indeed disabled for the guest, there are +two ways: (a) check for the @i{absence} of @code{rtm} in the guest's +@code{/proc/cpuinfo}; or (b) the +@code{/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort} file in +the guest should report @code{Mitigation: TSX disabled}. + @end table - @node preferred_cpu_models_amd_x86 @subsubsection Preferred CPU models for AMD x86 hostsSignature · 1 line
2.21.0
Signature · 1 line
/kashyap
Quoted 1 line · Kashyap Chamarthy
Ping.
I'm going to convert this entire doc (qemu-cpu-models.texi) to rST, and send it to the list as a separate change. (Including the content of this patch.)
[...]
Signature · 1 line
/kashyap