LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
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Casey Schaufler
maintainerv15 cover LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
Resending the audit related patches to the audit list, as there have been problems with the CC lists.
This patchset provides the changes required for the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v15: Rebase to 5.6-rc1
- Revise IMA data use (patch 0002)
Incorporate feedback from v14
- Fix lockdown module registration naming (patch 0002)
- Revise how /proc/self/attr/context is gathered. (patch 0022)
- Revise access modes on /proc/self/attr/context. (patch 0022)
- Revise documentation on LSM external interfaces. (patch 0022)
v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5
Incorporate feedback from v13
- Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002)
- Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002)
- Remove unneeded include (patch 0013)
- Use context.len correctly (patch 0015)
- Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016)
- Drop SO_PEERCONTEXT as it's not needed yet (patch 0023)
v13: Rebase to 5.5-rc2
Incorporate feedback from v12
- Print lsmblob size with %z (Patch 0002)
- Convert lockdown LSM initialization. (Patch 0002)
- Restore error check in nft_secmark_compute_secid (Patch 0006)
- Correct blob scaffolding in ima_must_appraise() (Patch 0009)
- Make security_setprocattr() clearer (Patch 0013)
- Use lsm_task_display more widely (Patch 0013)
- Use passed size in lsmcontext_init() (Patch 0014)
- Don't add a smack_release_secctx() hook (Patch 0014)
- Don't print warning in security_release_secctx() (Patch 0014)
- Don't duplicate the label in nfs4_label_init_security() (Patch 0016)
- Remove reviewed-by as code has significant change (Patch 0016)
- Send the entire lsmblob for Tag 6 (Patch 0019)
- Fix description of socket_getpeersec_stream parameters (Patch 0023)
- Retain LSMBLOB_FIRST. What was I thinking? (Patch 0023)
- Add compound context to LSM documentation (Patch 0023)
v12: Rebase to 5.5-rc1
Fixed a couple of incorrect contractions in the text.
v11: Rebase to 5.4-rc6
Incorporate feedback from v10
- Disambiguate reading /proc/.../attr/display by restricting all use of the interface to the current process.
- Fix a merge error in AppArmor's display attribute check
v10: Ask the security modules if the display can be changed.
v9: There is no version 9
v8: Incorporate feedback from v7
- Minor clean-up in display value management
- refactor "compound" context creation to use a common append_ctx() function.
v7: Incorporate feedback from v6
- Make setting the display a privileged operation. The availability of compound contexts reduces the need for setting the display.
v6: Incorporate feedback from v5
- Add subj_<lsm>= and obj_<lsm>= fields to audit records
- Add /proc/.../attr/context to get the full context in lsmname\0value\0... format as suggested by Simon McVittie
- Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for getsockopt() to get the full context in the same format, also suggested by Simon McVittie.
- Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm_display_default to provide the display default value.
v5: Incorporate feedback from v4
- Initialize the lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx()
- Clear the lsmcontext in all security_release_secctx() cases
- Don't use the "display" on strictly internal context interfaces.
- The SELinux binder hooks check for cases where the context "display" isn't compatible with SELinux.
v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
- Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
- Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the slot value.
- Validate slot values used in security.c
- Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
- fix display value check in dentry_init_security
- Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting the audit log
v3: Incorporate feedback from v2
- Make lsmblob parameter and variable names more meaningful, changing "le" and "l" to "blob".
- Improve consistency of constant naming.
- Do more sanity checking during LSM initialization.
- Be a bit clearer about what is temporary scaffolding.
- Rather than clutter security_getpeersec_dgram with otherwise unnecessary checks remove the apparmor stub, which does nothing useful.
Patch 0001 moves management of the sock security blob from the individual modules to the infrastructure.
Patches 0002-0012 replace system use of a "secid" with a structure "lsmblob" containing information from the security modules to be held and reused later. At this point lsmblob contains an array of u32 secids, one "slot" for each of the security modules compiled into the kernel that used secids. A "slot" is allocated when a security module requests one.
The infrastructure is changed to use the slot number to pass the correct secid to or from the security module hooks.
It is important that the lsmblob be a fixed size entity that does not have to be allocated. Several of the places where it is used would have performance and/or locking issues with dynamic allocation.
Patch 0013 provides a mechanism for a process to identify which security module's hooks should be used when displaying or converting a security context string. A new interface /proc/self/attr/display contains the name of the security module to show. Reading from this file will present the name of the module, while writing to it will set the value. Only names of active security modules are accepted. Internally, the name is translated to the appropriate "slot" number for the module which is then stored in the task security blob. Setting the display requires that all modules using the /proc interfaces allow the transition. The "display" of other processess can be neither read nor written. All suggested cases for reading the display of a different process have race conditions.
Patch 0014 Starts the process of changing how a security context is represented. Since it is possible for a security context to have been generated by more than one security module it is now necessary to note which module created a security context so that the correct "release" hook can be called. There are several places where the module that created a security context cannot be inferred.
This is achieved by introducing a "lsmcontext" structure which contains the context string, its length and the "slot" number of the security module that created it. The security_release_secctx() interface is changed, replacing the (string,len) pointer pair with a lsmcontext pointer.
Patches 0015-0017 convert the security interfaces from (string,len) pointer pairs to a lsmcontext pointer. The slot number identifying the creating module is added by the infrastructure. Where the security context is stored for extended periods the data type is changed.
The Netlabel code is converted to save lsmblob structures instead of secids in Patch 0018.
Patch 0019 adds checks to the binder hooks which verify that if both ends of a transaction use the same "display".
Patches 0020-0021 add addition data to the audit records to identify the LSM specific data for all active modules.
Patch 0022 adds a new interfaces for getting the compound security contexts.
Finally, with all interference on the AppArmor hooks removed, Patch 0023 removes the exclusive bit from AppArmor. An unnecessary stub hook was also removed.
The Ubuntu project is using an earlier version of this patchset in their distribution to enable stacking for containers.
Performance measurements to date have the change within the "noise". The sockperf and dbench results are on the order of 0.2% to 0.8% difference, with better performance being as common as worse. The benchmarks were run with AppArmor and Smack on Ubuntu.
https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.6-rc1-v15
--- Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 22 ++ drivers/android/binder.c | 26 +- fs/ceph/xattr.c | 6 +- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 8 +- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 20 +- fs/proc/base.c | 2 + include/linux/audit.h | 5 +- include/linux/cred.h | 3 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 34 ++- include/linux/security.h | 159 ++++++++-- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +- include/net/scm.h | 15 +- kernel/audit.c | 78 +++-- kernel/audit.h | 9 +- kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 1 + kernel/auditfilter.c | 34 ++- kernel/auditsc.c | 139 +++++---- kernel/cred.c | 12 +- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 23 +- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 20 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 11 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 26 +- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 12 +- net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 5 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 98 +++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 + net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 + security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +- security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +- security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 105 ++++--- security/apparmor/procattr.c | 22 +- security/commoncap.c | 7 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 15 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 11 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 42 +-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 53 ++-- security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 1 + security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +- security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 +- security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +- security/security.c | 525 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 99 +++--- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 + security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +- security/smack/smack.h | 6 + security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 83 ++--- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 +- security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 +- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 +- 62 files changed, 1350 insertions(+), 556 deletions(-)
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v15 1/23 LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++----------- security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 78 +++++++++++++++---------------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++ security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++----- security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 64 ++++++++++++------------- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 ++-- 10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +1 -0
@@ -2095,6 +2095,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {int lbs_cred;int lbs_file;int lbs_inode; +int lbs_sock;int lbs_ipc;int lbs_msg_msg;int lbs_task;
security/apparmor/include/net.h +5 -1
@@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {struct aa_label *peer; }; -#define SK_CTX (X ) ((X)->sk_security) +static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock (const struct sock *sk) +{ +return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} +#define SOCK_ctx (X ) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET (NAME ,OP ,SK ,F ,T ,P ) \ struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
security/apparmor/lsm.c +10 -28
@@ -766,33 +766,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginforeturn error; } -/** -* apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field -*/ -static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t flags) -{ -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; - - ctx =kzalloc (sizeof (*ctx), flags); -if (!ctx) -return -ENOMEM ; - -SK_CTX (sk) = ctx; - -return 0 ; -} -/** * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field */ static void apparmor_sk_free_security (struct sock *sk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk); -SK_CTX (sk) =NULL ;aa_put_label (ctx->label);aa_put_label (ctx->peer); -kfree (ctx); }/**
@@ -801,8 +783,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)static void apparmor_sk_clone_security (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); -struct aa_sk_ctx *new =SK_CTX (newsk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *new =aa_sock (newsk); new->label =aa_get_label (ctx->label); new->peer =aa_get_label (ctx->peer);
@@ -853,7 +835,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, label =aa_get_current_label ();if (sock->sk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sock->sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sock->sk);aa_put_label (ctx->label); ctx->label =aa_get_label (label);
@@ -1038,7 +1020,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)*/ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!skb->secmark)return 0 ;
@@ -1051,7 +1033,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label (struct sock *sk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (ctx->peer)return ctx->peer;
@@ -1135,7 +1117,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,*/ static void apparmor_sock_graft (struct sock *sk,struct socket *parent) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!ctx->label) ctx->label =aa_get_current_label ();
@@ -1145,7 +1127,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)static int apparmor_inet_conn_request (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb,struct request_sock *req) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!skb->secmark)return 0 ;
@@ -1162,6 +1144,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *), .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx), .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), + .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx), }; static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1198,7 +1181,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),LSM_HOOK_INIT (setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
@@ -1749,7 +1731,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,if (sk ==NULL )return NF_ACCEPT ; - ctx =SK_CTX (sk); + ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!apparmor_secmark_check (ctx->label,OP_SENDMSG ,AA_MAY_SEND , skb->secmark, sk))return NF_ACCEPT ;
security/security.c +35 -1
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@#include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/msg.h> #include <net/flow.h> +#include <net/sock.h> #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -201,6 +202,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); +lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); }
@@ -336,6 +338,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)init_debug ("inode blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_inode);init_debug ("ipc blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);init_debug ("msg_msg blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); +init_debug ("sock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_sock);init_debug ("task blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_task);/*
@@ -654,6 +657,28 @@ static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)return 0 ; } +/** +* lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob +* @sock: the sock that needs a blob +* @priority: allocation mode +* +* Allocate the sock blob for all the modules +* +* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. +*/ +static int lsm_sock_alloc (struct sock *sock,gfp_t priority) +{ +if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock ==0 ) { + sock->sk_security =NULL ; +return 0 ; + } + + sock->sk_security =kzalloc (blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority); +if (sock->sk_security ==NULL ) +return -ENOMEM ; +return 0 ; +} +/** * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob * @task: the task that needs a blob
@@ -2098,12 +2123,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);int security_sk_alloc (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority) { -return call_int_hook (sk_alloc_security,0 , sk, family, priority); +int rc =lsm_sock_alloc (sk, priority); + +if (unlikely (rc)) +return rc; + rc =call_int_hook (sk_alloc_security,0 , sk, family, priority); +if (unlikely (rc)) +security_sk_free (sk); +return rc; }void security_sk_free (struct sock *sk) {call_void_hook (sk_free_security, sk); +kfree (sk->sk_security); + sk->sk_security =NULL ; }void security_sk_clone (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk)
security/selinux/hooks.c +37 -41
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security/selinux/include/objsec.h +5 -0
@@ -189,4 +189,9 @@ static inline u32 current_sid(void) return tsec->sid; } +static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock (const struct sock *sock) +{ +return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} +#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
security/selinux/netlabel.c +12 -11
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@#include <linux/gfp.h> #include <linux/ip.h> #include <linux/ipv6.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include <net/ip.h>
@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr (struct sock *sk) {int rc; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;if (sksec->nlbl_secattr !=NULL )
@@ -100,7 +101,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr( const struct sock *sk, u32 sid) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;if (secattr ==NULL )
@@ -235,7 +236,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */ sk =skb_to_full_sk (skb);if (sk !=NULL ) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (sksec->nlbl_state !=NLBL_REQSKB )return 0 ;
@@ -273,7 +274,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, {int rc;struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (ep->base.sk);struct sockaddr_in addr4;struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
@@ -352,7 +353,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)*/ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone (struct sock *sk,u16 family) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (family ==PF_INET ) sksec->nlbl_state =NLBL_LABELED ;
@@ -370,8 +371,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)*/ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone (struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; -struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk); +struct sk_security_struct *newsksec =selinux_sock (newsk); newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state; }
@@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create (struct sock *sk,u16 family) {int rc; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;if (family !=PF_INET && family !=PF_INET6 )
@@ -504,7 +505,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, {int rc =0 ;struct sock *sk = sock->sk; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
@@ -542,7 +543,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr) {int rc; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
@@ -581,7 +582,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked (struct sock *sk,struct sockaddr *addr) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (sksec->nlbl_state !=NLBL_REQSKB && sksec->nlbl_state !=NLBL_CONNLABELED )
security/smack/smack.h +5 -0
@@ -372,6 +372,11 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc; } +static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock (const struct sock *sock) +{ +return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} +/* * Is the directory transmuting? */
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +30 -34
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security/smack/smack_netfilter.c +4 -4
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,struct socket_smack *ssp;struct smack_known *skp; -if (sk && sk->sk_security) { - ssp = sk->sk_security; +if (sk &&smack_sock (sk)) { + ssp =smack_sock (sk); skp = ssp->smk_out; skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid; }
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,struct socket_smack *ssp;struct smack_known *skp; -if (sk && sk->sk_security) { - ssp = sk->sk_security; +if (sk &&smack_sock (sk)) { + ssp =smack_sock (sk); skp = ssp->smk_out; skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid; }
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v15 2/23 LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
In reply to Casey SchauflerWhen more than one security module is exporting data to audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a structure to be used instead.
The lsmblob structure is currently an array of u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the security modules built into the system that would use secids if active. The system assigns the module a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are compiled in but not registered there will be unused slots.
A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of security module data rather than a single instance. Because IMA uses the audit rule functions it is affected as well.
--- include/linux/audit.h | 4 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 ++++- include/linux/security.h | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- kernel/auditfilter.c | 27 ++++++----- kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++--- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++- security/commoncap.c | 7 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 34 +++++++++----- security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++- security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 ++- security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++- security/security.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++- 16 files changed, 238 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
include/linux/audit.h +3 -1
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <uapi/linux/audit.h> #define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1)
@@ -64,8 +65,9 @@ struct audit_field {kuid_t uid;kgid_t gid;struct { +bool lsm_isset;char *lsm_str; -void *lsm_rule; +void *lsm_rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ]; }; };u32 op;
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +10 -2
@@ -2077,6 +2077,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {#endif } __randomize_layout; +/* +* Information that identifies a security module. +*/ +struct lsm_id { +const char *lsm;/* Name of the LSM */ +int slot;/* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */ +}; +/* * Security module hook list structure. * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
@@ -2085,7 +2093,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {struct hlist_node list;struct hlist_head *head;union security_list_options hook; -char *lsm; +struct lsm_id *lsmid; } __randomize_layout;/*
@@ -2114,7 +2122,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;extern char *lsm_names;extern void security_add_hooks (struct security_hook_list *hooks,int count, -char *lsm); +struct lsm_id *lsmid);#define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)#define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)
include/linux/security.h +62 -4
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kernel/auditfilter.c +15 -12
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW :case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH :kfree (f->lsm_str); -security_audit_rule_free (f->lsm_rule); +security_audit_rule_free (f->lsm_rules); } }
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, entry->rule.buflen += f->val; err =security_audit_rule_init (f->type, f->op, str, - (void **)&f->lsm_rule); + f->lsm_rules);/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (err == -EINVAL ) {
@@ -528,8 +528,10 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,if (err) {kfree (str); goto exit_free; - }else + }else { + f->lsm_isset = true; f->lsm_str = str; + }break ;case AUDIT_WATCH : str =audit_unpack_string (&bufp, &remain, f->val);
@@ -767,7 +769,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)return 0 ; } -/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be +/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rules is opaque, so must be * re-initialized. */ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field (struct audit_field *df,struct audit_field *sf)
@@ -781,9 +783,9 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,return -ENOMEM ; df->lsm_str = lsm_str; -/* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */ +/* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rules */ ret =security_audit_rule_init (df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str, - (void **)&df->lsm_rule); + df->lsm_rules);/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (ret == -EINVAL ) {
@@ -835,7 +837,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old) new->tree = old->tree;memcpy (new->fields, old->fields,sizeof (struct audit_field ) * fcount); -/* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because +/* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rules fields, because * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */ for (i =0 ; i < fcount; i++) {switch (new->fields[i].type) {
@@ -1353,10 +1355,11 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE :case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN :case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR : -if (f->lsm_rule) { +if (f->lsm_isset) {security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, - f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); + f->type, f->op, + f->lsm_rules); }break ;case AUDIT_EXE :
@@ -1383,7 +1386,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)return ret; } -static int update_lsm_rule (struct audit_krule *r) +static int update_lsm_rules (struct audit_krule *r) { struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);struct audit_entry *nentry;
@@ -1415,7 +1418,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)return err; } -/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules. +/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rules field of all applicable rules. * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
@@ -1430,7 +1433,7 @@ int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)for (i =0 ; i <AUDIT_NR_FILTERS ; i++) {list_for_each_entry_safe (r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) { -int res =update_lsm_rule (r); +int res =update_lsm_rules (r);if (!err) err = res; }
kernel/auditsc.c +6 -6
@@ -638,14 +638,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,match for now to avoid losing information that may be wanted. An error message will also be logged upon error */ -if (f->lsm_rule) { +if (f->lsm_isset) {if (need_sid) {security_task_getsecid (tsk, &sid); need_sid =0 ; } result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, f->type, f->op, - f->lsm_rule); + f->lsm_rules); }break ;case AUDIT_OBJ_USER :
@@ -655,21 +655,21 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH :/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR also applies here */ -if (f->lsm_rule) { +if (f->lsm_isset) {/* Find files that match */ if (name) { result =security_audit_rule_match ( name->osid, f->type, f->op, - f->lsm_rule); + f->lsm_rules); }else if (ctx) {list_for_each_entry (n, &ctx->names_list, list) {if (security_audit_rule_match ( n->osid, f->type, f->op, - f->lsm_rule)) { + f->lsm_rules)) { ++result;break ; }
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,break ;if (security_audit_rule_match (ctx->ipc.osid, f->type, f->op, - f->lsm_rule)) + f->lsm_rules)) ++result; }break ;
security/apparmor/lsm.c +6 -1
@@ -1147,6 +1147,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx), }; +static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="apparmor" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -1847,7 +1852,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) goto buffers_out; }security_add_hooks (apparmor_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (apparmor_hooks), -"apparmor" ); + &apparmor_lsmid);/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ apparmor_initialized =1 ;
security/commoncap.c +6 -1
@@ -1339,6 +1339,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="capability" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (capable, cap_capable), LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
@@ -1363,7 +1368,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {static int __init capability_init (void ) {security_add_hooks (capability_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (capability_hooks), -"capability" ); + &capability_lsmid);return 0 ; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +23 -11
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t ,kuid_t );/* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */ int pcr;struct { -void *rule;/* LSM file metadata specific */ +void *rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ];void *args_p;/* audit value */ int type;/* audit type */ } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES ];
@@ -84,6 +84,16 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {struct ima_template_desc *template; }; +static inline bool ima_lsm_isset (void *rules[]) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) +if (rules[i]) +return true; +return false; +} +/* * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
@@ -258,9 +268,11 @@ __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);static void ima_lsm_free_rule (struct ima_rule_entry *entry) {int i; +int r;for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) { -kfree (entry->lsm[i].rule); +for (r =0 ; r <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; r++) +kfree (entry->lsm[i].rules[r]);kfree (entry->lsm[i].args_p); }kfree (entry);
@@ -295,8 +307,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)security_filter_rule_init (nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, nentry->lsm[i].args_p, - &nentry->lsm[i].rule); -if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule) + nentry->lsm[i].rules); +if (!ima_lsm_isset (nentry->lsm[i].rules))pr_warn ("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n" , (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p); }
@@ -465,7 +477,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,int rc =0 ;u32 osid; -if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) { +if (!ima_lsm_isset (rule->lsm[i].rules)) {if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)continue ;else
@@ -479,7 +491,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, rc =security_filter_rule_match (osid, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, - rule->lsm[i].rule); + rule->lsm[i].rules);break ;case LSM_SUBJ_USER :case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE :
@@ -487,7 +499,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, rc =security_filter_rule_match (secid, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, - rule->lsm[i].rule); + rule->lsm[i].rules);default :break ; }
@@ -872,7 +884,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, {int result; -if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) +if (ima_lsm_isset (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules))return -EINVAL ; entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p =match_strdup (args);
@@ -883,8 +895,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, result =security_filter_rule_init (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); -if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) { + entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules); +if (!ima_lsm_isset (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules)) {pr_warn ("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n" , (char *)entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
@@ -1585,7 +1597,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) }for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) { -if (entry->lsm[i].rule) { +if (ima_lsm_isset (entry->lsm[i].rules)) {switch (i) {case LSM_OBJ_USER : seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
security/loadpin/loadpin.c +7 -1
@@ -180,6 +180,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)return loadpin_read_file (NULL , (enum kernel_read_file_id ) id); } +static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="loadpin" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),LSM_HOOK_INIT (kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
@@ -227,7 +232,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)pr_info ("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n" , enforce ?"" :"not " );parse_exclude (); -security_add_hooks (loadpin_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (loadpin_hooks),"loadpin" ); +security_add_hooks (loadpin_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (loadpin_hooks), + &loadpin_lsmid);return 0 ; }
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +6 -1
@@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down), }; +static struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="lockdown" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; +static int __init lockdown_lsm_init (void ) {#if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY )
@@ -83,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)lock_kernel_down ("Kernel configuration" ,LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX );#endif security_add_hooks (lockdown_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (lockdown_hooks), -"lockdown" ); + &lockdown_lsmid);return 0 ; }
security/safesetid/lsm.c +7 -1
@@ -149,6 +149,11 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,return -EACCES ; } +static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="safesetid" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; +static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),LSM_HOOK_INIT (capable, safesetid_security_capable)
@@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {static int __init safesetid_security_init (void ) {security_add_hooks (safesetid_security_hooks, -ARRAY_SIZE (safesetid_security_hooks),"safesetid" ); +ARRAY_SIZE (safesetid_security_hooks), + &safesetid_lsmid);/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */ safesetid_initialized =1 ;
security/security.c +61 -11
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security/selinux/hooks.c +7 -1
@@ -6864,6 +6864,11 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) }#endif +static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="selinux" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; +/* * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order: * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
@@ -7171,7 +7176,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)hashtab_cache_init (); -security_add_hooks (selinux_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (selinux_hooks),"selinux" ); +security_add_hooks (selinux_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (selinux_hooks), + &selinux_lsmid);if (avc_add_callback (selinux_netcache_avc_callback,AVC_CALLBACK_RESET ))panic ("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n" );
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +6 -1
@@ -4577,6 +4577,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack), }; +static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="smack" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -4775,7 +4780,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)/* * Register with LSM */ -security_add_hooks (smack_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (smack_hooks),"smack" ); +security_add_hooks (smack_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid); smack_enabled =1 ;pr_info ("Smack: Initializing.\n" );
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +7 -1
@@ -529,6 +529,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task) } } +static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="tomoyo" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; +/* * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for * registering TOMOYO.
@@ -581,7 +586,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)struct tomoyo_task *s =tomoyo_task (current);/* register ourselves with the security framework */ -security_add_hooks (tomoyo_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (tomoyo_hooks),"tomoyo" ); +security_add_hooks (tomoyo_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (tomoyo_hooks), + &tomoyo_lsmid);pr_info ("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n" ); s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;atomic_inc (&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
security/yama/yama_lsm.c +6 -1
@@ -421,6 +421,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)return rc; } +static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="yama" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -477,7 +482,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }static int __init yama_init (void ) {pr_info ("Yama: becoming mindful.\n" ); -security_add_hooks (yama_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (yama_hooks),"yama" ); +security_add_hooks (yama_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);yama_init_sysctl ();return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v15 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
Quoted 35 lines · Casey Schaufler
When more than one security module is exporting data to audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a structure to be used instead.
The lsmblob structure is currently an array of u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the security modules built into the system that would use secids if active. The system assigns the module a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are compiled in but not registered there will be unused slots.
A new
lsm_idstructure, which contains the name of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of security module data rather than a single instance. Because IMA uses the audit rule functions it is affected as well.
Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/audit.h | 4 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 ++++- include/linux/security.h | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- kernel/auditfilter.c | 27 ++++++----- kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++--- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++- security/commoncap.c | 7 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 34 +++++++++----- security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++-
Quoted 8 lines
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 ++- security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++- security/security.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++- 16 files changed, 238 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
Heads-up that there is likely to be some merge fuzz in kernel/auditfilter.c; I just had to fix some of the code you are touching (it is in Linus' tree). The merge should be trivial, but if you are uncertain let me know.
Signature · 8 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v15 3/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the lsmblob instead of a u32. In some cases this requires a temporary conversion using lsmblob_init() that will go away when other interfaces get converted.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++-- security/security.c | 8 +++++--- 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -1839,7 +1839,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY int security_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **lsmrule);int security_audit_rule_known (struct audit_krule *krule); -int security_audit_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op,void **lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_match (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 field,u32 op, +void **lsmrule);void security_audit_rule_free (void **lsmrule);#else
@@ -1855,8 +1856,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)return 0 ; } -static inline int security_audit_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op, -void **lsmrule) +static inline int security_audit_rule_match (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 field, +u32 op,void **lsmrule) {return 0 ; }
kernel/auditfilter.c +4 -2
@@ -1327,6 +1327,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];pid_t pid;u32 sid; +struct lsmblob blob;switch (f->type) {case AUDIT_PID :
@@ -1357,8 +1358,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR :if (f->lsm_isset) {security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); - result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, - f->type, f->op, +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); + result =security_audit_rule_match ( + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); }break ;
kernel/auditsc.c +10 -4
@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,const struct cred *cred;int i, need_sid =1 ;u32 sid; +struct lsmblob blob;unsigned int sessionid; cred =rcu_dereference_check (tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
@@ -643,7 +644,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,security_task_getsecid (tsk, &sid); need_sid =0 ; } - result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, f->type, +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); + result =security_audit_rule_match (&blob, + f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); }
@@ -658,15 +661,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,if (f->lsm_isset) {/* Find files that match */ if (name) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, name->osid); result =security_audit_rule_match ( - name->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); }else if (ctx) {list_for_each_entry (n, &ctx->names_list, list) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, name->osid);if (security_audit_rule_match ( - n->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules)) {
@@ -678,7 +683,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,/* Find ipc objects that match */ if (!ctx || ctx->type !=AUDIT_IPC )break ; -if (security_audit_rule_match (ctx->ipc.osid, +lsmblob_init (&blob, ctx->ipc.osid); +if (security_audit_rule_match (&blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules)) ++result;
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2 -2
@@ -408,8 +408,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,return -EINVAL ; } -static inline int security_filter_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op, -void *lsmrule) +static inline int security_filter_rule_match (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 field, +u32 op,void *lsmrule) {return -EINVAL ; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +5 -2
@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) {int rc =0 ;u32 osid; +struct lsmblob blob;if (!ima_lsm_isset (rule->lsm[i].rules)) {if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
@@ -488,7 +489,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_OBJ_ROLE :case LSM_OBJ_TYPE :security_inode_getsecid (inode, &osid); - rc =security_filter_rule_match (osid, +lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); + rc =security_filter_rule_match (&blob, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rules);
@@ -496,7 +498,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_SUBJ_USER :case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE :case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE : - rc =security_filter_rule_match (secid, +lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); + rc =security_filter_rule_match (&blob, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rules);
security/security.c +5 -3
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)/* * Current index to use while initializing the lsmblob secid list. */ -static int lsm_slot__initdata ; +static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init;/** * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
@@ -2467,7 +2467,8 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule) } } -int security_audit_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op,void **lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_match (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 field,u32 op, +void **lsmrule) {struct security_hook_list *hp;int rc;
@@ -2475,7 +2476,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))continue ; - rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match (secid, field, op, + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match (blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], + field, op, &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);if (rc)return rc;
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
Quoted 22 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change the secid parameter of
security_audit_rule_matchto a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.Change the users of
security_audit_rule_matchto use the lsmblob instead of a u32. In some cases this requires a temporary conversion usinglsmblob_init()that will go away when other interfaces get converted.Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++-- security/security.c | 8 +++++--- 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
...
Quoted 13 lines
kernel/auditfilter.c +1
-0@@ -1327,6 +1327,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];pid_t pid;u32 sid; +struct lsmblob blob;switch (f->type) {case AUDIT_PID :
kernel/auditfilter.c int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) · line 1364
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/auditfilter.c +3
-2@@ -1357,8 +1358,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR :if (f->lsm_isset) {security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); - result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, - f->type, f->op, +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); + result =security_audit_rule_match ( + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules);
Unless I'm mistaken this patch is almost exclusively the following pattern:
lsmblob_init(blob, sid); security_audit_rule_match(blob, ...);
... which means we are assigning every array member in @blob the same value of "sid" and then sending that into the LSM where each LSM is going to then have to index into that array, to all get the same value, and then do their match. I'm assuming this will make more sense as I progress through the rest of the patchset, but right now it seems like we could get by just fine with a u32 here.
Signature · 8 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
Quoted 51 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 21 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change the secid parameter of
security_audit_rule_matchto a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.Change the users of
security_audit_rule_matchto use the lsmblob instead of a u32. In some cases this requires a temporary conversion usinglsmblob_init()that will go away when other interfaces get converted.Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++-- security/security.c | 8 +++++--- 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)...
Quoted 13 lines
kernel/auditfilter.c +1
-0@@ -1327,6 +1327,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];pid_t pid;u32 sid; +struct lsmblob blob;switch (f->type) {case AUDIT_PID :kernel/auditfilter.c int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) · line 1364
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/auditfilter.c +3
-2@@ -1357,8 +1358,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR :if (f->lsm_isset) {security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); - result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, - f->type, f->op, +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); + result =security_audit_rule_match ( + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules);Unless I'm mistaken this patch is almost exclusively the following pattern:
lsmblob_init(blob, sid); security_audit_rule_match(blob, ...);
Quoted 6 lines
... which means we are assigning every array member in @blob the same value of "sid" and then sending that into the LSM where each LSM is going to then have to index into that array, to all get the same value, and then do their match. I'm assuming this will make more sense as I progress through the rest of the patchset, but right now it seems like we could get by just fine with a u32 here.
When I do the next version I'll put considerably more effort into explaining the scaffolding strategy. I'm definitely in that area where the advantage of keeping patches small and the advantage of making a change obvious are at odds. This will apply to the next few patches in the series as well.
--
Linux-audit mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
Quoted 59 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 51 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 21 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change the secid parameter of
security_audit_rule_matchto a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.Change the users of
security_audit_rule_matchto use the lsmblob instead of a u32. In some cases this requires a temporary conversion usinglsmblob_init()that will go away when other interfaces get converted.Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++-- security/security.c | 8 +++++--- 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)...
Quoted 13 lines
kernel/auditfilter.c +1
-0@@ -1327,6 +1327,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];pid_t pid;u32 sid; +struct lsmblob blob;switch (f->type) {case AUDIT_PID :kernel/auditfilter.c int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) · line 1364
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/auditfilter.c +3
-2@@ -1357,8 +1358,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR :if (f->lsm_isset) {security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); - result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, - f->type, f->op, +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); + result =security_audit_rule_match ( + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules);Unless I'm mistaken this patch is almost exclusively the following pattern:
lsmblob_init(blob, sid); security_audit_rule_match(blob, ...);Quoted 6 lines
... which means we are assigning every array member in @blob the same value of "sid" and then sending that into the LSM where each LSM is going to then have to index into that array, to all get the same value, and then do their match. I'm assuming this will make more sense as I progress through the rest of the patchset, but right now it seems like we could get by just fine with a u32 here.
Quoted 5 lines
When I do the next version I'll put considerably more effort into explaining the scaffolding strategy. I'm definitely in that area where the advantage of keeping patches small and the advantage of making a change obvious are at odds. This will apply to the next few patches in the series as well.
Yes, it's a hard line to walk. If it helps any, I try to go by two guiding principles when writing or reviewing a patch:
* each patch must have some standalone value
* each patch must make sense in the context of itself and the code which preceded it
... which is where the hand-wavy "trust me it's coming" scaffolding approach tends to fall apart. I'm sure others have more developed ideas on this, but that is the basis of my comments.
Signature · 8 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v15 7/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange security_secid_to_secctx() to take a lsmblob as input instead of a u32 secid. It will then call the LSM hooks using the lsmblob element allocated for that module. The callers have been updated as well. This allows for the possibility that more than one module may be called upon to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the audit code.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 4 +++- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- include/net/scm.h | 5 ++--- kernel/audit.c | 9 +++++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++---- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 8 ++++++-- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 +++- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 8 ++++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 6 +++--- security/security.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 12 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +3 -1
@@ -3107,10 +3107,12 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;size_t added_size;security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &secid); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz); +lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ; return_error_param = ret;
include/linux/security.h +3 -2
@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, size_t size);int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name); -int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen);
@@ -1298,7 +1298,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)return 0 ; } -static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob, +char **secdata,u32 *seclen) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
include/net/scm.h +2 -3
@@ -97,9 +97,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scint err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { -/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */ - err =security_secid_to_secctx (scm->lsmblob.secid[0 ], - &secdata, &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &secdata, + &seclen);if (!err) {put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata);
kernel/audit.c +7 -2
@@ -1418,7 +1418,10 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO : len =0 ;if (audit_sig_sid) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len); +struct lsmblob blob; + +lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_sig_sid); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len);if (err)return err; }
@@ -2061,12 +2064,14 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)unsigned len;int error;u32 sid; +struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (current, &sid);if (!sid)return 0 ; - error =security_secid_to_secctx (sid, &ctx, &len); +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); + error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len);if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL ) goto error_path;
kernel/auditsc.c +10 -4
@@ -966,6 +966,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len;int rc =0 ; +struct lsmblob blob; ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_OBJ_PID );if (!ab)
@@ -975,7 +976,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);if (sid) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (sid, &ctx, &len)) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else {
@@ -1218,7 +1220,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)if (osid) {char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len; -if (security_secid_to_secctx (osid, &ctx, &len)) { +struct lsmblob blob; + +lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , osid); *call_panic =1 ; }else {
@@ -1368,9 +1373,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,if (n->osid !=0 ) {char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len; +struct lsmblob blob; -if (security_secid_to_secctx ( - n->osid, &ctx, &len)) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, n->osid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , n->osid);if (call_panic) *call_panic =2 ;
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +1 -2
@@ -139,8 +139,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)if (err)return ; -/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */ - err =security_secid_to_secctx (lb.secid[0 ], &secdata, &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &secdata, &seclen);if (err)return ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +6 -2
@@ -331,8 +331,10 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)struct nlattr *nest_secctx;int len, ret;char *secctx; +struct lsmblob blob; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (ct->secmark, &secctx, &len); +lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len);if (ret)return 0 ;
@@ -643,8 +645,10 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct) {#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK int len, ret; +struct lsmblob blob; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (ct->secmark,NULL , &len); +lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob,NULL , &len);if (ret)return 0 ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +3 -1
@@ -175,8 +175,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)int ret;u32 len;char *secctx; +struct lsmblob blob; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (ct->secmark, &secctx, &len); +lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len);if (ret)return ;
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +6 -2
@@ -305,13 +305,17 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata) {u32 seclen =0 ;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK ) +struct lsmblob blob; +if (!skb || !sk_fullsock (skb->sk))return 0 ;read_lock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); -if (skb->secmark) -security_secid_to_secctx (skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen); +if (skb->secmark) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, skb->secmark); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, secdata, &seclen); + }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);#endif
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +14 -4
@@ -375,6 +375,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf =NULL ;char *secctx =NULL ;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob;if (addr_len !=sizeof (struct in_addr ) && addr_len !=sizeof (struct in6_addr ))
@@ -437,7 +438,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net, unlhsh_add_return:rcu_read_unlock ();if (audit_buf !=NULL ) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (secid, +lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx);
@@ -474,6 +476,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,struct net_device *dev;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock); list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -493,8 +496,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net, addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev); +if (entry !=NULL ) +lsmblob_init (&blob, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (entry->secid, +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx);security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -536,6 +541,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,struct net_device *dev;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock); list_entry =netlbl_af6list_remove (addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -554,8 +560,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net, addr, mask);if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev); +if (entry !=NULL ) +lsmblob_init (&blob, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (entry->secid, +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx);security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1076,6 +1084,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,u32 secid;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob; data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid, cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1130,7 +1139,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd, secid = addr6->secid; } - ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (secid, &secctx, &secctx_len); +lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); + ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +3 -3
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob;if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )return NULL ;
@@ -98,10 +99,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid), audit_info->sessionid); +lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_info->secid);if (audit_info->secid !=0 && -security_secid_to_secctx (audit_info->secid, - &secctx, - &secctx_len) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , secctx);security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); }
security/security.c +13 -3
@@ -1995,10 +1995,20 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_ismaclabel); -int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) { -return call_int_hook (secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , secid, secdata, - seclen); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc; + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx (blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], + secdata, seclen); +if (rc !=0 ) +return rc; + } +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secid_to_secctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
Quoted 14 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change
security_secid_to_secctx()to take a lsmblob as input instead of a u32 secid. It will then call the LSM hooks using the lsmblob element allocated for that module. The callers have been updated as well. This allows for the possibility that more than one module may be called upon to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the audit code.Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Quoted 14 lines
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 4 +++- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- include/net/scm.h | 5 ++--- kernel/audit.c | 9 +++++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++---- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 3 +-- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 8 ++++++-- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 +++- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 8 ++++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 6 +++--- security/security.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 12 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
More of the lsmblob_init()/dosomething() pattern.
I'm sure this will all change later (and peeking ahead, it looks like most of it does), but I think it needs to be better documented in these commits about what is temporary and what is intended to stick around. Imagine years later bisecting down to this patch and trying to make sense of why it was done this way.
I realize that it is hard to make individual patches do something meaningful when you are making such sweeping changes, but in these cases you need to document it until there is no doubt about why this patch exists.
Signature · 8 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v15 8/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerThere may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The audit data structure containing the secid will be updated later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 5 ++++- security/security.c | 12 +++++++++--- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);void security_task_to_inode (struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode);int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,short flag); -void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,u32 *secid); +void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg *msg);void security_msg_msg_free (struct msg_msg *msg);int security_msg_queue_alloc (struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -1176,9 +1176,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,return 0 ; } -static inline void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,u32 *secid) +static inline void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, +struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); }static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg *msg)
kernel/auditsc.c +4 -1
@@ -2285,11 +2285,14 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)void __audit_ipc_obj (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) {struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); +struct lsmblob blob; context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; context->ipc.has_perm =0 ; -security_ipc_getsecid (ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); +security_ipc_getsecid (ipcp, &blob); +/* scaffolding on the [0] - change "osid" to a lsmblob */ + context->ipc.osid = blob.secid[0 ]; context->type =AUDIT_IPC ; }
security/security.c +9 -3
@@ -1815,10 +1815,16 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)return call_int_hook (ipc_permission,0 , ipcp, flag); } -void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,u32 *secid) +void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; -call_void_hook (ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + hp->hook.ipc_getsecid (ipcp, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } }int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg *msg)
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
Quoted 6 lines · Casey Schaufler
There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data for auditing. Change
security_ipc_getsecid()to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The audit data structure containing the secid will be updated later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here.
"updated later", that's better, thank you. If I can go even a step further, it would be really nice if you could provide a brief explanation, a sentence or two is okay, on what you intended it to be when it is done in this patchset/iteration.
Quoted 9 lines
Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 5 ++++- security/security.c | 12 +++++++++--- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Signature · 8 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v15 9/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_task_getsecid() interface to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all possible secids for possible reporting.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 4 +-- include/linux/security.h | 7 +++-- kernel/audit.c | 11 +++---- kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +-- kernel/auditsc.c | 18 ++++++++---- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 +++- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 10 ++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 42 +++++++++++++++------------ security/security.c | 12 ++++++-- 10 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +1 -3
@@ -3106,12 +3106,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->priority =task_nice (current);if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) { -u32 secid;struct lsmblob blob;size_t added_size; -security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &secid); -lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); +security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &blob); ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ;
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,int security_task_setpgid (struct task_struct *p,pid_t pgid);int security_task_getpgid (struct task_struct *p);int security_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p); -void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid); +void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p,int nice);int security_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p,int ioprio);int security_task_getioprio (struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1103,9 +1103,10 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)return 0 ; } -static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid) +static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p, +struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); }static inline int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p,int nice)
kernel/audit.c +6 -5
@@ -2063,14 +2063,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)char *ctx =NULL ;unsigned len;int error; -u32 sid;struct lsmblob blob; -security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); -if (!sid) +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))return 0 ; -lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len);if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL )
@@ -2278,6 +2276,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)int audit_signal_info (int sig,struct task_struct *t) {kuid_t uid =current_uid (), auid; +struct lsmblob blob; if (auditd_test_task(t) && (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2288,7 +2287,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; -security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_sig_sid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */ + audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0 ]; }return audit_signal_info_syscall (t);
kernel/auditfilter.c +1 -3
@@ -1326,7 +1326,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)for (i =0 ; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];pid_t pid; -u32 sid;struct lsmblob blob;switch (f->type) {
@@ -1357,8 +1356,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN :case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR :if (f->lsm_isset) { -security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); -lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); result =security_audit_rule_match ( &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules);
kernel/auditsc.c +12 -6
@@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, {const struct cred *cred;int i, need_sid =1 ; -u32 sid;struct lsmblob blob;unsigned int sessionid;
@@ -641,10 +640,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,logged upon error */ if (f->lsm_isset) {if (need_sid) { -security_task_getsecid (tsk, &sid); +security_task_getsecid (tsk, &blob); need_sid =0 ; } -lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob, f->type, f->op,
@@ -2382,12 +2380,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)void __audit_ptrace (struct task_struct *t) {struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); +struct lsmblob blob; context->target_pid =task_tgid_nr (t); context->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); context->target_uid =task_uid (t); context->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &context->target_sid); +security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); +/* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */ + context->target_sid = blob.secid[0 ];memcpy (context->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); }
@@ -2403,6 +2404,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;struct audit_context *ctx =audit_context ();kuid_t t_uid =task_uid (t); +struct lsmblob blob;if (!audit_signals ||audit_dummy_context ())return 0 ;
@@ -2414,7 +2416,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &ctx->target_sid); +security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); +/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ + ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0 ];memcpy (ctx->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN );return 0 ; }
@@ -2435,7 +2439,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_loginuid (t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); +security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); +/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ + axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0 ];memcpy (axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); axp->pid_count++;
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +4 -1
@@ -1539,11 +1539,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)int ret_val;struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;struct netlbl_audit audit_info; +struct lsmblob blob;/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */ -security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_info.secid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */ + audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0 ]; audit_info.loginuid =GLOBAL_ROOT_UID ; audit_info.sessionid =0 ;
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h +5 -1
@@ -34,7 +34,11 @@static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo (struct sk_buff *skb,struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { -security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_info->secid); +struct lsmblob blob; + +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding until secid is converted */ + audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0 ]; audit_info->loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current); audit_info->sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (current); }
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +6 -4
@@ -48,14 +48,16 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)*/ int ima_must_appraise (struct inode *inode,int mask,enum ima_hooks func) { -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;if (!ima_appraise)return 0 ; -security_task_getsecid (current, &secid); -return ima_match_policy (inode,current_cred (), secid, func, mask, -IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL ); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding the .secid[0] */ +return ima_match_policy (inode,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], func, + mask,IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ,NULL ,NULL , +NULL ); } static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +24 -18
88 lines not on this page · raw message
security/security.c +9 -3
@@ -1732,10 +1732,16 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)return call_int_hook (task_getsid,0 , p); } -void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid) +void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; -call_void_hook (task_getsecid, p, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + hp->hook.task_getsecid (p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_task_getsecid);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v15 10/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided for IMA and audit.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 +--- security/security.c | 11 +++++++++-- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);int security_inode_getsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,void **buffer,bool alloc);int security_inode_setsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size,int flags);int security_inode_listsecurity (struct inode *inode,char *buffer,size_t buffer_size); -void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid); +void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new);int security_inode_copy_up_xattr (const char *name); int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
@@ -926,9 +926,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,return 0 ; } -static inline void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid) +static inline void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode, +struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); }static inline int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new)
kernel/auditsc.c +5 -1
@@ -1931,13 +1931,17 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,const struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags) { + struct lsmblob blob; + name->ino = inode->i_ino; name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; name->mode = inode->i_mode; name->uid = inode->i_uid; name->gid = inode->i_gid; name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; -security_inode_getsecid (inode, &name->osid); +security_inode_getsecid (inode, &blob); +/* scaffolding until osid is updated */ + name->osid = blob.secid[0 ];if (flags &AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL ) { name->fcap_ver =-1 ;return ;
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1 -3
@@ -475,7 +475,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,return false;for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) {int rc =0 ; -u32 osid;struct lsmblob blob;if (!ima_lsm_isset (rule->lsm[i].rules)) {
@@ -488,8 +487,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_OBJ_USER :case LSM_OBJ_ROLE :case LSM_OBJ_TYPE : -security_inode_getsecid (inode, &osid); -lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); +security_inode_getsecid (inode, &blob); rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
security/security.c +9 -2
@@ -1418,9 +1418,16 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_listsecurity); -void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid) +void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,struct lsmblob *blob) { -call_void_hook (inode_getsecid, inode, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + hp->hook.inode_getsecid (inode, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } }int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new)
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v15 11/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_cred_getsecid() interface to fill in a lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. The associated data elements in the audit sub-system are changed from a secid to a lsmblob to accommodate multiple possible LSM audit users.
--- include/linux/security.h | 2 +- kernel/audit.c | 19 +++++++----------- kernel/audit.h | 5 +++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 33 +++++++++++-------------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 8 ++++---- security/security.c | 12 ++++++++--- 6 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +1 -1
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);void security_cred_free (struct cred *cred);int security_prepare_creds (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old,gfp_t gfp);void security_transfer_creds (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old); -void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,u32 *secid); +void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_kernel_create_files_as (struct cred *new,struct inode *inode);int security_kernel_module_request (char *kmod_name);
kernel/audit.c +7 -12
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static u32 audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;/* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */ kuid_t audit_sig_uid =INVALID_UID ;pid_t audit_sig_pid =-1 ; -u32 audit_sig_sid =0 ; +struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;/* Records can be lost in several ways: 0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1417,23 +1417,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) }case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO : len =0 ; -if (audit_sig_sid) { -struct lsmblob blob; - -lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_sig_sid); - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len); +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx, + &len);if (err)return err; } sig_data =kmalloc (sizeof (*sig_data) + len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!sig_data) { -if (audit_sig_sid) +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm))security_release_secctx (ctx, len);return -ENOMEM ; } sig_data->uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid); sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid; -if (audit_sig_sid) { +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) {memcpy (sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);security_release_secctx (ctx, len); }
@@ -2276,7 +2274,6 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)int audit_signal_info (int sig,struct task_struct *t) {kuid_t uid =current_uid (), auid; -struct lsmblob blob; if (auditd_test_task(t) && (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2287,9 +2284,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; -security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */ - audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_sig_lsm); }return audit_signal_info_syscall (t);
kernel/audit.h +3 -2
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h> #include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ struct audit_context {kuid_t target_auid;kuid_t target_uid;unsigned int target_sessionid; -u32 target_sid; +struct lsmblob target_lsm;char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN ];struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
@@ -329,7 +330,7 @@ extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid; -extern u32 audit_sig_sid; +extern struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;extern int audit_filter (int msgtype,unsigned int listtype);
kernel/auditsc.c +12 -21
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ];kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ];unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ]; -u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ]; +struct lsmblob target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ];char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ][TASK_COMM_LEN ];int pid_count; };
@@ -957,14 +957,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) }static int audit_log_pid_context (struct audit_context *context,pid_t pid, -kuid_t auid,kuid_t uid,unsigned int sessionid, -u32 sid,char *comm) +kuid_t auid,kuid_t uid, +unsigned int sessionid, +struct lsmblob *blob,char *comm) {struct audit_buffer *ab;char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len;int rc =0 ; -struct lsmblob blob; ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_OBJ_PID );if (!ab)
@@ -973,9 +973,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,audit_log_format (ab,"opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d" , pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid),from_kuid (&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid); -if (sid) { -lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) { +if (lsmblob_is_set (blob)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else {
@@ -1546,7 +1545,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) axs->target_auid[i], axs->target_uid[i], axs->target_sessionid[i], - axs->target_sid[i], + &axs->target_lsm[i], axs->target_comm[i])) call_panic = 1; }
@@ -1555,7 +1554,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)audit_log_pid_context (context, context->target_pid, context->target_auid, context->target_uid, context->target_sessionid, - context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) + &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm)) call_panic = 1;if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -1733,7 +1732,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) context->aux =NULL ; context->aux_pids =NULL ; context->target_pid =0 ; - context->target_sid =0 ; +lsmblob_init (&context->target_lsm,0 ); context->sockaddr_len =0 ; context->type =0 ; context->fds[0 ] =-1 ;
@@ -2384,15 +2383,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)void __audit_ptrace (struct task_struct *t) {struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); -struct lsmblob blob; context->target_pid =task_tgid_nr (t); context->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); context->target_uid =task_uid (t); context->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); -/* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */ - context->target_sid = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (t, &context->target_lsm);memcpy (context->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); }
@@ -2408,7 +2404,6 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;struct audit_context *ctx =audit_context ();kuid_t t_uid =task_uid (t); -struct lsmblob blob;if (!audit_signals ||audit_dummy_context ())return 0 ;
@@ -2420,9 +2415,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); -/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ - ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (t, &ctx->target_lsm);memcpy (ctx->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN );return 0 ; }
@@ -2443,9 +2436,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_loginuid (t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); -/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ - axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]);memcpy (axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); axp->pid_count++;
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +4 -4
@@ -412,7 +412,6 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)int ima_bprm_check (struct linux_binprm *bprm) {int ret; -u32 secid;struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob);
@@ -422,9 +421,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)if (ret)return ret; -security_cred_getsecid (bprm->cred, &secid); -return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid,NULL ,0 , -MAY_EXEC ,CREDS_CHECK ); +security_cred_getsecid (bprm->cred, &blob); +/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ +return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0 ], +NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,CREDS_CHECK ); }/**
security/security.c +9 -3
@@ -1647,10 +1647,16 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)call_void_hook (cred_transfer, new, old); } -void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,u32 *secid) +void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; -call_void_hook (cred_getsecid, c, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.cred_getsecid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + hp->hook.cred_getsecid (c, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_cred_getsecid);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v15 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change the
security_cred_getsecid()interface to fill in a lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. The associated data elements in the audit sub-system are changed from a secid to a lsmblob to accommodate multiple possible LSM audit users.Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Quoted 8 lines
--- include/linux/security.h | 2 +- kernel/audit.c | 19 +++++++----------- kernel/audit.h | 5 +++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 33 +++++++++++-------------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 8 ++++---- security/security.c | 12 ++++++++--- 6 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
There is some undefined scaffolding in the IMA section, but I'll leave that to Mimi if she cares or not. One small suggestion below, but I'm okay if you ignore that, it's pretty minor.
kernel/auditsc.c void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) · line 1735
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +1
-1@@ -1733,7 +1732,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) context->aux =NULL ; context->aux_pids =NULL ; context->target_pid =0 ; - context->target_sid =0 ; +lsmblob_init (&context->target_lsm,0 );
Would it be worth having a "lsmblob_unset(struct lsmblob *)" for situations such as these? Even if right now it is just a wrapper around "lsmblob_init(blob, 0)" I think it might have some futureproofing value in case the struct grows additional fields and is no longer tightly packed.
Quoted 3 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +0
-0context->sockaddr_len =0 ; context->type =0 ; context->fds[0 ] =-1 ;
Signature · 8 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v15 12/23 IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
In reply to Casey SchauflerThe IMA interfaces ima_get_action() and ima_match_policy() call LSM functions that use lsmblobs. Change the IMA functions to pass the lsmblob to be compatible with the LSM functions.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 11 ++++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 10 ++++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 ++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 32 +++++++++++---------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 +++++----- 5 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +6 -5
@@ -230,9 +230,9 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS */ /* LIM API function definitions */ -int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -int mask,enum ima_hooks func,int *pcr, -struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, +int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob,int mask,enum ima_hooks func, +int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,const char *keyring);int ima_must_measure (struct inode *inode,int mask,enum ima_hooks func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -258,8 +258,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);const char *ima_d_path (const struct path *path,char **pathbuf,char *filename);/* IMA policy related functions */ -int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -enum ima_hooks func,int mask,int flags,int *pcr, +int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob,enum ima_hooks func,int mask, +int flags,int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,const char *keyring);void ima_init_policy (void );
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +5 -5
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy. * @inode: pointer to inode to measure * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate -* @secid: secid of the task being validated +* @blob: LSM data of the task being validated * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC, * MAY_APPEND) * @func: caller identifier
@@ -182,16 +182,16 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask. * */ -int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -int mask,enum ima_hooks func,int *pcr, -struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, +int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob,int mask,enum ima_hooks func, +int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,const char *keyring) {int flags =IMA_MEASURE |IMA_AUDIT |IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ; flags &= ima_policy_flag; -return ima_match_policy (inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr, +return ima_match_policy (inode, cred, blob, func, mask, flags, pcr, template_desc, keyring); }
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +2 -4
@@ -54,10 +54,8 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)return 0 ;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding the .secid[0] */ -return ima_match_policy (inode,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], func, - mask,IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ,NULL ,NULL , -NULL ); +return ima_match_policy (inode,current_cred (), &blob, func, mask, +IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL ); } static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +13 -19
@@ -190,8 +190,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) }static int process_measurement (struct file *file,const struct cred *cred, -u32 secid,char *buf,loff_t size,int mask, -enum ima_hooks func) +struct lsmblob *blob,char *buf,loff_t size, +int mask,enum ima_hooks func) {struct inode *inode =file_inode (file);struct integrity_iint_cache *iint =NULL ;
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. * Included is the appraise submask. */ - action =ima_get_action (inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr, + action =ima_get_action (inode, cred, blob, mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc,NULL ); violation_check = ((func ==FILE_CHECK || func ==MMAP_CHECK ) && (ima_policy_flag &IMA_MEASURE ));
@@ -388,8 +388,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)if (file && (prot &PROT_EXEC )) {security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */ -return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], +return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), &blob,NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,MMAP_CHECK ); }
@@ -415,16 +414,14 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ - ret =process_measurement (bprm->file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], -NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,BPRM_CHECK ); + ret =process_measurement (bprm->file,current_cred (), &blob,NULL ,0 , +MAY_EXEC ,BPRM_CHECK );if (ret)return ret;security_cred_getsecid (bprm->cred, &blob); -/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ -return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0 ], -NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,CREDS_CHECK ); +return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, &blob,NULL ,0 , +MAY_EXEC ,CREDS_CHECK ); }/**
@@ -442,8 +439,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ -return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ],NULL ,0 , +return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), &blob,NULL ,0 , mask & (MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE |MAY_EXEC |MAY_APPEND ),FILE_CHECK ); }
@@ -624,9 +620,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, func = read_idmap[read_id] ?:FILE_CHECK ;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ -return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], buf, - size,MAY_READ , func); +return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), &blob, buf, size, +MAY_READ , func); }/**
@@ -722,9 +717,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,*/ if (func) {security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding */ - action =ima_get_action (NULL ,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ],0 , - func, &pcr, &template, keyring); + action =ima_get_action (NULL ,current_cred (), &blob,0 , func, + &pcr, &template, keyring);if (!(action &IMA_MEASURE ))return ; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +6 -6
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,* Returns true on rule match, false on failure. */ static bool ima_match_rules (struct ima_rule_entry *rule,struct inode *inode, -const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, +const struct cred *cred,struct lsmblob *blob,enum ima_hooks func,int mask,const char *keyring) {
@@ -496,7 +496,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_SUBJ_USER :case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE :case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE : -lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
@@ -540,7 +539,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is * being made -* @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated +* @blob: LSM data of the task to be validated * @func: IMA hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
@@ -555,8 +554,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)* list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. */ -int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -enum ima_hooks func,int mask,int flags,int *pcr, +int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob,enum ima_hooks func,int mask, +int flags,int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,const char *keyring) {
@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,if (!(entry->action & actmask))continue ; -if (!ima_match_rules (entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask, +if (!ima_match_rules (entry, inode, cred, blob, func, mask, keyring))continue ;
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v15 14/23 LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
In reply to Casey SchauflerAdd a new lsmcontext data structure to hold all the information about a "security context", including the string, its size and which LSM allocated the string. The allocation information is necessary because LSMs have different policies regarding the lifecycle of these strings. SELinux allocates and destroys them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer to an entry in a list that never goes away.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 10 ++++--- fs/ceph/xattr.c | 6 ++++- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 8 ++++-- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 7 +++-- include/linux/security.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/net/scm.h | 5 +++- kernel/audit.c | 14 +++++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++++++--- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 ++- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 ++- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 ++- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 13 ++++++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 19 +++++++++++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 4 ++- security/security.c | 11 ++++---- 15 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +7 -3
@@ -2863,6 +2863,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,int t_debug_id =atomic_inc_return (&binder_last_id);char *secctx =NULL ;u32 secctx_sz =0 ; +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ e =binder_transaction_log_add (&binder_transaction_log); e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
@@ -3159,7 +3160,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->security_ctx =0 ;WARN_ON (1 ); } -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_sz); +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); secctx =NULL ; } t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
@@ -3492,8 +3494,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,binder_alloc_free_buf (&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer); err_binder_alloc_buf_failed: err_bad_extra_size: -if (secctx) -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_sz); +if (secctx) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + } err_get_secctx_failed:kfree (tcomplete);binder_stats_deleted (BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE );
fs/ceph/xattr.c +5 -1
@@ -1272,12 +1272,16 @@ int ceph_security_init_secctx(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,void ceph_release_acl_sec_ctx (struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx) { +#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_POSIX_ACL posix_acl_release (as_ctx->acl);posix_acl_release (as_ctx->default_acl);#endif #ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL -security_release_secctx (as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen); +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff);#endif if (as_ctx->pagelist)ceph_pagelist_release (as_ctx->pagelist);
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +6 -2
@@ -130,8 +130,12 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,static inline void nfs4_label_release_security (struct nfs4_label *label) { -if (label) -security_release_secctx (label->label, label->len); +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ + +if (label) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, label->label, label->len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + } }static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask (struct nfs_server *server,struct nfs4_label *label) {
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +5 -2
@@ -2496,6 +2496,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,int err;struct nfs4_acl *acl =NULL ;#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ void *context =NULL ;int contextlen;#endif
@@ -2998,8 +2999,10 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp, out:#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL -if (context) -security_release_secctx (context, contextlen); +if (context) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, context, contextlen,0 );/*scaffolding*/ +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + }#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */ kfree (acl);if (tempfh) {
include/linux/security.h +33 -2
@@ -130,6 +130,37 @@ enum lockdown_reason {extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX +1 ]; +/* +* A "security context" is the text representation of +* the information used by LSMs. +* This structure contains the string, its length, and which LSM +* it is useful for. +*/ +struct lsmcontext { +char *context;/* Provided by the module */ +u32 len; +int slot;/* Identifies the module */ +}; + +/** +* lsmcontext_init - initialize an lsmcontext structure. +* @cp: Pointer to the context to initialize +* @context: Initial context, or NULL +* @size: Size of context, or 0 +* @slot: Which LSM provided the context +* +* Fill in the lsmcontext from the provided information. +* This is a scaffolding function that will be removed when +* lsmcontext integration is complete. +*/ +static inline void lsmcontext_init (struct lsmcontext *cp,char *context, +u32 size,int slot) +{ + cp->slot = slot; + cp->context = context; + cp->len = size; +} +/* * Data exported by the security modules *
@@ -500,7 +531,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsmblob *blob); -void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen); +void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp);void security_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode);int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);int security_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1314,7 +1345,7 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } -static inline void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen) +static inline void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp) { }
include/net/scm.h +4 -1
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK static inline void scm_passec (struct socket *sock,struct msghdr *msg,struct scm_cookie *scm) { +struct lsmcontext context;char *secdata;u32 seclen;int err;
@@ -102,7 +103,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scif (!err) {put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata); -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +/*scaffolding*/ +lsmcontext_init (&context, secdata, seclen,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context); } } }
kernel/audit.c +10 -4
@@ -1181,6 +1181,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len; +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ err =audit_netlink_ok (skb, msg_type);if (err)
@@ -1425,15 +1426,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) } sig_data =kmalloc (sizeof (*sig_data) + len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!sig_data) { -if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + }return -ENOMEM ; } sig_data->uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid); sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) {memcpy (sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); }audit_send_reply (skb, seq,AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO ,0 ,0 , sig_data,sizeof (*sig_data) + len);
@@ -2062,6 +2066,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)unsigned len;int error;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ security_task_getsecid (current, &blob);if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))
@@ -2075,7 +2080,8 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) }audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff);return 0 ; error_path:
kernel/auditsc.c +9 -3
@@ -962,6 +962,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm) { struct audit_buffer *ab; +struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len;int rc =0 ;
@@ -979,7 +980,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, rc =1 ; }else {audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 );/*scaffolding*/ +security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); } }audit_log_format (ab," ocomm=" );
@@ -1192,6 +1194,7 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)static void show_special (struct audit_context *context,int *call_panic) { +struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;struct audit_buffer *ab;int i;
@@ -1225,7 +1228,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) *call_panic =1 ; }else {audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); } }if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
@@ -1371,6 +1375,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;lsmblob_init (&blob, n->osid);if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
@@ -1379,7 +1384,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n, *call_panic =2 ; }else {audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ +security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); } }
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +3 -1
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,static void ip_cmsg_recv_security (struct msghdr *msg,struct sk_buff *skb) { +struct lsmcontext context;struct lsmblob lb;char *secdata;u32 seclen;
@@ -144,7 +145,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)return ;put_cmsg (msg,SOL_IP ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata); -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secdata, seclen,0 );/* scaffolding */ +security_release_secctx (&context); }static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr (struct msghdr *msg,struct sk_buff *skb)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +3 -1
@@ -332,6 +332,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)int len, ret;char *secctx;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len);
@@ -349,7 +350,8 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct) ret =0 ; nla_put_failure: -security_release_secctx (secctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ +security_release_secctx (&context); return ret; }#else
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +3 -1
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)u32 len;char *secctx;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len);
@@ -184,7 +185,8 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)seq_printf (s,"secctx=%s " , secctx); - security_release_secctx(secctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ + security_release_secctx(&context); }#else static inline void ct_show_secctx (struct seq_file *s,const struct nf_conn *ct)
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +9 -4
@@ -395,6 +395,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,enum ip_conntrack_info uninitialized_var (ctinfo );struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;bool csum_verify; +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ char *secdata =NULL ;u32 seclen =0 ;
@@ -625,8 +626,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, } nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len; -if (seclen) -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +if (seclen) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secdata, seclen,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + }return skb; nla_put_failure:
@@ -634,8 +637,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,kfree_skb (skb);net_err_ratelimited ("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n" ); nlmsg_failure: -if (seclen) -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +if (seclen) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secdata, seclen,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + }return NULL ; }
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +15 -4
@@ -373,6 +373,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,struct net_device *dev;struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf =NULL ; +struct lsmcontext context;char *secctx =NULL ;u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -443,7 +444,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +/* scaffolding */ +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , ret_val ==0 ?1 :0 );audit_log_end (audit_buf);
@@ -474,6 +477,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev; +struct lsmcontext context;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -502,7 +506,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net, security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +/* scaffolding */ +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , entry !=NULL ?1 :0 );audit_log_end (audit_buf);
@@ -539,6 +545,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev; +struct lsmcontext context;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -566,7 +573,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net, security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , entry !=NULL ?1 :0 );audit_log_end (audit_buf);
@@ -1080,6 +1088,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,int ret_val = -ENOMEM ;struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;struct net_device *dev; +struct lsmcontext context;void *data;u32 secid;char *secctx;
@@ -1147,7 +1156,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX , secctx_len, secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +/* scaffolding */ +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure;
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +3 -1
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) {struct audit_buffer *audit_buf; +struct lsmcontext context;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -103,7 +104,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,if (audit_info->secid !=0 &&security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 );/*scaffolding*/ +security_release_secctx (&context); }return audit_buf;
security/security.c +6 -5
@@ -2175,16 +2175,17 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secctx_to_secid); -void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen) +void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp) {struct security_hook_list *hp; -int display =lsm_task_display (current);hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list) -if (display ==LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) { - hp->hook.release_secctx (secdata, seclen); -return ; +if (cp->slot == hp->lsmid->slot) { + hp->hook.release_secctx (cp->context, cp->len); +break ; } + +memset (cp,0 ,sizeof (*cp)); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_release_secctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v15 15/23 LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
In reply to Casey SchauflerReplace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier along with the context and context length. This allows security_release_secctx() to know how to release the context. Callers have been modified to use or save the returned data from the new structure.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 26 +++++++--------- include/linux/security.h | 4 +-- include/net/scm.h | 10 ++----- kernel/audit.c | 35 ++++++++-------------- kernel/auditsc.c | 31 +++++++------------ net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 7 ++--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 14 +++++---- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 7 ++--- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 5 +++- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 40 ++++++++----------------- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 7 ++--- security/security.c | 10 +++++-- 12 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +10 -16
@@ -2861,9 +2861,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off =0 ;struct binder_context *context = proc->context;int t_debug_id =atomic_inc_return (&binder_last_id); -char *secctx =NULL ; -u32 secctx_sz =0 ; -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ +struct lsmcontext lsmctx = { }; e =binder_transaction_log_add (&binder_transaction_log); e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
@@ -3111,14 +3109,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,size_t added_size;security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &blob); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx);if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ; return_error_param = ret; return_error_line = __LINE__; goto err_get_secctx_failed; } - added_size =ALIGN (secctx_sz,sizeof (u64)); + added_size =ALIGN (lsmctx.len,sizeof (u64)); extra_buffers_size += added_size;if (extra_buffers_size < added_size) {/* integer overflow of extra_buffers_size */
@@ -3145,24 +3143,22 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->buffer =NULL ; goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed; } -if (secctx) { +if (lsmctx.context) {int err;size_t buf_offset =ALIGN (tr->data_size,sizeof (void *)) +ALIGN (tr->offsets_size,sizeof (void *)) +ALIGN (extra_buffers_size,sizeof (void *)) - -ALIGN (secctx_sz,sizeof (u64)); +ALIGN (lsmctx.len,sizeof (u64)); t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t )t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset; err =binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer (&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer, buf_offset, - secctx, secctx_sz); + lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);if (err) { t->security_ctx =0 ;WARN_ON (1 ); } -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - secctx =NULL ; +security_release_secctx (&lsmctx); } t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id; t->buffer->transaction = t;
@@ -3218,7 +3214,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, off_end_offset = off_start_offset + tr->offsets_size; sg_buf_offset =ALIGN (off_end_offset,sizeof (void *)); sg_buf_end_offset = sg_buf_offset + extra_buffers_size - -ALIGN (secctx_sz,sizeof (u64)); +ALIGN (lsmctx.len,sizeof (u64)); off_min =0 ;for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset; buffer_offset +=sizeof (binder_size_t)) {
@@ -3494,10 +3490,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,binder_alloc_free_buf (&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer); err_binder_alloc_buf_failed: err_bad_extra_size: -if (secctx) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +if (lsmctx.context) +security_release_secctx (&lsmctx); err_get_secctx_failed:kfree (tcomplete);binder_stats_deleted (BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE );
include/linux/security.h +2 -2
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, size_t size);int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name); -int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1333,7 +1333,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob, -char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +struct lsmcontext *cp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
include/net/scm.h +3 -7
@@ -93,18 +93,14 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,static inline void scm_passec (struct socket *sock,struct msghdr *msg,struct scm_cookie *scm) {struct lsmcontext context; -char *secdata; -u32 seclen;int err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &secdata, - &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &context);if (!err) { -put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata); -/*scaffolding*/ -lsmcontext_init (&context, secdata, seclen,0 ); +put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , + context.len, context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); } }
kernel/audit.c +13 -22
@@ -1179,9 +1179,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)struct audit_buffer *ab;u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;struct audit_sig_info *sig_data; -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len; -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ +struct lsmcontext context = { }; err =audit_netlink_ok (skb, msg_type);if (err)
@@ -1417,30 +1415,26 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)break ; }case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO : - len =0 ;if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx, - &len); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, + &context);if (err)return err; } - sig_data =kmalloc (sizeof (*sig_data) + len,GFP_KERNEL ); + sig_data =kmalloc (sizeof (*sig_data) + context.len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!sig_data) { -if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) +security_release_secctx (&context);return -ENOMEM ; } sig_data->uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid); sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { -memcpy (sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); +memcpy (sig_data->ctx, context.context, context.len); +security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_send_reply (skb, seq,AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO ,0 ,0 , - sig_data,sizeof (*sig_data) + len); + sig_data,sizeof (*sig_data) + context.len);kfree (sig_data);break ;case AUDIT_TTY_GET : {
@@ -2062,26 +2056,23 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab) { -char *ctx =NULL ; -unsigned len;int error;struct lsmblob blob; -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ +struct lsmcontext context;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob);if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))return 0 ; - error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len); + error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL ) goto error_path;return 0 ; } -audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , ctx); -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); +audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , context.context); +security_release_secctx (&context);return 0 ; error_path:
kernel/auditsc.c +11 -20
@@ -962,9 +962,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm) { struct audit_buffer *ab; -struct lsmcontext lsmcxt; -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len; +struct lsmcontext lsmctx;int rc =0 ; ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_OBJ_PID );
@@ -975,13 +973,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);if (lsmblob_is_set (blob)) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &ctx, &len)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmctx)) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 );/*scaffolding*/ -security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); +audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , lsmctx.context); +security_release_secctx (&lsmctx); } }audit_log_format (ab," ocomm=" );
@@ -1194,7 +1191,6 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)static void show_special (struct audit_context *context,int *call_panic) { -struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;struct audit_buffer *ab;int i;
@@ -1218,17 +1214,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)from_kgid (&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid), context->ipc.mode);if (osid) { -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len; +struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;struct lsmblob blob;lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmcxt)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , osid); *call_panic =1 ; }else { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 ); +audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , lsmcxt.context);security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); } }
@@ -1372,20 +1366,17 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,MAJOR (n->rdev), MINOR(n->rdev));if (n->osid !=0 ) { -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len;struct lsmblob blob; -struct lsmcontext lsmcxt; +struct lsmcontext lsmctx;lsmblob_init (&blob, n->osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , n->osid);if (call_panic) *call_panic =2 ; }else { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ -security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); +audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , lsmctx.context); +security_release_secctx (&lsmctx); } }
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +2 -5
@@ -132,20 +132,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb) {struct lsmcontext context;struct lsmblob lb; -char *secdata; -u32 seclen;int err; err =security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (NULL , skb, &lb);if (err)return ; - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &secdata, &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &context);if (err)return ; -put_cmsg (msg,SOL_IP ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata); -lsmcontext_init (&context, secdata, seclen,0 );/* scaffolding */ +put_cmsg (msg,SOL_IP ,SCM_SECURITY , context.len, context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +8 -6
@@ -329,13 +329,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx (struct sk_buff *skb,const struct nf_conn *ct) {struct nlattr *nest_secctx; -int len, ret; -char *secctx; +int ret;struct lsmblob blob;struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (ret)return 0 ;
@@ -344,13 +343,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)if (!nest_secctx) goto nla_put_failure; -if (nla_put_string (skb,CTA_SECCTX_NAME , secctx)) +if (nla_put_string (skb,CTA_SECCTX_NAME , context.context)) goto nla_put_failure;nla_nest_end (skb, nest_secctx); ret =0 ; nla_put_failure: -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ security_release_secctx (&context);return ret; }
@@ -648,12 +646,16 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK int len, ret;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob,NULL , &len); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (ret)return 0 ; + len = context.len; +security_release_secctx (&context); +return nla_total_size (0 )/* CTA_SECCTX */ +nla_total_size (sizeof (char ) * len);/* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */ #else
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +2 -5
@@ -173,19 +173,16 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)static void ct_show_secctx (struct seq_file *s,const struct nf_conn *ct) {int ret; -u32 len; -char *secctx;struct lsmblob blob;struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (ret)return ; -seq_printf (s,"secctx=%s " , secctx); +seq_printf (s,"secctx=%s " , context.context); -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ security_release_secctx (&context); }#else
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +4 -1
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)u32 seclen =0 ;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK )struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context = { };if (!skb || !sk_fullsock (skb->sk))return 0 ;
@@ -314,10 +315,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)if (skb->secmark) {lsmblob_init (&blob, skb->secmark); -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, secdata, &seclen); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + *secdata = context.context; }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); + seclen = context.len;#endif return seclen; }
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +12 -28
@@ -374,8 +374,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf =NULL ;struct lsmcontext context; -char *secctx =NULL ; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob; if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
@@ -440,12 +438,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,rcu_read_unlock ();if (audit_buf !=NULL ) {lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, - &secctx, - &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -/* scaffolding */ -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , + context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , ret_val ==0 ?1 :0 );
@@ -478,8 +473,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev;struct lsmcontext context; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -503,11 +496,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,if (entry !=NULL )lsmblob_init (&blob, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, - &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -/* scaffolding */ -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , + context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , entry !=NULL ?1 :0 );
@@ -546,8 +537,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev;struct lsmcontext context; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -570,10 +559,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,if (entry !=NULL )lsmblob_init (&blob, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, - &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , + context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , entry !=NULL ?1 :0 );
@@ -1091,8 +1079,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,struct lsmcontext context;void *data;u32 secid; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob; data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
@@ -1149,15 +1135,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd, }lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); - ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len); + ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; ret_val =nla_put (cb_arg->skb,NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX , - secctx_len, - secctx); -/* scaffolding */ -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); + context.len, + context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure;
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +2 -5
@@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type, {struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct lsmcontext context; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )
@@ -102,9 +100,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_info->secid);if (audit_info->secid !=0 && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , secctx); -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 );/*scaffolding*/ +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }
security/security.c +7 -3
@@ -2140,18 +2140,22 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_ismaclabel); -int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp) {struct security_hook_list *hp;int display =lsm_task_display (current); +memset (cp,0 ,sizeof (*cp)); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))continue ; -if (display ==LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) +if (display ==LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) { + cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx ( blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], - secdata, seclen); + &cp->context, &cp->len); + } }return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v15 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier along with the context and context length. This allows
security_release_secctx()to know how to release the context. Callers have been modified to use or save the returned data from the new structure.Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Quoted 14 lines
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 26 +++++++--------- include/linux/security.h | 4 +-- include/net/scm.h | 10 ++----- kernel/audit.c | 35 ++++++++-------------- kernel/auditsc.c | 31 +++++++------------ net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 7 ++--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 14 +++++---- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 7 ++--- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 5 +++- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 40 ++++++++----------------- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 7 ++--- security/security.c | 10 +++++-- 12 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
Signature · 8 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v15 20/23 Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary
In reply to Casey SchauflerAdd record entries to identify subject data for all of the security modules when there is more than one.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +- include/linux/audit.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 9 ++++- include/net/scm.h | 3 +- kernel/audit.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++- kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 1 + kernel/auditfilter.c | 1 + kernel/auditsc.c | 10 +++-- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 11 ++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 + net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 1 + security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 1 + security/security.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- 19 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +1 -1
@@ -3109,7 +3109,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,size_t added_size;security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &blob); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ; return_error_param = ret;
include/linux/audit.h +1 -0
@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type,extern void audit_log_lost (const char *message);extern int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab); +extern void audit_log_task_lsms (struct audit_buffer *ab);extern void audit_log_task_info (struct audit_buffer *ab);extern int audit_update_lsm_rules (void );
include/linux/security.h +7 -2
@@ -178,6 +178,8 @@ struct lsmblob {#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1/* Not a valid LSM slot number */ #define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2/* Slot requested on initialization */ #define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3/* Slot not requested */ +#define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4/* Use the "display" slot */ +#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5/* Use the default "display" slot */ /** * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
@@ -219,6 +221,8 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)return !memcmp (bloba, blobb,sizeof (*bloba)); } +const char *security_lsm_slot_name (int slot); +/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable (const struct cred *cred,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,unsigned int opts);
@@ -528,7 +532,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, size_t size);int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name); -int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp); +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp, +int display);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1333,7 +1338,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob, -struct lsmcontext *cp) +struct lsmcontext *cp,int display) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
include/net/scm.h +2 -1
@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scint err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &context); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (!err) { put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
kernel/audit.c +38 -2
@@ -393,6 +393,7 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, u32 new, u32 old,if (rc) allow_changes =0 ;/* Something weird, deny request */ audit_log_format (ab," res=%d" , allow_changes); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab);return rc; }
@@ -1098,6 +1099,7 @@ static void audit_log_feature_change(int which, u32 old_feature, u32 new_featureaudit_log_format (ab," feature=%s old=%u new=%u old_lock=%u new_lock=%u res=%d" , audit_feature_names[which], !!old_feature, !!new_feature, !!old_lock, !!new_lock, res); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
@@ -1347,6 +1349,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) size--;audit_log_n_untrustedstring (ab, data, size); } +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }break ;
@@ -1361,6 +1364,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) msg_type ==AUDIT_ADD_RULE ?"add_rule" :"remove_rule" , audit_enabled); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab);return -EPERM ; }
@@ -1374,6 +1378,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)audit_log_common_recv_msg (audit_context (), &ab,AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE );audit_log_format (ab," op=trim res=1" ); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab);break ;case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV : {
@@ -1409,6 +1414,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)audit_log_format (ab," new=" );audit_log_untrustedstring (ab, new);audit_log_format (ab," res=%d" , !err); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab);kfree (old);kfree (new);
@@ -1417,7 +1423,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO :if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, - &context); + &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST );if (err)return err; }
@@ -1476,6 +1482,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)" old-log_passwd=%d new-log_passwd=%d res=%d" , old.enabled, s.enabled, old.log_passwd, s.log_passwd, !err); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab);break ; }
@@ -2054,6 +2061,33 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)audit_log_format (ab,"(null)" ); } +void audit_log_task_lsms (struct audit_buffer *ab) +{ +int i; +const char *lsm; +struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context; + +/* +* Don't do anything unless there is more than one LSM +* with a security context to report. +*/ +if (security_lsm_slot_name (1 ) ==NULL ) +return ; + +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) { + lsm =security_lsm_slot_name (i); +if (lsm ==NULL ) +break ; +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context, i)) +continue ; +audit_log_format (ab," subj_%s=%s" , lsm, context.context); +security_release_secctx (&context); + } +} +int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab) {int error;
@@ -2064,7 +2098,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))return 0 ; - error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST );if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL ) goto error_path;
@@ -2172,6 +2206,7 @@ void audit_log_path_denied(int type, const char *operation)audit_log_format (ab,"op=%s" , operation);audit_log_task_info (ab);audit_log_format (ab," res=0" ); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
@@ -2222,6 +2257,7 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid, oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ?tty_name (tty) :"(none)" , oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);audit_put_tty (tty); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
kernel/audit_fsnotify.c +1 -0
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ static void audit_mark_log_rule_change(struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark, caudit_log_untrustedstring (ab, audit_mark->path);audit_log_key (ab, rule->filterkey);audit_log_format (ab," list=%d res=1" , rule->listnr); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
kernel/auditfilter.c +1 -0
@@ -1105,6 +1105,7 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int reaudit_log_format (ab," op=%s" , action);audit_log_key (ab, rule->filterkey);audit_log_format (ab," list=%d res=%d" , rule->listnr, res); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
kernel/auditsc.c +7 -3
@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);if (lsmblob_is_set (blob)) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmctx)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmctx,LSMBLOB_FIRST )) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else {
@@ -1218,7 +1218,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)struct lsmblob blob;lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmcxt)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmcxt, +LSMBLOB_FIRST )) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , osid); *call_panic =1 ; }else {
@@ -1370,7 +1371,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,struct lsmcontext lsmctx;lsmblob_init (&blob, n->osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx,LSMBLOB_FIRST )) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , n->osid);if (call_panic) *call_panic =2 ;
@@ -1479,6 +1480,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)audit_log_task_info (ab);audit_log_key (ab, context->filterkey); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab);for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
@@ -2602,6 +2604,7 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)return ;audit_log_task (ab);audit_log_format (ab," sig=%ld res=1" , signr); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
@@ -2628,6 +2631,7 @@ void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)audit_log_format (ab," sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x" , signr,syscall_get_arch (current), syscall,in_compat_syscall (),KSTK_EIP (current), code); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +1 -1
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)if (err)return ; - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &context); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (err)return ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +2 -2
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret)return 0 ;
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret)return 0 ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +1 -1
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret)return ;
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +1 -1
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)if (skb->secmark) {/* Any LSM might be looking for the secmark */ lsmblob_init (&blob, skb->secmark); -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, context); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY ); }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +7 -4
@@ -436,7 +436,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net, unlhsh_add_return:rcu_read_unlock ();if (audit_buf !=NULL ) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);
@@ -491,7 +492,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);
@@ -551,7 +553,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);
@@ -1122,7 +1125,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd, lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob; } - ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmb, &context); + ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmb, &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST );if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +1 -1
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_info->secid);if (audit_info->secid !=0 && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +2 -0
@@ -4213,6 +4213,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_policy_add(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result, bool task_valid)xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo (task_valid, audit_buf);audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , result);xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo (xp, audit_buf); +audit_log_task_lsms (audit_buf);audit_log_end (audit_buf); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xfrm_audit_policy_add);
@@ -4228,6 +4229,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo (task_valid, audit_buf);audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , result);xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo (xp, audit_buf); +audit_log_task_lsms (audit_buf);audit_log_end (audit_buf); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xfrm_audit_policy_delete);
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +2 -0
@@ -2645,6 +2645,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_state_add(struct xfrm_state *x, int result, bool task_valid)xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo (task_valid, audit_buf);xfrm_audit_helper_sainfo (x, audit_buf);audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , result); +audit_log_task_lsms (audit_buf);audit_log_end (audit_buf); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xfrm_audit_state_add);
@@ -2659,6 +2660,7 @@ void xfrm_audit_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x, int result, bool task_valid)xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo (task_valid, audit_buf);xfrm_audit_helper_sainfo (x, audit_buf);audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , result); +audit_log_task_lsms (audit_buf);audit_log_end (audit_buf); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xfrm_audit_state_delete);
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +1 -0
@@ -365,6 +365,7 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,audit_log_format (ab," hash=\"%s:%s\"" , algo_name, hash);audit_log_task_info (ab); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); iint->flags |=IMA_AUDITED ;
security/integrity/integrity_audit.c +1 -0
@@ -54,5 +54,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,audit_log_format (ab," ino=%lu" , inode->i_ino); }audit_log_format (ab," res=%d" , !result); +audit_log_task_lsms (ab);audit_log_end (ab); }
security/security.c +47 -4
74 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v15 20/23] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary
Quoted 21 lines · Casey Schaufler
Add record entries to identify subject data for all of the security modules when there is more than one.
Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +- include/linux/audit.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 9 ++++- include/net/scm.h | 3 +- kernel/audit.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++- kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 1 + kernel/auditfilter.c | 1 + kernel/auditsc.c | 10 +++-- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +-
Quoted 8 lines
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 11 ++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 + net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 1 + security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 1 + security/security.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- 19 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
I'm not in love with some of the naming choices, but considering none of it is visible to userspace it isn't worth worrying about.
Signature · 8 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 20/23] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary
In reply to Casey SchauflerQuoted 29 lines · Casey Schaufler
Add record entries to identify subject data for all of the security modules when there is more than one.
Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +- include/linux/audit.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 9 ++++- include/net/scm.h | 3 +- kernel/audit.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++- kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 1 + kernel/auditfilter.c | 1 + kernel/auditsc.c | 10 +++-- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 11 ++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 + net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 1 + security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 1 + security/security.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- 19 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
...
Quoted 39 lines
kernel/audit.c +27
-0@@ -2054,6 +2061,33 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)audit_log_format (ab,"(null)" ); } +void audit_log_task_lsms (struct audit_buffer *ab) +{ +int i; +const char *lsm; +struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context; + +/* +* Don't do anything unless there is more than one LSM +* with a security context to report. +*/ +if (security_lsm_slot_name (1 ) ==NULL ) +return ; + +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) { + lsm =security_lsm_slot_name (i); +if (lsm ==NULL ) +break ; +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context, i)) +continue ; +audit_log_format (ab," subj_%s=%s" , lsm, context.context); +security_release_secctx (&context); + } +} +int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab) {int error;
kernel/audit.c int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) · line 2104
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/audit.c +1
-1@@ -2064,7 +2098,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))return 0 ; - error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST );if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL ) goto error_path;
Sorry, please disregard my previous ACK.
We should treat "subj=" similar to how we treat "obj="; if there is more than one LSM loaded the "subj=" should be set to "?" with the "subj_XXX=" set to the appropriate label for the named LSM. This patch looks like it is always using LSMBLOB_FIRST and not "?" when multiple LSMs are present.
Signature · 8 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 20/23] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary
Quoted 73 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 28 lines · Casey Schaufler
Add record entries to identify subject data for all of the security modules when there is more than one.
Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +- include/linux/audit.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 9 ++++- include/net/scm.h | 3 +- kernel/audit.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++- kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 1 + kernel/auditfilter.c | 1 + kernel/auditsc.c | 10 +++-- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 11 ++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 + net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 1 + security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 1 + security/security.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- 19 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)...
Quoted 42 lines
kernel/audit.c +27
-0@@ -2054,6 +2061,33 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)audit_log_format (ab,"(null)" ); } +void audit_log_task_lsms (struct audit_buffer *ab) +{ +int i; +const char *lsm; +struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context; + +/* +* Don't do anything unless there is more than one LSM +* with a security context to report. +*/ +if (security_lsm_slot_name (1 ) ==NULL ) +return ; + +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) { + lsm =security_lsm_slot_name (i); +if (lsm ==NULL ) +break ; +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context, i)) +continue ; +audit_log_format (ab," subj_%s=%s" , lsm, context.context); +security_release_secctx (&context); + } +} +int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab) {int error;@@ -2064,7 +2098,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))return 0 ;
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/audit.c int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) · line 2104
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/audit.c +1
-1- error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST );if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL ) goto error_path;Sorry, please disregard my previous ACK.
:(
Quoted 5 lines
We should treat "subj=" similar to how we treat "obj="; if there is more than one LSM loaded the "subj=" should be set to "?" with the "subj_XXX=" set to the appropriate label for the named LSM. This patch looks like it is always using
LSMBLOB_FIRSTand not "?" when multiple LSMs are present.
I'm fine with that, although I could see someone suggesting that would constitute breaking backward compatibility.
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Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 20/23] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary
Quoted 83 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 73 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 28 lines · Casey Schaufler
Add record entries to identify subject data for all of the security modules when there is more than one.
Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +- include/linux/audit.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 9 ++++- include/net/scm.h | 3 +- kernel/audit.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++- kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 1 + kernel/auditfilter.c | 1 + kernel/auditsc.c | 10 +++-- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 11 ++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 2 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 + net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 1 + security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 1 + security/security.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- 19 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)...
Quoted 42 lines
kernel/audit.c +27
-0@@ -2054,6 +2061,33 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)audit_log_format (ab,"(null)" ); } +void audit_log_task_lsms (struct audit_buffer *ab) +{ +int i; +const char *lsm; +struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context; + +/* +* Don't do anything unless there is more than one LSM +* with a security context to report. +*/ +if (security_lsm_slot_name (1 ) ==NULL ) +return ; + +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) { + lsm =security_lsm_slot_name (i); +if (lsm ==NULL ) +break ; +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context, i)) +continue ; +audit_log_format (ab," subj_%s=%s" , lsm, context.context); +security_release_secctx (&context); + } +} +int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab) {int error;@@ -2064,7 +2098,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))return 0 ;Quoted 6 lines
kernel/audit.c int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) · line 2104
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/audit.c +1
-1- error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST );if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL ) goto error_path;Sorry, please disregard my previous ACK.
:(
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
We should treat "subj=" similar to how we treat "obj="; if there is more than one LSM loaded the "subj=" should be set to "?" with the "subj_XXX=" set to the appropriate label for the named LSM. This patch looks like it is always using
LSMBLOB_FIRSTand not "?" when multiple LSMs are present.I'm fine with that, although I could see someone suggesting that would constitute breaking backward compatibility.
The argument is the same for both the subject and object fields. I maintain that in the brave new world of LSM stacking if you are using a newly stacked kernel with old userspace, having a "?" for a subject/object label is much safer than only showing the first LSM's information and assuming that was the problem. With a "?" for a subject/object label you have some indication that something is "not quite right" and you can dig into it further.
Signature · 8 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v15 21/23 Audit: Include object data for all security modules
In reply to Casey SchauflerWhen there is more than one context displaying security module extend what goes into the audit record by supplimenting the "obj=" with an "obj_<lsm>=" for each such security module.
--- kernel/audit.h | 4 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
kernel/audit.h +2 -2
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ struct audit_names {kuid_t uid;kgid_t gid;dev_t rdev; -u32 osid; +struct lsmblob oblob;struct audit_cap_data fcap;unsigned int fcap_ver;unsigned char type;/* record type */
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ struct audit_context {kuid_t uid;kgid_t gid;umode_t mode; -u32 osid; +struct lsmblob oblob;int has_perm;uid_t perm_uid;gid_t perm_gid;
kernel/auditsc.c +54 -52
181 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 21/23] Audit: Include object data for all security modules
Quoted 13 lines · Casey Schaufler
When there is more than one context displaying security module extend what goes into the audit record by supplimenting the "obj=" with an "obj_<lsm>=" for each such security module.
Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- kernel/audit.h | 4 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
...
Quoted 70 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +45
-4@@ -956,13 +953,57 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)kfree (context); } +static int audit_log_object_context (struct audit_buffer *ab, +struct lsmblob *blob) +{ +struct lsmcontext context; +const char *lsm; +int i; + +/* +* None of the installed modules have object labels. +*/ +if (security_lsm_slot_name (0 ) ==NULL ) +return 0 ; + +if (blob->secid[0 ] !=0 ) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &context,0 )) { +audit_log_format (ab," obj=?" ); +return 1 ; + } +audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , context.context); +security_release_secctx (&context); + } + +/* +* Don't do anything more unless there is more than one LSM +* with a security context to report. +*/ +if (security_lsm_slot_name (1 ) ==NULL ) +return 0 ; + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) { + lsm =security_lsm_slot_name (i); +if (lsm ==NULL ) +break ; +if (blob->secid[i] ==0 ) +continue ; +if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &context, i)) { +audit_log_format (ab," obj_%s=?" , lsm); +continue ; + } +audit_log_format (ab," obj_%s=%s" , lsm, context.context); +security_release_secctx (&context); + } +return 0 ; +} +static int audit_log_pid_context (struct audit_context *context,pid_t pid,kuid_t auid,kuid_t uid,unsigned int sessionid,struct lsmblob *blob,char *comm) {struct audit_buffer *ab; -struct lsmcontext lsmctx;int rc =0 ; ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_OBJ_PID );@@ -972,15 +1013,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,audit_log_format (ab,"opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d" , pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid),from_kuid (&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid); -if (lsmblob_is_set (blob)) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmctx,LSMBLOB_FIRST )) { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" );
kernel/auditsc.c static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, · line 1019
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +1
-6- rc =1 ; - }else { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , lsmctx.context); -security_release_secctx (&lsmctx); - } - } + rc =audit_log_object_context (ab, blob);audit_log_format (ab," ocomm=" );audit_log_untrustedstring (ab, comm);audit_log_end (ab);
I realized you don't hang around linux-audit (why would anyone want to do that?!) so let me tell you one of my most hated mantras: "new audit fields MUST go at the end of the audit record". The "MUST" is in all caps because either I'm being clever and reusing some IETF RFC concepts, or I'm tired of arguing this point and feel like capitalization is the best I can do for stress relief; maybe it is a combination of the two. Feel free to pick whichever reason you find most pleasing.
Either way, the "obj=" field should stay where it is, but the "obj_XXX=" fields need to find their way to the end of the record.
Signature · 8 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 21/23] Audit: Include object data for all security modules
Quoted 88 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 12 lines · Casey Schaufler
When there is more than one context displaying security module extend what goes into the audit record by supplimenting the "obj=" with an "obj_<lsm>=" for each such security module.
Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- kernel/audit.h | 4 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 106 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)...
Quoted 73 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +45
-7@@ -956,13 +953,57 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)kfree (context); } +static int audit_log_object_context (struct audit_buffer *ab, +struct lsmblob *blob) +{ +struct lsmcontext context; +const char *lsm; +int i; + +/* +* None of the installed modules have object labels. +*/ +if (security_lsm_slot_name (0 ) ==NULL ) +return 0 ; + +if (blob->secid[0 ] !=0 ) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &context,0 )) { +audit_log_format (ab," obj=?" ); +return 1 ; + } +audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , context.context); +security_release_secctx (&context); + } + +/* +* Don't do anything more unless there is more than one LSM +* with a security context to report. +*/ +if (security_lsm_slot_name (1 ) ==NULL ) +return 0 ; + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) { + lsm =security_lsm_slot_name (i); +if (lsm ==NULL ) +break ; +if (blob->secid[i] ==0 ) +continue ; +if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &context, i)) { +audit_log_format (ab," obj_%s=?" , lsm); +continue ; + } +audit_log_format (ab," obj_%s=%s" , lsm, context.context); +security_release_secctx (&context); + } +return 0 ; +} +static int audit_log_pid_context (struct audit_context *context,pid_t pid,kuid_t auid,kuid_t uid,unsigned int sessionid,struct lsmblob *blob,char *comm) {struct audit_buffer *ab; -struct lsmcontext lsmctx;int rc =0 ; ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_OBJ_PID );@@ -972,15 +1013,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,audit_log_format (ab,"opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d" , pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid),from_kuid (&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid); -if (lsmblob_is_set (blob)) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmctx,LSMBLOB_FIRST )) { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); - rc =1 ; - }else { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , lsmctx.context);
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/auditsc.c static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, · line 1019
Quoted 7 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +1
-3-security_release_secctx (&lsmctx); - } - } + rc =audit_log_object_context (ab, blob);audit_log_format (ab," ocomm=" );audit_log_untrustedstring (ab, comm);audit_log_end (ab);I realized you don't hang around linux-audit
I do, but having implemented audit systems in the past I try not to interfere with someone else's approach for fear of getting sucked in to working on it.
Quoted 1 line
(why would anyone want to do that?!)
Keeping an eye on trends or possible Smack impact.
Quoted 7 lines
so let me tell you one of my most hated mantras: "new audit fields MUST go at the end of the audit record". The "MUST" is in all caps because either I'm being clever and reusing some IETF RFC concepts, or I'm tired of arguing this point and feel like capitalization is the best I can do for stress relief; maybe it is a combination of the two. Feel free to pick whichever reason you find most pleasing.
I'll go with stress relief. Glad to be helpful. ;)
Quoted 2 lines
Either way, the "obj=" field should stay where it is, but the "obj_XXX=" fields need to find their way to the end of the record.
As Steve pointed out, there may be a bigger issue here. If the additional fields aren't going to fit in MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH bytes another format may be required. I had hoped that perhaps obj_selinux= might count as a refinement to obj= and hence not be considered a new field, but it looks like that's not flying.
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Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 21/23] Audit: Include object data for all security modules
Quoted 9 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Paul Moore
Either way, the "obj=" field should stay where it is, but the "obj_XXX=" fields need to find their way to the end of the record.
As Steve pointed out, there may be a bigger issue here. If the additional fields aren't going to fit in
MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTHbytes another format may be required. I had hoped that perhaps obj_selinux= might count as a refinement to obj= and hence not be considered a new field, but it looks like that's not flying.
Regardless, the field placement guidance remains the same.
As far as the record limitation; yes, Steve's audit userspace does have a limit, but I do wonder how limiting an 8k record size really is for the majority of systems. My guess is "not too bad". If you are concerned about that, I imagine you could always tack on a new record to relevant events with additional LSM subj/obj info. Some of the audit container ID pre-work have made that less painful than it would have been in the past, but it will still be a bit of work to get it right.
Signature · 8 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 21/23] Audit: Include object data for all security modules
Quoted 10 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 8 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Paul Moore
Either way, the "obj=" field should stay where it is, but the "obj_XXX=" fields need to find their way to the end of the record.
As Steve pointed out, there may be a bigger issue here. If the additional fields aren't going to fit in
MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTHbytes another format may be required. I had hoped that perhaps obj_selinux= might count as a refinement to obj= and hence not be considered a new field, but it looks like that's not flying.Regardless, the field placement guidance remains the same.
I hear that clearly. End of record.
Quoted 3 lines
As far as the record limitation; yes, Steve's audit userspace does have a limit, but I do wonder how limiting an 8k record size really is for the majority of systems. My guess is "not too bad".
Two large path names would be the only worrisome case. It seems that adding multiple labels will rarely be an issue in practice, but if we can avoid the difference between theory and practice we'll be ahead.
Quoted 3 lines
If you are
concerned about that, I imagine you could always tack on a new record to relevant events with additional LSM subj/obj info.
This seems safest, if doing so would be allowed.
Quoted 4 lines
Some of the
audit container ID pre-work have made that less painful than it would have been in the past, but it will still be a bit of work to get it right.
I'd rather put the work in up front than try to fight over whether records potentially getting too big violates the "don't break user-space" rules.
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Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 21/23] Audit: Include object data for all security modules
Quoted 24 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 10 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 8 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Paul Moore
Either way, the "obj=" field should stay where it is, but the "obj_XXX=" fields need to find their way to the end of the record.
As Steve pointed out, there may be a bigger issue here. If the additional fields aren't going to fit in
MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTHbytes another format may be required. I had hoped that perhaps obj_selinux= might count as a refinement to obj= and hence not be considered a new field, but it looks like that's not flying.Regardless, the field placement guidance remains the same.
I hear that clearly. End of record.
Quoted 3 lines
As far as the record limitation; yes, Steve's audit userspace does have a limit, but I do wonder how limiting an 8k record size really is for the majority of systems. My guess is "not too bad".
Two large path names would be the only worrisome case. It seems that adding multiple labels will rarely be an issue in practice, but if we can avoid the difference between theory and practice we'll be ahead.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
If you are
concerned about that, I imagine you could always tack on a new record to relevant events with additional LSM subj/obj info.This seems safest, if doing so would be allowed.
I'm open to other suggestions, although I'm struggling to think of options that don't massively break compat with older userspace.
Signature · 8 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Casey Schaufler
maintainerQuoted 2 lines · Casey Schaufler
Resending the audit related patches to the audit list, as there have been problems with the CC lists.
There's an awful lot of interaction between the module stacking and the audit sub-system. I have not gotten much feedback about the audit changes recently, but I can't bring myself to think this means there aren't any concerns. Before I start pushing for the stacking to get pulled I would really appreciate either ACKs or meaningful comments from the audit community. I can see that there's a lot going on in the audit sub-system, and appreciate that priorities may be elsewhere.
Thank you.
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Casey Schaufler
maintainerQuoted 12 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Casey Schaufler
Resending the audit related patches to the audit list, as there have been problems with the CC lists.
There's an awful lot of interaction between the module stacking and the audit sub-system. I have not gotten much feedback about the audit changes recently, but I can't bring myself to think this means there aren't any concerns. Before I start pushing for the stacking to get pulled I would really appreciate either ACKs or meaningful comments from the audit community. I can see that there's a lot going on in the audit sub-system, and appreciate that priorities may be elsewhere.
Quoted 1 line
Thank you.
I have to start pushing on this series. If the audit community hasn't any additional feedback, I'll take it that what's here is acceptable and move my lobbying efforts elsewhere.
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Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 13 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 12 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Casey Schaufler
Resending the audit related patches to the audit list, as there have been problems with the CC lists.
There's an awful lot of interaction between the module stacking and the audit sub-system. I have not gotten much feedback about the audit changes recently, but I can't bring myself to think this means there aren't any concerns. Before I start pushing for the stacking to get pulled I would really appreciate either ACKs or meaningful comments from the audit community. I can see that there's a lot going on in the audit sub-system, and appreciate that priorities may be elsewhere.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
Thank you.
I have to start pushing on this series. If the audit community hasn't any additional feedback, I'll take it that what's here is acceptable and move my lobbying efforts elsewhere.
I'll take another look later this week.
Signature · 8 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Casey Schaufler
maintainerQuoted 14 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 13 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 12 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Casey Schaufler
Resending the audit related patches to the audit list, as there have been problems with the CC lists.
There's an awful lot of interaction between the module stacking and the audit sub-system. I have not gotten much feedback about the audit changes recently, but I can't bring myself to think this means there aren't any concerns. Before I start pushing for the stacking to get pulled I would really appreciate either ACKs or meaningful comments from the audit community. I can see that there's a lot going on in the audit sub-system, and appreciate that priorities may be elsewhere.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Thank you.
I have to start pushing on this series. If the audit community hasn't any additional feedback, I'll take it that what's here is acceptable and move my lobbying efforts elsewhere.
I'll take another look later this week.
Thank you. Much appreciated.
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Quoted 14 lines · EST Casey Schaufler
Quoted 13 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Casey Schaufler
Resending the audit related patches to the audit list, as there have been problems with the CC lists.
There's an awful lot of interaction between the module stacking and the audit sub-system. I have not gotten much feedback about the audit changes recently, but I can't bring myself to think this means there aren't any concerns. Before I start pushing for the stacking to get pulled I would really appreciate either ACKs or meaningful comments from the audit community. I can see that there's a lot going on in the audit sub-system, and appreciate that priorities may be elsewhere.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
Thank you.
I have to start pushing on this series. If the audit community hasn't any additional feedback, I'll take it that what's here is acceptable and move my lobbying efforts elsewhere.
There is a limit in user space that may cause problems.
MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH 8970 // PATH_MAX*2+CONTEXT_SIZE*2+11+256+1
This has been in place for years. This is designed to hand the AUDIT_PATH record which can have PATH_MAX * 2 for name field, then it has 11 bytes set aside for other fields, then 256 bytes to handle the largest possible SELinux label. So, if we are agoing to stab other LSM's into the object identifier, how big is it? Do you have a max size that everyone has to fit into?
Changing this constant in user space is not something that you set and are done. Everything will need recompiling.
And one other question, no field names are changing because of this are they? And if a distribution has only 1 LSM, will anyone notice a change in format?
-Steve
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Casey Schaufler
maintainerQuoted 14 lines · Steve Grubb
Quoted 13 lines · EST Casey Schaufler
Quoted 12 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Casey Schaufler
Resending the audit related patches to the audit list, as there have been problems with the CC lists.
There's an awful lot of interaction between the module stacking and the audit sub-system. I have not gotten much feedback about the audit changes recently, but I can't bring myself to think this means there aren't any concerns. Before I start pushing for the stacking to get pulled I would really appreciate either ACKs or meaningful comments from the audit community. I can see that there's a lot going on in the audit sub-system, and appreciate that priorities may be elsewhere.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Thank you.
I have to start pushing on this series. If the audit community hasn't any additional feedback, I'll take it that what's here is acceptable and move my lobbying efforts elsewhere.
There is a limit in user space that may cause problems.
Oh my.
Quoted 7 lines
MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH8970 // PATH_MAX*2+CONTEXT_SIZE*2+11+256+1This has been in place for years. This is designed to hand the
AUDIT_PATHrecord which can havePATH_MAX* 2 for name field, then it has 11 bytes set aside for other fields, then 256 bytes to handle the largest possible SELinux label. So, if we are agoing to stab other LSM's into the object identifier, how big is it? Do you have a max size that everyone has to fit into?
We already have a potential problem here. This implicitly limits the size of a label for all security modules. While we don't have a problem for any of the existing modules, it reasonable to assume that some module some day may want more than that. We have a dearth of documentation on what security modules can and can't do, including limits like this.
Quoted 2 lines
Changing this constant in user space is not something that you set and are done. Everything will need recompiling.
Unfortunate, but hardly a surprise. I can see that having a MAX_AUDIT_MESSAGE_LENGTH is going to require some finagling regardless of what value it has.
Quoted 1 line
And one other question, no field names are changing because of this are they?
No field names change. subj= and obj= remain as they are. subj_selinux=, obj_smack= and the like are added.
Quoted 1 line
And if a distribution has only 1 LSM, will anyone notice a change in format?
No. Explicit steps are taken to ensure that the new fields are produced only if there's more than one active security module.
Quoted 1 line
-Steve
Thanks for the response. I'll be making more comments based on Paul's feedback.
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