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arm64: Expose original FAR_EL1 value in sigcontext

PATCH Superseded Peter Collingbourne 6 participants 63 messages Mar 12, 2020 – Aug 18, 2020 2 messages not in the archive Page 1 of 2

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 arm64: Expose original FAR_EL1 value in sigcontext

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a far_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the original value of FAR_EL1 (including the tag bits) there.

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h |  9 +++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c         |  2 --
 arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c        |  3 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c               | 20 ++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                    | 45 ++++++++++++++----------
 7 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h +1 -1
index 7a6e81ca23a8e..90e772d9b2cd8 100644
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static inline u32 disr_to_esr(u64 disr)
 }
 
 asmlinkage void enter_from_user_mode(void);
-void do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
+void do_mem_abort(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
 void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs);
 asmlinkage void bad_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr);
 void do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr_if_watchpoint, unsigned int esr,
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1 -1
index 5ba63204d078a..77d916c075319 100644
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ struct thread_struct {
 	void			*sve_state;	/* SVE registers, if any */
 	unsigned int		sve_vl;		/* SVE vector length */
 	unsigned int		sve_vl_onexec;	/* SVE vl after next exec */
-	unsigned long		fault_address;	/* fault info */
+	unsigned long		fault_address;	/* FAR_EL1 value */
 	unsigned long		fault_code;	/* ESR_EL1 value */
 	struct debug_info	debug;		/* debugging */
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +9 -0
index 8b0ebce92427b..f532a2505d5e8 100644
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ struct sigcontext {
  *
  *	0x210		fpsimd_context
  *	 0x10		esr_context
+ *	 0x10		far_context
  *	0x8a0		sve_context (vl <= 64) (optional)
  *	 0x20		extra_context (optional)
  *	 0x10		terminator (null _aarch64_ctx)
@@ -94,6 +95,14 @@ struct esr_context {
 	__u64 esr;
 };
 
+/* FAR_EL1 context */
+#define FAR_MAGIC	0x46415201
+
+struct far_context {
+	struct _aarch64_ctx head;
+	__u64 far;
+};
+
 /*
  * extra_context: describes extra space in the signal frame for
  * additional structures that don't fit in sigcontext.__reserved[].
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +0 -2
index fde59981445ca..290ea59c68b85 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ static void notrace el1_abort(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 	unsigned long far = read_sysreg(far_el1);
 
 	local_daif_inherit(regs);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el1_abort);
@@ -104,7 +103,6 @@ static void notrace el0_da(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 
 	user_exit_irqoff();
 	local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el0_da);
arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c +2 -1
index 0b727edf41046..985cd44decf62 100644
@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ static u64 get_distance_from_watchpoint(unsigned long addr, u64 val,
 		return 0;
 }
 
-static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
+static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr,
 			      struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	int i, step = 0, *kernel_step, access, closest_match = 0;
@@ -741,6 +741,7 @@ static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
 	struct debug_info *debug_info;
 	struct arch_hw_breakpoint *info;
 	struct arch_hw_breakpoint_ctrl ctrl;
+	unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(far);
 
 	slots = this_cpu_ptr(wp_on_reg);
 	debug_info = &current->thread.debug;
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +19 -1
index 339882db5a915..48e8b6c7b5369 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct rt_sigframe_user_layout {
 
 	unsigned long fpsimd_offset;
 	unsigned long esr_offset;
+	unsigned long far_offset;
 	unsigned long sve_offset;
 	unsigned long extra_offset;
 	unsigned long end_offset;
@@ -383,6 +384,7 @@ static int parse_user_sigframe(struct user_ctxs *user,
 			break;
 
 		case ESR_MAGIC:
+		case FAR_MAGIC:
 			/* ignore */
 			break;
 
@@ -581,6 +583,11 @@ static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 				     sizeof(struct esr_context));
 		if (err)
 			return err;
+
+		err = sigframe_alloc(user, &user->far_offset,
+				     sizeof(struct far_context));
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 	}
 
 	if (system_supports_sve()) {
@@ -621,7 +628,8 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 	__put_user_error(regs->pc, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pc, err);
 	__put_user_error(regs->pstate, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pstate, err);
 
-	__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
+	__put_user_error(untagged_addr(current->thread.fault_address),
+			 &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
 
 	err |= __copy_to_user(&sf->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
 
@@ -641,6 +649,16 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 		__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code, &esr_ctx->esr, err);
 	}
 
+	if (err == 0 && user->far_offset) {
+		struct far_context __user *far_ctx =
+			apply_user_offset(user, user->far_offset);
+
+		__put_user_error(FAR_MAGIC, &far_ctx->head.magic, err);
+		__put_user_error(sizeof(*far_ctx), &far_ctx->head.size, err);
+		__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address, &far_ctx->far,
+				 err);
+	}
+
 	/* Scalable Vector Extension state, if present */
 	if (system_supports_sve() && err == 0 && user->sve_offset) {
 		struct sve_context __user *sve_ctx =
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +27 -18

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#1 lore raw

Hi Peter,

arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c static void notrace el1_abort(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr) · line 27

Quoted 12 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +0 -1
index fde59981445ca..290ea59c68b85 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ static void notrace el1_abort(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 	unsigned long far = read_sysreg(far_el1);
 
 	local_daif_inherit(regs);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el1_abort);

Would we get a signal on faults triggered by the kernel? Anyway, I'm fine with this change for consistency and may help with the fault information printed by the kernel with khwasan or (later) MTE.

Quoted 22 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +0 -1
@@ -104,7 +103,6 @@ static void notrace el0_da(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 
 	user_exit_irqoff();
 	local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el0_da);
arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c +1 -1
index 0b727edf41046..985cd44decf62 100644
@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ static u64 get_distance_from_watchpoint(unsigned long addr, u64 val,
 		return 0;
 }
 
-static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
+static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr,
 			      struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	int i, step = 0, *kernel_step, access, closest_match = 0;

arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, · line 747

Quoted 7 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c +1 -0
@@ -741,6 +741,7 @@ static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
 	struct debug_info *debug_info;
 	struct arch_hw_breakpoint *info;
 	struct arch_hw_breakpoint_ctrl ctrl;
+	unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(far);
 
 	slots = this_cpu_ptr(wp_on_reg);
 	debug_info = &current->thread.debug;

Why do we need to untag this here? Have you hit any bug? This function gets the original FAR_EL1 value, untagged (via elX_dbg()), and we clear the tag further down in get_distance_from_watchpoint().

Quoted 21 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +2 -0
index 339882db5a915..48e8b6c7b5369 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct rt_sigframe_user_layout {
 
 	unsigned long fpsimd_offset;
 	unsigned long esr_offset;
+	unsigned long far_offset;
 	unsigned long sve_offset;
 	unsigned long extra_offset;
 	unsigned long end_offset;
@@ -383,6 +384,7 @@ static int parse_user_sigframe(struct user_ctxs *user,
 			break;
 
 		case ESR_MAGIC:
+		case FAR_MAGIC:
 			/* ignore */
 			break;
 

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user, · line 590

Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +5 -0
@@ -581,6 +583,11 @@ static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 				     sizeof(struct esr_context));
 		if (err)
 			return err;
+
+		err = sigframe_alloc(user, &user->far_offset,
+				     sizeof(struct far_context));
+		if (err)
+			return err;

It looks fine, I think it makes sense to only expose the raw FAR_EL1 when we also expose the ESR_EL1 (via set_thread_esr()).

Quoted 14 lines
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +1 -1
index 85566d32958f5..2ca2de1ff43be 100644
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
 #include <asm/traps.h>
 
 struct fault_info {
-	int	(*fn)(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
+	int	(*fn)(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr,
 		      struct pt_regs *regs);
 	int	sig;
 	int	code;

arch/arm64/mm/fault.c static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, · line 323

Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +1 -1
@@ -320,9 +320,11 @@ static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
 	die_kernel_fault(msg, addr, esr, regs);
 }
 
-static void set_thread_esr(unsigned long address, unsigned int esr)
+static void set_thread_esr(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr)

We might as well rename this to set_thread_far_esr().

Thanks.

Signature · 6 lines
Catalin

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#2 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · Catalin Marinas

Hi Peter,

Quoted 7 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +0 -0
index fde59981445ca..290ea59c68b85 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ static void notrace el1_abort(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
      unsigned long far = read_sysreg(far_el1);
 
Quoted 9 lines

arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c static void notrace el1_abort(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr) · line 27

Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +0 -1
      local_daif_inherit(regs);
-     far = untagged_addr(far);
      do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el1_abort);

Would we get a signal on faults triggered by the kernel? Anyway, I'm fine with this change for consistency and may help with the fault information printed by the kernel with khwasan or (later) MTE.

It doesn't look like we would. As far as I can tell all of the signal injection paths are guarded with if (user_mode(regs)) and such. Agreed with the consistency argument.

Quoted 27 lines
Quoted 27 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +0 -1
@@ -104,7 +103,6 @@ static void notrace el0_da(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 
      user_exit_irqoff();
      local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
-     far = untagged_addr(far);
      do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el0_da);
arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c +2 -1
index 0b727edf41046..985cd44decf62 100644
@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ static u64 get_distance_from_watchpoint(unsigned long addr, u64 val,
              return 0;
 }
 
-static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
+static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr,
                            struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
      int i, step = 0, *kernel_step, access, closest_match = 0;
@@ -741,6 +741,7 @@ static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
      struct debug_info *debug_info;
      struct arch_hw_breakpoint *info;
      struct arch_hw_breakpoint_ctrl ctrl;
+     unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(far);
 
Quoted 6 lines

arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c static int watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, · line 747

Quoted 2 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c +0 -0
      slots = this_cpu_ptr(wp_on_reg);
      debug_info = &current->thread.debug;

Why do we need to untag this here? Have you hit any bug? This function gets the original FAR_EL1 value, untagged (via elX_dbg()), and we clear the tag further down in get_distance_from_watchpoint().

You're right, I missed that this was going via elX_dbg() rather than an abort handler. In fact, this would seem to be a potential userspace break because the now-untagged address is also stored in counter_arch_bp(wp)->trigger, which is exposed to userspace via ptrace_hbptriggered in arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c. I've reverted this part in v2.

Quoted 50 lines
Quoted 21 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +2 -0
index 339882db5a915..48e8b6c7b5369 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct rt_sigframe_user_layout {
 
      unsigned long fpsimd_offset;
      unsigned long esr_offset;
+     unsigned long far_offset;
      unsigned long sve_offset;
      unsigned long extra_offset;
      unsigned long end_offset;
@@ -383,6 +384,7 @@ static int parse_user_sigframe(struct user_ctxs *user,
                      break;
 
              case ESR_MAGIC:
+             case FAR_MAGIC:
                      /* ignore */
                      break;
 

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user, · line 590

Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +5 -0
@@ -581,6 +583,11 @@ static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
                                   sizeof(struct esr_context));
              if (err)
                      return err;
+
+             err = sigframe_alloc(user, &user->far_offset,
+                                  sizeof(struct far_context));
+             if (err)
+                     return err;

It looks fine, I think it makes sense to only expose the raw FAR_EL1 when we also expose the ESR_EL1 (via set_thread_esr()).

Quoted 17 lines
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +1 -1
index 85566d32958f5..2ca2de1ff43be 100644
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
 #include <asm/traps.h>
 
 struct fault_info {
-     int     (*fn)(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
+     int     (*fn)(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr,
                    struct pt_regs *regs);
      int     sig;
      int     code;
@@ -320,9 +320,11 @@ static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
      die_kernel_fault(msg, addr, esr, regs);
 }
 
Quoted 4 lines

arch/arm64/mm/fault.c static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, · line 323

Quoted 2 lines
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +1 -1
-static void set_thread_esr(unsigned long address, unsigned int esr)
+static void set_thread_esr(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr)

We might as well rename this to set_thread_far_esr().

Done in v2.

Peter

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#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 arm64: Expose original FAR_EL1 value in sigcontext

In reply to Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a far_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the original value of FAR_EL1 (including the tag bits) there.

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

---
v2:
- revert changes to hw_breakpoint.c
- rename set_thread_esr to set_thread_far_esr

 arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h |  9 +++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c         |  2 --
 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c               | 20 ++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                    | 45 ++++++++++++++----------
 6 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h +1 -1
index 7a6e81ca23a8..90e772d9b2cd 100644
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static inline u32 disr_to_esr(u64 disr)
 }
 
 asmlinkage void enter_from_user_mode(void);
-void do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
+void do_mem_abort(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
 void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs);
 asmlinkage void bad_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr);
 void do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr_if_watchpoint, unsigned int esr,
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1 -1
index 5ba63204d078..77d916c07531 100644
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ struct thread_struct {
 	void			*sve_state;	/* SVE registers, if any */
 	unsigned int		sve_vl;		/* SVE vector length */
 	unsigned int		sve_vl_onexec;	/* SVE vl after next exec */
-	unsigned long		fault_address;	/* fault info */
+	unsigned long		fault_address;	/* FAR_EL1 value */
 	unsigned long		fault_code;	/* ESR_EL1 value */
 	struct debug_info	debug;		/* debugging */
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +9 -0
index 8b0ebce92427..f532a2505d5e 100644
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ struct sigcontext {
  *
  *	0x210		fpsimd_context
  *	 0x10		esr_context
+ *	 0x10		far_context
  *	0x8a0		sve_context (vl <= 64) (optional)
  *	 0x20		extra_context (optional)
  *	 0x10		terminator (null _aarch64_ctx)
@@ -94,6 +95,14 @@ struct esr_context {
 	__u64 esr;
 };
 
+/* FAR_EL1 context */
+#define FAR_MAGIC	0x46415201
+
+struct far_context {
+	struct _aarch64_ctx head;
+	__u64 far;
+};
+
 /*
  * extra_context: describes extra space in the signal frame for
  * additional structures that don't fit in sigcontext.__reserved[].
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +0 -2
index fde59981445c..290ea59c68b8 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ static void notrace el1_abort(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 	unsigned long far = read_sysreg(far_el1);
 
 	local_daif_inherit(regs);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el1_abort);
@@ -104,7 +103,6 @@ static void notrace el0_da(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 
 	user_exit_irqoff();
 	local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el0_da);
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +19 -1
index 339882db5a91..48e8b6c7b536 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct rt_sigframe_user_layout {
 
 	unsigned long fpsimd_offset;
 	unsigned long esr_offset;
+	unsigned long far_offset;
 	unsigned long sve_offset;
 	unsigned long extra_offset;
 	unsigned long end_offset;
@@ -383,6 +384,7 @@ static int parse_user_sigframe(struct user_ctxs *user,
 			break;
 
 		case ESR_MAGIC:
+		case FAR_MAGIC:
 			/* ignore */
 			break;
 
@@ -581,6 +583,11 @@ static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 				     sizeof(struct esr_context));
 		if (err)
 			return err;
+
+		err = sigframe_alloc(user, &user->far_offset,
+				     sizeof(struct far_context));
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 	}
 
 	if (system_supports_sve()) {
@@ -621,7 +628,8 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 	__put_user_error(regs->pc, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pc, err);
 	__put_user_error(regs->pstate, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pstate, err);
 
-	__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
+	__put_user_error(untagged_addr(current->thread.fault_address),
+			 &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
 
 	err |= __copy_to_user(&sf->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
 
@@ -641,6 +649,16 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 		__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code, &esr_ctx->esr, err);
 	}
 
+	if (err == 0 && user->far_offset) {
+		struct far_context __user *far_ctx =
+			apply_user_offset(user, user->far_offset);
+
+		__put_user_error(FAR_MAGIC, &far_ctx->head.magic, err);
+		__put_user_error(sizeof(*far_ctx), &far_ctx->head.size, err);
+		__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address, &far_ctx->far,
+				 err);
+	}
+
 	/* Scalable Vector Extension state, if present */
 	if (system_supports_sve() && err == 0 && user->sve_offset) {
 		struct sve_context __user *sve_ctx =
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +27 -18

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#4 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines · Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a far_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the original value of FAR_EL1 (including the tag bits) there.

Quoted 3 lines

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

The patch looks fine. However, I wouldn't queue it for 5.7, it's too close to the merging window and I'd like it to sit in linux-next for a bit. Unless there are other comments, it looks fine to me for -rc8.

Thanks.

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Catalin

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#5 lore raw
Quoted 13 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 12 lines · Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a far_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the original value of FAR_EL1 (including the tag bits) there.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

The patch looks fine. However, I wouldn't queue it for 5.7, it's too close to the merging window and I'd like it to sit in linux-next for a bit. Unless there are other comments, it looks fine to me for -rc8.

You mean 5.8? I'm also a bit surprised not to see a docs update, given that we talk about the general lack of tags in siginfo_t towards the end of Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst

Will

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#6 lore raw
Quoted 16 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 15 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 14 lines · Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a far_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the original value of FAR_EL1 (including the tag bits) there.

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line

The patch looks fine. However, I wouldn't queue it for 5.7, it's too close to the merging window and I'd like it to sit in linux-next for a bit. Unless there are other comments, it looks fine to me for -rc8.

You mean 5.8?

Yes.

Quoted 3 lines

I'm also a bit surprised not to see a docs update, given that we talk about the general lack of tags in siginfo_t towards the end of Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst

Good point. It's worth adding this to the tagged-pointers.rst document since the only use of the raw FAR_EL1 is for tagged pointers.

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#7 lore raw
Quoted 26 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 16 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 15 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 14 lines · Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a far_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the original value of FAR_EL1 (including the tag bits) there.

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line

The patch looks fine. However, I wouldn't queue it for 5.7, it's too close to the merging window and I'd like it to sit in linux-next for a bit. Unless there are other comments, it looks fine to me for -rc8.

You mean 5.8?

Quoted 8 lines

Yes.

Quoted 3 lines

I'm also a bit surprised not to see a docs update, given that we talk about the general lack of tags in siginfo_t towards the end of Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst

Good point. It's worth adding this to the tagged-pointers.rst document since the only use of the raw FAR_EL1 is for tagged pointers.

In v3 I've added a paragraph about far_context after the paragraph that talks about siginfo.

Unless I'm mistaken it looks like that paragraph is only really talking about the fault address (there aren't any other user address fields in siginfo on arm64 as far as I can tell), so I reworded it so that my new paragraph follows on from it (and clarified that sigcontext.fault_address doesn't have the tag either).

Peter

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#8 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/1 arm64: Expose original FAR_EL1 value in sigcontext

In reply to Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a far_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the original value of FAR_EL1 (including the tag bits) there.

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

---
v3:
- add documentation to tagged-pointers.rst
- update comments in sigcontext.h

v2:
- revert changes to hw_breakpoint.c
- rename set_thread_esr to set_thread_far_esr

 Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst  | 17 +++++----
 arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 21 +++++++----
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c         |  2 --
 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c               | 20 ++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                    | 45 ++++++++++++++----------
 7 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst +11 -6
index eab4323609b9..9da7f6262fad 100644
@@ -53,12 +53,17 @@ visibility.
 Preserving tags
 ---------------
 
-Non-zero tags are not preserved when delivering signals. This means that
-signal handlers in applications making use of tags cannot rely on the
-tag information for user virtual addresses being maintained for fields
-inside siginfo_t. One exception to this rule is for signals raised in
-response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the tag information will
-be preserved.
+Non-zero tags are not preserved in the fault address fields
+siginfo.si_addr or sigcontext.fault_address when delivering
+signals. This means that signal handlers in applications making use
+of tags cannot rely on the tag information for user virtual addresses
+being maintained in these fields. One exception to this rule is for
+signals raised in response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the
+tag information will be preserved.
+
+The fault address tag is preserved in the far field of the signal
+frame record far_context, which is present for signals raised in
+response to data aborts and instruction aborts.
 
 The architecture prevents the use of a tagged PC, so the upper byte will
 be set to a sign-extension of bit 55 on exception return.
arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h +1 -1
index 7a6e81ca23a8..90e772d9b2cd 100644
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static inline u32 disr_to_esr(u64 disr)
 }
 
 asmlinkage void enter_from_user_mode(void);
-void do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
+void do_mem_abort(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
 void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs);
 asmlinkage void bad_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr);
 void do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr_if_watchpoint, unsigned int esr,
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1 -1
index 5ba63204d078..77d916c07531 100644
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ struct thread_struct {
 	void			*sve_state;	/* SVE registers, if any */
 	unsigned int		sve_vl;		/* SVE vector length */
 	unsigned int		sve_vl_onexec;	/* SVE vl after next exec */
-	unsigned long		fault_address;	/* fault info */
+	unsigned long		fault_address;	/* FAR_EL1 value */
 	unsigned long		fault_code;	/* ESR_EL1 value */
 	struct debug_info	debug;		/* debugging */
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +15 -6
index 8b0ebce92427..6782394633cb 100644
@@ -44,11 +44,12 @@ struct sigcontext {
  *
  *	0x210		fpsimd_context
  *	 0x10		esr_context
+ *	 0x10		far_context
  *	0x8a0		sve_context (vl <= 64) (optional)
  *	 0x20		extra_context (optional)
  *	 0x10		terminator (null _aarch64_ctx)
  *
- *	0x510		(reserved for future allocation)
+ *	0x500		(reserved for future allocation)
  *
  * New records that can exceed this space need to be opt-in for userspace, so
  * that an expanded signal frame is not generated unexpectedly.  The mechanism
@@ -94,17 +95,25 @@ struct esr_context {
 	__u64 esr;
 };
 
+/* FAR_EL1 context */
+#define FAR_MAGIC	0x46415201
+
+struct far_context {
+	struct _aarch64_ctx head;
+	__u64 far;
+};
+
 /*
  * extra_context: describes extra space in the signal frame for
  * additional structures that don't fit in sigcontext.__reserved[].
  *
  * Note:
  *
- * 1) fpsimd_context, esr_context and extra_context must be placed in
- * sigcontext.__reserved[] if present.  They cannot be placed in the
- * extra space.  Any other record can be placed either in the extra
- * space or in sigcontext.__reserved[], unless otherwise specified in
- * this file.
+ * 1) fpsimd_context, esr_context, far_context and extra_context must be
+ * placed in sigcontext.__reserved[] if present.  They cannot be placed
+ * in the extra space.  Any other record can be placed either in the
+ * extra space or in sigcontext.__reserved[], unless otherwise specified
+ * in this file.
  *
  * 2) There must not be more than one extra_context.
  *
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +0 -2
index fde59981445c..290ea59c68b8 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ static void notrace el1_abort(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 	unsigned long far = read_sysreg(far_el1);
 
 	local_daif_inherit(regs);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el1_abort);
@@ -104,7 +103,6 @@ static void notrace el0_da(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 
 	user_exit_irqoff();
 	local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el0_da);
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +19 -1
index 339882db5a91..48e8b6c7b536 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct rt_sigframe_user_layout {
 
 	unsigned long fpsimd_offset;
 	unsigned long esr_offset;
+	unsigned long far_offset;
 	unsigned long sve_offset;
 	unsigned long extra_offset;
 	unsigned long end_offset;
@@ -383,6 +384,7 @@ static int parse_user_sigframe(struct user_ctxs *user,
 			break;
 
 		case ESR_MAGIC:
+		case FAR_MAGIC:
 			/* ignore */
 			break;
 
@@ -581,6 +583,11 @@ static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 				     sizeof(struct esr_context));
 		if (err)
 			return err;
+
+		err = sigframe_alloc(user, &user->far_offset,
+				     sizeof(struct far_context));
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 	}
 
 	if (system_supports_sve()) {
@@ -621,7 +628,8 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 	__put_user_error(regs->pc, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pc, err);
 	__put_user_error(regs->pstate, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pstate, err);
 
-	__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
+	__put_user_error(untagged_addr(current->thread.fault_address),
+			 &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
 
 	err |= __copy_to_user(&sf->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
 
@@ -641,6 +649,16 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 		__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code, &esr_ctx->esr, err);
 	}
 
+	if (err == 0 && user->far_offset) {
+		struct far_context __user *far_ctx =
+			apply_user_offset(user, user->far_offset);
+
+		__put_user_error(FAR_MAGIC, &far_ctx->head.magic, err);
+		__put_user_error(sizeof(*far_ctx), &far_ctx->head.size, err);
+		__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address, &far_ctx->far,
+				 err);
+	}
+
 	/* Scalable Vector Extension state, if present */
 	if (system_supports_sve() && err == 0 && user->sve_offset) {
 		struct sve_context __user *sve_ctx =
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +27 -18

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2.26.0.rc2.310.g2932bb562d-goog


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#9 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines · Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a far_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the original value of FAR_EL1 (including the tag bits) there.

Quoted 3 lines

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

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#10 lore raw
In reply to Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 12 lines · Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a far_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the original value of FAR_EL1 (including the tag bits) there.

Quoted 7 lines

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

---
v3:
- add documentation to tagged-pointers.rst
- update comments in sigcontext.h

Hmm, although the code looks fine, why don't we just expose the tag in the new field, rather than duplicate the address information? I'm nervous about exposing privileged registers directly to userspace.

Also, Catalin, could you elaborate on the MTE use-case please? The architecture says that FAR_EL1[63:60] are UNKNOWN on a synchronous tag check fault, so we'd have to *avoid* exposing them in that case!

Will

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#11 lore raw
Quoted 22 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 12 lines · Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a far_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the original value of FAR_EL1 (including the tag bits) there.

Quoted 7 lines

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

---
v3:
- add documentation to tagged-pointers.rst
- update comments in sigcontext.h

Quoted 3 lines

Hmm, although the code looks fine, why don't we just expose the tag in the new field, rather than duplicate the address information? I'm nervous about exposing privileged registers directly to userspace.

I have no strong opinion on whether this should just contain the tag or not.

Quoted 3 lines

Also, Catalin, could you elaborate on the MTE use-case please? The architecture says that FAR_EL1[63:60] are UNKNOWN on a synchronous tag check fault, so we'd have to *avoid* exposing them in that case!

The basic use case is to allow a signal handler to identify which allocation was accessed improperly in order to provide better diagnostics. For example, if you have granules tagged 1,2,3 consecutively and see an access with pointer tag 1 on the granule tagged 2, you can tell that it was probably a buffer overflow from the 1 granule and you can report that to the user.

It seems unfortunate that bits 63:60 are now UNKNOWN on synchronous tag check faults. It seems to be a recent change to the specification. I can think of a number of use cases for bits 63:60 after a synchronous tag check fault -- for example, an allocator could store an additional set of random bits there, and later use them to determine with more accuracy which allocation was used after free or out of bounds. That being said, we aren't planning to do this in the initial version of the MTE-aware scudo allocator.

If there is no chance of changing the architecture at this point, I will send a v4 with the bits masked out when handling a tag check fault.

Peter

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#12 lore raw

Hi Peter,

Quoted 22 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 21 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 19 lines · Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a far_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the original value of FAR_EL1 (including the tag bits) there.

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

---
v3:
- add documentation to tagged-pointers.rst
- update comments in sigcontext.h

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Hmm, although the code looks fine, why don't we just expose the tag in the new field, rather than duplicate the address information? I'm nervous about exposing privileged registers directly to userspace.

I have no strong opinion on whether this should just contain the tag or not.

A few of us chatted about this today. Please could you spin a v4 where only the top byte is exposed in the new sigcontext record as a __u8? You'll need to think of a better name than "FAR"; perhaps something like 'si_addr_top_byte', 'si_addr_63_56' or whatever you fancy. Naming is hard.

For MTE we can add a separate record later on, so as not to overload this (e.g. si_addr_mte_tag).

Ta,

Will

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#13 lore raw

PATCH v4 1/1 arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a fault_addr_top_byte_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the tag bits of FAR_EL1 there.

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

---
v4:
- expose only the tag bits in the context instead of the entire FAR_EL1
- remove mention of the new context from the sigcontext.__reserved[] note

v3:
- add documentation to tagged-pointers.rst
- update comments in sigcontext.h

v2:
- revert changes to hw_breakpoint.c
- rename set_thread_esr to set_thread_far_esr

 Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst  | 17 +++++----
 arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 11 +++++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c         |  2 --
 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c               | 22 +++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                    | 45 ++++++++++++++----------
 7 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst +11 -6
index eab4323609b9..c6e9592a9dea 100644
@@ -53,12 +53,17 @@ visibility.
 Preserving tags
 ---------------
 
-Non-zero tags are not preserved when delivering signals. This means that
-signal handlers in applications making use of tags cannot rely on the
-tag information for user virtual addresses being maintained for fields
-inside siginfo_t. One exception to this rule is for signals raised in
-response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the tag information will
-be preserved.
+Non-zero tags are not preserved in the fault address fields
+siginfo.si_addr or sigcontext.fault_address when delivering
+signals. This means that signal handlers in applications making use
+of tags cannot rely on the tag information for user virtual addresses
+being maintained in these fields. One exception to this rule is for
+signals raised in response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the
+tag information will be preserved.
+
+The fault address tag is preserved in the fault_addr_top_byte field of
+the signal frame record fault_addr_top_byte_context, which is present
+for signals raised in response to data aborts and instruction aborts.
 
 The architecture prevents the use of a tagged PC, so the upper byte will
 be set to a sign-extension of bit 55 on exception return.
arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h +1 -1
index 7a6e81ca23a8..90e772d9b2cd 100644
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static inline u32 disr_to_esr(u64 disr)
 }
 
 asmlinkage void enter_from_user_mode(void);
-void do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
+void do_mem_abort(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
 void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs);
 asmlinkage void bad_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr);
 void do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr_if_watchpoint, unsigned int esr,
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1 -1
index 240fe5e5b720..63185be29ff9 100644
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ struct thread_struct {
 	void			*sve_state;	/* SVE registers, if any */
 	unsigned int		sve_vl;		/* SVE vector length */
 	unsigned int		sve_vl_onexec;	/* SVE vl after next exec */
-	unsigned long		fault_address;	/* fault info */
+	unsigned long		fault_address;	/* FAR_EL1 value */
 	unsigned long		fault_code;	/* ESR_EL1 value */
 	struct debug_info	debug;		/* debugging */
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +10 -1
index 8b0ebce92427..736d6e845b66 100644
@@ -44,11 +44,12 @@ struct sigcontext {
  *
  *	0x210		fpsimd_context
  *	 0x10		esr_context
+ *	 0x10		fault_addr_top_byte_context
  *	0x8a0		sve_context (vl <= 64) (optional)
  *	 0x20		extra_context (optional)
  *	 0x10		terminator (null _aarch64_ctx)
  *
- *	0x510		(reserved for future allocation)
+ *	0x500		(reserved for future allocation)
  *
  * New records that can exceed this space need to be opt-in for userspace, so
  * that an expanded signal frame is not generated unexpectedly.  The mechanism
@@ -94,6 +95,14 @@ struct esr_context {
 	__u64 esr;
 };
 
+/* Top byte of fault address (normally not exposed via si_addr) */
+#define FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC	0x46544201
+
+struct fault_addr_top_byte_context {
+	struct _aarch64_ctx head;
+	__u8 fault_addr_top_byte;
+};
+
 /*
  * extra_context: describes extra space in the signal frame for
  * additional structures that don't fit in sigcontext.__reserved[].
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +0 -2
index c839b5bf1904..045b4f518836 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ static void notrace el1_abort(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 	unsigned long far = read_sysreg(far_el1);
 
 	local_daif_inherit(regs);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el1_abort);
@@ -104,7 +103,6 @@ static void notrace el0_da(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 
 	user_exit_irqoff();
 	local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el0_da);
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +21 -1
index 339882db5a91..baa88dc02e5c 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct rt_sigframe_user_layout {
 
 	unsigned long fpsimd_offset;
 	unsigned long esr_offset;
+	unsigned long ftb_offset;
 	unsigned long sve_offset;
 	unsigned long extra_offset;
 	unsigned long end_offset;
@@ -383,6 +384,7 @@ static int parse_user_sigframe(struct user_ctxs *user,
 			break;
 
 		case ESR_MAGIC:
+		case FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC:
 			/* ignore */
 			break;
 
@@ -581,6 +583,12 @@ static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 				     sizeof(struct esr_context));
 		if (err)
 			return err;
+
+		err = sigframe_alloc(
+			user, &user->ftb_offset,
+			sizeof(struct fault_addr_top_byte_context));
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 	}
 
 	if (system_supports_sve()) {
@@ -621,7 +629,8 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 	__put_user_error(regs->pc, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pc, err);
 	__put_user_error(regs->pstate, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pstate, err);
 
-	__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
+	__put_user_error(untagged_addr(current->thread.fault_address),
+			 &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
 
 	err |= __copy_to_user(&sf->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
 
@@ -641,6 +650,17 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 		__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code, &esr_ctx->esr, err);
 	}
 
+	if (err == 0 && user->ftb_offset) {
+		struct fault_addr_top_byte_context __user *ftb_ctx =
+			apply_user_offset(user, user->ftb_offset);
+
+		__put_user_error(FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC,
+				 &ftb_ctx->head.magic, err);
+		__put_user_error(sizeof(*ftb_ctx), &ftb_ctx->head.size, err);
+		__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address >> 56,
+				 &ftb_ctx->fault_addr_top_byte, err);
+	}
+
 	/* Scalable Vector Extension state, if present */
 	if (system_supports_sve() && err == 0 && user->sve_offset) {
 		struct sve_context __user *sve_ctx =
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +27 -18

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#14 lore raw

PATCH v5 1/1 arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a fault_addr_top_byte_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the tag bits of FAR_EL1 there.

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

---
v5:
- add padding to fault_addr_top_byte_context in order to ensure the correct size and preserve sp alignment

v4:
- expose only the tag bits in the context instead of the entire FAR_EL1
- remove mention of the new context from the sigcontext.__reserved[] note

v3:
- add documentation to tagged-pointers.rst
- update comments in sigcontext.h

v2:
- revert changes to hw_breakpoint.c
- rename set_thread_esr to set_thread_far_esr

 Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst  | 17 +++++----
 arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 12 ++++++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c         |  2 --
 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c               | 22 +++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                    | 45 ++++++++++++++----------
 7 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst +11 -6
index eab4323609b9..c6e9592a9dea 100644
@@ -53,12 +53,17 @@ visibility.
 Preserving tags
 ---------------
 
-Non-zero tags are not preserved when delivering signals. This means that
-signal handlers in applications making use of tags cannot rely on the
-tag information for user virtual addresses being maintained for fields
-inside siginfo_t. One exception to this rule is for signals raised in
-response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the tag information will
-be preserved.
+Non-zero tags are not preserved in the fault address fields
+siginfo.si_addr or sigcontext.fault_address when delivering
+signals. This means that signal handlers in applications making use
+of tags cannot rely on the tag information for user virtual addresses
+being maintained in these fields. One exception to this rule is for
+signals raised in response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the
+tag information will be preserved.
+
+The fault address tag is preserved in the fault_addr_top_byte field of
+the signal frame record fault_addr_top_byte_context, which is present
+for signals raised in response to data aborts and instruction aborts.
 
 The architecture prevents the use of a tagged PC, so the upper byte will
 be set to a sign-extension of bit 55 on exception return.
arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h +1 -1
index 7a6e81ca23a8..90e772d9b2cd 100644
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static inline u32 disr_to_esr(u64 disr)
 }
 
 asmlinkage void enter_from_user_mode(void);
-void do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
+void do_mem_abort(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
 void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs);
 asmlinkage void bad_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr);
 void do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr_if_watchpoint, unsigned int esr,
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1 -1
index 240fe5e5b720..63185be29ff9 100644
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ struct thread_struct {
 	void			*sve_state;	/* SVE registers, if any */
 	unsigned int		sve_vl;		/* SVE vector length */
 	unsigned int		sve_vl_onexec;	/* SVE vl after next exec */
-	unsigned long		fault_address;	/* fault info */
+	unsigned long		fault_address;	/* FAR_EL1 value */
 	unsigned long		fault_code;	/* ESR_EL1 value */
 	struct debug_info	debug;		/* debugging */
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +11 -1
index 8b0ebce92427..1a2d23092d8f 100644
@@ -44,11 +44,12 @@ struct sigcontext {
  *
  *	0x210		fpsimd_context
  *	 0x10		esr_context
+ *	 0x10		fault_addr_top_byte_context
  *	0x8a0		sve_context (vl <= 64) (optional)
  *	 0x20		extra_context (optional)
  *	 0x10		terminator (null _aarch64_ctx)
  *
- *	0x510		(reserved for future allocation)
+ *	0x500		(reserved for future allocation)
  *
  * New records that can exceed this space need to be opt-in for userspace, so
  * that an expanded signal frame is not generated unexpectedly.  The mechanism
@@ -94,6 +95,15 @@ struct esr_context {
 	__u64 esr;
 };
 
+/* Top byte of fault address (normally not exposed via si_addr) */
+#define FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC	0x46544201
+
+struct fault_addr_top_byte_context {
+	struct _aarch64_ctx head;
+	__u8 fault_addr_top_byte;
+	__u8 __reserved[7];
+};
+
 /*
  * extra_context: describes extra space in the signal frame for
  * additional structures that don't fit in sigcontext.__reserved[].
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +0 -2
index c839b5bf1904..045b4f518836 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ static void notrace el1_abort(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 	unsigned long far = read_sysreg(far_el1);
 
 	local_daif_inherit(regs);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el1_abort);
@@ -104,7 +103,6 @@ static void notrace el0_da(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 
 	user_exit_irqoff();
 	local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el0_da);
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +21 -1
index 339882db5a91..baa88dc02e5c 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct rt_sigframe_user_layout {
 
 	unsigned long fpsimd_offset;
 	unsigned long esr_offset;
+	unsigned long ftb_offset;
 	unsigned long sve_offset;
 	unsigned long extra_offset;
 	unsigned long end_offset;
@@ -383,6 +384,7 @@ static int parse_user_sigframe(struct user_ctxs *user,
 			break;
 
 		case ESR_MAGIC:
+		case FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC:
 			/* ignore */
 			break;
 
@@ -581,6 +583,12 @@ static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 				     sizeof(struct esr_context));
 		if (err)
 			return err;
+
+		err = sigframe_alloc(
+			user, &user->ftb_offset,
+			sizeof(struct fault_addr_top_byte_context));
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 	}
 
 	if (system_supports_sve()) {
@@ -621,7 +629,8 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 	__put_user_error(regs->pc, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pc, err);
 	__put_user_error(regs->pstate, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pstate, err);
 
-	__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
+	__put_user_error(untagged_addr(current->thread.fault_address),
+			 &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
 
 	err |= __copy_to_user(&sf->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
 
@@ -641,6 +650,17 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 		__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code, &esr_ctx->esr, err);
 	}
 
+	if (err == 0 && user->ftb_offset) {
+		struct fault_addr_top_byte_context __user *ftb_ctx =
+			apply_user_offset(user, user->ftb_offset);
+
+		__put_user_error(FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC,
+				 &ftb_ctx->head.magic, err);
+		__put_user_error(sizeof(*ftb_ctx), &ftb_ctx->head.size, err);
+		__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address >> 56,
+				 &ftb_ctx->fault_addr_top_byte, err);
+	}
+
 	/* Scalable Vector Extension state, if present */
 	if (system_supports_sve() && err == 0 && user->sve_offset) {
 		struct sve_context __user *sve_ctx =
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +27 -18

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maintainer Reviewed-by on v5 1/1
#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v5] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

Quoted 6 lines · Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

Quoted 8 lines

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a fault_addr_top_byte_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the tag bits of FAR_EL1 there.

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

It looks alright to me.

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#16 lore raw

PATCH v6 1/1 arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

In reply to Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a fault_addr_top_byte_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the tag bits of FAR_EL1 there.

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

---
v6:
- bring back comment about __reserved[]

v5:
- add padding to fault_addr_top_byte_context in order to ensure the correct size and preserve sp alignment

v4:
- expose only the tag bits in the context instead of the entire FAR_EL1
- remove mention of the new context from the sigcontext.__reserved[] note

v3:
- add documentation to tagged-pointers.rst
- update comments in sigcontext.h

v2:
- revert changes to hw_breakpoint.c
- rename set_thread_esr to set_thread_far_esr

 Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst  | 17 +++++----
 arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 22 ++++++++----
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c         |  2 --
 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c               | 22 +++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                    | 45 ++++++++++++++----------
 7 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst +11 -6
index eab4323609b9..c6e9592a9dea 100644
@@ -53,12 +53,17 @@ visibility.
 Preserving tags
 ---------------
 
-Non-zero tags are not preserved when delivering signals. This means that
-signal handlers in applications making use of tags cannot rely on the
-tag information for user virtual addresses being maintained for fields
-inside siginfo_t. One exception to this rule is for signals raised in
-response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the tag information will
-be preserved.
+Non-zero tags are not preserved in the fault address fields
+siginfo.si_addr or sigcontext.fault_address when delivering
+signals. This means that signal handlers in applications making use
+of tags cannot rely on the tag information for user virtual addresses
+being maintained in these fields. One exception to this rule is for
+signals raised in response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the
+tag information will be preserved.
+
+The fault address tag is preserved in the fault_addr_top_byte field of
+the signal frame record fault_addr_top_byte_context, which is present
+for signals raised in response to data aborts and instruction aborts.
 
 The architecture prevents the use of a tagged PC, so the upper byte will
 be set to a sign-extension of bit 55 on exception return.
arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h +1 -1
index 7a6e81ca23a8..90e772d9b2cd 100644
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static inline u32 disr_to_esr(u64 disr)
 }
 
 asmlinkage void enter_from_user_mode(void);
-void do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
+void do_mem_abort(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
 void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs);
 asmlinkage void bad_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr);
 void do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr_if_watchpoint, unsigned int esr,
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1 -1
index 240fe5e5b720..63185be29ff9 100644
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ struct thread_struct {
 	void			*sve_state;	/* SVE registers, if any */
 	unsigned int		sve_vl;		/* SVE vector length */
 	unsigned int		sve_vl_onexec;	/* SVE vl after next exec */
-	unsigned long		fault_address;	/* fault info */
+	unsigned long		fault_address;	/* FAR_EL1 value */
 	unsigned long		fault_code;	/* ESR_EL1 value */
 	struct debug_info	debug;		/* debugging */
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +16 -6
index 8b0ebce92427..2a3fe3de899d 100644
@@ -44,11 +44,12 @@ struct sigcontext {
  *
  *	0x210		fpsimd_context
  *	 0x10		esr_context
+ *	 0x10		fault_addr_top_byte_context
  *	0x8a0		sve_context (vl <= 64) (optional)
  *	 0x20		extra_context (optional)
  *	 0x10		terminator (null _aarch64_ctx)
  *
- *	0x510		(reserved for future allocation)
+ *	0x500		(reserved for future allocation)
  *
  * New records that can exceed this space need to be opt-in for userspace, so
  * that an expanded signal frame is not generated unexpectedly.  The mechanism
@@ -94,17 +95,26 @@ struct esr_context {
 	__u64 esr;
 };
 
+/* Top byte of fault address (normally not exposed via si_addr) */
+#define FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC	0x46544201
+
+struct fault_addr_top_byte_context {
+	struct _aarch64_ctx head;
+	__u8 fault_addr_top_byte;
+	__u8 __reserved[7];
+};
+
 /*
  * extra_context: describes extra space in the signal frame for
  * additional structures that don't fit in sigcontext.__reserved[].
  *
  * Note:
  *
- * 1) fpsimd_context, esr_context and extra_context must be placed in
- * sigcontext.__reserved[] if present.  They cannot be placed in the
- * extra space.  Any other record can be placed either in the extra
- * space or in sigcontext.__reserved[], unless otherwise specified in
- * this file.
+ * 1) fpsimd_context, esr_context, fault_addr_top_byte_context and
+ * extra_context must be placed in sigcontext.__reserved[] if present.
+ * They cannot be placed in the extra space.  Any other record can be
+ * placed either in the extra space or in sigcontext.__reserved[],
+ * unless otherwise specified in this file.
  *
  * 2) There must not be more than one extra_context.
  *
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +0 -2
index c839b5bf1904..045b4f518836 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ static void notrace el1_abort(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 	unsigned long far = read_sysreg(far_el1);
 
 	local_daif_inherit(regs);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el1_abort);
@@ -104,7 +103,6 @@ static void notrace el0_da(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 
 	user_exit_irqoff();
 	local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el0_da);
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +21 -1
index 339882db5a91..baa88dc02e5c 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct rt_sigframe_user_layout {
 
 	unsigned long fpsimd_offset;
 	unsigned long esr_offset;
+	unsigned long ftb_offset;
 	unsigned long sve_offset;
 	unsigned long extra_offset;
 	unsigned long end_offset;
@@ -383,6 +384,7 @@ static int parse_user_sigframe(struct user_ctxs *user,
 			break;
 
 		case ESR_MAGIC:
+		case FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC:
 			/* ignore */
 			break;
 
@@ -581,6 +583,12 @@ static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 				     sizeof(struct esr_context));
 		if (err)
 			return err;
+
+		err = sigframe_alloc(
+			user, &user->ftb_offset,
+			sizeof(struct fault_addr_top_byte_context));
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 	}
 
 	if (system_supports_sve()) {
@@ -621,7 +629,8 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 	__put_user_error(regs->pc, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pc, err);
 	__put_user_error(regs->pstate, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pstate, err);
 
-	__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
+	__put_user_error(untagged_addr(current->thread.fault_address),
+			 &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
 
 	err |= __copy_to_user(&sf->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
 
@@ -641,6 +650,17 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 		__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code, &esr_ctx->esr, err);
 	}
 
+	if (err == 0 && user->ftb_offset) {
+		struct fault_addr_top_byte_context __user *ftb_ctx =
+			apply_user_offset(user, user->ftb_offset);
+
+		__put_user_error(FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC,
+				 &ftb_ctx->head.magic, err);
+		__put_user_error(sizeof(*ftb_ctx), &ftb_ctx->head.size, err);
+		__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address >> 56,
+				 &ftb_ctx->fault_addr_top_byte, err);
+	}
+
 	/* Scalable Vector Extension state, if present */
 	if (system_supports_sve() && err == 0 && user->sve_offset) {
 		struct sve_context __user *sve_ctx =
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +27 -18

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#17 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v6] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

Quoted 118 lines · Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a fault_addr_top_byte_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the tag bits of FAR_EL1 there.

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

---
v6:
- bring back comment about __reserved[]

v5:
- add padding to fault_addr_top_byte_context in order to ensure the correct size and preserve sp alignment

v4:
- expose only the tag bits in the context instead of the entire FAR_EL1
- remove mention of the new context from the sigcontext.__reserved[] note

v3:
- add documentation to tagged-pointers.rst
- update comments in sigcontext.h

v2:
- revert changes to hw_breakpoint.c
- rename set_thread_esr to set_thread_far_esr

 Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst  | 17 +++++----
 arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 22 ++++++++----
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c         |  2 --
 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c               | 22 +++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                    | 45 ++++++++++++++----------
 7 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst +11 -6
index eab4323609b9..c6e9592a9dea 100644
@@ -53,12 +53,17 @@ visibility.
 Preserving tags
 ---------------
 
-Non-zero tags are not preserved when delivering signals. This means that
-signal handlers in applications making use of tags cannot rely on the
-tag information for user virtual addresses being maintained for fields
-inside siginfo_t. One exception to this rule is for signals raised in
-response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the tag information will
-be preserved.
+Non-zero tags are not preserved in the fault address fields
+siginfo.si_addr or sigcontext.fault_address when delivering
+signals. This means that signal handlers in applications making use
+of tags cannot rely on the tag information for user virtual addresses
+being maintained in these fields. One exception to this rule is for
+signals raised in response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the
+tag information will be preserved.
+
+The fault address tag is preserved in the fault_addr_top_byte field of
+the signal frame record fault_addr_top_byte_context, which is present
+for signals raised in response to data aborts and instruction aborts.
 
 The architecture prevents the use of a tagged PC, so the upper byte will
 be set to a sign-extension of bit 55 on exception return.
arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h +1 -1
index 7a6e81ca23a8..90e772d9b2cd 100644
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static inline u32 disr_to_esr(u64 disr)
 }
 
 asmlinkage void enter_from_user_mode(void);
-void do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
+void do_mem_abort(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
 void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs);
 asmlinkage void bad_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr);
 void do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr_if_watchpoint, unsigned int esr,
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1 -1
index 240fe5e5b720..63185be29ff9 100644
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ struct thread_struct {
 	void			*sve_state;	/* SVE registers, if any */
 	unsigned int		sve_vl;		/* SVE vector length */
 	unsigned int		sve_vl_onexec;	/* SVE vl after next exec */
-	unsigned long		fault_address;	/* fault info */
+	unsigned long		fault_address;	/* FAR_EL1 value */
 	unsigned long		fault_code;	/* ESR_EL1 value */
 	struct debug_info	debug;		/* debugging */
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +2 -1
index 8b0ebce92427..2a3fe3de899d 100644
@@ -44,11 +44,12 @@ struct sigcontext {
  *
  *	0x210		fpsimd_context
  *	 0x10		esr_context
+ *	 0x10		fault_addr_top_byte_context
  *	0x8a0		sve_context (vl <= 64) (optional)
  *	 0x20		extra_context (optional)
  *	 0x10		terminator (null _aarch64_ctx)
  *
- *	0x510		(reserved for future allocation)
+ *	0x500		(reserved for future allocation)
  *
  * New records that can exceed this space need to be opt-in for userspace, so
  * that an expanded signal frame is not generated unexpectedly.  The mechanism
@@ -94,17 +95,26 @@ struct esr_context {
 	__u64 esr;
 };

arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h struct esr_context { · line 106

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +9 -0
 
+/* Top byte of fault address (normally not exposed via si_addr) */
+#define FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC	0x46544201
+
+struct fault_addr_top_byte_context {
+	struct _aarch64_ctx head;
+	__u8 fault_addr_top_byte;
+	__u8 __reserved[7];
+};
+

Nit: the name here is a bit cumbersome (obviously bikeshedding...)

For the rest, some of my comments may be bogus -- I haven't dug into this stuff for a little while!

Anyway:

Do we really get the whole top byte of the address in the FAR? If so, fine, but I'm having trouble finding a clear statement in the architecture one way or the other. (I didn't attempt to dive into the pseudocode.)

Also, since we're burning 16 bytes here, I'd prefer if we make this extensible. At present the __reserved[7] is unusable because userspace has no way to know whether it's valid or not.

Options include an additional flag byte (0 for now), or just making the whole thing a __u64. In that case we can leave the top byte bits in their original positions if we want, but it would be a good idea to include a flag to say that field is valid at all. (See comments below on Synchronous external abort.)

So, say, foo_context->fault_info = (esr & (~0ULL << 56)) | TOP_BYTE_VALID. (with #defines for the bits/fields as appropriate).

Quoted 60 lines
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +5 -5
 /*
  * extra_context: describes extra space in the signal frame for
  * additional structures that don't fit in sigcontext.__reserved[].
  *
  * Note:
  *
- * 1) fpsimd_context, esr_context and extra_context must be placed in
- * sigcontext.__reserved[] if present.  They cannot be placed in the
- * extra space.  Any other record can be placed either in the extra
- * space or in sigcontext.__reserved[], unless otherwise specified in
- * this file.
+ * 1) fpsimd_context, esr_context, fault_addr_top_byte_context and
+ * extra_context must be placed in sigcontext.__reserved[] if present.
+ * They cannot be placed in the extra space.  Any other record can be
+ * placed either in the extra space or in sigcontext.__reserved[],
+ * unless otherwise specified in this file.
  *
  * 2) There must not be more than one extra_context.
  *
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +0 -2
index c839b5bf1904..045b4f518836 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ static void notrace el1_abort(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 	unsigned long far = read_sysreg(far_el1);
 
 	local_daif_inherit(regs);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el1_abort);
@@ -104,7 +103,6 @@ static void notrace el0_da(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 
 	user_exit_irqoff();
 	local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el0_da);
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +2 -0
index 339882db5a91..baa88dc02e5c 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct rt_sigframe_user_layout {
 
 	unsigned long fpsimd_offset;
 	unsigned long esr_offset;
+	unsigned long ftb_offset;
 	unsigned long sve_offset;
 	unsigned long extra_offset;
 	unsigned long end_offset;
@@ -383,6 +384,7 @@ static int parse_user_sigframe(struct user_ctxs *user,
 			break;
 
 		case ESR_MAGIC:
+		case FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC:
 			/* ignore */
 			break;
 

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user, · line 589

Quoted 7 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +4 -0
@@ -581,6 +583,12 @@ static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 				     sizeof(struct esr_context));
 		if (err)
 			return err;
+
+		err = sigframe_alloc(
+			user, &user->ftb_offset,
+			sizeof(struct fault_addr_top_byte_context));

Nit: inconsistent indentation?

(Mostly just because it makes the change look odd against the hunk context, but not a big deal.)

Quoted 20 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +5 -1
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 	}
 
 	if (system_supports_sve()) {
@@ -621,7 +629,8 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 	__put_user_error(regs->pc, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pc, err);
 	__put_user_error(regs->pstate, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pstate, err);
 
-	__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
+	__put_user_error(untagged_addr(current->thread.fault_address),
+			 &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
 
 	err |= __copy_to_user(&sf->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
 
@@ -641,6 +650,17 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 		__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code, &esr_ctx->esr, err);
 	}
 
+	if (err == 0 && user->ftb_offset) {

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user, · line 663

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +10 -0
+		struct fault_addr_top_byte_context __user *ftb_ctx =
+			apply_user_offset(user, user->ftb_offset);
+
+		__put_user_error(FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC,
+				 &ftb_ctx->head.magic, err);
+		__put_user_error(sizeof(*ftb_ctx), &ftb_ctx->head.size, err);
+		__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address >> 56,
+				 &ftb_ctx->fault_addr_top_byte, err);
+	}
+

How do we handle the fact that the top byte of FAR is sometimes UNKNOWN?

For Synchronous external aborts in particular, those bits are documented as UNKNOWN, but I don't see any special handling, There may be other cases I haven't spotted.

For preference we can omit this record entirely if we don't have any information we can report, but certainly we shouldn't expose UNKNOWN bits.

[ Aside:

Also, what if we're not reporting a memory abort at all? Does thread.fault_address just contain junk from the last fault? I see nothing anywhere that cleans this up. (This is historical and not your fault, but it would be good to close this down while we're about it.)

Hmmm, looking at the code I think we probably leak fault_address etc. across execve() too, so it may even be stale junk from an old process :/

Maybe I just confused myself.

End aside. ]

Apart from these issues, the actual code looks reasonable.

Cheers
---Dave

Quoted 159 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +0 -0
 	/* Scalable Vector Extension state, if present */
 	if (system_supports_sve() && err == 0 && user->sve_offset) {
 		struct sve_context __user *sve_ctx =
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +27 -18
index c9cedc0432d2..39bbaa05f162 100644
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
 #include <asm/traps.h>
 
 struct fault_info {
-	int	(*fn)(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
+	int	(*fn)(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr,
 		      struct pt_regs *regs);
 	int	sig;
 	int	code;
@@ -320,9 +320,11 @@ static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
 	die_kernel_fault(msg, addr, esr, regs);
 }
 
-static void set_thread_esr(unsigned long address, unsigned int esr)
+static void set_thread_far_esr(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr)
 {
-	current->thread.fault_address = address;
+	unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(far);
+
+	current->thread.fault_address = far;
 
 	/*
 	 * If the faulting address is in the kernel, we must sanitize the ESR.
@@ -336,7 +338,7 @@ static void set_thread_esr(unsigned long address, unsigned int esr)
 	 * type", so we ignore this wrinkle and just return the translation
 	 * fault.)
 	 */
-	if (!is_ttbr0_addr(current->thread.fault_address)) {
+	if (!is_ttbr0_addr(addr)) {
 		switch (ESR_ELx_EC(esr)) {
 		case ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW:
 			/*
@@ -377,8 +379,11 @@ static void set_thread_esr(unsigned long address, unsigned int esr)
 	current->thread.fault_code = esr;
 }
 
-static void do_bad_area(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
+static void do_bad_area(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr,
+			struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
+	unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(far);
+
 	/*
 	 * If we are in kernel mode at this point, we have no context to
 	 * handle this fault with.
@@ -386,7 +391,7 @@ static void do_bad_area(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *re
 	if (user_mode(regs)) {
 		const struct fault_info *inf = esr_to_fault_info(esr);
 
-		set_thread_esr(addr, esr);
+		set_thread_far_esr(far, esr);
 		arm64_force_sig_fault(inf->sig, inf->code, (void __user *)addr,
 				      inf->name);
 	} else {
@@ -439,7 +444,7 @@ static bool is_write_abort(unsigned int esr)
 	return (esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) && !(esr & ESR_ELx_CM);
 }
 
-static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
+static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr,
 				   struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	const struct fault_info *inf;
@@ -447,6 +452,7 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
 	vm_fault_t fault, major = 0;
 	unsigned long vm_flags = VM_ACCESS_FLAGS;
 	unsigned int mm_flags = FAULT_FLAG_DEFAULT;
+	unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(far);
 
 	if (kprobe_page_fault(regs, esr))
 		return 0;
@@ -570,7 +576,7 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
 	}
 
 	inf = esr_to_fault_info(esr);
-	set_thread_esr(addr, esr);
+	set_thread_far_esr(far, esr);
 	if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS) {
 		/*
 		 * We had some memory, but were unable to successfully fix up
@@ -605,30 +611,32 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int __kprobes do_translation_fault(unsigned long addr,
+static int __kprobes do_translation_fault(unsigned long far,
 					  unsigned int esr,
 					  struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
+	unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(far);
+
 	if (is_ttbr0_addr(addr))
-		return do_page_fault(addr, esr, regs);
+		return do_page_fault(far, esr, regs);
 
-	do_bad_area(addr, esr, regs);
+	do_bad_area(far, esr, regs);
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int do_alignment_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
+static int do_alignment_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr,
 			      struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-	do_bad_area(addr, esr, regs);
+	do_bad_area(far, esr, regs);
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int do_bad(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
+static int do_bad(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	return 1; /* "fault" */
 }
 
-static int do_sea(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
+static int do_sea(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	const struct fault_info *inf;
 	void __user *siaddr;
@@ -644,7 +652,7 @@ static int do_sea(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
 	if (esr & ESR_ELx_FnV)
 		siaddr = NULL;
 	else
-		siaddr  = (void __user *)addr;
+		siaddr  = (void __user *)untagged_addr(far);
 	arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, inf->sig, inf->code, siaddr, esr);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -717,11 +725,12 @@ static const struct fault_info fault_info[] = {
 	{ do_bad,		SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL,	"unknown 63"			},
 };
 
-void do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
+void do_mem_abort(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	const struct fault_info *inf = esr_to_fault_info(esr);
+	unsigned long addr = untagged_addr(far);
 
-	if (!inf->fn(addr, esr, regs))
+	if (!inf->fn(far, esr, regs))
 		return;
 
 	if (!user_mode(regs)) {
Signature · 7 lines
2.26.2.645.ge9eca65c58-goog


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#18 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v6] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

Quoted 138 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 118 lines · Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a fault_addr_top_byte_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the tag bits of FAR_EL1 there.

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

---
v6:
- bring back comment about __reserved[]

v5:
- add padding to fault_addr_top_byte_context in order to ensure the correct size and preserve sp alignment

v4:
- expose only the tag bits in the context instead of the entire FAR_EL1
- remove mention of the new context from the sigcontext.__reserved[] note

v3:
- add documentation to tagged-pointers.rst
- update comments in sigcontext.h

v2:
- revert changes to hw_breakpoint.c
- rename set_thread_esr to set_thread_far_esr

 Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst  | 17 +++++----
 arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 22 ++++++++----
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c         |  2 --
 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c               | 22 +++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                    | 45 ++++++++++++++----------
 7 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst +11 -6
index eab4323609b9..c6e9592a9dea 100644
@@ -53,12 +53,17 @@ visibility.
 Preserving tags
 ---------------
 
-Non-zero tags are not preserved when delivering signals. This means that
-signal handlers in applications making use of tags cannot rely on the
-tag information for user virtual addresses being maintained for fields
-inside siginfo_t. One exception to this rule is for signals raised in
-response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the tag information will
-be preserved.
+Non-zero tags are not preserved in the fault address fields
+siginfo.si_addr or sigcontext.fault_address when delivering
+signals. This means that signal handlers in applications making use
+of tags cannot rely on the tag information for user virtual addresses
+being maintained in these fields. One exception to this rule is for
+signals raised in response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the
+tag information will be preserved.
+
+The fault address tag is preserved in the fault_addr_top_byte field of
+the signal frame record fault_addr_top_byte_context, which is present
+for signals raised in response to data aborts and instruction aborts.
 
 The architecture prevents the use of a tagged PC, so the upper byte will
 be set to a sign-extension of bit 55 on exception return.
arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h +1 -1
index 7a6e81ca23a8..90e772d9b2cd 100644
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static inline u32 disr_to_esr(u64 disr)
 }
 
 asmlinkage void enter_from_user_mode(void);
-void do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
+void do_mem_abort(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
 void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs);
 asmlinkage void bad_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr);
 void do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr_if_watchpoint, unsigned int esr,
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1 -1
index 240fe5e5b720..63185be29ff9 100644
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ struct thread_struct {
      void                    *sve_state;     /* SVE registers, if any */
      unsigned int            sve_vl;         /* SVE vector length */
      unsigned int            sve_vl_onexec;  /* SVE vl after next exec */
-     unsigned long           fault_address;  /* fault info */
+     unsigned long           fault_address;  /* FAR_EL1 value */
      unsigned long           fault_code;     /* ESR_EL1 value */
      struct debug_info       debug;          /* debugging */
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +2 -1
index 8b0ebce92427..2a3fe3de899d 100644
@@ -44,11 +44,12 @@ struct sigcontext {
  *
  *   0x210           fpsimd_context
  *    0x10           esr_context
+ *    0x10           fault_addr_top_byte_context
  *   0x8a0           sve_context (vl <= 64) (optional)
  *    0x20           extra_context (optional)
  *    0x10           terminator (null _aarch64_ctx)
  *
- *   0x510           (reserved for future allocation)
+ *   0x500           (reserved for future allocation)
  *
  * New records that can exceed this space need to be opt-in for userspace, so
  * that an expanded signal frame is not generated unexpectedly.  The mechanism
@@ -94,17 +95,26 @@ struct esr_context {
      __u64 esr;
 };

arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h struct esr_context { · line 106

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +9 -0
 
+/* Top byte of fault address (normally not exposed via si_addr) */
+#define FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC    0x46544201
+
+struct fault_addr_top_byte_context {
+     struct _aarch64_ctx head;
+     __u8 fault_addr_top_byte;
+     __u8 __reserved[7];
+};
+

Nit: the name here is a bit cumbersome (obviously bikeshedding...)

For the rest, some of my comments may be bogus -- I haven't dug into this stuff for a little while!

Quoted 6 lines

Anyway:

Do we really get the whole top byte of the address in the FAR? If so, fine, but I'm having trouble finding a clear statement in the architecture one way or the other. (I didn't attempt to dive into the pseudocode.)

I rely on this statement in the ARM:

https://developer.arm.com/docs/ddi0595/b/aarch64-system-registers/far_el1
"For a Data Abort or Watchpoint exception, if address tagging is enabled for the address accessed by the data access that caused the exception, then this field includes the tag."

And note that address tagging here essentially means TBI (which is always enabled on Linux), and not memory tagging.

Quoted 4 lines

Also, since we're burning 16 bytes here, I'd prefer if we make this extensible. At present the __reserved[7] is unusable because userspace has no way to know whether it's valid or not.

Quoted 8 lines

Options include an additional flag byte (0 for now), or just making the whole thing a __u64. In that case we can leave the top byte bits in their original positions if we want, but it would be a good idea to include a flag to say that field is valid at all. (See comments below on Synchronous external abort.)

So, say, foo_context->fault_info = (esr & (~0ULL << 56)) | TOP_BYTE_VALID. (with #defines for the bits/fields as appropriate).

The flag bits seem like a good idea. Thinking ahead to the MTE sync tag fault (which might not provide us with bits 60-63), we may consider having separate bits to indicate "bits 56-59 valid" and "bits 60-63 valid", set both bits for regular data aborts and only the former for sync tag faults, which would avoid the need to define a separate context for these faults. And if a future architecture revision provides us with bits 60-63 for tag faults, we could start setting both flag bits even for tag faults.

Quoted 70 lines
Quoted 60 lines
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +5 -5
 /*
  * extra_context: describes extra space in the signal frame for
  * additional structures that don't fit in sigcontext.__reserved[].
  *
  * Note:
  *
- * 1) fpsimd_context, esr_context and extra_context must be placed in
- * sigcontext.__reserved[] if present.  They cannot be placed in the
- * extra space.  Any other record can be placed either in the extra
- * space or in sigcontext.__reserved[], unless otherwise specified in
- * this file.
+ * 1) fpsimd_context, esr_context, fault_addr_top_byte_context and
+ * extra_context must be placed in sigcontext.__reserved[] if present.
+ * They cannot be placed in the extra space.  Any other record can be
+ * placed either in the extra space or in sigcontext.__reserved[],
+ * unless otherwise specified in this file.
  *
  * 2) There must not be more than one extra_context.
  *
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +0 -2
index c839b5bf1904..045b4f518836 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ static void notrace el1_abort(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
      unsigned long far = read_sysreg(far_el1);
 
      local_daif_inherit(regs);
-     far = untagged_addr(far);
      do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el1_abort);
@@ -104,7 +103,6 @@ static void notrace el0_da(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 
      user_exit_irqoff();
      local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
-     far = untagged_addr(far);
      do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el0_da);
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +2 -0
index 339882db5a91..baa88dc02e5c 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct rt_sigframe_user_layout {
 
      unsigned long fpsimd_offset;
      unsigned long esr_offset;
+     unsigned long ftb_offset;
      unsigned long sve_offset;
      unsigned long extra_offset;
      unsigned long end_offset;
@@ -383,6 +384,7 @@ static int parse_user_sigframe(struct user_ctxs *user,
                      break;
 
              case ESR_MAGIC:
+             case FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC:
                      /* ignore */
                      break;
 

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user, · line 589

Quoted 7 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +4 -0
@@ -581,6 +583,12 @@ static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
                                   sizeof(struct esr_context));
              if (err)
                      return err;
+
+             err = sigframe_alloc(
+                     user, &user->ftb_offset,
+                     sizeof(struct fault_addr_top_byte_context));

Nit: inconsistent indentation?

Quoted 2 lines

(Mostly just because it makes the change look odd against the hunk context, but not a big deal.)

With consistent indentation we violate 80 cols due to the extra long struct name. The indentation is what clang-format is giving me.

Quoted 33 lines
Quoted 20 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +5 -1
+             if (err)
+                     return err;
      }
 
      if (system_supports_sve()) {
@@ -621,7 +629,8 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
      __put_user_error(regs->pc, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pc, err);
      __put_user_error(regs->pstate, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pstate, err);
 
-     __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
+     __put_user_error(untagged_addr(current->thread.fault_address),
+                      &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
 
      err |= __copy_to_user(&sf->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
 
@@ -641,6 +650,17 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
              __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code, &esr_ctx->esr, err);
      }
 
+     if (err == 0 && user->ftb_offset) {

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user, · line 663

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +10 -0
+             struct fault_addr_top_byte_context __user *ftb_ctx =
+                     apply_user_offset(user, user->ftb_offset);
+
+             __put_user_error(FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC,
+                              &ftb_ctx->head.magic, err);
+             __put_user_error(sizeof(*ftb_ctx), &ftb_ctx->head.size, err);
+             __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address >> 56,
+                              &ftb_ctx->fault_addr_top_byte, err);
+     }
+

How do we handle the fact that the top byte of FAR is sometimes UNKNOWN?

Quoted 7 lines

For Synchronous external aborts in particular, those bits are documented as UNKNOWN, but I don't see any special handling, There may be other cases I haven't spotted.

For preference we can omit this record entirely if we don't have any information we can report, but certainly we shouldn't expose UNKNOWN bits.

In this case we mask out the top byte in do_sea before passing the address to arm64_notify_die (which clears fault_address and passes the address argument on to arm64_force_sig_fault to be exposed via si_addr). So the record would always contain a 0 byte. It seems reasonable to omit the record in this case instead.

Quoted 9 lines

[ Aside:

Also, what if we're not reporting a memory abort at all? Does thread.fault_address just contain junk from the last fault? I see nothing anywhere that cleans this up. (This is historical and not your fault, but it would be good to close this down while we're about it.)

Quoted 7 lines

Hmmm, looking at the code I think we probably leak fault_address etc. across execve() too, so it may even be stale junk from an old process :/

Maybe I just confused myself.

End aside. ]

Yes, it's unclear whether we always manage to not expose a fault address if we're not reporting a data or instruction abort. The code would need to arrange for fault_code to be set to 0 in order to avoid exposing previous fault_address values via future signals. I don't see anywhere where we're resetting these fields after delivering a signal, so it seems possible by calling arm64_force_sig_fault without first setting fault_code (most callers do this, but the calls in arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c and arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c seem not to), or simply by calling force_sig_fault (which happens in many places throughout the kernel).

Maybe something like this would do the trick? (Untested, and forgive spaces instead of tabs, grumble grumble gmail):

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +0 -0
index baa88dc02e5c..5867f2fdbe64 100644
@@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct

rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,

                __put_user_error(ESR_MAGIC, &esr_ctx->head.magic, err);
                __put_user_error(sizeof(*esr_ctx), &esr_ctx->head.size, err);
                __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code,
&esr_ctx->esr, err);
+               current->thread.fault_code = 0;
        }

        if (err == 0 && user->ftb_offset) {
Quoted 1 line

Apart from these issues, the actual code looks reasonable.

Thanks for the review.

Peter

_______________________________________________
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#19 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v6] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

Quoted 146 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 138 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 118 lines · Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a fault_addr_top_byte_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the tag bits of FAR_EL1 there.

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

---
v6:
- bring back comment about __reserved[]

v5:
- add padding to fault_addr_top_byte_context in order to ensure the correct size and preserve sp alignment

v4:
- expose only the tag bits in the context instead of the entire FAR_EL1
- remove mention of the new context from the sigcontext.__reserved[] note

v3:
- add documentation to tagged-pointers.rst
- update comments in sigcontext.h

v2:
- revert changes to hw_breakpoint.c
- rename set_thread_esr to set_thread_far_esr

 Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst  | 17 +++++----
 arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 22 ++++++++----
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c         |  2 --
 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c               | 22 +++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                    | 45 ++++++++++++++----------
 7 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst +11 -6
index eab4323609b9..c6e9592a9dea 100644
@@ -53,12 +53,17 @@ visibility.
 Preserving tags
 ---------------
 
-Non-zero tags are not preserved when delivering signals. This means that
-signal handlers in applications making use of tags cannot rely on the
-tag information for user virtual addresses being maintained for fields
-inside siginfo_t. One exception to this rule is for signals raised in
-response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the tag information will
-be preserved.
+Non-zero tags are not preserved in the fault address fields
+siginfo.si_addr or sigcontext.fault_address when delivering
+signals. This means that signal handlers in applications making use
+of tags cannot rely on the tag information for user virtual addresses
+being maintained in these fields. One exception to this rule is for
+signals raised in response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the
+tag information will be preserved.
+
+The fault address tag is preserved in the fault_addr_top_byte field of
+the signal frame record fault_addr_top_byte_context, which is present
+for signals raised in response to data aborts and instruction aborts.
 
 The architecture prevents the use of a tagged PC, so the upper byte will
 be set to a sign-extension of bit 55 on exception return.
arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h +1 -1
index 7a6e81ca23a8..90e772d9b2cd 100644
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static inline u32 disr_to_esr(u64 disr)
 }
 
 asmlinkage void enter_from_user_mode(void);
-void do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
+void do_mem_abort(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
 void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs);
 asmlinkage void bad_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr);
 void do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr_if_watchpoint, unsigned int esr,
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1 -1
index 240fe5e5b720..63185be29ff9 100644
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ struct thread_struct {
      void                    *sve_state;     /* SVE registers, if any */
      unsigned int            sve_vl;         /* SVE vector length */
      unsigned int            sve_vl_onexec;  /* SVE vl after next exec */
-     unsigned long           fault_address;  /* fault info */
+     unsigned long           fault_address;  /* FAR_EL1 value */
      unsigned long           fault_code;     /* ESR_EL1 value */
      struct debug_info       debug;          /* debugging */
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +2 -1
index 8b0ebce92427..2a3fe3de899d 100644
@@ -44,11 +44,12 @@ struct sigcontext {
  *
  *   0x210           fpsimd_context
  *    0x10           esr_context
+ *    0x10           fault_addr_top_byte_context
  *   0x8a0           sve_context (vl <= 64) (optional)
  *    0x20           extra_context (optional)
  *    0x10           terminator (null _aarch64_ctx)
  *
- *   0x510           (reserved for future allocation)
+ *   0x500           (reserved for future allocation)
  *
  * New records that can exceed this space need to be opt-in for userspace, so
  * that an expanded signal frame is not generated unexpectedly.  The mechanism
@@ -94,17 +95,26 @@ struct esr_context {
      __u64 esr;
 };

arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h struct esr_context { · line 106

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +9 -0
 
+/* Top byte of fault address (normally not exposed via si_addr) */
+#define FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC    0x46544201
+
+struct fault_addr_top_byte_context {
+     struct _aarch64_ctx head;
+     __u8 fault_addr_top_byte;
+     __u8 __reserved[7];
+};
+

Nit: the name here is a bit cumbersome (obviously bikeshedding...)

For the rest, some of my comments may be bogus -- I haven't dug into this stuff for a little while!

Quoted 6 lines

Anyway:

Do we really get the whole top byte of the address in the FAR? If so, fine, but I'm having trouble finding a clear statement in the architecture one way or the other. (I didn't attempt to dive into the pseudocode.)

Quoted 6 lines

I rely on this statement in the ARM:

https://developer.arm.com/docs/ddi0595/b/aarch64-system-registers/far_el1
"For a Data Abort or Watchpoint exception, if address tagging is enabled for the address accessed by the data access that caused the exception, then this field includes the tag."

Yes, I think that covers it. I hadn't found a clear definition of "tag", but I think the TBI mechanism makes it "reasonably obvious" the non-address (i.e., tag) bits are [63:56].

Quoted 16 lines

And note that address tagging here essentially means TBI (which is always enabled on Linux), and not memory tagging.

Quoted 4 lines

Also, since we're burning 16 bytes here, I'd prefer if we make this extensible. At present the __reserved[7] is unusable because userspace has no way to know whether it's valid or not.

Quoted 8 lines

Options include an additional flag byte (0 for now), or just making the whole thing a __u64. In that case we can leave the top byte bits in their original positions if we want, but it would be a good idea to include a flag to say that field is valid at all. (See comments below on Synchronous external abort.)

So, say, foo_context->fault_info = (esr & (~0ULL << 56)) | TOP_BYTE_VALID. (with #defines for the bits/fields as appropriate).

Quoted 8 lines

The flag bits seem like a good idea. Thinking ahead to the MTE sync tag fault (which might not provide us with bits 60-63), we may consider having separate bits to indicate "bits 56-59 valid" and "bits 60-63 valid", set both bits for regular data aborts and only the former for sync tag faults, which would avoid the need to define a separate context for these faults. And if a future architecture revision provides us with bits 60-63 for tag faults, we could start setting both flag bits even for tag faults.

Seems reasonable, but a "tag mask" field of some sort might be preferable to hard-wiring, just in case a future update to MTE supports more than 4 bits.

Quoted 70 lines
Quoted 70 lines
Quoted 60 lines
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +5 -5
 /*
  * extra_context: describes extra space in the signal frame for
  * additional structures that don't fit in sigcontext.__reserved[].
  *
  * Note:
  *
- * 1) fpsimd_context, esr_context and extra_context must be placed in
- * sigcontext.__reserved[] if present.  They cannot be placed in the
- * extra space.  Any other record can be placed either in the extra
- * space or in sigcontext.__reserved[], unless otherwise specified in
- * this file.
+ * 1) fpsimd_context, esr_context, fault_addr_top_byte_context and
+ * extra_context must be placed in sigcontext.__reserved[] if present.
+ * They cannot be placed in the extra space.  Any other record can be
+ * placed either in the extra space or in sigcontext.__reserved[],
+ * unless otherwise specified in this file.
  *
  * 2) There must not be more than one extra_context.
  *
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +0 -2
index c839b5bf1904..045b4f518836 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ static void notrace el1_abort(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
      unsigned long far = read_sysreg(far_el1);
 
      local_daif_inherit(regs);
-     far = untagged_addr(far);
      do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el1_abort);
@@ -104,7 +103,6 @@ static void notrace el0_da(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 
      user_exit_irqoff();
      local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
-     far = untagged_addr(far);
      do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el0_da);
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +2 -0
index 339882db5a91..baa88dc02e5c 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct rt_sigframe_user_layout {
 
      unsigned long fpsimd_offset;
      unsigned long esr_offset;
+     unsigned long ftb_offset;
      unsigned long sve_offset;
      unsigned long extra_offset;
      unsigned long end_offset;
@@ -383,6 +384,7 @@ static int parse_user_sigframe(struct user_ctxs *user,
                      break;
 
              case ESR_MAGIC:
+             case FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC:
                      /* ignore */
                      break;
 

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user, · line 589

Quoted 7 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +4 -0
@@ -581,6 +583,12 @@ static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
                                   sizeof(struct esr_context));
              if (err)
                      return err;
+
+             err = sigframe_alloc(
+                     user, &user->ftb_offset,
+                     sizeof(struct fault_addr_top_byte_context));

Nit: inconsistent indentation?

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

(Mostly just because it makes the change look odd against the hunk context, but not a big deal.)

With consistent indentation we violate 80 cols due to the extra long struct name. The indentation is what clang-format is giving me.

I suspected that might be why. Fair enough (though a shorter name would be no bad thing, it's not worth changing that just for nicer indentation).

Quoted 42 lines
Quoted 34 lines
Quoted 21 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +5 -1
+             if (err)
+                     return err;
      }
 
      if (system_supports_sve()) {
@@ -621,7 +629,8 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
      __put_user_error(regs->pc, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pc, err);
      __put_user_error(regs->pstate, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pstate, err);
 
-     __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
+     __put_user_error(untagged_addr(current->thread.fault_address),
+                      &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
 
      err |= __copy_to_user(&sf->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
 
@@ -641,6 +650,17 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
              __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code, &esr_ctx->esr, err);
      }
 
+     if (err == 0 && user->ftb_offset) {

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user, · line 663

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +10 -0
+             struct fault_addr_top_byte_context __user *ftb_ctx =
+                     apply_user_offset(user, user->ftb_offset);
+
+             __put_user_error(FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC,
+                              &ftb_ctx->head.magic, err);
+             __put_user_error(sizeof(*ftb_ctx), &ftb_ctx->head.size, err);
+             __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address >> 56,
+                              &ftb_ctx->fault_addr_top_byte, err);
+     }
+

How do we handle the fact that the top byte of FAR is sometimes UNKNOWN?

Quoted 7 lines

For Synchronous external aborts in particular, those bits are documented as UNKNOWN, but I don't see any special handling, There may be other cases I haven't spotted.

For preference we can omit this record entirely if we don't have any information we can report, but certainly we shouldn't expose UNKNOWN bits.

Quoted 5 lines

In this case we mask out the top byte in do_sea before passing the address to arm64_notify_die (which clears fault_address and passes the address argument on to arm64_force_sig_fault to be exposed via si_addr). So the record would always contain a 0 byte. It seems reasonable to omit the record in this case instead.

Ah, right. Missed that.

The record is already omitted when fault_code == 0 IIUC, so perhaps we're already doing the right thing for synchronous external aborts.

Quoted 36 lines
Quoted 9 lines

[ Aside:

Also, what if we're not reporting a memory abort at all? Does thread.fault_address just contain junk from the last fault? I see nothing anywhere that cleans this up. (This is historical and not your fault, but it would be good to close this down while we're about it.)

Quoted 7 lines

Hmmm, looking at the code I think we probably leak fault_address etc. across execve() too, so it may even be stale junk from an old process :/

Maybe I just confused myself.

End aside. ]

Yes, it's unclear whether we always manage to not expose a fault address if we're not reporting a data or instruction abort. The code would need to arrange for fault_code to be set to 0 in order to avoid exposing previous fault_address values via future signals. I don't see anywhere where we're resetting these fields after delivering a signal, so it seems possible by calling arm64_force_sig_fault without first setting fault_code (most callers do this, but the calls in arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c and arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c seem not to), or simply by calling force_sig_fault (which happens in many places throughout the kernel).

Maybe something like this would do the trick? (Untested, and forgive spaces instead of tabs, grumble grumble gmail):

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +0 -0
index baa88dc02e5c..5867f2fdbe64 100644

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe(struct · line 653

Quoted 6 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +1 -0
@@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct
 rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
                __put_user_error(ESR_MAGIC, &esr_ctx->head.magic, err);
                __put_user_error(sizeof(*esr_ctx), &esr_ctx->head.size, err);
                __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code,
 &esr_ctx->esr, err);
+               current->thread.fault_code = 0;

Perhaps, but we'd need to be careful. For example, can we run out of user stack before this and deliver a SIGSEGV, but with the old fault_code still set? Then we'd emit the old fault code with the new "can't deliver signal" signal, which doesn't make sense.

Stuff may also go wrong with signal prioritisation.

If a higher-priority signal (say SIGINT) comes in after a data abort enters the kernel but before the resulting SIGSEGV is dequeued for delivery, wouldn't we deliver SIGINT first, with the bogus fault code? With your change we'd then have cleared the fault code by the time we deliver the SIGSEGV it actually relates to, if I've understood right.

Today, I think we just attach that fault code to every signal that's delivered until something overwrites or resets it, which means that a signal that needs fault_code gets it, at the expense of attaching it to a bunch of other random signals too.

Checking the signal number and si_code might help us to know what we should be doing with fault_code. We need to have sure userspace can't trick us with a non kernel generated signal here. It would also be necessary to check how PTRACE_SETSIGINFO interacts with this.

Cheers
---Dave

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#20 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v6] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

Quoted 184 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 146 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 138 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 118 lines · Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a fault_addr_top_byte_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the tag bits of FAR_EL1 there.

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

---
v6:
- bring back comment about __reserved[]

v5:
- add padding to fault_addr_top_byte_context in order to ensure the correct size and preserve sp alignment

v4:
- expose only the tag bits in the context instead of the entire FAR_EL1
- remove mention of the new context from the sigcontext.__reserved[] note

v3:
- add documentation to tagged-pointers.rst
- update comments in sigcontext.h

v2:
- revert changes to hw_breakpoint.c
- rename set_thread_esr to set_thread_far_esr

 Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst  | 17 +++++----
 arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 22 ++++++++----
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c         |  2 --
 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c               | 22 +++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                    | 45 ++++++++++++++----------
 7 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst +11 -6
index eab4323609b9..c6e9592a9dea 100644
@@ -53,12 +53,17 @@ visibility.
 Preserving tags
 ---------------
 
-Non-zero tags are not preserved when delivering signals. This means that
-signal handlers in applications making use of tags cannot rely on the
-tag information for user virtual addresses being maintained for fields
-inside siginfo_t. One exception to this rule is for signals raised in
-response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the tag information will
-be preserved.
+Non-zero tags are not preserved in the fault address fields
+siginfo.si_addr or sigcontext.fault_address when delivering
+signals. This means that signal handlers in applications making use
+of tags cannot rely on the tag information for user virtual addresses
+being maintained in these fields. One exception to this rule is for
+signals raised in response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the
+tag information will be preserved.
+
+The fault address tag is preserved in the fault_addr_top_byte field of
+the signal frame record fault_addr_top_byte_context, which is present
+for signals raised in response to data aborts and instruction aborts.
 
 The architecture prevents the use of a tagged PC, so the upper byte will
 be set to a sign-extension of bit 55 on exception return.
arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h +1 -1
index 7a6e81ca23a8..90e772d9b2cd 100644
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static inline u32 disr_to_esr(u64 disr)
 }
 
 asmlinkage void enter_from_user_mode(void);
-void do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
+void do_mem_abort(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
 void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs);
 asmlinkage void bad_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr);
 void do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr_if_watchpoint, unsigned int esr,
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +1 -1
index 240fe5e5b720..63185be29ff9 100644
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ struct thread_struct {
      void                    *sve_state;     /* SVE registers, if any */
      unsigned int            sve_vl;         /* SVE vector length */
      unsigned int            sve_vl_onexec;  /* SVE vl after next exec */
-     unsigned long           fault_address;  /* fault info */
+     unsigned long           fault_address;  /* FAR_EL1 value */
      unsigned long           fault_code;     /* ESR_EL1 value */
      struct debug_info       debug;          /* debugging */
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +2 -1
index 8b0ebce92427..2a3fe3de899d 100644
@@ -44,11 +44,12 @@ struct sigcontext {
  *
  *   0x210           fpsimd_context
  *    0x10           esr_context
+ *    0x10           fault_addr_top_byte_context
  *   0x8a0           sve_context (vl <= 64) (optional)
  *    0x20           extra_context (optional)
  *    0x10           terminator (null _aarch64_ctx)
  *
- *   0x510           (reserved for future allocation)
+ *   0x500           (reserved for future allocation)
  *
  * New records that can exceed this space need to be opt-in for userspace, so
  * that an expanded signal frame is not generated unexpectedly.  The mechanism
@@ -94,17 +95,26 @@ struct esr_context {
      __u64 esr;
 };

arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h struct esr_context { · line 106

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +9 -0
 
+/* Top byte of fault address (normally not exposed via si_addr) */
+#define FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC    0x46544201
+
+struct fault_addr_top_byte_context {
+     struct _aarch64_ctx head;
+     __u8 fault_addr_top_byte;
+     __u8 __reserved[7];
+};
+

Nit: the name here is a bit cumbersome (obviously bikeshedding...)

For the rest, some of my comments may be bogus -- I haven't dug into this stuff for a little while!

Quoted 6 lines

Anyway:

Do we really get the whole top byte of the address in the FAR? If so, fine, but I'm having trouble finding a clear statement in the architecture one way or the other. (I didn't attempt to dive into the pseudocode.)

Quoted 6 lines

I rely on this statement in the ARM:

https://developer.arm.com/docs/ddi0595/b/aarch64-system-registers/far_el1
"For a Data Abort or Watchpoint exception, if address tagging is enabled for the address accessed by the data access that caused the exception, then this field includes the tag."

Yes, I think that covers it. I hadn't found a clear definition of "tag", but I think the TBI mechanism makes it "reasonably obvious" the non-address (i.e., tag) bits are [63:56].

Quoted 16 lines

And note that address tagging here essentially means TBI (which is always enabled on Linux), and not memory tagging.

Quoted 4 lines

Also, since we're burning 16 bytes here, I'd prefer if we make this extensible. At present the __reserved[7] is unusable because userspace has no way to know whether it's valid or not.

Quoted 8 lines

Options include an additional flag byte (0 for now), or just making the whole thing a __u64. In that case we can leave the top byte bits in their original positions if we want, but it would be a good idea to include a flag to say that field is valid at all. (See comments below on Synchronous external abort.)

So, say, foo_context->fault_info = (esr & (~0ULL << 56)) | TOP_BYTE_VALID. (with #defines for the bits/fields as appropriate).

Quoted 8 lines

The flag bits seem like a good idea. Thinking ahead to the MTE sync tag fault (which might not provide us with bits 60-63), we may consider having separate bits to indicate "bits 56-59 valid" and "bits 60-63 valid", set both bits for regular data aborts and only the former for sync tag faults, which would avoid the need to define a separate context for these faults. And if a future architecture revision provides us with bits 60-63 for tag faults, we could start setting both flag bits even for tag faults.

Quoted 3 lines

Seems reasonable, but a "tag mask" field of some sort might be preferable to hard-wiring, just in case a future update to MTE supports more than 4 bits.

That's fine with me.

Quoted 194 lines
Quoted 70 lines
Quoted 70 lines
Quoted 60 lines
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +5 -5
 /*
  * extra_context: describes extra space in the signal frame for
  * additional structures that don't fit in sigcontext.__reserved[].
  *
  * Note:
  *
- * 1) fpsimd_context, esr_context and extra_context must be placed in
- * sigcontext.__reserved[] if present.  They cannot be placed in the
- * extra space.  Any other record can be placed either in the extra
- * space or in sigcontext.__reserved[], unless otherwise specified in
- * this file.
+ * 1) fpsimd_context, esr_context, fault_addr_top_byte_context and
+ * extra_context must be placed in sigcontext.__reserved[] if present.
+ * They cannot be placed in the extra space.  Any other record can be
+ * placed either in the extra space or in sigcontext.__reserved[],
+ * unless otherwise specified in this file.
  *
  * 2) There must not be more than one extra_context.
  *
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +0 -2
index c839b5bf1904..045b4f518836 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ static void notrace el1_abort(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
      unsigned long far = read_sysreg(far_el1);
 
      local_daif_inherit(regs);
-     far = untagged_addr(far);
      do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el1_abort);
@@ -104,7 +103,6 @@ static void notrace el0_da(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 
      user_exit_irqoff();
      local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
-     far = untagged_addr(far);
      do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el0_da);
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +2 -0
index 339882db5a91..baa88dc02e5c 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct rt_sigframe_user_layout {
 
      unsigned long fpsimd_offset;
      unsigned long esr_offset;
+     unsigned long ftb_offset;
      unsigned long sve_offset;
      unsigned long extra_offset;
      unsigned long end_offset;
@@ -383,6 +384,7 @@ static int parse_user_sigframe(struct user_ctxs *user,
                      break;
 
              case ESR_MAGIC:
+             case FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC:
                      /* ignore */
                      break;
 

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user, · line 589

Quoted 7 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +4 -0
@@ -581,6 +583,12 @@ static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
                                   sizeof(struct esr_context));
              if (err)
                      return err;
+
+             err = sigframe_alloc(
+                     user, &user->ftb_offset,
+                     sizeof(struct fault_addr_top_byte_context));

Nit: inconsistent indentation?

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

(Mostly just because it makes the change look odd against the hunk context, but not a big deal.)

With consistent indentation we violate 80 cols due to the extra long struct name. The indentation is what clang-format is giving me.

I suspected that might be why. Fair enough (though a shorter name would be no bad thing, it's not worth changing that just for nicer indentation).

Quoted 42 lines
Quoted 34 lines
Quoted 21 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +5 -1
+             if (err)
+                     return err;
      }
 
      if (system_supports_sve()) {
@@ -621,7 +629,8 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
      __put_user_error(regs->pc, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pc, err);
      __put_user_error(regs->pstate, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pstate, err);
 
-     __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
+     __put_user_error(untagged_addr(current->thread.fault_address),
+                      &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
 
      err |= __copy_to_user(&sf->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
 
@@ -641,6 +650,17 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
              __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code, &esr_ctx->esr, err);
      }
 
+     if (err == 0 && user->ftb_offset) {

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user, · line 663

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +10 -0
+             struct fault_addr_top_byte_context __user *ftb_ctx =
+                     apply_user_offset(user, user->ftb_offset);
+
+             __put_user_error(FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC,
+                              &ftb_ctx->head.magic, err);
+             __put_user_error(sizeof(*ftb_ctx), &ftb_ctx->head.size, err);
+             __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address >> 56,
+                              &ftb_ctx->fault_addr_top_byte, err);
+     }
+

How do we handle the fact that the top byte of FAR is sometimes UNKNOWN?

Quoted 7 lines

For Synchronous external aborts in particular, those bits are documented as UNKNOWN, but I don't see any special handling, There may be other cases I haven't spotted.

For preference we can omit this record entirely if we don't have any information we can report, but certainly we shouldn't expose UNKNOWN bits.

Quoted 5 lines

In this case we mask out the top byte in do_sea before passing the address to arm64_notify_die (which clears fault_address and passes the address argument on to arm64_force_sig_fault to be exposed via si_addr). So the record would always contain a 0 byte. It seems reasonable to omit the record in this case instead.

Ah, right. Missed that.

The record is already omitted when fault_code == 0 IIUC, so perhaps we're already doing the right thing for synchronous external aborts.

Quoted 36 lines
Quoted 9 lines

[ Aside:

Also, what if we're not reporting a memory abort at all? Does thread.fault_address just contain junk from the last fault? I see nothing anywhere that cleans this up. (This is historical and not your fault, but it would be good to close this down while we're about it.)

Quoted 7 lines

Hmmm, looking at the code I think we probably leak fault_address etc. across execve() too, so it may even be stale junk from an old process :/

Maybe I just confused myself.

End aside. ]

Yes, it's unclear whether we always manage to not expose a fault address if we're not reporting a data or instruction abort. The code would need to arrange for fault_code to be set to 0 in order to avoid exposing previous fault_address values via future signals. I don't see anywhere where we're resetting these fields after delivering a signal, so it seems possible by calling arm64_force_sig_fault without first setting fault_code (most callers do this, but the calls in arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c and arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c seem not to), or simply by calling force_sig_fault (which happens in many places throughout the kernel).

Maybe something like this would do the trick? (Untested, and forgive spaces instead of tabs, grumble grumble gmail):

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +0 -0
index baa88dc02e5c..5867f2fdbe64 100644

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe(struct · line 653

Quoted 6 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +1 -0
@@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct
 rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
                __put_user_error(ESR_MAGIC, &esr_ctx->head.magic, err);
                __put_user_error(sizeof(*esr_ctx), &esr_ctx->head.size, err);
                __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code,
 &esr_ctx->esr, err);
+               current->thread.fault_code = 0;

Perhaps, but we'd need to be careful. For example, can we run out of user stack before this and deliver a SIGSEGV, but with the old fault_code still set? Then we'd emit the old fault code with the new "can't deliver signal" signal, which doesn't make sense.

Stuff may also go wrong with signal prioritisation.

If a higher-priority signal (say SIGINT) comes in after a data abort enters the kernel but before the resulting SIGSEGV is dequeued for delivery, wouldn't we deliver SIGINT first, with the bogus fault code? With your change we'd then have cleared the fault code by the time we deliver the SIGSEGV it actually relates to, if I've understood right.

Today, I think we just attach that fault code to every signal that's delivered until something overwrites or resets it, which means that a signal that needs fault_code gets it, at the expense of attaching it to a bunch of other random signals too.

Quoted 4 lines

Checking the signal number and si_code might help us to know what we should be doing with fault_code. We need to have sure userspace can't trick us with a non kernel generated signal here. It would also be necessary to check how PTRACE_SETSIGINFO interacts with this.

With these possible interactions in mind I think we should store the fault code and fault address in kernel_siginfo instead of thread_struct (and clear these fields when we receive a siginfo from userspace, i.e. in copy_siginfo_from_user which is used by ptrace(PTRACE_SETSIGINFO) among other places). That way, the information is clearly associated with the signal itself and not the thread, so we don't need to worry about our signal being delivered out of order.

Peter

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#21 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v6] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

Quoted 38 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 32 lines · Dave Martin

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe(struct · line 653

Quoted 11 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +1 -0
index baa88dc02e5c..5867f2fdbe64 100644
@@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct
 rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
                __put_user_error(ESR_MAGIC, &esr_ctx->head.magic, err);
                __put_user_error(sizeof(*esr_ctx), &esr_ctx->head.size, err);
                __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code,
 &esr_ctx->esr, err);
+               current->thread.fault_code = 0;

Perhaps, but we'd need to be careful. For example, can we run out of user stack before this and deliver a SIGSEGV, but with the old fault_code still set? Then we'd emit the old fault code with the new "can't deliver signal" signal, which doesn't make sense.

Stuff may also go wrong with signal prioritisation.

If a higher-priority signal (say SIGINT) comes in after a data abort enters the kernel but before the resulting SIGSEGV is dequeued for delivery, wouldn't we deliver SIGINT first, with the bogus fault code? With your change we'd then have cleared the fault code by the time we deliver the SIGSEGV it actually relates to, if I've understood right.

Today, I think we just attach that fault code to every signal that's delivered until something overwrites or resets it, which means that a signal that needs fault_code gets it, at the expense of attaching it to a bunch of other random signals too.

Quoted 4 lines

Checking the signal number and si_code might help us to know what we should be doing with fault_code. We need to have sure userspace can't trick us with a non kernel generated signal here. It would also be necessary to check how PTRACE_SETSIGINFO interacts with this.

Quoted 8 lines

With these possible interactions in mind I think we should store the fault code and fault address in kernel_siginfo instead of thread_struct (and clear these fields when we receive a siginfo from userspace, i.e. in copy_siginfo_from_user which is used by ptrace(PTRACE_SETSIGINFO) among other places). That way, the information is clearly associated with the signal itself and not the thread, so we don't need to worry about our signal being delivered out of order.

Hmm, I can't see a way to do that that isn't horribly invasive in the core signal code. Can you?

But generally, I agree: the per-thread handling of fault_address and fault_code appears to be quite broken in the face of signal prioritisation and signals that don't correspond directly to hardware trap. It would be nice to have some tests for this...

If we want to pile on more bodges, perhaps we could stash the signal number to which the fault_{address,code} relate, and then check that at delivery and clear on a match. I hate it.

Will

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#22 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v6] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

Quoted 51 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 38 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 32 lines · Dave Martin

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe(struct · line 653

Quoted 11 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +1 -0
index baa88dc02e5c..5867f2fdbe64 100644
@@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct
 rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
                __put_user_error(ESR_MAGIC, &esr_ctx->head.magic, err);
                __put_user_error(sizeof(*esr_ctx), &esr_ctx->head.size, err);
                __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code,
 &esr_ctx->esr, err);
+               current->thread.fault_code = 0;

Perhaps, but we'd need to be careful. For example, can we run out of user stack before this and deliver a SIGSEGV, but with the old fault_code still set? Then we'd emit the old fault code with the new "can't deliver signal" signal, which doesn't make sense.

Stuff may also go wrong with signal prioritisation.

If a higher-priority signal (say SIGINT) comes in after a data abort enters the kernel but before the resulting SIGSEGV is dequeued for delivery, wouldn't we deliver SIGINT first, with the bogus fault code? With your change we'd then have cleared the fault code by the time we deliver the SIGSEGV it actually relates to, if I've understood right.

Today, I think we just attach that fault code to every signal that's delivered until something overwrites or resets it, which means that a signal that needs fault_code gets it, at the expense of attaching it to a bunch of other random signals too.

Quoted 4 lines

Checking the signal number and si_code might help us to know what we should be doing with fault_code. We need to have sure userspace can't trick us with a non kernel generated signal here. It would also be necessary to check how PTRACE_SETSIGINFO interacts with this.

Quoted 8 lines

With these possible interactions in mind I think we should store the fault code and fault address in kernel_siginfo instead of thread_struct (and clear these fields when we receive a siginfo from userspace, i.e. in copy_siginfo_from_user which is used by ptrace(PTRACE_SETSIGINFO) among other places). That way, the information is clearly associated with the signal itself and not the thread, so we don't need to worry about our signal being delivered out of order.

Hmm, I can't see a way to do that that isn't horribly invasive in the core signal code. Can you?

Quoted 8 lines

But generally, I agree: the per-thread handling of fault_address and fault_code appears to be quite broken in the face of signal prioritisation and signals that don't correspond directly to hardware trap. It would be nice to have some tests for this...

If we want to pile on more bodges, perhaps we could stash the signal number to which the fault_{address,code} relate, and then check that at delivery and clear on a match. I hate it.

I agree with Daniel's suggestion in principle, but I was also concerned about whether it would be too invasive elsewhere.

Question though: does the core code take special care to make sure that a force_sig cannot be outprioritised by a regular signal? If so, perhaps we get away with it. I ask this, because the same same issue may be hitting other arches otherwise.

Cheers
---Dave

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#23 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v6] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

Quoted 50 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 48 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 46 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 32 lines · Dave Martin

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe(struct · line 653

Quoted 11 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +1 -0
index baa88dc02e5c..5867f2fdbe64 100644
@@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct
 rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
                __put_user_error(ESR_MAGIC, &esr_ctx->head.magic, err);
                __put_user_error(sizeof(*esr_ctx), &esr_ctx->head.size, err);
                __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code,
 &esr_ctx->esr, err);
+               current->thread.fault_code = 0;

Perhaps, but we'd need to be careful. For example, can we run out of user stack before this and deliver a SIGSEGV, but with the old fault_code still set? Then we'd emit the old fault code with the new "can't deliver signal" signal, which doesn't make sense.

Stuff may also go wrong with signal prioritisation.

If a higher-priority signal (say SIGINT) comes in after a data abort enters the kernel but before the resulting SIGSEGV is dequeued for delivery, wouldn't we deliver SIGINT first, with the bogus fault code? With your change we'd then have cleared the fault code by the time we deliver the SIGSEGV it actually relates to, if I've understood right.

Today, I think we just attach that fault code to every signal that's delivered until something overwrites or resets it, which means that a signal that needs fault_code gets it, at the expense of attaching it to a bunch of other random signals too.

Quoted 4 lines

Checking the signal number and si_code might help us to know what we should be doing with fault_code. We need to have sure userspace can't trick us with a non kernel generated signal here. It would also be necessary to check how PTRACE_SETSIGINFO interacts with this.

With these possible interactions in mind I think we should store the fault code and fault address in kernel_siginfo instead of thread_struct (and clear these fields when we receive a siginfo from userspace, i.e. in copy_siginfo_from_user which is used by ptrace(PTRACE_SETSIGINFO) among other places). That way, the information is clearly associated with the signal itself and not the thread, so we don't need to worry about our signal being delivered out of order.

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Hmm, I can't see a way to do that that isn't horribly invasive in the core signal code. Can you?

I think I've come up with a way that doesn't seem to be too invasive. See patch #1 of the series that I'm about to send out.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines

But generally, I agree: the per-thread handling of fault_address and fault_code appears to be quite broken in the face of signal prioritisation and signals that don't correspond directly to hardware trap. It would be nice to have some tests for this...

If we want to pile on more bodges, perhaps we could stash the signal number to which the fault_{address,code} relate, and then check that at delivery and clear on a match. I hate it.

Quoted 7 lines

I agree with Daniel's suggestion in principle, but I was also concerned about whether it would be too invasive elsewhere.

Question though: does the core code take special care to make sure that a force_sig cannot be outprioritised by a regular signal? If so, perhaps we get away with it. I ask this, because the same same issue may be hitting other arches otherwise.

Not as far as I can tell. There does appear to be prioritisation for synchronous signals [1] but as far as I can tell nothing to distinguish one of these signals from one with the same signal number sent from userspace (e.g. via kill(2)).

Peter

[1] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/b85051e755b0e9d6dd8f17ef1da083851b83287d/kernel/signal.c#L222

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#24 lore raw

v6 cover arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a fault_addr_top_byte_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the tag bits of FAR_EL1 there.

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

Peter Collingbourne (3):
signal: Allow architectures to store arch-specific data in
kernel_siginfo
arm64: Move fault address and fault code into kernel_siginfo
arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

 Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst  |  17 ++--
 arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h       |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h       |   2 -
 arch/arm64/include/asm/signal.h          |  19 ++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/traps.h           |   8 +-
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h |  24 +++--
 arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c       |   4 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c         |   2 -
 arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c       |  18 ++--
 arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c               |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c               |  42 ++++++--
 arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c             |  15 ++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/sys_compat.c           |   9 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c                | 121 +++++++++++++++++++----
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                    | 111 ++++++---------------
 include/linux/signal.h                   |   2 -
 include/linux/signal_types.h             |   3 +
 kernel/signal.c                          |  17 +++-
 18 files changed, 259 insertions(+), 159 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/signal.h
Signature · 7 lines
2.26.2.761.g0e0b3e54be-goog


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#25 lore raw

PATCH v6 1/3 signal: Allow architectures to store arch-specific data in kernel_siginfo

In some cases we would like to store architecture-specific data in the kernel's siginfo but not in the userspace one. This is generally data is conceptually part of siginfo but is not stored there for one reason or another. For example, on arm64, the arch-specific fault code register ESR_EL1 is exposed to signal handlers, but since it is associated with many different types of signals it does not fit well into siginfo and appears in sigcontext instead.

Currently this data is stored in thread_struct, which is error-prone because the data is associated with the signal itself and not the task, and as a result it could get out of sync with the signal that is currently being delivered.

To help avoid these types of errors, introduce a way for architectures to store architecture-specific data in the kernel_siginfo. This part of the kernel_siginfo is not exposed to userspace so the architecture can use it in any way that it likes without ABI concerns. A follow-up change will start using this mechanism on arm64 to store the fault code and fault address.

---
 include/linux/signal.h       |  2 --
 include/linux/signal_types.h |  3 +++
 kernel/signal.c              | 17 +++++++++++++----
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/linux/signal.h +0 -2
index 05bacd2ab135..34bf18932e9b 100644
@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@ static inline void clear_siginfo(kernel_siginfo_t *info)
 	memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
 }
 
-#define SI_EXPANSION_SIZE (sizeof(struct siginfo) - sizeof(struct kernel_siginfo))
-
 int copy_siginfo_to_user(siginfo_t __user *to, const kernel_siginfo_t *from);
 int copy_siginfo_from_user(kernel_siginfo_t *to, const siginfo_t __user *from);
 
include/linux/signal_types.h +3 -0
index f8a90ae9c6ec..a8635eeb890b 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
 
 typedef struct kernel_siginfo {
 	__SIGINFO;
+#ifdef __ARCH_HAS_PRIVATE_SIGINFO
+	struct arch_private_siginfo arch;
+#endif
 } kernel_siginfo_t;
 
 /*
kernel/signal.c +13 -4
index 284fc1600063..a33df2280ed5 100644
@@ -3180,15 +3180,21 @@ enum siginfo_layout siginfo_layout(unsigned sig, int si_code)
 	return layout;
 }
 
+struct shared_siginfo {
+	__SIGINFO;
+};
+
+#define SI_EXPANSION_SIZE (sizeof(struct siginfo) - sizeof(struct shared_siginfo))
+
 static inline char __user *si_expansion(const siginfo_t __user *info)
 {
-	return ((char __user *)info) + sizeof(struct kernel_siginfo);
+	return ((char __user *)info) + sizeof(struct shared_siginfo);
 }
 
 int copy_siginfo_to_user(siginfo_t __user *to, const kernel_siginfo_t *from)
 {
 	char __user *expansion = si_expansion(to);
-	if (copy_to_user(to, from , sizeof(struct kernel_siginfo)))
+	if (copy_to_user(to, from , sizeof(struct shared_siginfo)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	if (clear_user(expansion, SI_EXPANSION_SIZE))
 		return -EFAULT;
@@ -3198,6 +3204,9 @@ int copy_siginfo_to_user(siginfo_t __user *to, const kernel_siginfo_t *from)
 static int post_copy_siginfo_from_user(kernel_siginfo_t *info,
 				       const siginfo_t __user *from)
 {
+#ifdef __ARCH_HAS_PRIVATE_SIGINFO
+	memset(&info->arch, 0, sizeof(info->arch));
+#endif
 	if (unlikely(!known_siginfo_layout(info->si_signo, info->si_code))) {
 		char __user *expansion = si_expansion(from);
 		char buf[SI_EXPANSION_SIZE];
@@ -3221,7 +3230,7 @@ static int post_copy_siginfo_from_user(kernel_siginfo_t *info,
 static int __copy_siginfo_from_user(int signo, kernel_siginfo_t *to,
 				    const siginfo_t __user *from)
 {
-	if (copy_from_user(to, from, sizeof(struct kernel_siginfo)))
+	if (copy_from_user(to, from, sizeof(struct shared_siginfo)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	to->si_signo = signo;
 	return post_copy_siginfo_from_user(to, from);
@@ -3229,7 +3238,7 @@ static int __copy_siginfo_from_user(int signo, kernel_siginfo_t *to,
 
 int copy_siginfo_from_user(kernel_siginfo_t *to, const siginfo_t __user *from)
 {
-	if (copy_from_user(to, from, sizeof(struct kernel_siginfo)))
+	if (copy_from_user(to, from, sizeof(struct shared_siginfo)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	return post_copy_siginfo_from_user(to, from);
 }
Signature · 7 lines
2.26.2.761.g0e0b3e54be-goog


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
#26 lore raw

PATCH v6 2/3 arm64: Move fault address and fault code into kernel_siginfo

In reply to Peter Collingbourne

Previously this data was being stored in thread_struct, which is error-prone because the data is associated with the signal itself and not the task, and as a result it could get out of sync with the signal that is currently being delivered. To avoid this problem, move the fields to kernel_siginfo using the newly-introduced generic support for doing so.

The new fields store the raw FAR_EL1 and ESR_EL1 values instead of the cooked ones as we were doing before. For FAR_EL1 this will be necessary in order to expose the high bits of FAR_EL1 in sigcontext in an upcoming change. Do the same for ESR_EL1 for consistency and to make the code less error-prone.

While here, fix an apparent compat bug where, when delivering a SIGILL signal in response to an invalid syscall, the syscall number was being interpreted as an ESR_EL1 value and translated into an FSR before being stored in sigcontext.error_code, rather than being stored in error_code directly, as was the intention (and the behaviour of the code in arch/arm). This is achieved by moving the error_code translation early so that the syscall number can avoid it.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h |   2 -
 arch/arm64/include/asm/signal.h    |  16 ++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/traps.h     |   8 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c |   4 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c   |   2 -
 arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c |  18 ++---
 arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c         |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c         |  17 +++--
 arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c       |  15 ++--
 arch/arm64/kernel/sys_compat.c     |   9 ++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c          | 117 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c              | 111 +++++++--------------------
 13 files changed, 183 insertions(+), 140 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/signal.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h +1 -1
index 7a6e81ca23a8..90e772d9b2cd 100644
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static inline u32 disr_to_esr(u64 disr)
 }
 
 asmlinkage void enter_from_user_mode(void);
-void do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
+void do_mem_abort(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
 void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs);
 asmlinkage void bad_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr);
 void do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr_if_watchpoint, unsigned int esr,
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +0 -2
index 240fe5e5b720..b326bfbcea62 100644
@@ -144,8 +144,6 @@ struct thread_struct {
 	void			*sve_state;	/* SVE registers, if any */
 	unsigned int		sve_vl;		/* SVE vector length */
 	unsigned int		sve_vl_onexec;	/* SVE vl after next exec */
-	unsigned long		fault_address;	/* fault info */
-	unsigned long		fault_code;	/* ESR_EL1 value */
 	struct debug_info	debug;		/* debugging */
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
 	struct ptrauth_keys_user	keys_user;
arch/arm64/include/asm/signal.h new file +16 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f5c001b0a125
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_ARM64_SIGNAL_H
+#define _ASM_ARM64_SIGNAL_H
+
+#include <uapi/asm/signal.h>
+
+#define __ARCH_HAS_PRIVATE_SIGINFO
+struct arch_private_siginfo {
+	/* FAR_EL1 value */
+	unsigned long fault_address;
+
+	/* Sanitized ESR_EL1 value, or FSR/syscall number in compat mode */
+	unsigned long error_code;
+};
+
+#endif
arch/arm64/include/asm/traps.h +6 -2
index cee5928e1b7d..5ed5be5347e6 100644
@@ -26,8 +26,12 @@ void register_undef_hook(struct undef_hook *hook);
 void unregister_undef_hook(struct undef_hook *hook);
 void force_signal_inject(int signal, int code, unsigned long address);
 void arm64_notify_segfault(unsigned long addr);
-void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr, const char *str);
-void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb, const char *str);
+void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+			   unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
+			   const char *str);
+void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
+			    unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
+			    const char *str);
 void arm64_force_sig_ptrace_errno_trap(int errno, void __user *addr, const char *str);
 
 /*
arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c +2 -2
index 48222a4760c2..498e6393b2ca 100644
@@ -232,8 +232,8 @@ static void send_user_sigtrap(int si_code)
 		local_irq_enable();
 
 	arm64_force_sig_fault(SIGTRAP, si_code,
-			     (void __user *)instruction_pointer(regs),
-			     "User debug trap");
+			      (void __user *)instruction_pointer(regs), 0, 0,
+			      "User debug trap");
 }
 
 static int single_step_handler(unsigned long unused, unsigned int esr,
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +0 -2
index c839b5bf1904..045b4f518836 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ static void notrace el1_abort(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 	unsigned long far = read_sysreg(far_el1);
 
 	local_daif_inherit(regs);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el1_abort);
@@ -104,7 +103,6 @@ static void notrace el0_da(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 
 	user_exit_irqoff();
 	local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el0_da);
arch/arm64/kernel/probes/uprobes.c +8 -10
index a412d8edbcd2..5bbcd2e813f0 100644
@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@
 
 #include "decode-insn.h"
 
-#define UPROBE_INV_FAULT_CODE	UINT_MAX
-
 void arch_uprobe_copy_ixol(struct page *page, unsigned long vaddr,
 		void *src, unsigned long len)
 {
@@ -63,9 +61,6 @@ int arch_uprobe_pre_xol(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	struct uprobe_task *utask = current->utask;
 
-	/* Initialize with an invalid fault code to detect if ol insn trapped */
-	current->thread.fault_code = UPROBE_INV_FAULT_CODE;
-
 	/* Instruction points to execute ol */
 	instruction_pointer_set(regs, utask->xol_vaddr);
 
@@ -78,7 +73,7 @@ int arch_uprobe_post_xol(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	struct uprobe_task *utask = current->utask;
 
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(current->thread.fault_code != UPROBE_INV_FAULT_CODE);
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(arch_uprobe_xol_was_trapped(current));
 
 	/* Instruction points to execute next to breakpoint address */
 	instruction_pointer_set(regs, utask->vaddr + 4);
@@ -89,13 +84,16 @@ int arch_uprobe_post_xol(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct pt_regs *regs)
 }
 bool arch_uprobe_xol_was_trapped(struct task_struct *t)
 {
+	struct sigqueue *q;
+
 	/*
 	 * Between arch_uprobe_pre_xol and arch_uprobe_post_xol, if an xol
-	 * insn itself is trapped, then detect the case with the help of
-	 * invalid fault code which is being set in arch_uprobe_pre_xol
+	 * insn itself is trapped, then detect the case by checking for
+	 * non-zero esr_el1 in the task's pending signals.
 	 */
-	if (t->thread.fault_code != UPROBE_INV_FAULT_CODE)
-		return true;
+	list_for_each_entry (q, &t->pending.list, list)
+		if (q->info.arch.error_code)
+			return true;
 
 	return false;
 }
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -1
index b3d3005d9515..51bb8bcaf24b 100644
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ static void ptrace_hbptriggered(struct perf_event *bp,
 	}
 #endif
 	arm64_force_sig_fault(SIGTRAP, TRAP_HWBKPT,
-			      (void __user *)(bkpt->trigger),
+			      (void __user *)(bkpt->trigger), 0, 0,
 			      desc);
 }
 
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +10 -7
index 339882db5a91..10d7e9832a89 100644
@@ -566,6 +566,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
  *	of the task.
  */
 static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
+				 struct kernel_siginfo *info,
 				 bool add_all)
 {
 	int err;
@@ -576,7 +577,7 @@ static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 		return err;
 
 	/* fault information, if valid */
-	if (add_all || current->thread.fault_code) {
+	if (add_all || info->arch.error_code) {
 		err = sigframe_alloc(user, &user->esr_offset,
 				     sizeof(struct esr_context));
 		if (err)
@@ -605,7 +606,8 @@ static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 }
 
 static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
-			  struct pt_regs *regs, sigset_t *set)
+			  struct pt_regs *regs, sigset_t *set,
+			  struct kernel_siginfo *info)
 {
 	int i, err = 0;
 	struct rt_sigframe __user *sf = user->sigframe;
@@ -621,7 +623,8 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 	__put_user_error(regs->pc, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pc, err);
 	__put_user_error(regs->pstate, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.pstate, err);
 
-	__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
+	__put_user_error(untagged_addr(info->arch.fault_address),
+			 &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
 
 	err |= __copy_to_user(&sf->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
 
@@ -638,7 +641,7 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 
 		__put_user_error(ESR_MAGIC, &esr_ctx->head.magic, err);
 		__put_user_error(sizeof(*esr_ctx), &esr_ctx->head.size, err);
-		__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code, &esr_ctx->esr, err);
+		__put_user_error(info->arch.error_code, &esr_ctx->esr, err);
 	}
 
 	/* Scalable Vector Extension state, if present */
@@ -701,7 +704,7 @@ static int get_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 	int err;
 
 	init_user_layout(user);
-	err = setup_sigframe_layout(user, false);
+	err = setup_sigframe_layout(user, &ksig->info, false);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
@@ -758,7 +761,7 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(int usig, struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
 	__put_user_error(NULL, &frame->uc.uc_link, err);
 
 	err |= __save_altstack(&frame->uc.uc_stack, regs->sp);
-	err |= setup_sigframe(&user, regs, set);
+	err |= setup_sigframe(&user, regs, set, &ksig->info);
 	if (err == 0) {
 		setup_return(regs, &ksig->ka, &user, usig);
 		if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO) {
@@ -958,7 +961,7 @@ void __init minsigstksz_setup(void)
 	 * If this fails, SIGFRAME_MAXSZ needs to be enlarged.  It won't
 	 * be big enough, but it's our best guess:
 	 */
-	if (WARN_ON(setup_sigframe_layout(&user, true)))
+	if (WARN_ON(setup_sigframe_layout(&user, 0, true)))
 		return;
 
 	signal_minsigstksz = sigframe_size(&user) +
arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c +6 -9
index 82feca6f7052..b302689b6651 100644
@@ -37,8 +37,6 @@ struct compat_vfp_sigframe {
 #define VFP_MAGIC		0x56465001
 #define VFP_STORAGE_SIZE	sizeof(struct compat_vfp_sigframe)
 
-#define FSR_WRITE_SHIFT		(11)
-
 struct compat_aux_sigframe {
 	struct compat_vfp_sigframe	vfp;
 
@@ -384,7 +382,8 @@ static void compat_setup_return(struct pt_regs *regs, struct k_sigaction *ka,
 }
 
 static int compat_setup_sigframe(struct compat_sigframe __user *sf,
-				 struct pt_regs *regs, sigset_t *set)
+				 struct pt_regs *regs, sigset_t *set,
+				 struct kernel_siginfo *info)
 {
 	struct compat_aux_sigframe __user *aux;
 	unsigned long psr = pstate_to_compat_psr(regs->pstate);
@@ -409,10 +408,8 @@ static int compat_setup_sigframe(struct compat_sigframe __user *sf,
 	__put_user_error(psr, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_cpsr, err);
 
 	__put_user_error((compat_ulong_t)0, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.trap_no, err);
-	/* set the compat FSR WnR */
-	__put_user_error(!!(current->thread.fault_code & ESR_ELx_WNR) <<
-			 FSR_WRITE_SHIFT, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.error_code, err);
-	__put_user_error(current->thread.fault_address, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
+	__put_user_error(info->arch.error_code, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.error_code, err);
+	__put_user_error(info->arch.fault_address, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.fault_address, err);
 	__put_user_error(set->sig[0], &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.oldmask, err);
 
 	err |= put_sigset_t(&sf->uc.uc_sigmask, set);
@@ -447,7 +444,7 @@ int compat_setup_rt_frame(int usig, struct ksignal *ksig,
 
 	err |= __compat_save_altstack(&frame->sig.uc.uc_stack, regs->compat_sp);
 
-	err |= compat_setup_sigframe(&frame->sig, regs, set);
+	err |= compat_setup_sigframe(&frame->sig, regs, set, &ksig->info);
 
 	if (err == 0) {
 		compat_setup_return(regs, &ksig->ka, frame->sig.retcode, frame, usig);
@@ -471,7 +468,7 @@ int compat_setup_frame(int usig, struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
 
 	__put_user_error(0x5ac3c35a, &frame->uc.uc_flags, err);
 
-	err |= compat_setup_sigframe(frame, regs, set);
+	err |= compat_setup_sigframe(frame, regs, set, &ksig->info);
 	if (err == 0)
 		compat_setup_return(regs, &ksig->ka, frame->retcode, frame, usig);
 
arch/arm64/kernel/sys_compat.c +7 -2
index 3c18c2454089..d7a0b93a8d9f 100644
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ do_compat_cache_op(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, int flags)
 long compat_arm_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno)
 {
 	void __user *addr;
+	struct kernel_siginfo info;
 
 	switch (scno) {
 	/*
@@ -114,7 +115,11 @@ long compat_arm_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno)
 	addr  = (void __user *)instruction_pointer(regs) -
 		(compat_thumb_mode(regs) ? 2 : 4);
 
-	arm64_notify_die("Oops - bad compat syscall(2)", regs,
-			 SIGILL, ILL_ILLTRP, addr, scno);
+	clear_siginfo(&info);
+	info.si_signo = SIGILL;
+	info.si_code = ILL_ILLTRP;
+	info.si_addr = addr;
+	info.arch.error_code = scno;
+	force_sig_info(&info);
 	return 0;
 }
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +97 -20

174 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +29 -82

223 lines not on this page · raw message

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_______________________________________________
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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
#27 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v6 2/3] arm64: Move fault address and fault code into kernel_siginfo

Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:

Hi Peter,

Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:

[auto build test WARNING on arm-perf/for-next/perf]
[also build test WARNING on linus/master v5.7-rc6]
[cannot apply to arm64/for-next/core next-20200519]
[if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system. BTW, we also suggest to use '--base' option to specify the base tree in git format-patch, please see https://stackoverflow.com/a/37406982]

url:    https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Peter-Collingbourne/arm64-Expose-FAR_EL1-tag-bits-in-sigcontext/20200521-103345
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/will/linux.git for-next/perf
config: arm64-randconfig-r005-20200520 (attached as .config)
compiler: clang version 11.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 3393cc4cebf9969db94dc424b7a2b6195589c33b)

reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# install arm64 cross compiling tool for clang build
# apt-get install binutils-aarch64-linux-gnu
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross ARCH=arm64

If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate

All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>, old ones prefixed by <<):

>> arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:283:55: warning: format specifies type 'unsigned int' but the argument has type 'unsigned long' [-Wformat]

WARN(1, "ESR 0x%x is not DABT or IABT from EL0n", esr);
~~ ^~~
%lx
include/asm-generic/bug.h:124:29: note: expanded from macro 'WARN'
__WARN_printf(TAINT_WARN, format); ^~~~~~
include/asm-generic/bug.h:92:17: note: expanded from macro '__WARN_printf'
__warn_printk(arg); ^~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:826:26: warning: initializer overrides prior initialization of this subobject [-Winitializer-overrides]
[ESR_ELx_EC_UNKNOWN] = "Unknown/Uncategorized",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:825:28: note: previous initialization is here
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = "UNRECOGNIZED EC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:827:22: warning: initializer overrides prior initialization of this subobject [-Winitializer-overrides]
[ESR_ELx_EC_WFx] = "WFI/WFE",
^~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:825:28: note: previous initialization is here
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = "UNRECOGNIZED EC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:828:26: warning: initializer overrides prior initialization of this subobject [-Winitializer-overrides]
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP15_32] = "CP15 MCR/MRC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:825:28: note: previous initialization is here
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = "UNRECOGNIZED EC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:829:26: warning: initializer overrides prior initialization of this subobject [-Winitializer-overrides]
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP15_64] = "CP15 MCRR/MRRC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:825:28: note: previous initialization is here
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = "UNRECOGNIZED EC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:830:26: warning: initializer overrides prior initialization of this subobject [-Winitializer-overrides]
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP14_MR] = "CP14 MCR/MRC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:825:28: note: previous initialization is here
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = "UNRECOGNIZED EC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:831:26: warning: initializer overrides prior initialization of this subobject [-Winitializer-overrides]
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP14_LS] = "CP14 LDC/STC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:825:28: note: previous initialization is here
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = "UNRECOGNIZED EC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:832:27: warning: initializer overrides prior initialization of this subobject [-Winitializer-overrides]
[ESR_ELx_EC_FP_ASIMD] = "ASIMD",
^~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:825:28: note: previous initialization is here
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = "UNRECOGNIZED EC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:833:26: warning: initializer overrides prior initialization of this subobject [-Winitializer-overrides]
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP10_ID] = "CP10 MRC/VMRS",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:825:28: note: previous initialization is here
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = "UNRECOGNIZED EC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:834:22: warning: initializer overrides prior initialization of this subobject [-Winitializer-overrides]
[ESR_ELx_EC_PAC] = "PAC",
^~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:825:28: note: previous initialization is here
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = "UNRECOGNIZED EC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:835:26: warning: initializer overrides prior initialization of this subobject [-Winitializer-overrides]
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP14_64] = "CP14 MCRR/MRRC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:825:28: note: previous initialization is here
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = "UNRECOGNIZED EC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:836:22: warning: initializer overrides prior initialization of this subobject [-Winitializer-overrides]
[ESR_ELx_EC_ILL] = "PSTATE.IL",
^~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:825:28: note: previous initialization is here
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = "UNRECOGNIZED EC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:837:24: warning: initializer overrides prior initialization of this subobject [-Winitializer-overrides]
[ESR_ELx_EC_SVC32] = "SVC (AArch32)",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:825:28: note: previous initialization is here
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = "UNRECOGNIZED EC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:838:24: warning: initializer overrides prior initialization of this subobject [-Winitializer-overrides]
[ESR_ELx_EC_HVC32] = "HVC (AArch32)",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:825:28: note: previous initialization is here
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = "UNRECOGNIZED EC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:839:24: warning: initializer overrides prior initialization of this subobject [-Winitializer-overrides]
[ESR_ELx_EC_SMC32] = "SMC (AArch32)",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:825:28: note: previous initialization is here
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = "UNRECOGNIZED EC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:840:24: warning: initializer overrides prior initialization of this subobject [-Winitializer-overrides]
[ESR_ELx_EC_SVC64] = "SVC (AArch64)",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:825:28: note: previous initialization is here
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = "UNRECOGNIZED EC",
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:841:24: warning: initializer overrides prior initialization of this subobject [-Winitializer-overrides]

vim +283 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c

236
237 static unsigned long esr_to_error_code(unsigned long esr, unsigned long far)
238 {
239 /*
240 * If the faulting address is in the kernel, we must sanitize the ESR.
241 * From userspace's point of view, kernel-only mappings don't exist
242 * at all, so we report them as level 0 translation faults.
243 * (This is not quite the way that "no mapping there at all" behaves:
244 * an alignment fault not caused by the memory type would take
245 * precedence over translation fault for a real access to empty
246 * space. Unfortunately we can't easily distinguish "alignment fault
247 * not caused by memory type" from "alignment fault caused by memory
248 * type", so we ignore this wrinkle and just return the translation
249 * fault.)
250 */
251 if (!is_ttbr0_addr(untagged_addr(far))) {
252 switch (ESR_ELx_EC(esr)) {
253 case ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW:
254 /*
255 * These bits provide only information about the
256 * faulting instruction, which userspace knows already.
257 * We explicitly clear bits which are architecturally
258 * RES0 in case they are given meanings in future.
259 * We always report the ESR as if the fault was taken
260 * to EL1 and so ISV and the bits in ISS[23:14] are
261 * clear. (In fact it always will be a fault to EL1.)
262 */
263 esr &= ESR_ELx_EC_MASK | ESR_ELx_IL |
264 ESR_ELx_CM | ESR_ELx_WNR;
265 esr |= ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT;
266 break;
267 case ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW:
268 /*
269 * Claim a level 0 translation fault.
270 * All other bits are architecturally RES0 for faults
271 * reported with that DFSC value, so we clear them.
272 */
273 esr &= ESR_ELx_EC_MASK | ESR_ELx_IL;
274 esr |= ESR_ELx_FSC_FAULT;
275 break;
276 default:
277 /*
278 * This should never happen (entry.S only brings us
279 * into this code for insn and data aborts from a lower
280 * exception level). Fail safe by not providing an ESR
281 * context record at all.
282 */

 > 283				WARN(1, "ESR 0x%x is not DABT or IABT from EL0\n", esr);

284 esr = 0;
285 break;
286 }
287 }
288
289 if (is_compat_task()) {
290 /* Use the compat FSR WnR */
291 return !!(esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) << FSR_WRITE_SHIFT;
292 }
293
294 return esr;
295 }
296

---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/[email protected]

#28 lore raw

PATCH v6 3/3 arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

In reply to Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a fault_addr_top_byte_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the tag bits of FAR_EL1 there.

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

---
v6:
- move fault address and fault code into the kernel_siginfo data structure
- split the patch in three since it was getting large and now has generic and arch-specific parts

v5:
- add padding to fault_addr_top_byte_context in order to ensure the correct size and preserve sp alignment

v4:
- expose only the tag bits in the context instead of the entire FAR_EL1
- remove mention of the new context from the sigcontext.__reserved[] note

v3:
- add documentation to tagged-pointers.rst
- update comments in sigcontext.h

v2:
- revert changes to hw_breakpoint.c
- rename set_thread_esr to set_thread_far_esr

 Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst  | 17 ++++++++++------
 arch/arm64/include/asm/signal.h          |  3 +++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/traps.h           |  4 ++--
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 24 +++++++++++++++++------
 arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c               |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c               | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c                | 10 ++++++----
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                    |  8 ++++----
 9 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst +11 -6
index eab4323609b9..c6e9592a9dea 100644
@@ -53,12 +53,17 @@ visibility.
 Preserving tags
 ---------------
 
-Non-zero tags are not preserved when delivering signals. This means that
-signal handlers in applications making use of tags cannot rely on the
-tag information for user virtual addresses being maintained for fields
-inside siginfo_t. One exception to this rule is for signals raised in
-response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the tag information will
-be preserved.
+Non-zero tags are not preserved in the fault address fields
+siginfo.si_addr or sigcontext.fault_address when delivering
+signals. This means that signal handlers in applications making use
+of tags cannot rely on the tag information for user virtual addresses
+being maintained in these fields. One exception to this rule is for
+signals raised in response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the
+tag information will be preserved.
+
+The fault address tag is preserved in the fault_addr_top_byte field of
+the signal frame record fault_addr_top_byte_context, which is present
+for signals raised in response to data aborts and instruction aborts.
 
 The architecture prevents the use of a tagged PC, so the upper byte will
 be set to a sign-extension of bit 55 on exception return.
arch/arm64/include/asm/signal.h +3 -0
index f5c001b0a125..c80eb3b3ea40 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ struct arch_private_siginfo {
 	/* FAR_EL1 value */
 	unsigned long fault_address;
 
+	/* Mask of defined bits in the top byte of FAR_EL1 */
+	unsigned char fault_address_top_byte_mask;
+
 	/* Sanitized ESR_EL1 value, or FSR/syscall number in compat mode */
 	unsigned long error_code;
 };
arch/arm64/include/asm/traps.h +2 -2
index 5ed5be5347e6..981b930b1e6f 100644
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ void unregister_undef_hook(struct undef_hook *hook);
 void force_signal_inject(int signal, int code, unsigned long address);
 void arm64_notify_segfault(unsigned long addr);
 void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
-			   unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
-			   const char *str);
+			   unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
+			   unsigned long esr, const char *str);
 void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
 			    unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
 			    const char *str);
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +18 -6
index 8b0ebce92427..6ce5e1bb7efd 100644
@@ -44,11 +44,12 @@ struct sigcontext {
  *
  *	0x210		fpsimd_context
  *	 0x10		esr_context
+ *	 0x10		fault_addr_top_byte_context
  *	0x8a0		sve_context (vl <= 64) (optional)
  *	 0x20		extra_context (optional)
  *	 0x10		terminator (null _aarch64_ctx)
  *
- *	0x510		(reserved for future allocation)
+ *	0x500		(reserved for future allocation)
  *
  * New records that can exceed this space need to be opt-in for userspace, so
  * that an expanded signal frame is not generated unexpectedly.  The mechanism
@@ -94,17 +95,28 @@ struct esr_context {
 	__u64 esr;
 };
 
+/* Top byte of fault address (normally not exposed via si_addr) */
+#define FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC	0x46544201
+
+struct fault_addr_top_byte_context {
+	struct _aarch64_ctx head;
+	__u8 flags;
+	__u8 fault_addr_top_byte;
+	__u8 fault_addr_top_byte_mask;
+	__u8 __reserved[5];
+};
+
 /*
  * extra_context: describes extra space in the signal frame for
  * additional structures that don't fit in sigcontext.__reserved[].
  *
  * Note:
  *
- * 1) fpsimd_context, esr_context and extra_context must be placed in
- * sigcontext.__reserved[] if present.  They cannot be placed in the
- * extra space.  Any other record can be placed either in the extra
- * space or in sigcontext.__reserved[], unless otherwise specified in
- * this file.
+ * 1) fpsimd_context, esr_context, fault_addr_top_byte_context and
+ * extra_context must be placed in sigcontext.__reserved[] if present.
+ * They cannot be placed in the extra space.  Any other record can be
+ * placed either in the extra space or in sigcontext.__reserved[],
+ * unless otherwise specified in this file.
  *
  * 2) There must not be more than one extra_context.
  *
arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c +1 -1
index 498e6393b2ca..575a907cd4fc 100644
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static void send_user_sigtrap(int si_code)
 		local_irq_enable();
 
 	arm64_force_sig_fault(SIGTRAP, si_code,
-			      (void __user *)instruction_pointer(regs), 0, 0,
+			      (void __user *)instruction_pointer(regs), 0, 0, 0,
 			      "User debug trap");
 }
 
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -1
index 51bb8bcaf24b..9b20284df88b 100644
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ static void ptrace_hbptriggered(struct perf_event *bp,
 	}
 #endif
 	arm64_force_sig_fault(SIGTRAP, TRAP_HWBKPT,
-			      (void __user *)(bkpt->trigger), 0, 0,
+			      (void __user *)(bkpt->trigger), 0, 0, 0,
 			      desc);
 }
 
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +25 -0
index 10d7e9832a89..f6783de54412 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ struct rt_sigframe_user_layout {
 
 	unsigned long fpsimd_offset;
 	unsigned long esr_offset;
+	unsigned long ftb_offset;
 	unsigned long sve_offset;
 	unsigned long extra_offset;
 	unsigned long end_offset;
@@ -383,6 +384,7 @@ static int parse_user_sigframe(struct user_ctxs *user,
 			break;
 
 		case ESR_MAGIC:
+		case FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC:
 			/* ignore */
 			break;
 
@@ -582,6 +584,14 @@ static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 				     sizeof(struct esr_context));
 		if (err)
 			return err;
+        }
+
+        if (add_all || info->arch.fault_address_top_byte_mask) {
+		err = sigframe_alloc(
+			user, &user->ftb_offset,
+			sizeof(struct fault_addr_top_byte_context));
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 	}
 
 	if (system_supports_sve()) {
@@ -644,6 +654,21 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 		__put_user_error(info->arch.error_code, &esr_ctx->esr, err);
 	}
 
+	if (err == 0 && user->ftb_offset) {
+		struct fault_addr_top_byte_context __user *ftb_ctx =
+			apply_user_offset(user, user->ftb_offset);
+
+		__put_user_error(FAULT_ADDR_TOP_BYTE_MAGIC,
+				 &ftb_ctx->head.magic, err);
+		__put_user_error(sizeof(*ftb_ctx), &ftb_ctx->head.size, err);
+		__put_user_error(0, &ftb_ctx->flags, err);
+		__put_user_error((info->arch.fault_address >> 56) &
+					 info->arch.fault_address_top_byte_mask,
+				 &ftb_ctx->fault_addr_top_byte, err);
+		__put_user_error(info->arch.fault_address_top_byte_mask,
+				 &ftb_ctx->fault_addr_top_byte_mask, err);
+	}
+
 	/* Scalable Vector Extension state, if present */
 	if (system_supports_sve() && err == 0 && user->sve_offset) {
 		struct sve_context __user *sve_ctx =
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +6 -4
index 4545fe067ea9..8154f2562f74 100644
@@ -295,8 +295,8 @@ static unsigned long esr_to_error_code(unsigned long esr, unsigned long far)
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
-			   unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
-			   const char *str)
+			   unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
+			   unsigned long esr, const char *str)
 {
 	arm64_show_signal(signo, esr, str);
 	if (signo == SIGKILL) {
@@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
 		info.si_code = code;
 		info.si_addr = addr;
 		info.arch.fault_address = far;
+		info.arch.fault_address_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
 		info.arch.error_code = esr_to_error_code(esr, far);
 		force_sig_info(&info);
 	}
@@ -329,6 +330,7 @@ void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
 	info.si_addr = addr;
 	info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
 	info.arch.fault_address = far;
+	info.arch.fault_address_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
 	info.arch.error_code = esr_to_error_code(esr, far);
 	force_sig_info(&info);
 }
@@ -346,7 +348,7 @@ void arm64_notify_die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs,
 {
 	if (user_mode(regs)) {
 		WARN_ON(regs != current_pt_regs());
-		arm64_force_sig_fault(signo, sicode, addr, 0, esr, str);
+		arm64_force_sig_fault(signo, sicode, addr, 0, 0, esr, str);
 	} else {
 		die(str, regs, esr);
 	}
@@ -893,7 +895,7 @@ void bad_el0_sync(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr)
 {
 	void __user *pc = (void __user *)instruction_pointer(regs);
 
-	arm64_force_sig_fault(SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, pc, 0, esr,
+	arm64_force_sig_fault(SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, pc, 0, 0, esr,
 			      "Bad EL0 synchronous exception");
 }
 
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +4 -4
index a7bada1392b3..1ba95f308c10 100644
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ static void do_bad_area(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr,
 	if (user_mode(regs)) {
 		const struct fault_info *inf = esr_to_fault_info(esr);
 		arm64_force_sig_fault(inf->sig, inf->code, (void __user *)addr,
-				      far, esr, inf->name);
+				      far, 0xff, esr, inf->name);
 	} else {
 		__do_kernel_fault(addr, esr, regs);
 	}
@@ -520,8 +520,8 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr,
 		 * We had some memory, but were unable to successfully fix up
 		 * this page fault.
 		 */
-		arm64_force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR, (void __user *)addr, far, esr,
-				      inf->name);
+		arm64_force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR, (void __user *)addr,
+				      far, 0xff, esr, inf->name);
 	} else if (fault & (VM_FAULT_HWPOISON_LARGE | VM_FAULT_HWPOISON)) {
 		unsigned int lsb;
 
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr,
 		 */
 		arm64_force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV,
 				      fault == VM_FAULT_BADACCESS ? SEGV_ACCERR : SEGV_MAPERR,
-				      (void __user *)addr, far, esr,
+				      (void __user *)addr, far, 0xff, esr,
 				      inf->name);
 	}
 
Signature · 7 lines
2.26.2.761.g0e0b3e54be-goog


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
#29 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v6] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

In reply to Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 74 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 50 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 48 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 46 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 32 lines · Dave Martin

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe(struct · line 653

Quoted 11 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +1 -0
index baa88dc02e5c..5867f2fdbe64 100644
@@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct
 rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
                __put_user_error(ESR_MAGIC, &esr_ctx->head.magic, err);
                __put_user_error(sizeof(*esr_ctx), &esr_ctx->head.size, err);
                __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code,
 &esr_ctx->esr, err);
+               current->thread.fault_code = 0;

Perhaps, but we'd need to be careful. For example, can we run out of user stack before this and deliver a SIGSEGV, but with the old fault_code still set? Then we'd emit the old fault code with the new "can't deliver signal" signal, which doesn't make sense.

Stuff may also go wrong with signal prioritisation.

If a higher-priority signal (say SIGINT) comes in after a data abort enters the kernel but before the resulting SIGSEGV is dequeued for delivery, wouldn't we deliver SIGINT first, with the bogus fault code? With your change we'd then have cleared the fault code by the time we deliver the SIGSEGV it actually relates to, if I've understood right.

Today, I think we just attach that fault code to every signal that's delivered until something overwrites or resets it, which means that a signal that needs fault_code gets it, at the expense of attaching it to a bunch of other random signals too.

Quoted 4 lines

Checking the signal number and si_code might help us to know what we should be doing with fault_code. We need to have sure userspace can't trick us with a non kernel generated signal here. It would also be necessary to check how PTRACE_SETSIGINFO interacts with this.

With these possible interactions in mind I think we should store the fault code and fault address in kernel_siginfo instead of thread_struct (and clear these fields when we receive a siginfo from userspace, i.e. in copy_siginfo_from_user which is used by ptrace(PTRACE_SETSIGINFO) among other places). That way, the information is clearly associated with the signal itself and not the thread, so we don't need to worry about our signal being delivered out of order.

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Hmm, I can't see a way to do that that isn't horribly invasive in the core signal code. Can you?

I think I've come up with a way that doesn't seem to be too invasive. See patch #1 of the series that I'm about to send out.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines

But generally, I agree: the per-thread handling of fault_address and fault_code appears to be quite broken in the face of signal prioritisation and signals that don't correspond directly to hardware trap. It would be nice to have some tests for this...

If we want to pile on more bodges, perhaps we could stash the signal number to which the fault_{address,code} relate, and then check that at delivery and clear on a match. I hate it.

Quoted 7 lines

I agree with Daniel's suggestion in principle, but I was also concerned about whether it would be too invasive elsewhere.

Question though: does the core code take special care to make sure that a force_sig cannot be outprioritised by a regular signal? If so, perhaps we get away with it. I ask this, because the same same issue may be hitting other arches otherwise.

Quoted 4 lines

Not as far as I can tell. There does appear to be prioritisation for synchronous signals [1] but as far as I can tell nothing to distinguish one of these signals from one with the same signal number sent from userspace (e.g. via kill(2)).

The si_code will differ between signals generated between userspace and signals generated by the kernel.

We do allow a little bit of ptrace and sending to yourself to spoof kernel generated signals, for reasons of debugging and process migration where an existing process needs to be reconstructed. But the defenses should be strong enough you can assume that we reliably distinguish between a signal from userspace and a signal from the kernel.

I don't fully follow what you are doing but this feels like the kind of case where a new si_code has been defined as well as additional fields in siginfo.

In your patchset I really hate that you were going back to force_sig_info, and filling out struct siginfo by hand. That is an error prone pattern, and I have fixed enough bugs in the kernel to prove that.

I take exception to the idea that including the full address might break userspace. That means typically means someone has been too lazy to look and see what userspace is doing. When that userspace that might break is the same userspace you are changing the kernel to serve that makes me nervous. AKA the userspace that cares about this signal and how it is represented in siginfo.

A fix of one instance of SIGILL should not be included with a patch that does something else, and really should come before everything else if possible.

If this information really belongs in struct siginfo (as it sounds like) please actually put the information in siginfo, and let userspace look in siginfo to find it. struct siginfo is a union with plenty of space, and plenty of si_codes.

If this applies to multiple cases then it might be trickier but please dig into the details, don't toss things into sigcontext just because you can't figure out a clean design for reporting this.

Eric

Quoted 3 lines

Peter

[1] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/b85051e755b0e9d6dd8f17ef1da083851b83287d/kernel/signal.c#L222

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#30 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v6] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

Quoted 82 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 74 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 50 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 48 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 46 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 32 lines · Dave Martin

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe(struct · line 653

Quoted 11 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +1 -0
index baa88dc02e5c..5867f2fdbe64 100644
@@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct
 rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
                __put_user_error(ESR_MAGIC, &esr_ctx->head.magic, err);
                __put_user_error(sizeof(*esr_ctx), &esr_ctx->head.size, err);
                __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code,
 &esr_ctx->esr, err);
+               current->thread.fault_code = 0;

Perhaps, but we'd need to be careful. For example, can we run out of user stack before this and deliver a SIGSEGV, but with the old fault_code still set? Then we'd emit the old fault code with the new "can't deliver signal" signal, which doesn't make sense.

Stuff may also go wrong with signal prioritisation.

If a higher-priority signal (say SIGINT) comes in after a data abort enters the kernel but before the resulting SIGSEGV is dequeued for delivery, wouldn't we deliver SIGINT first, with the bogus fault code? With your change we'd then have cleared the fault code by the time we deliver the SIGSEGV it actually relates to, if I've understood right.

Today, I think we just attach that fault code to every signal that's delivered until something overwrites or resets it, which means that a signal that needs fault_code gets it, at the expense of attaching it to a bunch of other random signals too.

Quoted 4 lines

Checking the signal number and si_code might help us to know what we should be doing with fault_code. We need to have sure userspace can't trick us with a non kernel generated signal here. It would also be necessary to check how PTRACE_SETSIGINFO interacts with this.

With these possible interactions in mind I think we should store the fault code and fault address in kernel_siginfo instead of thread_struct (and clear these fields when we receive a siginfo from userspace, i.e. in copy_siginfo_from_user which is used by ptrace(PTRACE_SETSIGINFO) among other places). That way, the information is clearly associated with the signal itself and not the thread, so we don't need to worry about our signal being delivered out of order.

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Hmm, I can't see a way to do that that isn't horribly invasive in the core signal code. Can you?

I think I've come up with a way that doesn't seem to be too invasive. See patch #1 of the series that I'm about to send out.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines

But generally, I agree: the per-thread handling of fault_address and fault_code appears to be quite broken in the face of signal prioritisation and signals that don't correspond directly to hardware trap. It would be nice to have some tests for this...

If we want to pile on more bodges, perhaps we could stash the signal number to which the fault_{address,code} relate, and then check that at delivery and clear on a match. I hate it.

Quoted 7 lines

I agree with Daniel's suggestion in principle, but I was also concerned about whether it would be too invasive elsewhere.

Question though: does the core code take special care to make sure that a force_sig cannot be outprioritised by a regular signal? If so, perhaps we get away with it. I ask this, because the same same issue may be hitting other arches otherwise.

Quoted 4 lines

Not as far as I can tell. There does appear to be prioritisation for synchronous signals [1] but as far as I can tell nothing to distinguish one of these signals from one with the same signal number sent from userspace (e.g. via kill(2)).

Quoted 8 lines

The si_code will differ between signals generated between userspace and signals generated by the kernel.

We do allow a little bit of ptrace and sending to yourself to spoof kernel generated signals, for reasons of debugging and process migration where an existing process needs to be reconstructed. But the defenses should be strong enough you can assume that we reliably distinguish between a signal from userspace and a signal from the kernel.

So check for SIGBUS || SIGSEGV and one of the below si_codes, and only add the context in that case? Seems fragile to me, but I suppose I could live with it.

Quoted 3 lines

I don't fully follow what you are doing but this feels like the kind of case where a new si_code has been defined as well as additional fields in siginfo.

There is no new si_code for this, the information will be exposed for several existing si_code types (BUS_ADRERR, BUS_ADRALN, BUS_MCEERR_AR, SEGV_ACCERR, SEGV_MAPERR), and possibly others in the future (particularly SEGV_MTESERR, which is part of the proposed MTE patch set). Note that we already have a union field for BUS_MCEERR_AR, and we may want to expose it for the other si_codes that already have union fields as well.

That being said, taking a closer look at siginfo, I think we are in luck and we might be able to make this work in a reasonable way by reusing padding (see below).

Quoted 4 lines

In your patchset I really hate that you were going back to force_sig_info, and filling out struct siginfo by hand. That is an error prone pattern, and I have fixed enough bugs in the kernel to prove that.

To be fair, most of the callers are in helper functions that take explicit parameters similar to force_sig_fault et al, and the SIGILL one could easily be made that way as well.

Quoted 6 lines

I take exception to the idea that including the full address might break userspace. That means typically means someone has been too lazy to look and see what userspace is doing. When that userspace that might break is the same userspace you are changing the kernel to serve that makes me nervous. AKA the userspace that cares about this signal and how it is represented in siginfo.

It's not a matter of being lazy. This behaviour isn't just an accident but has been explicitly documented for years (see the tagged-pointers.rst file that I changed: "Non-zero tags are not preserved when delivering signals."), so users can reasonably rely on it. Furthermore we simply don't have visibility into the majority of userspace. For example, there are a lot of closed source Android apps out there, and who knows what signal handlers they're installing and how they're making use of the si_addr field on e.g. SEGV_MAPERR. We can't just change the documented semantics under their feet.

It's also not the same userspace either. The userspace that's initially going to be consuming the new fields is in a part of the Android system that handles and reports crashes, and that's something that we control unlike all the apps.

Finally, the userspace may need to know whether the tag bits were actually zero or whether they were just unavailable, otherwise userspace could for example produce a misleading crash report. Simply having the kernel set the top bits of si_addr wouldn't accomplish that due to the kernel's previous behaviour, hence the mask to let userspace know which bits are accurate.

Quoted 3 lines

A fix of one instance of SIGILL should not be included with a patch that does something else, and really should come before everything else if possible.

Fair point. I can see if I can split that part out.

Quoted 8 lines

If this information really belongs in struct siginfo (as it sounds like) please actually put the information in siginfo, and let userspace look in siginfo to find it. struct siginfo is a union with plenty of space, and plenty of si_codes.

If this applies to multiple cases then it might be trickier but please dig into the details, don't toss things into sigcontext just because you can't figure out a clean design for reporting this.

If we wanted this in siginfo, one idea that I had was to revert commit b68a68d3dcc15ebbf23cbe91af1abf57591bd96b and add unsigned char fields _addr_top_byte and _addr_top_byte_mask in the padding between _addr_lsb and the union (with comments on all the fields of course to say when they are filled in). I think that would work since we are already clearing padding in siginfo, one nice property of the new fields is that the zero values are correct in the case where the information isn't being exposed (so old kernels would already have the correct behaviour). That would only work on certain architectures (i.e. at least alignof(void*) >= 4) so I suppose it could have an #ifdef __aarch64__ around it.

Peter

Peter

Quoted 7 lines

Eric

Quoted 3 lines

Peter

[1] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/b85051e755b0e9d6dd8f17ef1da083851b83287d/kernel/signal.c#L222

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#31 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v6] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

Quoted 165 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 82 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 74 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 50 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 48 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 46 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 32 lines · Dave Martin

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe(struct · line 653

Quoted 11 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +1 -0
index baa88dc02e5c..5867f2fdbe64 100644
@@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct
 rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
                __put_user_error(ESR_MAGIC, &esr_ctx->head.magic, err);
                __put_user_error(sizeof(*esr_ctx), &esr_ctx->head.size, err);
                __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code,
 &esr_ctx->esr, err);
+               current->thread.fault_code = 0;

Perhaps, but we'd need to be careful. For example, can we run out of user stack before this and deliver a SIGSEGV, but with the old fault_code still set? Then we'd emit the old fault code with the new "can't deliver signal" signal, which doesn't make sense.

Stuff may also go wrong with signal prioritisation.

If a higher-priority signal (say SIGINT) comes in after a data abort enters the kernel but before the resulting SIGSEGV is dequeued for delivery, wouldn't we deliver SIGINT first, with the bogus fault code? With your change we'd then have cleared the fault code by the time we deliver the SIGSEGV it actually relates to, if I've understood right.

Today, I think we just attach that fault code to every signal that's delivered until something overwrites or resets it, which means that a signal that needs fault_code gets it, at the expense of attaching it to a bunch of other random signals too.

Quoted 4 lines

Checking the signal number and si_code might help us to know what we should be doing with fault_code. We need to have sure userspace can't trick us with a non kernel generated signal here. It would also be necessary to check how PTRACE_SETSIGINFO interacts with this.

With these possible interactions in mind I think we should store the fault code and fault address in kernel_siginfo instead of thread_struct (and clear these fields when we receive a siginfo from userspace, i.e. in copy_siginfo_from_user which is used by ptrace(PTRACE_SETSIGINFO) among other places). That way, the information is clearly associated with the signal itself and not the thread, so we don't need to worry about our signal being delivered out of order.

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Hmm, I can't see a way to do that that isn't horribly invasive in the core signal code. Can you?

I think I've come up with a way that doesn't seem to be too invasive. See patch #1 of the series that I'm about to send out.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines

But generally, I agree: the per-thread handling of fault_address and fault_code appears to be quite broken in the face of signal prioritisation and signals that don't correspond directly to hardware trap. It would be nice to have some tests for this...

If we want to pile on more bodges, perhaps we could stash the signal number to which the fault_{address,code} relate, and then check that at delivery and clear on a match. I hate it.

Quoted 7 lines

I agree with Daniel's suggestion in principle, but I was also concerned about whether it would be too invasive elsewhere.

Question though: does the core code take special care to make sure that a force_sig cannot be outprioritised by a regular signal? If so, perhaps we get away with it. I ask this, because the same same issue may be hitting other arches otherwise.

Quoted 4 lines

Not as far as I can tell. There does appear to be prioritisation for synchronous signals [1] but as far as I can tell nothing to distinguish one of these signals from one with the same signal number sent from userspace (e.g. via kill(2)).

Quoted 8 lines

The si_code will differ between signals generated between userspace and signals generated by the kernel.

We do allow a little bit of ptrace and sending to yourself to spoof kernel generated signals, for reasons of debugging and process migration where an existing process needs to be reconstructed. But the defenses should be strong enough you can assume that we reliably distinguish between a signal from userspace and a signal from the kernel.

So check for SIGBUS || SIGSEGV and one of the below si_codes, and only add the context in that case? Seems fragile to me, but I suppose I could live with it.

Quoted 3 lines

I don't fully follow what you are doing but this feels like the kind of case where a new si_code has been defined as well as additional fields in siginfo.

There is no new si_code for this, the information will be exposed for several existing si_code types (BUS_ADRERR, BUS_ADRALN, BUS_MCEERR_AR, SEGV_ACCERR, SEGV_MAPERR), and possibly others in the future (particularly SEGV_MTESERR, which is part of the proposed MTE patch set). Note that we already have a union field for BUS_MCEERR_AR, and we may want to expose it for the other si_codes that already have union fields as well.

That being said, taking a closer look at siginfo, I think we are in luck and we might be able to make this work in a reasonable way by reusing padding (see below).

Quoted 4 lines

In your patchset I really hate that you were going back to force_sig_info, and filling out struct siginfo by hand. That is an error prone pattern, and I have fixed enough bugs in the kernel to prove that.

To be fair, most of the callers are in helper functions that take explicit parameters similar to force_sig_fault et al, and the SIGILL one could easily be made that way as well.

Quoted 6 lines

I take exception to the idea that including the full address might break userspace. That means typically means someone has been too lazy to look and see what userspace is doing. When that userspace that might break is the same userspace you are changing the kernel to serve that makes me nervous. AKA the userspace that cares about this signal and how it is represented in siginfo.

It's not a matter of being lazy. This behaviour isn't just an accident but has been explicitly documented for years (see the tagged-pointers.rst file that I changed: "Non-zero tags are not preserved when delivering signals."), so users can reasonably rely on it. Furthermore we simply don't have visibility into the majority of userspace. For example, there are a lot of closed source Android apps out there, and who knows what signal handlers they're installing and how they're making use of the si_addr field on e.g. SEGV_MAPERR. We can't just change the documented semantics under their feet.

It's also not the same userspace either. The userspace that's initially going to be consuming the new fields is in a part of the Android system that handles and reports crashes, and that's something that we control unlike all the apps.

Finally, the userspace may need to know whether the tag bits were actually zero or whether they were just unavailable, otherwise userspace could for example produce a misleading crash report. Simply having the kernel set the top bits of si_addr wouldn't accomplish that due to the kernel's previous behaviour, hence the mask to let userspace know which bits are accurate.

Quoted 3 lines

A fix of one instance of SIGILL should not be included with a patch that does something else, and really should come before everything else if possible.

Fair point. I can see if I can split that part out.

Quoted 8 lines

If this information really belongs in struct siginfo (as it sounds like) please actually put the information in siginfo, and let userspace look in siginfo to find it. struct siginfo is a union with plenty of space, and plenty of si_codes.

If this applies to multiple cases then it might be trickier but please dig into the details, don't toss things into sigcontext just because you can't figure out a clean design for reporting this.

Quoted 11 lines

If we wanted this in siginfo, one idea that I had was to revert commit b68a68d3dcc15ebbf23cbe91af1abf57591bd96b and add unsigned char fields _addr_top_byte and _addr_top_byte_mask in the padding between _addr_lsb and the union (with comments on all the fields of course to say when they are filled in). I think that would work since we are already clearing padding in siginfo, one nice property of the new fields is that the zero values are correct in the case where the information isn't being exposed (so old kernels would already have the correct behaviour). That would only work on certain architectures (i.e. at least alignof(void*) >= 4) so I suppose it could have an #ifdef __aarch64__ around it.

Perhaps add a 4th padding member to the union inside of _sigfault, that adds something like 4 unsigned long's worth of data, and then have your fields after the union.

Is it quite a bit of work to gather that information from the instructions that faulted? I am just checking that this work is really makes sense.

What I really don't understand is how well this problem generalizes to other architectures to tell if this is something other people need to solve at some point as well.

Eric

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#32 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v6] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

Quoted 180 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 165 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 82 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 74 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 50 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 48 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 46 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 32 lines · Dave Martin

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe(struct · line 653

Quoted 11 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +1 -0
index baa88dc02e5c..5867f2fdbe64 100644
@@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct
 rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
                __put_user_error(ESR_MAGIC, &esr_ctx->head.magic, err);
                __put_user_error(sizeof(*esr_ctx), &esr_ctx->head.size, err);
                __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code,
 &esr_ctx->esr, err);
+               current->thread.fault_code = 0;

Perhaps, but we'd need to be careful. For example, can we run out of user stack before this and deliver a SIGSEGV, but with the old fault_code still set? Then we'd emit the old fault code with the new "can't deliver signal" signal, which doesn't make sense.

Stuff may also go wrong with signal prioritisation.

If a higher-priority signal (say SIGINT) comes in after a data abort enters the kernel but before the resulting SIGSEGV is dequeued for delivery, wouldn't we deliver SIGINT first, with the bogus fault code? With your change we'd then have cleared the fault code by the time we deliver the SIGSEGV it actually relates to, if I've understood right.

Today, I think we just attach that fault code to every signal that's delivered until something overwrites or resets it, which means that a signal that needs fault_code gets it, at the expense of attaching it to a bunch of other random signals too.

Quoted 4 lines

Checking the signal number and si_code might help us to know what we should be doing with fault_code. We need to have sure userspace can't trick us with a non kernel generated signal here. It would also be necessary to check how PTRACE_SETSIGINFO interacts with this.

With these possible interactions in mind I think we should store the fault code and fault address in kernel_siginfo instead of thread_struct (and clear these fields when we receive a siginfo from userspace, i.e. in copy_siginfo_from_user which is used by ptrace(PTRACE_SETSIGINFO) among other places). That way, the information is clearly associated with the signal itself and not the thread, so we don't need to worry about our signal being delivered out of order.

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Hmm, I can't see a way to do that that isn't horribly invasive in the core signal code. Can you?

I think I've come up with a way that doesn't seem to be too invasive. See patch #1 of the series that I'm about to send out.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines

But generally, I agree: the per-thread handling of fault_address and fault_code appears to be quite broken in the face of signal prioritisation and signals that don't correspond directly to hardware trap. It would be nice to have some tests for this...

If we want to pile on more bodges, perhaps we could stash the signal number to which the fault_{address,code} relate, and then check that at delivery and clear on a match. I hate it.

Quoted 7 lines

I agree with Daniel's suggestion in principle, but I was also concerned about whether it would be too invasive elsewhere.

Question though: does the core code take special care to make sure that a force_sig cannot be outprioritised by a regular signal? If so, perhaps we get away with it. I ask this, because the same same issue may be hitting other arches otherwise.

Quoted 4 lines

Not as far as I can tell. There does appear to be prioritisation for synchronous signals [1] but as far as I can tell nothing to distinguish one of these signals from one with the same signal number sent from userspace (e.g. via kill(2)).

Quoted 8 lines

The si_code will differ between signals generated between userspace and signals generated by the kernel.

We do allow a little bit of ptrace and sending to yourself to spoof kernel generated signals, for reasons of debugging and process migration where an existing process needs to be reconstructed. But the defenses should be strong enough you can assume that we reliably distinguish between a signal from userspace and a signal from the kernel.

So check for SIGBUS || SIGSEGV and one of the below si_codes, and only add the context in that case? Seems fragile to me, but I suppose I could live with it.

Quoted 3 lines

I don't fully follow what you are doing but this feels like the kind of case where a new si_code has been defined as well as additional fields in siginfo.

There is no new si_code for this, the information will be exposed for several existing si_code types (BUS_ADRERR, BUS_ADRALN, BUS_MCEERR_AR, SEGV_ACCERR, SEGV_MAPERR), and possibly others in the future (particularly SEGV_MTESERR, which is part of the proposed MTE patch set). Note that we already have a union field for BUS_MCEERR_AR, and we may want to expose it for the other si_codes that already have union fields as well.

That being said, taking a closer look at siginfo, I think we are in luck and we might be able to make this work in a reasonable way by reusing padding (see below).

Quoted 4 lines

In your patchset I really hate that you were going back to force_sig_info, and filling out struct siginfo by hand. That is an error prone pattern, and I have fixed enough bugs in the kernel to prove that.

To be fair, most of the callers are in helper functions that take explicit parameters similar to force_sig_fault et al, and the SIGILL one could easily be made that way as well.

Quoted 6 lines

I take exception to the idea that including the full address might break userspace. That means typically means someone has been too lazy to look and see what userspace is doing. When that userspace that might break is the same userspace you are changing the kernel to serve that makes me nervous. AKA the userspace that cares about this signal and how it is represented in siginfo.

It's not a matter of being lazy. This behaviour isn't just an accident but has been explicitly documented for years (see the tagged-pointers.rst file that I changed: "Non-zero tags are not preserved when delivering signals."), so users can reasonably rely on it. Furthermore we simply don't have visibility into the majority of userspace. For example, there are a lot of closed source Android apps out there, and who knows what signal handlers they're installing and how they're making use of the si_addr field on e.g. SEGV_MAPERR. We can't just change the documented semantics under their feet.

It's also not the same userspace either. The userspace that's initially going to be consuming the new fields is in a part of the Android system that handles and reports crashes, and that's something that we control unlike all the apps.

Finally, the userspace may need to know whether the tag bits were actually zero or whether they were just unavailable, otherwise userspace could for example produce a misleading crash report. Simply having the kernel set the top bits of si_addr wouldn't accomplish that due to the kernel's previous behaviour, hence the mask to let userspace know which bits are accurate.

Quoted 3 lines

A fix of one instance of SIGILL should not be included with a patch that does something else, and really should come before everything else if possible.

Fair point. I can see if I can split that part out.

Quoted 8 lines

If this information really belongs in struct siginfo (as it sounds like) please actually put the information in siginfo, and let userspace look in siginfo to find it. struct siginfo is a union with plenty of space, and plenty of si_codes.

If this applies to multiple cases then it might be trickier but please dig into the details, don't toss things into sigcontext just because you can't figure out a clean design for reporting this.

Quoted 11 lines

If we wanted this in siginfo, one idea that I had was to revert commit b68a68d3dcc15ebbf23cbe91af1abf57591bd96b and add unsigned char fields _addr_top_byte and _addr_top_byte_mask in the padding between _addr_lsb and the union (with comments on all the fields of course to say when they are filled in). I think that would work since we are already clearing padding in siginfo, one nice property of the new fields is that the zero values are correct in the case where the information isn't being exposed (so old kernels would already have the correct behaviour). That would only work on certain architectures (i.e. at least alignof(void*) >= 4) so I suppose it could have an #ifdef __aarch64__ around it.

Quoted 3 lines

Perhaps add a 4th padding member to the union inside of _sigfault, that adds something like 4 unsigned long's worth of data, and then have your fields after the union.

Maybe. I guess we could always add another union after my fields if we end up needing another union member that is larger than the 4 unsigned longs, which would be ugly but at least it would work. Reusing the padding would avoid that but maybe it's not that likely that we'll need that much.

Quoted 3 lines

Is it quite a bit of work to gather that information from the instructions that faulted? I am just checking that this work is really makes sense.

I think so. At a glance there are hundreds of load and store instructions on arm64 and we would need to know how to disassemble all of them and recompute the si_addr from scratch (since the tag bits could come from any of the registers used to compute the address). And we really don't want to be doing this tricky stuff in a signal handler where we've just crashed.

Quoted 3 lines

What I really don't understand is how well this problem generalizes to other architectures to tell if this is something other people need to solve at some point as well.

An architecture with a feature similar to ARM's TBI or MTE may need something like this as well, depending on whether they decide to expose the tag bits in si_addr from the start (and if the feature is similar to TBI it certainly seems like a reasonable choice to follow arm64 for compatibility reasons). I would imagine that the main thing that could vary between architectures is the number of bits involved, which suggests making the fields arch-specific (or making them larger, but that may be wasteful).

The only other architecture that I'm aware of with such a feature is SPARC (whose ADI is similar to MTE). The documentation [1] seems to suggest that the tag bits are available in si_addr but isn't very specific.

Peter

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/sparc/adi.rst

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#33 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v6] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

Quoted 187 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 180 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 165 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 82 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 74 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 50 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 48 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 46 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 32 lines · Dave Martin

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe(struct · line 653

Quoted 11 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +1 -0
index baa88dc02e5c..5867f2fdbe64 100644
@@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct
 rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
                __put_user_error(ESR_MAGIC, &esr_ctx->head.magic, err);
                __put_user_error(sizeof(*esr_ctx), &esr_ctx->head.size, err);
                __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code,
 &esr_ctx->esr, err);
+               current->thread.fault_code = 0;

Perhaps, but we'd need to be careful. For example, can we run out of user stack before this and deliver a SIGSEGV, but with the old fault_code still set? Then we'd emit the old fault code with the new "can't deliver signal" signal, which doesn't make sense.

Stuff may also go wrong with signal prioritisation.

If a higher-priority signal (say SIGINT) comes in after a data abort enters the kernel but before the resulting SIGSEGV is dequeued for delivery, wouldn't we deliver SIGINT first, with the bogus fault code? With your change we'd then have cleared the fault code by the time we deliver the SIGSEGV it actually relates to, if I've understood right.

Today, I think we just attach that fault code to every signal that's delivered until something overwrites or resets it, which means that a signal that needs fault_code gets it, at the expense of attaching it to a bunch of other random signals too.

Quoted 4 lines

Checking the signal number and si_code might help us to know what we should be doing with fault_code. We need to have sure userspace can't trick us with a non kernel generated signal here. It would also be necessary to check how PTRACE_SETSIGINFO interacts with this.

With these possible interactions in mind I think we should store the fault code and fault address in kernel_siginfo instead of thread_struct (and clear these fields when we receive a siginfo from userspace, i.e. in copy_siginfo_from_user which is used by ptrace(PTRACE_SETSIGINFO) among other places). That way, the information is clearly associated with the signal itself and not the thread, so we don't need to worry about our signal being delivered out of order.

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Hmm, I can't see a way to do that that isn't horribly invasive in the core signal code. Can you?

I think I've come up with a way that doesn't seem to be too invasive. See patch #1 of the series that I'm about to send out.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines

But generally, I agree: the per-thread handling of fault_address and fault_code appears to be quite broken in the face of signal prioritisation and signals that don't correspond directly to hardware trap. It would be nice to have some tests for this...

If we want to pile on more bodges, perhaps we could stash the signal number to which the fault_{address,code} relate, and then check that at delivery and clear on a match. I hate it.

Quoted 7 lines

I agree with Daniel's suggestion in principle, but I was also concerned about whether it would be too invasive elsewhere.

Question though: does the core code take special care to make sure that a force_sig cannot be outprioritised by a regular signal? If so, perhaps we get away with it. I ask this, because the same same issue may be hitting other arches otherwise.

Quoted 4 lines

Not as far as I can tell. There does appear to be prioritisation for synchronous signals [1] but as far as I can tell nothing to distinguish one of these signals from one with the same signal number sent from userspace (e.g. via kill(2)).

Quoted 8 lines

The si_code will differ between signals generated between userspace and signals generated by the kernel.

We do allow a little bit of ptrace and sending to yourself to spoof kernel generated signals, for reasons of debugging and process migration where an existing process needs to be reconstructed. But the defenses should be strong enough you can assume that we reliably distinguish between a signal from userspace and a signal from the kernel.

So check for SIGBUS || SIGSEGV and one of the below si_codes, and only add the context in that case? Seems fragile to me, but I suppose I could live with it.

Quoted 3 lines

I don't fully follow what you are doing but this feels like the kind of case where a new si_code has been defined as well as additional fields in siginfo.

There is no new si_code for this, the information will be exposed for several existing si_code types (BUS_ADRERR, BUS_ADRALN, BUS_MCEERR_AR, SEGV_ACCERR, SEGV_MAPERR), and possibly others in the future (particularly SEGV_MTESERR, which is part of the proposed MTE patch set). Note that we already have a union field for BUS_MCEERR_AR, and we may want to expose it for the other si_codes that already have union fields as well.

That being said, taking a closer look at siginfo, I think we are in luck and we might be able to make this work in a reasonable way by reusing padding (see below).

Quoted 4 lines

In your patchset I really hate that you were going back to force_sig_info, and filling out struct siginfo by hand. That is an error prone pattern, and I have fixed enough bugs in the kernel to prove that.

To be fair, most of the callers are in helper functions that take explicit parameters similar to force_sig_fault et al, and the SIGILL one could easily be made that way as well.

Quoted 6 lines

I take exception to the idea that including the full address might break userspace. That means typically means someone has been too lazy to look and see what userspace is doing. When that userspace that might break is the same userspace you are changing the kernel to serve that makes me nervous. AKA the userspace that cares about this signal and how it is represented in siginfo.

It's not a matter of being lazy. This behaviour isn't just an accident but has been explicitly documented for years (see the tagged-pointers.rst file that I changed: "Non-zero tags are not preserved when delivering signals."), so users can reasonably rely on it. Furthermore we simply don't have visibility into the majority of userspace. For example, there are a lot of closed source Android apps out there, and who knows what signal handlers they're installing and how they're making use of the si_addr field on e.g. SEGV_MAPERR. We can't just change the documented semantics under their feet.

It's also not the same userspace either. The userspace that's initially going to be consuming the new fields is in a part of the Android system that handles and reports crashes, and that's something that we control unlike all the apps.

Finally, the userspace may need to know whether the tag bits were actually zero or whether they were just unavailable, otherwise userspace could for example produce a misleading crash report. Simply having the kernel set the top bits of si_addr wouldn't accomplish that due to the kernel's previous behaviour, hence the mask to let userspace know which bits are accurate.

Quoted 3 lines

A fix of one instance of SIGILL should not be included with a patch that does something else, and really should come before everything else if possible.

Fair point. I can see if I can split that part out.

Quoted 8 lines

If this information really belongs in struct siginfo (as it sounds like) please actually put the information in siginfo, and let userspace look in siginfo to find it. struct siginfo is a union with plenty of space, and plenty of si_codes.

If this applies to multiple cases then it might be trickier but please dig into the details, don't toss things into sigcontext just because you can't figure out a clean design for reporting this.

Quoted 11 lines

If we wanted this in siginfo, one idea that I had was to revert commit b68a68d3dcc15ebbf23cbe91af1abf57591bd96b and add unsigned char fields _addr_top_byte and _addr_top_byte_mask in the padding between _addr_lsb and the union (with comments on all the fields of course to say when they are filled in). I think that would work since we are already clearing padding in siginfo, one nice property of the new fields is that the zero values are correct in the case where the information isn't being exposed (so old kernels would already have the correct behaviour). That would only work on certain architectures (i.e. at least alignof(void*) >= 4) so I suppose it could have an #ifdef __aarch64__ around it.

Quoted 3 lines

Perhaps add a 4th padding member to the union inside of _sigfault, that adds something like 4 unsigned long's worth of data, and then have your fields after the union.

Quoted 5 lines

Maybe. I guess we could always add another union after my fields if we end up needing another union member that is larger than the 4 unsigned longs, which would be ugly but at least it would work. Reusing the padding would avoid that but maybe it's not that likely that we'll need that much.

In the interests of getting the discussion on this started again I'm sending a v7 which moves the fields into the padding bytes after si_addr_lsb. It should be easy to switch to another location in siginfo if you don't like this one.

Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Is it quite a bit of work to gather that information from the instructions that faulted? I am just checking that this work is really makes sense.

I think so. At a glance there are hundreds of load and store instructions on arm64 and we would need to know how to disassemble all of them and recompute the si_addr from scratch (since the tag bits could come from any of the registers used to compute the address). And we really don't want to be doing this tricky stuff in a signal handler where we've just crashed.

Quoted 3 lines

What I really don't understand is how well this problem generalizes to other architectures to tell if this is something other people need to solve at some point as well.

Quoted 8 lines

An architecture with a feature similar to ARM's TBI or MTE may need something like this as well, depending on whether they decide to expose the tag bits in si_addr from the start (and if the feature is similar to TBI it certainly seems like a reasonable choice to follow arm64 for compatibility reasons). I would imagine that the main thing that could vary between architectures is the number of bits involved, which suggests making the fields arch-specific (or making them larger, but that may be wasteful).

I made the new fields arch-specific given the points that I made above.

Peter

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#34 lore raw

PATCH v7 1/1 arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a new aarch64-specific union field in siginfo, and store the tag bits of FAR_EL1 there, together with a mask specifying which bits are valid.

The new fields are laid out in a part of siginfo that is currently unused due to having previously been used for padding between si_addr_lsb and the union. Existing kernels will zero-initialize the padding, setting both fields to 0, which is a valid value for the fields.

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

---
v7:
- switch to a new siginfo field instead of using sigcontext
- merge the patch back into one since the other patches are now unnecessary

v6:
- move fault address and fault code into the kernel_siginfo data structure
- split the patch in three since it was getting large and now has generic and arch-specific parts

v5:
- add padding to fault_addr_top_byte_context in order to ensure the correct size and preserve sp alignment

v4:
- expose only the tag bits in the context instead of the entire FAR_EL1
- remove mention of the new context from the sigcontext.__reserved[] note

v3:
- add documentation to tagged-pointers.rst
- update comments in sigcontext.h

v2:
- revert changes to hw_breakpoint.c
- rename set_thread_esr to set_thread_far_esr

 Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst | 17 +++++---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h      |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/traps.h          |  7 +++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c      |  4 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c        |  2 -
 arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c              |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c               | 35 ++++++++++++----
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                   | 54 ++++++++++++++-----------
 include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h      | 12 ++++++
 9 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.rst +11 -6
index eab4323609b9..f1880ed5cdf2 100644
@@ -53,12 +53,17 @@ visibility.
 Preserving tags
 ---------------
 
-Non-zero tags are not preserved when delivering signals. This means that
-signal handlers in applications making use of tags cannot rely on the
-tag information for user virtual addresses being maintained for fields
-inside siginfo_t. One exception to this rule is for signals raised in
-response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the tag information will
-be preserved.
+Non-zero tags are not preserved in the fault address fields
+siginfo.si_addr or sigcontext.fault_address when delivering
+signals. This means that signal handlers in applications making use
+of tags cannot rely on the tag information for user virtual addresses
+being maintained in these fields. One exception to this rule is for
+signals raised in response to watchpoint debug exceptions, where the
+tag information will be preserved.
+
+The fault address tag is preserved in the si_addr_top_byte field of
+siginfo, which is set for signals raised in response to data aborts
+and instruction aborts.
 
 The architecture prevents the use of a tagged PC, so the upper byte will
 be set to a sign-extension of bit 55 on exception return.
arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h +1 -1
index 7a6e81ca23a8..90e772d9b2cd 100644
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static inline u32 disr_to_esr(u64 disr)
 }
 
 asmlinkage void enter_from_user_mode(void);
-void do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
+void do_mem_abort(unsigned long far, unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
 void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs);
 asmlinkage void bad_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr);
 void do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr_if_watchpoint, unsigned int esr,
arch/arm64/include/asm/traps.h +5 -2
index cee5928e1b7d..8e4f6c5b97af 100644
@@ -26,8 +26,11 @@ void register_undef_hook(struct undef_hook *hook);
 void unregister_undef_hook(struct undef_hook *hook);
 void force_signal_inject(int signal, int code, unsigned long address);
 void arm64_notify_segfault(unsigned long addr);
-void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr, const char *str);
-void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb, const char *str);
+void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+			   unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
+			   const char *str);
+void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
+			    unsigned long far, const char *str);
 void arm64_force_sig_ptrace_errno_trap(int errno, void __user *addr, const char *str);
 
 /*
arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c +2 -2
index 48222a4760c2..498e6393b2ca 100644
@@ -232,8 +232,8 @@ static void send_user_sigtrap(int si_code)
 		local_irq_enable();
 
 	arm64_force_sig_fault(SIGTRAP, si_code,
-			     (void __user *)instruction_pointer(regs),
-			     "User debug trap");
+			      (void __user *)instruction_pointer(regs), 0, 0,
+			      "User debug trap");
 }
 
 static int single_step_handler(unsigned long unused, unsigned int esr,
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +0 -2
index c839b5bf1904..045b4f518836 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ static void notrace el1_abort(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 	unsigned long far = read_sysreg(far_el1);
 
 	local_daif_inherit(regs);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el1_abort);
@@ -104,7 +103,6 @@ static void notrace el0_da(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 
 	user_exit_irqoff();
 	local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
-	far = untagged_addr(far);
 	do_mem_abort(far, esr, regs);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(el0_da);
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -1
index b3d3005d9515..51bb8bcaf24b 100644
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ static void ptrace_hbptriggered(struct perf_event *bp,
 	}
 #endif
 	arm64_force_sig_fault(SIGTRAP, TRAP_HWBKPT,
-			      (void __user *)(bkpt->trigger),
+			      (void __user *)(bkpt->trigger), 0, 0,
 			      desc);
 }
 
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +28 -7
index cf402be5c573..53ddeb8bde0b 100644
@@ -234,20 +234,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+			   unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
 			   const char *str)
 {
 	arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
-	if (signo == SIGKILL)
+	if (signo == SIGKILL) {
 		force_sig(SIGKILL);
-	else
-		force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+	} else {
+		struct kernel_siginfo info;
+		clear_siginfo(&info);
+		info.si_signo = signo;
+		info.si_errno = 0;
+		info.si_code = code;
+		info.si_addr = addr;
+		info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+		info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+		force_sig_info(&info);
+	}
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
-			    const char *str)
+			    unsigned long far, const char *str)
 {
+	struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
 	arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
-	force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+
+	clear_siginfo(&info);
+	info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+	info.si_errno = 0;
+	info.si_code = code;
+	info.si_addr = addr;
+	info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
+	info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+	info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+	force_sig_info(&info);
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_ptrace_errno_trap(int errno, void __user *addr,
@@ -266,7 +287,7 @@ void arm64_notify_die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs,
 		current->thread.fault_address = 0;
 		current->thread.fault_code = err;
 
-		arm64_force_sig_fault(signo, sicode, addr, str);
+		arm64_force_sig_fault(signo, sicode, addr, 0, 0, str);
 	} else {
 		die(str, regs, err);
 	}
@@ -816,7 +837,7 @@ void bad_el0_sync(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr)
 	current->thread.fault_address = 0;
 	current->thread.fault_code = esr;
 
-	arm64_force_sig_fault(SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, pc,
+	arm64_force_sig_fault(SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, pc, 0, 0,
 			      "Bad EL0 synchronous exception");
 }
 
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +30 -24

159 lines not on this page · raw message

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +12 -0
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
 				char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
 				__u32 _pkey;
 			} _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+			/* used with all si_codes */
+			struct {
+				short _dummy_top_byte;
+				unsigned char _top_byte;
+				unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+			} _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
 		};
 	} _sigfault;
 
@@ -148,6 +156,10 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
 #define si_int		_sifields._rt._sigval.sival_int
 #define si_ptr		_sifields._rt._sigval.sival_ptr
 #define si_addr		_sifields._sigfault._addr
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+#define si_addr_top_byte	_sifields._sigfault._addr_top_byte._top_byte
+#define si_addr_top_byte_mask	_sifields._sigfault._addr_top_byte._top_byte_mask
+#endif
 #ifdef __ARCH_SI_TRAPNO
 #define si_trapno	_sifields._sigfault._trapno
 #endif
Signature · 7 lines
2.27.0.278.ge193c7cf3a9-goog


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#37 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 47 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 45 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +23 -5
index 47f651df781c..a8380a2b6361 100644
@@ -235,20 +235,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+			   unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
 			   const char *str)
 {
 	arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
-	if (signo == SIGKILL)
+	if (signo == SIGKILL) {
 		force_sig(SIGKILL);
-	else
-		force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+	} else {
+		struct kernel_siginfo info;
+		clear_siginfo(&info);
+		info.si_signo = signo;
+		info.si_errno = 0;
+		info.si_code = code;
+		info.si_addr = addr;
+		info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+		info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+		force_sig_info(&info);
+	}
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
-			    const char *str)
+			    unsigned long far, const char *str)
 {
+	struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
 	arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
-	force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+
+	clear_siginfo(&info);
+	info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+	info.si_errno = 0;
+	info.si_code = code;
+	info.si_addr = addr;
+	info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
Quoted 8 lines

arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str) · line 272

Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +3 -0
+	info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+	info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+	force_sig_info(&info);
 }

I have a real problem with this construction. force_sig_info is not an interface that should be used for anything except to define a wrapper that takes it's parameters.

Can you elaborate? How would you do this king of thing.

AIUI we absolutely need a forced signal here, we need to supply metadata, and we don't have to open-code all that at every relevant signal generation site...

Quoted 1 line

It is not clear to me that if you have adapted siginfo_layout.

Garbled sentence?

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
Quoted 8 lines

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 97

Quoted 8 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
 				char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
 				__u32 _pkey;
 			} _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+			/* used with all si_codes */
+			struct {
+				short _dummy_top_byte;

^ What's this for? I don't have Eric's insight here.

Quoted 10 lines

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 104

Quoted 7 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
+				unsigned char _top_byte;
+				unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+			} _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
 		};
 	} _sigfault;
 

Why the _dummy_top_byte? Oh I see it should be spelled "short _addr_lsb;".

Quoted 4 lines

Please remove the "#ifdef __aarch64__". If at all possible we want to design this so any other architecture who has this challenge can use the code. The kind of code does not get enough attention/maintenance if it is built for a single architecture.

Does this belong in the user-facing siginfo? It seems a bit strange, when other closely-related information such as esr_context is in the arch-specific signal frame.

If trying to make this reusable, I wonder if we should have some sort of "address attributes" field.

An alternative approach would be to add some opaque "arch_data" field, that the arch code can go look at when delivering the signal.

I think that's all we were trying to achieve here: tack some arch private data onto the signal, to avoid having to stash the same info in thread_info and pray that it doesn't get clobbered in between signal generation and delivery.

At signal delivery time, the arch signal delivery code could inspect this data and emit it into the signal frame as appropriate for the arch.

[...]

Cheers
---Dave

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#38 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 57 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 47 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 45 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +23 -5
index 47f651df781c..a8380a2b6361 100644
@@ -235,20 +235,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+			   unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
 			   const char *str)
 {
 	arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
-	if (signo == SIGKILL)
+	if (signo == SIGKILL) {
 		force_sig(SIGKILL);
-	else
-		force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+	} else {
+		struct kernel_siginfo info;
+		clear_siginfo(&info);
+		info.si_signo = signo;
+		info.si_errno = 0;
+		info.si_code = code;
+		info.si_addr = addr;
+		info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+		info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+		force_sig_info(&info);
+	}
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
-			    const char *str)
+			    unsigned long far, const char *str)
 {
+	struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
 	arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
-	force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+
+	clear_siginfo(&info);
+	info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+	info.si_errno = 0;
+	info.si_code = code;
+	info.si_addr = addr;
+	info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
Quoted 8 lines

arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str) · line 272

Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +3 -0
+	info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+	info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+	force_sig_info(&info);
 }

I have a real problem with this construction. force_sig_info is not an interface that should be used for anything except to define a wrapper that takes it's parameters.

Quoted 1 line

Can you elaborate? How would you do this king of thing.

There are no other uses of force_sig_info in architecture code.

I just removed them _all_ because they were almost all broken. In fact your mcerr case is broken because it uses two different union members simultantiously.

So I am looking for something like force_sig_mcerr or force_sig_fault that includes your new information that then calls force_sig_info.

I know of no other way to safely use the siginfo struct.

Quoted 7 lines

AIUI we absolutely need a forced signal here, we need to supply metadata, and we don't have to open-code all that at every relevant signal generation site...

Quoted 1 line

It is not clear to me that if you have adapted siginfo_layout.

Garbled sentence?

Looks like. One of the pieces of code that needs to change when siginfo gets updated is siginfo_layout so that the structure can be properly decoded and made sense of.

I am not seeing anything like that.

Quoted 35 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
Quoted 8 lines

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 97

Quoted 8 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
 				char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
 				__u32 _pkey;
 			} _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+			/* used with all si_codes */
+			struct {
+				short _dummy_top_byte;

^ What's this for? I don't have Eric's insight here.

Quoted 10 lines

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 104

Quoted 7 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
+				unsigned char _top_byte;
+				unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+			} _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
 		};
 	} _sigfault;
 

Why the _dummy_top_byte? Oh I see it should be spelled "short _addr_lsb;".

Quoted 4 lines

Please remove the "#ifdef __aarch64__". If at all possible we want to design this so any other architecture who has this challenge can use the code. The kind of code does not get enough attention/maintenance if it is built for a single architecture.

Does this belong in the user-facing siginfo? It seems a bit strange, when other closely-related information such as esr_context is in the arch-specific signal frame.

Quoted 5 lines

If trying to make this reusable, I wonder if we should have some sort of "address attributes" field.

An alternative approach would be to add some opaque "arch_data" field, that the arch code can go look at when delivering the signal.

My point is arch specific hacks don't get looked at, and wind up being broken. So I am not encouraging anything that doesn't get looked at, and winds up being broken.

Quoted 4 lines

I think that's all we were trying to achieve here: tack some arch private data onto the signal, to avoid having to stash the same info in thread_info and pray that it doesn't get clobbered in between signal generation and delivery.

What makes it arch private data? Why isn't it just data that your arch happens to have that other architectures don't yet.

Quoted 3 lines

At signal delivery time, the arch signal delivery code could inspect this data and emit it into the signal frame as appropriate for the arch.

Sorry this probably isn't what you mean but when I read that description I get the feeling that you are asking for code that won't be reviewed or looked at by anyone else. So inevitably that code will be broken. Frankly it is bad enough finding people to review and maintain the generic code of the kernel.

With that said, and your desire for this data to go into the sigframe (despite it sounding a lot like generic data that only aarch64 has implemented yet) can you remind me why siginfo comes into the equation at all?

Last I remember the discussion there were some issues and the plan was to simply solve the problem generically and use siginfo, and there would not need to be any sigframe changes.

But if you want to deliver via sigframe force_sig_info and all it's variants will be delivered when the kernel returns back to userspace. So there should be no need to touch siginfo or anything else in that scenario.

Eric

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

#39 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 60 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 57 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 55 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 39 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +17 -5
index 47f651df781c..a8380a2b6361 100644
@@ -235,20 +235,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+                     unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
                      const char *str)
 {
   arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
-  if (signo == SIGKILL)
+  if (signo == SIGKILL) {
           force_sig(SIGKILL);
-  else
-          force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+  } else {
+          struct kernel_siginfo info;
+          clear_siginfo(&info);
+          info.si_signo = signo;
+          info.si_errno = 0;
+          info.si_code = code;
+          info.si_addr = addr;
+          info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+          info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+          force_sig_info(&info);
+  }
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
-                      const char *str)
+                      unsigned long far, const char *str)
 {
+  struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
   arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
-  force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+

arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str) · line 273

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +9 -0
+  clear_siginfo(&info);
+  info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+  info.si_errno = 0;
+  info.si_code = code;
+  info.si_addr = addr;
+  info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
+  info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+  info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+  force_sig_info(&info);
 }

I have a real problem with this construction. force_sig_info is not an interface that should be used for anything except to define a wrapper that takes it's parameters.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Can you elaborate? How would you do this king of thing.

There are no other uses of force_sig_info in architecture code.

I just removed them _all_ because they were almost all broken. In fact your mcerr case is broken because it uses two different union members simultantiously.

Is that really broken? I thought that the Linux kernel deliberately didn't care about strict aliasing rules (the top-level Makefile passes -fno-strict-aliasing) so I thought that it was valid in "Linux kernel C" even though from a standards point of view it is invalid. (That being said, this is probably moot with my proposed changes below though.)

Quoted 4 lines

So I am looking for something like force_sig_mcerr or force_sig_fault that includes your new information that then calls force_sig_info.

I know of no other way to safely use the siginfo struct.

So you want something like:

int force_sig_fault_with_ignored_bits(int signo, int code, void __user *addr, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask); int force_sig_mceerr_with_ignored_bits(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);

in kernel/signal.c and the code in arch/arm64 would call that?

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

AIUI we absolutely need a forced signal here, we need to supply metadata, and we don't have to open-code all that at every relevant signal generation site...

Quoted 1 line

It is not clear to me that if you have adapted siginfo_layout.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Garbled sentence?

Looks like. One of the pieces of code that needs to change when siginfo gets updated is siginfo_layout so that the structure can be properly decoded and made sense of.

I am not seeing anything like that.

Okay, this has to do with copying between the compat and non-compat versions of the struct? Sure, I can update that, although the code would be basically non-functional on arm64 because TBI isn't supported on 32-bit ARM.

Quoted 6 lines
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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
                           char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
Quoted 8 lines
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Quoted 6 lines

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 97

Quoted 6 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
                           __u32 _pkey;
                   } _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+                  /* used with all si_codes */
+                  struct {
+                          short _dummy_top_byte;

^ What's this for? I don't have Eric's insight here.

We would need a short's worth of padding in order to prevent the fields from occupying the same address as si_addr_lsb.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
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Quoted 8 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
+                          unsigned char _top_byte;
+                          unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+                  } _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
           };
   } _sigfault;
 
Quoted 6 lines
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Why the _dummy_top_byte? Oh I see it should be spelled "short _addr_lsb;".

Please remove the "#ifdef __aarch64__". If at all possible we want to design this so any other architecture who has this challenge can use the code. The kind of code does not get enough attention/maintenance if it is built for a single architecture.

Seems reasonable. I was recently made aware that RISC-V was considering a similar feature:
https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-tee/topic/risc_v_tbi_proposal/72855478
I would have opted to expand this to other architectures on an as-needed basis, but I'd also be fine with having it on all architectures from the start.

If we make this arch-independent, we have an additional concern, which is "what if some future architecture wants more than one byte here?" For example, an architecture may have a "top-two-bytes-ignore" feature, which would imply two-byte (misnamed) "si_addr_top_byte" and "si_addr_top_byte_mask" fields. And the RISC-V proposal potentially implies many more ignored bits (see slide 13 of the presentation). The maximum size that these fields can possibly be is the size of a pointer, and with that there wouldn't be enough room in the padding at this point to accommodate the new fields.

That basically implies your earlier suggestion of adding a union member here to accommodate future expansion of the union, and adding the new fields after the union. I'm happy to make that change, with the fields renamed "si_addr_ignored" and "si_addr_ignored_mask".

Quoted 40 lines
Quoted 11 lines

Does this belong in the user-facing siginfo? It seems a bit strange, when other closely-related information such as esr_context is in the arch-specific signal frame.

If trying to make this reusable, I wonder if we should have some sort of "address attributes" field.

An alternative approach would be to add some opaque "arch_data" field, that the arch code can go look at when delivering the signal.

My point is arch specific hacks don't get looked at, and wind up being broken. So I am not encouraging anything that doesn't get looked at, and winds up being broken.

Quoted 4 lines

I think that's all we were trying to achieve here: tack some arch private data onto the signal, to avoid having to stash the same info in thread_info and pray that it doesn't get clobbered in between signal generation and delivery.

What makes it arch private data? Why isn't it just data that your arch happens to have that other architectures don't yet.

Quoted 3 lines

At signal delivery time, the arch signal delivery code could inspect this data and emit it into the signal frame as appropriate for the arch.

Sorry this probably isn't what you mean but when I read that description I get the feeling that you are asking for code that won't be reviewed or looked at by anyone else. So inevitably that code will be broken. Frankly it is bad enough finding people to review and maintain the generic code of the kernel.

With that said, and your desire for this data to go into the sigframe (despite it sounding a lot like generic data that only aarch64 has implemented yet) can you remind me why siginfo comes into the equation at all?

Quoted 8 lines

Last I remember the discussion there were some issues and the plan was to simply solve the problem generically and use siginfo, and there would not need to be any sigframe changes.

But if you want to deliver via sigframe force_sig_info and all it's variants will be delivered when the kernel returns back to userspace. So there should be no need to touch siginfo or anything else in that scenario.

My understanding is that siginfo should contain information about the signal itself, while sigcontext should contain any information about the machine state at the point when the signal was delivered that is needed in order to restore the state after returning from a signal handler. The fault address isn't really part of the restorable machine state (despite the existence of a "fault_address" field in sigcontext), so any information relating to it belongs (at least morally) in siginfo.

Peter

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

#40 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 70 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 60 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 57 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 55 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 39 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +17 -5
index 47f651df781c..a8380a2b6361 100644
@@ -235,20 +235,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+                     unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
                      const char *str)
 {
   arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
-  if (signo == SIGKILL)
+  if (signo == SIGKILL) {
           force_sig(SIGKILL);
-  else
-          force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+  } else {
+          struct kernel_siginfo info;
+          clear_siginfo(&info);
+          info.si_signo = signo;
+          info.si_errno = 0;
+          info.si_code = code;
+          info.si_addr = addr;
+          info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+          info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+          force_sig_info(&info);
+  }
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
-                      const char *str)
+                      unsigned long far, const char *str)
 {
+  struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
   arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
-  force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+

arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str) · line 273

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +9 -0
+  clear_siginfo(&info);
+  info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+  info.si_errno = 0;
+  info.si_code = code;
+  info.si_addr = addr;
+  info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
+  info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+  info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+  force_sig_info(&info);
 }

I have a real problem with this construction. force_sig_info is not an interface that should be used for anything except to define a wrapper that takes it's parameters.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Can you elaborate? How would you do this king of thing.

There are no other uses of force_sig_info in architecture code.

I just removed them _all_ because they were almost all broken. In fact your mcerr case is broken because it uses two different union members simultantiously.

Quoted 6 lines

Is that really broken? I thought that the Linux kernel deliberately didn't care about strict aliasing rules (the top-level Makefile passes -fno-strict-aliasing) so I thought that it was valid in "Linux kernel C" even though from a standards point of view it is invalid. (That being said, this is probably moot with my proposed changes below though.)

I have a feeling that -fno-strict-aliasing only allows you to _read_ a different union member from the one previously written.

Writing a different member from the last one written can still splatter on the other members IIUC.

It would be better to keep things separate rather than risk incorrectness just to save a few bytes.

IMHO -fno-strict-aliasing is no excuse for gratuitous type-punning.

Quoted 84 lines
Quoted 4 lines

So I am looking for something like force_sig_mcerr or force_sig_fault that includes your new information that then calls force_sig_info.

I know of no other way to safely use the siginfo struct.

So you want something like:

int force_sig_fault_with_ignored_bits(int signo, int code, void __user *addr, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask); int force_sig_mceerr_with_ignored_bits(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);

in kernel/signal.c and the code in arch/arm64 would call that?

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

AIUI we absolutely need a forced signal here, we need to supply metadata, and we don't have to open-code all that at every relevant signal generation site...

Quoted 1 line

It is not clear to me that if you have adapted siginfo_layout.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Garbled sentence?

Looks like. One of the pieces of code that needs to change when siginfo gets updated is siginfo_layout so that the structure can be properly decoded and made sense of.

I am not seeing anything like that.

Okay, this has to do with copying between the compat and non-compat versions of the struct? Sure, I can update that, although the code would be basically non-functional on arm64 because TBI isn't supported on 32-bit ARM.

Quoted 6 lines
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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
                           char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
Quoted 8 lines
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Quoted 6 lines

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 97

Quoted 6 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
                           __u32 _pkey;
                   } _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+                  /* used with all si_codes */
+                  struct {
+                          short _dummy_top_byte;

^ What's this for? I don't have Eric's insight here.

We would need a short's worth of padding in order to prevent the fields from occupying the same address as si_addr_lsb.

Quoted 9 lines
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Quoted 8 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
+                          unsigned char _top_byte;
+                          unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+                  } _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
           };
   } _sigfault;
 
Quoted 6 lines
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Why the _dummy_top_byte? Oh I see it should be spelled "short _addr_lsb;".

Please remove the "#ifdef __aarch64__". If at all possible we want to design this so any other architecture who has this challenge can use the code. The kind of code does not get enough attention/maintenance if it is built for a single architecture.

Seems reasonable. I was recently made aware that RISC-V was considering a similar feature:
https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-tee/topic/risc_v_tbi_proposal/72855478
I would have opted to expand this to other architectures on an as-needed basis, but I'd also be fine with having it on all architectures from the start.

If we make this arch-independent, we have an additional concern, which is "what if some future architecture wants more than one byte here?" For example, an architecture may have a "top-two-bytes-ignore" feature, which would imply two-byte (misnamed) "si_addr_top_byte" and "si_addr_top_byte_mask" fields. And the RISC-V proposal potentially implies many more ignored bits (see slide 13 of the presentation). The maximum size that these fields can possibly be is the size of a pointer, and with that there wouldn't be enough room in the padding at this point to accommodate the new fields.

Quoted 4 lines

That basically implies your earlier suggestion of adding a union member here to accommodate future expansion of the union, and adding the new fields after the union. I'm happy to make that change, with the fields renamed "si_addr_ignored" and "si_addr_ignored_mask".

I think what we need here is basically a flags word.

So long as we keep a flag spare to indicate the existence of a further flags word, we can extend as needed.

How the existence of the first flags words is detected is another problem. If it only applies for newly-defined si_code values, then I guess si_code may be sufficient.

Quoted 9 lines
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Does this belong in the user-facing siginfo? It seems a bit strange, when other closely-related information such as esr_context is in the arch-specific signal frame.

If trying to make this reusable, I wonder if we should have some sort of "address attributes" field.

Quoted 6 lines
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Quoted 2 lines

An alternative approach would be to add some opaque "arch_data" field, that the arch code can go look at when delivering the signal.

My point is arch specific hacks don't get looked at, and wind up being broken. So I am not encouraging anything that doesn't get looked at, and winds up being broken.

Arch code will get looked at, and is automatically inherently broken. Nor is the core code always perfect...

I agree that generic is best, both for getting more eyes on it and for coming up with a clean design, but there's also a risk of pointless over-abstraction for things that just aren't generic enough.

Part of the issue is that each arch necessarily has its own way of dumping its register state, while siginfo contains abstract diagnostic information. The boundary between these two is not clear-cut: for example, arm64 dumps its exception syndrome register which contains (among other things) imformation about whether a faulted access was a read or write. Is this generic information, or arch-specific information?

A side problem is that siginfo_t as originally designed is quite hard to extend.

AFAICT, any extension needs a new si_code, otherwise there is no way to detect that the extension fields are present. This is fine for defining entirely new signal types, but seems to make it hard to add supplementary information for existing signals. Have I missed something here?

Say we wanted to add extra data for SIGSEGV to indicate the size of access and whether it was a read or write. If we try to add a new si_code for this, then all software that inspects si_code at all for SIGSEGV now has no idea what to do with this new si_code.

Reading between the lines, I wonder whether this is part of the reason arches tend to go their own way: such information can't be added generically precisely because it _is_ generic -- too generic to justify a new si_code. If so, this problem is going to crop up again and again...

Quoted 7 lines
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I think that's all we were trying to achieve here: tack some arch private data onto the signal, to avoid having to stash the same info in thread_info and pray that it doesn't get clobbered in between signal generation and delivery.

What makes it arch private data? Why isn't it just data that your arch happens to have that other architectures don't yet.

I didn't mean it must be private, just that it can be.

Quoted 9 lines
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Quoted 3 lines

At signal delivery time, the arch signal delivery code could inspect this data and emit it into the signal frame as appropriate for the arch.

Sorry this probably isn't what you mean but when I read that description I get the feeling that you are asking for code that won't be reviewed or looked at by anyone else. So inevitably that code will be broken. Frankly it is bad enough finding people to review and maintain the generic code of the kernel.

Does this need flag up to the arch maintainers? Signal code has been heavily arch-specific for ages, and that's where the force of gravity seems to point. I a lot of work has gone into cleaning this up, but it sounds like arch maintainers might need to push back harder on anything that _could_ be done in the common code.

Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 5 lines

With that said, and your desire for this data to go into the sigframe (despite it sounding a lot like generic data that only aarch64 has implemented yet) can you remind me why siginfo comes into the equation at all?

Quoted 8 lines

Last I remember the discussion there were some issues and the plan was to simply solve the problem generically and use siginfo, and there would not need to be any sigframe changes.

But if you want to deliver via sigframe force_sig_info and all it's variants will be delivered when the kernel returns back to userspace. So there should be no need to touch siginfo or anything else in that scenario.

Quoted 8 lines

My understanding is that siginfo should contain information about the signal itself, while sigcontext should contain any information about the machine state at the point when the signal was delivered that is needed in order to restore the state after returning from a signal handler. The fault address isn't really part of the restorable machine state (despite the existence of a "fault_address" field in sigcontext), so any information relating to it belongs (at least morally) in siginfo.

I think this is more than just a principle.

Diagnostic information that is supposed to accompany a signal needs to be captured at the time the signal is generated, otherwise it may have been overwritten by another signal-generating event by the time the first signal is actually delivered.

Currently this isn't handled properly in the arm64 code, so it looks like some diagnostic fields in the arm64 signal frame can be wrong in some situations. (I know, that's your "non-generic code that hardly anyone relies on will be broken" argument. But the need to keep diagnostic information with the signal instance it relates to feels like a generic problem.)

I have no objection to finding a generic way to report the address tag information, but "address tag" is not the most generic concept in the world, even if there are a few arches with something analogous.

Cheers
---Dave

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#41 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 179 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 70 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 60 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 57 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 55 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 39 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +17 -5
index 47f651df781c..a8380a2b6361 100644
@@ -235,20 +235,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+                     unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
                      const char *str)
 {
   arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
-  if (signo == SIGKILL)
+  if (signo == SIGKILL) {
           force_sig(SIGKILL);
-  else
-          force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+  } else {
+          struct kernel_siginfo info;
+          clear_siginfo(&info);
+          info.si_signo = signo;
+          info.si_errno = 0;
+          info.si_code = code;
+          info.si_addr = addr;
+          info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+          info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+          force_sig_info(&info);
+  }
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
-                      const char *str)
+                      unsigned long far, const char *str)
 {
+  struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
   arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
-  force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+

arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str) · line 273

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +9 -0
+  clear_siginfo(&info);
+  info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+  info.si_errno = 0;
+  info.si_code = code;
+  info.si_addr = addr;
+  info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
+  info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+  info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+  force_sig_info(&info);
 }

I have a real problem with this construction. force_sig_info is not an interface that should be used for anything except to define a wrapper that takes it's parameters.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Can you elaborate? How would you do this king of thing.

There are no other uses of force_sig_info in architecture code.

I just removed them _all_ because they were almost all broken. In fact your mcerr case is broken because it uses two different union members simultantiously.

Quoted 6 lines

Is that really broken? I thought that the Linux kernel deliberately didn't care about strict aliasing rules (the top-level Makefile passes -fno-strict-aliasing) so I thought that it was valid in "Linux kernel C" even though from a standards point of view it is invalid. (That being said, this is probably moot with my proposed changes below though.)

I have a feeling that -fno-strict-aliasing only allows you to _read_ a different union member from the one previously written.

Writing a different member from the last one written can still splatter on the other members IIUC.

It would be better to keep things separate rather than risk incorrectness just to save a few bytes.

IMHO -fno-strict-aliasing is no excuse for gratuitous type-punning.

Quoted 84 lines
Quoted 4 lines

So I am looking for something like force_sig_mcerr or force_sig_fault that includes your new information that then calls force_sig_info.

I know of no other way to safely use the siginfo struct.

So you want something like:

int force_sig_fault_with_ignored_bits(int signo, int code, void __user *addr, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask); int force_sig_mceerr_with_ignored_bits(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);

in kernel/signal.c and the code in arch/arm64 would call that?

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

AIUI we absolutely need a forced signal here, we need to supply metadata, and we don't have to open-code all that at every relevant signal generation site...

Quoted 1 line

It is not clear to me that if you have adapted siginfo_layout.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Garbled sentence?

Looks like. One of the pieces of code that needs to change when siginfo gets updated is siginfo_layout so that the structure can be properly decoded and made sense of.

I am not seeing anything like that.

Okay, this has to do with copying between the compat and non-compat versions of the struct? Sure, I can update that, although the code would be basically non-functional on arm64 because TBI isn't supported on 32-bit ARM.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
                           char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 97

Quoted 6 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
                           __u32 _pkey;
                   } _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+                  /* used with all si_codes */
+                  struct {
+                          short _dummy_top_byte;

^ What's this for? I don't have Eric's insight here.

We would need a short's worth of padding in order to prevent the fields from occupying the same address as si_addr_lsb.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
+                          unsigned char _top_byte;
+                          unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+                  } _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
           };
   } _sigfault;
 
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Why the _dummy_top_byte? Oh I see it should be spelled "short _addr_lsb;".

Please remove the "#ifdef __aarch64__". If at all possible we want to design this so any other architecture who has this challenge can use the code. The kind of code does not get enough attention/maintenance if it is built for a single architecture.

Seems reasonable. I was recently made aware that RISC-V was considering a similar feature:
https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-tee/topic/risc_v_tbi_proposal/72855478
I would have opted to expand this to other architectures on an as-needed basis, but I'd also be fine with having it on all architectures from the start.

If we make this arch-independent, we have an additional concern, which is "what if some future architecture wants more than one byte here?" For example, an architecture may have a "top-two-bytes-ignore" feature, which would imply two-byte (misnamed) "si_addr_top_byte" and "si_addr_top_byte_mask" fields. And the RISC-V proposal potentially implies many more ignored bits (see slide 13 of the presentation). The maximum size that these fields can possibly be is the size of a pointer, and with that there wouldn't be enough room in the padding at this point to accommodate the new fields.

Quoted 4 lines

That basically implies your earlier suggestion of adding a union member here to accommodate future expansion of the union, and adding the new fields after the union. I'm happy to make that change, with the fields renamed "si_addr_ignored" and "si_addr_ignored_mask".

Quoted 8 lines

I think what we need here is basically a flags word.

So long as we keep a flag spare to indicate the existence of a further flags word, we can extend as needed.

How the existence of the first flags words is detected is another problem. If it only applies for newly-defined si_code values, then I guess si_code may be sufficient.

Existing kernels will zero-initialize unused regions of the siginfo data structure. The zero-initialization of the padding at the end of the struct is done by the clear_user call here:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/kernel/signal.c#L3193

and the zero-initialization of the padding between fields and unused union members is done by the clear_siginfo function which the kernel calls when initializing the data structure:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/include/linux/signal.h#L20

Therefore, a flag word value of 0 may be used to detect a lack of support for flagged fields.

That being said, in this particular case, we do not need a flag word. We can just take advantage of this zero-initialization behavior in existing kernels to set si_addr_ignored_mask to 0, which indicates that none of the bits in si_addr_ignored are valid.

Peter

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Does this belong in the user-facing siginfo? It seems a bit strange, when other closely-related information such as esr_context is in the arch-specific signal frame.

If trying to make this reusable, I wonder if we should have some sort of "address attributes" field.

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An alternative approach would be to add some opaque "arch_data" field, that the arch code can go look at when delivering the signal.

My point is arch specific hacks don't get looked at, and wind up being broken. So I am not encouraging anything that doesn't get looked at, and winds up being broken.

Arch code will get looked at, and is automatically inherently broken. Nor is the core code always perfect...

I agree that generic is best, both for getting more eyes on it and for coming up with a clean design, but there's also a risk of pointless over-abstraction for things that just aren't generic enough.

Part of the issue is that each arch necessarily has its own way of dumping its register state, while siginfo contains abstract diagnostic information. The boundary between these two is not clear-cut: for example, arm64 dumps its exception syndrome register which contains (among other things) imformation about whether a faulted access was a read or write. Is this generic information, or arch-specific information?

A side problem is that siginfo_t as originally designed is quite hard to extend.

AFAICT, any extension needs a new si_code, otherwise there is no way to detect that the extension fields are present. This is fine for defining entirely new signal types, but seems to make it hard to add supplementary information for existing signals. Have I missed something here?

Say we wanted to add extra data for SIGSEGV to indicate the size of access and whether it was a read or write. If we try to add a new si_code for this, then all software that inspects si_code at all for SIGSEGV now has no idea what to do with this new si_code.

Reading between the lines, I wonder whether this is part of the reason arches tend to go their own way: such information can't be added generically precisely because it _is_ generic -- too generic to justify a new si_code. If so, this problem is going to crop up again and again...

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I think that's all we were trying to achieve here: tack some arch private data onto the signal, to avoid having to stash the same info in thread_info and pray that it doesn't get clobbered in between signal generation and delivery.

What makes it arch private data? Why isn't it just data that your arch happens to have that other architectures don't yet.

I didn't mean it must be private, just that it can be.

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At signal delivery time, the arch signal delivery code could inspect this data and emit it into the signal frame as appropriate for the arch.

Sorry this probably isn't what you mean but when I read that description I get the feeling that you are asking for code that won't be reviewed or looked at by anyone else. So inevitably that code will be broken. Frankly it is bad enough finding people to review and maintain the generic code of the kernel.

Does this need flag up to the arch maintainers? Signal code has been heavily arch-specific for ages, and that's where the force of gravity seems to point. I a lot of work has gone into cleaning this up, but it sounds like arch maintainers might need to push back harder on anything that _could_ be done in the common code.

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With that said, and your desire for this data to go into the sigframe (despite it sounding a lot like generic data that only aarch64 has implemented yet) can you remind me why siginfo comes into the equation at all?

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Last I remember the discussion there were some issues and the plan was to simply solve the problem generically and use siginfo, and there would not need to be any sigframe changes.

But if you want to deliver via sigframe force_sig_info and all it's variants will be delivered when the kernel returns back to userspace. So there should be no need to touch siginfo or anything else in that scenario.

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My understanding is that siginfo should contain information about the signal itself, while sigcontext should contain any information about the machine state at the point when the signal was delivered that is needed in order to restore the state after returning from a signal handler. The fault address isn't really part of the restorable machine state (despite the existence of a "fault_address" field in sigcontext), so any information relating to it belongs (at least morally) in siginfo.

I think this is more than just a principle.

Diagnostic information that is supposed to accompany a signal needs to be captured at the time the signal is generated, otherwise it may have been overwritten by another signal-generating event by the time the first signal is actually delivered.

Currently this isn't handled properly in the arm64 code, so it looks like some diagnostic fields in the arm64 signal frame can be wrong in some situations. (I know, that's your "non-generic code that hardly anyone relies on will be broken" argument. But the need to keep diagnostic information with the signal instance it relates to feels like a generic problem.)

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I have no objection to finding a generic way to report the address tag information, but "address tag" is not the most generic concept in the world, even if there are a few arches with something analogous.

Cheers
---Dave

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

#42 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 194 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 179 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 70 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 60 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 57 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 55 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 39 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +17 -5
index 47f651df781c..a8380a2b6361 100644
@@ -235,20 +235,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+                     unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
                      const char *str)
 {
   arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
-  if (signo == SIGKILL)
+  if (signo == SIGKILL) {
           force_sig(SIGKILL);
-  else
-          force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+  } else {
+          struct kernel_siginfo info;
+          clear_siginfo(&info);
+          info.si_signo = signo;
+          info.si_errno = 0;
+          info.si_code = code;
+          info.si_addr = addr;
+          info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+          info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+          force_sig_info(&info);
+  }
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
-                      const char *str)
+                      unsigned long far, const char *str)
 {
+  struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
   arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
-  force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+

arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str) · line 273

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +9 -0
+  clear_siginfo(&info);
+  info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+  info.si_errno = 0;
+  info.si_code = code;
+  info.si_addr = addr;
+  info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
+  info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+  info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+  force_sig_info(&info);
 }

I have a real problem with this construction. force_sig_info is not an interface that should be used for anything except to define a wrapper that takes it's parameters.

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Can you elaborate? How would you do this king of thing.

There are no other uses of force_sig_info in architecture code.

I just removed them _all_ because they were almost all broken. In fact your mcerr case is broken because it uses two different union members simultantiously.

Quoted 6 lines

Is that really broken? I thought that the Linux kernel deliberately didn't care about strict aliasing rules (the top-level Makefile passes -fno-strict-aliasing) so I thought that it was valid in "Linux kernel C" even though from a standards point of view it is invalid. (That being said, this is probably moot with my proposed changes below though.)

I have a feeling that -fno-strict-aliasing only allows you to _read_ a different union member from the one previously written.

Writing a different member from the last one written can still splatter on the other members IIUC.

It would be better to keep things separate rather than risk incorrectness just to save a few bytes.

IMHO -fno-strict-aliasing is no excuse for gratuitous type-punning.

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So I am looking for something like force_sig_mcerr or force_sig_fault that includes your new information that then calls force_sig_info.

I know of no other way to safely use the siginfo struct.

So you want something like:

int force_sig_fault_with_ignored_bits(int signo, int code, void __user *addr, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask); int force_sig_mceerr_with_ignored_bits(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);

in kernel/signal.c and the code in arch/arm64 would call that?

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AIUI we absolutely need a forced signal here, we need to supply metadata, and we don't have to open-code all that at every relevant signal generation site...

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It is not clear to me that if you have adapted siginfo_layout.

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Garbled sentence?

Looks like. One of the pieces of code that needs to change when siginfo gets updated is siginfo_layout so that the structure can be properly decoded and made sense of.

I am not seeing anything like that.

Okay, this has to do with copying between the compat and non-compat versions of the struct? Sure, I can update that, although the code would be basically non-functional on arm64 because TBI isn't supported on 32-bit ARM.

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
                           char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 97

Quoted 6 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
                           __u32 _pkey;
                   } _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+                  /* used with all si_codes */
+                  struct {
+                          short _dummy_top_byte;

^ What's this for? I don't have Eric's insight here.

We would need a short's worth of padding in order to prevent the fields from occupying the same address as si_addr_lsb.

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
+                          unsigned char _top_byte;
+                          unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+                  } _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
           };
   } _sigfault;
 
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Why the _dummy_top_byte? Oh I see it should be spelled "short _addr_lsb;".

Please remove the "#ifdef __aarch64__". If at all possible we want to design this so any other architecture who has this challenge can use the code. The kind of code does not get enough attention/maintenance if it is built for a single architecture.

Seems reasonable. I was recently made aware that RISC-V was considering a similar feature:
https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-tee/topic/risc_v_tbi_proposal/72855478
I would have opted to expand this to other architectures on an as-needed basis, but I'd also be fine with having it on all architectures from the start.

If we make this arch-independent, we have an additional concern, which is "what if some future architecture wants more than one byte here?" For example, an architecture may have a "top-two-bytes-ignore" feature, which would imply two-byte (misnamed) "si_addr_top_byte" and "si_addr_top_byte_mask" fields. And the RISC-V proposal potentially implies many more ignored bits (see slide 13 of the presentation). The maximum size that these fields can possibly be is the size of a pointer, and with that there wouldn't be enough room in the padding at this point to accommodate the new fields.

Quoted 4 lines

That basically implies your earlier suggestion of adding a union member here to accommodate future expansion of the union, and adding the new fields after the union. I'm happy to make that change, with the fields renamed "si_addr_ignored" and "si_addr_ignored_mask".

Quoted 8 lines

I think what we need here is basically a flags word.

So long as we keep a flag spare to indicate the existence of a further flags word, we can extend as needed.

How the existence of the first flags words is detected is another problem. If it only applies for newly-defined si_code values, then I guess si_code may be sufficient.

Existing kernels will zero-initialize unused regions of the siginfo data structure. The zero-initialization of the padding at the end of the struct is done by the clear_user call here:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/kernel/signal.c#L3193

Quoted 7 lines

and the zero-initialization of the padding between fields and unused union members is done by the clear_siginfo function which the kernel calls when initializing the data structure:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/include/linux/signal.h#L20

Therefore, a flag word value of 0 may be used to detect a lack of support for flagged fields.

It's not enough that we do this today. We would have had to do it back to the dawn of time (though in the arm64 case I guess we just need to go back to when the arch/arm64 was merged).

v2.6.12:kernel/signal.c:copy_siginfo_to_user() suggests that this wasn't always the case, so unused parts of siginfo could be full of old junk from the user stack, if the kernel is sufficiently old.

If we're trying to do something generic that makes sense on all arches, this matters. I may have misunderstood something about the code though.

Quoted 4 lines

That being said, in this particular case, we do not need a flag word. We can just take advantage of this zero-initialization behavior in existing kernels to set si_addr_ignored_mask to 0, which indicates that none of the bits in si_addr_ignored are valid.

[...]

Cheers
---Dave

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

#43 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 208 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 194 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 179 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 70 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 60 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 57 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 55 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 39 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +17 -5
index 47f651df781c..a8380a2b6361 100644
@@ -235,20 +235,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+                     unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
                      const char *str)
 {
   arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
-  if (signo == SIGKILL)
+  if (signo == SIGKILL) {
           force_sig(SIGKILL);
-  else
-          force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+  } else {
+          struct kernel_siginfo info;
+          clear_siginfo(&info);
+          info.si_signo = signo;
+          info.si_errno = 0;
+          info.si_code = code;
+          info.si_addr = addr;
+          info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+          info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+          force_sig_info(&info);
+  }
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
-                      const char *str)
+                      unsigned long far, const char *str)
 {
+  struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
   arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
-  force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+

arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str) · line 273

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +9 -0
+  clear_siginfo(&info);
+  info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+  info.si_errno = 0;
+  info.si_code = code;
+  info.si_addr = addr;
+  info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
+  info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+  info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+  force_sig_info(&info);
 }

I have a real problem with this construction. force_sig_info is not an interface that should be used for anything except to define a wrapper that takes it's parameters.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Can you elaborate? How would you do this king of thing.

There are no other uses of force_sig_info in architecture code.

I just removed them _all_ because they were almost all broken. In fact your mcerr case is broken because it uses two different union members simultantiously.

Quoted 6 lines

Is that really broken? I thought that the Linux kernel deliberately didn't care about strict aliasing rules (the top-level Makefile passes -fno-strict-aliasing) so I thought that it was valid in "Linux kernel C" even though from a standards point of view it is invalid. (That being said, this is probably moot with my proposed changes below though.)

I have a feeling that -fno-strict-aliasing only allows you to _read_ a different union member from the one previously written.

Writing a different member from the last one written can still splatter on the other members IIUC.

It would be better to keep things separate rather than risk incorrectness just to save a few bytes.

IMHO -fno-strict-aliasing is no excuse for gratuitous type-punning.

Quoted 84 lines
Quoted 4 lines

So I am looking for something like force_sig_mcerr or force_sig_fault that includes your new information that then calls force_sig_info.

I know of no other way to safely use the siginfo struct.

So you want something like:

int force_sig_fault_with_ignored_bits(int signo, int code, void __user *addr, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask); int force_sig_mceerr_with_ignored_bits(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);

in kernel/signal.c and the code in arch/arm64 would call that?

Quoted 6 lines
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AIUI we absolutely need a forced signal here, we need to supply metadata, and we don't have to open-code all that at every relevant signal generation site...

Quoted 1 line

It is not clear to me that if you have adapted siginfo_layout.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Garbled sentence?

Looks like. One of the pieces of code that needs to change when siginfo gets updated is siginfo_layout so that the structure can be properly decoded and made sense of.

I am not seeing anything like that.

Okay, this has to do with copying between the compat and non-compat versions of the struct? Sure, I can update that, although the code would be basically non-functional on arm64 because TBI isn't supported on 32-bit ARM.

Quoted 6 lines
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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
                           char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
Quoted 8 lines
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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 97

Quoted 6 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
                           __u32 _pkey;
                   } _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+                  /* used with all si_codes */
+                  struct {
+                          short _dummy_top_byte;

^ What's this for? I don't have Eric's insight here.

We would need a short's worth of padding in order to prevent the fields from occupying the same address as si_addr_lsb.

Quoted 9 lines
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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
+                          unsigned char _top_byte;
+                          unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+                  } _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
           };
   } _sigfault;
 
Quoted 6 lines
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Why the _dummy_top_byte? Oh I see it should be spelled "short _addr_lsb;".

Please remove the "#ifdef __aarch64__". If at all possible we want to design this so any other architecture who has this challenge can use the code. The kind of code does not get enough attention/maintenance if it is built for a single architecture.

Seems reasonable. I was recently made aware that RISC-V was considering a similar feature:
https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-tee/topic/risc_v_tbi_proposal/72855478
I would have opted to expand this to other architectures on an as-needed basis, but I'd also be fine with having it on all architectures from the start.

If we make this arch-independent, we have an additional concern, which is "what if some future architecture wants more than one byte here?" For example, an architecture may have a "top-two-bytes-ignore" feature, which would imply two-byte (misnamed) "si_addr_top_byte" and "si_addr_top_byte_mask" fields. And the RISC-V proposal potentially implies many more ignored bits (see slide 13 of the presentation). The maximum size that these fields can possibly be is the size of a pointer, and with that there wouldn't be enough room in the padding at this point to accommodate the new fields.

Quoted 4 lines

That basically implies your earlier suggestion of adding a union member here to accommodate future expansion of the union, and adding the new fields after the union. I'm happy to make that change, with the fields renamed "si_addr_ignored" and "si_addr_ignored_mask".

Quoted 8 lines

I think what we need here is basically a flags word.

So long as we keep a flag spare to indicate the existence of a further flags word, we can extend as needed.

How the existence of the first flags words is detected is another problem. If it only applies for newly-defined si_code values, then I guess si_code may be sufficient.

Existing kernels will zero-initialize unused regions of the siginfo data structure. The zero-initialization of the padding at the end of the struct is done by the clear_user call here:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/kernel/signal.c#L3193

Quoted 7 lines

and the zero-initialization of the padding between fields and unused union members is done by the clear_siginfo function which the kernel calls when initializing the data structure:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/include/linux/signal.h#L20

Therefore, a flag word value of 0 may be used to detect a lack of support for flagged fields.

It's not enough that we do this today. We would have had to do it back to the dawn of time (though in the arm64 case I guess we just need to go back to when the arch/arm64 was merged).

Quoted 6 lines

v2.6.12:kernel/signal.c:copy_siginfo_to_user() suggests that this wasn't always the case, so unused parts of siginfo could be full of old junk from the user stack, if the kernel is sufficiently old.

If we're trying to do something generic that makes sense on all arches, this matters. I may have misunderstood something about the code though.

Hmm, I think you're right. The current behavior was introduced by commit c999b933faa5e281e3af2e110eccaf91698b0a81 which was first released in 4.18. So if an application wants to be compatible with pre-4.18 kernels then there would need to be some other way to indicate that the fields are valid. Probably the simplest way would be to have the application issue a uname(2) syscall and check the kernel version before reading these fields. I have a couple of other ideas that don't rely on version detection, if we'd prefer to avoid that. (They are somewhat ugly, but our hand is forced by backwards compatibility.)

One idea is to re-purpose the si_errno field as a flags field for certain signal numbers. I checked a few kernel releases going back to 2.6.18 and it looks like the field is set to 0 except in the following circumstances:
- sending a hardware breakpoint (SIGTRAP/TRAP_HWBKPT)
- seccomp failures (SIGSYS/SYS_SECCOMP)
- user-defined signal via kill_pid_usb_asyncio
- SIGSWI in 3.18 and before (code since removed)

It is also set to EFAULT for certain SIGSEGV/SEGV_MAPERR signals on powerpc since commit c96c4436aba4c12f1f48369f2f90bc43e12fe36c, which is currently unreleased. So if we wanted to go this route for SIGSEGV we would need to stop the kernel from setting si_errno to EFAULT for this signal before the 5.8 release.

Another idea was to have userspace set a flag in sa_flags when registering a signal handler meaning "this signal handler requires unknown siginfo fields to be zeroed", and have existing kernels reject the syscall due to an unknown flag being set, but unfortunately this won't work because existing kernels do not reject sigaction syscalls with unknown flags set in sa_flags. A perhaps more radical idea in this vein would be to claim some of the upper bits of the signal number as flags that will cause the syscall to be rejected if set and unknown to the kernel. Existing kernels (going back to at least 2.6.18) contain this code in do_sigaction:

        if (!valid_signal(sig) || sig < 1 || (act && sig_kernel_only(sig)))
                return -EINVAL;

and vald_signal is defined as:

static inline int valid_signal(unsigned long sig)

{
        return sig <= _NSIG ? 1 : 0;
}

All architectures define _NSIG as a value <= 128, so they will reject a signal number with any of bits 8-31 set. This means that we can use any of those bits for mandatory flags. Most likely we could use bit 30 (expanding down as necessary), as it keeps the signal number positive and permits future expansion of the signal number range.

Peter

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

#44 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 263 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 208 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 194 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 179 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 70 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 60 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 57 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 55 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 39 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +17 -5
index 47f651df781c..a8380a2b6361 100644
@@ -235,20 +235,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+                     unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
                      const char *str)
 {
   arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
-  if (signo == SIGKILL)
+  if (signo == SIGKILL) {
           force_sig(SIGKILL);
-  else
-          force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+  } else {
+          struct kernel_siginfo info;
+          clear_siginfo(&info);
+          info.si_signo = signo;
+          info.si_errno = 0;
+          info.si_code = code;
+          info.si_addr = addr;
+          info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+          info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+          force_sig_info(&info);
+  }
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
-                      const char *str)
+                      unsigned long far, const char *str)
 {
+  struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
   arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
-  force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+

arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str) · line 273

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +9 -0
+  clear_siginfo(&info);
+  info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+  info.si_errno = 0;
+  info.si_code = code;
+  info.si_addr = addr;
+  info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
+  info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+  info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+  force_sig_info(&info);
 }

I have a real problem with this construction. force_sig_info is not an interface that should be used for anything except to define a wrapper that takes it's parameters.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Can you elaborate? How would you do this king of thing.

There are no other uses of force_sig_info in architecture code.

I just removed them _all_ because they were almost all broken. In fact your mcerr case is broken because it uses two different union members simultantiously.

Quoted 6 lines

Is that really broken? I thought that the Linux kernel deliberately didn't care about strict aliasing rules (the top-level Makefile passes -fno-strict-aliasing) so I thought that it was valid in "Linux kernel C" even though from a standards point of view it is invalid. (That being said, this is probably moot with my proposed changes below though.)

I have a feeling that -fno-strict-aliasing only allows you to _read_ a different union member from the one previously written.

Writing a different member from the last one written can still splatter on the other members IIUC.

It would be better to keep things separate rather than risk incorrectness just to save a few bytes.

IMHO -fno-strict-aliasing is no excuse for gratuitous type-punning.

Quoted 84 lines
Quoted 4 lines

So I am looking for something like force_sig_mcerr or force_sig_fault that includes your new information that then calls force_sig_info.

I know of no other way to safely use the siginfo struct.

So you want something like:

int force_sig_fault_with_ignored_bits(int signo, int code, void __user *addr, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask); int force_sig_mceerr_with_ignored_bits(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);

in kernel/signal.c and the code in arch/arm64 would call that?

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

AIUI we absolutely need a forced signal here, we need to supply metadata, and we don't have to open-code all that at every relevant signal generation site...

Quoted 1 line

It is not clear to me that if you have adapted siginfo_layout.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Garbled sentence?

Looks like. One of the pieces of code that needs to change when siginfo gets updated is siginfo_layout so that the structure can be properly decoded and made sense of.

I am not seeing anything like that.

Okay, this has to do with copying between the compat and non-compat versions of the struct? Sure, I can update that, although the code would be basically non-functional on arm64 because TBI isn't supported on 32-bit ARM.

Quoted 6 lines
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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
                           char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
Quoted 8 lines
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Quoted 6 lines

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 97

Quoted 6 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
                           __u32 _pkey;
                   } _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+                  /* used with all si_codes */
+                  struct {
+                          short _dummy_top_byte;

^ What's this for? I don't have Eric's insight here.

We would need a short's worth of padding in order to prevent the fields from occupying the same address as si_addr_lsb.

Quoted 9 lines
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Quoted 8 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
+                          unsigned char _top_byte;
+                          unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+                  } _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
           };
   } _sigfault;
 
Quoted 6 lines
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Why the _dummy_top_byte? Oh I see it should be spelled "short _addr_lsb;".

Please remove the "#ifdef __aarch64__". If at all possible we want to design this so any other architecture who has this challenge can use the code. The kind of code does not get enough attention/maintenance if it is built for a single architecture.

Seems reasonable. I was recently made aware that RISC-V was considering a similar feature:
https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-tee/topic/risc_v_tbi_proposal/72855478
I would have opted to expand this to other architectures on an as-needed basis, but I'd also be fine with having it on all architectures from the start.

If we make this arch-independent, we have an additional concern, which is "what if some future architecture wants more than one byte here?" For example, an architecture may have a "top-two-bytes-ignore" feature, which would imply two-byte (misnamed) "si_addr_top_byte" and "si_addr_top_byte_mask" fields. And the RISC-V proposal potentially implies many more ignored bits (see slide 13 of the presentation). The maximum size that these fields can possibly be is the size of a pointer, and with that there wouldn't be enough room in the padding at this point to accommodate the new fields.

Quoted 4 lines

That basically implies your earlier suggestion of adding a union member here to accommodate future expansion of the union, and adding the new fields after the union. I'm happy to make that change, with the fields renamed "si_addr_ignored" and "si_addr_ignored_mask".

Quoted 8 lines

I think what we need here is basically a flags word.

So long as we keep a flag spare to indicate the existence of a further flags word, we can extend as needed.

How the existence of the first flags words is detected is another problem. If it only applies for newly-defined si_code values, then I guess si_code may be sufficient.

Existing kernels will zero-initialize unused regions of the siginfo data structure. The zero-initialization of the padding at the end of the struct is done by the clear_user call here:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/kernel/signal.c#L3193

Quoted 7 lines

and the zero-initialization of the padding between fields and unused union members is done by the clear_siginfo function which the kernel calls when initializing the data structure:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/include/linux/signal.h#L20

Therefore, a flag word value of 0 may be used to detect a lack of support for flagged fields.

It's not enough that we do this today. We would have had to do it back to the dawn of time (though in the arm64 case I guess we just need to go back to when the arch/arm64 was merged).

Quoted 6 lines

v2.6.12:kernel/signal.c:copy_siginfo_to_user() suggests that this wasn't always the case, so unused parts of siginfo could be full of old junk from the user stack, if the kernel is sufficiently old.

If we're trying to do something generic that makes sense on all arches, this matters. I may have misunderstood something about the code though.

Hmm, I think you're right. The current behavior was introduced by commit c999b933faa5e281e3af2e110eccaf91698b0a81 which was first released in 4.18. So if an application wants to be compatible with pre-4.18 kernels then there would need to be some other way to indicate that the fields are valid. Probably the simplest way would be to have the application issue a uname(2) syscall and check the kernel version before reading these fields. I have a couple of other ideas that don't rely on version detection, if we'd prefer to avoid that. (They are somewhat ugly, but our hand is forced by backwards compatibility.)

One idea is to re-purpose the si_errno field as a flags field for certain signal numbers. I checked a few kernel releases going back to 2.6.18 and it looks like the field is set to 0 except in the following circumstances:
- sending a hardware breakpoint (SIGTRAP/TRAP_HWBKPT)
- seccomp failures (SIGSYS/SYS_SECCOMP)
- user-defined signal via kill_pid_usb_asyncio
- SIGSWI in 3.18 and before (code since removed)

It is also set to EFAULT for certain SIGSEGV/SEGV_MAPERR signals on powerpc since commit c96c4436aba4c12f1f48369f2f90bc43e12fe36c, which is currently unreleased. So if we wanted to go this route for SIGSEGV we would need to stop the kernel from setting si_errno to EFAULT for this signal before the 5.8 release.

Another idea was to have userspace set a flag in sa_flags when registering a signal handler meaning "this signal handler requires unknown siginfo fields to be zeroed", and have existing kernels reject the syscall due to an unknown flag being set, but unfortunately this won't work because existing kernels do not reject sigaction syscalls with unknown flags set in sa_flags. A perhaps more radical idea in this vein would be to claim some of the upper bits of the signal number as flags that will cause the syscall to be rejected if set and unknown to the kernel. Existing kernels (going back to at least 2.6.18) contain this code in do_sigaction:

        if (!valid_signal(sig) || sig < 1 || (act && sig_kernel_only(sig)))
                return -EINVAL;

and vald_signal is defined as:

static inline int valid_signal(unsigned long sig)

{
        return sig <= _NSIG ? 1 : 0;
}
Quoted 5 lines

All architectures define _NSIG as a value <= 128, so they will reject a signal number with any of bits 8-31 set. This means that we can use any of those bits for mandatory flags. Most likely we could use bit 30 (expanding down as necessary), as it keeps the signal number positive and permits future expansion of the signal number range.

Does the signal core code actually gurantee to zero the unused fields? Unless the fields are poked in by hand this is fraught with subtlelies, especially when unions are involved. (I'm sure the code tries to do it, but I've not eyeballed it in detail...)

Using unused bits in the signal number to turn on new functionality feels risky. As currently specified, this is just a number. Since today a successful sigaction(n ...) guarantees that n is a valid signal number, reasonable code like the following would trigger a buffer overrun if we start trying to encode anything else in there:

struct sigaction actions[NSIG];

int do_something( ... )

{
	...

	if (!sigaction(n, sa, ...)) {
		actions[n] = *sa;
		return 0;
	}

	...
}

I think it would be cleaner for to add a single flag field that can be used for detecting other extensions, and request it via a new sa_flags bit. This removes the need for sematically useless zeroing of unused fields (though for hygiene and backwards compatibility reasons we would probably want to carry on zeroing them anyway).

I can see no simpler way to add supplementary siginfo fields for existing si_codes. For si_codes that didn't exist before the zeroing came in we could still detect optional si_code-specific fields via zeroing, but it seems messary to have two ways of detecting extensions.

Cheers
---Dave

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#45 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 271 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 263 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 208 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 194 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 179 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 70 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 60 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 57 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 55 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 39 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +17 -5
index 47f651df781c..a8380a2b6361 100644
@@ -235,20 +235,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+                     unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
                      const char *str)
 {
   arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
-  if (signo == SIGKILL)
+  if (signo == SIGKILL) {
           force_sig(SIGKILL);
-  else
-          force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+  } else {
+          struct kernel_siginfo info;
+          clear_siginfo(&info);
+          info.si_signo = signo;
+          info.si_errno = 0;
+          info.si_code = code;
+          info.si_addr = addr;
+          info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+          info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+          force_sig_info(&info);
+  }
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
-                      const char *str)
+                      unsigned long far, const char *str)
 {
+  struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
   arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
-  force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+

arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str) · line 273

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +9 -0
+  clear_siginfo(&info);
+  info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+  info.si_errno = 0;
+  info.si_code = code;
+  info.si_addr = addr;
+  info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
+  info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+  info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+  force_sig_info(&info);
 }

I have a real problem with this construction. force_sig_info is not an interface that should be used for anything except to define a wrapper that takes it's parameters.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Can you elaborate? How would you do this king of thing.

There are no other uses of force_sig_info in architecture code.

I just removed them _all_ because they were almost all broken. In fact your mcerr case is broken because it uses two different union members simultantiously.

Quoted 6 lines

Is that really broken? I thought that the Linux kernel deliberately didn't care about strict aliasing rules (the top-level Makefile passes -fno-strict-aliasing) so I thought that it was valid in "Linux kernel C" even though from a standards point of view it is invalid. (That being said, this is probably moot with my proposed changes below though.)

I have a feeling that -fno-strict-aliasing only allows you to _read_ a different union member from the one previously written.

Writing a different member from the last one written can still splatter on the other members IIUC.

It would be better to keep things separate rather than risk incorrectness just to save a few bytes.

IMHO -fno-strict-aliasing is no excuse for gratuitous type-punning.

Quoted 84 lines
Quoted 4 lines

So I am looking for something like force_sig_mcerr or force_sig_fault that includes your new information that then calls force_sig_info.

I know of no other way to safely use the siginfo struct.

So you want something like:

int force_sig_fault_with_ignored_bits(int signo, int code, void __user *addr, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask); int force_sig_mceerr_with_ignored_bits(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);

in kernel/signal.c and the code in arch/arm64 would call that?

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

AIUI we absolutely need a forced signal here, we need to supply metadata, and we don't have to open-code all that at every relevant signal generation site...

Quoted 1 line

It is not clear to me that if you have adapted siginfo_layout.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Garbled sentence?

Looks like. One of the pieces of code that needs to change when siginfo gets updated is siginfo_layout so that the structure can be properly decoded and made sense of.

I am not seeing anything like that.

Okay, this has to do with copying between the compat and non-compat versions of the struct? Sure, I can update that, although the code would be basically non-functional on arm64 because TBI isn't supported on 32-bit ARM.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
                           char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 97

Quoted 6 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
                           __u32 _pkey;
                   } _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+                  /* used with all si_codes */
+                  struct {
+                          short _dummy_top_byte;

^ What's this for? I don't have Eric's insight here.

We would need a short's worth of padding in order to prevent the fields from occupying the same address as si_addr_lsb.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
+                          unsigned char _top_byte;
+                          unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+                  } _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
           };
   } _sigfault;
 
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

Why the _dummy_top_byte? Oh I see it should be spelled "short _addr_lsb;".

Please remove the "#ifdef __aarch64__". If at all possible we want to design this so any other architecture who has this challenge can use the code. The kind of code does not get enough attention/maintenance if it is built for a single architecture.

Seems reasonable. I was recently made aware that RISC-V was considering a similar feature:
https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-tee/topic/risc_v_tbi_proposal/72855478
I would have opted to expand this to other architectures on an as-needed basis, but I'd also be fine with having it on all architectures from the start.

If we make this arch-independent, we have an additional concern, which is "what if some future architecture wants more than one byte here?" For example, an architecture may have a "top-two-bytes-ignore" feature, which would imply two-byte (misnamed) "si_addr_top_byte" and "si_addr_top_byte_mask" fields. And the RISC-V proposal potentially implies many more ignored bits (see slide 13 of the presentation). The maximum size that these fields can possibly be is the size of a pointer, and with that there wouldn't be enough room in the padding at this point to accommodate the new fields.

Quoted 4 lines

That basically implies your earlier suggestion of adding a union member here to accommodate future expansion of the union, and adding the new fields after the union. I'm happy to make that change, with the fields renamed "si_addr_ignored" and "si_addr_ignored_mask".

Quoted 8 lines

I think what we need here is basically a flags word.

So long as we keep a flag spare to indicate the existence of a further flags word, we can extend as needed.

How the existence of the first flags words is detected is another problem. If it only applies for newly-defined si_code values, then I guess si_code may be sufficient.

Existing kernels will zero-initialize unused regions of the siginfo data structure. The zero-initialization of the padding at the end of the struct is done by the clear_user call here:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/kernel/signal.c#L3193

Quoted 7 lines

and the zero-initialization of the padding between fields and unused union members is done by the clear_siginfo function which the kernel calls when initializing the data structure:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/include/linux/signal.h#L20

Therefore, a flag word value of 0 may be used to detect a lack of support for flagged fields.

It's not enough that we do this today. We would have had to do it back to the dawn of time (though in the arm64 case I guess we just need to go back to when the arch/arm64 was merged).

Quoted 6 lines

v2.6.12:kernel/signal.c:copy_siginfo_to_user() suggests that this wasn't always the case, so unused parts of siginfo could be full of old junk from the user stack, if the kernel is sufficiently old.

If we're trying to do something generic that makes sense on all arches, this matters. I may have misunderstood something about the code though.

Hmm, I think you're right. The current behavior was introduced by commit c999b933faa5e281e3af2e110eccaf91698b0a81 which was first released in 4.18. So if an application wants to be compatible with pre-4.18 kernels then there would need to be some other way to indicate that the fields are valid. Probably the simplest way would be to have the application issue a uname(2) syscall and check the kernel version before reading these fields. I have a couple of other ideas that don't rely on version detection, if we'd prefer to avoid that. (They are somewhat ugly, but our hand is forced by backwards compatibility.)

One idea is to re-purpose the si_errno field as a flags field for certain signal numbers. I checked a few kernel releases going back to 2.6.18 and it looks like the field is set to 0 except in the following circumstances:
- sending a hardware breakpoint (SIGTRAP/TRAP_HWBKPT)
- seccomp failures (SIGSYS/SYS_SECCOMP)
- user-defined signal via kill_pid_usb_asyncio
- SIGSWI in 3.18 and before (code since removed)

It is also set to EFAULT for certain SIGSEGV/SEGV_MAPERR signals on powerpc since commit c96c4436aba4c12f1f48369f2f90bc43e12fe36c, which is currently unreleased. So if we wanted to go this route for SIGSEGV we would need to stop the kernel from setting si_errno to EFAULT for this signal before the 5.8 release.

Another idea was to have userspace set a flag in sa_flags when registering a signal handler meaning "this signal handler requires unknown siginfo fields to be zeroed", and have existing kernels reject the syscall due to an unknown flag being set, but unfortunately this won't work because existing kernels do not reject sigaction syscalls with unknown flags set in sa_flags. A perhaps more radical idea in this vein would be to claim some of the upper bits of the signal number as flags that will cause the syscall to be rejected if set and unknown to the kernel. Existing kernels (going back to at least 2.6.18) contain this code in do_sigaction:

        if (!valid_signal(sig) || sig < 1 || (act && sig_kernel_only(sig)))
                return -EINVAL;

and vald_signal is defined as:

static inline int valid_signal(unsigned long sig)

{
        return sig <= _NSIG ? 1 : 0;
}
Quoted 5 lines

All architectures define _NSIG as a value <= 128, so they will reject a signal number with any of bits 8-31 set. This means that we can use any of those bits for mandatory flags. Most likely we could use bit 30 (expanding down as necessary), as it keeps the signal number positive and permits future expansion of the signal number range.

Quoted 4 lines

Does the signal core code actually gurantee to zero the unused fields? Unless the fields are poked in by hand this is fraught with subtlelies, especially when unions are involved. (I'm sure the code tries to do it, but I've not eyeballed it in detail...)

It memsets the siginfo structure before setting the fields and sending the signal (grep for clear_siginfo which is just a memset; you should find a call before all callers of force_sig_info). Memset is the right approach here since unlike setting fields by hand it clears padding which could lead to information leaks from the kernel. IIUC this is the reason why Eric wants all of the signals to be raised via wrappers in kernel/signal.c instead of via force_sig_info directly (to make this aspect easier to audit).

Quoted 9 lines

Using unused bits in the signal number to turn on new functionality feels risky. As currently specified, this is just a number. Since today a successful sigaction(n ...) guarantees that n is a valid signal number, reasonable code like the following would trigger a buffer overrun if we start trying to encode anything else in there:

struct sigaction actions[NSIG];

int do_something( ... )

Quoted 10 lines
{
        ...

        if (!sigaction(n, sa, ...)) {
                actions[n] = *sa;
                return 0;
        }

        ...
}

I imagine the bit in the signal number being set by the direct caller to sigaction, and we could specifically recommend that calling pattern. In that case, your "n" wouldn't have the bit set in it. It could only appear in newly-written code that doesn't follow our recommendations, and there are already plenty of much more likely ways to cause buffer overflows in C code that doesn't follow recommendations anyway. (And even if such a buffer overflow occurred, it would very likely be caught early in development by the MMU due to the magnitude of the number 1<<30.)

Quoted 10 lines

I think it would be cleaner for to add a single flag field that can be used for detecting other extensions, and request it via a new sa_flags bit. This removes the need for sematically useless zeroing of unused fields (though for hygiene and backwards compatibility reasons we would probably want to carry on zeroing them anyway).

I can see no simpler way to add supplementary siginfo fields for existing si_codes. For si_codes that didn't exist before the zeroing came in we could still detect optional si_code-specific fields via zeroing, but it seems messary to have two ways of detecting extensions.

That would certainly be cleaner if it worked, but that would only be the case if old kernels rejected unknown bits in sa_flags, and unfortunately they don't. With the bit in the signal number, the "old kernels reject" behavior admits relatively straightforward usage code:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS, &sa, 0) < 0) { //
succeeds in new kernels, fails in old kernels

    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0) // succeeds in old kernels
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

void clear_fields_and_handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
sa->si_future_field = 0;
handle_segv(signum, sa, ctx);
}

void handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
// At this point, si_future_field will have the value 0 in old
kernels and the kernel-supplied value in new kernels. }

Imagine if we moved the flag SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS from the signal number to sa_flags. In that case, the first sigaction would succeed in old kernels so handle_segv wouldn't know whether it can safely read from si_future_field. With the sa_flags approach, you would need kernel version number checking via uname before setting the flag in sa_flags, and at that point why even have the flag in sa_flags at all since you could just have the signal handler conditionally read from si_future_field based on the uname?

Note that the same applies to a flag indicating the availability of a si_flags field in sigaction (just s/SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS/SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS/ and s/si_future_field/si_flags/ in the usage code above). In terms of SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS versus SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS I'd be fine either way.

Another thought that occurred to me is that we may consider generalizing this a step further and introducing a single flag bit in the signal number that means "reject unknown flags in sa_flags". This would mean that we wouldn't need to add any more flag bits to the signal number in the future, thus limiting this signal number hack to a single bit; all future mandatory behavior changes could just be put behind a flag in sa_flags and userspace code would easily be able to detect missing support for a flag and fall back if necessary. In our case, this would imply usage code like this:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS;
// Succeeds in kernels with SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support. // Fails in kernels with SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support but no
SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support (because of the unknown flags check).
// Fails in kernels without SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support (because of
the bounds check on the signal number).

  if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS, &sa, 0) < 0) {
    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
    // Succeeds in old kernels, no need to use SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS since
we're using sa_flags from the beginning of time.
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0)
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

Peter

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#46 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 277 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 271 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 263 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 208 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 194 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 179 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 70 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 60 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 57 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 55 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 39 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +17 -5
index 47f651df781c..a8380a2b6361 100644
@@ -235,20 +235,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+                     unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
                      const char *str)
 {
   arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
-  if (signo == SIGKILL)
+  if (signo == SIGKILL) {
           force_sig(SIGKILL);
-  else
-          force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+  } else {
+          struct kernel_siginfo info;
+          clear_siginfo(&info);
+          info.si_signo = signo;
+          info.si_errno = 0;
+          info.si_code = code;
+          info.si_addr = addr;
+          info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+          info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+          force_sig_info(&info);
+  }
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
-                      const char *str)
+                      unsigned long far, const char *str)
 {
+  struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
   arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
-  force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+

arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str) · line 273

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +9 -0
+  clear_siginfo(&info);
+  info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+  info.si_errno = 0;
+  info.si_code = code;
+  info.si_addr = addr;
+  info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
+  info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+  info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+  force_sig_info(&info);
 }

I have a real problem with this construction. force_sig_info is not an interface that should be used for anything except to define a wrapper that takes it's parameters.

Quoted 7 lines
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Can you elaborate? How would you do this king of thing.

There are no other uses of force_sig_info in architecture code.

I just removed them _all_ because they were almost all broken. In fact your mcerr case is broken because it uses two different union members simultantiously.

Quoted 6 lines

Is that really broken? I thought that the Linux kernel deliberately didn't care about strict aliasing rules (the top-level Makefile passes -fno-strict-aliasing) so I thought that it was valid in "Linux kernel C" even though from a standards point of view it is invalid. (That being said, this is probably moot with my proposed changes below though.)

I have a feeling that -fno-strict-aliasing only allows you to _read_ a different union member from the one previously written.

Writing a different member from the last one written can still splatter on the other members IIUC.

It would be better to keep things separate rather than risk incorrectness just to save a few bytes.

IMHO -fno-strict-aliasing is no excuse for gratuitous type-punning.

Quoted 84 lines
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So I am looking for something like force_sig_mcerr or force_sig_fault that includes your new information that then calls force_sig_info.

I know of no other way to safely use the siginfo struct.

So you want something like:

int force_sig_fault_with_ignored_bits(int signo, int code, void __user *addr, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask); int force_sig_mceerr_with_ignored_bits(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);

in kernel/signal.c and the code in arch/arm64 would call that?

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AIUI we absolutely need a forced signal here, we need to supply metadata, and we don't have to open-code all that at every relevant signal generation site...

Quoted 1 line

It is not clear to me that if you have adapted siginfo_layout.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Garbled sentence?

Looks like. One of the pieces of code that needs to change when siginfo gets updated is siginfo_layout so that the structure can be properly decoded and made sense of.

I am not seeing anything like that.

Okay, this has to do with copying between the compat and non-compat versions of the struct? Sure, I can update that, although the code would be basically non-functional on arm64 because TBI isn't supported on 32-bit ARM.

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
                           char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 97

Quoted 6 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
                           __u32 _pkey;
                   } _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+                  /* used with all si_codes */
+                  struct {
+                          short _dummy_top_byte;

^ What's this for? I don't have Eric's insight here.

We would need a short's worth of padding in order to prevent the fields from occupying the same address as si_addr_lsb.

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
+                          unsigned char _top_byte;
+                          unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+                  } _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
           };
   } _sigfault;
 
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Why the _dummy_top_byte? Oh I see it should be spelled "short _addr_lsb;".

Please remove the "#ifdef __aarch64__". If at all possible we want to design this so any other architecture who has this challenge can use the code. The kind of code does not get enough attention/maintenance if it is built for a single architecture.

Seems reasonable. I was recently made aware that RISC-V was considering a similar feature:
https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-tee/topic/risc_v_tbi_proposal/72855478
I would have opted to expand this to other architectures on an as-needed basis, but I'd also be fine with having it on all architectures from the start.

If we make this arch-independent, we have an additional concern, which is "what if some future architecture wants more than one byte here?" For example, an architecture may have a "top-two-bytes-ignore" feature, which would imply two-byte (misnamed) "si_addr_top_byte" and "si_addr_top_byte_mask" fields. And the RISC-V proposal potentially implies many more ignored bits (see slide 13 of the presentation). The maximum size that these fields can possibly be is the size of a pointer, and with that there wouldn't be enough room in the padding at this point to accommodate the new fields.

Quoted 4 lines

That basically implies your earlier suggestion of adding a union member here to accommodate future expansion of the union, and adding the new fields after the union. I'm happy to make that change, with the fields renamed "si_addr_ignored" and "si_addr_ignored_mask".

Quoted 8 lines

I think what we need here is basically a flags word.

So long as we keep a flag spare to indicate the existence of a further flags word, we can extend as needed.

How the existence of the first flags words is detected is another problem. If it only applies for newly-defined si_code values, then I guess si_code may be sufficient.

Existing kernels will zero-initialize unused regions of the siginfo data structure. The zero-initialization of the padding at the end of the struct is done by the clear_user call here:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/kernel/signal.c#L3193

Quoted 7 lines

and the zero-initialization of the padding between fields and unused union members is done by the clear_siginfo function which the kernel calls when initializing the data structure:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/include/linux/signal.h#L20

Therefore, a flag word value of 0 may be used to detect a lack of support for flagged fields.

It's not enough that we do this today. We would have had to do it back to the dawn of time (though in the arm64 case I guess we just need to go back to when the arch/arm64 was merged).

Quoted 6 lines

v2.6.12:kernel/signal.c:copy_siginfo_to_user() suggests that this wasn't always the case, so unused parts of siginfo could be full of old junk from the user stack, if the kernel is sufficiently old.

If we're trying to do something generic that makes sense on all arches, this matters. I may have misunderstood something about the code though.

Hmm, I think you're right. The current behavior was introduced by commit c999b933faa5e281e3af2e110eccaf91698b0a81 which was first released in 4.18. So if an application wants to be compatible with pre-4.18 kernels then there would need to be some other way to indicate that the fields are valid. Probably the simplest way would be to have the application issue a uname(2) syscall and check the kernel version before reading these fields. I have a couple of other ideas that don't rely on version detection, if we'd prefer to avoid that. (They are somewhat ugly, but our hand is forced by backwards compatibility.)

One idea is to re-purpose the si_errno field as a flags field for certain signal numbers. I checked a few kernel releases going back to 2.6.18 and it looks like the field is set to 0 except in the following circumstances:
- sending a hardware breakpoint (SIGTRAP/TRAP_HWBKPT)
- seccomp failures (SIGSYS/SYS_SECCOMP)
- user-defined signal via kill_pid_usb_asyncio
- SIGSWI in 3.18 and before (code since removed)

It is also set to EFAULT for certain SIGSEGV/SEGV_MAPERR signals on powerpc since commit c96c4436aba4c12f1f48369f2f90bc43e12fe36c, which is currently unreleased. So if we wanted to go this route for SIGSEGV we would need to stop the kernel from setting si_errno to EFAULT for this signal before the 5.8 release.

Another idea was to have userspace set a flag in sa_flags when registering a signal handler meaning "this signal handler requires unknown siginfo fields to be zeroed", and have existing kernels reject the syscall due to an unknown flag being set, but unfortunately this won't work because existing kernels do not reject sigaction syscalls with unknown flags set in sa_flags. A perhaps more radical idea in this vein would be to claim some of the upper bits of the signal number as flags that will cause the syscall to be rejected if set and unknown to the kernel. Existing kernels (going back to at least 2.6.18) contain this code in do_sigaction:

        if (!valid_signal(sig) || sig < 1 || (act && sig_kernel_only(sig)))
                return -EINVAL;

and vald_signal is defined as:

static inline int valid_signal(unsigned long sig)

{
        return sig <= _NSIG ? 1 : 0;
}
Quoted 5 lines

All architectures define _NSIG as a value <= 128, so they will reject a signal number with any of bits 8-31 set. This means that we can use any of those bits for mandatory flags. Most likely we could use bit 30 (expanding down as necessary), as it keeps the signal number positive and permits future expansion of the signal number range.

Quoted 4 lines

Does the signal core code actually gurantee to zero the unused fields? Unless the fields are poked in by hand this is fraught with subtlelies, especially when unions are involved. (I'm sure the code tries to do it, but I've not eyeballed it in detail...)

Quoted 8 lines

It memsets the siginfo structure before setting the fields and sending the signal (grep for clear_siginfo which is just a memset; you should find a call before all callers of force_sig_info). Memset is the right approach here since unlike setting fields by hand it clears padding which could lead to information leaks from the kernel. IIUC this is the reason why Eric wants all of the signals to be raised via wrappers in kernel/signal.c instead of via force_sig_info directly (to make this aspect easier to audit).

My impression was that the reason for this model is partly to ensure that siginfo fields are populated more consistently. When it was all down to the individual callers, inconsistencies creeped in.

With regard to memset(), this is not a complete defence against data leakage. Assigning to a struct member can set any or all padding in the struct to random garbage (consider write-combining of neighboring member writes into a single larger accesses in asm for example). The only way to avoid this is to ensure that the struct is 100% padding-free, and that each member of a union is the same size. A quick clance at <uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h> confirms that this is not the case.

This might need to be looked at separately.

But it does mean, strictly speaking, that we can't reliably add new fields anywhere that there was previously padding: assigning to neighboring members can still fill those with garbage after the memset().

Quoted 17 lines
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Using unused bits in the signal number to turn on new functionality feels risky. As currently specified, this is just a number. Since today a successful sigaction(n ...) guarantees that n is a valid signal number, reasonable code like the following would trigger a buffer overrun if we start trying to encode anything else in there:

struct sigaction actions[NSIG];

int do_something( ... )

{
        ...

        if (!sigaction(n, sa, ...)) {
                actions[n] = *sa;
                return 0;
        }
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
        ...
}

I imagine the bit in the signal number being set by the direct caller to sigaction, and we could specifically recommend that calling pattern. In that case, your "n" wouldn't have the bit set in it. It

I can imagine this too, but that doesn't mean that software does it.

If the above kind of thing exists in a framework or library somewhere, we could get problems. Similarly, a pre-existing LD_PRELOAD framework that provides a wrapper for sigaction may now go wrong even if your pattern is followed -- i.e., the caller thinks it's calling sigaction directly but in fact it isn't.

Quoted 6 lines

could only appear in newly-written code that doesn't follow our recommendations, and there are already plenty of much more likely ways to cause buffer overflows in C code that doesn't follow recommendations anyway. (And even if such a buffer overflow occurred, it would very likely be caught early in development by the MMU due to the magnitude of the number 1<<30.)

Choosing the bit value is hard. If shitfing it overflows, this can trigger random undefined behaviour in the compiler in addition to (or perhaps instead of) an out-of-bounds access or segfault.

If shifting it doesn't overflow, we might still fall into a valid mapping, though I'd agree a segfault is more likely.

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I think it would be cleaner for to add a single flag field that can be used for detecting other extensions, and request it via a new sa_flags bit. This removes the need for sematically useless zeroing of unused fields (though for hygiene and backwards compatibility reasons we would probably want to carry on zeroing them anyway).

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I can see no simpler way to add supplementary siginfo fields for existing si_codes. For si_codes that didn't exist before the zeroing came in we could still detect optional si_code-specific fields via zeroing, but it seems messary to have two ways of detecting extensions.

That would certainly be cleaner if it worked, but that would only be the case if old kernels rejected unknown bits in sa_flags, and unfortunately they don't. With the bit in the signal number, the "old

Hmm, that is a problem I wasn't aware of.

Quoted 24 lines

kernels reject" behavior admits relatively straightforward usage code:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS, &sa, 0) < 0) { //
succeeds in new kernels, fails in old kernels

    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0) // succeeds in old kernels
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

void clear_fields_and_handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
sa->si_future_field = 0;
handle_segv(signum, sa, ctx);
}

void handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
// At this point, si_future_field will have the value 0 in old
kernels and the kernel-supplied value in new kernels. }

Quoted 8 lines

Imagine if we moved the flag SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS from the signal number to sa_flags. In that case, the first sigaction would succeed in old kernels so handle_segv wouldn't know whether it can safely read from si_future_field. With the sa_flags approach, you would need kernel version number checking via uname before setting the flag in sa_flags, and at that point why even have the flag in sa_flags at all since you could just have the signal handler conditionally read from si_future_field based on the uname?

Software setting SA_SIFLAGS (or whatever) is new by definition, since it would be using a new #define. So it might be reasonable to put the burden on that software to verify that the flag was really accepted by the kernel, by reading it back.

Unfortunately, even relatively recent kernels blindly store sa_flags in the kernel without validating it, and so it looks like duff flags can be read back out via a sigaction() call. Dang.

Perhaps a new frontend syscall could be added. A new libc that knows about this "sigaction2" could use it and mask off problem bits from sa_flags in its sigaction() wrapper before calling sigaction2. An old libc would call the old sigaction syscall, where we would ignore these new sa_flags bits as before.

This may not be a popular approach though, and software wouldn't be able to use our new features until libc is updated to match.

If we go down this route, it may provide additional opportunities to fix annoying defects in the old interface.

Quoted 32 lines

Note that the same applies to a flag indicating the availability of a si_flags field in sigaction (just s/SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS/SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS/ and s/si_future_field/si_flags/ in the usage code above). In terms of SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS versus SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS I'd be fine either way.

Another thought that occurred to me is that we may consider generalizing this a step further and introducing a single flag bit in the signal number that means "reject unknown flags in sa_flags". This would mean that we wouldn't need to add any more flag bits to the signal number in the future, thus limiting this signal number hack to a single bit; all future mandatory behavior changes could just be put behind a flag in sa_flags and userspace code would easily be able to detect missing support for a flag and fall back if necessary. In our case, this would imply usage code like this:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS;
// Succeeds in kernels with SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support. // Fails in kernels with SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support but no
SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support (because of the unknown flags check).
// Fails in kernels without SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support (because of
the bounds check on the signal number).

  if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS, &sa, 0) < 0) {
    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
    // Succeeds in old kernels, no need to use SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS since
we're using sa_flags from the beginning of time.
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0)
      perror("sigaction");
Quoted 2 lines

}
}

As with the other options this could work, but looks like it could break the ABI due to violating the original semantics for the signal number argument. Perhaps I'm being too paranoid.

Cheers
---Dave

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#47 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 288 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 277 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 271 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 263 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 208 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 194 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 179 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 70 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 60 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 57 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 55 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 39 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +17 -5
index 47f651df781c..a8380a2b6361 100644
@@ -235,20 +235,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+                     unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
                      const char *str)
 {
   arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
-  if (signo == SIGKILL)
+  if (signo == SIGKILL) {
           force_sig(SIGKILL);
-  else
-          force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+  } else {
+          struct kernel_siginfo info;
+          clear_siginfo(&info);
+          info.si_signo = signo;
+          info.si_errno = 0;
+          info.si_code = code;
+          info.si_addr = addr;
+          info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+          info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+          force_sig_info(&info);
+  }
 }
 
 void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
-                      const char *str)
+                      unsigned long far, const char *str)
 {
+  struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
   arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
-  force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+

arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str) · line 273

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +9 -0
+  clear_siginfo(&info);
+  info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+  info.si_errno = 0;
+  info.si_code = code;
+  info.si_addr = addr;
+  info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
+  info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+  info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+  force_sig_info(&info);
 }

I have a real problem with this construction. force_sig_info is not an interface that should be used for anything except to define a wrapper that takes it's parameters.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Can you elaborate? How would you do this king of thing.

There are no other uses of force_sig_info in architecture code.

I just removed them _all_ because they were almost all broken. In fact your mcerr case is broken because it uses two different union members simultantiously.

Quoted 6 lines

Is that really broken? I thought that the Linux kernel deliberately didn't care about strict aliasing rules (the top-level Makefile passes -fno-strict-aliasing) so I thought that it was valid in "Linux kernel C" even though from a standards point of view it is invalid. (That being said, this is probably moot with my proposed changes below though.)

I have a feeling that -fno-strict-aliasing only allows you to _read_ a different union member from the one previously written.

Writing a different member from the last one written can still splatter on the other members IIUC.

It would be better to keep things separate rather than risk incorrectness just to save a few bytes.

IMHO -fno-strict-aliasing is no excuse for gratuitous type-punning.

Quoted 84 lines
Quoted 4 lines

So I am looking for something like force_sig_mcerr or force_sig_fault that includes your new information that then calls force_sig_info.

I know of no other way to safely use the siginfo struct.

So you want something like:

int force_sig_fault_with_ignored_bits(int signo, int code, void __user *addr, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask); int force_sig_mceerr_with_ignored_bits(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);

in kernel/signal.c and the code in arch/arm64 would call that?

Quoted 6 lines
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AIUI we absolutely need a forced signal here, we need to supply metadata, and we don't have to open-code all that at every relevant signal generation site...

Quoted 1 line

It is not clear to me that if you have adapted siginfo_layout.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

Garbled sentence?

Looks like. One of the pieces of code that needs to change when siginfo gets updated is siginfo_layout so that the structure can be properly decoded and made sense of.

I am not seeing anything like that.

Okay, this has to do with copying between the compat and non-compat versions of the struct? Sure, I can update that, although the code would be basically non-functional on arm64 because TBI isn't supported on 32-bit ARM.

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
                           char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
Quoted 8 lines
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Quoted 6 lines

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 97

Quoted 6 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
                           __u32 _pkey;
                   } _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+                  /* used with all si_codes */
+                  struct {
+                          short _dummy_top_byte;

^ What's this for? I don't have Eric's insight here.

We would need a short's worth of padding in order to prevent the fields from occupying the same address as si_addr_lsb.

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +4 -0
+                          unsigned char _top_byte;
+                          unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+                  } _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
           };
   } _sigfault;
 
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Why the _dummy_top_byte? Oh I see it should be spelled "short _addr_lsb;".

Please remove the "#ifdef __aarch64__". If at all possible we want to design this so any other architecture who has this challenge can use the code. The kind of code does not get enough attention/maintenance if it is built for a single architecture.

Seems reasonable. I was recently made aware that RISC-V was considering a similar feature:
https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-tee/topic/risc_v_tbi_proposal/72855478
I would have opted to expand this to other architectures on an as-needed basis, but I'd also be fine with having it on all architectures from the start.

If we make this arch-independent, we have an additional concern, which is "what if some future architecture wants more than one byte here?" For example, an architecture may have a "top-two-bytes-ignore" feature, which would imply two-byte (misnamed) "si_addr_top_byte" and "si_addr_top_byte_mask" fields. And the RISC-V proposal potentially implies many more ignored bits (see slide 13 of the presentation). The maximum size that these fields can possibly be is the size of a pointer, and with that there wouldn't be enough room in the padding at this point to accommodate the new fields.

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That basically implies your earlier suggestion of adding a union member here to accommodate future expansion of the union, and adding the new fields after the union. I'm happy to make that change, with the fields renamed "si_addr_ignored" and "si_addr_ignored_mask".

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I think what we need here is basically a flags word.

So long as we keep a flag spare to indicate the existence of a further flags word, we can extend as needed.

How the existence of the first flags words is detected is another problem. If it only applies for newly-defined si_code values, then I guess si_code may be sufficient.

Existing kernels will zero-initialize unused regions of the siginfo data structure. The zero-initialization of the padding at the end of the struct is done by the clear_user call here:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/kernel/signal.c#L3193

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and the zero-initialization of the padding between fields and unused union members is done by the clear_siginfo function which the kernel calls when initializing the data structure:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/include/linux/signal.h#L20

Therefore, a flag word value of 0 may be used to detect a lack of support for flagged fields.

It's not enough that we do this today. We would have had to do it back to the dawn of time (though in the arm64 case I guess we just need to go back to when the arch/arm64 was merged).

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v2.6.12:kernel/signal.c:copy_siginfo_to_user() suggests that this wasn't always the case, so unused parts of siginfo could be full of old junk from the user stack, if the kernel is sufficiently old.

If we're trying to do something generic that makes sense on all arches, this matters. I may have misunderstood something about the code though.

Hmm, I think you're right. The current behavior was introduced by commit c999b933faa5e281e3af2e110eccaf91698b0a81 which was first released in 4.18. So if an application wants to be compatible with pre-4.18 kernels then there would need to be some other way to indicate that the fields are valid. Probably the simplest way would be to have the application issue a uname(2) syscall and check the kernel version before reading these fields. I have a couple of other ideas that don't rely on version detection, if we'd prefer to avoid that. (They are somewhat ugly, but our hand is forced by backwards compatibility.)

One idea is to re-purpose the si_errno field as a flags field for certain signal numbers. I checked a few kernel releases going back to 2.6.18 and it looks like the field is set to 0 except in the following circumstances:
- sending a hardware breakpoint (SIGTRAP/TRAP_HWBKPT)
- seccomp failures (SIGSYS/SYS_SECCOMP)
- user-defined signal via kill_pid_usb_asyncio
- SIGSWI in 3.18 and before (code since removed)

It is also set to EFAULT for certain SIGSEGV/SEGV_MAPERR signals on powerpc since commit c96c4436aba4c12f1f48369f2f90bc43e12fe36c, which is currently unreleased. So if we wanted to go this route for SIGSEGV we would need to stop the kernel from setting si_errno to EFAULT for this signal before the 5.8 release.

Another idea was to have userspace set a flag in sa_flags when registering a signal handler meaning "this signal handler requires unknown siginfo fields to be zeroed", and have existing kernels reject the syscall due to an unknown flag being set, but unfortunately this won't work because existing kernels do not reject sigaction syscalls with unknown flags set in sa_flags. A perhaps more radical idea in this vein would be to claim some of the upper bits of the signal number as flags that will cause the syscall to be rejected if set and unknown to the kernel. Existing kernels (going back to at least 2.6.18) contain this code in do_sigaction:

        if (!valid_signal(sig) || sig < 1 || (act && sig_kernel_only(sig)))
                return -EINVAL;

and vald_signal is defined as:

static inline int valid_signal(unsigned long sig)

{
        return sig <= _NSIG ? 1 : 0;
}
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All architectures define _NSIG as a value <= 128, so they will reject a signal number with any of bits 8-31 set. This means that we can use any of those bits for mandatory flags. Most likely we could use bit 30 (expanding down as necessary), as it keeps the signal number positive and permits future expansion of the signal number range.

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Does the signal core code actually gurantee to zero the unused fields? Unless the fields are poked in by hand this is fraught with subtlelies, especially when unions are involved. (I'm sure the code tries to do it, but I've not eyeballed it in detail...)

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It memsets the siginfo structure before setting the fields and sending the signal (grep for clear_siginfo which is just a memset; you should find a call before all callers of force_sig_info). Memset is the right approach here since unlike setting fields by hand it clears padding which could lead to information leaks from the kernel. IIUC this is the reason why Eric wants all of the signals to be raised via wrappers in kernel/signal.c instead of via force_sig_info directly (to make this aspect easier to audit).

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My impression was that the reason for this model is partly to ensure that siginfo fields are populated more consistently. When it was all down to the individual callers, inconsistencies creeped in.

With regard to memset(), this is not a complete defence against data leakage. Assigning to a struct member can set any or all padding in the struct to random garbage (consider write-combining of neighboring member writes into a single larger accesses in asm for example). The

I don't believe that LLVM will store to padding like this. I don't know about GCC, though, but I wouldn't be surprised if this is something that the kernel would want to turn off in "kernel C" (like it turns off strict aliasing) specifically because of the information leak issue.

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only way to avoid this is to ensure that the struct is 100% padding-free, and that each member of a union is the same size. A quick clance at <uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h> confirms that this is not the case.

This might need to be looked at separately.

But it does mean, strictly speaking, that we can't reliably add new fields anywhere that there was previously padding: assigning to neighboring members can still fill those with garbage after the memset().

...but this is largely moot because I'm not proposing to add new fields in the padding any more (because the fields needed to become larger in order to accommodate future hypothetical architectures which might want to use the fields, and thus they wouldn't fit in the padding). The siginfo.h diff would be something like:

(quoted diff) +0 -0

b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index cb3d6c267181..4a2fe257415d 100644

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +3 -0
@@ -91,7 +91,10 @@ union __sifields {
                                char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
                                __u32 _pkey;
                        } _addr_pkey;
+                       void *_pad[6];
                };
+               uintptr_t _ignored_bits;
+               uintptr_t _ignored_bits_mask;
        } _sigfault;
 
        /* SIGPOLL */

or with a "uintptr_t _flags" added in before _ignored_bits if we go with that.

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Using unused bits in the signal number to turn on new functionality feels risky. As currently specified, this is just a number. Since today a successful sigaction(n ...) guarantees that n is a valid signal number, reasonable code like the following would trigger a buffer overrun if we start trying to encode anything else in there:

struct sigaction actions[NSIG];

int do_something( ... )

{
        ...

        if (!sigaction(n, sa, ...)) {
                actions[n] = *sa;
                return 0;
        }
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        ...
}

I imagine the bit in the signal number being set by the direct caller to sigaction, and we could specifically recommend that calling pattern. In that case, your "n" wouldn't have the bit set in it. It

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I can imagine this too, but that doesn't mean that software does it.

If the above kind of thing exists in a framework or library somewhere, we could get problems. Similarly, a pre-existing LD_PRELOAD framework that provides a wrapper for sigaction may now go wrong even if your pattern is followed -- i.e., the caller thinks it's calling sigaction directly but in fact it isn't.

I'm aware of one library like that. It's called libsigchain, and it has an early bounds check:
https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:art/sigchainlib/sigchain.cc;l=371

Until the library is changed to recognize the flag, calling code would see the return value of -1 as if the kernel failed the syscall, and would fall back to the code for old kernels.

In general I think that any library like this with independent tracking of the kernel's purported signal handler state would need to be very sensitive to which syscalls are capable of setting signal handlers, what their semantics are, and so on. This applies to any change that we might make to the signal handler interface. So for example, if we introduced a new syscall as you propose below, and the library hasn't been updated to recognize the new syscall, it will silently miss changes in signal handler state caused by the new syscall.

At the end of this argument lies "we can never change anything about how signal handlers work because it could break some interposing library somewhere" -- replace "signal handlers" with any kernel feature whose behavior may be modified by an interposing library if you like -- and I don't think we want to go that far. As far as I know, this isn't really the kernel's business anyway -- the kernel's stable ABI contract starts and ends with the syscall interface and not some library on top.

That being said, we should perhaps try to define our interface so that something reasonable will probably happen if there is such a library and it hasn't been updated. With the new syscall, the library will sometimes silently fail to work in some non-local fashion. With the flag bit in the signal number, the library will either cause the caller to fall back to the old kernel code path (if there is a bounds check) or likely crash loudly (if there is no bounds check). To me, the "flag bit in the signal number" behavior seems more reasonable, since either something correct or something easy to debug will probably happen at runtime.

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could only appear in newly-written code that doesn't follow our recommendations, and there are already plenty of much more likely ways to cause buffer overflows in C code that doesn't follow recommendations anyway. (And even if such a buffer overflow occurred, it would very likely be caught early in development by the MMU due to the magnitude of the number 1<<30.)

Choosing the bit value is hard. If shitfing it overflows, this can trigger random undefined behaviour in the compiler in addition to (or perhaps instead of) an out-of-bounds access or segfault.

It wouldn't overflow on a 64-bit architecture assuming normal array indexing (the index would be promoted to pointer width before being scaled to the array element size), and to begin with the users of this would be 64-bit.

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If shifting it doesn't overflow, we might still fall into a valid mapping, though I'd agree a segfault is more likely.

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I think it would be cleaner for to add a single flag field that can be used for detecting other extensions, and request it via a new sa_flags bit. This removes the need for sematically useless zeroing of unused fields (though for hygiene and backwards compatibility reasons we would probably want to carry on zeroing them anyway).

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I can see no simpler way to add supplementary siginfo fields for existing si_codes. For si_codes that didn't exist before the zeroing came in we could still detect optional si_code-specific fields via zeroing, but it seems messary to have two ways of detecting extensions.

That would certainly be cleaner if it worked, but that would only be the case if old kernels rejected unknown bits in sa_flags, and unfortunately they don't. With the bit in the signal number, the "old

Hmm, that is a problem I wasn't aware of.

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kernels reject" behavior admits relatively straightforward usage code:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS, &sa, 0) < 0) { //
succeeds in new kernels, fails in old kernels

    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0) // succeeds in old kernels
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

void clear_fields_and_handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
sa->si_future_field = 0;
handle_segv(signum, sa, ctx);
}

void handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
// At this point, si_future_field will have the value 0 in old
kernels and the kernel-supplied value in new kernels. }

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Imagine if we moved the flag SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS from the signal number to sa_flags. In that case, the first sigaction would succeed in old kernels so handle_segv wouldn't know whether it can safely read from si_future_field. With the sa_flags approach, you would need kernel version number checking via uname before setting the flag in sa_flags, and at that point why even have the flag in sa_flags at all since you could just have the signal handler conditionally read from si_future_field based on the uname?

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Software setting SA_SIFLAGS (or whatever) is new by definition, since it would be using a new #define. So it might be reasonable to put the burden on that software to verify that the flag was really accepted by the kernel, by reading it back.

That doesn't seem like a good idea even if it worked, because it could lead to race conditions. If the si_flags-reading signal handler were invoked in response to a signal between when you set it and when you ended up replacing it with the fallback signal handler for old kernels, the handler may end up reading garbage data from si_flags.

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Unfortunately, even relatively recent kernels blindly store sa_flags in the kernel without validating it, and so it looks like duff flags can be read back out via a sigaction() call. Dang.

Perhaps a new frontend syscall could be added. A new libc that knows about this "sigaction2" could use it and mask off problem bits from sa_flags in its sigaction() wrapper before calling sigaction2. An old libc would call the old sigaction syscall, where we would ignore these new sa_flags bits as before.

I'm not currently in favor of the new syscall but if we do this I would keep sigaction and sigaction2 separate. That is, libc sigaction should always use the sigaction syscall, and libc sigaction2 should always use the sigaction2 syscall. We should avoid libc's sigaction having different behavior based on the libc version and kernel version, as that would make it harder to reason about its behavior. Calling code would need to check for presence of sigaction2 in both libc and the kernel, e.g.

__attribute__((weak)) decltype(sigaction2) sigaction2;

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_SIFLAGS;

  if (!sigaction2 || sigaction2(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0) {
    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0)
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

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This may not be a popular approach though, and software wouldn't be able to use our new features until libc is updated to match.

If we go down this route, it may provide additional opportunities to fix annoying defects in the old interface.

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Note that the same applies to a flag indicating the availability of a si_flags field in sigaction (just s/SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS/SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS/ and s/si_future_field/si_flags/ in the usage code above). In terms of SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS versus SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS I'd be fine either way.

Another thought that occurred to me is that we may consider generalizing this a step further and introducing a single flag bit in the signal number that means "reject unknown flags in sa_flags". This would mean that we wouldn't need to add any more flag bits to the signal number in the future, thus limiting this signal number hack to a single bit; all future mandatory behavior changes could just be put behind a flag in sa_flags and userspace code would easily be able to detect missing support for a flag and fall back if necessary. In our case, this would imply usage code like this:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS;
// Succeeds in kernels with SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support. // Fails in kernels with SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support but no
SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support (because of the unknown flags check).
// Fails in kernels without SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support (because of
the bounds check on the signal number).

  if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS, &sa, 0) < 0) {
    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
    // Succeeds in old kernels, no need to use SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS since
we're using sa_flags from the beginning of time.
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0)
      perror("sigaction");
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}
}

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As with the other options this could work, but looks like it could break the ABI due to violating the original semantics for the signal number argument. Perhaps I'm being too paranoid.

There's no ABI being broken here, as long as we consider syscalls to be the stable ABI layer. Old kernels are simply rejecting arguments that they don't know about yet. By that argument, any introduction of a new syscall is an ABI break because it changes the semantics of a previously-unallocated syscall number.

Peter

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#48 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 298 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 288 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 277 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 271 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 263 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 208 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 194 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 179 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 70 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 60 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 57 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 55 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 49 lines · Peter Collingbourne

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
index 47f651df781c..a8380a2b6361 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
@@ -235,20 +235,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
}

void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+ unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
const char *str)
{
arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
- if (signo == SIGKILL)
+ if (signo == SIGKILL) {
force_sig(SIGKILL);
- else
- force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+ } else {
+ struct kernel_siginfo info;
+ clear_siginfo(&info);
+ info.si_signo = signo;
+ info.si_errno = 0;
+ info.si_code = code;
+ info.si_addr = addr;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+ force_sig_info(&info);
+ }
}

void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
- const char *str)
+ unsigned long far, const char *str)
{
+ struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
- force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+
+ clear_siginfo(&info);
+ info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+ info.si_errno = 0;
+ info.si_code = code;
+ info.si_addr = addr;
+ info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+ force_sig_info(&info);
}

I have a real problem with this construction. force_sig_info is not an interface that should be used for anything except to define a wrapper that takes it's parameters.

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Can you elaborate? How would you do this king of thing.

There are no other uses of force_sig_info in architecture code.

I just removed them _all_ because they were almost all broken. In fact your mcerr case is broken because it uses two different union members simultantiously.

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Is that really broken? I thought that the Linux kernel deliberately didn't care about strict aliasing rules (the top-level Makefile passes -fno-strict-aliasing) so I thought that it was valid in "Linux kernel C" even though from a standards point of view it is invalid. (That being said, this is probably moot with my proposed changes below though.)

I have a feeling that -fno-strict-aliasing only allows you to _read_ a different union member from the one previously written.

Writing a different member from the last one written can still splatter on the other members IIUC.

It would be better to keep things separate rather than risk incorrectness just to save a few bytes.

IMHO -fno-strict-aliasing is no excuse for gratuitous type-punning.

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So I am looking for something like force_sig_mcerr or force_sig_fault that includes your new information that then calls force_sig_info.

I know of no other way to safely use the siginfo struct.

So you want something like:

int force_sig_fault_with_ignored_bits(int signo, int code, void __user *addr, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask); int force_sig_mceerr_with_ignored_bits(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);

in kernel/signal.c and the code in arch/arm64 would call that?

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AIUI we absolutely need a forced signal here, we need to supply metadata, and we don't have to open-code all that at every relevant signal generation site...

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It is not clear to me that if you have adapted siginfo_layout.

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Garbled sentence?

Looks like. One of the pieces of code that needs to change when siginfo gets updated is siginfo_layout so that the structure can be properly decoded and made sense of.

I am not seeing anything like that.

Okay, this has to do with copying between the compat and non-compat versions of the struct? Sure, I can update that, although the code would be basically non-functional on arm64 because TBI isn't supported on 32-bit ARM.

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diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];

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__u32 _pkey;
} _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+ /* used with all si_codes */
+ struct {
+ short _dummy_top_byte;

^ What's this for? I don't have Eric's insight here.

We would need a short's worth of padding in order to prevent the fields from occupying the same address as si_addr_lsb.

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+ unsigned char _top_byte;
+ unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+ } _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
};
} _sigfault;

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Why the _dummy_top_byte? Oh I see it should be spelled "short _addr_lsb;".

Please remove the "#ifdef __aarch64__". If at all possible we want to design this so any other architecture who has this challenge can use the code. The kind of code does not get enough attention/maintenance if it is built for a single architecture.

Seems reasonable. I was recently made aware that RISC-V was considering a similar feature:
https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-tee/topic/risc_v_tbi_proposal/72855478
I would have opted to expand this to other architectures on an as-needed basis, but I'd also be fine with having it on all architectures from the start.

If we make this arch-independent, we have an additional concern, which is "what if some future architecture wants more than one byte here?" For example, an architecture may have a "top-two-bytes-ignore" feature, which would imply two-byte (misnamed) "si_addr_top_byte" and "si_addr_top_byte_mask" fields. And the RISC-V proposal potentially implies many more ignored bits (see slide 13 of the presentation). The maximum size that these fields can possibly be is the size of a pointer, and with that there wouldn't be enough room in the padding at this point to accommodate the new fields.

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That basically implies your earlier suggestion of adding a union member here to accommodate future expansion of the union, and adding the new fields after the union. I'm happy to make that change, with the fields renamed "si_addr_ignored" and "si_addr_ignored_mask".

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I think what we need here is basically a flags word.

So long as we keep a flag spare to indicate the existence of a further flags word, we can extend as needed.

How the existence of the first flags words is detected is another problem. If it only applies for newly-defined si_code values, then I guess si_code may be sufficient.

Existing kernels will zero-initialize unused regions of the siginfo data structure. The zero-initialization of the padding at the end of the struct is done by the clear_user call here:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/kernel/signal.c#L3193

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and the zero-initialization of the padding between fields and unused union members is done by the clear_siginfo function which the kernel calls when initializing the data structure:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/include/linux/signal.h#L20

Therefore, a flag word value of 0 may be used to detect a lack of support for flagged fields.

It's not enough that we do this today. We would have had to do it back to the dawn of time (though in the arm64 case I guess we just need to go back to when the arch/arm64 was merged).

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v2.6.12:kernel/signal.c:copy_siginfo_to_user() suggests that this wasn't always the case, so unused parts of siginfo could be full of old junk from the user stack, if the kernel is sufficiently old.

If we're trying to do something generic that makes sense on all arches, this matters. I may have misunderstood something about the code though.

Hmm, I think you're right. The current behavior was introduced by commit c999b933faa5e281e3af2e110eccaf91698b0a81 which was first released in 4.18. So if an application wants to be compatible with pre-4.18 kernels then there would need to be some other way to indicate that the fields are valid. Probably the simplest way would be to have the application issue a uname(2) syscall and check the kernel version before reading these fields. I have a couple of other ideas that don't rely on version detection, if we'd prefer to avoid that. (They are somewhat ugly, but our hand is forced by backwards compatibility.)

One idea is to re-purpose the si_errno field as a flags field for certain signal numbers. I checked a few kernel releases going back to 2.6.18 and it looks like the field is set to 0 except in the following circumstances:
- sending a hardware breakpoint (SIGTRAP/TRAP_HWBKPT)
- seccomp failures (SIGSYS/SYS_SECCOMP)
- user-defined signal via kill_pid_usb_asyncio
- SIGSWI in 3.18 and before (code since removed)

It is also set to EFAULT for certain SIGSEGV/SEGV_MAPERR signals on powerpc since commit c96c4436aba4c12f1f48369f2f90bc43e12fe36c, which is currently unreleased. So if we wanted to go this route for SIGSEGV we would need to stop the kernel from setting si_errno to EFAULT for this signal before the 5.8 release.

Another idea was to have userspace set a flag in sa_flags when registering a signal handler meaning "this signal handler requires unknown siginfo fields to be zeroed", and have existing kernels reject the syscall due to an unknown flag being set, but unfortunately this won't work because existing kernels do not reject sigaction syscalls with unknown flags set in sa_flags. A perhaps more radical idea in this vein would be to claim some of the upper bits of the signal number as flags that will cause the syscall to be rejected if set and unknown to the kernel. Existing kernels (going back to at least 2.6.18) contain this code in do_sigaction:

        if (!valid_signal(sig) || sig < 1 || (act && sig_kernel_only(sig)))
                return -EINVAL;

and vald_signal is defined as:

static inline int valid_signal(unsigned long sig)

{
        return sig <= _NSIG ? 1 : 0;
}
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All architectures define _NSIG as a value <= 128, so they will reject a signal number with any of bits 8-31 set. This means that we can use any of those bits for mandatory flags. Most likely we could use bit 30 (expanding down as necessary), as it keeps the signal number positive and permits future expansion of the signal number range.

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Does the signal core code actually gurantee to zero the unused fields? Unless the fields are poked in by hand this is fraught with subtlelies, especially when unions are involved. (I'm sure the code tries to do it, but I've not eyeballed it in detail...)

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It memsets the siginfo structure before setting the fields and sending the signal (grep for clear_siginfo which is just a memset; you should find a call before all callers of force_sig_info). Memset is the right approach here since unlike setting fields by hand it clears padding which could lead to information leaks from the kernel. IIUC this is the reason why Eric wants all of the signals to be raised via wrappers in kernel/signal.c instead of via force_sig_info directly (to make this aspect easier to audit).

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My impression was that the reason for this model is partly to ensure that siginfo fields are populated more consistently. When it was all down to the individual callers, inconsistencies creeped in.

With regard to memset(), this is not a complete defence against data leakage. Assigning to a struct member can set any or all padding in the struct to random garbage (consider write-combining of neighboring member writes into a single larger accesses in asm for example). The

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I don't believe that LLVM will store to padding like this. I don't know about GCC, though, but I wouldn't be surprised if this is something that the kernel would want to turn off in "kernel C" (like it turns off strict aliasing) specifically because of the information leak issue.

Again, the issue is not future kernel builds -- we can always find a way to fix the behaviour for those -- but past kernel builds.

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only way to avoid this is to ensure that the struct is 100% padding-free, and that each member of a union is the same size. A quick clance at <uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h> confirms that this is not the case.

This might need to be looked at separately.

But it does mean, strictly speaking, that we can't reliably add new fields anywhere that there was previously padding: assigning to neighboring members can still fill those with garbage after the memset().

...but this is largely moot because I'm not proposing to add new fields in the padding any more (because the fields needed to become larger in order to accommodate future hypothetical architectures which might want to use the fields, and thus they wouldn't fit in the padding). The siginfo.h diff would be something like:

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c267181..4a2fe257415d 100644

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 97

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +3 -0
@@ -91,7 +91,10 @@ union __sifields {
                                char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
                                __u32 _pkey;
                        } _addr_pkey;
+                       void *_pad[6];
                };
+               uintptr_t _ignored_bits;
+               uintptr_t _ignored_bits_mask;

This _is_ in padding: the tail-padding of the (previously smaller) _sigfault. Again, the compiler was allowed to populate this area with junk before these fields were added.

I agree that it seems fairly unlikely that the compiler would have been overwriting this in normal circumstances, but that's not a guarantee. My worry is that if this goes wrong, it will go wrong silently and unpredictably.

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
        } _sigfault;
 
        /* SIGPOLL */

or with a "uintptr_t _flags" added in before _ignored_bits if we go with that.

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Using unused bits in the signal number to turn on new functionality feels risky. As currently specified, this is just a number. Since today a successful sigaction(n ...) guarantees that n is a valid signal number, reasonable code like the following would trigger a buffer overrun if we start trying to encode anything else in there:

struct sigaction actions[NSIG];

int do_something( ... )

{
        ...

        if (!sigaction(n, sa, ...)) {
                actions[n] = *sa;
                return 0;
        }
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        ...
}

I imagine the bit in the signal number being set by the direct caller to sigaction, and we could specifically recommend that calling pattern. In that case, your "n" wouldn't have the bit set in it. It

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I can imagine this too, but that doesn't mean that software does it.

If the above kind of thing exists in a framework or library somewhere, we could get problems. Similarly, a pre-existing LD_PRELOAD framework that provides a wrapper for sigaction may now go wrong even if your pattern is followed -- i.e., the caller thinks it's calling sigaction directly but in fact it isn't.

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I'm aware of one library like that. It's called libsigchain, and it has an early bounds check:
https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:art/sigchainlib/sigchain.cc;l=371

Until the library is changed to recognize the flag, calling code would see the return value of -1 as if the kernel failed the syscall, and would fall back to the code for old kernels.

But only after some bad dereferences. If these were writes, this means that memory _may_ be silently corrupted (I don't say it't likely in a given case, and we cannot pick a flag bit that makes this impossible).

So, _even though the user program is correct_, our change may trigger the corruption of arbitrary user memory. This what I mean by an ABI break. The fact that the corruption is not done by the syscall itself is no excuse.

We also fail to notice failures in sigaddset() etc., though in this code it looks like that should not matter.

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In general I think that any library like this with independent tracking of the kernel's purported signal handler state would need to be very sensitive to which syscalls are capable of setting signal handlers, what their semantics are, and so on. This applies to any change that we might make to the signal handler interface. So for example, if we introduced a new syscall as you propose below, and the library hasn't been updated to recognize the new syscall, it will silently miss changes in signal handler state caused by the new syscall.

At the end of this argument lies "we can never change anything about how signal handlers work because it could break some interposing library somewhere" -- replace "signal handlers" with any kernel feature whose behavior may be modified by an interposing library if you like -- and I don't think we want to go that far. As far as I know, this isn't really the kernel's business anyway -- the kernel's stable ABI contract starts and ends with the syscall interface and not some library on top.

That being said, we should perhaps try to define our interface so that something reasonable will probably happen if there is such a library and it hasn't been updated. With the new syscall, the library will sometimes silently fail to work in some non-local fashion. With the flag bit in the signal number, the library will either cause the caller to fall back to the old kernel code path (if there is a bounds check) or likely crash loudly (if there is no bounds check). To me, the "flag bit in the signal number" behavior seems more reasonable, since either something correct or something easy to debug will probably happen at runtime.

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could only appear in newly-written code that doesn't follow our recommendations, and there are already plenty of much more likely ways to cause buffer overflows in C code that doesn't follow recommendations anyway. (And even if such a buffer overflow occurred, it would very likely be caught early in development by the MMU due to the magnitude of the number 1<<30.)

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Choosing the bit value is hard. If shitfing it overflows, this can trigger random undefined behaviour in the compiler in addition to (or perhaps instead of) an out-of-bounds access or segfault.

It wouldn't overflow on a 64-bit architecture assuming normal array indexing (the index would be promoted to pointer width before being scaled to the array element size), and to begin with the users of this would be 64-bit.

Unless we don't offer this feature for 32-bit at all (possible, if ugly) we can't stop people using it.

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If shifting it doesn't overflow, we might still fall into a valid mapping, though I'd agree a segfault is more likely.

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I think it would be cleaner for to add a single flag field that can be used for detecting other extensions, and request it via a new sa_flags bit. This removes the need for sematically useless zeroing of unused fields (though for hygiene and backwards compatibility reasons we would probably want to carry on zeroing them anyway).

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I can see no simpler way to add supplementary siginfo fields for existing si_codes. For si_codes that didn't exist before the zeroing came in we could still detect optional si_code-specific fields via zeroing, but it seems messary to have two ways of detecting extensions.

That would certainly be cleaner if it worked, but that would only be the case if old kernels rejected unknown bits in sa_flags, and unfortunately they don't. With the bit in the signal number, the "old

Hmm, that is a problem I wasn't aware of.

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kernels reject" behavior admits relatively straightforward usage code:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS, &sa, 0) < 0) { //
succeeds in new kernels, fails in old kernels

    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0) // succeeds in old kernels
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

void clear_fields_and_handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
sa->si_future_field = 0;
handle_segv(signum, sa, ctx);
}

void handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
// At this point, si_future_field will have the value 0 in old
kernels and the kernel-supplied value in new kernels. }

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Imagine if we moved the flag SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS from the signal number to sa_flags. In that case, the first sigaction would succeed in old kernels so handle_segv wouldn't know whether it can safely read from si_future_field. With the sa_flags approach, you would need kernel version number checking via uname before setting the flag in sa_flags, and at that point why even have the flag in sa_flags at all since you could just have the signal handler conditionally read from si_future_field based on the uname?

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Software setting SA_SIFLAGS (or whatever) is new by definition, since it would be using a new #define. So it might be reasonable to put the burden on that software to verify that the flag was really accepted by the kernel, by reading it back.

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That doesn't seem like a good idea even if it worked, because it could lead to race conditions. If the si_flags-reading signal handler were invoked in response to a signal between when you set it and when you ended up replacing it with the fallback signal handler for old kernels, the handler may end up reading garbage data from si_flags.

Not really. My example may have this problem, but the signal handler can be written to support both scenarios, based on testing a flag that the main program sets after verifying that the flag could be set. Or the signal could be blocked around establishment (often a good idea for other reasons).

But I agree it's a bit gross, and anyway doesn't work due to the fact that the kernel doesn't filter out unrecognised flags anyway.

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Unfortunately, even relatively recent kernels blindly store sa_flags in the kernel without validating it, and so it looks like duff flags can be read back out via a sigaction() call. Dang.

Perhaps a new frontend syscall could be added. A new libc that knows about this "sigaction2" could use it and mask off problem bits from sa_flags in its sigaction() wrapper before calling sigaction2. An old libc would call the old sigaction syscall, where we would ignore these new sa_flags bits as before.

I'm not currently in favor of the new syscall but if we do this I would keep sigaction and sigaction2 separate. That is, libc sigaction should always use the sigaction syscall, and libc sigaction2 should always use the sigaction2 syscall. We should avoid libc's sigaction having different behavior based on the libc version and kernel version, as that would make it harder to reason about its behavior. Calling code would need to check for presence of sigaction2 in both libc and the kernel, e.g.

__attribute__((weak)) decltype(sigaction2) sigaction2;

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_SIFLAGS;

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  if (!sigaction2 || sigaction2(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0) {
    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0)
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

I guess. But I share your distaste for adding a new syscall.

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This may not be a popular approach though, and software wouldn't be able to use our new features until libc is updated to match.

If we go down this route, it may provide additional opportunities to fix annoying defects in the old interface.

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Note that the same applies to a flag indicating the availability of a si_flags field in sigaction (just s/SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS/SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS/ and s/si_future_field/si_flags/ in the usage code above). In terms of SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS versus SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS I'd be fine either way.

Another thought that occurred to me is that we may consider generalizing this a step further and introducing a single flag bit in the signal number that means "reject unknown flags in sa_flags". This would mean that we wouldn't need to add any more flag bits to the signal number in the future, thus limiting this signal number hack to a single bit; all future mandatory behavior changes could just be put behind a flag in sa_flags and userspace code would easily be able to detect missing support for a flag and fall back if necessary. In our case, this would imply usage code like this:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS;
// Succeeds in kernels with SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support. // Fails in kernels with SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support but no
SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support (because of the unknown flags check).
// Fails in kernels without SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support (because of
the bounds check on the signal number).

  if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS, &sa, 0) < 0) {
    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
    // Succeeds in old kernels, no need to use SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS since
we're using sa_flags from the beginning of time.
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0)
      perror("sigaction");
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}
}

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As with the other options this could work, but looks like it could break the ABI due to violating the original semantics for the signal number argument. Perhaps I'm being too paranoid.

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There's no ABI being broken here, as long as we consider syscalls to be the stable ABI layer. Old kernels are simply rejecting arguments that they don't know about yet. By that argument, any introduction of a new syscall is an ABI break because it changes the semantics of a previously-unallocated syscall number.

As argued above, I think this is an invalid argument.

Although any addition will change behaviour (so is a break in some sense), the key is not to make "surprising" changes.

Having something random happen when setting a previously reserved flag bit, or when issuing a syscall when an unknown syscall number, or not surprising at all.

Making fundamental changes to the encoding of an existing argument is highly surprising, on the other hand: as your example shows, it is reasonable to index an array using a signal number.

I agree that this doesn't get us closer to a practical solution though.

But we do seem to need some mechanism in addition to (or instead of) sa_flags.

Here's another thought:

Since si_flags would be either always present or always absent, it could make sense to have a global property to report this, rather than an sa_flags or signal number bit to request it per-signal.

Requiring software to parse uname() might be reasonable for that, if cumbersome (did you suggest this previously?). If we're concerned that the awkwardness of this would encourage people not to bother (or encourage people to do it wrong) then we might opt for something simpler like an AT_FLAGS bit.

Ultimately libc could provide a more portable interface for discovery, such as via sysconf().

Thoughts?

---Dave

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linux-arm-kernel mailing list
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#49 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 650 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 298 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 288 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 277 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 271 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 263 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 208 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 194 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 179 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 70 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 60 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 57 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 55 lines · Eric W. Biederman

Peter Collingbourne <[email protected]> writes:

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
index 47f651df781c..a8380a2b6361 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
@@ -235,20 +235,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
}

void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+ unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
const char *str)
{
arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
- if (signo == SIGKILL)
+ if (signo == SIGKILL) {
force_sig(SIGKILL);
- else
- force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+ } else {
+ struct kernel_siginfo info;
+ clear_siginfo(&info);
+ info.si_signo = signo;
+ info.si_errno = 0;
+ info.si_code = code;
+ info.si_addr = addr;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+ force_sig_info(&info);
+ }
}

void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
- const char *str)
+ unsigned long far, const char *str)
{
+ struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
- force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+
+ clear_siginfo(&info);
+ info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+ info.si_errno = 0;
+ info.si_code = code;
+ info.si_addr = addr;
+ info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+ force_sig_info(&info);
}

I have a real problem with this construction. force_sig_info is not an
interface that should be used for anything except to define a wrapper
that takes it's parameters.

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Can you elaborate? How would you do this king of thing.

There are no other uses of force_sig_info in architecture code.

I just removed them _all_ because they were almost all broken. In fact your mcerr case is broken because it uses two different union members simultantiously.

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Is that really broken? I thought that the Linux kernel deliberately didn't care about strict aliasing rules (the top-level Makefile passes -fno-strict-aliasing) so I thought that it was valid in "Linux kernel C" even though from a standards point of view it is invalid. (That being said, this is probably moot with my proposed changes below though.)

I have a feeling that -fno-strict-aliasing only allows you to _read_ a different union member from the one previously written.

Writing a different member from the last one written can still splatter on the other members IIUC.

It would be better to keep things separate rather than risk incorrectness just to save a few bytes.

IMHO -fno-strict-aliasing is no excuse for gratuitous type-punning.

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So I am looking for something like force_sig_mcerr or force_sig_fault that includes your new information that then calls force_sig_info.

I know of no other way to safely use the siginfo struct.

So you want something like:

int force_sig_fault_with_ignored_bits(int signo, int code, void __user *addr, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask); int force_sig_mceerr_with_ignored_bits(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);

in kernel/signal.c and the code in arch/arm64 would call that?

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AIUI we absolutely need a forced signal here, we need to supply metadata, and we don't have to open-code all that at every relevant signal generation site...

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It is not clear to me that if you have adapted siginfo_layout.

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Garbled sentence?

Looks like. One of the pieces of code that needs to change when siginfo gets updated is siginfo_layout so that the structure can be properly decoded and made sense of.

I am not seeing anything like that.

Okay, this has to do with copying between the compat and non-compat versions of the struct? Sure, I can update that, although the code would be basically non-functional on arm64 because TBI isn't supported on 32-bit ARM.

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diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];

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__u32 _pkey;
} _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+ /* used with all si_codes */
+ struct {
+ short _dummy_top_byte;

^ What's this for? I don't have Eric's insight here.

We would need a short's worth of padding in order to prevent the fields from occupying the same address as si_addr_lsb.

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+ unsigned char _top_byte;
+ unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+ } _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
};
} _sigfault;

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Why the _dummy_top_byte? Oh I see it should be spelled "short _addr_lsb;".

Please remove the "#ifdef __aarch64__". If at all possible we want to
design this so any other architecture who has this challenge can use the
code. The kind of code does not get enough attention/maintenance if it
is built for a single architecture.

Seems reasonable. I was recently made aware that RISC-V was considering a similar feature:
https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-tee/topic/risc_v_tbi_proposal/72855478
I would have opted to expand this to other architectures on an as-needed basis, but I'd also be fine with having it on all architectures from the start.

If we make this arch-independent, we have an additional concern, which is "what if some future architecture wants more than one byte here?" For example, an architecture may have a "top-two-bytes-ignore" feature, which would imply two-byte (misnamed) "si_addr_top_byte" and "si_addr_top_byte_mask" fields. And the RISC-V proposal potentially implies many more ignored bits (see slide 13 of the presentation). The maximum size that these fields can possibly be is the size of a pointer, and with that there wouldn't be enough room in the padding at this point to accommodate the new fields.

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That basically implies your earlier suggestion of adding a union member here to accommodate future expansion of the union, and adding the new fields after the union. I'm happy to make that change, with the fields renamed "si_addr_ignored" and "si_addr_ignored_mask".

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I think what we need here is basically a flags word.

So long as we keep a flag spare to indicate the existence of a further flags word, we can extend as needed.

How the existence of the first flags words is detected is another problem. If it only applies for newly-defined si_code values, then I guess si_code may be sufficient.

Existing kernels will zero-initialize unused regions of the siginfo data structure. The zero-initialization of the padding at the end of the struct is done by the clear_user call here:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/kernel/signal.c#L3193

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and the zero-initialization of the padding between fields and unused union members is done by the clear_siginfo function which the kernel calls when initializing the data structure:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/include/linux/signal.h#L20

Therefore, a flag word value of 0 may be used to detect a lack of support for flagged fields.

It's not enough that we do this today. We would have had to do it back to the dawn of time (though in the arm64 case I guess we just need to go back to when the arch/arm64 was merged).

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v2.6.12:kernel/signal.c:copy_siginfo_to_user() suggests that this wasn't always the case, so unused parts of siginfo could be full of old junk from the user stack, if the kernel is sufficiently old.

If we're trying to do something generic that makes sense on all arches, this matters. I may have misunderstood something about the code though.

Hmm, I think you're right. The current behavior was introduced by commit c999b933faa5e281e3af2e110eccaf91698b0a81 which was first released in 4.18. So if an application wants to be compatible with pre-4.18 kernels then there would need to be some other way to indicate that the fields are valid. Probably the simplest way would be to have the application issue a uname(2) syscall and check the kernel version before reading these fields. I have a couple of other ideas that don't rely on version detection, if we'd prefer to avoid that. (They are somewhat ugly, but our hand is forced by backwards compatibility.)

One idea is to re-purpose the si_errno field as a flags field for certain signal numbers. I checked a few kernel releases going back to 2.6.18 and it looks like the field is set to 0 except in the following circumstances:
- sending a hardware breakpoint (SIGTRAP/TRAP_HWBKPT)
- seccomp failures (SIGSYS/SYS_SECCOMP)
- user-defined signal via kill_pid_usb_asyncio
- SIGSWI in 3.18 and before (code since removed)

It is also set to EFAULT for certain SIGSEGV/SEGV_MAPERR signals on powerpc since commit c96c4436aba4c12f1f48369f2f90bc43e12fe36c, which is currently unreleased. So if we wanted to go this route for SIGSEGV we would need to stop the kernel from setting si_errno to EFAULT for this signal before the 5.8 release.

Another idea was to have userspace set a flag in sa_flags when registering a signal handler meaning "this signal handler requires unknown siginfo fields to be zeroed", and have existing kernels reject the syscall due to an unknown flag being set, but unfortunately this won't work because existing kernels do not reject sigaction syscalls with unknown flags set in sa_flags. A perhaps more radical idea in this vein would be to claim some of the upper bits of the signal number as flags that will cause the syscall to be rejected if set and unknown to the kernel. Existing kernels (going back to at least 2.6.18) contain this code in do_sigaction:

        if (!valid_signal(sig) || sig < 1 || (act && sig_kernel_only(sig)))
                return -EINVAL;

and vald_signal is defined as:

static inline int valid_signal(unsigned long sig)

{
        return sig <= _NSIG ? 1 : 0;
}
Quoted 5 lines

All architectures define _NSIG as a value <= 128, so they will reject a signal number with any of bits 8-31 set. This means that we can use any of those bits for mandatory flags. Most likely we could use bit 30 (expanding down as necessary), as it keeps the signal number positive and permits future expansion of the signal number range.

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Does the signal core code actually gurantee to zero the unused fields? Unless the fields are poked in by hand this is fraught with subtlelies, especially when unions are involved. (I'm sure the code tries to do it, but I've not eyeballed it in detail...)

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It memsets the siginfo structure before setting the fields and sending the signal (grep for clear_siginfo which is just a memset; you should find a call before all callers of force_sig_info). Memset is the right approach here since unlike setting fields by hand it clears padding which could lead to information leaks from the kernel. IIUC this is the reason why Eric wants all of the signals to be raised via wrappers in kernel/signal.c instead of via force_sig_info directly (to make this aspect easier to audit).

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My impression was that the reason for this model is partly to ensure that siginfo fields are populated more consistently. When it was all down to the individual callers, inconsistencies creeped in.

With regard to memset(), this is not a complete defence against data leakage. Assigning to a struct member can set any or all padding in the struct to random garbage (consider write-combining of neighboring member writes into a single larger accesses in asm for example). The

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I don't believe that LLVM will store to padding like this. I don't know about GCC, though, but I wouldn't be surprised if this is something that the kernel would want to turn off in "kernel C" (like it turns off strict aliasing) specifically because of the information leak issue.

Again, the issue is not future kernel builds -- we can always find a way to fix the behaviour for those -- but past kernel builds.

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only way to avoid this is to ensure that the struct is 100% padding-free, and that each member of a union is the same size. A quick clance at <uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h> confirms that this is not the case.

This might need to be looked at separately.

But it does mean, strictly speaking, that we can't reliably add new fields anywhere that there was previously padding: assigning to neighboring members can still fill those with garbage after the memset().

...but this is largely moot because I'm not proposing to add new fields in the padding any more (because the fields needed to become larger in order to accommodate future hypothetical architectures which might want to use the fields, and thus they wouldn't fit in the padding). The siginfo.h diff would be something like:

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c267181..4a2fe257415d 100644

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 97

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +3 -0
@@ -91,7 +91,10 @@ union __sifields {
                                char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
                                __u32 _pkey;
                        } _addr_pkey;
+                       void *_pad[6];
                };
+               uintptr_t _ignored_bits;
+               uintptr_t _ignored_bits_mask;

This _is_ in padding: the tail-padding of the (previously smaller) _sigfault. Again, the compiler was allowed to populate this area with junk before these fields were added.

I agree that it seems fairly unlikely that the compiler would have been overwriting this in normal circumstances, but that's not a guarantee. My worry is that if this goes wrong, it will go wrong silently and unpredictably.

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
        } _sigfault;
 
        /* SIGPOLL */

or with a "uintptr_t _flags" added in before _ignored_bits if we go with that.

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Using unused bits in the signal number to turn on new functionality feels risky. As currently specified, this is just a number. Since today a successful sigaction(n ...) guarantees that n is a valid signal number, reasonable code like the following would trigger a buffer overrun if we start trying to encode anything else in there:

struct sigaction actions[NSIG];

int do_something( ... )

{
        ...

        if (!sigaction(n, sa, ...)) {
                actions[n] = *sa;
                return 0;
        }
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        ...
}

I imagine the bit in the signal number being set by the direct caller to sigaction, and we could specifically recommend that calling pattern. In that case, your "n" wouldn't have the bit set in it. It

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I can imagine this too, but that doesn't mean that software does it.

If the above kind of thing exists in a framework or library somewhere, we could get problems. Similarly, a pre-existing LD_PRELOAD framework that provides a wrapper for sigaction may now go wrong even if your pattern is followed -- i.e., the caller thinks it's calling sigaction directly but in fact it isn't.

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I'm aware of one library like that. It's called libsigchain, and it has an early bounds check:
https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:art/sigchainlib/sigchain.cc;l=371

Until the library is changed to recognize the flag, calling code would see the return value of -1 as if the kernel failed the syscall, and would fall back to the code for old kernels.

But only after some bad dereferences. If these were writes, this means that memory _may_ be silently corrupted (I don't say it't likely in a given case, and we cannot pick a flag bit that makes this impossible).

So, _even though the user program is correct_, our change may trigger the corruption of arbitrary user memory. This what I mean by an ABI break. The fact that the corruption is not done by the syscall itself is no excuse.

We also fail to notice failures in sigaddset() etc., though in this code it looks like that should not matter.

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In general I think that any library like this with independent tracking of the kernel's purported signal handler state would need to be very sensitive to which syscalls are capable of setting signal handlers, what their semantics are, and so on. This applies to any change that we might make to the signal handler interface. So for example, if we introduced a new syscall as you propose below, and the library hasn't been updated to recognize the new syscall, it will silently miss changes in signal handler state caused by the new syscall.

At the end of this argument lies "we can never change anything about how signal handlers work because it could break some interposing library somewhere" -- replace "signal handlers" with any kernel feature whose behavior may be modified by an interposing library if you like -- and I don't think we want to go that far. As far as I know, this isn't really the kernel's business anyway -- the kernel's stable ABI contract starts and ends with the syscall interface and not some library on top.

That being said, we should perhaps try to define our interface so that something reasonable will probably happen if there is such a library and it hasn't been updated. With the new syscall, the library will sometimes silently fail to work in some non-local fashion. With the flag bit in the signal number, the library will either cause the caller to fall back to the old kernel code path (if there is a bounds check) or likely crash loudly (if there is no bounds check). To me, the "flag bit in the signal number" behavior seems more reasonable, since either something correct or something easy to debug will probably happen at runtime.

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could only appear in newly-written code that doesn't follow our recommendations, and there are already plenty of much more likely ways to cause buffer overflows in C code that doesn't follow recommendations anyway. (And even if such a buffer overflow occurred, it would very likely be caught early in development by the MMU due to the magnitude of the number 1<<30.)

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Choosing the bit value is hard. If shitfing it overflows, this can trigger random undefined behaviour in the compiler in addition to (or perhaps instead of) an out-of-bounds access or segfault.

It wouldn't overflow on a 64-bit architecture assuming normal array indexing (the index would be promoted to pointer width before being scaled to the array element size), and to begin with the users of this would be 64-bit.

Unless we don't offer this feature for 32-bit at all (possible, if ugly) we can't stop people using it.

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If shifting it doesn't overflow, we might still fall into a valid mapping, though I'd agree a segfault is more likely.

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I think it would be cleaner for to add a single flag field that can be used for detecting other extensions, and request it via a new sa_flags bit. This removes the need for sematically useless zeroing of unused fields (though for hygiene and backwards compatibility reasons we would probably want to carry on zeroing them anyway).

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I can see no simpler way to add supplementary siginfo fields for existing si_codes. For si_codes that didn't exist before the zeroing came in we could still detect optional si_code-specific fields via zeroing, but it seems messary to have two ways of detecting extensions.

That would certainly be cleaner if it worked, but that would only be the case if old kernels rejected unknown bits in sa_flags, and unfortunately they don't. With the bit in the signal number, the "old

Hmm, that is a problem I wasn't aware of.

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kernels reject" behavior admits relatively straightforward usage code:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS, &sa, 0) < 0) { //
succeeds in new kernels, fails in old kernels

    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0) // succeeds in old kernels
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

void clear_fields_and_handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
sa->si_future_field = 0;
handle_segv(signum, sa, ctx);
}

void handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
// At this point, si_future_field will have the value 0 in old
kernels and the kernel-supplied value in new kernels. }

Quoted 8 lines

Imagine if we moved the flag SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS from the signal number to sa_flags. In that case, the first sigaction would succeed in old kernels so handle_segv wouldn't know whether it can safely read from si_future_field. With the sa_flags approach, you would need kernel version number checking via uname before setting the flag in sa_flags, and at that point why even have the flag in sa_flags at all since you could just have the signal handler conditionally read from si_future_field based on the uname?

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Software setting SA_SIFLAGS (or whatever) is new by definition, since it would be using a new #define. So it might be reasonable to put the burden on that software to verify that the flag was really accepted by the kernel, by reading it back.

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That doesn't seem like a good idea even if it worked, because it could lead to race conditions. If the si_flags-reading signal handler were invoked in response to a signal between when you set it and when you ended up replacing it with the fallback signal handler for old kernels, the handler may end up reading garbage data from si_flags.

Not really. My example may have this problem, but the signal handler can be written to support both scenarios, based on testing a flag that the main program sets after verifying that the flag could be set. Or the signal could be blocked around establishment (often a good idea for other reasons).

But I agree it's a bit gross, and anyway doesn't work due to the fact that the kernel doesn't filter out unrecognised flags anyway.

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Unfortunately, even relatively recent kernels blindly store sa_flags in the kernel without validating it, and so it looks like duff flags can be read back out via a sigaction() call. Dang.

Perhaps a new frontend syscall could be added. A new libc that knows about this "sigaction2" could use it and mask off problem bits from sa_flags in its sigaction() wrapper before calling sigaction2. An old libc would call the old sigaction syscall, where we would ignore these new sa_flags bits as before.

I'm not currently in favor of the new syscall but if we do this I would keep sigaction and sigaction2 separate. That is, libc sigaction should always use the sigaction syscall, and libc sigaction2 should always use the sigaction2 syscall. We should avoid libc's sigaction having different behavior based on the libc version and kernel version, as that would make it harder to reason about its behavior. Calling code would need to check for presence of sigaction2 in both libc and the kernel, e.g.

__attribute__((weak)) decltype(sigaction2) sigaction2;

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_SIFLAGS;

Quoted 7 lines
  if (!sigaction2 || sigaction2(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0) {
    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0)
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

I guess. But I share your distaste for adding a new syscall.

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This may not be a popular approach though, and software wouldn't be able to use our new features until libc is updated to match.

If we go down this route, it may provide additional opportunities to fix annoying defects in the old interface.

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Note that the same applies to a flag indicating the availability of a si_flags field in sigaction (just s/SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS/SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS/ and s/si_future_field/si_flags/ in the usage code above). In terms of SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS versus SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS I'd be fine either way.

Another thought that occurred to me is that we may consider generalizing this a step further and introducing a single flag bit in the signal number that means "reject unknown flags in sa_flags". This would mean that we wouldn't need to add any more flag bits to the signal number in the future, thus limiting this signal number hack to a single bit; all future mandatory behavior changes could just be put behind a flag in sa_flags and userspace code would easily be able to detect missing support for a flag and fall back if necessary. In our case, this would imply usage code like this:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS;
// Succeeds in kernels with SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support. // Fails in kernels with SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support but no
SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support (because of the unknown flags check).
// Fails in kernels without SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support (because of
the bounds check on the signal number).

  if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS, &sa, 0) < 0) {
    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
    // Succeeds in old kernels, no need to use SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS since
we're using sa_flags from the beginning of time.
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0)
      perror("sigaction");
Quoted 2 lines

}
}

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As with the other options this could work, but looks like it could break the ABI due to violating the original semantics for the signal number argument. Perhaps I'm being too paranoid.

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There's no ABI being broken here, as long as we consider syscalls to be the stable ABI layer. Old kernels are simply rejecting arguments that they don't know about yet. By that argument, any introduction of a new syscall is an ABI break because it changes the semantics of a previously-unallocated syscall number.

As argued above, I think this is an invalid argument.

Although any addition will change behaviour (so is a break in some sense), the key is not to make "surprising" changes.

Having something random happen when setting a previously reserved flag bit, or when issuing a syscall when an unknown syscall number, or not surprising at all.

Making fundamental changes to the encoding of an existing argument is highly surprising, on the other hand: as your example shows, it is reasonable to index an array using a signal number.

I agree that this doesn't get us closer to a practical solution though.

But we do seem to need some mechanism in addition to (or instead of) sa_flags.

Here's another thought:

Since si_flags would be either always present or always absent, it could make sense to have a global property to report this, rather than an sa_flags or signal number bit to request it per-signal.

Requiring software to parse uname() might be reasonable for that, if cumbersome (did you suggest this previously?). If we're concerned that the awkwardness of this would encourage people not to bother (or encourage people to do it wrong) then we might opt for something simpler like an AT_FLAGS bit.

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Ultimately libc could provide a more portable interface for discovery, such as via sysconf().

Thoughts?

While you're thinking about that, here's another idea:

It occurs to me that there are spare bits in si_code. si_code is an enum, but unlike the signal number there are no specific bounds for this value, so we may have an easier time recycling bits here.

The high bits of si_code are usually sign-extension and so not always 0, but we can XOR flags into them provided we don't forget the real sign.

Software that isn't expecting twiddled bits would get confused, so we need a new SA_ flag to enable this. But this flag (SA_CODEX) below is now just a request. If the kernel doesn't understand it (or without SA_SIGINFO) then no flags would be reported in si_code, which is backwards-compatible.

A handler would now do

void handler(int n, siginfo_t *si, ...)

{
	int flags = SI_FLAGS(si->si_code);
	int code = SI_CODE(si->si_code);

	if (!(flags & SIF_CODEX) {
		/* flags not supported */
		/* Careful assignment of flag meanings may make this
		   check unnecessary, but it's probably useful for
		   developers for testing their code. */
	}

	/* Handle signal based on n, code and flags */
}

If the kernel doesn't report any flags (perhaps because it's too old) then SI_FLAGS() will yield 0 and SI_CODE() will just return si_code unchanged. This means that even non-SA_CODEX handlers can use these macros, which may ease migration.

Cheers
---Dave

--8<--

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +12 -0
index cb3d6c2..4e77c71 100644
@@ -176,6 +176,18 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
 #define SI_DETHREAD	-7		/* sent by execve() killing subsidiary threads */
 #define SI_ASYNCNL	-60		/* sent by glibc async name lookup completion */
 
+#define __SI_FLAGS	0x7ffff000	/* optional code extension flags */
+#define SIF_CODEX	0x40000000	/* code extension flags supported */
+
+/*
+ * Extract value and extension flags from si_code.
+ * These are only required in handlers registered with SA_CODEX.
+ */
+#define SI_CODE(sicode)
+	((sicode) >= 0 ? (sicode) & ~__SI_FLAGS : (sicode) | __SI_FLAGS)
+#define SI_FLAGS(sicode) \
+	(((sicode) >= 0 ? (sicode) : ~(sicode)) & __SI_FLAGS)
+
 #define SI_FROMUSER(siptr)	((siptr)->si_code <= 0)
 #define SI_FROMKERNEL(siptr)	((siptr)->si_code > 0)
 
include/uapi/asm-generic/signal.h +2 -0
index 5c716a9..c20f5f61 100644
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
  * SA_RESETHAND clears the handler when the signal is delivered.
  * SA_NOCLDWAIT flag on SIGCHLD to inhibit zombies.
  * SA_NODEFER prevents the current signal from being masked in the handler.
+ * SA_CODEX allows extension flag reporting in si_code.
  *
  * SA_ONESHOT and SA_NOMASK are the historical Linux names for the Single
  * Unix names RESETHAND and NODEFER respectively.
@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@
 #define SA_NOCLDSTOP	0x00000001
 #define SA_NOCLDWAIT	0x00000002
 #define SA_SIGINFO	0x00000004
+#define SA_CODEX	0x04000000
 #define SA_ONSTACK	0x08000000
 #define SA_RESTART	0x10000000
 #define SA_NODEFER	0x40000000
kernel/signal.c +0 -0
index ee22ec7..8e8550a 100644

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#50 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 301 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 299 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 298 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 296 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 277 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 271 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 263 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 208 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 194 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 179 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 70 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 60 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 57 lines · Dave Martin

On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 07:54:59AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
Peter Collingbourne <[email protected]> writes:

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
index 47f651df781c..a8380a2b6361 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
@@ -235,20 +235,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
}

void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+ unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
const char *str)
{
arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
- if (signo == SIGKILL)
+ if (signo == SIGKILL) {
force_sig(SIGKILL);
- else
- force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+ } else {
+ struct kernel_siginfo info;
+ clear_siginfo(&info);
+ info.si_signo = signo;
+ info.si_errno = 0;
+ info.si_code = code;
+ info.si_addr = addr;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+ force_sig_info(&info);
+ }
}

void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
- const char *str)
+ unsigned long far, const char *str)
{
+ struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
- force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+
+ clear_siginfo(&info);
+ info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+ info.si_errno = 0;
+ info.si_code = code;
+ info.si_addr = addr;
+ info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+ force_sig_info(&info);
}

I have a real problem with this construction. force_sig_info is not an
interface that should be used for anything except to define a wrapper
that takes it's parameters.

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Can you elaborate? How would you do this king of thing.

There are no other uses of force_sig_info in architecture code.

I just removed them _all_ because they were almost all broken. In fact your mcerr case is broken because it uses two different union members simultantiously.

Quoted 6 lines

Is that really broken? I thought that the Linux kernel deliberately didn't care about strict aliasing rules (the top-level Makefile passes -fno-strict-aliasing) so I thought that it was valid in "Linux kernel C" even though from a standards point of view it is invalid. (That being said, this is probably moot with my proposed changes below though.)

I have a feeling that -fno-strict-aliasing only allows you to _read_ a different union member from the one previously written.

Writing a different member from the last one written can still splatter on the other members IIUC.

It would be better to keep things separate rather than risk incorrectness just to save a few bytes.

IMHO -fno-strict-aliasing is no excuse for gratuitous type-punning.

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So I am looking for something like force_sig_mcerr or force_sig_fault that includes your new information that then calls force_sig_info.

I know of no other way to safely use the siginfo struct.

So you want something like:

int force_sig_fault_with_ignored_bits(int signo, int code, void __user *addr, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask); int force_sig_mceerr_with_ignored_bits(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);

in kernel/signal.c and the code in arch/arm64 would call that?

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AIUI we absolutely need a forced signal here, we need to supply
metadata, and we don't have to open-code all that at every relevant
signal generation site...

It is not clear to me that if you have adapted siginfo_layout.

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Garbled sentence?

Looks like. One of the pieces of code that needs to change when siginfo gets updated is siginfo_layout so that the structure can be properly decoded and made sense of.

I am not seeing anything like that.

Okay, this has to do with copying between the compat and non-compat versions of the struct? Sure, I can update that, although the code would be basically non-functional on arm64 because TBI isn't supported on 32-bit ARM.

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diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];

Quoted 8 lines
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__u32 _pkey;
} _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+ /* used with all si_codes */
+ struct {
+ short _dummy_top_byte;

^ What's this for? I don't have Eric's insight here.

We would need a short's worth of padding in order to prevent the fields from occupying the same address as si_addr_lsb.

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+ unsigned char _top_byte;
+ unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+ } _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
};
} _sigfault;

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Why the _dummy_top_byte? Oh I see it should be spelled "short _addr_lsb;".

Please remove the "#ifdef __aarch64__". If at all possible we want to
design this so any other architecture who has this challenge can use the
code. The kind of code does not get enough attention/maintenance if it
is built for a single architecture.

Seems reasonable. I was recently made aware that RISC-V was considering a similar feature:
https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-tee/topic/risc_v_tbi_proposal/72855478
I would have opted to expand this to other architectures on an as-needed basis, but I'd also be fine with having it on all architectures from the start.

If we make this arch-independent, we have an additional concern, which is "what if some future architecture wants more than one byte here?" For example, an architecture may have a "top-two-bytes-ignore" feature, which would imply two-byte (misnamed) "si_addr_top_byte" and "si_addr_top_byte_mask" fields. And the RISC-V proposal potentially implies many more ignored bits (see slide 13 of the presentation). The maximum size that these fields can possibly be is the size of a pointer, and with that there wouldn't be enough room in the padding at this point to accommodate the new fields.

Quoted 4 lines

That basically implies your earlier suggestion of adding a union member here to accommodate future expansion of the union, and adding the new fields after the union. I'm happy to make that change, with the fields renamed "si_addr_ignored" and "si_addr_ignored_mask".

Quoted 8 lines

I think what we need here is basically a flags word.

So long as we keep a flag spare to indicate the existence of a further flags word, we can extend as needed.

How the existence of the first flags words is detected is another problem. If it only applies for newly-defined si_code values, then I guess si_code may be sufficient.

Existing kernels will zero-initialize unused regions of the siginfo data structure. The zero-initialization of the padding at the end of the struct is done by the clear_user call here:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/kernel/signal.c#L3193

Quoted 7 lines

and the zero-initialization of the padding between fields and unused union members is done by the clear_siginfo function which the kernel calls when initializing the data structure:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/include/linux/signal.h#L20

Therefore, a flag word value of 0 may be used to detect a lack of support for flagged fields.

It's not enough that we do this today. We would have had to do it back to the dawn of time (though in the arm64 case I guess we just need to go back to when the arch/arm64 was merged).

Quoted 6 lines

v2.6.12:kernel/signal.c:copy_siginfo_to_user() suggests that this wasn't always the case, so unused parts of siginfo could be full of old junk from the user stack, if the kernel is sufficiently old.

If we're trying to do something generic that makes sense on all arches, this matters. I may have misunderstood something about the code though.

Hmm, I think you're right. The current behavior was introduced by commit c999b933faa5e281e3af2e110eccaf91698b0a81 which was first released in 4.18. So if an application wants to be compatible with pre-4.18 kernels then there would need to be some other way to indicate that the fields are valid. Probably the simplest way would be to have the application issue a uname(2) syscall and check the kernel version before reading these fields. I have a couple of other ideas that don't rely on version detection, if we'd prefer to avoid that. (They are somewhat ugly, but our hand is forced by backwards compatibility.)

One idea is to re-purpose the si_errno field as a flags field for certain signal numbers. I checked a few kernel releases going back to 2.6.18 and it looks like the field is set to 0 except in the following circumstances:
- sending a hardware breakpoint (SIGTRAP/TRAP_HWBKPT)
- seccomp failures (SIGSYS/SYS_SECCOMP)
- user-defined signal via kill_pid_usb_asyncio
- SIGSWI in 3.18 and before (code since removed)

It is also set to EFAULT for certain SIGSEGV/SEGV_MAPERR signals on powerpc since commit c96c4436aba4c12f1f48369f2f90bc43e12fe36c, which is currently unreleased. So if we wanted to go this route for SIGSEGV we would need to stop the kernel from setting si_errno to EFAULT for this signal before the 5.8 release.

Another idea was to have userspace set a flag in sa_flags when registering a signal handler meaning "this signal handler requires unknown siginfo fields to be zeroed", and have existing kernels reject the syscall due to an unknown flag being set, but unfortunately this won't work because existing kernels do not reject sigaction syscalls with unknown flags set in sa_flags. A perhaps more radical idea in this vein would be to claim some of the upper bits of the signal number as flags that will cause the syscall to be rejected if set and unknown to the kernel. Existing kernels (going back to at least 2.6.18) contain this code in do_sigaction:

        if (!valid_signal(sig) || sig < 1 || (act && sig_kernel_only(sig)))
                return -EINVAL;

and vald_signal is defined as:

static inline int valid_signal(unsigned long sig)

{
        return sig <= _NSIG ? 1 : 0;
}
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All architectures define _NSIG as a value <= 128, so they will reject a signal number with any of bits 8-31 set. This means that we can use any of those bits for mandatory flags. Most likely we could use bit 30 (expanding down as necessary), as it keeps the signal number positive and permits future expansion of the signal number range.

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Does the signal core code actually gurantee to zero the unused fields? Unless the fields are poked in by hand this is fraught with subtlelies, especially when unions are involved. (I'm sure the code tries to do it, but I've not eyeballed it in detail...)

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It memsets the siginfo structure before setting the fields and sending the signal (grep for clear_siginfo which is just a memset; you should find a call before all callers of force_sig_info). Memset is the right approach here since unlike setting fields by hand it clears padding which could lead to information leaks from the kernel. IIUC this is the reason why Eric wants all of the signals to be raised via wrappers in kernel/signal.c instead of via force_sig_info directly (to make this aspect easier to audit).

My impression was that the reason for this model is partly to ensure that siginfo fields are populated more consistently. When it was all down to the individual callers, inconsistencies creeped in.

With regard to memset(), this is not a complete defence against data leakage. Assigning to a struct member can set any or all padding in the struct to random garbage (consider write-combining of neighboring member writes into a single larger accesses in asm for example). The

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I don't believe that LLVM will store to padding like this. I don't know about GCC, though, but I wouldn't be surprised if this is something that the kernel would want to turn off in "kernel C" (like it turns off strict aliasing) specifically because of the information leak issue.

Again, the issue is not future kernel builds -- we can always find a way to fix the behaviour for those -- but past kernel builds.

I thought that the whole point of the "bit in the signal number" (or SI_CODEX or whatever) was that we didn't need to worry about the behavior of past kernel builds?

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only way to avoid this is to ensure that the struct is 100% padding-free, and that each member of a union is the same size. A quick clance at <uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h> confirms that this is not the case.

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This might need to be looked at separately.

But it does mean, strictly speaking, that we can't reliably add new fields anywhere that there was previously padding: assigning to neighboring members can still fill those with garbage after the memset().

...but this is largely moot because I'm not proposing to add new fields in the padding any more (because the fields needed to become larger in order to accommodate future hypothetical architectures which might want to use the fields, and thus they wouldn't fit in the padding). The siginfo.h diff would be something like:

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c267181..4a2fe257415d 100644

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 97

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +3 -0
@@ -91,7 +91,10 @@ union __sifields {
                                char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
                                __u32 _pkey;
                        } _addr_pkey;
+                       void *_pad[6];
                };
+               uintptr_t _ignored_bits;
+               uintptr_t _ignored_bits_mask;

This _is_ in padding: the tail-padding of the (previously smaller) _sigfault. Again, the compiler was allowed to populate this area with junk before these fields were added.

I agree that it seems fairly unlikely that the compiler would have been overwriting this in normal circumstances, but that's not a guarantee. My worry is that if this goes wrong, it will go wrong silently and unpredictably.

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
        } _sigfault;
 
        /* SIGPOLL */

or with a "uintptr_t _flags" added in before _ignored_bits if we go with that.

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Using unused bits in the signal number to turn on new functionality feels risky. As currently specified, this is just a number. Since today a successful sigaction(n ...) guarantees that n is a valid signal number, reasonable code like the following would trigger a buffer overrun if we start trying to encode anything else in there:

struct sigaction actions[NSIG];

int do_something( ... )

{
        ...

        if (!sigaction(n, sa, ...)) {
                actions[n] = *sa;
                return 0;
        }
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        ...
}

I imagine the bit in the signal number being set by the direct caller to sigaction, and we could specifically recommend that calling pattern. In that case, your "n" wouldn't have the bit set in it. It

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I can imagine this too, but that doesn't mean that software does it.

If the above kind of thing exists in a framework or library somewhere, we could get problems. Similarly, a pre-existing LD_PRELOAD framework that provides a wrapper for sigaction may now go wrong even if your pattern is followed -- i.e., the caller thinks it's calling sigaction directly but in fact it isn't.

I'm aware of one library like that. It's called libsigchain, and it has an early bounds check:
https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:art/sigchainlib/sigchain.cc;l=371

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Until the library is changed to recognize the flag, calling code would see the return value of -1 as if the kernel failed the syscall, and would fall back to the code for old kernels.

But only after some bad dereferences. If these were writes, this means that memory _may_ be silently corrupted (I don't say it't likely in a given case, and we cannot pick a flag bit that makes this impossible).

You're talking about libsigchain, right? I don't see any bad references, the function returns after noticing the bounds check failure.

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So, _even though the user program is correct_, our change may trigger

Let's say that you were talking about some other library and not libsigchain. Such an interceptor wouldn't be correct though, it failed to account for our change to the syscall semantics. If the accesses were before the syscall (or the bounds check), then the interceptor would not have been correct in the first place because POSIX requires returning -1 with errno=EINVAL (and not crashing) if the signal number is invalid.

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the corruption of arbitrary user memory. This what I mean by an ABI break. The fact that the corruption is not done by the syscall itself is no excuse.

At some point, though, accommodating interceptors becomes pretty much tantamount to saying "we can never change anything". Even just adding a field to __sifields (which is pretty much required for what we need to do) could break things in the presence of some interceptors because the interceptor could be copying the fields manually to a new data structure before calling the user's signal handler (e.g. because it wants to defer the signal until later) and miss our new field. I think most of the other ideas we're discussing fail to meet this bar as well and I'll go into more details later on.

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We also fail to notice failures in sigaddset() etc., though in this code it looks like that should not matter.

Maybe you're looking at the handler ("SignalChain::Handler")? The bit wouldn't be set in the signo argument to the handler. I'm talking about line 371 of the code I linked, in the sigaction interceptor "__sigaction" (it looks like sometimes the link doesn't take you to the correct line for some reason).

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In general I think that any library like this with independent tracking of the kernel's purported signal handler state would need to be very sensitive to which syscalls are capable of setting signal handlers, what their semantics are, and so on. This applies to any change that we might make to the signal handler interface. So for example, if we introduced a new syscall as you propose below, and the library hasn't been updated to recognize the new syscall, it will silently miss changes in signal handler state caused by the new syscall.

At the end of this argument lies "we can never change anything about how signal handlers work because it could break some interposing library somewhere" -- replace "signal handlers" with any kernel feature whose behavior may be modified by an interposing library if you like -- and I don't think we want to go that far. As far as I know, this isn't really the kernel's business anyway -- the kernel's stable ABI contract starts and ends with the syscall interface and not some library on top.

That being said, we should perhaps try to define our interface so that something reasonable will probably happen if there is such a library and it hasn't been updated. With the new syscall, the library will sometimes silently fail to work in some non-local fashion. With the flag bit in the signal number, the library will either cause the caller to fall back to the old kernel code path (if there is a bounds check) or likely crash loudly (if there is no bounds check). To me, the "flag bit in the signal number" behavior seems more reasonable, since either something correct or something easy to debug will probably happen at runtime.

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could only appear in newly-written code that doesn't follow our recommendations, and there are already plenty of much more likely ways to cause buffer overflows in C code that doesn't follow recommendations anyway. (And even if such a buffer overflow occurred, it would very likely be caught early in development by the MMU due to the magnitude of the number 1<<30.)

Choosing the bit value is hard. If shitfing it overflows, this can trigger random undefined behaviour in the compiler in addition to (or perhaps instead of) an out-of-bounds access or segfault.

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It wouldn't overflow on a 64-bit architecture assuming normal array indexing (the index would be promoted to pointer width before being scaled to the array element size), and to begin with the users of this would be 64-bit.

Unless we don't offer this feature for 32-bit at all (possible, if ugly) we can't stop people using it.

My point is that the problem in the interceptor library would probably be noticed on 64-bit (since that's what most people use these days), which would probably result in it being fixed by the time it reaches 32-bit users.

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If shifting it doesn't overflow, we might still fall into a valid mapping, though I'd agree a segfault is more likely.

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I think it would be cleaner for to add a single flag field that can be used for detecting other extensions, and request it via a new sa_flags bit. This removes the need for sematically useless zeroing of unused fields (though for hygiene and backwards compatibility reasons we would probably want to carry on zeroing them anyway).

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I can see no simpler way to add supplementary siginfo fields for existing si_codes. For si_codes that didn't exist before the zeroing came in we could still detect optional si_code-specific fields via zeroing, but it seems messary to have two ways of detecting extensions.

That would certainly be cleaner if it worked, but that would only be the case if old kernels rejected unknown bits in sa_flags, and unfortunately they don't. With the bit in the signal number, the "old

Hmm, that is a problem I wasn't aware of.

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kernels reject" behavior admits relatively straightforward usage code:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS, &sa, 0) < 0) { //
succeeds in new kernels, fails in old kernels

    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0) // succeeds in old kernels
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

void clear_fields_and_handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
sa->si_future_field = 0;
handle_segv(signum, sa, ctx);
}

void handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
// At this point, si_future_field will have the value 0 in old
kernels and the kernel-supplied value in new kernels. }

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Imagine if we moved the flag SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS from the signal number to sa_flags. In that case, the first sigaction would succeed in old kernels so handle_segv wouldn't know whether it can safely read from si_future_field. With the sa_flags approach, you would need kernel version number checking via uname before setting the flag in sa_flags, and at that point why even have the flag in sa_flags at all since you could just have the signal handler conditionally read from si_future_field based on the uname?

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Software setting SA_SIFLAGS (or whatever) is new by definition, since it would be using a new #define. So it might be reasonable to put the burden on that software to verify that the flag was really accepted by the kernel, by reading it back.

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That doesn't seem like a good idea even if it worked, because it could lead to race conditions. If the si_flags-reading signal handler were invoked in response to a signal between when you set it and when you ended up replacing it with the fallback signal handler for old kernels, the handler may end up reading garbage data from si_flags.

Not really. My example may have this problem, but the signal handler can be written to support both scenarios, based on testing a flag that the main program sets after verifying that the flag could be set. Or the signal could be blocked around establishment (often a good idea for other reasons).

But I agree it's a bit gross, and anyway doesn't work due to the fact that the kernel doesn't filter out unrecognised flags anyway.

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Unfortunately, even relatively recent kernels blindly store sa_flags in the kernel without validating it, and so it looks like duff flags can be read back out via a sigaction() call. Dang.

Perhaps a new frontend syscall could be added. A new libc that knows about this "sigaction2" could use it and mask off problem bits from sa_flags in its sigaction() wrapper before calling sigaction2. An old libc would call the old sigaction syscall, where we would ignore these new sa_flags bits as before.

I'm not currently in favor of the new syscall but if we do this I would keep sigaction and sigaction2 separate. That is, libc sigaction should always use the sigaction syscall, and libc sigaction2 should always use the sigaction2 syscall. We should avoid libc's sigaction having different behavior based on the libc version and kernel version, as that would make it harder to reason about its behavior. Calling code would need to check for presence of sigaction2 in both libc and the kernel, e.g.

__attribute__((weak)) decltype(sigaction2) sigaction2;

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_SIFLAGS;

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  if (!sigaction2 || sigaction2(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0) {
    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0)
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

I guess. But I share your distaste for adding a new syscall.

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This may not be a popular approach though, and software wouldn't be able to use our new features until libc is updated to match.

If we go down this route, it may provide additional opportunities to fix annoying defects in the old interface.

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Note that the same applies to a flag indicating the availability of a si_flags field in sigaction (just s/SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS/SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS/ and s/si_future_field/si_flags/ in the usage code above). In terms of SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS versus SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS I'd be fine either way.

Another thought that occurred to me is that we may consider generalizing this a step further and introducing a single flag bit in the signal number that means "reject unknown flags in sa_flags". This would mean that we wouldn't need to add any more flag bits to the signal number in the future, thus limiting this signal number hack to a single bit; all future mandatory behavior changes could just be put behind a flag in sa_flags and userspace code would easily be able to detect missing support for a flag and fall back if necessary. In our case, this would imply usage code like this:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS;
// Succeeds in kernels with SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support. // Fails in kernels with SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support but no
SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support (because of the unknown flags check).
// Fails in kernels without SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support (because of
the bounds check on the signal number).

  if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS, &sa, 0) < 0) {
    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
    // Succeeds in old kernels, no need to use SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS since
we're using sa_flags from the beginning of time.
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0)
      perror("sigaction");
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}
}

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As with the other options this could work, but looks like it could break the ABI due to violating the original semantics for the signal number argument. Perhaps I'm being too paranoid.

There's no ABI being broken here, as long as we consider syscalls to be the stable ABI layer. Old kernels are simply rejecting arguments that they don't know about yet. By that argument, any introduction of a new syscall is an ABI break because it changes the semantics of a previously-unallocated syscall number.

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As argued above, I think this is an invalid argument.

Although any addition will change behaviour (so is a break in some sense), the key is not to make "surprising" changes.

If we care about interceptors then I don't think "surprising" comes into it. It's more a question of "does the anticipated behavior of the interceptor match our desired behavior", where "desired" means "most likely to avoid silent breakage". We would need to get into the head of a potential interceptor author and think about how they would have handled the signal number argument, as well as other arguments like sa_flags if we want to go that route, and see whether that behavior would lead to the desired result.

In this case, I think we exactly want the interceptor author to have thought "oh, it's just a number, I'll (possibly do a bounds check and then) use the number as an index into an array". This will lead to one of two outcomes: crashing (yes, yes, it won't always crash, but if the alternative is that it never crashes and we get silently incorrect behavior all of the time, I'll take sometimes crashing) or fail the bounds check and pretend to be an old kernel (the latter is anticipated by POSIX which requires returning -1/EINVAL for an invalid signal number). Each of these behaviors are desirable, as they are observable failures, which are more likely to result in fixes than silent ones.

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Having something random happen when setting a previously reserved flag bit, or when issuing a syscall when an unknown syscall number, or not surprising at all.

Introducing a new syscall is right out in this model. The interceptor author wouldn't have anticipated our introducing a new syscall, so the new syscall wouldn't be intercepted and calls to the new syscall would silently bypass the interceptor. For example, adding sigaction2 could result in signal handlers being set without the interceptor's knowledge.

Regarding a sa_flags bit, let's get inside the head of the interceptor author again. How would they handle a flag bit that they don't recognize when replacing the signal handler? It wouldn't be correct to just pass it through to the kernel, or drop the flag on the floor, as it might be semantically meaningful (and thus could change the calling convention as SA_SIGINFO does, or change the meaning of fields in siginfo, as SA_CODEX would do). A correctly written sigaction interceptor should probably abort the program upon encountering an unknown flag (thus giving a human a chance to update the interceptor), but chances are that they don't. Ignoring all but a few flags (and passing a fixed set of flags to the kernel) seems to be what libsigchain does, and in the case of SA_CODEX it would seem to result in desirable behavior (but I suspect that it isn't handling the other flags correctly), but I could also see an interceptor author just passing it unchanged to the kernel without checking it (perhaps because they didn't think about these issues, and because that didn't matter until now, with the exception of from-the-beginning-of-time flags like SA_SIGINFO). And with SA_CODEX that could lead to silent misreading of si_code in the interceptor's signal handler, if it hasn't been updated to use the new macros.

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Making fundamental changes to the encoding of an existing argument is highly surprising, on the other hand: as your example shows, it is reasonable to index an array using a signal number.

I agree that this doesn't get us closer to a practical solution though.

But we do seem to need some mechanism in addition to (or instead of) sa_flags.

Here's another thought:

Since si_flags would be either always present or always absent, it could make sense to have a global property to report this, rather than an sa_flags or signal number bit to request it per-signal.

Requiring software to parse uname() might be reasonable for that, if cumbersome (did you suggest this previously?). If we're concerned that the awkwardness of this would encourage people not to bother (or encourage people to do it wrong) then we might opt for something simpler like an AT_FLAGS bit.

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Ultimately libc could provide a more portable interface for discovery, such as via sysconf().

Thoughts?

Yes, this was all to avoid the userspace code needing to contain a version check (or equivalent). Maybe the version check would be better than the alternatives though (although it's still vulnerable to non-updated interceptors not copying our new fields). AT_FLAGS sounds good to me.

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While you're thinking about that, here's another idea:

It occurs to me that there are spare bits in si_code. si_code is an enum, but unlike the signal number there are no specific bounds for this value, so we may have an easier time recycling bits here.

The high bits of si_code are usually sign-extension and so not always 0, but we can XOR flags into them provided we don't forget the real sign.

Software that isn't expecting twiddled bits would get confused, so we need a new SA_ flag to enable this. But this flag (SA_CODEX) below is now just a request. If the kernel doesn't understand it (or without SA_SIGINFO) then no flags would be reported in si_code, which is backwards-compatible.

A handler would now do

void handler(int n, siginfo_t *si, ...)

{
        int flags = SI_FLAGS(si->si_code);
        int code = SI_CODE(si->si_code);

        if (!(flags & SIF_CODEX) {
                /* flags not supported */
                /* Careful assignment of flag meanings may make this
                   check unnecessary, but it's probably useful for
                   developers for testing their code. */
        }

        /* Handle signal based on n, code and flags */
}
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If the kernel doesn't report any flags (perhaps because it's too old) then SI_FLAGS() will yield 0 and SI_CODE() will just return si_code unchanged. This means that even non-SA_CODEX handlers can use these macros, which may ease migration.

Thanks, this seems more appealing to me than the bit in the signal number idea. It uses the sa_flags field as intended and doesn't abuse the fields of the siginfo data structure too much. I don't think we should put as much weight into interceptor concerns as you do, so you can consider my above argumentation to be from a devil's advocate perspective.

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Cheers
---Dave

--8<--

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c2..4e77c71 100644

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h typedef struct siginfo { · line 180

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +2 -0
@@ -176,6 +176,18 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
 #define SI_DETHREAD    -7              /* sent by execve() killing subsidiary threads */
 #define SI_ASYNCNL     -60             /* sent by glibc async name lookup completion */
 
+#define __SI_FLAGS     0x7ffff000      /* optional code extension flags */
+#define SIF_CODEX      0x40000000      /* code extension flags supported */

I don't think we would need this flag because even old kernels "support" the extension flags under this scheme (they just don't report any features). We would only need to introduce flags for actual features.

Peter

kernel/signal.c

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +10 -0
+
+/*
+ * Extract value and extension flags from si_code.
+ * These are only required in handlers registered with SA_CODEX.
+ */
+#define SI_CODE(sicode)
+       ((sicode) >= 0 ? (sicode) & ~__SI_FLAGS : (sicode) | __SI_FLAGS)
+#define SI_FLAGS(sicode) \
+       (((sicode) >= 0 ? (sicode) : ~(sicode)) & __SI_FLAGS)
+
 #define SI_FROMUSER(siptr)     ((siptr)->si_code <= 0)
 #define SI_FROMKERNEL(siptr)   ((siptr)->si_code > 0)
 
include/uapi/asm-generic/signal.h +2 -0
index 5c716a9..c20f5f61 100644
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
  * SA_RESETHAND clears the handler when the signal is delivered.
  * SA_NOCLDWAIT flag on SIGCHLD to inhibit zombies.
  * SA_NODEFER prevents the current signal from being masked in the handler.
+ * SA_CODEX allows extension flag reporting in si_code.
  *
  * SA_ONESHOT and SA_NOMASK are the historical Linux names for the Single
  * Unix names RESETHAND and NODEFER respectively.
@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@
 #define SA_NOCLDSTOP   0x00000001
 #define SA_NOCLDWAIT   0x00000002
 #define SA_SIGINFO     0x00000004
+#define SA_CODEX       0x04000000
 #define SA_ONSTACK     0x08000000
 #define SA_RESTART     0x10000000
 #define SA_NODEFER     0x40000000
kernel/signal.c +0 -0
index ee22ec7..8e8550a 100644

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#51 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 308 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 307 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 305 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 303 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 288 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 277 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 271 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 263 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 208 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 194 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 179 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 70 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 67 lines · Eric W. Biederman

Dave Martin <[email protected]> writes:

On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 07:54:59AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
Peter Collingbourne <[email protected]> writes:

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
index 47f651df781c..a8380a2b6361 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
@@ -235,20 +235,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
}

void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+ unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
const char *str)
{
arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
- if (signo == SIGKILL)
+ if (signo == SIGKILL) {
force_sig(SIGKILL);
- else
- force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+ } else {
+ struct kernel_siginfo info;
+ clear_siginfo(&info);
+ info.si_signo = signo;
+ info.si_errno = 0;
+ info.si_code = code;
+ info.si_addr = addr;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+ force_sig_info(&info);
+ }
}

void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
- const char *str)
+ unsigned long far, const char *str)
{
+ struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
- force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+
+ clear_siginfo(&info);
+ info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+ info.si_errno = 0;
+ info.si_code = code;
+ info.si_addr = addr;
+ info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+ force_sig_info(&info);
}

I have a real problem with this construction. force_sig_info is not an
interface that should be used for anything except to define a wrapper
that takes it's parameters.

Can you elaborate? How would you do this king of thing.

There are no other uses of force_sig_info in architecture code.

I just removed them _all_ because they were almost all broken.
In fact your mcerr case is broken because it uses two different
union members simultantiously.

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Is that really broken? I thought that the Linux kernel deliberately didn't care about strict aliasing rules (the top-level Makefile passes -fno-strict-aliasing) so I thought that it was valid in "Linux kernel C" even though from a standards point of view it is invalid. (That being said, this is probably moot with my proposed changes below though.)

I have a feeling that -fno-strict-aliasing only allows you to _read_ a different union member from the one previously written.

Writing a different member from the last one written can still splatter on the other members IIUC.

It would be better to keep things separate rather than risk incorrectness just to save a few bytes.

IMHO -fno-strict-aliasing is no excuse for gratuitous type-punning.

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So I am looking for something like force_sig_mcerr or force_sig_fault
that includes your new information that then calls force_sig_info.

I know of no other way to safely use the siginfo struct.

So you want something like:

int force_sig_fault_with_ignored_bits(int signo, int code, void __user *addr, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask); int force_sig_mceerr_with_ignored_bits(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);

in kernel/signal.c and the code in arch/arm64 would call that?

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AIUI we absolutely need a forced signal here, we need to supply
metadata, and we don't have to open-code all that at every relevant
signal generation site...

It is not clear to me that if you have adapted siginfo_layout.

Garbled sentence?

Looks like. One of the pieces of code that needs to change
when siginfo gets updated is siginfo_layout so that the structure
can be properly decoded and made sense of.

I am not seeing anything like that.

Okay, this has to do with copying between the compat and non-compat versions of the struct? Sure, I can update that, although the code would be basically non-functional on arm64 because TBI isn't supported on 32-bit ARM.

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diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
__u32 _pkey;
} _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+ /* used with all si_codes */
+ struct {
+ short _dummy_top_byte;

^ What's this for? I don't have Eric's insight here.

We would need a short's worth of padding in order to prevent the fields from occupying the same address as si_addr_lsb.

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+ unsigned char _top_byte;
+ unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+ } _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
};
} _sigfault;

Why the _dummy_top_byte? Oh I see it should be spelled "short _addr_lsb;".

Please remove the "#ifdef __aarch64__". If at all possible we want to
design this so any other architecture who has this challenge can use the
code. The kind of code does not get enough attention/maintenance if it
is built for a single architecture.

Seems reasonable. I was recently made aware that RISC-V was considering a similar feature:
https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-tee/topic/risc_v_tbi_proposal/72855478
I would have opted to expand this to other architectures on an as-needed basis, but I'd also be fine with having it on all architectures from the start.

If we make this arch-independent, we have an additional concern, which is "what if some future architecture wants more than one byte here?" For example, an architecture may have a "top-two-bytes-ignore" feature, which would imply two-byte (misnamed) "si_addr_top_byte" and "si_addr_top_byte_mask" fields. And the RISC-V proposal potentially implies many more ignored bits (see slide 13 of the presentation). The maximum size that these fields can possibly be is the size of a pointer, and with that there wouldn't be enough room in the padding at this point to accommodate the new fields.

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That basically implies your earlier suggestion of adding a union member here to accommodate future expansion of the union, and adding the new fields after the union. I'm happy to make that change, with the fields renamed "si_addr_ignored" and "si_addr_ignored_mask".

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I think what we need here is basically a flags word.

So long as we keep a flag spare to indicate the existence of a further flags word, we can extend as needed.

How the existence of the first flags words is detected is another problem. If it only applies for newly-defined si_code values, then I guess si_code may be sufficient.

Existing kernels will zero-initialize unused regions of the siginfo data structure. The zero-initialization of the padding at the end of the struct is done by the clear_user call here:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/kernel/signal.c#L3193

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and the zero-initialization of the padding between fields and unused union members is done by the clear_siginfo function which the kernel calls when initializing the data structure:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/include/linux/signal.h#L20

Therefore, a flag word value of 0 may be used to detect a lack of support for flagged fields.

It's not enough that we do this today. We would have had to do it back to the dawn of time (though in the arm64 case I guess we just need to go back to when the arch/arm64 was merged).

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v2.6.12:kernel/signal.c:copy_siginfo_to_user() suggests that this wasn't always the case, so unused parts of siginfo could be full of old junk from the user stack, if the kernel is sufficiently old.

If we're trying to do something generic that makes sense on all arches, this matters. I may have misunderstood something about the code though.

Hmm, I think you're right. The current behavior was introduced by commit c999b933faa5e281e3af2e110eccaf91698b0a81 which was first released in 4.18. So if an application wants to be compatible with pre-4.18 kernels then there would need to be some other way to indicate that the fields are valid. Probably the simplest way would be to have the application issue a uname(2) syscall and check the kernel version before reading these fields. I have a couple of other ideas that don't rely on version detection, if we'd prefer to avoid that. (They are somewhat ugly, but our hand is forced by backwards compatibility.)

One idea is to re-purpose the si_errno field as a flags field for certain signal numbers. I checked a few kernel releases going back to 2.6.18 and it looks like the field is set to 0 except in the following circumstances:
- sending a hardware breakpoint (SIGTRAP/TRAP_HWBKPT)
- seccomp failures (SIGSYS/SYS_SECCOMP)
- user-defined signal via kill_pid_usb_asyncio
- SIGSWI in 3.18 and before (code since removed)

It is also set to EFAULT for certain SIGSEGV/SEGV_MAPERR signals on powerpc since commit c96c4436aba4c12f1f48369f2f90bc43e12fe36c, which is currently unreleased. So if we wanted to go this route for SIGSEGV we would need to stop the kernel from setting si_errno to EFAULT for this signal before the 5.8 release.

Another idea was to have userspace set a flag in sa_flags when registering a signal handler meaning "this signal handler requires unknown siginfo fields to be zeroed", and have existing kernels reject the syscall due to an unknown flag being set, but unfortunately this won't work because existing kernels do not reject sigaction syscalls with unknown flags set in sa_flags. A perhaps more radical idea in this vein would be to claim some of the upper bits of the signal number as flags that will cause the syscall to be rejected if set and unknown to the kernel. Existing kernels (going back to at least 2.6.18) contain this code in do_sigaction:

        if (!valid_signal(sig) || sig < 1 || (act && sig_kernel_only(sig)))
                return -EINVAL;

and vald_signal is defined as:

static inline int valid_signal(unsigned long sig)

{
        return sig <= _NSIG ? 1 : 0;
}
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All architectures define _NSIG as a value <= 128, so they will reject a signal number with any of bits 8-31 set. This means that we can use any of those bits for mandatory flags. Most likely we could use bit 30 (expanding down as necessary), as it keeps the signal number positive and permits future expansion of the signal number range.

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Does the signal core code actually gurantee to zero the unused fields? Unless the fields are poked in by hand this is fraught with subtlelies, especially when unions are involved. (I'm sure the code tries to do it, but I've not eyeballed it in detail...)

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It memsets the siginfo structure before setting the fields and sending the signal (grep for clear_siginfo which is just a memset; you should find a call before all callers of force_sig_info). Memset is the right approach here since unlike setting fields by hand it clears padding which could lead to information leaks from the kernel. IIUC this is the reason why Eric wants all of the signals to be raised via wrappers in kernel/signal.c instead of via force_sig_info directly (to make this aspect easier to audit).

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My impression was that the reason for this model is partly to ensure that siginfo fields are populated more consistently. When it was all down to the individual callers, inconsistencies creeped in.

With regard to memset(), this is not a complete defence against data leakage. Assigning to a struct member can set any or all padding in the struct to random garbage (consider write-combining of neighboring member writes into a single larger accesses in asm for example). The

I don't believe that LLVM will store to padding like this. I don't know about GCC, though, but I wouldn't be surprised if this is something that the kernel would want to turn off in "kernel C" (like it turns off strict aliasing) specifically because of the information leak issue.

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Again, the issue is not future kernel builds -- we can always find a way to fix the behaviour for those -- but past kernel builds.

I thought that the whole point of the "bit in the signal number" (or SI_CODEX or whatever) was that we didn't need to worry about the behavior of past kernel builds?

It depends on what we use the new flag(s) for.

If the flag means just that unused padding is safely zeroed, that could work -- but we'd want high confidence that it really is zeroed even in wacky configurations.

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only way to avoid this is to ensure that the struct is 100% padding-free, and that each member of a union is the same size. A quick clance at <uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h> confirms that this is not the case.

This might need to be looked at separately.

But it does mean, strictly speaking, that we can't reliably add new fields anywhere that there was previously padding: assigning to neighboring members can still fill those with garbage after the memset().

...but this is largely moot because I'm not proposing to add new fields in the padding any more (because the fields needed to become larger in order to accommodate future hypothetical architectures which might want to use the fields, and thus they wouldn't fit in the padding). The siginfo.h diff would be something like:

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c267181..4a2fe257415d 100644

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 97

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +3 -0
@@ -91,7 +91,10 @@ union __sifields {
                                char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
                                __u32 _pkey;
                        } _addr_pkey;
+                       void *_pad[6];
                };
+               uintptr_t _ignored_bits;
+               uintptr_t _ignored_bits_mask;

This _is_ in padding: the tail-padding of the (previously smaller) _sigfault. Again, the compiler was allowed to populate this area with junk before these fields were added.

I agree that it seems fairly unlikely that the compiler would have been overwriting this in normal circumstances, but that's not a guarantee. My worry is that if this goes wrong, it will go wrong silently and unpredictably.

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
        } _sigfault;
 
        /* SIGPOLL */

or with a "uintptr_t _flags" added in before _ignored_bits if we go with that.

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Using unused bits in the signal number to turn on new functionality feels risky. As currently specified, this is just a number. Since today a successful sigaction(n ...) guarantees that n is a valid signal number, reasonable code like the following would trigger a buffer overrun if we start trying to encode anything else in there:

struct sigaction actions[NSIG];

int do_something( ... )

{
        ...

        if (!sigaction(n, sa, ...)) {
                actions[n] = *sa;
                return 0;
        }
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        ...
}

I imagine the bit in the signal number being set by the direct caller to sigaction, and we could specifically recommend that calling pattern. In that case, your "n" wouldn't have the bit set in it. It

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I can imagine this too, but that doesn't mean that software does it.

If the above kind of thing exists in a framework or library somewhere, we could get problems. Similarly, a pre-existing LD_PRELOAD framework that provides a wrapper for sigaction may now go wrong even if your pattern is followed -- i.e., the caller thinks it's calling sigaction directly but in fact it isn't.

I'm aware of one library like that. It's called libsigchain, and it has an early bounds check:
https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:art/sigchainlib/sigchain.cc;l=371

Until the library is changed to recognize the flag, calling code would see the return value of -1 as if the kernel failed the syscall, and would fall back to the code for old kernels.

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But only after some bad dereferences. If these were writes, this means that memory _may_ be silently corrupted (I don't say it't likely in a given case, and we cannot pick a flag bit that makes this impossible).

You're talking about libsigchain, right? I don't see any bad references, the function returns after noticing the bounds check failure.

Yes, I confused myself by reading Handler() out of context. The kernel will invoke this with signo to a real signal number (without any flags).

The sigaction wrapper does the bounds check before doing anything else, just as you say -- so that looks fine.

(Side question: is all this thread-safe? Is there some implicit locking somewhere?)

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So, _even though the user program is correct_, our change may trigger

Let's say that you were talking about some other library and not libsigchain. Such an interceptor wouldn't be correct though, it failed to account for our change to the syscall semantics. If the accesses were before the syscall (or the bounds check), then the interceptor would not have been correct in the first place because POSIX requires returning -1 with errno=EINVAL (and not crashing) if the signal number is invalid.

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the corruption of arbitrary user memory. This what I mean by an ABI break. The fact that the corruption is not done by the syscall itself is no excuse.

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At some point, though, accommodating interceptors becomes pretty much tantamount to saying "we can never change anything". Even just adding a field to __sifields (which is pretty much required for what we need to do) could break things in the presence of some interceptors because the interceptor could be copying the fields manually to a new data structure before calling the user's signal handler (e.g. because it wants to defer the signal until later) and miss our new field. I think most of the other ideas we're discussing fail to meet this bar as well and I'll go into more details later on.

I agree we cannot always avoid breaking such things. But we should do our best to avoid it.

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We also fail to notice failures in sigaddset() etc., though in this code it looks like that should not matter.

Maybe you're looking at the handler ("SignalChain::Handler")? The bit wouldn't be set in the signo argument to the handler. I'm talking about line 371 of the code I linked, in the sigaction interceptor "__sigaction" (it looks like sometimes the link doesn't take you to the correct line for some reason).

Ack, I confused myself.

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In general I think that any library like this with independent tracking of the kernel's purported signal handler state would need to be very sensitive to which syscalls are capable of setting signal handlers, what their semantics are, and so on. This applies to any change that we might make to the signal handler interface. So for example, if we introduced a new syscall as you propose below, and the library hasn't been updated to recognize the new syscall, it will silently miss changes in signal handler state caused by the new syscall.

At the end of this argument lies "we can never change anything about how signal handlers work because it could break some interposing library somewhere" -- replace "signal handlers" with any kernel feature whose behavior may be modified by an interposing library if you like -- and I don't think we want to go that far. As far as I know, this isn't really the kernel's business anyway -- the kernel's stable ABI contract starts and ends with the syscall interface and not some library on top.

That being said, we should perhaps try to define our interface so that something reasonable will probably happen if there is such a library and it hasn't been updated. With the new syscall, the library will sometimes silently fail to work in some non-local fashion. With the flag bit in the signal number, the library will either cause the caller to fall back to the old kernel code path (if there is a bounds check) or likely crash loudly (if there is no bounds check). To me, the "flag bit in the signal number" behavior seems more reasonable, since either something correct or something easy to debug will probably happen at runtime.

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could only appear in newly-written code that doesn't follow our recommendations, and there are already plenty of much more likely ways to cause buffer overflows in C code that doesn't follow recommendations anyway. (And even if such a buffer overflow occurred, it would very likely be caught early in development by the MMU due to the magnitude of the number 1<<30.)

Choosing the bit value is hard. If shitfing it overflows, this can trigger random undefined behaviour in the compiler in addition to (or perhaps instead of) an out-of-bounds access or segfault.

It wouldn't overflow on a 64-bit architecture assuming normal array indexing (the index would be promoted to pointer width before being scaled to the array element size), and to begin with the users of this would be 64-bit.

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Unless we don't offer this feature for 32-bit at all (possible, if ugly) we can't stop people using it.

My point is that the problem in the interceptor library would probably be noticed on 64-bit (since that's what most people use these days), which would probably result in it being fixed by the time it reaches 32-bit users.

Agreed. But we shouldn't take such bets unless we really have to.

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If shifting it doesn't overflow, we might still fall into a valid mapping, though I'd agree a segfault is more likely.

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I think it would be cleaner for to add a single flag field that can be used for detecting other extensions, and request it via a new sa_flags bit. This removes the need for sematically useless zeroing of unused fields (though for hygiene and backwards compatibility reasons we would probably want to carry on zeroing them anyway).

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I can see no simpler way to add supplementary siginfo fields for existing si_codes. For si_codes that didn't exist before the zeroing came in we could still detect optional si_code-specific fields via zeroing, but it seems messary to have two ways of detecting extensions.

That would certainly be cleaner if it worked, but that would only be the case if old kernels rejected unknown bits in sa_flags, and unfortunately they don't. With the bit in the signal number, the "old

Hmm, that is a problem I wasn't aware of.

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kernels reject" behavior admits relatively straightforward usage code:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS, &sa, 0) < 0) { //
succeeds in new kernels, fails in old kernels

    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0) // succeeds in old kernels
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

void clear_fields_and_handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
sa->si_future_field = 0;
handle_segv(signum, sa, ctx);
}

void handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
// At this point, si_future_field will have the value 0 in old
kernels and the kernel-supplied value in new kernels. }

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Imagine if we moved the flag SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS from the signal number to sa_flags. In that case, the first sigaction would succeed in old kernels so handle_segv wouldn't know whether it can safely read from si_future_field. With the sa_flags approach, you would need kernel version number checking via uname before setting the flag in sa_flags, and at that point why even have the flag in sa_flags at all since you could just have the signal handler conditionally read from si_future_field based on the uname?

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Software setting SA_SIFLAGS (or whatever) is new by definition, since it would be using a new #define. So it might be reasonable to put the burden on that software to verify that the flag was really accepted by the kernel, by reading it back.

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That doesn't seem like a good idea even if it worked, because it could lead to race conditions. If the si_flags-reading signal handler were invoked in response to a signal between when you set it and when you ended up replacing it with the fallback signal handler for old kernels, the handler may end up reading garbage data from si_flags.

Not really. My example may have this problem, but the signal handler can be written to support both scenarios, based on testing a flag that the main program sets after verifying that the flag could be set. Or the signal could be blocked around establishment (often a good idea for other reasons).

But I agree it's a bit gross, and anyway doesn't work due to the fact that the kernel doesn't filter out unrecognised flags anyway.

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Unfortunately, even relatively recent kernels blindly store sa_flags in the kernel without validating it, and so it looks like duff flags can be read back out via a sigaction() call. Dang.

Perhaps a new frontend syscall could be added. A new libc that knows about this "sigaction2" could use it and mask off problem bits from sa_flags in its sigaction() wrapper before calling sigaction2. An old libc would call the old sigaction syscall, where we would ignore these new sa_flags bits as before.

I'm not currently in favor of the new syscall but if we do this I would keep sigaction and sigaction2 separate. That is, libc sigaction should always use the sigaction syscall, and libc sigaction2 should always use the sigaction2 syscall. We should avoid libc's sigaction having different behavior based on the libc version and kernel version, as that would make it harder to reason about its behavior. Calling code would need to check for presence of sigaction2 in both libc and the kernel, e.g.

__attribute__((weak)) decltype(sigaction2) sigaction2;

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_SIFLAGS;

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  if (!sigaction2 || sigaction2(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0) {
    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0)
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

I guess. But I share your distaste for adding a new syscall.

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This may not be a popular approach though, and software wouldn't be able to use our new features until libc is updated to match.

If we go down this route, it may provide additional opportunities to fix annoying defects in the old interface.

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Note that the same applies to a flag indicating the availability of a si_flags field in sigaction (just s/SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS/SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS/ and s/si_future_field/si_flags/ in the usage code above). In terms of SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS versus SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS I'd be fine either way.

Another thought that occurred to me is that we may consider generalizing this a step further and introducing a single flag bit in the signal number that means "reject unknown flags in sa_flags". This would mean that we wouldn't need to add any more flag bits to the signal number in the future, thus limiting this signal number hack to a single bit; all future mandatory behavior changes could just be put behind a flag in sa_flags and userspace code would easily be able to detect missing support for a flag and fall back if necessary. In our case, this would imply usage code like this:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS;
// Succeeds in kernels with SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support. // Fails in kernels with SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support but no
SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support (because of the unknown flags check).
// Fails in kernels without SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support (because of
the bounds check on the signal number).

  if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS, &sa, 0) < 0) {
    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
    // Succeeds in old kernels, no need to use SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS since
we're using sa_flags from the beginning of time.
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0)
      perror("sigaction");
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}
}

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As with the other options this could work, but looks like it could break the ABI due to violating the original semantics for the signal number argument. Perhaps I'm being too paranoid.

There's no ABI being broken here, as long as we consider syscalls to be the stable ABI layer. Old kernels are simply rejecting arguments that they don't know about yet. By that argument, any introduction of a new syscall is an ABI break because it changes the semantics of a previously-unallocated syscall number.

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As argued above, I think this is an invalid argument.

Although any addition will change behaviour (so is a break in some sense), the key is not to make "surprising" changes.

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If we care about interceptors then I don't think "surprising" comes into it. It's more a question of "does the anticipated behavior of the interceptor match our desired behavior", where "desired" means "most likely to avoid silent breakage". We would need to get into the head of a potential interceptor author and think about how they would have handled the signal number argument, as well as other arguments like sa_flags if we want to go that route, and see whether that behavior would lead to the desired result.

That's exactly what I mean by "surprising". However, not every interceptor author will be making the same assumptions, and not every bit of software affected will be an interceptor. So some judgement needs to be applied.

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In this case, I think we exactly want the interceptor author to have thought "oh, it's just a number, I'll (possibly do a bounds check and then) use the number as an index into an array". This will lead to one of two outcomes: crashing (yes, yes, it won't always crash, but if the alternative is that it never crashes and we get silently incorrect behavior all of the time, I'll take sometimes crashing) or fail the bounds check and pretend to be an old kernel (the latter is anticipated by POSIX which requires returning -1/EINVAL for an invalid signal number). Each of these behaviors are desirable, as they are observable failures, which are more likely to result in fixes than silent ones.

Agreed, except wanting the author to have thought something doesn't ensure that they actually did think that.

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Having something random happen when setting a previously reserved flag bit, or when issuing a syscall when an unknown syscall number, or not surprising at all.

Introducing a new syscall is right out in this model. The interceptor author wouldn't have anticipated our introducing a new syscall, so the new syscall wouldn't be intercepted and calls to the new syscall would silently bypass the interceptor. For example, adding sigaction2 could result in signal handlers being set without the interceptor's knowledge.

Agreed. My sentence was a bit mangled: I mean to say "Having something random happen when [...] issuing a syscall *with* an unknown syscall number *is* not surprising at all."

I agree that adding a new syscall is problematic if we want to avoid breaking existing interceptors in particular. Other types of code are much less likely to be affected by the addition of new syscalls.

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Regarding a sa_flags bit, let's get inside the head of the interceptor author again. How would they handle a flag bit that they don't recognize when replacing the signal handler? It wouldn't be correct to just pass it through to the kernel, or drop the flag on the floor, as it might be semantically meaningful (and thus could change the calling convention as SA_SIGINFO does, or change the meaning of fields in siginfo, as SA_CODEX would do). A correctly written sigaction interceptor should probably abort the program upon encountering an unknown flag (thus giving a human a chance to update the interceptor), but chances are that they don't. Ignoring all but a few flags (and passing a fixed set of flags to the kernel) seems to be what libsigchain does, and in the case of SA_CODEX it would seem to result

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in desirable behavior (but I suspect that it isn't handling the other flags correctly), but I could also see an interceptor author just passing it unchanged to the kernel without checking it (perhaps because they didn't think about these issues, and because that didn't matter until now, with the exception of from-the-beginning-of-time flags like SA_SIGINFO). And with SA_CODEX that could lead to silent misreading of si_code in the interceptor's signal handler, if it hasn't been updated to use the new macros.

Agreed. I've tried to implement things rather like this in the past, and how to interpret the flags is a tricky issue. Some of the flags are impossible to emulate even when you know what they mean, in particular SA_NODEFER and SA_RESTART.

Making new flags safe to ignore and harmless to set of you don't know what they mean is the safest approach, but not always possible (I think I managed this with by suggestion below, though).

Ideally, a flags field should be specified with rules that say exactly what to do with flags you don't recognise. Sadly this is usually not thought about until it's too late.

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Making fundamental changes to the encoding of an existing argument is highly surprising, on the other hand: as your example shows, it is reasonable to index an array using a signal number.

I agree that this doesn't get us closer to a practical solution though.

But we do seem to need some mechanism in addition to (or instead of) sa_flags.

Here's another thought:

Since si_flags would be either always present or always absent, it could make sense to have a global property to report this, rather than an sa_flags or signal number bit to request it per-signal.

Requiring software to parse uname() might be reasonable for that, if cumbersome (did you suggest this previously?). If we're concerned that the awkwardness of this would encourage people not to bother (or encourage people to do it wrong) then we might opt for something simpler like an AT_FLAGS bit.

Ultimately libc could provide a more portable interface for discovery, such as via sysconf().

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Thoughts?

Yes, this was all to avoid the userspace code needing to contain a version check (or equivalent). Maybe the version check would be better than the alternatives though (although it's still vulnerable to non-updated interceptors not copying our new fields). AT_FLAGS sounds good to me.

Ack (though not needed if we use the approach outlined below).

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While you're thinking about that, here's another idea:

It occurs to me that there are spare bits in si_code. si_code is an enum, but unlike the signal number there are no specific bounds for this value, so we may have an easier time recycling bits here.

The high bits of si_code are usually sign-extension and so not always 0, but we can XOR flags into them provided we don't forget the real sign.

Software that isn't expecting twiddled bits would get confused, so we need a new SA_ flag to enable this. But this flag (SA_CODEX) below is now just a request. If the kernel doesn't understand it (or without SA_SIGINFO) then no flags would be reported in si_code, which is backwards-compatible.

A handler would now do

void handler(int n, siginfo_t *si, ...)

{
        int flags = SI_FLAGS(si->si_code);
        int code = SI_CODE(si->si_code);

        if (!(flags & SIF_CODEX) {
                /* flags not supported */
                /* Careful assignment of flag meanings may make this
                   check unnecessary, but it's probably useful for
                   developers for testing their code. */
        }

        /* Handle signal based on n, code and flags */
}
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If the kernel doesn't report any flags (perhaps because it's too old) then SI_FLAGS() will yield 0 and SI_CODE() will just return si_code unchanged. This means that even non-SA_CODEX handlers can use these macros, which may ease migration.

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Thanks, this seems more appealing to me than the bit in the signal number idea. It uses the sa_flags field as intended and doesn't abuse the fields of the siginfo data structure too much. I don't think we should put as much weight into interceptor concerns as you do, so you can consider my above argumentation to be from a devil's advocate perspective.

Ditto: we shouldn't break forwards compatibility wherever we can avoid doing so, but with APIs that are not well designed for forwards compatibility (the signal API included) we have to be realistic.

The interceptor case is just one example of something that could break, but I'll admit I couldn't come up with a more convincing example so far.

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c2..4e77c71 100644
@@ -176,6 +176,18 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
 #define SI_DETHREAD    -7              /* sent by execve() killing subsidiary threads */
 #define SI_ASYNCNL     -60             /* sent by glibc async name lookup completion */
 
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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h typedef struct siginfo { · line 180

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +2 -0
+#define __SI_FLAGS     0x7ffff000      /* optional code extension flags */
+#define SIF_CODEX      0x40000000      /* code extension flags supported */

I don't think we would need this flag because even old kernels "support" the extension flags under this scheme (they just don't report any features). We would only need to introduce flags for actual features.

Agreed, it's not strictly required. It occurred to me that someone writing code in userspace would want a way to verify that they'd set the flag correctly and that the kernel supported it. But there ought to be other ways to do that once real si_code flags get added.

Cheers
---Dave

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#52 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 418 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 308 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 307 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 305 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 303 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 288 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 277 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 271 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 263 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 208 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 194 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 179 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 76 lines · Peter Collingbourne

On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 10:52 AM Eric W. Biederman
<[email protected]> wrote:

Dave Martin <[email protected]> writes:

On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 07:54:59AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
Peter Collingbourne <[email protected]> writes:

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
index 47f651df781c..a8380a2b6361 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
@@ -235,20 +235,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
}

void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+ unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
const char *str)
{
arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
- if (signo == SIGKILL)
+ if (signo == SIGKILL) {
force_sig(SIGKILL);
- else
- force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+ } else {
+ struct kernel_siginfo info;
+ clear_siginfo(&info);
+ info.si_signo = signo;
+ info.si_errno = 0;
+ info.si_code = code;
+ info.si_addr = addr;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+ force_sig_info(&info);
+ }
}

void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
- const char *str)
+ unsigned long far, const char *str)
{
+ struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
- force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+
+ clear_siginfo(&info);
+ info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+ info.si_errno = 0;
+ info.si_code = code;
+ info.si_addr = addr;
+ info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+ force_sig_info(&info);
}

I have a real problem with this construction. force_sig_info is not an
interface that should be used for anything except to define a wrapper
that takes it's parameters.

Can you elaborate? How would you do this king of thing.

There are no other uses of force_sig_info in architecture code.

I just removed them _all_ because they were almost all broken.
In fact your mcerr case is broken because it uses two different
union members simultantiously.

Is that really broken? I thought that the Linux kernel deliberately
didn't care about strict aliasing rules (the top-level Makefile passes
-fno-strict-aliasing) so I thought that it was valid in "Linux kernel
C" even though from a standards point of view it is invalid. (That
being said, this is probably moot with my proposed changes below
though.)

I have a feeling that -fno-strict-aliasing only allows you to _read_ a different union member from the one previously written.

Writing a different member from the last one written can still splatter on the other members IIUC.

It would be better to keep things separate rather than risk incorrectness just to save a few bytes.

IMHO -fno-strict-aliasing is no excuse for gratuitous type-punning.

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So I am looking for something like force_sig_mcerr or force_sig_fault
that includes your new information that then calls force_sig_info.

I know of no other way to safely use the siginfo struct.

So you want something like:

int force_sig_fault_with_ignored_bits(int signo, int code, void __user
*addr, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);
int force_sig_mceerr_with_ignored_bits(int code, void __user *addr,
short lsb, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);

in kernel/signal.c and the code in arch/arm64 would call that?

AIUI we absolutely need a forced signal here, we need to supply
metadata, and we don't have to open-code all that at every relevant
signal generation site...

It is not clear to me that if you have adapted siginfo_layout.

Garbled sentence?

Looks like. One of the pieces of code that needs to change
when siginfo gets updated is siginfo_layout so that the structure
can be properly decoded and made sense of.

I am not seeing anything like that.

Okay, this has to do with copying between the compat and non-compat
versions of the struct? Sure, I can update that, although the code
would be basically non-functional on arm64 because TBI isn't supported
on 32-bit ARM.

diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
__u32 _pkey;
} _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+ /* used with all si_codes */
+ struct {
+ short _dummy_top_byte;

^ What's this for? I don't have Eric's insight here.

We would need a short's worth of padding in order to prevent the
fields from occupying the same address as si_addr_lsb.

+ unsigned char _top_byte;
+ unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+ } _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
};
} _sigfault;

Why the _dummy_top_byte? Oh I see it should be spelled "short _addr_lsb;".

Please remove the "#ifdef __aarch64__". If at all possible we want to
design this so any other architecture who has this challenge can use the
code. The kind of code does not get enough attention/maintenance if it
is built for a single architecture.

Seems reasonable. I was recently made aware that RISC-V was
considering a similar feature:
https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-tee/topic/risc_v_tbi_proposal/72855478
I would have opted to expand this to other architectures on an
as-needed basis, but I'd also be fine with having it on all
architectures from the start.

If we make this arch-independent, we have an additional concern, which
is "what if some future architecture wants more than one byte here?"
For example, an architecture may have a "top-two-bytes-ignore"
feature, which would imply two-byte (misnamed) "si_addr_top_byte" and
"si_addr_top_byte_mask" fields. And the RISC-V proposal potentially
implies many more ignored bits (see slide 13 of the presentation). The
maximum size that these fields can possibly be is the size of a
pointer, and with that there wouldn't be enough room in the padding at
this point to accommodate the new fields.

That basically implies your earlier suggestion of adding a union
member here to accommodate future expansion of the union, and adding
the new fields after the union. I'm happy to make that change, with
the fields renamed "si_addr_ignored" and "si_addr_ignored_mask".

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I think what we need here is basically a flags word.

So long as we keep a flag spare to indicate the existence of a further flags word, we can extend as needed.

How the existence of the first flags words is detected is another problem. If it only applies for newly-defined si_code values, then I guess si_code may be sufficient.

Existing kernels will zero-initialize unused regions of the siginfo data structure. The zero-initialization of the padding at the end of the struct is done by the clear_user call here:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/kernel/signal.c#L3193

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and the zero-initialization of the padding between fields and unused union members is done by the clear_siginfo function which the kernel calls when initializing the data structure:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/include/linux/signal.h#L20

Therefore, a flag word value of 0 may be used to detect a lack of support for flagged fields.

It's not enough that we do this today. We would have had to do it back to the dawn of time (though in the arm64 case I guess we just need to go back to when the arch/arm64 was merged).

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v2.6.12:kernel/signal.c:copy_siginfo_to_user() suggests that this wasn't always the case, so unused parts of siginfo could be full of old junk from the user stack, if the kernel is sufficiently old.

If we're trying to do something generic that makes sense on all arches, this matters. I may have misunderstood something about the code though.

Hmm, I think you're right. The current behavior was introduced by commit c999b933faa5e281e3af2e110eccaf91698b0a81 which was first released in 4.18. So if an application wants to be compatible with pre-4.18 kernels then there would need to be some other way to indicate that the fields are valid. Probably the simplest way would be to have the application issue a uname(2) syscall and check the kernel version before reading these fields. I have a couple of other ideas that don't rely on version detection, if we'd prefer to avoid that. (They are somewhat ugly, but our hand is forced by backwards compatibility.)

One idea is to re-purpose the si_errno field as a flags field for certain signal numbers. I checked a few kernel releases going back to 2.6.18 and it looks like the field is set to 0 except in the following circumstances:
- sending a hardware breakpoint (SIGTRAP/TRAP_HWBKPT)
- seccomp failures (SIGSYS/SYS_SECCOMP)
- user-defined signal via kill_pid_usb_asyncio
- SIGSWI in 3.18 and before (code since removed)

It is also set to EFAULT for certain SIGSEGV/SEGV_MAPERR signals on powerpc since commit c96c4436aba4c12f1f48369f2f90bc43e12fe36c, which is currently unreleased. So if we wanted to go this route for SIGSEGV we would need to stop the kernel from setting si_errno to EFAULT for this signal before the 5.8 release.

Another idea was to have userspace set a flag in sa_flags when registering a signal handler meaning "this signal handler requires unknown siginfo fields to be zeroed", and have existing kernels reject the syscall due to an unknown flag being set, but unfortunately this won't work because existing kernels do not reject sigaction syscalls with unknown flags set in sa_flags. A perhaps more radical idea in this vein would be to claim some of the upper bits of the signal number as flags that will cause the syscall to be rejected if set and unknown to the kernel. Existing kernels (going back to at least 2.6.18) contain this code in do_sigaction:

        if (!valid_signal(sig) || sig < 1 || (act && sig_kernel_only(sig)))
                return -EINVAL;

and vald_signal is defined as:

static inline int valid_signal(unsigned long sig)

{
        return sig <= _NSIG ? 1 : 0;
}
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All architectures define _NSIG as a value <= 128, so they will reject a signal number with any of bits 8-31 set. This means that we can use any of those bits for mandatory flags. Most likely we could use bit 30 (expanding down as necessary), as it keeps the signal number positive and permits future expansion of the signal number range.

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Does the signal core code actually gurantee to zero the unused fields? Unless the fields are poked in by hand this is fraught with subtlelies, especially when unions are involved. (I'm sure the code tries to do it, but I've not eyeballed it in detail...)

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It memsets the siginfo structure before setting the fields and sending the signal (grep for clear_siginfo which is just a memset; you should find a call before all callers of force_sig_info). Memset is the right approach here since unlike setting fields by hand it clears padding which could lead to information leaks from the kernel. IIUC this is the reason why Eric wants all of the signals to be raised via wrappers in kernel/signal.c instead of via force_sig_info directly (to make this aspect easier to audit).

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My impression was that the reason for this model is partly to ensure that siginfo fields are populated more consistently. When it was all down to the individual callers, inconsistencies creeped in.

With regard to memset(), this is not a complete defence against data leakage. Assigning to a struct member can set any or all padding in the struct to random garbage (consider write-combining of neighboring member writes into a single larger accesses in asm for example). The

I don't believe that LLVM will store to padding like this. I don't know about GCC, though, but I wouldn't be surprised if this is something that the kernel would want to turn off in "kernel C" (like it turns off strict aliasing) specifically because of the information leak issue.

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Again, the issue is not future kernel builds -- we can always find a way to fix the behaviour for those -- but past kernel builds.

I thought that the whole point of the "bit in the signal number" (or SI_CODEX or whatever) was that we didn't need to worry about the behavior of past kernel builds?

It depends on what we use the new flag(s) for.

If the flag means just that unused padding is safely zeroed, that could work -- but we'd want high confidence that it really is zeroed even in wacky configurations.

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only way to avoid this is to ensure that the struct is 100% padding-free, and that each member of a union is the same size. A quick clance at <uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h> confirms that this is not the case.

This might need to be looked at separately.

But it does mean, strictly speaking, that we can't reliably add new fields anywhere that there was previously padding: assigning to neighboring members can still fill those with garbage after the memset().

...but this is largely moot because I'm not proposing to add new fields in the padding any more (because the fields needed to become larger in order to accommodate future hypothetical architectures which might want to use the fields, and thus they wouldn't fit in the padding). The siginfo.h diff would be something like:

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c267181..4a2fe257415d 100644

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 97

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +3 -0
@@ -91,7 +91,10 @@ union __sifields {
                                char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
                                __u32 _pkey;
                        } _addr_pkey;
+                       void *_pad[6];
                };
+               uintptr_t _ignored_bits;
+               uintptr_t _ignored_bits_mask;

This _is_ in padding: the tail-padding of the (previously smaller) _sigfault. Again, the compiler was allowed to populate this area with junk before these fields were added.

I agree that it seems fairly unlikely that the compiler would have been overwriting this in normal circumstances, but that's not a guarantee. My worry is that if this goes wrong, it will go wrong silently and unpredictably.

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
        } _sigfault;
 
        /* SIGPOLL */

or with a "uintptr_t _flags" added in before _ignored_bits if we go with that.

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Using unused bits in the signal number to turn on new functionality feels risky. As currently specified, this is just a number. Since today a successful sigaction(n ...) guarantees that n is a valid signal number, reasonable code like the following would trigger a buffer overrun if we start trying to encode anything else in there:

struct sigaction actions[NSIG];

int do_something( ... )

{
        ...

        if (!sigaction(n, sa, ...)) {
                actions[n] = *sa;
                return 0;
        }
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        ...
}

I imagine the bit in the signal number being set by the direct caller to sigaction, and we could specifically recommend that calling pattern. In that case, your "n" wouldn't have the bit set in it. It

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I can imagine this too, but that doesn't mean that software does it.

If the above kind of thing exists in a framework or library somewhere, we could get problems. Similarly, a pre-existing LD_PRELOAD framework that provides a wrapper for sigaction may now go wrong even if your pattern is followed -- i.e., the caller thinks it's calling sigaction directly but in fact it isn't.

I'm aware of one library like that. It's called libsigchain, and it has an early bounds check:
https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:art/sigchainlib/sigchain.cc;l=371

Until the library is changed to recognize the flag, calling code would see the return value of -1 as if the kernel failed the syscall, and would fall back to the code for old kernels.

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But only after some bad dereferences. If these were writes, this means that memory _may_ be silently corrupted (I don't say it't likely in a given case, and we cannot pick a flag bit that makes this impossible).

You're talking about libsigchain, right? I don't see any bad references, the function returns after noticing the bounds check failure.

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Yes, I confused myself by reading Handler() out of context. The kernel will invoke this with signo to a real signal number (without any flags).

The sigaction wrapper does the bounds check before doing anything else, just as you say -- so that looks fine.

(Side question: is all this thread-safe? Is there some implicit locking somewhere?)

I think maybe it isn't? There seem to be possible races on the handler_ field. One possibility is that the function could race with itself on another thread, which could be fixed via locking, but it would also need to handle races between itself and the signal handler, most likely by blocking the signal while setting it.

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So, _even though the user program is correct_, our change may trigger

Let's say that you were talking about some other library and not libsigchain. Such an interceptor wouldn't be correct though, it failed to account for our change to the syscall semantics. If the accesses were before the syscall (or the bounds check), then the interceptor would not have been correct in the first place because POSIX requires returning -1 with errno=EINVAL (and not crashing) if the signal number is invalid.

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the corruption of arbitrary user memory. This what I mean by an ABI break. The fact that the corruption is not done by the syscall itself is no excuse.

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At some point, though, accommodating interceptors becomes pretty much tantamount to saying "we can never change anything". Even just adding a field to __sifields (which is pretty much required for what we need to do) could break things in the presence of some interceptors because the interceptor could be copying the fields manually to a new data structure before calling the user's signal handler (e.g. because it wants to defer the signal until later) and miss our new field. I think most of the other ideas we're discussing fail to meet this bar as well and I'll go into more details later on.

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I agree we cannot always avoid breaking such things. But we should do our best to avoid it.

I think that given the hand that we've been dealt, no matter what we do, we can't really avoid risking breaking something. The relevant questions are "what are we going to risk breaking", "how much risk is there", "will it be easily noticed/fixable", and "once we're on the other side of the potential breakage, will we find ourselves in a position where changing things involves less breakage risk".

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We also fail to notice failures in sigaddset() etc., though in this code it looks like that should not matter.

Maybe you're looking at the handler ("SignalChain::Handler")? The bit wouldn't be set in the signo argument to the handler. I'm talking about line 371 of the code I linked, in the sigaction interceptor "__sigaction" (it looks like sometimes the link doesn't take you to the correct line for some reason).

Ack, I confused myself.

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In general I think that any library like this with independent tracking of the kernel's purported signal handler state would need to be very sensitive to which syscalls are capable of setting signal handlers, what their semantics are, and so on. This applies to any change that we might make to the signal handler interface. So for example, if we introduced a new syscall as you propose below, and the library hasn't been updated to recognize the new syscall, it will silently miss changes in signal handler state caused by the new syscall.

At the end of this argument lies "we can never change anything about how signal handlers work because it could break some interposing library somewhere" -- replace "signal handlers" with any kernel feature whose behavior may be modified by an interposing library if you like -- and I don't think we want to go that far. As far as I know, this isn't really the kernel's business anyway -- the kernel's stable ABI contract starts and ends with the syscall interface and not some library on top.

That being said, we should perhaps try to define our interface so that something reasonable will probably happen if there is such a library and it hasn't been updated. With the new syscall, the library will sometimes silently fail to work in some non-local fashion. With the flag bit in the signal number, the library will either cause the caller to fall back to the old kernel code path (if there is a bounds check) or likely crash loudly (if there is no bounds check). To me, the "flag bit in the signal number" behavior seems more reasonable, since either something correct or something easy to debug will probably happen at runtime.

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could only appear in newly-written code that doesn't follow our recommendations, and there are already plenty of much more likely ways to cause buffer overflows in C code that doesn't follow recommendations anyway. (And even if such a buffer overflow occurred, it would very likely be caught early in development by the MMU due to the magnitude of the number 1<<30.)

Choosing the bit value is hard. If shitfing it overflows, this can trigger random undefined behaviour in the compiler in addition to (or perhaps instead of) an out-of-bounds access or segfault.

It wouldn't overflow on a 64-bit architecture assuming normal array indexing (the index would be promoted to pointer width before being scaled to the array element size), and to begin with the users of this would be 64-bit.

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Unless we don't offer this feature for 32-bit at all (possible, if ugly) we can't stop people using it.

My point is that the problem in the interceptor library would probably be noticed on 64-bit (since that's what most people use these days), which would probably result in it being fixed by the time it reaches 32-bit users.

Agreed. But we shouldn't take such bets unless we really have to.

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If shifting it doesn't overflow, we might still fall into a valid mapping, though I'd agree a segfault is more likely.

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I think it would be cleaner for to add a single flag field that can be used for detecting other extensions, and request it via a new sa_flags bit. This removes the need for sematically useless zeroing of unused fields (though for hygiene and backwards compatibility reasons we would probably want to carry on zeroing them anyway).

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I can see no simpler way to add supplementary siginfo fields for existing si_codes. For si_codes that didn't exist before the zeroing came in we could still detect optional si_code-specific fields via zeroing, but it seems messary to have two ways of detecting extensions.

That would certainly be cleaner if it worked, but that would only be the case if old kernels rejected unknown bits in sa_flags, and unfortunately they don't. With the bit in the signal number, the "old

Hmm, that is a problem I wasn't aware of.

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kernels reject" behavior admits relatively straightforward usage code:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS, &sa, 0) < 0) { //
succeeds in new kernels, fails in old kernels

    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0) // succeeds in old kernels
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

void clear_fields_and_handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
sa->si_future_field = 0;
handle_segv(signum, sa, ctx);
}

void handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
// At this point, si_future_field will have the value 0 in old
kernels and the kernel-supplied value in new kernels. }

Quoted 8 lines

Imagine if we moved the flag SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS from the signal number to sa_flags. In that case, the first sigaction would succeed in old kernels so handle_segv wouldn't know whether it can safely read from si_future_field. With the sa_flags approach, you would need kernel version number checking via uname before setting the flag in sa_flags, and at that point why even have the flag in sa_flags at all since you could just have the signal handler conditionally read from si_future_field based on the uname?

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Software setting SA_SIFLAGS (or whatever) is new by definition, since it would be using a new #define. So it might be reasonable to put the burden on that software to verify that the flag was really accepted by the kernel, by reading it back.

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That doesn't seem like a good idea even if it worked, because it could lead to race conditions. If the si_flags-reading signal handler were invoked in response to a signal between when you set it and when you ended up replacing it with the fallback signal handler for old kernels, the handler may end up reading garbage data from si_flags.

Not really. My example may have this problem, but the signal handler can be written to support both scenarios, based on testing a flag that the main program sets after verifying that the flag could be set. Or the signal could be blocked around establishment (often a good idea for other reasons).

But I agree it's a bit gross, and anyway doesn't work due to the fact that the kernel doesn't filter out unrecognised flags anyway.

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Unfortunately, even relatively recent kernels blindly store sa_flags in the kernel without validating it, and so it looks like duff flags can be read back out via a sigaction() call. Dang.

Perhaps a new frontend syscall could be added. A new libc that knows about this "sigaction2" could use it and mask off problem bits from sa_flags in its sigaction() wrapper before calling sigaction2. An old libc would call the old sigaction syscall, where we would ignore these new sa_flags bits as before.

I'm not currently in favor of the new syscall but if we do this I would keep sigaction and sigaction2 separate. That is, libc sigaction should always use the sigaction syscall, and libc sigaction2 should always use the sigaction2 syscall. We should avoid libc's sigaction having different behavior based on the libc version and kernel version, as that would make it harder to reason about its behavior. Calling code would need to check for presence of sigaction2 in both libc and the kernel, e.g.

__attribute__((weak)) decltype(sigaction2) sigaction2;

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_SIFLAGS;

Quoted 7 lines
  if (!sigaction2 || sigaction2(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0) {
    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0)
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

I guess. But I share your distaste for adding a new syscall.

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This may not be a popular approach though, and software wouldn't be able to use our new features until libc is updated to match.

If we go down this route, it may provide additional opportunities to fix annoying defects in the old interface.

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Note that the same applies to a flag indicating the availability of a si_flags field in sigaction (just s/SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS/SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS/ and s/si_future_field/si_flags/ in the usage code above). In terms of SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS versus SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS I'd be fine either way.

Another thought that occurred to me is that we may consider generalizing this a step further and introducing a single flag bit in the signal number that means "reject unknown flags in sa_flags". This would mean that we wouldn't need to add any more flag bits to the signal number in the future, thus limiting this signal number hack to a single bit; all future mandatory behavior changes could just be put behind a flag in sa_flags and userspace code would easily be able to detect missing support for a flag and fall back if necessary. In our case, this would imply usage code like this:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS;
// Succeeds in kernels with SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support. // Fails in kernels with SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support but no
SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support (because of the unknown flags check).
// Fails in kernels without SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support (because of
the bounds check on the signal number).

  if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS, &sa, 0) < 0) {
    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
    // Succeeds in old kernels, no need to use SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS since
we're using sa_flags from the beginning of time.
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0)
      perror("sigaction");
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}
}

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As with the other options this could work, but looks like it could break the ABI due to violating the original semantics for the signal number argument. Perhaps I'm being too paranoid.

There's no ABI being broken here, as long as we consider syscalls to be the stable ABI layer. Old kernels are simply rejecting arguments that they don't know about yet. By that argument, any introduction of a new syscall is an ABI break because it changes the semantics of a previously-unallocated syscall number.

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As argued above, I think this is an invalid argument.

Although any addition will change behaviour (so is a break in some sense), the key is not to make "surprising" changes.

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If we care about interceptors then I don't think "surprising" comes into it. It's more a question of "does the anticipated behavior of the interceptor match our desired behavior", where "desired" means "most likely to avoid silent breakage". We would need to get into the head of a potential interceptor author and think about how they would have handled the signal number argument, as well as other arguments like sa_flags if we want to go that route, and see whether that behavior would lead to the desired result.

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That's exactly what I mean by "surprising".

Not quite, see below.

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However, not every
interceptor author will be making the same assumptions, and not every bit of software affected will be an interceptor.

I can see a couple of ways in which non-interceptor software could be affected:

- It's doing something like "call sigaction on every possible signal number in the 31-bit range and end up failing if the syscall succeeded" (e.g. with an OOB write). Perhaps software could be doing something like this in a loop to collect all currently registered signal handlers. That being said, this program:

#include <limits.h>
#include <signal.h>

int main() {
struct sigaction act;

  for (int i = 1; i != INT_MAX; ++i) {
    sigaction(i, 0, &act);

}
}

takes around 5 seconds to run on my relatively-fast machine, so I would expect any such code to be noticed as a performance issue and either be changed to be bounded on _NSIG or break on EINVAL.

This is probably the largest potential flaw that I can currently see in the "bit in the signal number" idea, since it could conceivably result in userspace code being broken without having first required it to have been changed to make use of the new feature. I'm not convinced that it would be an ABI break though, because the code seems unlikely to exist in this form in the wild because of the performance issue, and you could anyway make the argument that the code is incorrect because, in order to contain a loop like this, it would need to be able to handle large, previously-unknown signal numbers somehow. If we accept that the code is incorrect, a similar line of argument applies as for interceptors (i.e. likely to result in an OOB access which will fail loudly and be easily debugged and fixed).

- If we do something that involves introducing a new flag in sa_flags, the flag may be exposed to unaware software via the oldact argument to sigaction, and I suppose that it's conceivable that exposing a previously-unknown flag like this could somehow break something. But this seems like an unreasonable restriction because it would mean that we can never add a flag to sa_flags no matter what.

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So some judgement
needs to be applied.

Of course. We need to agree *how* to apply the judgement though.

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In this case, I think we exactly want the interceptor author to have thought "oh, it's just a number, I'll (possibly do a bounds check and then) use the number as an index into an array". This will lead to one of two outcomes: crashing (yes, yes, it won't always crash, but if the alternative is that it never crashes and we get silently incorrect behavior all of the time, I'll take sometimes crashing) or fail the bounds check and pretend to be an old kernel (the latter is anticipated by POSIX which requires returning -1/EINVAL for an invalid signal number). Each of these behaviors are desirable, as they are observable failures, which are more likely to result in fixes than silent ones.

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Agreed, except wanting the author to have thought something doesn't ensure that they actually did think that.

True, but if our goal is only to accommodate reasonably written interceptors, we don't actually need to ensure anything here.

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Having something random happen when setting a previously reserved flag bit, or when issuing a syscall when an unknown syscall number, or not surprising at all.

Introducing a new syscall is right out in this model. The interceptor author wouldn't have anticipated our introducing a new syscall, so the new syscall wouldn't be intercepted and calls to the new syscall would silently bypass the interceptor. For example, adding sigaction2 could result in signal handlers being set without the interceptor's knowledge.

Quoted 7 lines

Agreed. My sentence was a bit mangled: I mean to say "Having something random happen when [...] issuing a syscall *with* an unknown syscall number *is* not surprising at all."

I agree that adding a new syscall is problematic if we want to avoid breaking existing interceptors in particular. Other types of code are much less likely to be affected by the addition of new syscalls.

Right, and this to me is a case in point for why I would say that "surprising" isn't the right frame of analysis here. My analysis seems to generally be that "anticipated interceptor behavior matches desired behavior" is positively correlated with "surprising" (i.e. the interceptor viewpoint is the dual of the user viewpoint), so if we care about interceptors we may end up making a "surprising" change even though it doesn't intuitively seem like the right thing to do.

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Regarding a sa_flags bit, let's get inside the head of the interceptor author again. How would they handle a flag bit that they don't recognize when replacing the signal handler? It wouldn't be correct to just pass it through to the kernel, or drop the flag on the floor, as it might be semantically meaningful (and thus could change the calling convention as SA_SIGINFO does, or change the meaning of fields in siginfo, as SA_CODEX would do). A correctly written sigaction interceptor should probably abort the program upon encountering an unknown flag (thus giving a human a chance to update the interceptor), but chances are that they don't. Ignoring all but a few flags (and passing a fixed set of flags to the kernel) seems to be what libsigchain does, and in the case of SA_CODEX it would seem to result

Quoted 8 lines

in desirable behavior (but I suspect that it isn't handling the other flags correctly), but I could also see an interceptor author just passing it unchanged to the kernel without checking it (perhaps because they didn't think about these issues, and because that didn't matter until now, with the exception of from-the-beginning-of-time flags like SA_SIGINFO). And with SA_CODEX that could lead to silent misreading of si_code in the interceptor's signal handler, if it hasn't been updated to use the new macros.

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Agreed. I've tried to implement things rather like this in the past, and how to interpret the flags is a tricky issue. Some of the flags are impossible to emulate even when you know what they mean, in particular SA_NODEFER and SA_RESTART.

Making new flags safe to ignore and harmless to set of you don't know what they mean is the safest approach, but not always possible (I think I managed this with by suggestion below, though).

Again, this suggestion could lead to silent failures in an interceptor, if:
- the interceptor passes the sa_flags through to the kernel unchanged (or otherwise doesn't touch SA_CODEX)
- the interceptor replaces the user's sa_sigaction
- the interceptor's replacement sa_sigaction tests the provided si_code.

Maybe you're not concerned about that, though? At least to me it seems in the same ballpark of likelihood as the ways in which things could go wrong with the signal number bit.

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Ideally, a flags field should be specified with rules that say exactly what to do with flags you don't recognise. Sadly this is usually not thought about until it's too late.

It perhaps isn't too late to introduce such rules for sigaction if we adopt the signal number bit and we make it mean "reject unknown flags".

Peter

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#53 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 425 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 424 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 308 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 307 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 305 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 303 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 288 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 277 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 271 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 263 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 208 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 194 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 187 lines · Dave Martin

On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 05:40:08PM -0700, Peter Collingbourne wrote:
On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 10:52 AM Eric W. Biederman
<[email protected]> wrote:

Dave Martin <[email protected]> writes:

On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 07:54:59AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
Peter Collingbourne <[email protected]> writes:

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
index 47f651df781c..a8380a2b6361 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
@@ -235,20 +235,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
}

void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+ unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
const char *str)
{
arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
- if (signo == SIGKILL)
+ if (signo == SIGKILL) {
force_sig(SIGKILL);
- else
- force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+ } else {
+ struct kernel_siginfo info;
+ clear_siginfo(&info);
+ info.si_signo = signo;
+ info.si_errno = 0;
+ info.si_code = code;
+ info.si_addr = addr;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+ force_sig_info(&info);
+ }
}

void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
- const char *str)
+ unsigned long far, const char *str)
{
+ struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
- force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+
+ clear_siginfo(&info);
+ info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+ info.si_errno = 0;
+ info.si_code = code;
+ info.si_addr = addr;
+ info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+ force_sig_info(&info);
}

I have a real problem with this construction. force_sig_info is not an
interface that should be used for anything except to define a wrapper
that takes it's parameters.

Can you elaborate? How would you do this king of thing.

There are no other uses of force_sig_info in architecture code.

I just removed them _all_ because they were almost all broken.
In fact your mcerr case is broken because it uses two different
union members simultantiously.

Is that really broken? I thought that the Linux kernel deliberately
didn't care about strict aliasing rules (the top-level Makefile passes
-fno-strict-aliasing) so I thought that it was valid in "Linux kernel
C" even though from a standards point of view it is invalid. (That
being said, this is probably moot with my proposed changes below
though.)

I have a feeling that -fno-strict-aliasing only allows you to _read_ a
different union member from the one previously written.

Writing a different member from the last one written can still splatter
on the other members IIUC.

It would be better to keep things separate rather than risk
incorrectness just to save a few bytes.

IMHO -fno-strict-aliasing is no excuse for gratuitous type-punning.

So I am looking for something like force_sig_mcerr or force_sig_fault
that includes your new information that then calls force_sig_info.

I know of no other way to safely use the siginfo struct.

So you want something like:

int force_sig_fault_with_ignored_bits(int signo, int code, void __user
*addr, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);
int force_sig_mceerr_with_ignored_bits(int code, void __user *addr,
short lsb, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);

in kernel/signal.c and the code in arch/arm64 would call that?

AIUI we absolutely need a forced signal here, we need to supply
metadata, and we don't have to open-code all that at every relevant
signal generation site...

It is not clear to me that if you have adapted siginfo_layout.

Garbled sentence?

Looks like. One of the pieces of code that needs to change
when siginfo gets updated is siginfo_layout so that the structure
can be properly decoded and made sense of.

I am not seeing anything like that.

Okay, this has to do with copying between the compat and non-compat
versions of the struct? Sure, I can update that, although the code
would be basically non-functional on arm64 because TBI isn't supported
on 32-bit ARM.

diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
__u32 _pkey;
} _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+ /* used with all si_codes */
+ struct {
+ short _dummy_top_byte;

^ What's this for? I don't have Eric's insight here.

We would need a short's worth of padding in order to prevent the
fields from occupying the same address as si_addr_lsb.

+ unsigned char _top_byte;
+ unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+ } _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
};
} _sigfault;

Why the _dummy_top_byte? Oh I see it should be spelled "short _addr_lsb;".

Please remove the "#ifdef __aarch64__". If at all possible we want to
design this so any other architecture who has this challenge can use the
code. The kind of code does not get enough attention/maintenance if it
is built for a single architecture.

Seems reasonable. I was recently made aware that RISC-V was
considering a similar feature:
https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-tee/topic/risc_v_tbi_proposal/72855478
I would have opted to expand this to other architectures on an
as-needed basis, but I'd also be fine with having it on all
architectures from the start.

If we make this arch-independent, we have an additional concern, which
is "what if some future architecture wants more than one byte here?"
For example, an architecture may have a "top-two-bytes-ignore"
feature, which would imply two-byte (misnamed) "si_addr_top_byte" and
"si_addr_top_byte_mask" fields. And the RISC-V proposal potentially
implies many more ignored bits (see slide 13 of the presentation). The
maximum size that these fields can possibly be is the size of a
pointer, and with that there wouldn't be enough room in the padding at
this point to accommodate the new fields.

That basically implies your earlier suggestion of adding a union
member here to accommodate future expansion of the union, and adding
the new fields after the union. I'm happy to make that change, with
the fields renamed "si_addr_ignored" and "si_addr_ignored_mask".

I think what we need here is basically a flags word.

So long as we keep a flag spare to indicate the existence of a further
flags word, we can extend as needed.

How the existence of the first flags words is detected is another
problem. If it only applies for newly-defined si_code values, then
I guess si_code may be sufficient.

Existing kernels will zero-initialize unused regions of the siginfo data structure. The zero-initialization of the padding at the end of the struct is done by the clear_user call here:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/kernel/signal.c#L3193

Quoted 7 lines

and the zero-initialization of the padding between fields and unused union members is done by the clear_siginfo function which the kernel calls when initializing the data structure:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/include/linux/signal.h#L20

Therefore, a flag word value of 0 may be used to detect a lack of support for flagged fields.

It's not enough that we do this today. We would have had to do it back to the dawn of time (though in the arm64 case I guess we just need to go back to when the arch/arm64 was merged).

Quoted 6 lines

v2.6.12:kernel/signal.c:copy_siginfo_to_user() suggests that this wasn't always the case, so unused parts of siginfo could be full of old junk from the user stack, if the kernel is sufficiently old.

If we're trying to do something generic that makes sense on all arches, this matters. I may have misunderstood something about the code though.

Hmm, I think you're right. The current behavior was introduced by commit c999b933faa5e281e3af2e110eccaf91698b0a81 which was first released in 4.18. So if an application wants to be compatible with pre-4.18 kernels then there would need to be some other way to indicate that the fields are valid. Probably the simplest way would be to have the application issue a uname(2) syscall and check the kernel version before reading these fields. I have a couple of other ideas that don't rely on version detection, if we'd prefer to avoid that. (They are somewhat ugly, but our hand is forced by backwards compatibility.)

One idea is to re-purpose the si_errno field as a flags field for certain signal numbers. I checked a few kernel releases going back to 2.6.18 and it looks like the field is set to 0 except in the following circumstances:
- sending a hardware breakpoint (SIGTRAP/TRAP_HWBKPT)
- seccomp failures (SIGSYS/SYS_SECCOMP)
- user-defined signal via kill_pid_usb_asyncio
- SIGSWI in 3.18 and before (code since removed)

It is also set to EFAULT for certain SIGSEGV/SEGV_MAPERR signals on powerpc since commit c96c4436aba4c12f1f48369f2f90bc43e12fe36c, which is currently unreleased. So if we wanted to go this route for SIGSEGV we would need to stop the kernel from setting si_errno to EFAULT for this signal before the 5.8 release.

Another idea was to have userspace set a flag in sa_flags when registering a signal handler meaning "this signal handler requires unknown siginfo fields to be zeroed", and have existing kernels reject the syscall due to an unknown flag being set, but unfortunately this won't work because existing kernels do not reject sigaction syscalls with unknown flags set in sa_flags. A perhaps more radical idea in this vein would be to claim some of the upper bits of the signal number as flags that will cause the syscall to be rejected if set and unknown to the kernel. Existing kernels (going back to at least 2.6.18) contain this code in do_sigaction:

        if (!valid_signal(sig) || sig < 1 || (act && sig_kernel_only(sig)))
                return -EINVAL;

and vald_signal is defined as:

static inline int valid_signal(unsigned long sig)

{
        return sig <= _NSIG ? 1 : 0;
}
Quoted 5 lines

All architectures define _NSIG as a value <= 128, so they will reject a signal number with any of bits 8-31 set. This means that we can use any of those bits for mandatory flags. Most likely we could use bit 30 (expanding down as necessary), as it keeps the signal number positive and permits future expansion of the signal number range.

Quoted 4 lines

Does the signal core code actually gurantee to zero the unused fields? Unless the fields are poked in by hand this is fraught with subtlelies, especially when unions are involved. (I'm sure the code tries to do it, but I've not eyeballed it in detail...)

Quoted 8 lines

It memsets the siginfo structure before setting the fields and sending the signal (grep for clear_siginfo which is just a memset; you should find a call before all callers of force_sig_info). Memset is the right approach here since unlike setting fields by hand it clears padding which could lead to information leaks from the kernel. IIUC this is the reason why Eric wants all of the signals to be raised via wrappers in kernel/signal.c instead of via force_sig_info directly (to make this aspect easier to audit).

Quoted 8 lines

My impression was that the reason for this model is partly to ensure that siginfo fields are populated more consistently. When it was all down to the individual callers, inconsistencies creeped in.

With regard to memset(), this is not a complete defence against data leakage. Assigning to a struct member can set any or all padding in the struct to random garbage (consider write-combining of neighboring member writes into a single larger accesses in asm for example). The

I don't believe that LLVM will store to padding like this. I don't know about GCC, though, but I wouldn't be surprised if this is something that the kernel would want to turn off in "kernel C" (like it turns off strict aliasing) specifically because of the information leak issue.

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Again, the issue is not future kernel builds -- we can always find a way to fix the behaviour for those -- but past kernel builds.

I thought that the whole point of the "bit in the signal number" (or SI_CODEX or whatever) was that we didn't need to worry about the behavior of past kernel builds?

It depends on what we use the new flag(s) for.

If the flag means just that unused padding is safely zeroed, that could work -- but we'd want high confidence that it really is zeroed even in wacky configurations.

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only way to avoid this is to ensure that the struct is 100% padding-free, and that each member of a union is the same size. A quick clance at <uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h> confirms that this is not the case.

This might need to be looked at separately.

But it does mean, strictly speaking, that we can't reliably add new fields anywhere that there was previously padding: assigning to neighboring members can still fill those with garbage after the memset().

...but this is largely moot because I'm not proposing to add new fields in the padding any more (because the fields needed to become larger in order to accommodate future hypothetical architectures which might want to use the fields, and thus they wouldn't fit in the padding). The siginfo.h diff would be something like:

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c267181..4a2fe257415d 100644

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 97

Quoted 7 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +3 -0
@@ -91,7 +91,10 @@ union __sifields {
                                char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
                                __u32 _pkey;
                        } _addr_pkey;
+                       void *_pad[6];
                };
+               uintptr_t _ignored_bits;
+               uintptr_t _ignored_bits_mask;

This _is_ in padding: the tail-padding of the (previously smaller) _sigfault. Again, the compiler was allowed to populate this area with junk before these fields were added.

I agree that it seems fairly unlikely that the compiler would have been overwriting this in normal circumstances, but that's not a guarantee. My worry is that if this goes wrong, it will go wrong silently and unpredictably.

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
        } _sigfault;
 
        /* SIGPOLL */

or with a "uintptr_t _flags" added in before _ignored_bits if we go with that.

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Using unused bits in the signal number to turn on new functionality feels risky. As currently specified, this is just a number. Since today a successful sigaction(n ...) guarantees that n is a valid signal number, reasonable code like the following would trigger a buffer overrun if we start trying to encode anything else in there:

struct sigaction actions[NSIG];

int do_something( ... )

{
        ...

        if (!sigaction(n, sa, ...)) {
                actions[n] = *sa;
                return 0;
        }
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        ...
}

I imagine the bit in the signal number being set by the direct caller to sigaction, and we could specifically recommend that calling pattern. In that case, your "n" wouldn't have the bit set in it. It

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I can imagine this too, but that doesn't mean that software does it.

If the above kind of thing exists in a framework or library somewhere, we could get problems. Similarly, a pre-existing LD_PRELOAD framework that provides a wrapper for sigaction may now go wrong even if your pattern is followed -- i.e., the caller thinks it's calling sigaction directly but in fact it isn't.

I'm aware of one library like that. It's called libsigchain, and it has an early bounds check:
https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:art/sigchainlib/sigchain.cc;l=371

Until the library is changed to recognize the flag, calling code would see the return value of -1 as if the kernel failed the syscall, and would fall back to the code for old kernels.

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But only after some bad dereferences. If these were writes, this means that memory _may_ be silently corrupted (I don't say it't likely in a given case, and we cannot pick a flag bit that makes this impossible).

You're talking about libsigchain, right? I don't see any bad references, the function returns after noticing the bounds check failure.

Yes, I confused myself by reading Handler() out of context. The kernel will invoke this with signo to a real signal number (without any flags).

The sigaction wrapper does the bounds check before doing anything else, just as you say -- so that looks fine.

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(Side question: is all this thread-safe? Is there some implicit locking somewhere?)

I think maybe it isn't? There seem to be possible races on the handler_ field. One possibility is that the function could race with itself on another thread, which could be fixed via locking, but it would also need to handle races between itself and the signal handler, most likely by blocking the signal while setting it.

Hmmm, tricky... anyway, that's not my problem ;)

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So, _even though the user program is correct_, our change may trigger

Let's say that you were talking about some other library and not libsigchain. Such an interceptor wouldn't be correct though, it failed to account for our change to the syscall semantics. If the accesses were before the syscall (or the bounds check), then the interceptor would not have been correct in the first place because POSIX requires returning -1 with errno=EINVAL (and not crashing) if the signal number is invalid.

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the corruption of arbitrary user memory. This what I mean by an ABI break. The fact that the corruption is not done by the syscall itself is no excuse.

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At some point, though, accommodating interceptors becomes pretty much tantamount to saying "we can never change anything". Even just adding a field to __sifields (which is pretty much required for what we need to do) could break things in the presence of some interceptors because the interceptor could be copying the fields manually to a new data structure before calling the user's signal handler (e.g. because it wants to defer the signal until later) and miss our new field. I think most of the other ideas we're discussing fail to meet this bar as well and I'll go into more details later on.

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I agree we cannot always avoid breaking such things. But we should do our best to avoid it.

I think that given the hand that we've been dealt, no matter what we do, we can't really avoid risking breaking something. The relevant questions are "what are we going to risk breaking", "how much risk is there", "will it be easily noticed/fixable", and "once we're on the other side of the potential breakage, will we find ourselves in a position where changing things involves less breakage risk".

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We also fail to notice failures in sigaddset() etc., though in this code it looks like that should not matter.

Maybe you're looking at the handler ("SignalChain::Handler")? The bit wouldn't be set in the signo argument to the handler. I'm talking about line 371 of the code I linked, in the sigaction interceptor "__sigaction" (it looks like sometimes the link doesn't take you to the correct line for some reason).

Ack, I confused myself.

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In general I think that any library like this with independent tracking of the kernel's purported signal handler state would need to be very sensitive to which syscalls are capable of setting signal handlers, what their semantics are, and so on. This applies to any change that we might make to the signal handler interface. So for example, if we introduced a new syscall as you propose below, and the library hasn't been updated to recognize the new syscall, it will silently miss changes in signal handler state caused by the new syscall.

At the end of this argument lies "we can never change anything about how signal handlers work because it could break some interposing library somewhere" -- replace "signal handlers" with any kernel feature whose behavior may be modified by an interposing library if you like -- and I don't think we want to go that far. As far as I know, this isn't really the kernel's business anyway -- the kernel's stable ABI contract starts and ends with the syscall interface and not some library on top.

That being said, we should perhaps try to define our interface so that something reasonable will probably happen if there is such a library and it hasn't been updated. With the new syscall, the library will sometimes silently fail to work in some non-local fashion. With the flag bit in the signal number, the library will either cause the caller to fall back to the old kernel code path (if there is a bounds check) or likely crash loudly (if there is no bounds check). To me, the "flag bit in the signal number" behavior seems more reasonable, since either something correct or something easy to debug will probably happen at runtime.

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could only appear in newly-written code that doesn't follow our recommendations, and there are already plenty of much more likely ways to cause buffer overflows in C code that doesn't follow recommendations anyway. (And even if such a buffer overflow occurred, it would very likely be caught early in development by the MMU due to the magnitude of the number 1<<30.)

Choosing the bit value is hard. If shitfing it overflows, this can trigger random undefined behaviour in the compiler in addition to (or perhaps instead of) an out-of-bounds access or segfault.

It wouldn't overflow on a 64-bit architecture assuming normal array indexing (the index would be promoted to pointer width before being scaled to the array element size), and to begin with the users of this would be 64-bit.

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Unless we don't offer this feature for 32-bit at all (possible, if ugly) we can't stop people using it.

My point is that the problem in the interceptor library would probably be noticed on 64-bit (since that's what most people use these days), which would probably result in it being fixed by the time it reaches 32-bit users.

Agreed. But we shouldn't take such bets unless we really have to.

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If shifting it doesn't overflow, we might still fall into a valid mapping, though I'd agree a segfault is more likely.

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I think it would be cleaner for to add a single flag field that can be used for detecting other extensions, and request it via a new sa_flags bit. This removes the need for sematically useless zeroing of unused fields (though for hygiene and backwards compatibility reasons we would probably want to carry on zeroing them anyway).

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I can see no simpler way to add supplementary siginfo fields for existing si_codes. For si_codes that didn't exist before the zeroing came in we could still detect optional si_code-specific fields via zeroing, but it seems messary to have two ways of detecting extensions.

That would certainly be cleaner if it worked, but that would only be the case if old kernels rejected unknown bits in sa_flags, and unfortunately they don't. With the bit in the signal number, the "old

Hmm, that is a problem I wasn't aware of.

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kernels reject" behavior admits relatively straightforward usage code:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS, &sa, 0) < 0) { //
succeeds in new kernels, fails in old kernels

    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0) // succeeds in old kernels
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

void clear_fields_and_handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
sa->si_future_field = 0;
handle_segv(signum, sa, ctx);
}

void handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
// At this point, si_future_field will have the value 0 in old
kernels and the kernel-supplied value in new kernels. }

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Imagine if we moved the flag SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS from the signal number to sa_flags. In that case, the first sigaction would succeed in old kernels so handle_segv wouldn't know whether it can safely read from si_future_field. With the sa_flags approach, you would need kernel version number checking via uname before setting the flag in sa_flags, and at that point why even have the flag in sa_flags at all since you could just have the signal handler conditionally read from si_future_field based on the uname?

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Software setting SA_SIFLAGS (or whatever) is new by definition, since it would be using a new #define. So it might be reasonable to put the burden on that software to verify that the flag was really accepted by the kernel, by reading it back.

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That doesn't seem like a good idea even if it worked, because it could lead to race conditions. If the si_flags-reading signal handler were invoked in response to a signal between when you set it and when you ended up replacing it with the fallback signal handler for old kernels, the handler may end up reading garbage data from si_flags.

Not really. My example may have this problem, but the signal handler can be written to support both scenarios, based on testing a flag that the main program sets after verifying that the flag could be set. Or the signal could be blocked around establishment (often a good idea for other reasons).

But I agree it's a bit gross, and anyway doesn't work due to the fact that the kernel doesn't filter out unrecognised flags anyway.

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Unfortunately, even relatively recent kernels blindly store sa_flags in the kernel without validating it, and so it looks like duff flags can be read back out via a sigaction() call. Dang.

Perhaps a new frontend syscall could be added. A new libc that knows about this "sigaction2" could use it and mask off problem bits from sa_flags in its sigaction() wrapper before calling sigaction2. An old libc would call the old sigaction syscall, where we would ignore these new sa_flags bits as before.

I'm not currently in favor of the new syscall but if we do this I would keep sigaction and sigaction2 separate. That is, libc sigaction should always use the sigaction syscall, and libc sigaction2 should always use the sigaction2 syscall. We should avoid libc's sigaction having different behavior based on the libc version and kernel version, as that would make it harder to reason about its behavior. Calling code would need to check for presence of sigaction2 in both libc and the kernel, e.g.

__attribute__((weak)) decltype(sigaction2) sigaction2;

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_SIFLAGS;

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  if (!sigaction2 || sigaction2(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0) {
    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0)
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

I guess. But I share your distaste for adding a new syscall.

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This may not be a popular approach though, and software wouldn't be able to use our new features until libc is updated to match.

If we go down this route, it may provide additional opportunities to fix annoying defects in the old interface.

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Note that the same applies to a flag indicating the availability of a si_flags field in sigaction (just s/SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS/SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS/ and s/si_future_field/si_flags/ in the usage code above). In terms of SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS versus SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS I'd be fine either way.

Another thought that occurred to me is that we may consider generalizing this a step further and introducing a single flag bit in the signal number that means "reject unknown flags in sa_flags". This would mean that we wouldn't need to add any more flag bits to the signal number in the future, thus limiting this signal number hack to a single bit; all future mandatory behavior changes could just be put behind a flag in sa_flags and userspace code would easily be able to detect missing support for a flag and fall back if necessary. In our case, this would imply usage code like this:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS;
// Succeeds in kernels with SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support. // Fails in kernels with SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support but no
SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support (because of the unknown flags check).
// Fails in kernels without SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support (because of
the bounds check on the signal number).

  if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS, &sa, 0) < 0) {
    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
    // Succeeds in old kernels, no need to use SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS since
we're using sa_flags from the beginning of time.
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0)
      perror("sigaction");
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}
}

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As with the other options this could work, but looks like it could break the ABI due to violating the original semantics for the signal number argument. Perhaps I'm being too paranoid.

There's no ABI being broken here, as long as we consider syscalls to be the stable ABI layer. Old kernels are simply rejecting arguments that they don't know about yet. By that argument, any introduction of a new syscall is an ABI break because it changes the semantics of a previously-unallocated syscall number.

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As argued above, I think this is an invalid argument.

Although any addition will change behaviour (so is a break in some sense), the key is not to make "surprising" changes.

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If we care about interceptors then I don't think "surprising" comes into it. It's more a question of "does the anticipated behavior of the interceptor match our desired behavior", where "desired" means "most likely to avoid silent breakage". We would need to get into the head of a potential interceptor author and think about how they would have handled the signal number argument, as well as other arguments like sa_flags if we want to go that route, and see whether that behavior would lead to the desired result.

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That's exactly what I mean by "surprising".

Not quite, see below.

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However, not every
interceptor author will be making the same assumptions, and not every bit of software affected will be an interceptor.

I can see a couple of ways in which non-interceptor software could be affected:

- It's doing something like "call sigaction on every possible signal number in the 31-bit range and end up failing if the syscall succeeded" (e.g. with an OOB write). Perhaps software could be doing something like this in a loop to collect all currently registered signal handlers. That being said, this program:

#include <limits.h>
#include <signal.h>

int main() {
struct sigaction act;

  for (int i = 1; i != INT_MAX; ++i) {
    sigaction(i, 0, &act);

}
}

takes around 5 seconds to run on my relatively-fast machine, so I would expect any such code to be noticed as a performance issue and either be changed to be bounded on _NSIG or break on EINVAL.

This is probably the largest potential flaw that I can currently see in the "bit in the signal number" idea, since it could conceivably result in userspace code being broken without having first required it to have been changed to make use of the new feature. I'm not convinced that it would be an ABI break though, because the code seems unlikely to exist in this form in the wild because of the performance issue, and you could anyway make the argument that the code is incorrect because, in order to contain a loop like this, it would need to be able to handle large, previously-unknown signal numbers somehow. If we accept that the code is incorrect, a similar line of argument applies as for interceptors (i.e. likely to result in an OOB access which will fail loudly and be easily debugged and fixed).

- If we do something that involves introducing a new flag in sa_flags, the flag may be exposed to unaware software via the oldact argument to sigaction, and I suppose that it's conceivable that exposing a previously-unknown flag like this could somehow break something. But this seems like an unreasonable restriction because it would mean that we can never add a flag to sa_flags no matter what.

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So some judgement
needs to be applied.

Of course. We need to agree *how* to apply the judgement though.

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In this case, I think we exactly want the interceptor author to have thought "oh, it's just a number, I'll (possibly do a bounds check and then) use the number as an index into an array". This will lead to one of two outcomes: crashing (yes, yes, it won't always crash, but if the alternative is that it never crashes and we get silently incorrect behavior all of the time, I'll take sometimes crashing) or fail the bounds check and pretend to be an old kernel (the latter is anticipated by POSIX which requires returning -1/EINVAL for an invalid signal number). Each of these behaviors are desirable, as they are observable failures, which are more likely to result in fixes than silent ones.

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Agreed, except wanting the author to have thought something doesn't ensure that they actually did think that.

True, but if our goal is only to accommodate reasonably written interceptors, we don't actually need to ensure anything here.

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Having something random happen when setting a previously reserved flag bit, or when issuing a syscall when an unknown syscall number, or not surprising at all.

Introducing a new syscall is right out in this model. The interceptor author wouldn't have anticipated our introducing a new syscall, so the new syscall wouldn't be intercepted and calls to the new syscall would silently bypass the interceptor. For example, adding sigaction2 could result in signal handlers being set without the interceptor's knowledge.

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Agreed. My sentence was a bit mangled: I mean to say "Having something random happen when [...] issuing a syscall *with* an unknown syscall number *is* not surprising at all."

I agree that adding a new syscall is problematic if we want to avoid breaking existing interceptors in particular. Other types of code are much less likely to be affected by the addition of new syscalls.

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Right, and this to me is a case in point for why I would say that "surprising" isn't the right frame of analysis here. My analysis seems to generally be that "anticipated interceptor behavior matches desired behavior" is positively correlated with "surprising" (i.e. the interceptor viewpoint is the dual of the user viewpoint), so if we care about interceptors we may end up making a "surprising" change even though it doesn't intuitively seem like the right thing to do.

You're right that interceptors are different from normal callers. I'm not sure I follow your argument, but an alternative way of looking at it might be to say that an interceptor is both an implementation of an interface and a caller of the same interface. Since API specs are rarely complete enough to cover the corner cases that arise from this, full portability is hard to achieve on top of an evolving kernel.

However, I think this interceptor thing is a bit of a red herring. I just intended that as an illustration of the kind of code that might fall foul. This doesn't mean that it's 100% certain that no other software can be affected.

The starting points for this discussion were: "is it reasonable for a caller to pass an unvalidated signal number to sigaction(), and rely on sigaction() to validate it?" and "is it reasonable to assume that a signal number accepted by sigaction() fits the POSIX specification of a valid signal number?"

I think yes; you aren't (or weren't) convinced.

The mere fact that it's hard to agree suggests to me that the specification is too weak to extend safely in this area. Unfortunately, it's rather weak for sa_flags too, although a non-full flags argument does at least suggest that future extensions might appear.

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Regarding a sa_flags bit, let's get inside the head of the interceptor author again. How would they handle a flag bit that they don't recognize when replacing the signal handler? It wouldn't be correct to just pass it through to the kernel, or drop the flag on the floor, as it might be semantically meaningful (and thus could change the calling convention as SA_SIGINFO does, or change the meaning of fields in siginfo, as SA_CODEX would do). A correctly written sigaction interceptor should probably abort the program upon encountering an unknown flag (thus giving a human a chance to update the interceptor), but chances are that they don't. Ignoring all but a few flags (and passing a fixed set of flags to the kernel) seems to be what libsigchain does, and in the case of SA_CODEX it would seem to result

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in desirable behavior (but I suspect that it isn't handling the other flags correctly), but I could also see an interceptor author just passing it unchanged to the kernel without checking it (perhaps because they didn't think about these issues, and because that didn't matter until now, with the exception of from-the-beginning-of-time flags like SA_SIGINFO). And with SA_CODEX that could lead to silent misreading of si_code in the interceptor's signal handler, if it hasn't been updated to use the new macros.

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Agreed. I've tried to implement things rather like this in the past, and how to interpret the flags is a tricky issue. Some of the flags are impossible to emulate even when you know what they mean, in particular SA_NODEFER and SA_RESTART.

Making new flags safe to ignore and harmless to set of you don't know what they mean is the safest approach, but not always possible (I think I managed this with by suggestion below, though).

Again, this suggestion could lead to silent failures in an interceptor, if:
- the interceptor passes the sa_flags through to the kernel unchanged (or otherwise doesn't touch SA_CODEX)
- the interceptor replaces the user's sa_sigaction
- the interceptor's replacement sa_sigaction tests the provided si_code.

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Maybe you're not concerned about that, though? At least to me it seems in the same ballpark of likelihood as the ways in which things could go wrong with the signal number bit.

I agree this is a concern, and perhaps a bit nastier in practice than side-effects of setting random bits in the signal number.

Personally I do tend to be paranoid about flags arguments and try to police them in any code that isn't a trivial pass-through, but this doesn't mean that all code out there does it. (Including the kernel's sigaction()!)

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Ideally, a flags field should be specified with rules that say exactly what to do with flags you don't recognise. Sadly this is usually not thought about until it's too late.

It perhaps isn't too late to introduce such rules for sigaction if we adopt the signal number bit and we make it mean "reject unknown flags".

If Eric likes the idea then fair enough, but as I've tried to argue this may still just be moving the problem around rather than solving it.

As a final random idea to add to the mix, we could add two or more flags in sa_flags, and require the kernel to transform them in a specific way, say:

#define SA_WANT_FLAGS 0x00c700000
#define SA_HAVE_FLAGS 0x009200000
#define SA_FLAGS_MASK 0x00ff00000

volatile sig_atomic_t have_flags = 0;

	sa.sa_flags |= SA_WANT_FLAGS;
	if (sigaction(n, &sa, NULL))
		if (!sigaction(n, NULL, &sa) &&
				(sa.sa_flags & SA_FLAGS_MASK) == SA_HAVE_FLAGS)
			have_flags = 1;

This is at least proof against "dumb readback".

Provided that the handler can cope with the have_flags == 0 case and just reads the flag once per call, I don't think we would need to worry about races.

Of course, an interceptor that doesn't understand this mechanism and munges or manufactures its own siginfo might still fail to properly initialise our new field before passing it on to a signal handler that is expecting it. But that's already broken: such an interceptor might also not understand new si_codes that the client code absolutely relies on. And new si_codes _do_ get added (that's another extensibility fail in the existing signal API).

So... overall, maybe a bit in the signal number isn't a lot worse, and perhaps it _will_ lead to cleaner failures.

Really, I don't see a way to solve it properly without a new API.

In the meantime, can I suggest:

(1) Come up with an extensible way of encoding supplementary information in siginfo. If the consensus is that zeroing unused fields is sufficient and that the kernel and compiler will reliably do it, then great. Otherwise, we might need explicit flags fields or something.

(2) Hack up any simple mechanism (such as your signal number flag) for requesting/detecting the extra information.

Along with an illustration of a application of the mechanism (i.e., reporting address tag bits), this should at least provide a basis for further review.

We can then try to swap in a different mechanism for (2) if people have still have concerns (or it not, keep it).

Cheers
---Dave

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#54 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 932 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 425 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 424 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 308 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 307 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 305 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 303 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 288 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 277 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 271 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 263 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 208 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 201 lines · Peter Collingbourne

On Wed, Jun 24, 2020 at 2:28 AM Dave Martin <[email protected]> wrote:

On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 05:40:08PM -0700, Peter Collingbourne wrote:
On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 10:52 AM Eric W. Biederman
<[email protected]> wrote:

Dave Martin <[email protected]> writes:

On Tue, Jun 23, 2020 at 07:54:59AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
Peter Collingbourne <[email protected]> writes:

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
index 47f651df781c..a8380a2b6361 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
@@ -235,20 +235,41 @@ static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
}

void arm64_force_sig_fault(int signo, int code, void __user *addr,
+ unsigned long far, unsigned char far_tb_mask,
const char *str)
{
arm64_show_signal(signo, str);
- if (signo == SIGKILL)
+ if (signo == SIGKILL) {
force_sig(SIGKILL);
- else
- force_sig_fault(signo, code, addr);
+ } else {
+ struct kernel_siginfo info;
+ clear_siginfo(&info);
+ info.si_signo = signo;
+ info.si_errno = 0;
+ info.si_code = code;
+ info.si_addr = addr;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte = (far >> 56) & far_tb_mask;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = far_tb_mask;
+ force_sig_info(&info);
+ }
}

void arm64_force_sig_mceerr(int code, void __user *addr, short lsb,
- const char *str)
+ unsigned long far, const char *str)
{
+ struct kernel_siginfo info;
+
arm64_show_signal(SIGBUS, str);
- force_sig_mceerr(code, addr, lsb);
+
+ clear_siginfo(&info);
+ info.si_signo = SIGBUS;
+ info.si_errno = 0;
+ info.si_code = code;
+ info.si_addr = addr;
+ info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte = far >> 56;
+ info.si_addr_top_byte_mask = 0xff;
+ force_sig_info(&info);
}

I have a real problem with this construction. force_sig_info is not an
interface that should be used for anything except to define a wrapper
that takes it's parameters.

Can you elaborate? How would you do this king of thing.

There are no other uses of force_sig_info in architecture code.

I just removed them _all_ because they were almost all broken.
In fact your mcerr case is broken because it uses two different
union members simultantiously.

Is that really broken? I thought that the Linux kernel deliberately
didn't care about strict aliasing rules (the top-level Makefile passes
-fno-strict-aliasing) so I thought that it was valid in "Linux kernel
C" even though from a standards point of view it is invalid. (That
being said, this is probably moot with my proposed changes below
though.)

I have a feeling that -fno-strict-aliasing only allows you to _read_ a
different union member from the one previously written.

Writing a different member from the last one written can still splatter
on the other members IIUC.

It would be better to keep things separate rather than risk
incorrectness just to save a few bytes.

IMHO -fno-strict-aliasing is no excuse for gratuitous type-punning.

So I am looking for something like force_sig_mcerr or force_sig_fault
that includes your new information that then calls force_sig_info.

I know of no other way to safely use the siginfo struct.

So you want something like:

int force_sig_fault_with_ignored_bits(int signo, int code, void __user
*addr, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);
int force_sig_mceerr_with_ignored_bits(int code, void __user *addr,
short lsb, uintptr_t addr_ignored, uintptr_t addr_ignored_mask);

in kernel/signal.c and the code in arch/arm64 would call that?

AIUI we absolutely need a forced signal here, we need to supply
metadata, and we don't have to open-code all that at every relevant
signal generation site...

It is not clear to me that if you have adapted siginfo_layout.

Garbled sentence?

Looks like. One of the pieces of code that needs to change
when siginfo gets updated is siginfo_layout so that the structure
can be properly decoded and made sense of.

I am not seeing anything like that.

Okay, this has to do with copying between the compat and non-compat
versions of the struct? Sure, I can update that, although the code
would be basically non-functional on arm64 because TBI isn't supported
on 32-bit ARM.

diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index cb3d6c267181..6dd82373eb2d 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ union __sifields {
char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
__u32 _pkey;
} _addr_pkey;
+#ifdef __aarch64__
+ /* used with all si_codes */
+ struct {
+ short _dummy_top_byte;

^ What's this for? I don't have Eric's insight here.

We would need a short's worth of padding in order to prevent the
fields from occupying the same address as si_addr_lsb.

+ unsigned char _top_byte;
+ unsigned char _top_byte_mask;
+ } _addr_top_byte;
+#endif
};
} _sigfault;

Why the _dummy_top_byte? Oh I see it should be spelled "short _addr_lsb;".

Please remove the "#ifdef __aarch64__". If at all possible we want to
design this so any other architecture who has this challenge can use the
code. The kind of code does not get enough attention/maintenance if it
is built for a single architecture.

Seems reasonable. I was recently made aware that RISC-V was
considering a similar feature:
https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-tee/topic/risc_v_tbi_proposal/72855478
I would have opted to expand this to other architectures on an
as-needed basis, but I'd also be fine with having it on all
architectures from the start.

If we make this arch-independent, we have an additional concern, which
is "what if some future architecture wants more than one byte here?"
For example, an architecture may have a "top-two-bytes-ignore"
feature, which would imply two-byte (misnamed) "si_addr_top_byte" and
"si_addr_top_byte_mask" fields. And the RISC-V proposal potentially
implies many more ignored bits (see slide 13 of the presentation). The
maximum size that these fields can possibly be is the size of a
pointer, and with that there wouldn't be enough room in the padding at
this point to accommodate the new fields.

That basically implies your earlier suggestion of adding a union
member here to accommodate future expansion of the union, and adding
the new fields after the union. I'm happy to make that change, with
the fields renamed "si_addr_ignored" and "si_addr_ignored_mask".

I think what we need here is basically a flags word.

So long as we keep a flag spare to indicate the existence of a further
flags word, we can extend as needed.

How the existence of the first flags words is detected is another
problem. If it only applies for newly-defined si_code values, then
I guess si_code may be sufficient.

Existing kernels will zero-initialize unused regions of the siginfo
data structure. The zero-initialization of the padding at the end of
the struct is done by the clear_user call here:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/kernel/signal.c#L3193

and the zero-initialization of the padding between fields and unused
union members is done by the clear_siginfo function which the kernel
calls when initializing the data structure:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/3e08a95294a4fb3702bb3d35ed08028433c37fe6/include/linux/signal.h#L20

Therefore, a flag word value of 0 may be used to detect a lack of
support for flagged fields.

It's not enough that we do this today. We would have had to do it back to the dawn of time (though in the arm64 case I guess we just need to go back to when the arch/arm64 was merged).

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v2.6.12:kernel/signal.c:copy_siginfo_to_user() suggests that this wasn't always the case, so unused parts of siginfo could be full of old junk from the user stack, if the kernel is sufficiently old.

If we're trying to do something generic that makes sense on all arches, this matters. I may have misunderstood something about the code though.

Hmm, I think you're right. The current behavior was introduced by commit c999b933faa5e281e3af2e110eccaf91698b0a81 which was first released in 4.18. So if an application wants to be compatible with pre-4.18 kernels then there would need to be some other way to indicate that the fields are valid. Probably the simplest way would be to have the application issue a uname(2) syscall and check the kernel version before reading these fields. I have a couple of other ideas that don't rely on version detection, if we'd prefer to avoid that. (They are somewhat ugly, but our hand is forced by backwards compatibility.)

One idea is to re-purpose the si_errno field as a flags field for certain signal numbers. I checked a few kernel releases going back to 2.6.18 and it looks like the field is set to 0 except in the following circumstances:
- sending a hardware breakpoint (SIGTRAP/TRAP_HWBKPT)
- seccomp failures (SIGSYS/SYS_SECCOMP)
- user-defined signal via kill_pid_usb_asyncio
- SIGSWI in 3.18 and before (code since removed)

It is also set to EFAULT for certain SIGSEGV/SEGV_MAPERR signals on powerpc since commit c96c4436aba4c12f1f48369f2f90bc43e12fe36c, which is currently unreleased. So if we wanted to go this route for SIGSEGV we would need to stop the kernel from setting si_errno to EFAULT for this signal before the 5.8 release.

Another idea was to have userspace set a flag in sa_flags when registering a signal handler meaning "this signal handler requires unknown siginfo fields to be zeroed", and have existing kernels reject the syscall due to an unknown flag being set, but unfortunately this won't work because existing kernels do not reject sigaction syscalls with unknown flags set in sa_flags. A perhaps more radical idea in this vein would be to claim some of the upper bits of the signal number as flags that will cause the syscall to be rejected if set and unknown to the kernel. Existing kernels (going back to at least 2.6.18) contain this code in do_sigaction:

        if (!valid_signal(sig) || sig < 1 || (act && sig_kernel_only(sig)))
                return -EINVAL;

and vald_signal is defined as:

static inline int valid_signal(unsigned long sig)

{
        return sig <= _NSIG ? 1 : 0;
}
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All architectures define _NSIG as a value <= 128, so they will reject a signal number with any of bits 8-31 set. This means that we can use any of those bits for mandatory flags. Most likely we could use bit 30 (expanding down as necessary), as it keeps the signal number positive and permits future expansion of the signal number range.

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Does the signal core code actually gurantee to zero the unused fields? Unless the fields are poked in by hand this is fraught with subtlelies, especially when unions are involved. (I'm sure the code tries to do it, but I've not eyeballed it in detail...)

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It memsets the siginfo structure before setting the fields and sending the signal (grep for clear_siginfo which is just a memset; you should find a call before all callers of force_sig_info). Memset is the right approach here since unlike setting fields by hand it clears padding which could lead to information leaks from the kernel. IIUC this is the reason why Eric wants all of the signals to be raised via wrappers in kernel/signal.c instead of via force_sig_info directly (to make this aspect easier to audit).

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My impression was that the reason for this model is partly to ensure that siginfo fields are populated more consistently. When it was all down to the individual callers, inconsistencies creeped in.

With regard to memset(), this is not a complete defence against data leakage. Assigning to a struct member can set any or all padding in the struct to random garbage (consider write-combining of neighboring member writes into a single larger accesses in asm for example). The

I don't believe that LLVM will store to padding like this. I don't know about GCC, though, but I wouldn't be surprised if this is something that the kernel would want to turn off in "kernel C" (like it turns off strict aliasing) specifically because of the information leak issue.

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Again, the issue is not future kernel builds -- we can always find a way to fix the behaviour for those -- but past kernel builds.

I thought that the whole point of the "bit in the signal number" (or SI_CODEX or whatever) was that we didn't need to worry about the behavior of past kernel builds?

It depends on what we use the new flag(s) for.

If the flag means just that unused padding is safely zeroed, that could work -- but we'd want high confidence that it really is zeroed even in wacky configurations.

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only way to avoid this is to ensure that the struct is 100% padding-free, and that each member of a union is the same size. A quick clance at <uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h> confirms that this is not the case.

This might need to be looked at separately.

But it does mean, strictly speaking, that we can't reliably add new fields anywhere that there was previously padding: assigning to neighboring members can still fill those with garbage after the memset().

...but this is largely moot because I'm not proposing to add new fields in the padding any more (because the fields needed to become larger in order to accommodate future hypothetical architectures which might want to use the fields, and thus they wouldn't fit in the padding). The siginfo.h diff would be something like:

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
index cb3d6c267181..4a2fe257415d 100644

include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h union __sifields { · line 97

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +3 -0
@@ -91,7 +91,10 @@ union __sifields {
                                char _dummy_pkey[__ADDR_BND_PKEY_PAD];
                                __u32 _pkey;
                        } _addr_pkey;
+                       void *_pad[6];
                };
+               uintptr_t _ignored_bits;
+               uintptr_t _ignored_bits_mask;

This _is_ in padding: the tail-padding of the (previously smaller) _sigfault. Again, the compiler was allowed to populate this area with junk before these fields were added.

I agree that it seems fairly unlikely that the compiler would have been overwriting this in normal circumstances, but that's not a guarantee. My worry is that if this goes wrong, it will go wrong silently and unpredictably.

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include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0 -0
        } _sigfault;
 
        /* SIGPOLL */

or with a "uintptr_t _flags" added in before _ignored_bits if we go with that.

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Using unused bits in the signal number to turn on new functionality feels risky. As currently specified, this is just a number. Since today a successful sigaction(n ...) guarantees that n is a valid signal number, reasonable code like the following would trigger a buffer overrun if we start trying to encode anything else in there:

struct sigaction actions[NSIG];

int do_something( ... )

{
        ...

        if (!sigaction(n, sa, ...)) {
                actions[n] = *sa;
                return 0;
        }
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        ...
}

I imagine the bit in the signal number being set by the direct caller to sigaction, and we could specifically recommend that calling pattern. In that case, your "n" wouldn't have the bit set in it. It

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I can imagine this too, but that doesn't mean that software does it.

If the above kind of thing exists in a framework or library somewhere, we could get problems. Similarly, a pre-existing LD_PRELOAD framework that provides a wrapper for sigaction may now go wrong even if your pattern is followed -- i.e., the caller thinks it's calling sigaction directly but in fact it isn't.

I'm aware of one library like that. It's called libsigchain, and it has an early bounds check:
https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:art/sigchainlib/sigchain.cc;l=371

Until the library is changed to recognize the flag, calling code would see the return value of -1 as if the kernel failed the syscall, and would fall back to the code for old kernels.

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But only after some bad dereferences. If these were writes, this means that memory _may_ be silently corrupted (I don't say it't likely in a given case, and we cannot pick a flag bit that makes this impossible).

You're talking about libsigchain, right? I don't see any bad references, the function returns after noticing the bounds check failure.

Yes, I confused myself by reading Handler() out of context. The kernel will invoke this with signo to a real signal number (without any flags).

The sigaction wrapper does the bounds check before doing anything else, just as you say -- so that looks fine.

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(Side question: is all this thread-safe? Is there some implicit locking somewhere?)

I think maybe it isn't? There seem to be possible races on the handler_ field. One possibility is that the function could race with itself on another thread, which could be fixed via locking, but it would also need to handle races between itself and the signal handler, most likely by blocking the signal while setting it.

Hmmm, tricky... anyway, that's not my problem ;)

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So, _even though the user program is correct_, our change may trigger

Let's say that you were talking about some other library and not libsigchain. Such an interceptor wouldn't be correct though, it failed to account for our change to the syscall semantics. If the accesses were before the syscall (or the bounds check), then the interceptor would not have been correct in the first place because POSIX requires returning -1 with errno=EINVAL (and not crashing) if the signal number is invalid.

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the corruption of arbitrary user memory. This what I mean by an ABI break. The fact that the corruption is not done by the syscall itself is no excuse.

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At some point, though, accommodating interceptors becomes pretty much tantamount to saying "we can never change anything". Even just adding a field to __sifields (which is pretty much required for what we need to do) could break things in the presence of some interceptors because the interceptor could be copying the fields manually to a new data structure before calling the user's signal handler (e.g. because it wants to defer the signal until later) and miss our new field. I think most of the other ideas we're discussing fail to meet this bar as well and I'll go into more details later on.

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I agree we cannot always avoid breaking such things. But we should do our best to avoid it.

I think that given the hand that we've been dealt, no matter what we do, we can't really avoid risking breaking something. The relevant questions are "what are we going to risk breaking", "how much risk is there", "will it be easily noticed/fixable", and "once we're on the other side of the potential breakage, will we find ourselves in a position where changing things involves less breakage risk".

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We also fail to notice failures in sigaddset() etc., though in this code it looks like that should not matter.

Maybe you're looking at the handler ("SignalChain::Handler")? The bit wouldn't be set in the signo argument to the handler. I'm talking about line 371 of the code I linked, in the sigaction interceptor "__sigaction" (it looks like sometimes the link doesn't take you to the correct line for some reason).

Ack, I confused myself.

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In general I think that any library like this with independent tracking of the kernel's purported signal handler state would need to be very sensitive to which syscalls are capable of setting signal handlers, what their semantics are, and so on. This applies to any change that we might make to the signal handler interface. So for example, if we introduced a new syscall as you propose below, and the library hasn't been updated to recognize the new syscall, it will silently miss changes in signal handler state caused by the new syscall.

At the end of this argument lies "we can never change anything about how signal handlers work because it could break some interposing library somewhere" -- replace "signal handlers" with any kernel feature whose behavior may be modified by an interposing library if you like -- and I don't think we want to go that far. As far as I know, this isn't really the kernel's business anyway -- the kernel's stable ABI contract starts and ends with the syscall interface and not some library on top.

That being said, we should perhaps try to define our interface so that something reasonable will probably happen if there is such a library and it hasn't been updated. With the new syscall, the library will sometimes silently fail to work in some non-local fashion. With the flag bit in the signal number, the library will either cause the caller to fall back to the old kernel code path (if there is a bounds check) or likely crash loudly (if there is no bounds check). To me, the "flag bit in the signal number" behavior seems more reasonable, since either something correct or something easy to debug will probably happen at runtime.

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could only appear in newly-written code that doesn't follow our recommendations, and there are already plenty of much more likely ways to cause buffer overflows in C code that doesn't follow recommendations anyway. (And even if such a buffer overflow occurred, it would very likely be caught early in development by the MMU due to the magnitude of the number 1<<30.)

Choosing the bit value is hard. If shitfing it overflows, this can trigger random undefined behaviour in the compiler in addition to (or perhaps instead of) an out-of-bounds access or segfault.

It wouldn't overflow on a 64-bit architecture assuming normal array indexing (the index would be promoted to pointer width before being scaled to the array element size), and to begin with the users of this would be 64-bit.

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Unless we don't offer this feature for 32-bit at all (possible, if ugly) we can't stop people using it.

My point is that the problem in the interceptor library would probably be noticed on 64-bit (since that's what most people use these days), which would probably result in it being fixed by the time it reaches 32-bit users.

Agreed. But we shouldn't take such bets unless we really have to.

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If shifting it doesn't overflow, we might still fall into a valid mapping, though I'd agree a segfault is more likely.

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I think it would be cleaner for to add a single flag field that can be used for detecting other extensions, and request it via a new sa_flags bit. This removes the need for sematically useless zeroing of unused fields (though for hygiene and backwards compatibility reasons we would probably want to carry on zeroing them anyway).

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I can see no simpler way to add supplementary siginfo fields for existing si_codes. For si_codes that didn't exist before the zeroing came in we could still detect optional si_code-specific fields via zeroing, but it seems messary to have two ways of detecting extensions.

That would certainly be cleaner if it worked, but that would only be the case if old kernels rejected unknown bits in sa_flags, and unfortunately they don't. With the bit in the signal number, the "old

Hmm, that is a problem I wasn't aware of.

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kernels reject" behavior admits relatively straightforward usage code:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS, &sa, 0) < 0) { //
succeeds in new kernels, fails in old kernels

    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0) // succeeds in old kernels
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

void clear_fields_and_handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
sa->si_future_field = 0;
handle_segv(signum, sa, ctx);
}

void handle_segv(int signum, siginfo_t *sa, void *ctx) {
// At this point, si_future_field will have the value 0 in old
kernels and the kernel-supplied value in new kernels. }

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Imagine if we moved the flag SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS from the signal number to sa_flags. In that case, the first sigaction would succeed in old kernels so handle_segv wouldn't know whether it can safely read from si_future_field. With the sa_flags approach, you would need kernel version number checking via uname before setting the flag in sa_flags, and at that point why even have the flag in sa_flags at all since you could just have the signal handler conditionally read from si_future_field based on the uname?

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Software setting SA_SIFLAGS (or whatever) is new by definition, since it would be using a new #define. So it might be reasonable to put the burden on that software to verify that the flag was really accepted by the kernel, by reading it back.

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That doesn't seem like a good idea even if it worked, because it could lead to race conditions. If the si_flags-reading signal handler were invoked in response to a signal between when you set it and when you ended up replacing it with the fallback signal handler for old kernels, the handler may end up reading garbage data from si_flags.

Not really. My example may have this problem, but the signal handler can be written to support both scenarios, based on testing a flag that the main program sets after verifying that the flag could be set. Or the signal could be blocked around establishment (often a good idea for other reasons).

But I agree it's a bit gross, and anyway doesn't work due to the fact that the kernel doesn't filter out unrecognised flags anyway.

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Unfortunately, even relatively recent kernels blindly store sa_flags in the kernel without validating it, and so it looks like duff flags can be read back out via a sigaction() call. Dang.

Perhaps a new frontend syscall could be added. A new libc that knows about this "sigaction2" could use it and mask off problem bits from sa_flags in its sigaction() wrapper before calling sigaction2. An old libc would call the old sigaction syscall, where we would ignore these new sa_flags bits as before.

I'm not currently in favor of the new syscall but if we do this I would keep sigaction and sigaction2 separate. That is, libc sigaction should always use the sigaction syscall, and libc sigaction2 should always use the sigaction2 syscall. We should avoid libc's sigaction having different behavior based on the libc version and kernel version, as that would make it harder to reason about its behavior. Calling code would need to check for presence of sigaction2 in both libc and the kernel, e.g.

__attribute__((weak)) decltype(sigaction2) sigaction2;

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_SIFLAGS;

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  if (!sigaction2 || sigaction2(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0) {
    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0)
      perror("sigaction");

}
}

I guess. But I share your distaste for adding a new syscall.

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This may not be a popular approach though, and software wouldn't be able to use our new features until libc is updated to match.

If we go down this route, it may provide additional opportunities to fix annoying defects in the old interface.

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Note that the same applies to a flag indicating the availability of a si_flags field in sigaction (just s/SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS/SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS/ and s/si_future_field/si_flags/ in the usage code above). In terms of SF_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS versus SF_HAS_SI_FLAGS I'd be fine either way.

Another thought that occurred to me is that we may consider generalizing this a step further and introducing a single flag bit in the signal number that means "reject unknown flags in sa_flags". This would mean that we wouldn't need to add any more flag bits to the signal number in the future, thus limiting this signal number hack to a single bit; all future mandatory behavior changes could just be put behind a flag in sa_flags and userspace code would easily be able to detect missing support for a flag and fall back if necessary. In our case, this would imply usage code like this:

void set_segv_handler(void) {
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_sigaction = handle_segv;
sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS;
// Succeeds in kernels with SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support. // Fails in kernels with SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support but no
SA_CLEAR_UNKNOWN_FIELDS support (because of the unknown flags check).
// Fails in kernels without SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS support (because of
the bounds check on the signal number).

  if (sigaction(SIGSEGV | SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS, &sa, 0) < 0) {
    sa.sa_sigaction = clear_fields_and_handle_segv;
    sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
    // Succeeds in old kernels, no need to use SF_CHECK_SA_FLAGS since
we're using sa_flags from the beginning of time.
    if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, 0) < 0)
      perror("sigaction");
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}
}

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As with the other options this could work, but looks like it could break the ABI due to violating the original semantics for the signal number argument. Perhaps I'm being too paranoid.

There's no ABI being broken here, as long as we consider syscalls to be the stable ABI layer. Old kernels are simply rejecting arguments that they don't know about yet. By that argument, any introduction of a new syscall is an ABI break because it changes the semantics of a previously-unallocated syscall number.

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As argued above, I think this is an invalid argument.

Although any addition will change behaviour (so is a break in some sense), the key is not to make "surprising" changes.

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If we care about interceptors then I don't think "surprising" comes into it. It's more a question of "does the anticipated behavior of the interceptor match our desired behavior", where "desired" means "most likely to avoid silent breakage". We would need to get into the head of a potential interceptor author and think about how they would have handled the signal number argument, as well as other arguments like sa_flags if we want to go that route, and see whether that behavior would lead to the desired result.

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That's exactly what I mean by "surprising".

Not quite, see below.

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However, not every
interceptor author will be making the same assumptions, and not every bit of software affected will be an interceptor.

I can see a couple of ways in which non-interceptor software could be affected:

- It's doing something like "call sigaction on every possible signal number in the 31-bit range and end up failing if the syscall succeeded" (e.g. with an OOB write). Perhaps software could be doing something like this in a loop to collect all currently registered signal handlers. That being said, this program:

#include <limits.h>
#include <signal.h>

int main() {
struct sigaction act;

  for (int i = 1; i != INT_MAX; ++i) {
    sigaction(i, 0, &act);

}
}

takes around 5 seconds to run on my relatively-fast machine, so I would expect any such code to be noticed as a performance issue and either be changed to be bounded on _NSIG or break on EINVAL.

This is probably the largest potential flaw that I can currently see in the "bit in the signal number" idea, since it could conceivably result in userspace code being broken without having first required it to have been changed to make use of the new feature. I'm not convinced that it would be an ABI break though, because the code seems unlikely to exist in this form in the wild because of the performance issue, and you could anyway make the argument that the code is incorrect because, in order to contain a loop like this, it would need to be able to handle large, previously-unknown signal numbers somehow. If we accept that the code is incorrect, a similar line of argument applies as for interceptors (i.e. likely to result in an OOB access which will fail loudly and be easily debugged and fixed).

- If we do something that involves introducing a new flag in sa_flags, the flag may be exposed to unaware software via the oldact argument to sigaction, and I suppose that it's conceivable that exposing a previously-unknown flag like this could somehow break something. But this seems like an unreasonable restriction because it would mean that we can never add a flag to sa_flags no matter what.

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So some judgement
needs to be applied.

Of course. We need to agree *how* to apply the judgement though.

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In this case, I think we exactly want the interceptor author to have thought "oh, it's just a number, I'll (possibly do a bounds check and then) use the number as an index into an array". This will lead to one of two outcomes: crashing (yes, yes, it won't always crash, but if the alternative is that it never crashes and we get silently incorrect behavior all of the time, I'll take sometimes crashing) or fail the bounds check and pretend to be an old kernel (the latter is anticipated by POSIX which requires returning -1/EINVAL for an invalid signal number). Each of these behaviors are desirable, as they are observable failures, which are more likely to result in fixes than silent ones.

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Agreed, except wanting the author to have thought something doesn't ensure that they actually did think that.

True, but if our goal is only to accommodate reasonably written interceptors, we don't actually need to ensure anything here.

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Having something random happen when setting a previously reserved flag bit, or when issuing a syscall when an unknown syscall number, or not surprising at all.

Introducing a new syscall is right out in this model. The interceptor author wouldn't have anticipated our introducing a new syscall, so the new syscall wouldn't be intercepted and calls to the new syscall would silently bypass the interceptor. For example, adding sigaction2 could result in signal handlers being set without the interceptor's knowledge.

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Agreed. My sentence was a bit mangled: I mean to say "Having something random happen when [...] issuing a syscall *with* an unknown syscall number *is* not surprising at all."

I agree that adding a new syscall is problematic if we want to avoid breaking existing interceptors in particular. Other types of code are much less likely to be affected by the addition of new syscalls.

Quoted 7 lines

Right, and this to me is a case in point for why I would say that "surprising" isn't the right frame of analysis here. My analysis seems to generally be that "anticipated interceptor behavior matches desired behavior" is positively correlated with "surprising" (i.e. the interceptor viewpoint is the dual of the user viewpoint), so if we care about interceptors we may end up making a "surprising" change even though it doesn't intuitively seem like the right thing to do.

You're right that interceptors are different from normal callers. I'm not sure I follow your argument, but an alternative way of looking at it might be to say that an interceptor is both an implementation of an interface and a caller of the same interface. Since API specs are rarely complete enough to cover the corner cases that arise from this, full portability is hard to achieve on top of an evolving kernel.

However, I think this interceptor thing is a bit of a red herring. I just intended that as an illustration of the kind of code that might fall foul. This doesn't mean that it's 100% certain that no other software can be affected.

The starting points for this discussion were: "is it reasonable for a caller to pass an unvalidated signal number to sigaction(), and rely on sigaction() to validate it?" and "is it reasonable to assume that a signal number accepted by sigaction() fits the POSIX specification of a valid signal number?"

I think yes; you aren't (or weren't) convinced.

The mere fact that it's hard to agree suggests to me that the specification is too weak to extend safely in this area. Unfortunately, it's rather weak for sa_flags too, although a non-full flags argument does at least suggest that future extensions might appear.

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Regarding a sa_flags bit, let's get inside the head of the interceptor author again. How would they handle a flag bit that they don't recognize when replacing the signal handler? It wouldn't be correct to just pass it through to the kernel, or drop the flag on the floor, as it might be semantically meaningful (and thus could change the calling convention as SA_SIGINFO does, or change the meaning of fields in siginfo, as SA_CODEX would do). A correctly written sigaction interceptor should probably abort the program upon encountering an unknown flag (thus giving a human a chance to update the interceptor), but chances are that they don't. Ignoring all but a few flags (and passing a fixed set of flags to the kernel) seems to be what libsigchain does, and in the case of SA_CODEX it would seem to result

Quoted 8 lines

in desirable behavior (but I suspect that it isn't handling the other flags correctly), but I could also see an interceptor author just passing it unchanged to the kernel without checking it (perhaps because they didn't think about these issues, and because that didn't matter until now, with the exception of from-the-beginning-of-time flags like SA_SIGINFO). And with SA_CODEX that could lead to silent misreading of si_code in the interceptor's signal handler, if it hasn't been updated to use the new macros.

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Agreed. I've tried to implement things rather like this in the past, and how to interpret the flags is a tricky issue. Some of the flags are impossible to emulate even when you know what they mean, in particular SA_NODEFER and SA_RESTART.

Making new flags safe to ignore and harmless to set of you don't know what they mean is the safest approach, but not always possible (I think I managed this with by suggestion below, though).

Again, this suggestion could lead to silent failures in an interceptor, if:
- the interceptor passes the sa_flags through to the kernel unchanged (or otherwise doesn't touch SA_CODEX)
- the interceptor replaces the user's sa_sigaction
- the interceptor's replacement sa_sigaction tests the provided si_code.

Quoted 3 lines

Maybe you're not concerned about that, though? At least to me it seems in the same ballpark of likelihood as the ways in which things could go wrong with the signal number bit.

I agree this is a concern, and perhaps a bit nastier in practice than side-effects of setting random bits in the signal number.

Personally I do tend to be paranoid about flags arguments and try to police them in any code that isn't a trivial pass-through, but this doesn't mean that all code out there does it. (Including the kernel's sigaction()!)

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Ideally, a flags field should be specified with rules that say exactly what to do with flags you don't recognise. Sadly this is usually not thought about until it's too late.

It perhaps isn't too late to introduce such rules for sigaction if we adopt the signal number bit and we make it mean "reject unknown flags".

If Eric likes the idea then fair enough, but as I've tried to argue this may still just be moving the problem around rather than solving it.

As a final random idea to add to the mix, we could add two or more flags in sa_flags, and require the kernel to transform them in a specific way, say:

#define SA_WANT_FLAGS 0x00c700000
#define SA_HAVE_FLAGS 0x009200000
#define SA_FLAGS_MASK 0x00ff00000

volatile sig_atomic_t have_flags = 0;

        sa.sa_flags |= SA_WANT_FLAGS;
        if (sigaction(n, &sa, NULL))
                if (!sigaction(n, NULL, &sa) &&
                                (sa.sa_flags & SA_FLAGS_MASK) == SA_HAVE_FLAGS)
                        have_flags = 1;

This is at least proof against "dumb readback".

Provided that the handler can cope with the have_flags == 0 case and just reads the flag once per call, I don't think we would need to worry about races.

Of course, an interceptor that doesn't understand this mechanism and munges or manufactures its own siginfo might still fail to properly initialise our new field before passing it on to a signal handler that is expecting it. But that's already broken: such an interceptor might also not understand new si_codes that the client code absolutely relies on. And new si_codes _do_ get added (that's another extensibility fail in the existing signal API).

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So... overall, maybe a bit in the signal number isn't a lot worse, and perhaps it _will_ lead to cleaner failures.

Really, I don't see a way to solve it properly without a new API.

I started on implementing my signal number bit idea, and in the process of doing so came up with another idea that may be better from the "don't abuse existing arguments" perspective. It involves a sigaction protocol similar to the one that you describe above, but it only requires one new bit (plus one bit per new flag) so it is less wasteful of sa_flags bits.

The idea is twofold:

1. Require the kernel to clear unknown flag bits in sa_flags when passing them back in oldact. I suppose that this is technically a behavior change for sigaction, but critically, this change in behavior only applies to unallocated flags, which we are free to change the meaning of. We can simply define each existing unallocated flag bit to mean "clear this bit in oldact (unless the bit becomes supported in the future)". There was already code doing something similar in a limited fashion on x86, which we can remove by using this approach.

2. Define a flag bit SA_UNSUPPORTED which will never be supported by the kernel. Now userspace can use the fact that the bit has been cleared to mean that it can trust that other unsupported bits have also been cleared.

Now we may have code like this:

#define SA_UNSUPPORTED 0x400
#define SA_XFLAGS 0x800

volatile sig_atomic_t have_xflags = 0;

         sa.sa_flags |= SA_UNSUPPORTED | SA_XFLAGS;
         if (sigaction(n, &sa, NULL))
                 if (!sigaction(n, NULL, &sa) &&
                                 !(sa.sa_flags & SA_UNSUPPORTED) &&
(sa.sa_flags & SA_XFLAGS))
                         have_xflags = 1;
Quoted 7 lines

In the meantime, can I suggest:

(1) Come up with an extensible way of encoding supplementary information in siginfo. If the consensus is that zeroing unused fields is sufficient and that the kernel and compiler will reliably do it, then great. Otherwise, we might need explicit flags fields or something.

I thought about this for a while and concluded that we probably want a flags field anyway. si_addr_ignored_bits is something of a special case in the sense that we can define the zero value to mean "unknown" by taking advantage of the mask field (which I suppose is something of a flags field), but we can't necessarily say that the same is true for any fields that we may add in the future. For example, if we wanted to communicate whether the failing access is a read or a write, we would need a tristate: read, write and "unknown" (and arrange for old kernels' behavior to be interpreted as "unknown"). If we rely on zeroing then we may implement this by adding a field like:

char si_access_type; // 0 = unknown, 1 = read, 2 = write

But that's really just a (slightly wasteful, because we use the entire byte) flags field, so we may as well define an actual flags field to begin with and let people add their flags there.

Unfortunately we can't name it sa_flags because ia64 got there first. We may consider making the ia64 field generic though (ia64 only uses one bit of their field, so we would have 31 free bits). In the meantime, I added a separate field, sa_xflags.

Quoted 9 lines

(2) Hack up any simple mechanism (such as your signal number flag) for requesting/detecting the extra information.

Along with an illustration of a application of the mechanism (i.e., reporting address tag bits), this should at least provide a basis for further review.

We can then try to swap in a different mechanism for (2) if people have still have concerns (or it not, keep it).

Sounds good. Apologies for not replying sooner, I was hoping that Eric would chime in so that I would get a sense of which approach he would prefer (so that I wouldn't spend as much time implementing in an undesired direction), then this fell off my radar. I decided to go with the SA_UNSUPPORTED approach that I mentioned above for now, and I'll send a v9 with that implemented shortly. Most of the change is about letting the architecture-independent code know which bits are supported, so it should be easy to replace the detection mechanism with another idea like the signal number bit.

Peter

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#55 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

Quoted 1 line · Peter Collingbourne

On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 10:36 AM Dave Martin <[email protected]> wrote:

[...]

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As a final random idea to add to the mix, we could add two or more flags in sa_flags, and require the kernel to transform them in a specific way, say:

#define SA_WANT_FLAGS 0x00c700000
#define SA_HAVE_FLAGS 0x009200000
#define SA_FLAGS_MASK 0x00ff00000

volatile sig_atomic_t have_flags = 0;

        sa.sa_flags |= SA_WANT_FLAGS;
        if (sigaction(n, &sa, NULL))
                if (!sigaction(n, NULL, &sa) &&
                                (sa.sa_flags & SA_FLAGS_MASK) == SA_HAVE_FLAGS)
                        have_flags = 1;

This is at least proof against "dumb readback".

Provided that the handler can cope with the have_flags == 0 case and just reads the flag once per call, I don't think we would need to worry about races.

Of course, an interceptor that doesn't understand this mechanism and munges or manufactures its own siginfo might still fail to properly initialise our new field before passing it on to a signal handler that is expecting it. But that's already broken: such an interceptor might also not understand new si_codes that the client code absolutely relies on. And new si_codes _do_ get added (that's another extensibility fail in the existing signal API).

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So... overall, maybe a bit in the signal number isn't a lot worse, and perhaps it _will_ lead to cleaner failures.

Really, I don't see a way to solve it properly without a new API.

I started on implementing my signal number bit idea, and in the process of doing so came up with another idea that may be better from the "don't abuse existing arguments" perspective. It involves a sigaction protocol similar to the one that you describe above, but it only requires one new bit (plus one bit per new flag) so it is less wasteful of sa_flags bits.

The idea is twofold:

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1. Require the kernel to clear unknown flag bits in sa_flags when passing them back in oldact. I suppose that this is technically a behavior change for sigaction, but critically, this change in behavior only applies to unallocated flags, which we are free to change the meaning of. We can simply define each existing unallocated flag bit to mean "clear this bit in oldact (unless the bit becomes supported in the future)". There was already code doing something similar in a limited fashion on x86, which we can remove by using this approach.

Sounds reasonable. It's quite hard to imagine how software could accidentally rely on unallocated sa_flags bits reading back out unmodified through sigaction(). Software that deliberately relies on this for some bit that is never allocated would be obviously non POSIX compliant.

Quoted 10 lines

2. Define a flag bit SA_UNSUPPORTED which will never be supported by the kernel. Now userspace can use the fact that the bit has been cleared to mean that it can trust that other unsupported bits have also been cleared.

Now we may have code like this:

#define SA_UNSUPPORTED 0x400
#define SA_XFLAGS 0x800

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volatile sig_atomic_t have_xflags = 0;

         sa.sa_flags |= SA_UNSUPPORTED | SA_XFLAGS;
         if (sigaction(n, &sa, NULL))
                 if (!sigaction(n, NULL, &sa) &&
                                 !(sa.sa_flags & SA_UNSUPPORTED) &&
(sa.sa_flags & SA_XFLAGS))
                         have_xflags = 1;

OK, so I think the novelty here is that we detect support by requiring the kernel to clear one bit while preserving another. That does indeed seem more robust: an old kernel (unless bizarrely buggy) would either clear all unsupported bits or preserve them all. Other OSes that extend their sigaction() in line with POSIX would also be highly unlikely to exhibit this behaviour by accident IMHO, making it easier for this to coexist with other people's extensions.

Interceptors still may not transparently work with this approach, but I think that's a reasonable price to pay.

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In the meantime, can I suggest:

(1) Come up with an extensible way of encoding supplementary information in siginfo. If the consensus is that zeroing unused fields is sufficient and that the kernel and compiler will reliably do it, then great. Otherwise, we might need explicit flags fields or something.

I thought about this for a while and concluded that we probably want a flags field anyway. si_addr_ignored_bits is something of a special case in the sense that we can define the zero value to mean "unknown" by taking advantage of the mask field (which I suppose is something of a flags field), but we can't necessarily say that the same is true for any fields that we may add in the future. For example, if we wanted to communicate whether the failing access is a read or a write, we would need a tristate: read, write and "unknown" (and arrange for old kernels' behavior to be interpreted as "unknown"). If we rely on zeroing then we may implement this by adding a field like:

char si_access_type; // 0 = unknown, 1 = read, 2 = write

Quoted 8 lines

But that's really just a (slightly wasteful, because we use the entire byte) flags field, so we may as well define an actual flags field to begin with and let people add their flags there.

Unfortunately we can't name it sa_flags because ia64 got there first. We may consider making the ia64 field generic though (ia64 only uses one bit of their field, so we would have 31 free bits). In the meantime, I added a separate field, sa_xflags.

Seems fair enough to me. We still have the option to use zeroing for detection of fields where it works.

Would SA_XFLAGS imply zeroing of unallocated siginfo fields? This may just be a matter of documentation, if the kernel already does the zeroing today.

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(2) Hack up any simple mechanism (such as your signal number flag) for requesting/detecting the extra information.

Along with an illustration of a application of the mechanism (i.e., reporting address tag bits), this should at least provide a basis for further review.

We can then try to swap in a different mechanism for (2) if people have still have concerns (or it not, keep it).

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Sounds good. Apologies for not replying sooner, I was hoping that Eric would chime in so that I would get a sense of which approach he would prefer (so that I wouldn't spend as much time implementing in an undesired direction), then this fell off my radar. I decided to go with the SA_UNSUPPORTED approach that I mentioned above for now, and I'll send a v9 with that implemented shortly. Most of the change is about letting the architecture-independent code know which bits are supported, so it should be easy to replace the detection mechanism with another idea like the signal number bit.

No worries, I think various people have had distractions (I certainly have ... but I digress).

I'll take a look at your v9.

Cheers
---Dave

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#56 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in siginfo

In reply to a message not in the archive
Quoted 5 lines · Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

[...]

Minor nit: Can you stop making each version of this series in-reply-to the previous series please? Most people don't do that, and it's giving me weird threading in my mailbox...

Cheers
---Dave

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#57 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v6] arm64: Expose FAR_EL1 tag bits in sigcontext

In reply to Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 183 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 165 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 82 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 74 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 50 lines · Dave Martin
Quoted 48 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 46 lines · Peter Collingbourne
Quoted 32 lines · Dave Martin

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c static int setup_sigframe(struct · line 653

Quoted 11 lines · Peter Collingbourne
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +1 -0
index baa88dc02e5c..5867f2fdbe64 100644
@@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct
 rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
                __put_user_error(ESR_MAGIC, &esr_ctx->head.magic, err);
                __put_user_error(sizeof(*esr_ctx), &esr_ctx->head.size, err);
                __put_user_error(current->thread.fault_code,
 &esr_ctx->esr, err);
+               current->thread.fault_code = 0;

Perhaps, but we'd need to be careful. For example, can we run out of user stack before this and deliver a SIGSEGV, but with the old fault_code still set? Then we'd emit the old fault code with the new "can't deliver signal" signal, which doesn't make sense.

Stuff may also go wrong with signal prioritisation.

If a higher-priority signal (say SIGINT) comes in after a data abort enters the kernel but before the resulting SIGSEGV is dequeued for delivery, wouldn't we deliver SIGINT first, with the bogus fault code? With your change we'd then have cleared the fault code by the time we deliver the SIGSEGV it actually relates to, if I've understood right.

Today, I think we just attach that fault code to every signal that's delivered until something overwrites or resets it, which means that a signal that needs fault_code gets it, at the expense of attaching it to a bunch of other random signals too.

Quoted 4 lines

Checking the signal number and si_code might help us to know what we should be doing with fault_code. We need to have sure userspace can't trick us with a non kernel generated signal here. It would also be necessary to check how PTRACE_SETSIGINFO interacts with this.

With these possible interactions in mind I think we should store the fault code and fault address in kernel_siginfo instead of thread_struct (and clear these fields when we receive a siginfo from userspace, i.e. in copy_siginfo_from_user which is used by ptrace(PTRACE_SETSIGINFO) among other places). That way, the information is clearly associated with the signal itself and not the thread, so we don't need to worry about our signal being delivered out of order.

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Hmm, I can't see a way to do that that isn't horribly invasive in the core signal code. Can you?

I think I've come up with a way that doesn't seem to be too invasive. See patch #1 of the series that I'm about to send out.

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But generally, I agree: the per-thread handling of fault_address and fault_code appears to be quite broken in the face of signal prioritisation and signals that don't correspond directly to hardware trap. It would be nice to have some tests for this...

If we want to pile on more bodges, perhaps we could stash the signal number to which the fault_{address,code} relate, and then check that at delivery and clear on a match. I hate it.

Quoted 7 lines

I agree with Daniel's suggestion in principle, but I was also concerned about whether it would be too invasive elsewhere.

Question though: does the core code take special care to make sure that a force_sig cannot be outprioritised by a regular signal? If so, perhaps we get away with it. I ask this, because the same same issue may be hitting other arches otherwise.

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Not as far as I can tell. There does appear to be prioritisation for synchronous signals [1] but as far as I can tell nothing to distinguish one of these signals from one with the same signal number sent from userspace (e.g. via kill(2)).

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The si_code will differ between signals generated between userspace and signals generated by the kernel.

We do allow a little bit of ptrace and sending to yourself to spoof kernel generated signals, for reasons of debugging and process migration where an existing process needs to be reconstructed. But the defenses should be strong enough you can assume that we reliably distinguish between a signal from userspace and a signal from the kernel.

So check for SIGBUS || SIGSEGV and one of the below si_codes, and only add the context in that case? Seems fragile to me, but I suppose I could live with it.

Quoted 3 lines

I don't fully follow what you are doing but this feels like the kind of case where a new si_code has been defined as well as additional fields in siginfo.

There is no new si_code for this, the information will be exposed for several existing si_code types (BUS_ADRERR, BUS_ADRALN, BUS_MCEERR_AR, SEGV_ACCERR, SEGV_MAPERR), and possibly others in the future (particularly SEGV_MTESERR, which is part of the proposed MTE patch set). Note that we already have a union field for BUS_MCEERR_AR, and we may want to expose it for the other si_codes that already have union fields as well.

That being said, taking a closer look at siginfo, I think we are in luck and we might be able to make this work in a reasonable way by reusing padding (see below).

Quoted 4 lines

In your patchset I really hate that you were going back to force_sig_info, and filling out struct siginfo by hand. That is an error prone pattern, and I have fixed enough bugs in the kernel to prove that.

To be fair, most of the callers are in helper functions that take explicit parameters similar to force_sig_fault et al, and the SIGILL one could easily be made that way as well.

Quoted 6 lines

I take exception to the idea that including the full address might break userspace. That means typically means someone has been too lazy to look and see what userspace is doing. When that userspace that might break is the same userspace you are changing the kernel to serve that makes me nervous. AKA the userspace that cares about this signal and how it is represented in siginfo.

It's not a matter of being lazy. This behaviour isn't just an accident but has been explicitly documented for years (see the tagged-pointers.rst file that I changed: "Non-zero tags are not preserved when delivering signals."), so users can reasonably rely on it. Furthermore we simply don't have visibility into the majority of userspace. For example, there are a lot of closed source Android apps out there, and who knows what signal handlers they're installing and how they're making use of the si_addr field on e.g. SEGV_MAPERR. We can't just change the documented semantics under their feet.

It's also not the same userspace either. The userspace that's initially going to be consuming the new fields is in a part of the Android system that handles and reports crashes, and that's something that we control unlike all the apps.

Finally, the userspace may need to know whether the tag bits were actually zero or whether they were just unavailable, otherwise userspace could for example produce a misleading crash report. Simply having the kernel set the top bits of si_addr wouldn't accomplish that due to the kernel's previous behaviour, hence the mask to let userspace know which bits are accurate.

Quoted 3 lines

A fix of one instance of SIGILL should not be included with a patch that does something else, and really should come before everything else if possible.

Fair point. I can see if I can split that part out.

Quoted 8 lines

If this information really belongs in struct siginfo (as it sounds like) please actually put the information in siginfo, and let userspace look in siginfo to find it. struct siginfo is a union with plenty of space, and plenty of si_codes.

If this applies to multiple cases then it might be trickier but please dig into the details, don't toss things into sigcontext just because you can't figure out a clean design for reporting this.

Quoted 11 lines

If we wanted this in siginfo, one idea that I had was to revert commit b68a68d3dcc15ebbf23cbe91af1abf57591bd96b and add unsigned char fields _addr_top_byte and _addr_top_byte_mask in the padding between _addr_lsb and the union (with comments on all the fields of course to say when they are filled in). I think that would work since we are already clearing padding in siginfo, one nice property of the new fields is that the zero values are correct in the case where the information isn't being exposed (so old kernels would already have the correct behaviour). That would only work on certain architectures (i.e. at least alignof(void*) >= 4) so I suppose it could have an #ifdef __aarch64__ around it.

Perhaps add a 4th padding member to the union inside of _sigfault, that adds something like 4 unsigned long's worth of data, and then have your fields after the union.

Quoted 7 lines

Is it quite a bit of work to gather that information from the instructions that faulted? I am just checking that this work is really makes sense.

What I really don't understand is how well this problem generalizes to other architectures to tell if this is something other people need to solve at some point as well.

The broad issue here is how arch-specific fault diagnostics make it into the signal frame, and whether this is needed at all.

The address tag bits are one case, but the same basic mechanism is also used to report the type of failed access (read versus write) for SIGSEGV on arm64. (IIRC qemu relies on this for tracking page use / dirtiness in userspace.)

Having a way to associate arch metadata of this sort with the specific signal it relates to seems a good idea. That way, we're not relying on internal details of the signal common code such as the precise order signals get delivered in.

This concept is certainly applicable to other arches, but I don't know the extent to which they actually depend on it.

Ideally, there would be a si_flags field to add simple arch_specific attributes in, but there seems no backwards compatible way to add such a thing for existing signals. (Or is there?)

Cheers
---Dave

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maintainer
#58 lore raw
In reply to Will Deacon
Quoted 21 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 12 lines · Peter Collingbourne

The kernel currently clears the tag bits (i.e. bits 56-63) in the fault address exposed via siginfo.si_addr and sigcontext.fault_address. However, the tag bits may be needed by tools in order to accurately diagnose memory errors, such as HWASan [1] or future tools based on the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE).

We should not stop clearing these bits in the existing fault address fields, because there may be existing userspace applications that are expecting the tag bits to be cleared. Instead, create a far_context in sigcontext (similar to the existing esr_context), and store the original value of FAR_EL1 (including the tag bits) there.

Quoted 7 lines

[1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

---
v3:
- add documentation to tagged-pointers.rst
- update comments in sigcontext.h

Quoted 3 lines

Hmm, although the code looks fine, why don't we just expose the tag in the new field, rather than duplicate the address information? I'm nervous about exposing privileged registers directly to userspace.

That's for consistency with ESR_EL1 which we expose in a similar way, though with bits of it not relevant to user masked out. For FAR_EL1, all the bits are relevant, even if some of them are duplicated in the si_addr field.

Quoted 3 lines

Also, Catalin, could you elaborate on the MTE use-case please? The architecture says that FAR_EL1[63:60] are UNKNOWN on a synchronous tag check fault, so we'd have to *avoid* exposing them in that case!

With MTE, FAR_EL1[63:60] will be cleared on sync tag check faults (not currently done as I don't have this patch in my MTE series).

Signature · 6 lines
Catalin

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