arm64: Branch Target Identification support
Subsystems (8)
v8 cover arm64: Branch Target Identification support
This patch series implements support for ARMv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI), which is a control flow integrity protection feature introduced as part of the ARMv8.5-A extensions.
Changes:
v8:
- Remove a redundant IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_BTI) check.
v7:
- Rebase onto v5.6-rc3.
- Move comment about keeping NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0 internal into first patch.
- Add an explicit check for system_supports_bti() when parsing BTI ELF property for improved robustness.
v6:
- Rebase onto v5.6-rc1.
- Fix typos s/BYTPE/BTYPE/ in commit log for "arm64: BTI: Decode BYTPE bits when printing PSTATE".
v5:
- Changed a bunch of -EIO to -ENOEXEC in the ELF parsing code.
- Move PSR_BTYPE defines to UAPI.
- Use compat_user_mode() rather than open coding.
- Fix a typo s/BYTPE/BTYPE/ in syscall.c
v4:
- Dropped patch fixing existing documentation as it has already been merged.
- Convert WARN_ON() to WARN_ON_ONCE() in "ELF: Add ELF program property parsing support".
- Added display of guarded pages to ptdump.
- Updated for conversion of exception handling from assembler to C.
Notes:
* GCC 9 can compile backwards-compatible BTI-enabled code with -mbranch-protection=bti or -mbranch-protection=standard.
* Binutils trunk supports the new ELF note, but this wasn't in a release the last time I posted this series. (The situation _might_ have changed in the meantime...)
Creation of a BTI-enabled binary requires _everything_ linked in to be BTI-enabled. For now ld --force-bti can be used to override this, but some things may break until the required C library support is in place.
There is no straightforward way to mark a .s file as BTI-enabled:
scraping the output from gcc -S works as a quick hack for now.
readelf -n can be used to examing the program properties in an ELF file.
* Runtime mmap() and mprotect() can be used to enable BTI on a page-by-page basis using the new PROT_BTI, but the code in the affected pages still needs to be written or compiled to contain the appopriate BTI landing pads.
Dave Martin (10):
ELF: UAPI and Kconfig additions for ELF program properties
ELF: Add ELF program property parsing support
arm64: Basic Branch Target Identification support
elf: Allow arch to tweak initial mmap prot flags
arm64: elf: Enable BTI at exec based on ELF program properties
arm64: BTI: Decode BYTPE bits when printing PSTATE
arm64: unify native/compat instruction skipping
arm64: traps: Shuffle code to eliminate forward declarations
arm64: BTI: Reset BTYPE when skipping emulated instructions
KVM: arm64: BTI: Reset BTYPE when skipping emulated instructions
Mark Brown (1):
arm64: mm: Display guarded pages in ptdump
Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.rst | 2 + Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst | 5 + arch/arm64/Kconfig | 25 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 3 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 6 + arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h | 50 ++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 6 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h | 37 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 4 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 9 ++ arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 9 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 33 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c | 11 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 36 ++++- arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 16 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c | 18 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 127 +++++++-------- arch/arm64/mm/dump.c | 5 + fs/Kconfig.binfmt | 6 + fs/binfmt_elf.c | 145 +++++++++++++++++- fs/compat_binfmt_elf.c | 4 + include/linux/elf.h | 43 ++++++ include/linux/mm.h | 3 + include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 11 ++ 33 files changed, 551 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v8 1/11 ELF: UAPI and Kconfig additions for ELF program properties
From: Dave Martin <[email protected]>
Pull the basic ELF definitions relating to the NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0 note from Yu-Cheng Yu's earlier x86 shstk series.
--- fs/Kconfig.binfmt | 3 +++ include/linux/elf.h | 12 ++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
fs/Kconfig.binfmt +3 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ config COMPAT_BINFMT_ELF config ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE bool +config ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY + bool + config BINFMT_ELF_FDPIC bool "Kernel support for FDPIC ELF binaries" default y if !BINFMT_ELF
include/linux/elf.h +12 -0
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@#ifndef _LINUX_ELF_H#define _LINUX_ELF_H +#include <linux/types.h> #include <asm/elf.h> #include <uapi/linux/elf.h>
@@ -56,4 +57,15 @@ static inline int elf_coredump_extra_notes_write(struct coredump_params *cprm) {extern int elf_coredump_extra_notes_size (void );extern int elf_coredump_extra_notes_write (struct coredump_params *cprm);#endif + +/* +* NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0 header: +* Keep this internal until/unless there is an agreed UAPI definition. +* pr_type values (GNU_PROPERTY_*) are public and defined in the UAPI header. +*/ +struct gnu_property { +u32 pr_type; +u32 pr_datasz; +}; +#endif /* _LINUX_ELF_H */
include/uapi/linux/elf.h +1 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ typedef __s64 Elf64_Sxword;#define PT_LOPROC 0x70000000#define PT_HIPROC 0x7fffffff#define PT_GNU_EH_FRAME 0x6474e550 +#define PT_GNU_PROPERTY 0x6474e553#define PT_GNU_STACK (PT_LOOS + 0x474e551)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v8 2/11 ELF: Add ELF program property parsing support
In reply to Mark BrownFrom: Dave Martin <[email protected]>
ELF program properties will be needed for detecting whether to enable optional architecture or ABI features for a new ELF process.
For now, there are no generic properties that we care about, so do nothing unless CONFIG_ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY=y.
Otherwise, the presence of properties using the PT_PROGRAM_PROPERTY phdrs entry (if any), and notify each property to the arch code.
For now, the added code is not used.
--- fs/binfmt_elf.c | 127 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/compat_binfmt_elf.c | 4 ++ include/linux/elf.h | 19 ++++++ include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 4 ++ 4 files changed, 154 insertions(+)
fs/binfmt_elf.c +127 -0
@@ -39,12 +39,18 @@#include <linux/sched/coredump.h> #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h> #include <linux/sched/cputime.h> +#include <linux/sizes.h> +#include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/cred.h> #include <linux/dax.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/param.h> #include <asm/page.h> +#ifndef ELF_COMPAT +#define ELF_COMPAT 0 +#endif +#ifndef user_long_t#define user_long_t long#endif
@@ -681,6 +687,111 @@ static unsigned long load_elf_interp(struct elfhdr *interp_elf_ex,* libraries. There is no binary dependent code anywhere else. */ +static int parse_elf_property (const char *data,size_t *off,size_t datasz, +struct arch_elf_state *arch, +bool have_prev_type,u32 *prev_type) +{ +size_t o, step; +const struct gnu_property *pr; +int ret; + +if (*off == datasz) +return -ENOENT ; + +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (*off > datasz || *off %ELF_GNU_PROPERTY_ALIGN )) +return -EIO ; + o = *off; + datasz -= *off; + +if (datasz <sizeof (*pr)) +return -ENOEXEC ; + pr = (const struct gnu_property *)(data + o); + o +=sizeof (*pr); + datasz -=sizeof (*pr); + +if (pr->pr_datasz > datasz) +return -ENOEXEC ; + +WARN_ON_ONCE (o %ELF_GNU_PROPERTY_ALIGN ); + step =round_up (pr->pr_datasz,ELF_GNU_PROPERTY_ALIGN ); +if (step > datasz) +return -ENOEXEC ; + +/* Properties are supposed to be unique and sorted on pr_type: */ +if (have_prev_type && pr->pr_type <= *prev_type) +return -ENOEXEC ; + *prev_type = pr->pr_type; + + ret =arch_parse_elf_property (pr->pr_type, data + o, + pr->pr_datasz,ELF_COMPAT , arch); +if (ret) +return ret; + + *off = o + step; +return 0 ; +} + +#define NOTE_DATA_SZ SZ_1K +#define GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0_NAME "GNU" +#define NOTE_NAME_SZ (sizeof(GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0_NAME)) + +static int parse_elf_properties (struct file *f,const struct elf_phdr *phdr, +struct arch_elf_state *arch) +{ +union { +struct elf_note nhdr; +char data[NOTE_DATA_SZ ]; + } note; +loff_t pos; +ssize_t n; +size_t off, datasz; +int ret; +bool have_prev_type; +u32 prev_type; + +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY ) || !phdr) +return 0 ; + +/* load_elf_binary() shouldn't call us unless this is true... */ +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (phdr->p_type !=PT_GNU_PROPERTY )) +return -ENOEXEC ; + +/* If the properties are crazy large, that's too bad (for now): */ +if (phdr->p_filesz >sizeof (note)) +return -ENOEXEC ; + + pos = phdr->p_offset; + n =kernel_read (f, ¬e, phdr->p_filesz, &pos); + +BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (note) <sizeof (note.nhdr) +NOTE_NAME_SZ ); +if (n <0 || n <sizeof (note.nhdr) +NOTE_NAME_SZ ) +return -EIO ; + +if (note.nhdr.n_type !=NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0 || + note.nhdr.n_namesz !=NOTE_NAME_SZ || +strncmp (note.data +sizeof (note.nhdr), +GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0_NAME , n -sizeof (note.nhdr))) +return -ENOEXEC ; + + off =round_up (sizeof (note.nhdr) +NOTE_NAME_SZ , +ELF_GNU_PROPERTY_ALIGN ); +if (off > n) +return -ENOEXEC ; + +if (note.nhdr.n_descsz > n - off) +return -ENOEXEC ; + datasz = off + note.nhdr.n_descsz; + + have_prev_type = false; +do { + ret =parse_elf_property (note.data, &off, datasz, arch, + have_prev_type, &prev_type); + have_prev_type = true; + }while (!ret); + +return ret == -ENOENT ?0 : ret; +} +static int load_elf_binary (struct linux_binprm *bprm) {struct file *interpreter =NULL ;/* to shut gcc up */
@@ -688,6 +799,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)int load_addr_set =0 ;unsigned long error;struct elf_phdr *elf_ppnt, *elf_phdata, *interp_elf_phdata =NULL ; +struct elf_phdr *elf_property_phdata =NULL ;unsigned long elf_bss, elf_brk;int bss_prot =0 ;int retval, i;
@@ -733,6 +845,11 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)for (i =0 ; i < elf_ex->e_phnum; i++, elf_ppnt++) {char *elf_interpreter; +if (elf_ppnt->p_type ==PT_GNU_PROPERTY ) { + elf_property_phdata = elf_ppnt; +continue ; + } +if (elf_ppnt->p_type !=PT_INTERP )continue ;
@@ -820,9 +937,14 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) goto out_free_dentry;/* Pass PT_LOPROC..PT_HIPROC headers to arch code */ + elf_property_phdata =NULL ; elf_ppnt = interp_elf_phdata;for (i =0 ; i < loc->interp_elf_ex.e_phnum; i++, elf_ppnt++)switch (elf_ppnt->p_type) { +case PT_GNU_PROPERTY : + elf_property_phdata = elf_ppnt; +break ; + case PT_LOPROC ... PT_HIPROC: retval = arch_elf_pt_proc(&loc->interp_elf_ex, elf_ppnt, interpreter,
@@ -833,6 +955,11 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } } + retval =parse_elf_properties (interpreter ?: bprm->file, + elf_property_phdata, &arch_state); +if (retval) + goto out_free_dentry; +/* * Allow arch code to reject the ELF at this point, whilst it's * still possible to return an error to the code that invoked
fs/compat_binfmt_elf.c +4 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@#include <linux/elfcore-compat.h> #include <linux/time.h> +#define ELF_COMPAT 1 +/* * Rename the basic ELF layout types to refer to the 32-bit class of files. */
@@ -28,11 +30,13 @@#undef elf_shdr#undef elf_note#undef elf_addr_t +#undef ELF_GNU_PROPERTY_ALIGN#define elfhdr elf32_hdr#define elf_phdr elf32_phdr#define elf_shdr elf32_shdr#define elf_note elf32_note#define elf_addr_t Elf32_Addr +#define ELF_GNU_PROPERTY_ALIGN ELF32_GNU_PROPERTY_ALIGN/* * Some data types as stored in coredump.
include/linux/elf.h +19 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ SET_PERSONALITY(ex)#endif +#define ELF32_GNU_PROPERTY_ALIGN 4 +#define ELF64_GNU_PROPERTY_ALIGN 8 +#if ELF_CLASS ==ELFCLASS32 extern Elf32_Dyn _DYNAMIC [];
@@ -32,6 +35,7 @@ extern Elf32_Dyn _DYNAMIC [];#define elf_addr_t Elf32_Off#define Elf_Half Elf32_Half#define Elf_Word Elf32_Word +#define ELF_GNU_PROPERTY_ALIGN ELF32_GNU_PROPERTY_ALIGN#else
@@ -43,6 +47,7 @@ extern Elf64_Dyn _DYNAMIC [];#define elf_addr_t Elf64_Off#define Elf_Half Elf64_Half#define Elf_Word Elf64_Word +#define ELF_GNU_PROPERTY_ALIGN ELF64_GNU_PROPERTY_ALIGN#endif
@@ -68,4 +73,18 @@ struct gnu_property { u32 pr_datasz; }; +struct arch_elf_state ; + +#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY +static inline int arch_parse_elf_property (u32 type,const void *data, +size_t datasz,bool compat, +struct arch_elf_state *arch) +{ +return 0 ; +} +#else +extern int arch_parse_elf_property (u32 type,const void *data,size_t datasz, +bool compat,struct arch_elf_state *arch); +#endif +#endif /* _LINUX_ELF_H */
include/uapi/linux/elf.h +4 -0
@@ -368,6 +368,7 @@ typedef struct elf64_shdr {* Notes used in ET_CORE. Architectures export some of the arch register sets * using the corresponding note types via the PTRACE_GETREGSET and * PTRACE_SETREGSET requests. +* The note name for all these is "LINUX". */ #define NT_PRSTATUS 1#define NT_PRFPREG 2
@@ -430,6 +431,9 @@ typedef struct elf64_shdr {#define NT_MIPS_FP_MODE 0x801/* MIPS floating-point mode */ #define NT_MIPS_MSA 0x802/* MIPS SIMD registers */ +/* Note types with note name "GNU" */ +#define NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0 5 +/* Note header in a PT_NOTE section */ typedef struct elf32_note { Elf32_Word n_namesz; /* Name size */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v8 3/11 arm64: Basic Branch Target Identification support
In reply to Mark BrownFrom: Dave Martin <[email protected]>
This patch adds the bare minimum required to expose the ARMv8.5 Branch Target Identification feature to userspace.
By itself, this does _not_ automatically enable BTI for any initial executable pages mapped by execve(). This will come later, but for now it should be possible to enable BTI manually on those pages by using mprotect() from within the target process.
Other arches already using the generic mman.h are already using 0x10 for arch-specific prot flags, so we use that for PROT_BTI here.
For consistency, signal handler entry points in BTI guarded pages are required to be annotated as such, just like any other function. This blocks a relatively minor attack vector, but comforming userspace will have the annotations anyway, so we may as well enforce them.
--- Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.rst | 2 + Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst | 5 +++ arch/arm64/Kconfig | 22 +++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 3 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 6 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h | 37 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 4 ++ arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 9 +++++ arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 9 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c | 11 ++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 16 ++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c | 18 +++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 8 ++++ include/linux/mm.h | 3 ++ 24 files changed, 194 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.rst +2 -0
@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ infrastructure: +------------------------------+---------+---------+ | SSBS | [7-4] | y | +------------------------------+---------+---------+ + | BT | [3-0] | y | + +------------------------------+---------+---------+ 4) MIDR_EL1 - Main ID Register
Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.rst +5 -0
@@ -236,6 +236,11 @@ HWCAP2_RNG Functionality implied by ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1.RNDR == 0b0001. +HWCAP2_BTI + + Functionality implied by ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.BT == 0b0001. + + 4. Unused AT_HWCAP bits -----------------------
arch/arm64/Kconfig +22 -0
@@ -1519,6 +1519,28 @@ endmenu menu "ARMv8.5 architectural features" +config ARM64_BTI + bool "Branch Target Identification support" + default y + help + Branch Target Identification (part of the ARMv8.5 Extensions) + provides a mechanism to limit the set of locations to which computed + branch instructions such as BR or BLR can jump. + + To make use of BTI on CPUs that support it, say Y. + + BTI is intended to provide complementary protection to other control + flow integrity protection mechanisms, such as the Pointer + authentication mechanism provided as part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions. + For this reason, it does not make sense to enable this option without + also enabling support for pointer authentication. Thus, when + enabling this option you should also select ARM64_PTR_AUTH=y. + + Userspace binaries must also be specifically compiled to make use of + this mechanism. If you say N here or the hardware does not support + BTI, such binaries can still run, but you get no additional + enforcement of branch destinations. + config ARM64_E0PD bool "Enable support for E0PD" default y
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h +2 -1
@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@#define ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT_NVHE 48#define ARM64_HAS_E0PD 49#define ARM64_HAS_RNG 50 +#define ARM64_BTI 51 -#define ARM64_NCAPS 51 +#define ARM64_NCAPS 52#endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +6 -0
@@ -613,6 +613,12 @@ static inline bool system_has_prio_mask_debugging(void)system_uses_irq_prio_masking (); } +static inline bool system_supports_bti (void ) +{ +return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_BTI ) && +cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_BTI ); +} +static inline bool system_capabilities_finalized (void ) {return static_branch_likely (&arm64_const_caps_ready);
arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h +1 -1
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@#define ESR_ELx_EC_PAC (0x09)/* EL2 and above */ /* Unallocated EC: 0x0A - 0x0B */ #define ESR_ELx_EC_CP14_64 (0x0C) -/* Unallocated EC: 0x0d */ +#define ESR_ELx_EC_BTI (0x0D)#define ESR_ELx_EC_ILL (0x0E)/* Unallocated EC: 0x0F - 0x10 */ #define ESR_ELx_EC_SVC32 (0x11)
arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h +1 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ static inline u32 disr_to_esr(u64 disr) asmlinkage void enter_from_user_mode(void);void do_mem_abort (unsigned long addr,unsigned int esr,struct pt_regs *regs);void do_undefinstr (struct pt_regs *regs); +void do_bti (struct pt_regs *regs); asmlinkage void bad_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr);void do_debug_exception (unsigned long addr_if_watchpoint,unsigned int esr,struct pt_regs *regs);
arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h +1 -0
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@#define KERNEL_HWCAP_BF16 __khwcap2_feature(BF16)#define KERNEL_HWCAP_DGH __khwcap2_feature(DGH)#define KERNEL_HWCAP_RNG __khwcap2_feature(RNG) +#define KERNEL_HWCAP_BTI __khwcap2_feature(BTI)/* * This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h new file +37 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_MMAN_H__ +#define __ASM_MMAN_H__ + +#include <linux/compiler.h> +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <uapi/asm/mman.h> + +static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (unsigned long prot, +unsigned long pkey__always_unused ) +{ +if (system_supports_bti () && (prot &PROT_BTI )) +return VM_ARM64_BTI ; + +return 0 ; +} +#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) + +static inline pgprot_t arch_vm_get_page_prot (unsigned long vm_flags) +{ +return (vm_flags &VM_ARM64_BTI ) ?__pgprot (PTE_GP ) :__pgprot (0 ); +} +#define arch_vm_get_page_prot (vm_flags) arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags) + +static inline bool arch_validate_prot (unsigned long prot, +unsigned long addr__always_unused ) +{ +unsigned long supported =PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE |PROT_EXEC |PROT_SEM ; + +if (system_supports_bti ()) + supported |=PROT_BTI ; + +return (prot & ~supported) ==0 ; +} +#define arch_validate_prot (prot, addr) arch_validate_prot(prot, addr) + +#endif /* ! __ASM_MMAN_H__ */
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h +1 -0
@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@#define PTE_SHARED (_AT(pteval_t, 3) << 8)/* SH[1:0], inner shareable */ #define PTE_AF (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << 10)/* Access Flag */ #define PTE_NG (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << 11)/* nG */ +#define PTE_GP (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << 50)/* BTI guarded */ #define PTE_DBM (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << 51)/* Dirty Bit Management */ #define PTE_CONT (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << 52)/* Contiguous range */ #define PTE_PXN (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << 53)/* Privileged XN */
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h +1 -1
@@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ static inline phys_addr_t pgd_page_paddr(pgd_t pgd)static inline pte_t pte_modify (pte_t pte,pgprot_t newprot) {const pteval_t mask =PTE_USER |PTE_PXN |PTE_UXN |PTE_RDONLY | -PTE_PROT_NONE |PTE_VALID |PTE_WRITE ; +PTE_PROT_NONE |PTE_VALID |PTE_WRITE |PTE_GP ;/* preserve the hardware dirty information */ if (pte_hw_dirty (pte)) pte =pte_mkdirty (pte);
arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h +1 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@#define GIC_PRIO_PSR_I_SET (1 << 4)/* Additional SPSR bits not exposed in the UABI */ +#define PSR_IL_BIT (1 << 20)/* AArch32-specific ptrace requests */
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +4 -0
@@ -514,6 +514,8 @@#endif /* SCTLR_EL1 specific flags. */ +#define SCTLR_EL1_BT1 (BIT(36)) +#define SCTLR_EL1_BT0 (BIT(35))#define SCTLR_EL1_UCI (BIT(26))#define SCTLR_EL1_E0E (BIT(24))#define SCTLR_EL1_SPAN (BIT(23))
@@ -620,10 +622,12 @@/* id_aa64pfr1 */ #define ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_SHIFT 4 +#define ID_AA64PFR1_BT_SHIFT 0#define ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_PSTATE_NI 0#define ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_PSTATE_ONLY 1#define ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_PSTATE_INSNS 2 +#define ID_AA64PFR1_BT_BTI 0x1/* id_aa64zfr0 */ #define ID_AA64ZFR0_F64MM_SHIFT 56
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h +1 -0
@@ -73,5 +73,6 @@#define HWCAP2_BF16 (1 << 14)#define HWCAP2_DGH (1 << 15)#define HWCAP2_RNG (1 << 16) +#define HWCAP2_BTI (1 << 17)#endif /* _UAPI__ASM_HWCAP_H */
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/mman.h new file +9 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +#ifndef _UAPI__ASM_MMAN_H +#define _UAPI__ASM_MMAN_H + +#include <asm-generic/mman.h> + +#define PROT_BTI 0x10/* BTI guarded page */ + +#endif /* ! _UAPI__ASM_MMAN_H */
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h +9 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@#define PSR_I_BIT 0x00000080#define PSR_A_BIT 0x00000100#define PSR_D_BIT 0x00000200 +#define PSR_BTYPE_MASK 0x00000c00#define PSR_SSBS_BIT 0x00001000#define PSR_PAN_BIT 0x00400000#define PSR_UAO_BIT 0x00800000
@@ -55,6 +56,8 @@#define PSR_Z_BIT 0x40000000#define PSR_N_BIT 0x80000000 +#define PSR_BTYPE_SHIFT 10 +/* * Groups of PSR bits */
@@ -63,6 +66,12 @@#define PSR_x 0x0000ff00/* Extension */ #define PSR_c 0x000000ff/* Control */ +/* Convenience names for the values of PSTATE.BTYPE */ +#define PSR_BTYPE_NONE (0b00 << PSR_BTYPE_SHIFT) +#define PSR_BTYPE_JC (0b01 << PSR_BTYPE_SHIFT) +#define PSR_BTYPE_C (0b10 << PSR_BTYPE_SHIFT) +#define PSR_BTYPE_J (0b11 << PSR_BTYPE_SHIFT) +/* syscall emulation path in ptrace */ #define PTRACE_SYSEMU 31#define PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP 32
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +33 -0
@@ -179,6 +179,8 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr0[] = {static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr1[] = {ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE ,FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_SHIFT ,4 ,ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_PSTATE_NI ), +ARM64_FTR_BITS (FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_BTI ), +FTR_STRICT ,FTR_LOWER_SAFE ,ID_AA64PFR1_BT_SHIFT ,4 ,0 ),ARM64_FTR_END , };
@@ -1347,6 +1349,21 @@ static bool can_use_gic_priorities(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, }#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_BTI +static void bti_enable (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) +{ +/* +* Use of X16/X17 for tail-calls and trampolines that jump to +* function entry points using BR is a requirement for +* marking binaries with GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI. +* So, be strict and forbid other BRs using other registers to +* jump onto a PACIxSP instruction: +*/ +sysreg_clear_set (sctlr_el1,0 ,SCTLR_EL1_BT0 |SCTLR_EL1_BT1 ); +isb (); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_BTI */ +static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { { .desc ="GIC system register CPU interface" ,
@@ -1671,6 +1688,19 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, .min_field_value = 1, }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_BTI + { + .desc = "Branch Target Identification", + .capability = ARM64_BTI, + .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE, + .matches = has_cpuid_feature, + .cpu_enable = bti_enable, + .sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, + .field_pos = ID_AA64PFR1_BT_SHIFT, + .min_field_value = ID_AA64PFR1_BT_BTI, + .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, + }, #endif {}, };
@@ -1781,6 +1811,9 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_elf_hwcaps[] = {HWCAP_CAP (SYS_ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1 ,ID_AA64ZFR0_F64MM_SHIFT ,FTR_UNSIGNED ,ID_AA64ZFR0_F64MM ,CAP_HWCAP ,KERNEL_HWCAP_SVEF64MM ), #endifHWCAP_CAP (SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1 ,ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_SHIFT ,FTR_UNSIGNED ,ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_PSTATE_INSNS ,CAP_HWCAP ,KERNEL_HWCAP_SSBS ), +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_BTI +HWCAP_CAP (SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1 ,ID_AA64PFR1_BT_SHIFT ,FTR_UNSIGNED ,ID_AA64PFR1_BT_BTI ,CAP_HWCAP ,KERNEL_HWCAP_BTI ), +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTHHWCAP_MULTI_CAP (ptr_auth_hwcap_addr_matches,CAP_HWCAP ,KERNEL_HWCAP_PACA ), HWCAP_MULTI_CAP(ptr_auth_hwcap_gen_matches, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_PACG),
arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c +1 -0
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ static const char *const hwcap_str[] = {"bf16" ,"dgh" ,"rng" , +"bti" , NULL };
arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c +11 -0
@@ -188,6 +188,14 @@ static void notrace el0_undef(struct pt_regs *regs) }NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (el0_undef); +static void notrace el0_bti(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +user_exit_irqoff (); +local_daif_restore (DAIF_PROCCTX ); +do_bti (regs); +} +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (el0_bti); + static void notrace el0_inv(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr) {user_exit_irqoff ();
@@ -255,6 +263,9 @@ asmlinkage void notrace el0_sync_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)case ESR_ELx_EC_UNKNOWN:el0_undef (regs);break ; +case ESR_ELx_EC_BTI: +el0_bti (regs); +break ;case ESR_ELx_EC_BREAKPT_LOW:case ESR_ELx_EC_SOFTSTP_LOW:case ESR_ELx_EC_WATCHPT_LOW:
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -1
@@ -1874,7 +1874,7 @@ void syscall_trace_exit(struct pt_regs *regs)*/ #define SPSR_EL1_AARCH64_RES0_BITS \ (GENMASK_ULL(63, 32) | GENMASK_ULL(27, 25) | GENMASK_ULL(23, 22) | \ - GENMASK_ULL(20, 13) | GENMASK_ULL(11, 10) | GENMASK_ULL(5, 5)) + GENMASK_ULL(20, 13) | GENMASK_ULL(5, 5))#define SPSR_EL1_AARCH32_RES0_BITS \ (GENMASK_ULL(63, 32) | GENMASK_ULL(22, 22) | GENMASK_ULL(20, 20))
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +16 -0
@@ -732,6 +732,22 @@ static void setup_return(struct pt_regs *regs, struct k_sigaction *ka, regs->regs[29 ] = (unsigned long )&user->next_frame->fp; regs->pc = (unsigned long )ka->sa.sa_handler; +/* +* Signal delivery is a (wacky) indirect function call in +* userspace, so simulate the same setting of BTYPE as a BLR +* <register containing the signal handler entry point>. +* Signal delivery to a location in a PROT_BTI guarded page +* that is not a function entry point will now trigger a +* SIGILL in userspace. +* +* If the signal handler entry point is not in a PROT_BTI +* guarded page, this is harmless. +*/ +if (system_supports_bti ()) { + regs->pstate &= ~PSR_BTYPE_MASK ; + regs->pstate |=PSR_BTYPE_C ; + } +if (ka->sa.sa_flags &SA_RESTORER ) sigtramp = ka->sa.sa_restorer;else
arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c +18 -0
@@ -98,6 +98,24 @@ static void el0_svc_common(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno, int sc_nr, regs->orig_x0 = regs->regs[0 ]; regs->syscallno = scno; +/* +* BTI note: +* The architecture does not guarantee that SPSR.BTYPE is zero +* on taking an SVC, so we could return to userspace with a +* non-zero BTYPE after the syscall. +* +* This shouldn't matter except when userspace is explicitly +* doing something stupid, such as setting PROT_BTI on a page +* that lacks conforming BTI/PACIxSP instructions, falling +* through from one executable page to another with differing +* PROT_BTI, or messing with BTYPE via ptrace: in such cases, +* userspace should not be surprised if a SIGILL occurs on +* syscall return. +* +* So, don't touch regs->pstate & PSR_BTYPE_MASK here. +* (Similarly for HVC and SMC elsewhere.) +*/ +cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_svc_handler ();local_daif_restore (DAIF_PROCCTX );user_exit ();
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +8 -0
@@ -411,6 +411,13 @@ void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs) }NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (do_undefinstr); +void do_bti (struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +BUG_ON (!user_mode (regs)); +force_signal_inject (SIGILL ,ILL_ILLOPC , regs->pc); +} +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL (do_bti); +#define __user_cache_maint (insn, address, res) \ if (address >= user_addr_max()) { \ res = -EFAULT; \
@@ -753,6 +760,7 @@ static const char *esr_class_str[] = { [ESR_ELx_EC_CP10_ID] = "CP10 MRC/VMRS", [ESR_ELx_EC_PAC] = "PAC", [ESR_ELx_EC_CP14_64] = "CP14 MCRR/MRRC", + [ESR_ELx_EC_BTI] = "BTI", [ESR_ELx_EC_ILL] = "PSTATE.IL", [ESR_ELx_EC_SVC32] = "SVC (AArch32)", [ESR_ELx_EC_HVC32] = "HVC (AArch32)",
include/linux/mm.h +3 -0
@@ -324,6 +324,9 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);#elif defined(CONFIG_SPARC64 )# define VM_SPARC_ADI VM_ARCH_1/* Uses ADI tag for access control */ # define VM_ARCH_CLEAR VM_SPARC_ADI +#elif defined(CONFIG_ARM64 ) +# define VM_ARM64_BTI VM_ARCH_1/* BTI guarded page, a.k.a. GP bit */ +# define VM_ARCH_CLEAR VM_ARM64_BTI#elif !defined(CONFIG_MMU )# define VM_MAPPED_COPY VM_ARCH_1/* T if mapped copy of data (nommu mmap) */ #endif
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Catalin Marinas
maintainerRe: [PATCH v8 03/11] arm64: Basic Branch Target Identification support
Quoted 19 lines · Mark Brown
arch/arm64/Kconfig +11
-0@@ -1519,6 +1519,28 @@ endmenu menu "ARMv8.5 architectural features" +config ARM64_BTI + bool "Branch Target Identification support" + default y + help + Branch Target Identification (part of the ARMv8.5 Extensions) + provides a mechanism to limit the set of locations to which computed + branch instructions such as BR or BLR can jump. + + To make use of BTI on CPUs that support it, say Y. + + BTI is intended to provide complementary protection to other control
arch/arm64/Kconfig endmenu · line 1542
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/Kconfig +10
-0+ flow integrity protection mechanisms, such as the Pointer + authentication mechanism provided as part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions. + For this reason, it does not make sense to enable this option without + also enabling support for pointer authentication. Thus, when + enabling this option you should also select ARM64_PTR_AUTH=y. + + Userspace binaries must also be specifically compiled to make use of + this mechanism. If you say N here or the hardware does not support + BTI, such binaries can still run, but you get no additional + enforcement of branch destinations.
To keep the series bisectable, I'd move the Kconfig into a separate patch towards the end. It looks like the feature is only partially supported after patch 3, so let's not advertise it here.
Signature · 1 line
Catalin
PATCH v8 4/11 elf: Allow arch to tweak initial mmap prot flags
In reply to Mark BrownFrom: Dave Martin <[email protected]>
An arch may want to tweak the mmap prot flags for an ELFexecutable's initial mappings. For example, arm64 is going to need to add PROT_BTI for executable pages in an ELF process whose executable is marked as using Branch Target Identification (an ARMv8.5-A control flow integrity feature).
So that this can be done in a generic way, add a hook arch_elf_adjust_prot() to modify the prot flags as desired: arches can select CONFIG_HAVE_ELF_PROT and implement their own backend where necessary.
By default, leave the prot flags unchanged.
--- fs/Kconfig.binfmt | 3 +++ fs/binfmt_elf.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ include/linux/elf.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/Kconfig.binfmt +3 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ config COMPAT_BINFMT_ELF config ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE bool +config ARCH_HAVE_ELF_PROT + bool + config ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY bool
fs/binfmt_elf.c +12 -6
@@ -544,7 +544,8 @@ static inline int arch_check_elf(struct elfhdr *ehdr, bool has_interp,#endif /* !CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE */ -static inline int make_prot (u32 p_flags) +static inline int make_prot (u32 p_flags,struct arch_elf_state *arch_state, +bool has_interp,bool is_interp) {int prot =0 ;
@@ -554,7 +555,8 @@ static inline int make_prot(u32 p_flags) prot |=PROT_WRITE ;if (p_flags &PF_X ) prot |=PROT_EXEC ; -return prot; + +return arch_elf_adjust_prot (prot, arch_state, has_interp, is_interp); }/* This is much more generalized than the library routine read function,
@@ -564,7 +566,8 @@ static inline int make_prot(u32 p_flags)static unsigned long load_elf_interp (struct elfhdr *interp_elf_ex,struct file *interpreter, -unsigned long no_base,struct elf_phdr *interp_elf_phdata) +unsigned long no_base,struct elf_phdr *interp_elf_phdata, +struct arch_elf_state *arch_state) {struct elf_phdr *eppnt;unsigned long load_addr =0 ;
@@ -596,7 +599,8 @@ static unsigned long load_elf_interp(struct elfhdr *interp_elf_ex,for (i =0 ; i < interp_elf_ex->e_phnum; i++, eppnt++) {if (eppnt->p_type ==PT_LOAD ) {int elf_type =MAP_PRIVATE |MAP_DENYWRITE ; -int elf_prot =make_prot (eppnt->p_flags); +int elf_prot =make_prot (eppnt->p_flags, arch_state, + true, true);unsigned long vaddr =0 ;unsigned long k, map_addr;
@@ -1041,7 +1045,8 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } } - elf_prot =make_prot (elf_ppnt->p_flags); + elf_prot =make_prot (elf_ppnt->p_flags, &arch_state, + !!interpreter, false); elf_flags =MAP_PRIVATE |MAP_DENYWRITE |MAP_EXECUTABLE ;
@@ -1184,7 +1189,8 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)if (interpreter) { elf_entry =load_elf_interp (&loc->interp_elf_ex, interpreter, - load_bias, interp_elf_phdata); + load_bias, interp_elf_phdata, + &arch_state);if (!IS_ERR ((void *)elf_entry)) {/* * load_elf_interp() returns relocation
include/linux/elf.h +12 -0
@@ -87,4 +87,16 @@ extern int arch_parse_elf_property(u32 type, const void *data, size_t datasz, bool compat, struct arch_elf_state *arch);#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAVE_ELF_PROT +int arch_elf_adjust_prot (int prot,const struct arch_elf_state *state, +bool has_interp,bool is_interp); +#else +static inline int arch_elf_adjust_prot (int prot, +const struct arch_elf_state *state, +bool has_interp,bool is_interp) +{ +return prot; +} +#endif +#endif /* _LINUX_ELF_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v8 5/11 arm64: elf: Enable BTI at exec based on ELF program properties
In reply to Mark BrownFrom: Dave Martin <[email protected]>
For BTI protection to be as comprehensive as possible, it is desirable to have BTI enabled from process startup. If this is not done, the process must use mprotect() to enable BTI for each of its executable mappings, but this is painful to do in the libc startup code. It's simpler and more sound to have the kernel do it instead.
To this end, detect BTI support in the executable (or ELF interpreter, as appropriate), via the NT_GNU_PROGRAM_PROPERTY_TYPE_0 note, and tweak the initial prot flags for the process' executable pages to include PROT_BTI as appropriate.
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 3 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 19 ++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 6 +++++ 4 files changed, 78 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +3 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ config ARM64 select ACPI_MCFG if (ACPI && PCI) select ACPI_SPCR_TABLE if ACPI select ACPI_PPTT if ACPI + select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE select ARCH_CLOCKSOURCE_DATA select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ config ARM64 select ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_WRAPPER select ARCH_HAS_TEARDOWN_DMA_OPS if IOMMU_SUPPORT select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST + select ARCH_HAVE_ELF_PROT select ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG select ARCH_INLINE_READ_LOCK if !PREEMPTION select ARCH_INLINE_READ_LOCK_BH if !PREEMPTION
@@ -62,6 +64,7 @@ config ARM64 select ARCH_INLINE_SPIN_UNLOCK_IRQRESTORE if !PREEMPTION select ARCH_KEEP_MEMBLOCK select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF + select ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY if BINFMT_ELF select ARCH_USE_QUEUED_RWLOCKS select ARCH_USE_QUEUED_SPINLOCKS select ARCH_SUPPORTS_MEMORY_FAILURE
arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h +50 -0
63 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +19 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@#include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/efi.h> +#include <linux/elf.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/sched/debug.h>
@@ -18,6 +19,7 @@#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/lockdep.h> +#include <linux/mman.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/stddef.h> #include <linux/sysctl.h>
@@ -654,3 +656,20 @@ asmlinkage void __sched arm64_preempt_schedule_irq(void)if (system_capabilities_finalized ())preempt_schedule_irq (); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF +int arch_elf_adjust_prot (int prot,const struct arch_elf_state *state, +bool has_interp,bool is_interp) +{ +if (is_interp != has_interp) +return prot; + +if (!(state->flags &ARM64_ELF_BTI )) +return prot; + +if (prot &PROT_EXEC ) + prot |=PROT_BTI ; + +return prot; +} +#endif
include/uapi/linux/elf.h +6 -0
@@ -448,4 +448,10 @@ typedef struct elf64_note { Elf64_Word n_type; /* Content type */ } Elf64_Nhdr; +/* .note.gnu.property types for EM_AARCH64: */ +#define GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_AND 0xc0000000 + +/* Bits for GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI */ +#define GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI (1U << 0) +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_ELF_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v8 6/11 arm64: BTI: Decode BYTPE bits when printing PSTATE
In reply to Mark BrownFrom: Dave Martin <[email protected]>
The current code to print PSTATE symbolically when generating backtraces etc., does not include the BYTPE field used by Branch Target Identification.
So, decode BYTPE and print it too.
In the interests of human-readability, print the classes of BTI matched. The symbolic notation, BYTPE (PSTATE[11:10]) and permitted classes of subsequent instruction are:
-- (BTYPE=0b00): any insn
jc (BTYPE=0b01): BTI jc, BTI j, BTI c, PACIxSP
-c (BYTPE=0b10): BTI jc, BTI c, PACIxSP
j- (BTYPE=0b11): BTI jc, BTI j--- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +15 -2
@@ -211,6 +211,15 @@ void machine_restart(char *cmd)while (1 ); } +#define bstr (suffix, str) [PSR_BTYPE_ ## suffix >> PSR_BTYPE_SHIFT] = str +static const char *const btypes[] = { +bstr (NONE ,"--" ), +bstr (JC ,"jc" ), +bstr (C ,"-c" ), +bstr (J ,"j-" ) +}; +#undef bstr +static void print_pstate (struct pt_regs *regs) {u64 pstate = regs->pstate;
@@ -229,7 +238,10 @@ static void print_pstate(struct pt_regs *regs) pstate &PSR_AA32_I_BIT ?'I' :'i' , pstate & PSR_AA32_F_BIT ? 'F' : 'f'); }else { - printk("pstate: %08llx (%c%c%c%c %c%c%c%c %cPAN %cUAO)\n", +const char *btype_str = btypes[(pstate &PSR_BTYPE_MASK ) >> +PSR_BTYPE_SHIFT ]; + + printk("pstate: %08llx (%c%c%c%c %c%c%c%c %cPAN %cUAO BTYPE=%s)\n", pstate, pstate & PSR_N_BIT ? 'N' : 'n', pstate & PSR_Z_BIT ? 'Z' : 'z',
@@ -240,7 +252,8 @@ static void print_pstate(struct pt_regs *regs) pstate &PSR_I_BIT ?'I' :'i' , pstate &PSR_F_BIT ?'F' :'f' , pstate &PSR_PAN_BIT ?'+' :'-' , - pstate & PSR_UAO_BIT ? '+' : '-'); + pstate &PSR_UAO_BIT ?'+' :'-' , + btype_str); } }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v8 7/11 arm64: unify native/compat instruction skipping
In reply to Mark BrownFrom: Dave Martin <[email protected]>
Skipping of an instruction on AArch32 works a bit differently from AArch64, mainly due to the different CPSR/PSTATE semantics.
Currently arm64_skip_faulting_instruction() is only suitable for AArch64, and arm64_compat_skip_faulting_instruction() handles the IT state machine but is local to traps.c.
Since manual instruction skipping implies a trap, it's a relatively slow path.
So, make arm64_skip_faulting_instruction() handle both compat and native, and get rid of the arm64_compat_skip_faulting_instruction() special case.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 18 ++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +8 -10
@@ -272,6 +272,8 @@ void arm64_notify_die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, } } +static void advance_itstate (struct pt_regs *regs); +void arm64_skip_faulting_instruction (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long size) { regs->pc += size;
@@ -282,6 +284,9 @@ void arm64_skip_faulting_instruction(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long size)*/ if (user_mode (regs))user_fastforward_single_step (current); + +if (regs->pstate &PSR_MODE32_BIT ) +advance_itstate (regs); }static LIST_HEAD (undef_hook);
@@ -644,19 +649,12 @@ static void advance_itstate(struct pt_regs *regs)compat_set_it_state (regs, it); } -static void arm64_compat_skip_faulting_instruction (struct pt_regs *regs, -unsigned int sz) -{ -advance_itstate (regs); -arm64_skip_faulting_instruction (regs, sz); -} -static void compat_cntfrq_read_handler (unsigned int esr,struct pt_regs *regs) {int reg = (esr & ESR_ELx_CP15_32_ISS_RT_MASK) >> ESR_ELx_CP15_32_ISS_RT_SHIFT;pt_regs_write_reg (regs, reg,arch_timer_get_rate ()); -arm64_compat_skip_faulting_instruction (regs,4 ); +arm64_skip_faulting_instruction (regs,4 ); }static const struct sys64_hook cp15_32_hooks[] = {
@@ -676,7 +674,7 @@ static void compat_cntvct_read_handler(unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)pt_regs_write_reg (regs, rt,lower_32_bits (val));pt_regs_write_reg (regs, rt2,upper_32_bits (val)); -arm64_compat_skip_faulting_instruction (regs,4 ); +arm64_skip_faulting_instruction (regs,4 ); }static const struct sys64_hook cp15_64_hooks[] = {
@@ -697,7 +695,7 @@ void do_cp15instr(unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)* There is no T16 variant of a CP access, so we * always advance PC by 4 bytes. */ -arm64_compat_skip_faulting_instruction (regs,4 ); +arm64_skip_faulting_instruction (regs,4 );return ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v8 8/11 arm64: traps: Shuffle code to eliminate forward declarations
In reply to Mark BrownFrom: Dave Martin <[email protected]>
Hoist the IT state handling code earlier in traps.c, to avoid accumulating forward declarations.
No functional change.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 103 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +50 -53
@@ -272,7 +272,55 @@ void arm64_notify_die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, } } -static void advance_itstate (struct pt_regs *regs); +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +#define PSTATE_IT_1_0_SHIFT 25 +#define PSTATE_IT_1_0_MASK (0x3 << PSTATE_IT_1_0_SHIFT) +#define PSTATE_IT_7_2_SHIFT 10 +#define PSTATE_IT_7_2_MASK (0x3f << PSTATE_IT_7_2_SHIFT) + +static u32 compat_get_it_state (struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +u32 it, pstate = regs->pstate; + + it = (pstate &PSTATE_IT_1_0_MASK ) >>PSTATE_IT_1_0_SHIFT ; + it |= ((pstate &PSTATE_IT_7_2_MASK ) >>PSTATE_IT_7_2_SHIFT ) <<2 ; + +return it; +} + +static void compat_set_it_state (struct pt_regs *regs,u32 it) +{ +u32 pstate_it; + + pstate_it = (it <<PSTATE_IT_1_0_SHIFT ) &PSTATE_IT_1_0_MASK ; + pstate_it |= ((it >>2 ) <<PSTATE_IT_7_2_SHIFT ) &PSTATE_IT_7_2_MASK ; + + regs->pstate &= ~PSR_AA32_IT_MASK ; + regs->pstate |= pstate_it; +} + +static void advance_itstate (struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +u32 it; + +/* ARM mode */ +if (!(regs->pstate &PSR_AA32_T_BIT ) || + !(regs->pstate &PSR_AA32_IT_MASK )) +return ; + + it =compat_get_it_state (regs); + +/* +* If this is the last instruction of the block, wipe the IT +* state. Otherwise advance it. +*/ +if (!(it &7 )) + it =0 ; +else + it = (it &0xe0 ) | ((it <<1 ) &0x1f ); + +compat_set_it_state (regs, it); +}void arm64_skip_faulting_instruction (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long size) {
@@ -285,7 +333,7 @@ void arm64_skip_faulting_instruction(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long size)if (user_mode (regs))user_fastforward_single_step (current); -if (regs->pstate &PSR_MODE32_BIT ) +if (compat_user_mode (regs))advance_itstate (regs); }
@@ -578,34 +626,6 @@ static const struct sys64_hook sys64_hooks[] = { {}, }; - -#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT -#define PSTATE_IT_1_0_SHIFT 25 -#define PSTATE_IT_1_0_MASK (0x3 << PSTATE_IT_1_0_SHIFT) -#define PSTATE_IT_7_2_SHIFT 10 -#define PSTATE_IT_7_2_MASK (0x3f << PSTATE_IT_7_2_SHIFT) - -static u32 compat_get_it_state (struct pt_regs *regs) -{ -u32 it, pstate = regs->pstate; - - it = (pstate &PSTATE_IT_1_0_MASK ) >>PSTATE_IT_1_0_SHIFT ; - it |= ((pstate &PSTATE_IT_7_2_MASK ) >>PSTATE_IT_7_2_SHIFT ) <<2 ; - -return it; -} - -static void compat_set_it_state (struct pt_regs *regs,u32 it) -{ -u32 pstate_it; - - pstate_it = (it <<PSTATE_IT_1_0_SHIFT ) &PSTATE_IT_1_0_MASK ; - pstate_it |= ((it >>2 ) <<PSTATE_IT_7_2_SHIFT ) &PSTATE_IT_7_2_MASK ; - - regs->pstate &= ~PSR_AA32_IT_MASK ; - regs->pstate |= pstate_it; -} -static bool cp15_cond_valid (unsigned int esr,struct pt_regs *regs) {int cond;
@@ -626,29 +646,6 @@ static bool cp15_cond_valid(unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs)return aarch32_opcode_cond_checks[cond](regs->pstate); } -static void advance_itstate (struct pt_regs *regs) -{ -u32 it; - -/* ARM mode */ -if (!(regs->pstate &PSR_AA32_T_BIT ) || - !(regs->pstate &PSR_AA32_IT_MASK )) -return ; - - it =compat_get_it_state (regs); - -/* -* If this is the last instruction of the block, wipe the IT -* state. Otherwise advance it. -*/ -if (!(it &7 )) - it =0 ; -else - it = (it &0xe0 ) | ((it <<1 ) &0x1f ); - -compat_set_it_state (regs, it); -} -static void compat_cntfrq_read_handler (unsigned int esr,struct pt_regs *regs) {int reg = (esr & ESR_ELx_CP15_32_ISS_RT_MASK) >> ESR_ELx_CP15_32_ISS_RT_SHIFT;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v8 9/11 arm64: BTI: Reset BTYPE when skipping emulated instructions
In reply to Mark BrownFrom: Dave Martin <[email protected]>
Since normal execution of any non-branch instruction resets the PSTATE BTYPE field to 0, so do the same thing when emulating a trapped instruction.
Branches don't trap directly, so we should never need to assign a non-zero value to BTYPE here.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +2 -0
@@ -335,6 +335,8 @@ void arm64_skip_faulting_instruction(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long size)if (compat_user_mode (regs))advance_itstate (regs); +else + regs->pstate &= ~PSR_BTYPE_MASK ; }static LIST_HEAD (undef_hook);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v8 10/11 KVM: arm64: BTI: Reset BTYPE when skipping emulated instructions
In reply to Mark BrownFrom: Dave Martin <[email protected]>
Since normal execution of any non-branch instruction resets the PSTATE BTYPE field to 0, so do the same thing when emulating a trapped instruction.
Branches don't trap directly, so we should never need to assign a non-zero value to BTYPE here.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +4 -2
@@ -506,10 +506,12 @@ static inline unsigned long vcpu_data_host_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,static inline void kvm_skip_instr (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,bool is_wide_instr) { -if (vcpu_mode_is_32bit (vcpu)) +if (vcpu_mode_is_32bit (vcpu)) {kvm_skip_instr32 (vcpu, is_wide_instr); -else + }else { *vcpu_pc (vcpu) +=4 ; + *vcpu_cpsr (vcpu) &= ~PSR_BTYPE_MASK ; + }/* advance the singlestep state machine */ *vcpu_cpsr (vcpu) &= ~DBG_SPSR_SS ;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v8 11/11 arm64: mm: Display guarded pages in ptdump
In reply to Mark Brownv8.5-BTI introduces the GP field in stage 1 translation tables which indicates that blocks and pages with it set are guarded pages for which branch target identification checks should be performed. Decode this when dumping the page tables to aid debugging.
--- arch/arm64/mm/dump.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/mm/dump.c +5 -0
@@ -145,6 +145,11 @@ static const struct prot_bits pte_bits[] = { .val = PTE_UXN, .set = "UXN", .clear = " ", + }, { + .mask = PTE_GP, + .val = PTE_GP, + .set = "GP", + .clear = " ", }, { .mask = PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK, .val = PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_DEVICE_nGnRnE),
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Quoted 3 lines · Mark Brown
* Binutils trunk supports the new ELF note, but this wasn't in a release the last time I posted this series. (The situation _might_ have changed in the meantime...)
I believe this support is in binutils 2.32.
r~
Quoted 6 lines · Richard Henderson
Quoted 3 lines · Mark Brown
* Binutils trunk supports the new ELF note, but this wasn't in a release the last time I posted this series. (The situation _might_ have changed in the meantime...)
I believe this support is in binutils 2.32.
It looks like it's actually 2.33 but either way it's in a release, thanks for prompting me to check. I've updated this for v9.
Catalin Marinas
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · Mark Brown
Dave Martin (10):
ELF: UAPI andKconfigadditions for ELF program properties
ELF: Add ELF program property parsing support
arm64: Basic Branch Target Identification support
elf: Allow arch to tweak initial mmap prot flags
Al, are you ok for patches 1, 2 and 4 in this series to be merged via the arm64 tree? The full series is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
Thanks.
Signature · 1 line
Catalin
Catalin Marinas
maintainerQuoted 3 lines · Mark Brown
This patch series implements support for ARMv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI), which is a control flow integrity protection feature introduced as part of the ARMv8.5-A extensions.
Does this series affect uprobes in any way? I.e. can you probe a landing pad?
Signature · 1 line
Catalin
Quoted 8 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 3 lines · Mark Brown
This patch series implements support for ARMv8.5-A Branch Target Identification (BTI), which is a control flow integrity protection feature introduced as part of the ARMv8.5-A extensions.
Does this series affect uprobes in any way? I.e. can you probe a landing pad?
You can't probe a landing pad, uprobes on landing pads will be silently ignored so the program isn't disrupted, you just don't get the expected trace from those uprobes. This isn't new with the BTI support since the landing pads are generally pointer auth instructions, these already can't be probed regardless of what's going on with this series. It's already on the list to get sorted.
Quoted 11 lines · Mark Brown
Quoted 2 lines · Catalin Marinas
Does this series affect uprobes in any way? I.e. can you probe a landing pad?
You can't probe a landing pad, uprobes on landing pads will be silently ignored so the program isn't disrupted, you just don't get the expected trace from those uprobes. This isn't new with the BTI support since the landing pads are generally pointer auth instructions, these already can't be probed regardless of what's going on with this series. It's already on the list to get sorted.
Sorry, I realized thanks to Amit's off-list prompting that I was testing that I was verifying with the wrong kernel binary here (user error since it took me a while to sort out uprobes) so this isn't quite right - you can probe the landing pads with or without this series.
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Catalin Marinas
maintainerQuoted 13 lines · Mark Brown
Quoted 11 lines · Mark Brown
Quoted 2 lines · Catalin Marinas
Does this series affect uprobes in any way? I.e. can you probe a landing pad?
You can't probe a landing pad, uprobes on landing pads will be silently ignored so the program isn't disrupted, you just don't get the expected trace from those uprobes. This isn't new with the BTI support since the landing pads are generally pointer auth instructions, these already can't be probed regardless of what's going on with this series. It's already on the list to get sorted.
Quoted 4 lines
Sorry, I realized thanks to Amit's off-list prompting that I was testing that I was verifying with the wrong kernel binary here (user error since it took me a while to sort out uprobes) so this isn't quite right - you can probe the landing pads with or without this series.
Can we not change aarch64_insn_is_nop() to actually return true only for NOP and ignore everything else in the hint space? We tend to re-use the hint instructions for new things in the architecture, so I'd rather white-list what we know we can safely probe than black-listing only some of the hint instructions.
I haven't assessed the effort of doing the above (probably not a lot) but as a short-term workaround we could add the BTI and PAC hint instructions to the aarch64_insn_is_nop() (though my preferred option is the white-list one).
Signature · 1 line
Catalin
Quoted 7 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 4 lines · Mark Brown
Sorry, I realized thanks to Amit's off-list prompting that I was testing that I was verifying with the wrong kernel binary here (user error since it took me a while to sort out uprobes) so this isn't quite right - you can probe the landing pads with or without this series.
Quoted 5 lines
Can we not change
aarch64_insn_is_nop()to actually return true only for NOP and ignore everything else in the hint space? We tend to re-use the hint instructions for new things in the architecture, so I'd rather white-list what we know we can safely probe than black-listing only some of the hint instructions.
That's literally the patch I am sitting on which made the difference with the testing on the wrong binary.
Quoted 4 lines
I haven't assessed the effort of doing the above (probably not a lot) but as a short-term workaround we could add the BTI and PAC hint instructions to the
aarch64_insn_is_nop()(though my preferred option is the white-list one).
The only thing I've seen in testing with just NOPs whitelisted is an inability to probe the PAC instructions which isn't the best user experience, especially since the effect is that the probes get silently ignored. This isn't extensive userspace testing though. Adding whitelisting of the BTI and PAC hints would definitely be a safer as a first step though. I can post either version?
Catalin Marinas
maintainerQuoted 12 lines · Mark Brown
Quoted 11 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 4 lines · Mark Brown
Sorry, I realized thanks to Amit's off-list prompting that I was testing that I was verifying with the wrong kernel binary here (user error since it took me a while to sort out uprobes) so this isn't quite right - you can probe the landing pads with or without this series.
Can we not change
aarch64_insn_is_nop()to actually return true only for NOP and ignore everything else in the hint space? We tend to re-use the hint instructions for new things in the architecture, so I'd rather white-list what we know we can safely probe than black-listing only some of the hint instructions.
[...]
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I haven't assessed the effort of doing the above (probably not a lot) but as a short-term workaround we could add the BTI and PAC hint instructions to the
aarch64_insn_is_nop()(though my preferred option is the white-list one).The only thing I've seen in testing with just NOPs whitelisted is an inability to probe the PAC instructions which isn't the best user experience, especially since the effect is that the probes get silently ignored. This isn't extensive userspace testing though. Adding whitelisting of the BTI and PAC hints would definitely be a safer as a first step though. I can post either version?
I thought BTI and PAC are already whitelisted in mainline as they fall into the hint space (by whitelisting I mean you can probe them).
I'm trying to understand how the BTI patches affect the current uprobes support and what is needed. Executing BTI or PCI?SP out of line should be fine as they don't generate a BTI exception (the BRK doesn't either, just the normal debug exception).
I think (it needs checking) that BRK preserves the PSTATE.BTYPE in SPSR. If we probe an instruction in a guarded page and then we single-step it in a non-guarded page, we'll miss a potential BTI fault. Is this an issue?
If we are to keep the BTI faulting behaviour, we'd need an additional xol page, guarded, and to find a way to report the original probed address of the fault rather than the xol page.
So, IIUC, we don't have an issue with the actual BTI or PACI?SP instructions but rather the other instructions that would not fault with the BTI support. While we should try to address this, I think the important bit now is not to break the existing uprobes support when running a binary with BTI enabled.
Have I missed anything?
Signature · 1 line
Catalin
Quoted 6 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 4 lines · Mark Brown
Quoted 2 lines · Catalin Marinas
Can we not change
aarch64_insn_is_nop()to actually return true only for NOP and ignore everything else in the hint space? We tend to re-use the
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
ignored. This isn't extensive userspace testing though. Adding whitelisting of the BTI and PAC hints would definitely be a safer as a first step though. I can post either version?
I thought BTI and PAC are already whitelisted in mainline as they fall into the hint space (by whitelisting I mean you can probe them).
This was in the context of your comment above about modifying aarch64_insn_is_nop() - if we do that and nothing else then we'd remove the current whitelisting.
Quoted 4 lines
I'm trying to understand how the BTI patches affect the current uprobes support and what is needed. Executing BTI or PCI?SP out of line should be fine as they don't generate a BTI exception (the BRK doesn't either, just the normal debug exception).
Right.
Quoted 1 line
I think (it needs checking) that BRK preserves the PSTATE.BTYPE in SPSR.
Yes, Exception_SoftwareBreakpoint preserves PSTATE.BTYPE.
Quoted 3 lines
If we probe an instruction in a guarded page and then we single-step it in a non-guarded page, we'll miss a potential BTI fault. Is this an issue?
Obviously the main thing here is that if we miss faults then that's potentially opening something that could be used as part of an exploit chain. I'm not aware of any sensible applications that would generate the exceptions in normal operation.
Quoted 3 lines
If we are to keep the BTI faulting behaviour, we'd need an additional xol page, guarded, and to find a way to report the original probed address of the fault rather than the xol page.
Yes, or just accept the inaccurate fault address which isn't good but might be the least worst thing if there's issues with reporting the original address.
Quoted 5 lines
So, IIUC, we don't have an issue with the actual BTI or PACI?SP instructions but rather the other instructions that would not fault with the BTI support. While we should try to address this, I think the important bit now is not to break the existing uprobes support when running a binary with BTI enabled.
I think so, and as far as my ability to tell goes the worst consequence would be missing exceptions like you say. That's not great but it's at least an extra hoop people have to jump through.