efi: fix a race and add a sanity check
cover efi: fix a race and add a sanity check
There is a race and a buffer overflow while reading an efi variable and the first patch fixes it. The second patch adds a sanity check to efivar_store_raw(). The original patchset applies to the 5.x trees fine.
Vladis Dronov (2):
efi: fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfs
efi: add a sanity check to efivar_store_raw()
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
PATCH 1/2 efi: Fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfs
commit 286d3250c9d6437340203fb64938bea344729a0e upstream.
There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an EFI variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct efi_variable in efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following:
CPU0: CPU1:efivar_attr_read()
var->DataSize = 1024;
efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize)
down_interruptible(&efivars_lock)
efivar_attr_read() // same EFI var
var->DataSize = 1024;
efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize)
down_interruptible(&efivars_lock)
virt_efi_get_variable()
// returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but
// var->DataSize is set to a real
// var size more than 1024 bytes
up(&efivars_lock)
virt_efi_get_variable()
// called with var->DataSize set
// to a real var size, returns
// successfully and overwrites
// a 1024-bytes kernel buffer
up(&efivars_lock)This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an EFI variable which size is more than 1024 bytes:
ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \ cat /sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size & ) ; done
Fix this by using a local variable for a var's data buffer size so it does not get overwritten.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +20 -9
@@ -139,13 +139,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;if (var->Attributes &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE )
@@ -172,13 +175,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_size_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ; str +=sprintf (str,"0x%lx\n" , var->DataSize);
@@ -189,12 +195,15 @@ static ssize_t efivar_data_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data); +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;memcpy (buf, var->Data, var->DataSize);
@@ -314,14 +323,16 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) {struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;struct compat_efi_variable *compat; +unsigned long datasize =sizeof (var->Data);size_t size; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return 0 ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &entry->var.Attributes, - &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &datasize, var->Data); + var->DataSize = datasize; +if (ret)return -EIO ;if (is_compat ()) {
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH 4.19, 4.14, 4.9, 4.4 1/2] efi: Fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfs
Quoted 134 lines · Vladis Dronov
commit
286d3250c9d6437340203fb64938bea344729a0eupstream.There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an EFI variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct
efi_variablein efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following:CPU0: CPU1:
efivar_attr_read()
var->DataSize= 1024;
efivar_entry_get(...&var->DataSize)down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) efivar_attr_read() // same EFI var var->DataSize = 1024; efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize) down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but // var->DataSize is set to a real // var size more than 1024 bytes up(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // called with var->DataSize set // to a real var size, returns // successfully and overwrites // a 1024-bytes kernel buffer up(&efivars_lock)This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an EFI variable which size is more than 1024 bytes:
ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \ cat /sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size & ) ; doneFix this by using a local variable for a var's data buffer size so it does not get overwritten.
Fixes e14ab23dde12b80d ("efivars: efivar_entry API")Signed-off-by Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Cc <[email protected]>--- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +20
-9@@ -139,13 +139,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;if (var->Attributes &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE )@@ -172,13 +175,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_size_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ; str +=sprintf (str,"0x%lx\n" , var->DataSize);@@ -189,12 +195,15 @@ static ssize_t efivar_data_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data); +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;memcpy (buf, var->Data, var->DataSize);@@ -314,14 +323,16 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) {struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;struct compat_efi_variable *compat; +unsigned long datasize =sizeof (var->Data);size_t size; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return 0 ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &entry->var.Attributes, - &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &datasize, var->Data); + var->DataSize = datasize; +if (ret)return -EIO ;if (is_compat ()) {Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
This is already in all of my stable trees, did it need to be somehow backported differently to 4.19 and older?
thanks,
greg k-h
Re: [PATCH 4.19, 4.14, 4.9, 4.4 1/2] efi: Fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfs
Hello,
----- Original Message -----
Quoted 139 lines
From: "Greg KH" <[email protected]>
To: "Vladis Dronov" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected], "Sasha Levin" <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, March 16, 2020 2:27:18 PM
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4.19, 4.14, 4.9, 4.4 1/2] efi: Fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfsQuoted 132 lines · Vladis Dronov
commit
286d3250c9d6437340203fb64938bea344729a0eupstream.There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an EFI variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct
efi_variablein efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following:CPU0: CPU1:
efivar_attr_read()
var->DataSize= 1024;
efivar_entry_get(...&var->DataSize)down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) efivar_attr_read() // same EFI var var->DataSize = 1024; efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize) down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but // var->DataSize is set to a real // var size more than 1024 bytes up(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // called with var->DataSize set // to a real var size, returns // successfully and overwrites // a 1024-bytes kernel buffer up(&efivars_lock)This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an EFI variable which size is more than 1024 bytes:
ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \ cat /sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size & ) ; doneFix this by using a local variable for a var's data buffer size so it does not get overwritten.
Fixes e14ab23dde12b80d ("efivars: efivar_entry API")Signed-off-by Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Cc <[email protected]>--- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +20
-9@@ -139,13 +139,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;if (var->Attributes &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE )@@ -172,13 +175,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_size_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ; str +=sprintf (str,"0x%lx\n" , var->DataSize);@@ -189,12 +195,15 @@ static ssize_t efivar_data_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data); +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;memcpy (buf, var->Data, var->DataSize);@@ -314,14 +323,16 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) {struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;struct compat_efi_variable *compat; +unsigned long datasize =sizeof (var->Data);size_t size; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return 0 ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &entry->var.Attributes, - &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &datasize, var->Data); + var->DataSize = datasize; +if (ret)return -EIO ;
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
if (
is_compat()) {
--
2.20.1This is already in all of my stable trees, did it need to be somehow backported differently to 4.19 and older?
It looks like I've misunderstood "... failed to apply to 4.XX-stable tree" messages. This exact patch does not need any special backporting (if it applies fine to the tree). Apologies for the spam and traffic.
Quoted 3 lines
thanks,
greg k-h
Best regards,
Vladis Dronov | Red Hat, Inc. | The Core Kernel | Senior Software Engineer
PATCH 2/2 efi: Add a sanity check to efivar_store_raw()
In reply to Vladis Dronovcommit d6c066fda90d578aacdf19771a027ed484a79825 upstream.
Add a sanity check to efivar_store_raw() the same way efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and efivar_show_raw() have it.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +3 -0
@@ -272,6 +272,9 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count)u8 *data;int err; +if (!entry || !buf) +return -EINVAL ; +if (is_compat ()) {struct compat_efi_variable *compat;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Greg KH
maintainerRe: [PATCH 4.19, 4.14, 4.9, 4.4 2/2] efi: Add a sanity check to efivar_store_raw()
Quoted 32 lines · Vladis Dronov
commit
d6c066fda90d578aacdf19771a027ed484a79825upstream.Add a sanity check to
efivar_store_raw()the same way efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() andefivar_show_raw()have it.Signed-off-by Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Cc <[email protected]>--- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +3
-0@@ -272,6 +272,9 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count)u8 *data;int err; +if (!entry || !buf) +return -EINVAL ; +if (is_compat ()) {struct compat_efi_variable *compat;Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Now queued up, thanks.
greg k-h