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syscalls/add_key05: add maxbytes/maxkeys test under unprivileged user

PATCH New Yang Xu 3 participants 14 messages Feb 7, 2020 – Mar 20, 2020

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Yang Xu

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 syscalls/add_key05: add maxbytes/maxkeys test under unprivileged user

---
 runtest/syscalls                              |   1 +
 testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/.gitignore  |   1 +
 testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c | 180 ++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 182 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c
runtest/syscalls +1 -0
index 577a4a527..df7bbcbf1 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ add_key01 add_key01
 add_key02 add_key02
 add_key03 add_key03
 add_key04 add_key04
+add_key05 add_key05
 
 adjtimex01 adjtimex01
 adjtimex02 adjtimex02
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/.gitignore +1 -0
index b9a04214d..f57dc2228 100644
@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@
 /add_key02
 /add_key03
 /add_key04
+/add_key05
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +180 -0

180 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.18.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 syscalls/add_key05: add maxbytes/maxkeys test under unprivileged user

Hi!

Quoted 86 lines
runtest/syscalls +1 -0
index 577a4a527..df7bbcbf1 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ add_key01 add_key01
 add_key02 add_key02
 add_key03 add_key03
 add_key04 add_key04
+add_key05 add_key05
 
 adjtimex01 adjtimex01
 adjtimex02 adjtimex02
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/.gitignore +1 -0
index b9a04214d..f57dc2228 100644
@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@
 /add_key02
 /add_key03
 /add_key04
+/add_key05
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +59 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0d5e9db28
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 FUJITSU LIMITED. All rights reserved.
+ * Author: Yang Xu <[email protected]>
+ *
+ *Description:
+ * Test unprivileged user can support the number of keys and the
+ * number of bytes consumed in payloads of the keys.The defalut value
+ * is 200 and 20000.
+ * This is also a regresstion test for
+ * commit a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exact")
+ *
+ */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "lapi/keyctl.h"
+
+static char *user_buf, *user_buf1, *keyring_buf;
+static const char *username = "ltp_add_key05";
+static int user_added;
+struct passwd *ltpuser;
+static unsigned int used_bytes, max_bytes, used_key, max_key, data_len;
+char fmt[1024];
+int flag[2] = {1, 0};
+
+void add_user(void)
+{
+	if (user_added)
+		return;
+
+	const char *const cmd_useradd[] = {"useradd", username, NULL};
+	int rc;
+
+	switch ((rc = tst_run_cmd(cmd_useradd, NULL, NULL, 1))) {
+	case 0:
+		user_added = 1;
+		ltpuser = SAFE_GETPWNAM(username);
+		break;
+	case 1:
+	case 255:
+		break;
+	default:
+		tst_brk(TBROK, "Useradd failed (%d)", rc);
+	}
+	sprintf(fmt, "%5u: %%*5d %%*d/%%*d %%d/%%d %%d/%%d", ltpuser->pw_uid);
+}
+
+void clean_user(void)
+{
+	if (!user_added)
+		return;
+
+	const char *const cmd_userdel[] = {"userdel", "-r", username, NULL};
+
+	if (tst_run_cmd(cmd_userdel, NULL, NULL, 1))
+		tst_res(TWARN | TERRNO, "'userdel -r %s' failed", username);
+	else

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 69

Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +10 -0
+		user_added = 0;
+}
+
+void verify_max_btyes(void)
+{
+	char *buf, *invalid_buf;
+	int plen, invalid_plen;
+
+	tst_res(TINFO, "test max bytes under unprivileged user");
+	invalid_plen = max_bytes - used_bytes - data_len - 8;

What is the -8 for, strlen("test_inv")?

I guess that it will be more readable if we used the strlen() here as well.

Quoted 27 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +27 -0
+	plen = invalid_plen - 1;
+	buf = tst_alloc(plen);
+	invalid_buf = tst_alloc(invalid_plen);
+
+	TEST(add_key("user", "test_inv", invalid_buf, invalid_plen, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+	if (TST_RET != -1)
+		tst_res(TFAIL, "add_key(test_inv) succeeded unexpectedltly");
+	else {
+		if (TST_ERR == EDQUOT)
+			tst_res(TPASS | TTERRNO, "add_key(test_inv) failed as expected");
+		else
+			tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add_key(test_inv) failed expected EDQUOT got");
+	}
+
+	TEST(add_key("user", "test_max", buf, plen, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+	if (TST_RET != -1) {
+		tst_res(TPASS, "add_key(test_max) succeeded as expected");
+		SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF("/proc/key-users", fmt, &used_key, &max_key, &used_bytes, &max_bytes);
+		if (used_bytes == max_bytes)
+			tst_res(TPASS, "allow reaching the max bytes exactly");
+		else
+			tst_res(TFAIL, "max used bytes %u, key allow max bytes %u", used_bytes, max_bytes);
+	} else
+		tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add_key(test_max) failed unexpectedly");
+}
+
+void verify_max_keys(void)

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 106

Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +10 -0
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	char desc[10];
+
+	tst_res(TINFO, "test max keys under unprivileged user");
+	for (i = used_key + 1; i < max_key; i++) {
+		sprintf(desc, "abc%d", i);
+		TEST(add_key("keyring", desc, keyring_buf, 0, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+		if (TST_RET == -1)
+			tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add keyring key(%s) failed", desc);

Why we are using the "keyring" ring here instead? I doubt that it matters for the quota, but it just seems strange.

Also we should stop the loop on a first failure, I guess that goto
count: would suffice.

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 114

Quoted 9 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +9 -0
+	}
+
+	TEST(add_key("keyring", "abc200", keyring_buf, 0, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+
+	if (TST_RET == -1) {
+		tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add keyring key(abc200) failed");
+		goto count;
+	} else
+		tst_res(TPASS, "add keyring key(abc200) succedd");

Why don't we just start the loop above at used_key? There is no point in adding the last key here outside of the loop.

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 119

Quoted 4 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +4 -0
+	TEST(add_key("keyring", "abc201", keyring_buf, 0, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+	if (TST_RET != -1) {
+		tst_res(TFAIL, "add keyring key(abc201) succeeded unexpectedly");
+		goto count;

We should add a key with a different name than the previous "abc%d" pattern here, if the upper limit was over 200 we would just replace a key here instread which will not fail at all.

Quoted 21 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +21 -0
+	} else {
+		if (TST_ERR == EDQUOT)
+			tst_res(TPASS | TTERRNO, "add keyring key(abc201) failed as expected over max key");
+		else
+			tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add_keyring failed expected EDQUOT got");
+	}
+count:
+	SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF("/proc/key-users", fmt, &used_key, &max_key, &used_bytes, &max_bytes);
+	if (used_key == max_key)
+		tst_res(TPASS, "allow reaching the max key exactly");
+	else
+		tst_res(TFAIL, "max used key %u, key allow max key %u", used_key, max_key);
+}
+
+static void do_test(unsigned int n)
+{
+	add_user();
+	int f_used_bytes = 0;
+
+	if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+		SAFE_SETUID(ltpuser->pw_uid);

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 150

Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +10 -0
+
+		TEST(add_key("user", "test1", user_buf, 64, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+		if (TST_RET == -1)
+			tst_brk(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add key test1 failed");
+		SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF("/proc/key-users", fmt, &used_key, &max_key, &used_bytes, &max_bytes);
+		f_used_bytes = used_bytes;
+
+		TEST(add_key("user", "test2", user_buf1, 64, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+		if (TST_RET == -1)
+			tst_brk(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add key test2 failed");

Do we really need to pass a different users_buf to each call?

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 153

Quoted 3 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +3 -0
+		SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF("/proc/key-users", fmt, &used_key, &max_key, &used_bytes, &max_bytes);
+
+		data_len = used_bytes - f_used_bytes - strlen("test1") - 1 - 64;

So this code here is used to determine how much data will consume the key structure in kernel itself? I guess that this is useless to run in the case of testing for maximal number of keys, right? Can we put this code into a function something as get_kernel_key_data_size() and call it from the verify_max_bytes() only?

I guess that the SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF() intializes the max_key for the max_keys test. Having a global variables that are initalized in random places makes the code really confusing, can we avoid that if poissible please?

I guess that we can at least create:

parse_proc_key_users(int *used_keys, int *max_key, int *used_bytes, *int max_bytes)

function that would read the values into a local variables and copy the results only if non-NULL pointers were passed.

That way the verify_max_keys() would call:
parse_proc_key_users(NULL, &max_keys, NULL, NULL); and use the result for the loop that adds the keys.

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 154

Quoted 1 line
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +1 -0
+		if (flag[n])

Huh, why not just if (n)?

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 161

Quoted 7 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +7 -0
+			verify_max_btyes();
+		else
+			verify_max_keys();
+		exit(0);
+	}
+	tst_reap_children();
+	clean_user();

What is the reason to add and remove a user for each iteration?

Aare you cleaning the keys that way?

Quoted 27 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +19 -0
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+	.test = do_test,
+	.tcnt = 2,
+	.needs_root = 1,
+	.forks_child = 1,
+	.cleanup = clean_user,
+	.bufs = (struct tst_buffers []) {
+		{&keyring_buf, .size = 1},
+		{&user_buf, .size = 64},
+		{&user_buf1, .size = 64},
+		{}
+	},
+	.tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
+		{"linux-git", "a08bf91ce28"},
+		{}
+	}
+};
Signature · 7 lines
2.18.0




-- 
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
Signature · 2 lines
Cyril Hrubis
[email protected]
author
#2 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 syscalls/add_key05: add maxbytes/maxkeys test under unprivileged user

Hi!

Quoted 13 lines

Hi!

runtest/syscalls

Quoted 10 lines
runtest/syscalls +7 -1
index 577a4a527..df7bbcbf1 100644
--
+void verify_max_btyes(void)
+{
+	char *buf, *invalid_buf;
+	int plen, invalid_plen;
+
+	tst_res(TINFO, "test max bytes under unprivileged user");
+	invalid_plen = max_bytes - used_bytes - data_len - 8;

What is the -8 for, strlen("test_inv")?

Yes.

Quoted 3 lines

I guess that it will be more readable if we used the strlen() here as well.

OK. I will use strlen.

Quoted 33 lines
Quoted 33 lines
runtest/syscalls +32 -0
+	plen = invalid_plen - 1;
+	buf = tst_alloc(plen);
+	invalid_buf = tst_alloc(invalid_plen);
+
+	TEST(add_key("user", "test_inv", invalid_buf, invalid_plen, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+	if (TST_RET != -1)
+		tst_res(TFAIL, "add_key(test_inv) succeeded unexpectedltly");
+	else {
+		if (TST_ERR == EDQUOT)
+			tst_res(TPASS | TTERRNO, "add_key(test_inv) failed as expected");
+		else
+			tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add_key(test_inv) failed expected EDQUOT got");
+	}
+
+	TEST(add_key("user", "test_max", buf, plen, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+	if (TST_RET != -1) {
+		tst_res(TPASS, "add_key(test_max) succeeded as expected");
+		SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF("/proc/key-users", fmt, &used_key, &max_key, &used_bytes, &max_bytes);
+		if (used_bytes == max_bytes)
+			tst_res(TPASS, "allow reaching the max bytes exactly");
+		else
+			tst_res(TFAIL, "max used bytes %u, key allow max bytes %u", used_bytes, max_bytes);
+	} else
+		tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add_key(test_max) failed unexpectedly");
+}
+
+void verify_max_keys(void)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	char desc[10];
+
+	tst_res(TINFO, "test max keys under unprivileged user");
Quoted 8 lines

runtest/syscalls

Quoted 5 lines
runtest/syscalls +5 -0
+	for (i = used_key + 1; i < max_key; i++) {
+		sprintf(desc, "abc%d", i);
+		TEST(add_key("keyring", desc, keyring_buf, 0, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+		if (TST_RET == -1)
+			tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add keyring key(%s) failed", desc);

Why we are using the "keyring" ring here instead? I doubt that it matters for the quota, but it just seems strange.

It doesn't matter quota, only because "keyrings" plen is 0. I will use "user" type for this.

Quoted 3 lines

Also we should stop the loop on a first failure, I guess that goto
count: would suffice.

I ignored this before, thanks.

Quoted 14 lines

runtest/syscalls

Quoted 10 lines
runtest/syscalls +9 -0
+	}
+
+	TEST(add_key("keyring", "abc200", keyring_buf, 0, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+
+	if (TST_RET == -1) {
+		tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add keyring key(abc200) failed");
+		goto count;
+	} else
+		tst_res(TPASS, "add keyring key(abc200) succedd");

Why don't we just start the loop above at used_key? There is no point in adding the last key here outside of the loop.

Using start + 1 more clean?
abc100 >> the 100th key,
We can change code (including last key)as below:
for (i = used_key + 1; i <= max_key; i ++)

Quoted 8 lines

runtest/syscalls

Quoted 4 lines
runtest/syscalls +4 -0
+	TEST(add_key("keyring", "abc201", keyring_buf, 0, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+	if (TST_RET != -1) {
+		tst_res(TFAIL, "add keyring key(abc201) succeeded unexpectedly");
+		goto count;

We should add a key with a different name than the previous "abc%d" pattern here, if the upper limit was over 200 we would just replace a key here instread which will not fail at all.

Do you mean to use "invalid_num_key" to avoid upper limit over 200?

Quoted 26 lines
Quoted 26 lines
runtest/syscalls +25 -0
+	} else {
+		if (TST_ERR == EDQUOT)
+			tst_res(TPASS | TTERRNO, "add keyring key(abc201) failed as expected over max key");
+		else
+			tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add_keyring failed expected EDQUOT got");
+	}
+count:
+	SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF("/proc/key-users", fmt, &used_key, &max_key, &used_bytes, &max_bytes);
+	if (used_key == max_key)
+		tst_res(TPASS, "allow reaching the max key exactly");
+	else
+		tst_res(TFAIL, "max used key %u, key allow max key %u", used_key, max_key);
+}
+
+static void do_test(unsigned int n)
+{
+	add_user();
+	int f_used_bytes = 0;
+
+	if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+		SAFE_SETUID(ltpuser->pw_uid);
+
+		TEST(add_key("user", "test1", user_buf, 64, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+		if (TST_RET == -1)
+			tst_brk(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add key test1 failed");
Quoted 8 lines

runtest/syscalls

Quoted 6 lines
runtest/syscalls +6 -0
+		SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF("/proc/key-users", fmt, &used_key, &max_key, &used_bytes, &max_bytes);
+		f_used_bytes = used_bytes;
+
+		TEST(add_key("user", "test2", user_buf1, 64, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+		if (TST_RET == -1)
+			tst_brk(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add key test2 failed");

Do we really need to pass a different users_buf to each call?

I have seen kernel code, payload is used to instantiate or update the key, I think it is no problme to use the same buf because we don't get it again from kernel space.

Quoted 7 lines

runtest/syscalls

Quoted 4 lines
runtest/syscalls +3 -0
+		SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF("/proc/key-users", fmt, &used_key, &max_key, &used_bytes, &max_bytes);
+
+		data_len = used_bytes - f_used_bytes - strlen("test1") - 1 - 64;

So this code here is used to determine how much data will consume the key structure in kernel itself?

I debug this code after adding test1 key, show in /proc/keys
add_key05.c:154: INFO: 1535d151 I--Q--- 24 perm 3f030000 0 0
keyring _ses: 1

add_key05.c:154: INFO: 15d7df09 I--Q--- 6 perm 1f3f0000 0 65534
keyring _uid.0: empty

add_key05.c:154: INFO: 1a300c72 I--Q--- 1 perm 3f010000 1003 0
user test1: 64

add_key05.c:154: INFO: 2e57738c I--Q--- 1 perm 3f010000 1003 0
keyring _tid: 1

the key num is 2 in /proc/key-users, I use this code to figure keyring
_tid: 1(I don't know why has it) consumed data bytes.
I guess that this is useless to run in

Quoted 3 lines

the case of testing for maximal number of keys, right? Can we put this code into a function something as get_kernel_key_data_size() and call it from the verify_max_bytes() only?

Yes, it was only used in max_bytes.

Quoted 5 lines

I guess that the SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF() intializes the max_key for the max_keys test. Having a global variables that are initalized in random places makes the code really confusing, can we avoid that if poissible please?

Ok. I will avoid this and make code clean.

Quoted 11 lines

I guess that we can at least create:

parse_proc_key_users(int *used_keys, int *max_key, int *used_bytes, *int max_bytes)

function that would read the values into a local variables and copy the results only if non-NULL pointers were passed.

That way the verify_max_keys() would call:
parse_proc_key_users(NULL, &max_keys, NULL, NULL); and use the result for the loop that adds the keys.

Sound good, I will use it.

Quoted 5 lines

runtest/syscalls

Quoted 2 lines
runtest/syscalls +1 -0
+		if (flag[n])

Huh, why not just if (n)?

OK.

Quoted 11 lines

runtest/syscalls

Quoted 7 lines
runtest/syscalls +7 -0
+			verify_max_btyes();
+		else
+			verify_max_keys();
+		exit(0);
+	}
+	tst_reap_children();
+	clean_user();

What is the reason to add and remove a user for each iteration?

Aare you cleaning the keys that way?

Yes, I planed to look for a wise (try KEYCTL_CLEAR
or KEYCTL_INVALIDATE)way but failed. Can you give me some
suggestion?

Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 28 lines
runtest/syscalls +19 -0
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+	.test = do_test,
+	.tcnt = 2,
+	.needs_root = 1,
+	.forks_child = 1,
+	.cleanup = clean_user,
+	.bufs = (struct tst_buffers []) {
+		{&keyring_buf, .size = 1},
+		{&user_buf, .size = 64},
+		{&user_buf1, .size = 64},
+		{}
+	},
+	.tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
+		{"linux-git", "a08bf91ce28"},
+		{}
+	}
+};
Signature · 7 lines
2.18.0




-- 
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
author
#3 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 syscalls/add_key05: add maxbytes/maxkeys test under unprivileged user

Hi!

Quoted 149 lines

Hi!

Quoted 13 lines

Hi!

runtest/syscalls

Quoted 10 lines
runtest/syscalls +0 -0
index 577a4a527..df7bbcbf1 100644
runtest/syscalls +7 -0
+void verify_max_btyes(void)
+{
+??? char *buf, *invalid_buf;
+??? int plen, invalid_plen;
+
+??? tst_res(TINFO, "test max bytes under unprivileged user");
+??? invalid_plen = max_bytes - used_bytes - data_len - 8;

What is the -8 for, strlen("test_inv")?

Yes.

Quoted 3 lines

I guess that it will be more readable if we used the strlen() here as well.

OK. I will use strlen.

Quoted 42 lines
Quoted 42 lines

+??? plen = invalid_plen - 1;
+??? buf = tst_alloc(plen);
+??? invalid_buf = tst_alloc(invalid_plen);
+
+??? TEST(add_key("user", "test_inv", invalid_buf, invalid_plen, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+??? if (TST_RET != -1)
+??????? tst_res(TFAIL, "add_key(test_inv) succeeded unexpectedltly"); +??? else {
+??????? if (TST_ERR == EDQUOT)
+??????????? tst_res(TPASS | TTERRNO, "add_key(test_inv) failed as expected");
+??????? else
+??????????? tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add_key(test_inv) failed expected EDQUOT got");
+??? }
+
+??? TEST(add_key("user", "test_max", buf, plen, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+??? if (TST_RET != -1) {
+??????? tst_res(TPASS, "add_key(test_max) succeeded as expected"); +??????? SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF("/proc/key-users", fmt, &used_key, &max_key, &used_bytes, &max_bytes);
+??????? if (used_bytes == max_bytes)
+??????????? tst_res(TPASS, "allow reaching the max bytes exactly"); +??????? else
+??????????? tst_res(TFAIL, "max used bytes %u, key allow max bytes %u", used_bytes, max_bytes);
+??? } else
+??????? tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add_key(test_max) failed unexpectedly");

runtest/syscalls +10 -0
+}
+
+void verify_max_keys(void)
+{
+??? unsigned int i;
+??? char desc[10];
+
+??? tst_res(TINFO, "test max keys under unprivileged user");
+??? for (i = used_key + 1; i < max_key; i++) {
+??????? sprintf(desc, "abc%d", i);
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

+??????? TEST(add_key("keyring", desc, keyring_buf, 0, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+??????? if (TST_RET == -1)
+??????????? tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add keyring key(%s) failed", desc);

Why we are using the "keyring" ring here instead? I doubt that it matters for the quota, but it just seems strange.

It doesn't matter quota, only because "keyrings" plen is 0. I will use "user" type for this.
?>

Quoted 2 lines

Also we should stop the loop on a first failure, I guess that goto
count: would suffice.

I ignored this before, thanks.

Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 11 lines

+??? }
+
+??? TEST(add_key("keyring", "abc200", keyring_buf, 0, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+
+??? if (TST_RET == -1) {
+??????? tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add keyring key(abc200) failed"); +??????? goto count;
+??? } else
+??????? tst_res(TPASS, "add keyring key(abc200) succedd");

Why don't we just start the loop above at used_key? There is no point in adding the last key here outside of the loop.

Using start + 1 more clean?
abc100 >> the 100th key,
We can change code (including last key)as below:
for (i = used_key + 1; i <= max_key; i ++)

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 6 lines

+??? TEST(add_key("keyring", "abc201", keyring_buf, 0, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+??? if (TST_RET != -1) {
+??????? tst_res(TFAIL, "add keyring key(abc201) succeeded unexpectedly");
+??????? goto count;

We should add a key with a different name than the previous "abc%d" pattern here, if the upper limit was over 200 we would just replace a key here instread which will not fail at all.

Do you mean to use? "invalid_num_key" to avoid upper limit over 200?

Quoted 33 lines
Quoted 33 lines

+??? } else {
+??????? if (TST_ERR == EDQUOT)
+??????????? tst_res(TPASS | TTERRNO, "add keyring key(abc201) failed as expected over max key");
+??????? else
+??????????? tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add_keyring failed expected EDQUOT got");
+??? }
+count:
+??? SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF("/proc/key-users", fmt, &used_key, &max_key, &used_bytes, &max_bytes);
+??? if (used_key == max_key)
+??????? tst_res(TPASS, "allow reaching the max key exactly"); +??? else
+??????? tst_res(TFAIL, "max used key %u, key allow max key %u", used_key, max_key);

runtest/syscalls +11 -0
+}
+
+static void do_test(unsigned int n)
+{
+??? add_user();
+??? int f_used_bytes = 0;
+
+??? if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+??????? SAFE_SETUID(ltpuser->pw_uid);
+
+??????? TEST(add_key("user", "test1", user_buf, 64, 

KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+??????? if (TST_RET == -1)
+??????????? tst_brk(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add key test1 failed"); +??????? SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF("/proc/key-users", fmt, &used_key, &max_key, &used_bytes, &max_bytes);

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

+??????? f_used_bytes = used_bytes;
+
+??????? TEST(add_key("user", "test2", user_buf1, 64, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+??????? if (TST_RET == -1)
+??????????? tst_brk(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add key test2 failed");

Do we really need to pass a different users_buf to each call?

Quoted 12 lines

I have seen kernel code, payload is used to instantiate or update the key, I think it is no problme to use the same buf because we don't get it again from kernel space.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines

+??????? SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF("/proc/key-users", fmt, &used_key, &max_key, &used_bytes, &max_bytes);
+
+??????? data_len = used_bytes - f_used_bytes - strlen("test1") - 1 - 64;

So this code here is used to determine how much data will consume the key structure in kernel itself?

Sorry for the wrong info. This code is designed to compute delta, I have seen kernel code yestorday:
add_key calltrace as below:
add_key()
key_create_or_update()

     key_alloc()
     __key_instantiate_and_link
       generic_key_instantiate
         key_payload_reserve
           ......

In key_alloc, we use type->def_datalen to alloc space, but when instantiating key, we using delta(quota_len -type->def_datalen) to adjust reserver space. So I compute this variable(delta, add_key05.c uses data_len) to avoid that we can reach max bytes in key_alloc but got EDQOUT in key_payload_reserve.

more info:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst#n1353

Also, using my v2 patch(send later), this case also fails on lastest kernel because of incomplete kernel commit.

more info:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11411507/

Best Regards
Yang Xu

Quoted 88 lines

I debug this code after adding test1 key, show in /proc/keys add_key05.c:154: INFO: 1535d151 I--Q---??? 24 perm 3f030000???? 0???? 0 keyring?? _ses: 1

add_key05.c:154: INFO: 15d7df09 I--Q---???? 6 perm 1f3f0000???? 0 65534 keyring?? _uid.0: empty

add_key05.c:154: INFO: 1a300c72 I--Q---???? 1 perm 3f010000? 1003???? 0 user????? test1: 64

add_key05.c:154: INFO: 2e57738c I--Q---???? 1 perm 3f010000? 1003???? 0 keyring?? _tid: 1

the key num is 2 in /proc/key-users, I use this code to figure keyring
?_tid: 1(I don't know why has it) consumed data bytes.
I guess that this is useless to run in

Quoted 3 lines

the case of testing for maximal number of keys, right? Can we put this code into a function something as get_kernel_key_data_size() and call it from the verify_max_bytes() only?

Yes, it was only used in max_bytes.

Quoted 5 lines

I guess that the SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF() intializes the max_key for the max_keys test. Having a global variables that are initalized in random places makes the code really confusing, can we avoid that if poissible please?

Ok. I will avoid this and make code clean.

Quoted 6 lines

I guess that we can at least create:

parse_proc_key_users(int *used_keys, int *max_key, int *used_bytes, *int max_bytes)

Quoted 6 lines

function that would read the values into a local variables and copy the results only if non-NULL pointers were passed.

That way the verify_max_keys() would call:
parse_proc_key_users(NULL, &max_keys, NULL, NULL); and use the result for the loop that adds the keys.

Sound good, I will use it.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

+??????? if (flag[n])

Huh, why not just if (n)?

OK.

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 7 lines

+??????????? verify_max_btyes();
+??????? else
+??????????? verify_max_keys();
+??????? exit(0);
+??? }
+??? tst_reap_children();
+??? clean_user();

What is the reason to add and remove a user for each iteration?

Aare you cleaning the keys that way?

Yes, I planed to look for a wise (try KEYCTL_CLEAR
?or KEYCTL_INVALIDATE)way but failed. Can you give me some
suggestion?

Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 28 lines
runtest/syscalls +19 -0
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+??? .test = do_test,
+??? .tcnt = 2,
+??? .needs_root = 1,
+??? .forks_child = 1,
+??? .cleanup = clean_user,
+??? .bufs = (struct tst_buffers []) {
+??????? {&keyring_buf, .size = 1},
+??????? {&user_buf, .size = 64},
+??????? {&user_buf1, .size = 64},
+??????? {}
+??? },
+??? .tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
+??????? {"linux-git", "a08bf91ce28"},
+??????? {}
+??? }
+};
Signature · 7 lines
2.18.0




-- 
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
author
#4 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 syscalls/add_key05: add maxbytes/maxkeys test under unprivileged user

In reply to Cyril Hrubis

This case is designed to test whether we can reach maxbytes/maxkeys quota exactly under unprivileged users. It is a regression test for commit a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly"). But this kenrel commit is a incomplete fix, it still fails on 5.6.3-rc1. Fix patch[1] is still under review.

[1]https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11411507/

---
v1->v2:
1. using parse_proc_key_user
2. add some messages about delta(v1 uses data_len)
3. fix something pointed by Cyril

 runtest/syscalls                              |   1 +
 testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/.gitignore  |   1 +
 testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c | 211 ++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 213 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c
runtest/syscalls +1 -0
index a9faf1e25..0462a08ef 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ add_key01 add_key01
 add_key02 add_key02
 add_key03 add_key03
 add_key04 add_key04
+add_key05 add_key05
 
 adjtimex01 adjtimex01
 adjtimex02 adjtimex02
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/.gitignore +1 -0
index b9a04214d..f57dc2228 100644
@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@
 /add_key02
 /add_key03
 /add_key04
+/add_key05
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +211 -0

211 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.18.0
#5 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 syscalls/add_key05: add maxbytes/maxkeys test under unprivileged user

Hi Xu,

thanks for your patch.

Quoted 7 lines

This case is designed to test whether we can reach maxbytes/maxkeys quota exactly under unprivileged users. It is a regression test for commit a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly"). But this kenrel commit is a incomplete fix, it still fails on 5.6.3-rc1. Fix patch[1] is still under review.

[1]https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11411507/

It's already in next tree, congratulations :).
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?h=next-20200317&id=2e356101e72ab1361821b3af024d64877d9a798d

Quoted 6 lines

---
v1->v2:
1. using parse_proc_key_user
2. add some messages about delta(v1 uses data_len)
3. fix something pointed by Cyril

...

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 6

Quoted 8 lines

+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +6 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 FUJITSU LIMITED. All rights reserved.
+ * Author: Yang Xu <[email protected]>
+ *
+ *Description:

Few formatting like comments (sorry for pointing out unimportant nits, but with little care it can be avoided, of course this can be fixed by person who merges):
nit: missing space after *. I also tend to avoid text like "Description" (it's obvious it's a description).

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 8

Quoted 2 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +2 -0
+ * Test unprivileged user can support the number of keys and the
+ * number of bytes consumed in payloads of the keys.The defalut value

nit: missing space after dot.

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 11

Quoted 3 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +3 -0
+ * is 200 and 20000.
+ * This is also a regresstion test for
+ * commit a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly")

It's not bad to mention this commit, but maybe not needed since there is linux-git tag.

Review line 12

Quoted 1 line
(quoted diff) +1 -0
+ *

Why extra line with * ?

Quoted 24 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +24 -0
+ */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "lapi/keyctl.h"
+
+static char *user_buf;
+static const char *username = "ltp_add_key05";
+static int user_added;
+struct passwd *ltpuser;
+static char fmt[1024];
+
+static void add_user(void)
+{
+	if (user_added)
+		return;
+
+	const char *const cmd_useradd[] = {"useradd", username, NULL};
+	int rc;
+
+	switch ((rc = tst_run_cmd(cmd_useradd, NULL, NULL, 1))) {
+	case 0:
+		user_added = 1;

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 46

Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +10 -0
+		ltpuser = SAFE_GETPWNAM(username);
+		break;
+	case 1:
+	case 255:
+		break;
+	default:
+		tst_brk(TBROK, "Useradd failed (%d)", rc);
+	}
+	sprintf(fmt, "%5u: %%*5d %%*d/%%*d %%d/%%d %%d/%%d", ltpuser->pw_uid);
+}

I've been planning to add functionality like this to the library for some time. (there is identical code in setpriority01.c and other tests would benefit from that). But no need to stop this patch just for this, I've created issue for it:
https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp/issues/468

Quoted 71 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +71 -0
+
+static void clean_user(void)
+{
+	if (!user_added)
+		return;
+
+	const char *const cmd_userdel[] = {"userdel", "-r", username, NULL};
+
+	if (tst_run_cmd(cmd_userdel, NULL, NULL, 1))
+		tst_res(TWARN | TERRNO, "'userdel -r %s' failed", username);
+	else
+		user_added = 0;
+}
+
+static inline void parse_proc_key_users(int *used_key, int *max_key, int *used_bytes, int *max_bytes)
+{
+	unsigned int val[4];
+	SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF("/proc/key-users", fmt, &val[0], &val[1], &val[2], &val[3]);
+
+	if (used_key)
+		*used_key = val[0];
+	if (max_key)
+		*max_key = val[1];
+	if (used_bytes)
+		*used_bytes = val[2];
+	if (max_bytes)
+		*max_bytes = val[3];
+}
+
+static void verify_max_btyes(void)
+{
+	char *buf;
+	int plen, invalid_plen, delta;
+	int used_bytes, max_bytes, tmp_used_bytes;
+
+	tst_res(TINFO, "test max bytes under unprivileged user");
+
+	parse_proc_key_users(NULL, NULL, &tmp_used_bytes, NULL);
+	TEST(add_key("user", "test2", user_buf, 64, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+	if (TST_RET == -1) {
+		tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add key test2 failed");
+		return;
+	}
+	parse_proc_key_users(NULL, NULL, &used_bytes, &max_bytes);
+
+	/*
+	 * Compute delta between default datalen(in key_alloc) and actual
+	 * datlen(in key_payload_reserve).
+	 * more info see kernel code: security/keys/key.c
+	 */
+	delta = used_bytes - tmp_used_bytes - strlen("test2") - 1 - 64;
+	invalid_plen = max_bytes - used_bytes - delta - strlen("test_xxx");
+	buf = tst_alloc(invalid_plen);
+
+	TEST(add_key("user", "test_inv", buf, invalid_plen, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+	if (TST_RET != -1) {
+		tst_res(TFAIL, "add_key(test_inv) succeeded unexpectedltly");
+		return;
+	}
+	if (TST_ERR == EDQUOT)
+		tst_res(TPASS | TTERRNO, "add_key(test_inv) failed as expected");
+	else
+		tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add_key(test_inv) failed expected EDQUOT got");
+
+	/*Reset delta*/
+	TEST(add_key("user", "test3", user_buf, 64, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+	if (TST_RET == -1) {
+		tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add key test3 failed");
+		return;
+	}
+	TEST(add_key("user", "test4", user_buf, 64, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 127

Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +10 -0
+	if (TST_RET == -1) {
+		tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add key test4 failed");
+		return;
+	}
+	parse_proc_key_users(NULL, NULL, &used_bytes, &max_bytes);
+	plen = max_bytes - used_bytes - delta - strlen("test_xxx") - 1;
+	TEST(add_key("user", "test_max", buf, plen, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+	if (TST_RET == -1) {
+		 tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add_key(test_max) failed unexpectedly");
+		 return;

Hm, I get this failure, I guess both are because missing your fix 2e356101e72ab1361821b3af024d64877d9a798d, right?

add_key05.c:106: PASS: add_key(test_inv) failed as expected: EDQUOT (122) add_key05.c:125: FAIL: add_key(test_max) failed unexpectedly: EDQUOT (122) no crontab for ltp_add_key05
userdel: ltp_add_key05 home directory (/home/ltp_add_key05) not found

Tested on tmpfs and ext4 on openSUSE (5.5.7-1-default):

Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 useradd[28122]: new user: name=ltp_add_key05, UID=1001, GID=100, home=/home/ltp_add_key05, shell=/bin/bash, from=/dev/pts/3
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/passwd` was written to
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/passwd` was moved into place, adding watch
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/group` was written to
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/passwd` (35)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/group` (3)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/passwd` (35)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/group` (3)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 crontab[28135]: (root) DELETE (ltp_add_key05)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 userdel[28133]: delete user 'ltp_add_key05'
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/passwd` was written to
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/passwd` was moved into place, adding watch
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/group` was written to
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/passwd` (36)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/group` (3)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/passwd` (36)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/group` (3)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 useradd[28145]: new user: name=ltp_add_key05, UID=1001, GID=100, home=/home/ltp_add_key05, shell=/bin/bash, from=/dev/pts/3
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/passwd` was written to
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/passwd` was moved into place, adding watch
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/group` was written to
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/passwd` (37)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/group` (3)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/passwd` (37)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/group` (3)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 crontab[28158]: (root) DELETE (ltp_add_key05)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 userdel[28156]: delete user 'ltp_add_key05'
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/passwd` was written to
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/passwd` was moved into place, adding watch
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/group` was written to
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/passwd` (38)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/group` (3)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/passwd` (38)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/group` (3)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)

Also failed on Debian (5.3.0-rc3+)
add_key05.c:82: INFO: test max bytes under unprivileged user add_key05.c:107: PASS: add_key(test_inv) failed as expected: EDQUOT (122) add_key05.c:126: FAIL: add_key(test_max) failed unexpectedly: EDQUOT (122)
userdel: ltp_add_key05 mail spool (/var/mail/ltp_add_key05) not found
userdel: ltp_add_key05 home directory (/home/ltp_add_key05) not found

Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing useradd[969]: new group: name=ltp_add_key05, GID=1002
Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing useradd[969]: new user: name=ltp_add_key05, UID=1002, GID=1002, home=/home/ltp_add_key05, shell=
Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing userdel[975]: delete user 'ltp_add_key05'
Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing userdel[975]: removed group 'ltp_add_key05' owned by 'ltp_add_key05'
Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing userdel[975]: removed shadow group 'ltp_add_key05' owned by 'ltp_add_key05'
Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing useradd[980]: new group: name=ltp_add_key05, GID=1002
Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing useradd[980]: new user: name=ltp_add_key05, UID=1002, GID=1002, home=/home/ltp_add_key05, shell=
Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing userdel[986]: delete user 'ltp_add_key05'
Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing userdel[986]: removed group 'ltp_add_key05' owned by 'ltp_add_key05'
Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing userdel[986]: removed shadow group 'ltp_add_key05' owned by 'ltp_add_key05'

The rest looks ok to me.

Kind regards,
Petr

author
#6 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 syscalls/add_key05: add maxbytes/maxkeys test under unprivileged user

Hi Petr

Quoted 10 lines

Hi Xu,

thanks for your patch.

Quoted 5 lines

This case is designed to test whether we can reach maxbytes/maxkeys quota exactly under unprivileged users. It is a regression test for commit a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly"). But this kenrel commit is a incomplete fix, it still fails on 5.6.3-rc1. Fix patch[1] is still under review.

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line

[1]https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11411507/

It's already in next tree, congratulations :).
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?h=next-20200317&id=2e356101e72ab1361821b3af024d64877d9a798d

Thanks.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines

---
v1->v2:
1. using parse_proc_key_user
2. add some messages about delta(v1 uses data_len)
3. fix something pointed by Cyril

...

Quoted 12 lines

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 6

Quoted 8 lines

+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +6 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 FUJITSU LIMITED. All rights reserved.
+ * Author: Yang Xu <[email protected]>
+ *
+ *Description:

Few formatting like comments (sorry for pointing out unimportant nits, but with little care it can be avoided, of course this can be fixed by person who merges):
nit: missing space after *. I also tend to avoid text like "Description" (it's obvious it's a description).

Right, I will remove "Description:".

Quoted 9 lines

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 8

Quoted 2 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +2 -0
+ * Test unprivileged user can support the number of keys and the
+ * number of bytes consumed in payloads of the keys.The defalut value

nit: missing space after dot.

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 11

Quoted 3 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +3 -0
+ * is 200 and 20000.
+ * This is also a regresstion test for
+ * commit a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly")

It's not bad to mention this commit, but maybe not needed since there is linux-git tag.

I prefer to keep it, it is more clear for user.

Quoted 2 lines

Review line 12

Quoted 1 line
(quoted diff) +1 -0
+ *

Why extra line with * ?

I will remove it.

Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 30 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +30 -0
+ */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "lapi/keyctl.h"
+
+static char *user_buf;
+static const char *username = "ltp_add_key05";
+static int user_added;
+struct passwd *ltpuser;
+static char fmt[1024];
+
+static void add_user(void)
+{
+	if (user_added)
+		return;
+
+	const char *const cmd_useradd[] = {"useradd", username, NULL};
+	int rc;
+
+	switch ((rc = tst_run_cmd(cmd_useradd, NULL, NULL, 1))) {
+	case 0:
+		user_added = 1;
+		ltpuser = SAFE_GETPWNAM(username);
+		break;
+	case 1:
+	case 255:
+		break;
+	default:
Quoted 9 lines

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 46

Quoted 4 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +4 -0
+		tst_brk(TBROK, "Useradd failed (%d)", rc);
+	}
+	sprintf(fmt, "%5u: %%*5d %%*d/%%*d %%d/%%d %%d/%%d", ltpuser->pw_uid);
+}

I've been planning to add functionality like this to the library for some time. (there is identical code in setpriority01.c and other tests would benefit from that). But no need to stop this patch just for this, I've created issue for it:
https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp/issues/468

That't great.

Quoted 75 lines
Quoted 75 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +75 -0
+
+static void clean_user(void)
+{
+	if (!user_added)
+		return;
+
+	const char *const cmd_userdel[] = {"userdel", "-r", username, NULL};
+
+	if (tst_run_cmd(cmd_userdel, NULL, NULL, 1))
+		tst_res(TWARN | TERRNO, "'userdel -r %s' failed", username);
+	else
+		user_added = 0;
+}
+
+static inline void parse_proc_key_users(int *used_key, int *max_key, int *used_bytes, int *max_bytes)
+{
+	unsigned int val[4];
+	SAFE_FILE_LINES_SCANF("/proc/key-users", fmt, &val[0], &val[1], &val[2], &val[3]);
+
+	if (used_key)
+		*used_key = val[0];
+	if (max_key)
+		*max_key = val[1];
+	if (used_bytes)
+		*used_bytes = val[2];
+	if (max_bytes)
+		*max_bytes = val[3];
+}
+
+static void verify_max_btyes(void)
+{
+	char *buf;
+	int plen, invalid_plen, delta;
+	int used_bytes, max_bytes, tmp_used_bytes;
+
+	tst_res(TINFO, "test max bytes under unprivileged user");
+
+	parse_proc_key_users(NULL, NULL, &tmp_used_bytes, NULL);
+	TEST(add_key("user", "test2", user_buf, 64, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+	if (TST_RET == -1) {
+		tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add key test2 failed");
+		return;
+	}
+	parse_proc_key_users(NULL, NULL, &used_bytes, &max_bytes);
+
+	/*
+	 * Compute delta between default datalen(in key_alloc) and actual
+	 * datlen(in key_payload_reserve).
+	 * more info see kernel code: security/keys/key.c
+	 */
+	delta = used_bytes - tmp_used_bytes - strlen("test2") - 1 - 64;
+	invalid_plen = max_bytes - used_bytes - delta - strlen("test_xxx");
+	buf = tst_alloc(invalid_plen);
+
+	TEST(add_key("user", "test_inv", buf, invalid_plen, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+	if (TST_RET != -1) {
+		tst_res(TFAIL, "add_key(test_inv) succeeded unexpectedltly");
+		return;
+	}
+	if (TST_ERR == EDQUOT)
+		tst_res(TPASS | TTERRNO, "add_key(test_inv) failed as expected");
+	else
+		tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add_key(test_inv) failed expected EDQUOT got");
+
+	/*Reset delta*/
+	TEST(add_key("user", "test3", user_buf, 64, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+	if (TST_RET == -1) {
+		tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add key test3 failed");
+		return;
+	}
+	TEST(add_key("user", "test4", user_buf, 64, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+	if (TST_RET == -1) {
+		tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add key test4 failed");
+		return;
+	}
Quoted 8 lines

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 127

Quoted 6 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +6 -0
+	parse_proc_key_users(NULL, NULL, &used_bytes, &max_bytes);
+	plen = max_bytes - used_bytes - delta - strlen("test_xxx") - 1;
+	TEST(add_key("user", "test_max", buf, plen, KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING));
+	if (TST_RET == -1) {
+		 tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO, "add_key(test_max) failed unexpectedly");
+		 return;

Hm, I get this failure, I guess both are because missing your fix 2e356101e72ab1361821b3af024d64877d9a798d, right?

Yes, if your kernel is only with commit ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exact"), add_key(test_max) will fail because we don't remove this limit when initializing the key.

Quoted 77 lines

add_key05.c:106: PASS: add_key(test_inv) failed as expected: EDQUOT (122) add_key05.c:125: FAIL: add_key(test_max) failed unexpectedly: EDQUOT (122) no crontab for ltp_add_key05
userdel: ltp_add_key05 home directory (/home/ltp_add_key05) not found

Tested on tmpfs and ext4 on openSUSE (5.5.7-1-default):

Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 useradd[28122]: new user: name=ltp_add_key05, UID=1001, GID=100, home=/home/ltp_add_key05, shell=/bin/bash, from=/dev/pts/3
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/passwd` was written to
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/passwd` was moved into place, adding watch
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/group` was written to
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/passwd` (35)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/group` (3)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/passwd` (35)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/group` (3)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 crontab[28135]: (root) DELETE (ltp_add_key05)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 userdel[28133]: delete user 'ltp_add_key05'
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/passwd` was written to
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/passwd` was moved into place, adding watch
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/group` was written to
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/passwd` (36)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/group` (3)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/passwd` (36)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/group` (3)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 useradd[28145]: new user: name=ltp_add_key05, UID=1001, GID=100, home=/home/ltp_add_key05, shell=/bin/bash, from=/dev/pts/3
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/passwd` was written to
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/passwd` was moved into place, adding watch
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/group` was written to
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/passwd` (37)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/group` (3)
Mar 17 12:54:52 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/passwd` (37)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/group` (3)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 crontab[28158]: (root) DELETE (ltp_add_key05)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 userdel[28156]: delete user 'ltp_add_key05'
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/passwd` was written to
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/passwd` was moved into place, adding watch
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitored file `/etc/group` was written to
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/passwd` (38)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/group` (3)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/passwd` (38)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring file `/etc/group` (3)
Mar 17 12:54:53 dell5510 nscd[1781]: 1781 monitoring directory `/etc` (2)

Also failed on Debian (5.3.0-rc3+)
add_key05.c:82: INFO: test max bytes under unprivileged user add_key05.c:107: PASS: add_key(test_inv) failed as expected: EDQUOT (122) add_key05.c:126: FAIL: add_key(test_max) failed unexpectedly: EDQUOT (122)
userdel: ltp_add_key05 mail spool (/var/mail/ltp_add_key05) not found
userdel: ltp_add_key05 home directory (/home/ltp_add_key05) not found

Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing useradd[969]: new group: name=ltp_add_key05, GID=1002
Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing useradd[969]: new user: name=ltp_add_key05, UID=1002, GID=1002, home=/home/ltp_add_key05, shell=
Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing userdel[975]: delete user 'ltp_add_key05'
Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing userdel[975]: removed group 'ltp_add_key05' owned by 'ltp_add_key05'
Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing userdel[975]: removed shadow group 'ltp_add_key05' owned by 'ltp_add_key05'
Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing useradd[980]: new group: name=ltp_add_key05, GID=1002
Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing useradd[980]: new user: name=ltp_add_key05, UID=1002, GID=1002, home=/home/ltp_add_key05, shell=
Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing userdel[986]: delete user 'ltp_add_key05'
Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing userdel[986]: removed group 'ltp_add_key05' owned by 'ltp_add_key05'
Mar 17 11:58:32 debian-testing userdel[986]: removed shadow group 'ltp_add_key05' owned by 'ltp_add_key05'
Quoted 1 line

The rest looks ok to me.

Thanks for your reivew. I will send v3 (also add save_store for keys/btyes )

Best Regards
Yang Xu

Quoted 5 lines

Kind regards,
Petr

#7 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 syscalls/add_key05: add maxbytes/maxkeys test under unprivileged user

Hi Xu,

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Hm, I get this failure, I guess both are because missing your fix 2e356101e72ab1361821b3af024d64877d9a798d, right?

Yes, if your kernel is only with commit ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exact"), add_key(test_max) will fail because we don't remove this limit when initializing the key.

Great, thanks for a confirmation, that was my main concern.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines

add_key05.c:106: PASS: add_key(test_inv) failed as expected: EDQUOT (122) add_key05.c:125: FAIL: add_key(test_max) failed unexpectedly: EDQUOT (122) no crontab for ltp_add_key05
userdel: ltp_add_key05 home directory (/home/ltp_add_key05) not found

The rest looks ok to me.

Thanks for your reivew. I will send v3 (also add save_store for keys/btyes )

OK, I'll wait for v3 (but I could also merge just this one and fix that tiny formatting issues, up to you).

Kind regards,
Petr

#8 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 syscalls/add_key05: add maxbytes/maxkeys test under unprivileged user

Hi Xu,

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 1 line

The rest looks ok to me.

Thanks for your reivew. I will send v3 (also add save_store for keys/btyes )

OK, I'll wait for v3 (but I could also merge just this one and fix that tiny formatting issues, up to you).

OK, v3 already sent. I'll have look today. Thanks!

Kind regards,
Petr

author
#9 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/1 syscalls/add_key05: add maxbytes/maxkeys test under unprivileged user

In reply to Petr Vorel

This case is designed to test whether we can reach maxbytes/maxkeys quota exactly under unprivileged users. It is a regression test for commit a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly"). But this kenrel commit is a incomplete fix, it still fails on lastest upstream kernel. Fix patch[1] is on linux-next branch.

[1]https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=2e356101e72a

---
v2->v3:
1.add save restore for bytes/keys
2.add linux tag even it is only on next branch
3.fix description
4.remove useless plen in test_max_keys

 runtest/syscalls                              |   1 +
 testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/.gitignore  |   1 +
 testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c | 222 ++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 224 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c
runtest/syscalls +1 -0
index 224de8c9b..6ba4b36e2 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ add_key01 add_key01
 add_key02 add_key02
 add_key03 add_key03
 add_key04 add_key04
+add_key05 add_key05
 
 adjtimex01 adjtimex01
 adjtimex02 adjtimex02
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/.gitignore +1 -0
index b9a04214d..f57dc2228 100644
@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@
 /add_key02
 /add_key03
 /add_key04
+/add_key05
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +222 -0

222 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.18.1
#10 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/1 syscalls/add_key05: add maxbytes/maxkeys test under unprivileged user

Hi Xu,

Quoted 4 lines

This case is designed to test whether we can reach maxbytes/maxkeys quota exactly under unprivileged users. It is a regression test for commit a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly"). But this kenrel commit is a incomplete fix, it still fails on lastest

nit: typos: kenrel, lastest (will be fixed during merge).

Quoted 3 lines

upstream kernel. Fix patch[1] is on linux-next branch.

[1]https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=2e356101e72a

I guess this commit get's preserved when merged in mainline, so we don't have to wait for it.

LGTM except one concern about ltpuser setup.

Quoted 1 line

+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c

...

Quoted 4 lines

+ * Test unprivileged user can support the number of keys and the
+ * number of bytes consumed in payloads of the keys. The defalut
+ * value is 200 and 20000.
+ * This is also a regresstion test for

nit: typos: defalut, regresstion (will be fixed during merge).

Quoted 5 lines

+ * commit a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly")
+ * commit 2e356101e72a ("KEYS: reaching the keys quotas correctly")
+ */

+struct passwd *ltpuser;

...

Quoted 11 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +11 -0
+static void add_user(void)
+{
+	if (user_added)
+		return;
+
+	const char *const cmd_useradd[] = {"useradd", username, NULL};
+	int rc;
+
+	switch ((rc = tst_run_cmd(cmd_useradd, NULL, NULL, 1))) {
+	case 0:
+		user_added = 1;

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 52

Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +10 -0
+		ltpuser = SAFE_GETPWNAM(username);
+		break;
+	case 1:
+	case 255:
+		break;
+	default:
+		tst_brk(TBROK, "Useradd failed (%d)", rc);
+	}
+	sprintf(fmt, "%5u: %%*5d %%*d/%%*d %%d/%%d %%d/%%d", ltpuser->pw_uid);
+}

ltpuser is undefined for 1 and 255, therefore it gets SIGSEGV. It should either require tst_run_cmd to exit 0 or use 0 as UID (root UID).

Kind regards,
Petr

author
#11 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/1 syscalls/add_key05: add maxbytes/maxkeys test under unprivileged user

Hi Petr

Quoted 6 lines

Hi Xu,

Quoted 4 lines

This case is designed to test whether we can reach maxbytes/maxkeys quota exactly under unprivileged users. It is a regression test for commit a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly"). But this kenrel commit is a incomplete fix, it still fails on lastest

Quoted 6 lines

nit: typos: kenrel, lastest (will be fixed during merge).

Quoted 3 lines

upstream kernel. Fix patch[1] is on linux-next branch.

[1]https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=2e356101e72a

I guess this commit get's preserved when merged in mainline, so we don't have to wait for it.

This morning, I got email about this patch[1](change subject"keys: Fix the keys quotas limit check"). I'm not sure whether they will recycle and modify this.

[1]https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11411507/

Quoted 11 lines

LGTM except one concern about ltpuser setup.

Quoted 1 line

+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c

...

Quoted 4 lines

+ * Test unprivileged user can support the number of keys and the
+ * number of bytes consumed in payloads of the keys. The defalut
+ * value is 200 and 20000.
+ * This is also a regresstion test for

nit: typos: defalut, regresstion (will be fixed during merge).

Sorry for these typos.

Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 6 lines

+ * commit a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly")
+ * commit 2e356101e72a ("KEYS: reaching the keys quotas correctly")
+ */

+struct passwd *ltpuser;

...

Quoted 15 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +15 -0
+static void add_user(void)
+{
+	if (user_added)
+		return;
+
+	const char *const cmd_useradd[] = {"useradd", username, NULL};
+	int rc;
+
+	switch ((rc = tst_run_cmd(cmd_useradd, NULL, NULL, 1))) {
+	case 0:
+		user_added = 1;
+		ltpuser = SAFE_GETPWNAM(username);
+		break;
+	case 1:
+	case 255:
Quoted 8 lines

testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c line 52

Quoted 6 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c new file +6 -0
+		break;
+	default:
+		tst_brk(TBROK, "Useradd failed (%d)", rc);
+	}
+	sprintf(fmt, "%5u: %%*5d %%*d/%%*d %%d/%%d %%d/%%d", ltpuser->pw_uid);
+}

ltpuser is undefined for 1 and 255, therefore it gets SIGSEGV. It should either require tst_run_cmd to exit 0 or use 0 as UID (root UID).

Oh, sorry for this obvious mistake, thanks for pointing out it. Yes, I prefer to exit when running into 0 or 255.

Best Regards
Yang Xu

Quoted 5 lines

Kind regards,
Petr

#12 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/1 syscalls/add_key05: add maxbytes/maxkeys test under unprivileged user

Hi Xu,

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This case is designed to test whether we can reach maxbytes/maxkeys quota exactly under unprivileged users. It is a regression test for commit a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly"). But this kenrel commit is a incomplete fix, it still fails on lastest

nit: typos: kenrel, lastest (will be fixed during merge).

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upstream kernel. Fix patch[1] is on linux-next branch.

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[1]https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=2e356101e72a

I guess this commit get's preserved when merged in mainline, so we don't have to wait for it.

This morning, I got email about this patch[1](change subject"keys: Fix the keys quotas limit check"). I'm not sure whether they will recycle and modify this.

[1]https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11411507/

Although the maintainers were discussing commit message change, in the end Jarkko has sent it:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/3/15/314
Well, if the commit hash changes, we'll just fix it.

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+struct passwd *ltpuser;

...

Quoted 15 lines
(quoted diff) +15 -0
+static void add_user(void)
+{
+	if (user_added)
+		return;
+
+	const char *const cmd_useradd[] = {"useradd", username, NULL};
+	int rc;
+
+	switch ((rc = tst_run_cmd(cmd_useradd, NULL, NULL, 1))) {
+	case 0:
+		user_added = 1;
+		ltpuser = SAFE_GETPWNAM(username);
+		break;
+	case 1:
+	case 255:
Quoted 8 lines

Review

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(quoted diff) +6 -0
+		break;
+	default:
+		tst_brk(TBROK, "Useradd failed (%d)", rc);
+	}
+	sprintf(fmt, "%5u: %%*5d %%*d/%%*d %%d/%%d %%d/%%d", ltpuser->pw_uid);
+}

ltpuser is undefined for 1 and 255, therefore it gets SIGSEGV. It should either require tst_run_cmd to exit 0 or use 0 as UID (root UID).

Quoted 2 lines

Oh, sorry for this obvious mistake, thanks for pointing out it. Yes, I prefer to exit when running into 0 or 255.

Fine :). I'm going to merge with handling specially only 255:

Kind regards,
Petr

index a0c8c00cc..a39bfa0b7 100644

kernel/syscalls/add_key/add_key05.c +2 -2
@@ -43,11 +43,11 @@ static void add_user(void)
                user_added = 1;
                ltpuser = SAFE_GETPWNAM(username);
                break;
-       case 1:
        case 255:
+               tst_brk(TCONF, "useradd not found");
                break;
        default:
-               tst_brk(TBROK, "Useradd failed (%d)", rc);
+               tst_brk(TBROK, "useradd failed (%d)", rc);
        }
        sprintf(fmt, "%5u: %%*5d %%*d/%%*d %%d/%%d %%d/%%d", ltpuser->pw_uid);
 }