Skip to contentSkip to conversation

KVM: VMX: Disable Intel PT before VM-entry

PATCH In review Luwei Kang 3 participants 9 messages Mar 18, 2020 – Apr 17, 2020

Subsystems (4)
lore
Share & tools
lore

Luwei Kang

author
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 KVM: VMX: Disable Intel PT before VM-entry

If the logical processor is operating with Intel PT enabled ( IA32_RTIT_CTL.TraceEn = 1) at the time of VM entry, the “load IA32_RTIT_CTL” VM-entry control must be 0(SDM 26.2.1.1).

The first disabled the host Intel PT(Clear TraceEn) will make all the buffered packets are flushed out of the processor and it may cause an Intel PT PMI. The host Intel PT will be re-enabled in the host Intel PT PMI handler.

handle_pmi_common()

    -> intel_pt_interrupt()
            -> pt_config_start()

This patch will disable the Intel PT twice to make sure the Intel PT is disabled before VM-Entry.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +9 -1
index 26f8f31..d936a91 100644
@@ -1095,6 +1095,8 @@ static inline void pt_save_msr(struct pt_ctx *ctx, u32 addr_range)
 
 static void pt_guest_enter(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
+	u64 rtit_ctl;
+
 	if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_SYSTEM)
 		return;
 
@@ -1103,8 +1105,14 @@ static void pt_guest_enter(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 	 * Save host state before VM entry.
 	 */
 	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl);
-	if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
+	if (vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, rtit_ctl);
+		if (rtit_ctl)
+			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
+	}
+
+	if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
 		pt_save_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.host, vmx->pt_desc.addr_range);
 		pt_load_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.guest, vmx->pt_desc.addr_range);
 	}
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Luwei Kang

If the logical processor is operating with Intel PT enabled ( IA32_RTIT_CTL.TraceEn = 1) at the time of VM entry, the “load IA32_RTIT_CTL” VM-entry control must be 0(SDM 26.2.1.1).

Quoted 8 lines

The first disabled the host Intel PT(Clear TraceEn) will make all the buffered packets are flushed out of the processor and it may cause an Intel PT PMI. The host Intel PT will be re-enabled in the host Intel PT PMI handler.

handle_pmi_common()

    -> intel_pt_interrupt()
            -> pt_config_start()

IIUC, this is only possible when PT "plays nice" with VMX, correct? Otherwise pt->vmx_on will be true and pt_config_start() would skip the WRMSR.

And IPT PMI must be delivered via NMI (though maybe they're always delivered via NMI?).

In any case, redoing WRMSR doesn't seem safe, and it certainly isn't performant, e.g. what prevents the second WRMSR from triggering a second IPT PMI?

pt_guest_enter() is called after the switch to the vCPU has already been recorded, can't this be handled in the IPT code, e.g. something like this?

arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c +1 -1
index 1db7a51d9792..e38ddae9f0d1 100644
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ static void pt_config_start(struct perf_event *event)
        ctl |= RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN;
        if (READ_ONCE(pt->vmx_on))
                perf_aux_output_flag(&pt->handle, PERF_AUX_FLAG_PARTIAL);
-       else
+       else (!(current->flags & PF_VCPU))
                wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, ctl);
 
        WRITE_ONCE(event->hw.config, ctl);
Quoted 40 lines

This patch will disable the Intel PT twice to make sure the Intel PT is disabled before VM-Entry.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +9 -1
index 26f8f31..d936a91 100644
@@ -1095,6 +1095,8 @@ static inline void pt_save_msr(struct pt_ctx *ctx, u32 addr_range)
 
 static void pt_guest_enter(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
+	u64 rtit_ctl;
+
 	if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_SYSTEM)
 		return;
 
@@ -1103,8 +1105,14 @@ static void pt_guest_enter(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 	 * Save host state before VM entry.
 	 */
 	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl);
-	if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
+	if (vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, rtit_ctl);
+		if (rtit_ctl)
+			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
+	}
+
+	if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
 		pt_save_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.host, vmx->pt_desc.addr_range);
 		pt_load_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.guest, vmx->pt_desc.addr_range);
 	}
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
#2 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines

If the logical processor is operating with Intel PT enabled ( IA32_RTIT_CTL.TraceEn = 1) at the time of VM entry, the “load IA32_RTIT_CTL” VM-entry control must be 0(SDM 26.2.1.1).

The first disabled the host Intel PT(Clear TraceEn) will make all the buffered packets are flushed out of the processor and it may cause an Intel PT PMI. The host Intel PT will be re-enabled in the host Intel PT PMI handler.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

handle_pmi_common()

    -> intel_pt_interrupt()
            -> pt_config_start()

IIUC, this is only possible when PT "plays nice" with VMX, correct? Otherwise pt->vmx_on will be true and pt_config_start() would skip the WRMSR.

Yes. The pt_config_start() would skip the WRMSR if the HW doesn't support enable PT across the VMX.

Quoted 3 lines

And IPT PMI must be delivered via NMI (though maybe they're always delivered via NMI?).

Yes, IPT PMI is an NMI in the host.

Quoted 4 lines

In any case, redoing WRMSR doesn't seem safe, and it certainly isn't performant, e.g. what prevents the second WRMSR from triggering a second IPT PMI?

Twice is enough. There is probably a lot of PT trace not flush out and a PMI will happen after the first WRMSR. There are not so much data between the end of the PMI handler and the second WRMSR.

Quoted 9 lines

pt_guest_enter() is called after the switch to the vCPU has already been recorded, can't this be handled in the IPT code, e.g. something like this?

arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c index renamed from arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c +0 -0

1db7a51d9792..e38ddae9f0d1 100644

arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c static void pt_config_start(struct perf_event *event) · line 411

Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c +1 -1
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ static void pt_config_start(struct perf_event *event)
        ctl |= RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN;
        if (READ_ONCE(pt->vmx_on))
                perf_aux_output_flag(&pt->handle, PERF_AUX_FLAG_PARTIAL);
-       else
+       else (!(current->flags & PF_VCPU))
                wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, ctl);
 
        WRITE_ONCE(event->hw.config, ctl);

Thanks. But I am afraid the host perf don’t like any virtualization specific changes. I will try this.

Luwei Kang

Quoted 43 lines
Quoted 43 lines

This patch will disable the Intel PT twice to make sure the Intel PT is disabled before VM-Entry.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index renamed from arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +0 -0

26f8f31..d936a91 100644

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +9 -1
@@ -1095,6 +1095,8 @@ static inline void pt_save_msr(struct pt_ctx
 *ctx, u32 addr_range)
 
 static void pt_guest_enter(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)  {
+	u64 rtit_ctl;
+
 	if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_SYSTEM)
 		return;
 
@@ -1103,8 +1105,14 @@ static void pt_guest_enter(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 	 * Save host state before VM entry.
 	 */
 	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl);
-	if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
+	if (vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, rtit_ctl);
+		if (rtit_ctl)
+			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
+	}
+
+	if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
 		pt_save_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.host, vmx-
 pt_desc.addr_range);
 		pt_load_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.guest, vmx-

pt_desc.addr_range);
}
--
1.8.3.1

#3 lore raw
In reply to Sean Christopherson
Quoted 33 lines · Luwei Kang
Quoted 4 lines

If the logical processor is operating with Intel PT enabled ( IA32_RTIT_CTL.TraceEn = 1) at the time of VM entry, the “load IA32_RTIT_CTL” VM-entry control must be 0(SDM 26.2.1.1).

Quoted 8 lines

The first disabled the host Intel PT(Clear TraceEn) will make all the buffered packets are flushed out of the processor and it may cause an Intel PT PMI. The host Intel PT will be re-enabled in the host Intel PT PMI handler.

handle_pmi_common()

    -> intel_pt_interrupt()
            -> pt_config_start()

IIUC, this is only possible when PT "plays nice" with VMX, correct? Otherwise pt->vmx_on will be true and pt_config_start() would skip the WRMSR.

And IPT PMI must be delivered via NMI (though maybe they're always delivered via NMI?).

In any case, redoing WRMSR doesn't seem safe, and it certainly isn't performant, e.g. what prevents the second WRMSR from triggering a second IPT PMI?

pt_guest_enter() is called after the switch to the vCPU has already been recorded, can't this be handled in the IPT code, e.g. something like this?

arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c index renamed from arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c +0 -0

1db7a51d9792..e38ddae9f0d1 100644

arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c static void pt_config_start(struct perf_event *event) · line 409

Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c +1 -1
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ static void pt_config_start(struct perf_event *event)
        ctl |= RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN;
        if (READ_ONCE(pt->vmx_on))
                perf_aux_output_flag(&pt->handle, PERF_AUX_FLAG_PARTIAL);
-       else
+       else (!(current->flags & PF_VCPU))
                wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, ctl);

Intel PT can work in SYSTEM and HOST_GUEST mode by setting the kvm-intel.ko parameter "pt_mode".
In SYSTEM mode, the host and guest PT trace will be saved in the host buffer. The KVM do nothing during VM-entry/exit in SYSTEM mode and Intel PT PMI may happened on any place. The PT trace may be disabled when running in KVM(PT only needs to be disabled before VM-entry in HOST_GUEST mode).

Thanks,
Luwei Kang

Quoted 45 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c +0 -0
        WRITE_ONCE(event->hw.config, ctl);
 
Quoted 42 lines

This patch will disable the Intel PT twice to make sure the Intel PT is disabled before VM-Entry.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index renamed from arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +0 -0

26f8f31..d936a91 100644

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +9 -1
@@ -1095,6 +1095,8 @@ static inline void pt_save_msr(struct pt_ctx
 *ctx, u32 addr_range)
 
 static void pt_guest_enter(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)  {
+	u64 rtit_ctl;
+
 	if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_SYSTEM)
 		return;
 
@@ -1103,8 +1105,14 @@ static void pt_guest_enter(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 	 * Save host state before VM entry.
 	 */
 	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl);
-	if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
+	if (vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, rtit_ctl);
+		if (rtit_ctl)
+			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
+	}
+
+	if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
 		pt_save_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.host, vmx-
 pt_desc.addr_range);
 		pt_load_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.guest, vmx-

pt_desc.addr_range);
}
--
1.8.3.1

#4 lore raw
Quoted 38 lines · Luwei
Quoted 38 lines · Luwei Kang
Quoted 4 lines

If the logical processor is operating with Intel PT enabled ( IA32_RTIT_CTL.TraceEn = 1) at the time of VM entry, the “load IA32_RTIT_CTL” VM-entry control must be 0(SDM 26.2.1.1).

Quoted 8 lines

The first disabled the host Intel PT(Clear TraceEn) will make all the buffered packets are flushed out of the processor and it may cause an Intel PT PMI. The host Intel PT will be re-enabled in the host Intel PT PMI handler.

handle_pmi_common()

    -> intel_pt_interrupt()
            -> pt_config_start()

IIUC, this is only possible when PT "plays nice" with VMX, correct? Otherwise pt->vmx_on will be true and pt_config_start() would skip the WRMSR.

And IPT PMI must be delivered via NMI (though maybe they're always delivered via NMI?).

In any case, redoing WRMSR doesn't seem safe, and it certainly isn't performant, e.g. what prevents the second WRMSR from triggering a second IPT PMI?

pt_guest_enter() is called after the switch to the vCPU has already been recorded, can't this be handled in the IPT code, e.g. something like this?

arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c index renamed from arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c +0 -0

1db7a51d9792..e38ddae9f0d1 100644

arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c +1 -1
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ static void pt_config_start(struct perf_event *event)
        ctl |= RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN;
        if (READ_ONCE(pt->vmx_on))
                perf_aux_output_flag(&pt->handle, PERF_AUX_FLAG_PARTIAL);
-       else
+       else (!(current->flags & PF_VCPU))
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c static void pt_config_start(struct perf_event *event) · line 409

Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c +0 -0
                wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, ctl);

Intel PT can work in SYSTEM and HOST_GUEST mode by setting the kvm-intel.ko parameter "pt_mode". In SYSTEM mode, the host and guest PT trace will be saved in the host buffer. The KVM do nothing during VM-entry/exit in SYSTEM mode and Intel PT PMI may happened on any place. The PT trace may be disabled when running in KVM(PT only needs to be disabled before VM-entry in HOST_GUEST mode).

Ah, right. What about enhancing intel_pt_handle_vmx() and 'struct pt' to replace vmx_on with a field that incorporates the KVM mode? From an outsider's perspective, that'd be an improvment irrespective of this bug fix as 'vmx_on' is misleading, e.g. it can be %false when the CPU is post- VMXON, and really means "post-VMXON and Intel PT can't trace it".

#5 lore raw
Quoted 49 lines
Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 21 lines · Luwei Kang
Quoted 4 lines

If the logical processor is operating with Intel PT enabled ( IA32_RTIT_CTL.TraceEn = 1) at the time of VM entry, the “load IA32_RTIT_CTL” VM-entry control must be 0(SDM 26.2.1.1).

Quoted 8 lines

The first disabled the host Intel PT(Clear TraceEn) will make all the buffered packets are flushed out of the processor and it may cause an Intel PT PMI. The host Intel PT will be re-enabled in the host Intel PT PMI handler.

handle_pmi_common()

    -> intel_pt_interrupt()
            -> pt_config_start()

IIUC, this is only possible when PT "plays nice" with VMX, correct? Otherwise pt->vmx_on will be true and pt_config_start() would skip the WRMSR.

And IPT PMI must be delivered via NMI (though maybe they're always delivered via NMI?).

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines

In any case, redoing WRMSR doesn't seem safe, and it certainly isn't performant, e.g. what prevents the second WRMSR from triggering a second IPT PMI?

pt_guest_enter() is called after the switch to the vCPU has already been recorded, can't this be handled in the IPT code, e.g. something like

this?

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c +0 -0

index
1db7a51d9792..e38ddae9f0d1 100644

arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c +1 -1
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ static void pt_config_start(struct perf_event *event)
        ctl |= RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN;
        if (READ_ONCE(pt->vmx_on))
                perf_aux_output_flag(&pt->handle, PERF_AUX_FLAG_PARTIAL);
-       else
+       else (!(current->flags & PF_VCPU))
Quoted 8 lines

arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c static void pt_config_start(struct perf_event *event) · line 409

Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c +0 -0
                wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, ctl);

Intel PT can work in SYSTEM and HOST_GUEST mode by setting the kvm-intel.ko parameter "pt_mode". In SYSTEM mode, the host and guest PT trace will be saved in the host buffer. The KVM do nothing during VM-entry/exit in SYSTEM mode and Intel PT PMI may happened on any place. The PT trace may be disabled when running in KVM(PT only needs to be disabled before VM-entry in HOST_GUEST mode).

Quoted 2 lines

Ah, right. What about enhancing intel_pt_handle_vmx() and 'struct pt' to replace vmx_on with a field that incorporates the KVM mode?

Some history is the host perf didn't fully agree with introducing HOST_GUEST mode for PT in KVM. Because the KVM will disable the host trace before VM-entry in HOST_GUEST mode and KVM guest will win in this case. e.g. Intel PT has been enabled in KVM guest and the host wants to start system-wide trace(collect all the trace on this system) at this time, the trace produced by the Guest OS will be saved in guest PT buffer and host buffer can't get this. So I prefer don't introduce the KVM PT mode to host perf framework. The similar problem happens on PEBS virtualization via DS as well.

Thanks,
Luwei Kang

Quoted 3 lines

From an outsider's perspective, that'd be an improvment irrespective of this bug fix as
'vmx_on' is misleading, e.g. it can be %false when the CPU is post- VMXON, and really means "post-VMXON and Intel PT can't trace it".

#6 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Luwei
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · Luwei Kang

Ah, right. What about enhancing intel_pt_handle_vmx() and 'struct pt' to replace vmx_on with a field that incorporates the KVM mode?

Quoted 8 lines

Some history is the host perf didn't fully agree with introducing HOST_GUEST mode for PT in KVM. Because the KVM will disable the host trace before VM-entry in HOST_GUEST mode and KVM guest will win in this case. e.g. Intel PT has been enabled in KVM guest and the host wants to start system-wide trace(collect all the trace on this system) at this time, the trace produced by the Guest OS will be saved in guest PT buffer and host buffer can't get this. So I prefer don't introduce the KVM PT mode to host perf framework. The similar problem happens on PEBS virtualization via DS as well.

A maintainer's distaste for a feature isn't a good reason to put a hack into KVM. Perf burying its head in the sand won't change the fact that "pt->vmx_on" is poorly named and misleading. Disagreement over features is fine, but things will go sideways quick if perf and KVM are outright hostile towards each other.

maintainer
#7 lore raw
In reply to Kang, Luwei
Quoted 5 lines · Luwei
Quoted 2 lines

Ah, right. What about enhancing intel_pt_handle_vmx() and 'struct pt' to replace vmx_on with a field that incorporates the KVM mode?

Some history is the host perf didn't fully agree with introducing HOST_GUEST mode for PT in KVM.

I don't think this is accurate. IIRC the maintainers wanted packets in the host-side trace to signal where the trace was interrupted. In the end we solved the issue by 1) dropping host-only mode since it can be achieved in userspace 2) making host-guest an opt in feature.

I think it would make sense to rename vmx_on into vmx_state and make it an

enum pt_vmx_state {
	PT_VMX_OFF,
	PT_VMX_ON_DISABLED,
	PT_VMX_ON_SYSTEM,
	PT_VMX_ON_HOST_GUEST
};

KVM would pass the enum to intel_pt_handle_vmx (one of PT_VMX_OFF, PT_VMX_ON_SYSTEM, PT_VMX_ON_HOST_GUEST). Inside intel_pt_handle_vmx you can do

	if (pt_pmu.vmx) {
		WRITE_ONCE(pt->vmx_state, state);
		return;
	}

	local_irq_save(flags);
	WRITE_ONCE(pt->vmx_state,
		   state == PT_VMX_OFF ? PT_VMX_OFF : PT_VMX_ON_DISABLED);
	...

and in pt_config_start:

	...
	vmx = READ_ONCE(pt->vmx_start);
	if (vmx == PT_VMX_ON_DISABLED)
                perf_aux_output_flag(&pt->handle, PERF_AUX_FLAG_PARTIAL);
        else if (vmx == PT_VMX_ON_SYSTEM ||
		 !(current->flags & PF_VCPU))
                wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, ctl);
	...

Thanks,

Paolo

#8 lore raw
Quoted 37 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Ah, right. What about enhancing intel_pt_handle_vmx() and 'struct pt' to replace vmx_on with a field that incorporates the KVM mode?

Some history is the host perf didn't fully agree with introducing HOST_GUEST mode for PT in KVM.

I don't think this is accurate. IIRC the maintainers wanted packets in the host- side trace to signal where the trace was interrupted. In the end we solved the issue by 1) dropping host-only mode since it can be achieved in userspace 2) making host-guest an opt in feature.

I think it would make sense to rename vmx_on into vmx_state and make it an

enum pt_vmx_state {
	PT_VMX_OFF,
	PT_VMX_ON_DISABLED,
	PT_VMX_ON_SYSTEM,
	PT_VMX_ON_HOST_GUEST
};

KVM would pass the enum to intel_pt_handle_vmx (one of PT_VMX_OFF, PT_VMX_ON_SYSTEM, PT_VMX_ON_HOST_GUEST). Inside intel_pt_handle_vmx you can do

	if (pt_pmu.vmx) {
		WRITE_ONCE(pt->vmx_state, state);
		return;
	}

	local_irq_save(flags);
	WRITE_ONCE(pt->vmx_state,
		   state == PT_VMX_OFF ? PT_VMX_OFF :
PT_VMX_ON_DISABLED);
	...

and in pt_config_start:

Quoted 8 lines
	...
	vmx = READ_ONCE(pt->vmx_start);
	if (vmx == PT_VMX_ON_DISABLED)
                perf_aux_output_flag(&pt->handle, PERF_AUX_FLAG_PARTIAL);
        else if (vmx == PT_VMX_ON_SYSTEM ||
		 !(current->flags & PF_VCPU))
                wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, ctl);
	...

I will try this. Thanks.

Luwei Kang

Quoted 4 lines

Thanks,

Paolo