target/ppc: Add capability for enabling secure guests
RFC PATCH 1/1 target/ppc: Add capability for enabling secure guests
Making use of ppc's Protected Execution Facility (PEF) feature, a guest can become a secure guest (aka. secure VM - SVM) and have its memory protected from access by the host. This feature is mediated by a piece of firmware called the Ultravisor (UV).
The transition from a regular to a secure VM is initiated by the guest kernel during prom_init via the use of an ultracall (enter secure mode
- UV_ESM) and with cooperation from the hypervisor via an hcall (H_SVM_INIT_START).
Currently QEMU has no knowledge of this process and no way to determine if a host supports the feature. A guest with PEF support enabled would always try to enter secure mode regardless of user intent or hardware support.
To address the above, a new KVM capability (KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST [1]) is being introduced in the kernel without which KVM will block the secure transition.
This patch adds support for checking/enabling this KVM capability via a new spapr capability (SPAPR_CAP_SECURE_GUEST) and the equivalent command line switch (-machine pseries,cap-svm). The capability defaults to off.
1- https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20200319043301.GA13052@blackberry
---
I have implemented this to be able to test Paul's patch. I'm sending it as RFC in case it helps anyone else and if we decide to go in this direction I can develop it further.
PS: TCG currently gets in a loop of 0x700 due to the lack of 'sc 2' emulation - and all the rest of PEF, of course =).
--- hw/ppc/spapr.c | 1 + hw/ppc/spapr_caps.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/hw/ppc/spapr.h | 3 ++- target/ppc/kvm.c | 12 ++++++++++++ target/ppc/kvm_ppc.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
hw/ppc/spapr.c +1 -0
@@ -4542,6 +4542,7 @@ static void spapr_machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data) smc->default_caps.caps[SPAPR_CAP_LARGE_DECREMENTER ] =SPAPR_CAP_ON ; smc->default_caps.caps[SPAPR_CAP_CCF_ASSIST ] =SPAPR_CAP_ON ; smc->default_caps.caps[SPAPR_CAP_FWNMI ] =SPAPR_CAP_ON ; + smc->default_caps.caps[SPAPR_CAP_SECURE_GUEST ] =SPAPR_CAP_OFF ;spapr_caps_add_properties (smc, &error_abort); smc->irq = &spapr_irq_dual; smc->dr_phb_enabled = true;
hw/ppc/spapr_caps.c +30 -0
@@ -524,6 +524,27 @@ static void cap_fwnmi_apply(SpaprMachineState *spapr, uint8_t val, } } +static void cap_secure_guest_apply (SpaprMachineState *spapr, +uint8_t val,Error **errp) +{ +if (!val) { +/* capability disabled by default */ +return ; + } + +if (!kvm_enabled ()) { +error_setg (errp,"No PEF support in tcg, try cap-svm=off" ); +return ; + } + +if (!kvmppc_has_cap_secure_guest ()) { +error_setg (errp,"KVM implementation does not support secure guests, " +"try cap-svm=off" ); + }else if (kvmppc_enable_cap_secure_guest () <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Error enabling cap-svm, try cap-svm=off" ); + } +} +SpaprCapabilityInfo capability_table[SPAPR_CAP_NUM ] = { [SPAPR_CAP_HTM ] = { .name ="htm" ,
@@ -632,6 +653,15 @@ SpaprCapabilityInfo capability_table[SPAPR_CAP_NUM] = { .type = "bool", .apply = cap_fwnmi_apply, }, + [SPAPR_CAP_SECURE_GUEST] = { + .name = "svm", + .description = "Allow the guest to become a Secure Guest", + .index = SPAPR_CAP_SECURE_GUEST, + .get = spapr_cap_get_bool, + .set = spapr_cap_set_bool, + .type = "bool", + .apply = cap_secure_guest_apply, + }, }; static SpaprCapabilities default_caps_with_cpu(SpaprMachineState *spapr,
include/hw/ppc/spapr.h +2 -1
@@ -81,8 +81,9 @@ typedef enum {#define SPAPR_CAP_CCF_ASSIST 0x09/* Implements PAPR FWNMI option */ #define SPAPR_CAP_FWNMI 0x0A +#define SPAPR_CAP_SECURE_GUEST 0x0B/* Num Caps */ -#define SPAPR_CAP_NUM (SPAPR_CAP_FWNMI + 1) +#define SPAPR_CAP_NUM (SPAPR_CAP_SECURE_GUEST + 1)/* * Capability Values
target/ppc/kvm.c +12 -0
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ static int cap_ppc_safe_indirect_branch;static int cap_ppc_count_cache_flush_assist;static int cap_ppc_nested_kvm_hv;static int cap_large_decr; +static int cap_ppc_secure_guest;static uint32_t debug_inst_opcode;
@@ -135,6 +136,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init(MachineState *ms, KVMState *s) cap_resize_hpt =kvm_vm_check_extension (s,KVM_CAP_SPAPR_RESIZE_HPT );kvmppc_get_cpu_characteristics (s); cap_ppc_nested_kvm_hv =kvm_vm_check_extension (s,KVM_CAP_PPC_NESTED_HV ); + cap_ppc_secure_guest =kvm_vm_check_extension (s,KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST ); cap_large_decr =kvmppc_get_dec_bits ();/* * Note: setting it to false because there is not such capability
@@ -2532,6 +2534,16 @@ int kvmppc_enable_cap_large_decr(PowerPCCPU *cpu, int enable)return 0 ; } +bool kvmppc_has_cap_secure_guest (void ) +{ +return !!cap_ppc_secure_guest; +} + +int kvmppc_enable_cap_secure_guest (void ) +{ +return kvm_vm_enable_cap (kvm_state,KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST ,0 ,1 ); +} +PowerPCCPUClass *kvm_ppc_get_host_cpu_class (void ) {uint32_t host_pvr =mfpvr ();
target/ppc/kvm_ppc.h +12 -0
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ int kvmppc_set_cap_nested_kvm_hv(int enable);int kvmppc_get_cap_large_decr (void );int kvmppc_enable_cap_large_decr (PowerPCCPU *cpu,int enable);int kvmppc_enable_hwrng (void ); +bool kvmppc_has_cap_secure_guest (void ); +int kvmppc_enable_cap_secure_guest (void );int kvmppc_put_books_sregs (PowerPCCPU *cpu);PowerPCCPUClass *kvm_ppc_get_host_cpu_class (void );void kvmppc_check_papr_resize_hpt (Error **errp);
@@ -380,6 +382,16 @@ static inline int kvmppc_enable_cap_large_decr(PowerPCCPU *cpu, int enable)return -1 ; } +static inline bool kvmppc_has_cap_secure_guest (void ) +{ +return false; +} + +static inline int kvmppc_enable_cap_secure_guest (void ) +{ +return -1 ; +} +static inline int kvmppc_enable_hwrng (void ) {return -1 ;
--
2.23.0
Quoted 24 lines · Fabiano Rosas
Making use of ppc's Protected Execution Facility (PEF) feature, a guest can become a secure guest (aka. secure VM - SVM) and have its memory protected from access by the host. This feature is mediated by a piece of firmware called the Ultravisor (UV).
The transition from a regular to a secure VM is initiated by the guest kernel during
prom_initvia the use of an ultracall (enter secure mode
-UV_ESM) and with cooperation from the hypervisor via an hcall (H_SVM_INIT_START).Currently QEMU has no knowledge of this process and no way to determine if a host supports the feature. A guest with PEF support enabled would always try to enter secure mode regardless of user intent or hardware support.
To address the above, a new KVM capability (
KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST[1]) is being introduced in the kernel without which KVM will block the secure transition.This patch adds support for checking/enabling this KVM capability via a new spapr capability (
SPAPR_CAP_SECURE_GUEST) and the equivalent command line switch (-machine pseries,cap-svm). The capability defaults to off.
Quoted 8 lines
1- https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20200319043301.GA13052@blackberry
Signed-off-by Fabiano Rosas <[email protected]>---
I have implemented this to be able to test Paul's patch. I'm sending it as RFC in case it helps anyone else and if we decide to go in this direction I can develop it further.
LGTM
It will miss the qemu-5.0 cut-off, of course, but that should be ok.
Quoted 154 lines
PS: TCG currently gets in a loop of
0x700due to the lack of 'sc 2' emulation - and all the rest of PEF, of course =).--- hw/ppc/spapr.c | 1 + hw/ppc/spapr_caps.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/hw/ppc/spapr.h | 3 ++- target/ppc/kvm.c | 12 ++++++++++++ target/ppc/kvm_ppc.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)hw/ppc/spapr.c +1
-0@@ -4542,6 +4542,7 @@ static void spapr_machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data) smc->default_caps.caps[SPAPR_CAP_LARGE_DECREMENTER ] =SPAPR_CAP_ON ; smc->default_caps.caps[SPAPR_CAP_CCF_ASSIST ] =SPAPR_CAP_ON ; smc->default_caps.caps[SPAPR_CAP_FWNMI ] =SPAPR_CAP_ON ; + smc->default_caps.caps[SPAPR_CAP_SECURE_GUEST ] =SPAPR_CAP_OFF ;spapr_caps_add_properties (smc, &error_abort); smc->irq = &spapr_irq_dual; smc->dr_phb_enabled = true;hw/ppc/spapr_caps.c +30
-0@@ -524,6 +524,27 @@ static void cap_fwnmi_apply(SpaprMachineState *spapr, uint8_t val, } } +static void cap_secure_guest_apply (SpaprMachineState *spapr, +uint8_t val,Error **errp) +{ +if (!val) { +/* capability disabled by default */ +return ; + } + +if (!kvm_enabled ()) { +error_setg (errp,"No PEF support in tcg, try cap-svm=off" ); +return ; + } + +if (!kvmppc_has_cap_secure_guest ()) { +error_setg (errp,"KVM implementation does not support secure guests, " +"try cap-svm=off" ); + }else if (kvmppc_enable_cap_secure_guest () <0 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Error enabling cap-svm, try cap-svm=off" ); + } +} +SpaprCapabilityInfo capability_table[SPAPR_CAP_NUM ] = { [SPAPR_CAP_HTM ] = { .name ="htm" ,@@ -632,6 +653,15 @@ SpaprCapabilityInfo capability_table[SPAPR_CAP_NUM] = { .type = "bool", .apply = cap_fwnmi_apply, }, + [SPAPR_CAP_SECURE_GUEST] = { + .name = "svm", + .description = "Allow the guest to become a Secure Guest", + .index = SPAPR_CAP_SECURE_GUEST, + .get = spapr_cap_get_bool, + .set = spapr_cap_set_bool, + .type = "bool", + .apply = cap_secure_guest_apply, + }, }; static SpaprCapabilities default_caps_with_cpu(SpaprMachineState *spapr,include/hw/ppc/spapr.h +2
-1@@ -81,8 +81,9 @@ typedef enum {#define SPAPR_CAP_CCF_ASSIST 0x09/* Implements PAPR FWNMI option */ #define SPAPR_CAP_FWNMI 0x0A +#define SPAPR_CAP_SECURE_GUEST 0x0B/* Num Caps */ -#define SPAPR_CAP_NUM (SPAPR_CAP_FWNMI + 1) +#define SPAPR_CAP_NUM (SPAPR_CAP_SECURE_GUEST + 1)/* * Capability Values target/ppc/kvm.c +12
-0@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ static int cap_ppc_safe_indirect_branch;static int cap_ppc_count_cache_flush_assist;static int cap_ppc_nested_kvm_hv;static int cap_large_decr; +static int cap_ppc_secure_guest;static uint32_t debug_inst_opcode;@@ -135,6 +136,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init(MachineState *ms, KVMState *s) cap_resize_hpt =kvm_vm_check_extension (s,KVM_CAP_SPAPR_RESIZE_HPT );kvmppc_get_cpu_characteristics (s); cap_ppc_nested_kvm_hv =kvm_vm_check_extension (s,KVM_CAP_PPC_NESTED_HV ); + cap_ppc_secure_guest =kvm_vm_check_extension (s,KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST ); cap_large_decr =kvmppc_get_dec_bits ();/* * Note: setting it to false because there is not such capability @@ -2532,6 +2534,16 @@ int kvmppc_enable_cap_large_decr(PowerPCCPU *cpu, int enable)return 0 ; } +bool kvmppc_has_cap_secure_guest (void ) +{ +return !!cap_ppc_secure_guest; +} + +int kvmppc_enable_cap_secure_guest (void ) +{ +return kvm_vm_enable_cap (kvm_state,KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST ,0 ,1 ); +} +PowerPCCPUClass *kvm_ppc_get_host_cpu_class (void ) {uint32_t host_pvr =mfpvr ();target/ppc/kvm_ppc.h +12
-0@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ int kvmppc_set_cap_nested_kvm_hv(int enable);int kvmppc_get_cap_large_decr (void );int kvmppc_enable_cap_large_decr (PowerPCCPU *cpu,int enable);int kvmppc_enable_hwrng (void ); +bool kvmppc_has_cap_secure_guest (void ); +int kvmppc_enable_cap_secure_guest (void );int kvmppc_put_books_sregs (PowerPCCPU *cpu);PowerPCCPUClass *kvm_ppc_get_host_cpu_class (void );void kvmppc_check_papr_resize_hpt (Error **errp);@@ -380,6 +382,16 @@ static inline int kvmppc_enable_cap_large_decr(PowerPCCPU *cpu, int enable)return -1 ; } +static inline bool kvmppc_has_cap_secure_guest (void ) +{ +return false; +} + +static inline int kvmppc_enable_cap_secure_guest (void ) +{ +return -1 ; +} +static inline int kvmppc_enable_hwrng (void ) {return -1 ;
Signature · 4 lines
David Gibson | I'll have my music baroque, and my code david AT gibson.dropbear.id.au | minimalist, thank you. NOT _the_ _other_ | _way_ _around_! http://www.ozlabs.org/~dgibson