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arch/*/include/asm/stackprotector.h: Use get_random_canary() consistently

RFC PATCH In review George Spelvin 2 participants 2 messages Dec 10, 2019 – Apr 20, 2020

Subsystems (7)
Arm (32-bit) x86 PowerPC MIPS +3 more subsystems
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RFC PATCH 40/50 arch/*/include/asm/stackprotector.h: Use get_random_canary() consistently

... in boot_init_stack_canary().

This is the archetypical example of where the extra security of get_random_bytes() is wasted. The canary is only important as long as it's stored in __stack_chk_guard.

It's also a great example of code that has been copied around a lot and not updated.

Remove the XOR with LINUX_VERSION_CODE as it's pointless; the inclusion of utsname() in init_std_data in the random seeding obviates it.

The XOR with the TSC on x86 and mtfb() on powerPC were left in, as I haven't proved them redundant yet. For those, we call get_random_long(), xor, and mask manually.

FUNCTIONAL CHANGE: mips and xtensa were changed from 64-bit get_random_long() to 56-bit get_random_canary() to match the others, in accordance with the logic in CANARY_MASK.

(We could do 1 bit better and zero *one* of the two high bytes.)

Cc Russell King <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Burton <[email protected]>
Cc James Hogan <[email protected]>
Cc Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Cc Yoshinori Sato <[email protected]>
Cc Rich Felker <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Chris Zankel <[email protected]>
Cc Max Filippov <[email protected]>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/stackprotector.h     | 9 +++------
 arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h   | 8 ++------
 arch/mips/include/asm/stackprotector.h    | 7 ++-----
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 6 ++----
 arch/sh/include/asm/stackprotector.h      | 8 ++------
 arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h     | 4 ++--
 arch/xtensa/include/asm/stackprotector.h  | 7 ++-----
 7 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/stackprotector.h +3 -6
index 72a20c3a0a90b..88c66fec1b5f4 100644
@@ -30,17 +30,14 @@ extern unsigned long __stack_chk_guard;
  */
 static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
 {
-	unsigned long canary;
-
 	/* Try to get a semi random initial value. */
-	get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
-	canary ^= LINUX_VERSION_CODE;
+	unsigned long canary = get_random_canary();
 
 	current->stack_canary = canary;
 #ifndef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK
-	__stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary;
+	__stack_chk_guard = canary;
 #else
-	current_thread_info()->stack_canary = current->stack_canary;
+	current_thread_info()->stack_canary = canary;
 #endif
 }
 
arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h +2 -6
index 5884a2b028277..705f60b9df85e 100644
@@ -26,16 +26,12 @@ extern unsigned long __stack_chk_guard;
  */
 static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
 {
-	unsigned long canary;
-
 	/* Try to get a semi random initial value. */
-	get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
-	canary ^= LINUX_VERSION_CODE;
-	canary &= CANARY_MASK;
+	unsigned long canary = get_random_canary();
 
 	current->stack_canary = canary;
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK))
-		__stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary;
+		__stack_chk_guard = canary;
 }
 
 #endif	/* _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H */
arch/mips/include/asm/stackprotector.h +2 -5
index 68d4be9e12547..6d1e4652152bc 100644
@@ -28,14 +28,11 @@ extern unsigned long __stack_chk_guard;
  */
 static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
 {
-	unsigned long canary;
-
 	/* Try to get a semi random initial value. */
-	get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
-	canary ^= LINUX_VERSION_CODE;
+	unsigned long canary = get_random_canary();
 
 	current->stack_canary = canary;
-	__stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary;
+	__stack_chk_guard = canary;
 }
 
 #endif	/* _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/stackprotector.h +2 -4
index 1c8460e235838..76577b72ef736 100644
@@ -21,12 +21,10 @@
  */
 static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
 {
-	unsigned long canary;
-
 	/* Try to get a semi random initial value. */
-	canary = get_random_canary();
+	unsigned long canary = get_random_long();
+
 	canary ^= mftb();
-	canary ^= LINUX_VERSION_CODE;
 	canary &= CANARY_MASK;
 
 	current->stack_canary = canary;
arch/sh/include/asm/stackprotector.h +2 -6
index 35616841d0a1c..a9ef619c8a0ec 100644
@@ -15,15 +15,11 @@ extern unsigned long __stack_chk_guard;
  */
 static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
 {
-	unsigned long canary;
-
 	/* Try to get a semi random initial value. */
-	get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
-	canary ^= LINUX_VERSION_CODE;
-	canary &= CANARY_MASK;
+	unsigned long canary = get_random_canary();
 
 	current->stack_canary = canary;
-	__stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary;
+	__stack_chk_guard = canary;
 }
 
 #endif /* __ASM_SH_STACKPROTECTOR_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h +2 -2
index 91e29b6a86a5e..af74fd3130cf4 100644
@@ -72,9 +72,9 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
 	 * there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later
 	 * on during the bootup the random pool has true entropy too.
 	 */
-	get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
+	canary = get_random_u64();
 	tsc = rdtsc();
-	canary += tsc + (tsc << 32UL);
+	canary += tsc + (tsc << 32);
 	canary &= CANARY_MASK;
 
 	current->stack_canary = canary;
arch/xtensa/include/asm/stackprotector.h +2 -5
index e368f94fd2af3..9807fd80e5a8e 100644
@@ -27,14 +27,11 @@ extern unsigned long __stack_chk_guard;
  */
 static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
 {
-	unsigned long canary;
-
 	/* Try to get a semi random initial value. */
-	get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
-	canary ^= LINUX_VERSION_CODE;
+	unsigned long canary = get_random_canary();
 
 	current->stack_canary = canary;
-	__stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary;
+	__stack_chk_guard = canary;
 }
 
 #endif	/* _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H */
Signature · 1 line
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#1 lore raw
Quoted 46 lines · George Spelvin

... in boot_init_stack_canary().

This is the archetypical example of where the extra security of get_random_bytes() is wasted. The canary is only important as long as it's stored in __stack_chk_guard.

It's also a great example of code that has been copied around a lot and not updated.

Remove the XOR with LINUX_VERSION_CODE as it's pointless; the inclusion of utsname() in init_std_data in the random seeding obviates it.

The XOR with the TSC on x86 and mtfb() on powerPC were left in, as I haven't proved them redundant yet. For those, we call get_random_long(), xor, and mask manually.

FUNCTIONAL CHANGE: mips and xtensa were changed from 64-bit get_random_long() to 56-bit get_random_canary() to match the others, in accordance with the logic in CANARY_MASK.

(We could do 1 bit better and zero *one* of the two high bytes.)

Cc Russell King <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Burton <[email protected]>
Cc James Hogan <[email protected]>
Cc Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Cc Yoshinori Sato <[email protected]>
Cc Rich Felker <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Chris Zankel <[email protected]>
Cc Max Filippov <[email protected]>
Quoted 9 lines
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/stackprotector.h     | 9 +++------
 arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h   | 8 ++------
 arch/mips/include/asm/stackprotector.h    | 7 ++-----
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 6 ++----
 arch/sh/include/asm/stackprotector.h      | 8 ++------
 arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h     | 4 ++--
 arch/xtensa/include/asm/stackprotector.h  | 7 ++-----
 7 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)

Just found this kicking around in the depths of my inbox. Is the series dead?

Will